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HINA IMPACT CARDS

i. Extension - Internal Link 1 – China Doesn’t Like Containment

China has called for less containment by the United States

Xinhua News Agency “CPPCC Calls for Less Containmen in Sino-US Ties,” Xinhua News Agency, China Daily, Ma

2010 http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/ china/ guangxisessions/2010-03/02/ content _9526797.htm [Ethos]

There should be more cooperation and less containment in Sino-U.S. relations, which suffered a "spring chill" at the beginning of 201

aid a spokesman for China's top political advisory body here Tuesday. Zhao Qizheng, spokesman for the third session of the 11th National ommittee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), made the remarks at a press conference at the Great Hall of

ople in central Beijing. Zhao said since the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1979, the China-U.S. relations had developed rapidly with the volume of bilateral trapanding more than 100 times as well as a lot of cultural, political and economic exchanges, which benefited both sides. U.S. President Barack Obama seemed to have some

nking on the relations, but two events, which happened during the first 20 days of 2010, had chilled the China-U.S. ties, sahao, referring to the Obama administration's arms sales plan to Taiwan and Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama d

ong opposition from China. "These two events damaged China's core interests," Zhao told hundreds of domestic and foreign journalists. "Changes in the China-U.S. relatione changes in weather, from sunny days to cloudy days, and this has aroused Chinese people's concerns." He said Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama "seriously disturbed"no-U.S. relations, while the arms sales to Taiwan "seriously violated" three joint communiques between China and the United States and harmed China's national security an

oss-Strait peace and stability. "The responsibility of the setback of the Sino-U.S. relations lies with the U.S. side," he said. "Tlike playing tennis, the United States served the ball and what China did was simply strike the ball back." "For the

f the interests of both countries, there should be more cooperation between China and the United States and lessontainment' from the United States," Zhao said.”

Comments after the sinking of the Cheonan display the tension between China and the US and its allies

eter Lee[Reporter, Staff Writer, and Journalist, Asia Times] “China Smarts at US Slap” Asia Times Online, July 2,

010 http:// www.atimes.com/ atimes/ China/ LG02Ad 02.html [Brackets Added; Ellipses in Original] [Ethos]

As the People's Republic of China absorbs the impact of a resounding slap to the face administered by United Statesresident Barack Obama in Toronto, it may have to rethink its attempts to form a win-win relationship of equals betwhina, North and South Korea, Japan and the US in North Asia. At the Group of 20 meeting in Toronto, Obama went public with a demand tha

hina abandon its "willful blindness", as al-Jazeera reports: Barack Obama said he hoped that Hu Jintao, his Chinese counterpart, would

ecognize that North Korea crossed a line in the sinking of the Cheonan warship, which killed 46 South Korean sailors. He said hederstood that North Korea and China were neighbors, "There's a difference between restraint and willful blindness to consistentroblems." Obama held talks with Hu on the sidelines of the summit and said he had been "blunt" with him on the issue of North Korea. "My hope is that President Hu w

cognize as well that this is an example of Pyongyang going over the line," he said. China, which is Pyongyang's main international ally, has so far remained nommittal on the issue, prompting Obama to say that shying away from the harsh facts about North Korea's behaviora bad habit we need to break". Obama said he wanted the UN Security Council to produce a "crystal-clear acknowledgment" of the North's alleged action, wh

ould require the cooperation of veto-wielding member China. [1] Chosun Ilbo, the South Korean daily newspaper, piled on, making the counter-intu

least to China, point that heightening tensions with a denunciation was the best way to reduce tensions - while making [made] it clear that South Koreaelieved that China was forfeiting its position as regional leader - and even "bringing the Cold War atmosphere backy not going along on the Cheonan campaign: If China had boosted international condemnation of the sinking, the security situation on the peninsula w

ve been markedly different. A firm stance by Beijing could have even improved stability. In other words, China is also responsible for bringing th

old War atmosphere back to the region... As long as China insists on standing by North Korea, which continues to produce nuclear weapons and attack S

orea, the South has no choice but to consider other options. If China continues to take the short-sighted approach of rallying behind a belligerent North Korea, Asian countriee international community will grow increasingly suspicious of Beijing's role on the global stage. [2] Amid this storm of criticism, it undoubtedly did not escape Beijing's attat the other superpower that has so far declined to endorse the Cheonan findings - Russia - was excused from public humiliation. China riposted promptly with a People's Daitorial pointedly entitled "Blindness to China's efforts on the Peninsula", which labeled Obama's remarks as "irresponsible and flippant" and continued: Without China'svolvement, there would not have been the six-party talks, and the outbreak of yet another Korean War might well have been a possibility. Ultimately, the solution to tensions orean Peninsula hinges on eliminating the last vestiges of the Cold War. This is the time for all sides involved to break the old, hardened pattern and think of new ways of death North Korea. This is China's constructive proposal that deserves serious consideration by all parties involved. The US cannot ignore the fact that China remains the most

portant channel of effective communication in this situation. [3] It would appear that the Obama administration's efforts to sideline Chinnd promote South Korea and the US to central stage in managing the North Korea issue have created a perversencentive for Beijing and Pyongyang to cooperate and even raise tensions in the peninsula in order to demonstrate thndispensability. Certainly, China's announcement of live-fire exercises in the East China Sea to counter planned joint South Korea-US exercises in the Yellow Sea betw

e Korean Peninsula and China is an indication that China is more willing to play the military card than it has been before. [4] Chinese belligerence represents an interestingnaround from several days before, when China was clearly considering a policy of distancing itself from North Korea and presenting itself as an honest broker in Korean aff

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HINA IMPACT CARDS

The SCO is a reaction to US influence in Asia

ariue Niazi[Professor, Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire; Contributor, Foreign Policy in Focus]Pushback to Unilateralism: The China-India-Russia Alliance” Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute in Policy Studies,

ecember 20, 2007 http:// www. fpif .org / articles/ pushback _ to_ unilateralism_ the_ china-india-russia_ alliance [Ethos]

The SCO's geopolitical pushback to the unipolar-unilateral makeover of the world is, however, defensive. Both Chind Russia are being protective of their turf. Their internal divisions caused by "extremism, splitism, and terrorism" further unnerve them

ven a slight hint of U.S. or NATO proximity to their "near-abroad." They have created the SCO and CSTO, and formed the C

a Alliance to put distance between their respective "spheres of influence" and NATO-US presence. Many argue that thliance-building is a reaction to U.S. unilateralism. These alliances, however, cannot threaten U.S. security interests in the region. The allied nations

en consistently reassuring the U.S. that their alliances are not directed at "third party." In fact, SCO member states have helped the U.S. to protect its security interests in thethe run-up to U.S. military action in Afghanistan in 2001, the Russian President Putin, according to Bob Woodward, stunned the top U.S. policy makers with his unsolicited olet U.S. combat jets use the Russian airspace to strike the Taliban government in Kabul .32 The Bush White House was not even sure if Russians would agree to U.S. airbase

yrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for which it sought Putin's consent. More importantly, China, which shares a long border with Kyrgyzstan and is next door neighbor to Uzbekistanong with the U.S. bases in both countries. Besides, and it is noteworthy for American policy makers, the three nations that broke out in spontaneous outpouring of sympathy 11 victims were not Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, but Russia, Iran and China--in that order--where hundreds of thousands of marchers held candle-lit vigils and mourned thgic deaths of 3,000 Americans in terrorist attacks. In strictly strategic sense, the U.S. by itself and together with its allies, especially Australia, Britain and Japan, continues t

e dominant force in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, which are the key sources and supply routes of energy shipments for Chinade goods for Central Asia. This makes China and the region vulnerable to U.S. retaliation in the event of any perceived or real threat to U.S. security interests.”

China is threatened by containment

obert Kagan[Adjunct Professor, History, Georgetown University; PhD, American History, American University;xpert, US National Security, Foreign Policy, US Relations with China, NATO Expansion; Former Senior Associate,

arnegie Endowment for International Peace; Former Member, Policy Planning Staff, State Department; Former eputy for Policy, Buruau of Inter-American Affairs, State Department] “Ambition and Anxiety – America's Compet

ith China” Published in “The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition” New York Encounter Books, 2009

-23 (ISBN-13: 978-1-59403-231-8; ISBN-10: 1-59403-231-9) [Ethos]

If the Chinese search for greater “comprehensive national power” is partly driven by the Thycydidean triad of honor, interesnd fear, what is it that the Chinese fear? They fear what all rising powers fear: they they will be denied. The Chineseeel threatened, but not by invasion. What they fear is obstruction. They worry that an American-led world will try to stop theom fulfilling their ambitions and their destiny. And the leaders of China have their own special fear, that the denial

hinese ambitions abroad could ultimately undermine their ability to rule at home. So the cycle continues: Chinese power has produc

mbition, and ambition in turn has produced anxiety. This helps explain the apparent paradox that has puzzled many foreign observers of China's behavior over the past decadethough stronger and more secure than ever, China has often acted in a “highly provocate manner,” as if it were “faced with a threat greater than ever before.”

Rising Chinese influence has been countered by what China sees as containment

obert Kagan[Adjunct Professor, History, Georgetown University; PhD, American History, American University;xpert, US National Security, Foreign Policy, US Relations with China, NATO Expansion; Former Senior Associate,

arnegie Endowment for International Peace; Former Member, Policy Planning Staff, State Department; Former

eputy for Policy, Buruau of Inter-American Affairs, State Department] “Ambition and Anxiety – America's Competith China” Published in “The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition” New York Encounter Books, 2009

-23 (ISBN-13: 978-1-59403-231-8; ISBN-10: 1-59403-231-9) [Brackets in Original] [Ethos]

The rise of China in East Asia in the past two decades has challenged but not dislodged American hegemony. Insteaccepting a new balance of power in the region, the United States since the 1990s has responded to growing Chinese power byroadening and deepening its military relationship with Japan, strengthening its strategic relationship with Taiwan,

maintaining forces in South Korea, deepening military cooperation with the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and othoutheast Asian nations, and also with Pakistan and Afghanistan, all as part of the fight against terrorism. It has reachut to India, sanctioning its nuclear program in the interest of closer strategic ties. Americans would deny that any of this constitutes a newrategy of containment aimed at China, much less an effort to preserve American hegemony. But the Chinese see it aoth. Here is how China's current premier, Hu Jin-tao, describes the course of an American foreign policy that Americans thems

e as merely reactive: [The United States has] strengthened its military deployments in the Asia-Pacfic region, strengthened the US-Japan military alliance, streng

ategic cooperation with India, improved relations with Vietnam, inveigled Pakistan, established a pro-American government in Afghanistan, increased arms sales to Taiwan,

. They have extended outposts and placed pressures points from the east, south, and west.”

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HINA IMPACT CARDS

Containment is the best way to ignite conflict with China, even if it’s not what we’re intending

he Economist, “Leaders: The Dangers of a Rising China” The Economist , Vol. 397, No, 8711, p. 15, December 4, 2Ethos]

The best way to turn China into an opponent is to treat it as one. The danger is that spats and rows will sour relationetween China and America, just as the friendship between Germany and Britain crumbled in the decades before the first world war. It is alreadyappening in defence. Feeling threatened by American naval power, China has been modernising its missiles, submarines, radar, cyber-warfare and anti-satellite we

ow America feels on its mettle. Recent Pentagon assessments of China’s military strength warn of the threat to Taiwan andmerican bases and to aircraft-carriers near the Chinese coast. The US Navy has begun to deploy more forces in theacific. Feeling threatened anew, China may respond. Even if neither America nor China intended harm—if they wanted on

sure their own security— each could nevertheless see the other as a growing threat.”

ii. Extension - Internal Link 3 – Beijing Uses Nationalism for Personal Gain

Beijing has historically encouraged nationalism

oshua Kurlantzick[Visiting Scholar, China, Carnegie Moscow Center ; Fellow, USC School for Public Diplomacy;

ellow, Pacific Council on International Policy[ “China's Next-Generation Nationalists” Moscow Center, Carnegie

ndowment for International Peace, May 6, 2008 http:// www.carnegie.ru/ publications/?fa=20095 [Ethos]

The explosion of nationalist sentiment, especially among young people, might seem shocking, but it's been simmering for a lonme. In fact, Beijing's leadership, for all its problems, may be less hard-line than China's youth, the country's future. If China ever were to become a truly free political syste

ght actually become more, not less, aggressive. China's youth nationalism tends to explode over sparks like the Tibet unrest. It burst into violent anti-American protests afteATO's accidental bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1999. (Most young Chinese I've met don't believe that the bombing was an accident.) Even after 9/me when the governments of China and the United States were building a closer relationship, some young Chinese welcomed America's pain. "When the planes crashed into torld Trade Center, I really felt very delighted," one student told Chinese pollsters. Youth nationalism exploded again into anti-Japan riots across China in 2005, after the releapanese textbooks deemed offensive in China for their apparent whitewashing of World War II atrocities. During the riots, I was working in Lanzhou, a gritty, medium-sized cdustrial central China. Day after day, young Chinese marched through Lanzhou and looked for shops selling Japanese goods to smash up -- though, of course, these stores w

wned by local Chinese merchants. Hardly uneducated know-nothings, young nationalists tend to be middle-class urbanites. Far more than rural Chinese, who remain mired inverty, these urbanites have benefited enormously from the country's three decades of economic growth. They also have begun traveling and working abroad. They can see thanghai and Beijing are catching up to Western cities, that Chinese multinationals can compete with the West, and they've lost their awe of Western power. Many middle-aged

hinese intellectuals are astounded by the differences between them and their younger peers. Academics I know, members of the Tiananmen generation, are shocked by someudents' disdain for foreigners and, often, disinterest in liberal concepts such as democratization. University students now tend to prefer business-oriented majors to liberal artented subjects such as political science. The young Chinese interviewed for a story last fall in Time magazine on the country's "Me Generation" barely discussed democracy

litical change in their daily lives. Beijing has long encouraged nationalism. Over the last decade, the government has introducew school textbooks that focus on past victimization of China by outside powers. The state media, such as the People's Dail

hich hosts one of the most strongly nationalist Web forums, also highlight China's perceived mistreatment at the hands of the United Stand other powers. In recent years, too, the Communist Party has opened its membership and perks to young urbanites, cementing the belief that their interests lie with

gime, not with political change -- and that democracy might lead to unrest and instability. According to Minxin Pei of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The owers the urban intelligentsia, professionals and private entrepreneurs with economic perks, professional honors and political access." In the 1980s, by contrast, these types ofessionals and academics were at the forefront of Tiananmen protests. The state media also increasingly highlight the problems of rural China -- China now has income inepar with many Latin American nations -- suggesting to urbanites the economic and political catastrophe that might befall them if these rural peasants swamped wealthy citie

Beijing has been using nationalism as a tool for political stability, to rally public support

uisheng Zhao[Professor and Executive Director, Center for China-US Cooperation, Josef Korbel School of

nternational Studies, University of Denver; PhD, Political Science, University of California, San Diego; Member,

oard of Governors, US Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; Member, National ommittee on US-China-Relations; Research Associate, Fair Banks Center for East Asian Research, Harvard

University; Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Harvard University; Honor Professor, Beijing University,

enmin University, and Fudan University] “China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?” The Washingtonuarterly, Winter 2005, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 131-144 [Ethos]

Anxiety is growing in Asia and the West that a virulent nationalism has emerged out of China’s “century of shame and humiliation,hreatening to make China’s rise less peaceful. Yet, Chinese nationalism is a phenomenon much more complex than the expression of its emotional rhet

e streets. Although the Chinese government is hardly above exploiting nationalist sentiment when doing so suits itsurposes, Beijing has practiced a pragmatic nationalism tempered by diplomatic prudence. State-led and largely reactive, pragma

tionalism is not fixed, objectified, and defined for all time; nor is it driven by any ideology, religious beliefs, or other abstract ideas. Rather, pragmatic nationalism

n instrument that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses to bolster the population’s faith in a troubled political

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HINA IMPACT CARDS

ystem and to hold the country together during its period of rapid and turbulent transformation into a post-Communist society. These leaders have set peac

velopment as China’s primary international goals and have tried to avoid confrontations with the United States and other Western powers that hold the key to China’s

odernization. They have made use of nationalism to rally public support , but they realize that, if allowed to persist unrestrained, nationalist senti

uld jeopardize the overarching objectives of political stability and economic modernization on which the CCP’s legitimacy is ultimately based. The question remains, can Beep this nationalism reined in, or will it begin to accelerate out of control?”

Using nationalism as protection against outside influence is highly effective given China's history


nternational Studies, University of Denver; PhD, Political Science, University of California, San Diego; Member,oard of Governors, US Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; Member, National

ommittee on US-China-Relations; Research Associate, Fair Banks Center for East Asian Research, Harvard

University; Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Harvard University; Honor Professor, Beijing University,enmin University, and Fudan University] “China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?” The Washington

uarterly, Winter 2005, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 131-144 [Ethos]

Chinese people share a deeply rooted historical sense of injustice at the hands of foreign countries, as well as a “dref a strong China” (qiangguomeng). For this reason, the nationalist card is particularly effective when China faces hostility andhallenges from abroad. According to one former Chinese senior official, if Chinese people felt threatened by external forces, theolidarity among the Chinese would be strengthened, and nationalism would be a useful tool for the regime to justify

adership role. In fact, even though corruption and social as well as economic problems have undermined the CCP’s legitimacy to an extent, many people side with thevernment when foreigners criticize it, believing that, no matter how corrupt the government is, foreigners have no right to make unwarranted remarks about China and its pe

Many Chinese people are upset by U.S. pressure on issues such as human rights, intellectual property rights, tradeeficits, weapons proliferation, and Taiwan because they believe that the United States has used these issues to demohina in an effort to prevent it from achieving great-power status.””

iii. Extension - Internal Link - Nationalism Promotes Aggression

Political leaders are effected by nationalist groups that support a less submissive attitude towards the rest of

orld

he Economist “Less Biding and Hiding: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397,

711, after p. 62, p. 8-10, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

Whatever the leaders think, they are operating in a society that is changing rapidly. These days they are more influey a new set of foreign-policy interests, including resource companies, financial institutions, local government, research organisations, the press and online

tivists. Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), who have studhese groups, say many of them feel strongly that China should be “less submissive” towards the outside world.”

Growing nationalism will become more important as the elections draw closer in 2012; compromise can be

s weakness

he Economist “Less Biding and Hiding: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397,

711, after p. 62, p. 8-10, December 4, 2010 [Brackets & Ellipses in Original] [Ethos]

Nationalism may frame an issue before the leaders get to deal with it. By the time the row over, say, the disputedenkaku/Diaoyu Islands reaches their desks, the propaganda department, along with commentators in the press and statements from the P

may have created a context that they cannot back away from without looking weak. This dynamic is not new. It greatly complicated t

d-air collision between a Chinese fighter and an American spy plane in 2001, which the PLA had (wrongly) blamed on the Americans. But just now, in the run-up he change of the country’s leadership in 2012, seeming to be a pushover could wreck careers. The risk, writes Ms Shirk , ihat “compromise is likely to be viewed as capitulation.” That creates dangers for anyone in China who favours detente. Speaking to Mr Lampton

iwan, one Chinese scholar put it this way: “If we suppose that there are two options and they use tough measures…anhe leader fails to resolve [a problem], he is justified. But if [he] uses too much honey and he fails, he is regarded asuilty by all future generations.””



HINA IMPACT CARDS

iv. Extension - Brink 1 – Nationalism is Growing in Strength and Numbers

It is questionable how long Beijing can continue to control nationalism and pursue cooperation with the We






Despite the warnings of some China watchers, the rise of nationalism in China has not made Beijing’s foreign policy particularlyncooperative or irrational. Of course, the future might be different. Although China has nominally remained aommunist authoritarian state, it is no longer ruled by charismatic leaders such as Mao or Deng who had the authority to arbitrate dispute

mong the leadership or to set the country’s course personally. Current Chinese leaders must cater to a range of constituencies and will bencreasingly constrained by rising nationalist sentiment. More than two decades of opening and reform has made theegime more responsive to public opinion. In particular, the telephone and the Internet give the average Chinese citizen instant access to information, as w

w means to express their views, including their nationalist feelings. China’s pragmatic leaders have maintained their authoritarian power a

revented nationalism from getting out of hand thus far, but it remains to be seen how long their absolute control canst.”

Nationalist sentiments within China have risen in recent months

hristopher Bodeen[Staff Writer, Associated Press] “Chinese Nationalists Increasingly Strident” Associated Press,

eattle Times, June 25, 2010ttp:// seattletimes.nwsource.com/ html / nationworld /2012206131_ apaschinanationalism.html ?syndication=rss [Ethos

Over recent months, such nationalist sentiments have increasingly found their way into print with the publication of ngoistic tomes such as "Unhappy China," which details the causes of Beijing's anger at the West, and "China Dreamhose author, PLA Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu, states that China must seize global supremacy or face certain ruin. Uniformed fficers have spoken out publicly as well. Gen. Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the PLA's general staff, took a swipe at

Washington at a security conference earlier this month in Singapore, complaining of "the threat to use force in international relations, annterference in other countries' internal affairs." Senior officers make such statements knowing they will be well receoth among the public and with a significant portion of the political elite, said Michael Swaine, an expert on Chinese civil-military relatio

e Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "And the senior (Chinese) leadership is probably either unaware of or does not actively suppresuch views as long as they do not strongly attack the party's basic pro-reform and opening line or the authority of the party, or openly argue for conflict with the US," Swa

d. Chinese politicians ignore nationalist voices at their peril, especially with a looming leadership transition set to begin in 2012. At such times, no aspiring leader can affordpear soft toward the U.S., particularly on an issue as sensitive as Taiwan.”

Chinese nationalism grows from three different sources: younger generations, social media, and the Chinese

netizens”

he Economist “Less Biding and Hiding: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397,711, after p. 62, p. 8-10, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

he first generation to get that treatment is now nearing its 30s, and its nationalism shows every sign of being genuine and widespread. “On T

d Taiwan it’s not just Chinese ministers who bang tables,” says Lord Patten, who negotiated the handover of Hong Kong from Britain to Ch

but Chinese dissidents, too.” “This is a people with a sense of their past greatness, recent humiliation, presentchievement and future supremacy,” says Mr White, the former Australian security and defence official. “It’s a poten

mix.” China’s more commercial media have found that nationalism sells. According to Susan Shirk, an American academic and former de

sistant secretary of state, readers like stories complaining about Japan, Taiwan and America—and the censors are usually happy to see cove

ch things. SIPRI found that the most influential journalism on foreign policy appears in the Global Times, which is written by hardlineationalists. The country’s excitable “netizens” tend to spread the idea that China is misunderstood and to see a sligh

ound every corner. In 2008, during a Chinese row with Vietnam over the South China Sea, another suggested teaching the Vietnamese a lesson—and published an in

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HINA IMPACT CARDS

an to show how. This feeds China’s sense of victimhood. One blogger and journalist, called Fang Kechang, worked out that since 1948 the Chinese people had officially beenumiliated” at least 140 times—and that the insults were more common in the reform era than in Mao’s time.”

Nationalism is from more than public opinion; government officials are growing more nationalist as well

he Economist “Less Biding and Hiding: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397,711, after p. 62, p. 8-10, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

What passes for public opinion in China is not the only source of pressure on the leaders. The factions within China

ite “selectorate”, no passive monolith, have also been finding their voice. And that, too, tends to nudge policy towaationalism. Foreign affairs used to be the business of the pro-detente foreign ministry. It was mocked as the “ministry for selling out the country” and, supposedly, was s

lcium pills by members of the public who wanted to stiffen its spine. Now the issues are more complex, domestic ministries and mid-level bureaucratsso involved—and they tend to be more nationalistic than senior foreign-ministry officials.The SIPRI researchers found that the

nistry of state security, in particular, has a bigger role in foreign policy. At the climate-change talks in Copenhagen authority lay with the National Development and Reformommission, charged with economic development. China attracted foreign criticism for taking a hard line, against the foreign ministry’s advice.”

v. Extension - Brink 2 – Conflict is Likely

China's self-interest paradigm put the US and China at odds, hinting at a collision of national egos

obert Samuelson[Contributing Editor, Newsweek and Washington Post] “The China Miscalculation” Real Clear

olitics, February 15, 2010ttp:// www.realclearpolitics.com/ articles/2010/02/15/ the_ china_ miscalculation_100294.html [Ethos]

China's policies reflect a different notion: China First. Unlike the isolationist America First movement of the 1930s, China First does not mean globa

sengagement. It does mean engagement on China's terms. China accepts and supports the existing order when that serves ieeds, as when it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. Otherwise, it plays by its own rules and norms. Trade policy is explicitly discrimina

dress two crucial problems: surplus labor and scarce commodities. The undervalued renminbi aims to help create 20 million or more jobs that Jacques cites as needed annuallhina is scouring the globe to make investments in secure raw materials, particularly fuel. The object of "economic reform," Jacques writes, was "never Westernization" but "arestore the (Communist) Party's legitimacy." Most American-Chinese disputes reflect China's unwillingness to endanger domestic goals for international ends. It won't comm

nding greenhouse gas cuts because these could reduce economic growth and (again) jobs. On Iran, it values its oil investments more than it fears Iranian nukes. Likewise, it wat unrest in North Korea could send refugees spilling across the border. Because Taiwan is regarded as part of China, U.S. arms sales there become domestic interference. And

nsorship is needed to maintain one-party control. China's worldview threatens America's geopolitical and economic interests. Just rece

U.S. trade associations wrote the Obama administration warning that new Chinese rules for "indigenous innovation" could "exclude a wide array of U.S. firms" from the Ch

arket -- or force them to turn over advanced technology. (British firms are so incensed by "overwhelming protectionism" that some may quit China, reports the Telegraphwspaper.) It would be a tragedy if these two superpowers began regarding each other as adversaries. But that's the drifteirs to a 2,000-year cultural tradition -- and citizens of the world's largest country -- the Chinese have an innate sense of superiority, Jacques writes.

mericans, too, have a sense of superiority, thinking that our values -- the belief in freedom, individualism and democracy -- reflect niversal aspirations. Greater conflicts and a collision of national egos seem inevitable. No longer should we sit passively while Ch

de and currency policies jeopardize jobs here and elsewhere. Political differences between the countries are increasingly hard to ignore. But given China's growin ower -- and the world economy's fragile state -- a showdown may do no one any good. Miscalculation is leading us down dark alleys.”

It is unlikely that the US would peacefully concede its waning power in East Asia, due to conflicting ideologi

obert Kagan[Adjunct Professor, History, Georgetown University; PhD, American History, American University;

xpert, US National Security, Foreign Policy, US Relations with China, NATO Expansion; Former Senior Associate,

arnegie Endowment for International Peace; Former Member, Policy Planning Staff, State Department; Former eputy for Policy, Buruau of Inter-American Affairs, State Department] “Ambition and Anxiety – America's Compet

ith China” Published in “The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition” New York Encounter Books, 2009

-23 (ISBN-13: 978-1-59403-231-8; ISBN-10: 1-59403-231-9) [Ethos]

Competition between the United States and China is not the only possible scenario, however. One can imagine a situation in which

adual decline in American power and influence in East Asia produced not war but a Pax Sinica. Great powers, and even superpowers, have given way to risegional powers in the past, even to former rivals. Great Britain withdrew from the Western Hemisphere at the end of the 19th century and ceded the r

a rather belligerent United States. More recently, the United States has been gradually ceding its once-dominant position in Europe to the leadership of the European Union.

Would the United States pursue a similar course in East Asia? It is unlikely. The reason is not only that Americans wear instability, insecurity, a loss of trade and access to reources, or damage to other American material interests.After

x Sinica might well provide secure access to trade and resources, and even a stable peace. What makes the siutation in East Asia different isomething less tangible but perhaps more powerful. It is the conflicting ideologies of the United States and China. Gre

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HINA IMPACT CARDS

itain could cede the Western Hemisphere to the United States in part because it was a fellow liberal democracy, and they shared common social values and political and econnciples. At a time when the British people faced a growing challenge from German and Russia, whose political and cultural values they did not share, they trusted the Amerimocracy to not turn its growing power and influence against them. Similarly, the Untied States can reduce its role in Europe because the continent has become, as Americanssay, “whole and free.” Even though the United State fought two horrific wars against European powers in the past century, Americans cannot really imagine Europe turning iwer against them again. In American eyes, the ideological transformation of Europe has been decisive. In East Asia, the situation is different. There is a clash not only of

mpetitive powers, but also of competitive political systems. Because China is not a democracy, and its leaders insist they have no intenf making it one, Americans, quite simply, don't trust it. Chinese leaders have their own fears and suspicions. Theyecognize America's ideological hostility. Because they are not a democracy, they fear that a persistent and growingmerican liberal hegemony in East Asia, with its ring of democratic states on China's periphery, will eventually undermine their legitim

home. Indeed, the Chinese may have an even clearer sense than most Americans about what a large role ideology plays in shaping the relationship between the two powe

China and the US mistrust each other, aware of potential conflict

he Economist, “Leaders: The Dangers of a Rising China” The Economist, Vol. 397, No. 8711, p. 15, December 4, 2

Ethos]

So far, things have gone remarkably well between America and China. While China has devoted itself to economic growth, American sec

s focused on Islamic terrorism and war in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the two mistrust each other. China sees America as a waning power ill eventually seek to block its own rise. And America worries about how Chinese nationalism, fuelled by rediscover

conomic and military might, will express itself (see our special report ).”

Mistrust between China and the US is deepening

he Economist, “Brushwood and Gall: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397, N711, after p. 62, p. 3-5, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

uch things are perhaps small in themselves, but they matter because of that double bet. America is constantly looking for signs that China is goielsh on the deal and turn aggressive—and China is looking for signs that America and its allies are going to gang up to stose. Everything is coloured by that strategic mistrust. Peering through this lens, China-watchers detect a shift. “The smilingiplomacy is over,” says Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state under George Bush. “China’s aspiration for powvery obvious,” says Yukio Okamoto, a Japanese security expert. Diplomats, talking on condition of anonymity, speak of

nderlying suspicions and anxiety in their dealings with China. Although day-to-day traffic between American and Chinese government depart

ws smoothly, “the strategic mistrust between China and the US continues to deepen,” says Bonnie Glaser of the Centre

trategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.”

Though war is unlikely for now, soured relations could lead to a longer conflict between China and the US,

ndermining the prospects of global peace

he Economist, “Brushwood and Gall: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397, N

711, after p. 62, p. 3-5, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

Now, however, many factors, on many sides, from domestic politics to the fallout from the financial crisis, are conspiringmake relations worse. The risk is not war—for the time being that remains almost unthinkable, if only because it would be so greatly to everyon

sadvantage. The danger is that the leaders of China and America will over the next decade lay the foundations for a dee

ntagonism.This is best described by

Henry Kissinger.Under Richard Nixon, Mr Kissinger created the conditions for 40 years of peace in Asia by seeing that

merica and China could gain more from working together than from competing. Today Mr Kissinger is worried . Speaking in September at a meeting of tnternational Institute for Strategic Studies, he observed that bringing China into the global order would be even harder than bringing in Germany had bee

ntury ago. “It is not an issue of integrating a European-style nation-state, but a full-fledged continental power,” he said. “The DNA of both [America andhina] could generate a growing adversarial relationship, much as Germany and Britain drifted from friendship toonfrontation…Neither Washington nor Beijing has much practice in co-operative relations with equals. Yet their leaave no more important task than to implement the truths that neither country will ever be able to dominate the othernd that conflict between them would exhaust their societies and undermine the prospects of world peace.””

Chinese and American security interests and the paradox of security are one reason why relations will proba

our

he Economist, “The Fourth Modernization: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 3

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HINA IMPACT CARDS

No. 8711, after p. 62, p. 6-8, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

hat logic works in China, too. America has not been shy of going to war in recent years. Not long ago a retired Chinese admiral likened the Am

vy to a man with a criminal record “wandering just outside the gate of a family home”. American strength in the 1990s made China feel insecurtransformed the PLA to shore up its policy on Taiwan and protect its economically vital coastline. Yet by adding to its own

ecurity, China has taken away from that of its neighbours and of the United States. Perhaps China does not mean ever to use its wea

gressively. But American defence planners cannot rely on that, so they must respond. In this way two states that never intend harm can begin toerceive each other as growing threats. If you do not arm, you leave yourself open to attack. If you do, you threaten tther country. A British historian, Herbert Butterfield, called this the “absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma”. It is one reason why relationsetween China and America will probably sour.”

As China’s strength has been revealed, it’s appetite for power has grown, hastening the inevitable strategic

ompetition with the United States

he Economist, “Less Biding and Hiding: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397No. 8711, after p. 62, p. 8-10, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

tart with China’s changing strategy. China has a keen sense of its growing national power and American decline, sharpened by nancial crisis, which uncovered flaws in America and Europe and found China to be stronger than many had expected. “There is a

erception in China that the West needs China more than China needs the West,” says one diplomat in Beijing. America’s difficult warded to the impression. According to Raffaello Pantucci, a visiting scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese analysts “gleefully” conclude that NATO for

ll lose in Afghanistan.“We used to hide our power—deny our power,” a Chinese scholar told David Lampton of the Schoodvanced International Studies in Washington. “But then this became increasingly impossible as our strength increased.” For a time this led to redoub

forts to reassure America and the region. But today, according to Yuan Peng, of the China Institutes of Contemporary Internationelations in Beijing, “many Chinese scholars suggest that the government give up the illusion of US partnership and

quarely the profound and inevitable strategic competition.” China’s desire to assert itself springs from a natural apperising country is like a diner sitting down to a full table: until he starts eating, he does not realise how hungry he is. “Power changes nations,” writes Robeagan, an American foreign-policy commentator. “It expands their wants and desires, increases their sense of

ntitlement, their need for deference and respect. It also makes them more ambitious. It lessens their tolerance tobstacles, their willingness to take no for an answer.””

vi. Extension - Brink 3 – Violence is Possible

Beijing has continued to modernize and sustain a force capable of attacking Taiwan

oster Klug[Staff Writer, Associated Press] "US Official Warns of China, Taiwan Conflict" The Associated Press, Thhina Post, February 14, 2009 http:// www.chinapost .com.tw/ china/ national -news/2009/02/14/195982/ U .S .-official .h

Brackets Added] [Ethos]

Taiwan and China split amid civil war in 1949, and Beijing threatens to attack should Taiwan formalize its de factondependence. The United States and China came close to conflict over Taiwan in 1996, when President Bill Clinton deployed warships in response to China lobbing mi

o waters near Taiwan. [National Intelligence Director Dennis] Blair called recent warming ties between China and Taiwan

positive” and “very encouraging.” New Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou has worked to defuse tensions and expand trade with China. But Blair also sn testimony that Chinese “preparations for a possible Taiwan conflict continue to drive the modernization goals of theople's Liberation Army and the Chinese defense-industrial complex.””

China has continued to maintain the ability to attack Taiwan, labeling Taiwan as its main potential adversar

Hsu Shai-Hsuan[Reporter, Staff Writer, and Journalist, Taipei Times] "PRC's Preparations to Attack Taiwan Acceler

eport" Taipei Times, July 19, 2010 http:// www.taipeitimes.com/ News/ front / archives/2010/07/19/2003478290/1 [Eth

Despite repeated displays of goodwill by the government of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) since it came to power in 2008, China’s military preparationn attack on Taiwan continue to accelerate, a report by the Ministry of National Defense’s intelligence research branch says. T

port says China’s military preparedness for an attack on Taiwan has never been relaxed and that if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA

unched a missile attack on Taiwan, it would destroy more than 90 percent of the nation’s political, economic, military and civil infrastructure. It also predicts the number of Cssiles aimed at Taiwan could reach 2,000 by the end of the year. Although the government’s pro-Beijing policies have been strongly criticized domestically, the ministry’s de

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HINA IMPACT CARDS

post the internal research report on its official Web site has raised eyebrows. Lin Cheng-yi (林正義), a researcher at the Institute of European and American Studies at

cademia Sinica, said following Ma’s accession to power, China has moved its military exercises from the coastal areas of Fujian Province to other parts of the country and tha

nger uses Hong Kong media to attack Taiwan. Lin said that while this was intended to create a more relaxed atmosphere, in reality China’s military threat isonstantly growing. The ministry sees through the smokescreen, continues to keep track of China’s military posture and therefore is remaining true to its responsibili

n said. Although China has reduced the number of military exercises simulating an attack on Taiwan, its activities in the South China Sea and in theaters north and east of Taiwan have been increasing, Lin said. The report said that a June 1993 meeting of China’s Central

Military Commission readjusted its strategic goals, unambiguously making Taiwan its main potential adversary.”

Liberal nationalists have openly and vocally attacked the United States






ince 1989, both nativism and antitraditionalism have found their expressions in liberal nationalism. Nativism has become more acceptable to liberal nationalists as mainstreahinese intellectual discourse shifted dramatically in the 1990s in response to China’s deteriorating relations with major Western countries, particularly the United States, and t

estern media’s rising advocacy to contain China. Many liberal nationalists came to suspect that the Western powers, particularly thenited States and Japan, were conspiring to prevent China from rising to the status of a great power and voiced stron

riticisms in response. In fact, liberal nationalism propelled the anti-U.S. demonstrators in May 1999 and the anti-Japanese demonstrators in April 2005. Becausheir vocal attacks on Western countries’ “evil” intentions, some Western observers have labeled liberal nationalists aeo-authoritarianists who have argued that a centralized power structure must be strengthened to maintain China’s soability and economic development.”

Despite claims to the contrary, Chinese aggression is just below the surface, and easily roused

he Economist, “Leaders: The Dangers of a Rising China” The Economist, Vol. 397, No. 8711, p. 15, December 4, 2Ethos]

In many ways China has made efforts to try to reassure an anxious world. It has repeatedly promised that it means oeace. It has spent freely on aid and investment, settled border disputes with its neighbours and rolled up its sleeves in UN peacekeeping forces and international organisati

hen North Korea shelled a South Korean island last month China did at least try to create a framework to rein in its neighbour. But reasonable China sometimives way to aggressive China. In March, when the North sank a South Korean warship, killing 46 sailors, China failed to ny condemnation. A few months later it fell out with Japan over some Chinese fishermen, arrested for ramming Japanese coastg

ssels around some disputed islands— and then it locked up some Japanese businessmen and withheld exports of rare earths vitalapanese industry. And it has forcefully reasserted its claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands and to sovereignty oveirtually the entire South China Sea.”

China’s modernized forces pose a threat to US interests in the region, that has been ignored by current defen

lanning

he Economist, “The Fourth Modernization: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 3No. 8711, after p. 62, p. 6-8, December 4, 2010 [Brackets Added] [Ethos]

What does this amount to? Military experts in America, Australia and Japan think China’s new arsenals are a greater threat than its highrofile plans to launch aircraft-carriers in the next decade or so. Alan Dupont, of the University of Sydney in Australia, says that “missiles and

uivalents are becoming the weapons of choice for the conventionally outgunned.” According to the Centre for Strategic and Budgetaryssessments (CSBA), an American research institute, Chinese firepower threatens America’s Asian bases, which until now have b

afe from all but nuclear attack. The Second Artillery’s missiles could swamp the bases’ defences and destroy runways as well as large numbers of fighters and

pan is already within range of Chinese missiles, many of them currently pointing at Taiwan. Guam soon will be (see chart 1). China’s submarines, missiles and anti-ship cruisssiles threaten America’s aircraft-carrier strike groups within 1,000 to 1,600 nautical miles of the Chinese coast. According to Ross Babbage, an Australian defence analyst aunder of the Kokoda Foundation, if China had an anti-ship ballistic missile, coming in fast and without much warning, it would be even harder to defend against. And China’sace and cyber-weapons could serve as what Chinese planners label an “assassin’s mace” in a surprise attack designed to smash America’s elaborate but fragile electronic net

hat would leave American forces half-blind and mute, and its bases and carriers more vulnerable still. In sum, China’s abilities to strike have soared far



HINA IMPACT CARDS

eyond seeking to deter American intervention in any future mainland dispute with Taiwan. Today China can projectower out from its coastline well beyond the 12-mile (19km) limit that the Americans once approached without a secohought. Mr Okamoto, the Japanese security expert, believes China’s strategy is to have “complete control” of what planners call the First Island Chain. Ultimately, China s

want to stop the American fleet from being able to secure its interests in the western Pacific. America’s most senior officials have taken note. Lastear Robert Gates, the defence secretary, gave warning that “investments [in countries like China] in cyber- and anti-atellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry and ballistic missiles could threaten America’s primary way to projeower and help allies in the Pacific—in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups.” Mr Babbage [an Australian defence analblunter: “Current defence planning is invalid,” he says. He and the analysts at CSBA argue that America needs to rethink its strategy in the Pacific. I

ould strengthen its bases and be able to disrupt Chinese attacks with decoys and by spreading aircraft and ships around the region. American forces must have better logisticsable to fight even when their information networks are impaired. Crucially, they must be in a position to disable China’s electronic reconnaissance, surveillance and battle-d

sessment, some of which is protected by a system of tunnels beyond easy reach of American weapons.”

3 certainties in Chinese military planning: 1) China has already been able to deter US ships; 2) China’s abil

o project power in the West Pacific is threatening the US’ own ability to project power; and 3) the US faces

bstacles to be able to respond to Chinese modernization

he Economist, “The Fourth Modernization: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 3

No. 8711, after p. 62, p. 6-8, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

or all the uncertainties in this debate, three things are beyond dispute. First, China has already forced American ships to think ab

ow and when they approach the Chinese coast. The closer American vessels come, the more missiles and submarines they face and the less time they ve to react to a strike. Anyone sailing a carrier worth $15 billion-20 billion with a crew of 6,000 would think twice about taking on that extra risk. To deny America possessio

as it has dominated for decades, China does not need to control its own coastal waters; it just has to be able to threaten Americhips there. Hugh White, a former Australian security and defence official, foresees the western Pacific becoming anaval no-go zone”. Second, China’s ability to project power is improving. Its submarines, fighter aircraft, missiles, and cyber- and electr

arfare, once poor, now pose a threat. China’s weapons will continue to improve, and its forces will gather experience. Provided that the economy does not fall over, budgets w

ow, too, absolutely and possibly as a share of GDP. Other things being equal, China can project power into its backyard more easily than Aman project power across the Pacific Ocean. At risk is what Mr Gates has called “the operational sanctuary our navy has enjoyed in thestern Pacific for the better part of six decades”. T hird, although the United States is able to respond to China, it will have to vercome some obstacles first. America’s military spending in Asia is overshadowed by the need to cut overallovernment spending and by other military priorities, such as Afghanistan. Jonathan Pollack, of the Brookings Institution, points out that some idea

replacing aircraft-carriers with more submarines, would inevitably run into opposition from the navy and from politicians whose constituencies would suffer. “For many offie navy’s core institutional identity is indelibly tied to carriers and the power-projection mission they perform,” he says. “Reducing their numbers is going to be a very painfu

ocess.” Above all, big shifts in military planning take decades: America needs to think now about China in 2025.”

vii. Extension - Impact 1 – Great Depression

Sino-Taiwan war kills US economy, dragging us into a second Great Depression

ee J Hunkovic[MA, Intelligence Studies, American Military University, President's Roll] "The Chinese-Taiwanese

onflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation Between China, Taiwan, and the United States of America" AmericanMilitary University, 2009 http :// www . google . com /# sclient = psy & hl = en & safe = active & q =

%22IN +520+Analytic+Methods%22&aq= f &aqi=&aql = f &oq=& gs_ rfai=& psj=1& fp=cc7 ad 1a43d 378bba [Ethos]

he American economy is in terrible shape.

After losing an estimated forty percent of its market value, which has led to annternational chain-reaction and a global recession, the political and economic leaders of the United States have beenesperately struggling to keep the crisis from worsening into a second Great Depression. Despite their antagonistic political relatio

e United States and the PRC conduct tens of billions of dollars in trade each year and the U.S. does billions of dollars worth of trade with Taiwan as well. Therefore,

onsidering these facts, a war between China and Taiwan, especially with American military involvement, is a losing scenario from aconomic standpoint, regardless of the outcome. While America would shift its most preferred nation status from the PRC to Taiwan if Taiwan were to

l independence and pursue a greater trade relationship with them, it would still be damaging its relationship with its other trading partner, which means that it would still sufonomically. If China were to reabsorb Taiwan with little resistance or before America could intervene, America would still suffer an economic loss in the short term, as trade

hina would go on, but Taiwan would be no more. In either case, the economic loss of a Cross-Strait war would almost certainly guaranteehat the American economy further declines and the U.S. would enter a second Great Depression, making it a terriblecenario under the current conditions. Therefore, America has an even greater interest in avoiding a war between the PRC and Taiwan, even if it were to me

sing Taiwan and degrading America’s image and credibility.”

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viii. Extension - Impact 2 – Engagement Lost

The best strategy for “containing” China, is engagement

Henry A Kissinger[Former Secretary of State, Administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford; Former National

ecurity Advisor, Administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford; Former Director, Psychological Strategy BoarHarvard University] "China: Containment Won't Work" The Washington Post, June 13, 2005

ttp:// www.washingtonpost .com/ wp-dyn/ content / article/2005/06/12/ AR2005061201533.html [Ethos]

he test of China's intentions will be whether its growing capacity will be used to seek to exclude America from Asia or whether it will be part of a cooperative effort.

aradoxically, the best strategy for achieving anti-hegemonic objectives is to maintain close relations with all the maountries of Asia, including China. In that sense, Asia's rise will be a test of U.S. competitiveness in the world now emerging, especially in the countries of As

he historical American aim of opposing hegemony in Asia -- incorporated as a joint aim with China in the Shanghai Communique of 1972 -- remains valid. It will have to bersued, however, primarily by political and economic measures -- albeit backed by U.S. power. In a U.S. confrontation with China, the vast majority of nations will seek to avoosing sides. At the same time, they will generally have greater incentives to participate in a multilateral system with America than to adopt an exclusionary Asian nationalism

hey will not want to be seen as pieces of an American design. India, for example, perceives ever closer common interests with the United States regarding opposition to radicaam, some aspects of nuclear proliferation and the integrity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It sees no need to give these common purposes an ideological or an

hinese character. It finds no inconsistency between its dramatically improving relations with the United States and proclaiming a strategic partnership with China. American

sistence on an ideological crusade and on a Cold War-type of containment might accelerate such gestures. And it would risk inflaming India's Muslim population. China,wn interest, is seeking cooperation with the United States for many reasons, including the need to close the gap between its own developed and develop

gions; the imperative of adjusting its political institutions to the accelerating economic and technological revolutions; and the potentially catastrophic impact of a Cold War wnited States on the continued raising of the standard of living, on which the legitimacy of the government depends. But it does not follow from this that any damage to China

used by a Cold War would benefit America. We would have few followers anywhere in Asia. Asian countries would continue trading with China. Whatever happenhina will not disappear. The American interest in cooperative relations with China is for the pursuit of a stable

nternational system. Preemption is not a feasible policy toward a country of China's magnitude. It cannot be in our nterest to have new generations in China grow up with a perception of a permanently and inherently hostile Unitedtates. It cannot be in China's interest to be perceived in America as being exclusively focused on its own narrow domestic or Asian interests.”

Multi-lateral engagement with China is the best way to avoid 21st century conflict

he Economist, “Leaders: The Dangers of a Rising China” The Economist, Vol. 397, No. 8711, p. 15, December 4, 2

Ethos]

History shows that superpowers can coexist peacefully when the rising power believes it can rise unhindered and th

ncumbent power believes that the way it runs the world is not fundamentally threatened. So a military build-up needs to be accom

a build-up of trust. There are lots of ways to build trust in Asia. One would be to help ensure that disputes and misunderstandings do not get out of hand. China should thus bore open about its military doctrine—about its nuclear posture, its aircraft-carriers and missile programme. Likewise, America and China need rules for disputes including No

orea (see article), Taiwan, space and cyber-warfare. And Asia as a whole needs agreements to help prevent every collision at sea from becoming a trial of strength. Amerind China should try to work multilaterally. Instead of today’s confusion of competing venues, Asia needs a single regional security forum, such as the Ea

ia Summit, where it can do business. Asian countries could also collaborate more in confidence-boosting non-traditional security, such as health, environmental protection, a

acy and counter-terrorism, where threats by their nature cross borders. If America wants to bind China into the rules-based liberal order itromotes, it needs to stick to the rules itself. Every time America breaks them—by, for instance, protectionism— it feeds China’suspicions and undermines the very order it seeks.”

ix. Extension - Impact 3 - Containment Costs Too Much

Containment would be a very bad policy decision to implement against China

he Economist “Friends, or Else: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397, No. 87

fter p. 62, p. 13-15, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

One way to resolve these tensions would be to put security first. America could aim to block China now before it gets any stronger. Amer on the cold war by isolating the Soviet economy and stalemating its armed forces. But trying that again would be a

dea, as Robert Art explains in a recent issue of Political Science Quarterly. For one thing, the cost would be astronomical; for another, Amemight suffer as much as China. The two countries’ economies are intertwined and China owns more Americanovernment debt than anyone else. In war, nations override such factors out of necessity. If an American president trio override them in peace out of choice, he would face dissent at home and opprobrium abroad. In any case, a policy of ontainment risks backfiring, except against an unambiguously hostile China. Unless America could persuade large parts of the world to join in, China wouill have access to most markets. A belligerent United States would risk losing the very alliances in Asia that it was

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HINA IMPACT CARDS

eeking to protect. And Joseph Nye, of the Kennedy School at Harvard, has argued that the best way to make an enemf China is to treat it like one.”

china impact cards

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