china influence da seniors ndi 2010

7/29/2019 China Influence DA Seniors NDI 2010

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Northwestern Debate Institute 2010 1Seniors China DA

Chinese Influence Disad

Chinese Influence Disad.....................................................................................................................................................................1

Chinese Influence Disad ...................................................................................................................................... 1

1NC.......................................................................................................................................................................................................3

1NC ....................................................................................................................................................................... 31NC.......................................................................................................................................................................................................4

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***Links...............................................................................................................................................................................................5

***Links ............................................................................................................................................................... 5

South Korea.........................................................................................................................................................................................6

South Korea ..........................................................................................................................................................6

Japan....................................................................................................................................................................................................7

Japan ..................................................................................................................................................................... 7South Korea/Japan.............................................................................................................................................................................8

South Korea/Japan .............................................................................................................................................. 8

South Korea/Japan.............................................................................................................................................................................9

South Korea/Japan .............................................................................................................................................. 9

***Uniqueness...................................................................................................................................................................................10

***Uniqueness ....................................................................................................................................................10

Uniqueness Wall................................................................................................................................................................................11

Uniqueness Wall ................................................................................................................................................. 11

Uniqueness Wall................................................................................................................................................................................12

Uniqueness Wall ................................................................................................................................................. 12

***Impacts.........................................................................................................................................................................................13

***Impacts ......................................................................................................................................................... 13

Heg Impact Thayer........................................................................................................................................................................14

Heg Impact Thayer .........................................................................................................................................14

2NC Heg AT: Military Dominance ............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .......... ...... ..... ...... ..15

2NC Heg AT: Military Dominance .............................................................................................................. 15

2NC Impact Taiwan.......................................................................................................................................................................16

2NC Impact Taiwan ........................................................................................................................................16

2NC Impact Capitalism.................................................................................................................................................................17

2NC Impact Capitalism ................................................................................................................................. 17

2NC Impact Japan ReArm..........................................................................................................................................................18

2NC Impact Japan ReArm .......................................................................................................................... 18

2NC Module South China Sea......................................................................................................................................................19


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2NC Module South China Sea ....................................................................................................................... 19

South China Sea Impact Econ......................................................................................................................................................20

South China Sea Impact Econ ....................................................................................................................... 20

South China Sea Impact Econ......................................................................................................................................................21

South China Sea Impact Econ ....................................................................................................................... 21South China Sea Impact Heg........................................................................................................................................................22

South China Sea Impact Heg .........................................................................................................................22

***Aff.................................................................................................................................................................................................23

***Aff ..................................................................................................................................................................23

AFF WITHDRAWAL GOOD ........... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ...... ...... ..... ...... ..24

AFF WITHDRAWAL GOOD ...................................................................................................................... 24

AFF Japan Checks.........................................................................................................................................................................25

AFF Japan Checks .......................................................................................................................................... 25

AFF Deterrence Checks.................................................................................................................................................................26

AFF Deterrence Checks ................................................................................................................................. 26

AFF No China Rising.....................................................................................................................................................................27

AFF No China Rising ..................................................................................................................................... 27


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1NC

US influence in region is stable now---removal of troops gives China a go-ahead message into East Asia

Scobell, 10 [Dr. Andrew Scobell February 4, 2010- Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the China

Certificate Program. Testimony before U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Chinas Activities in Southeast Asiaand the Implications for U.S. Interests,

http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2010hearings/written_testimonies/10_02_04_wrt/10_02_04_scobell_statement.php]

This statement examines the Peoples Republic of Chinas geostrategic thinking since the end of the Cold War and where Southeast Asia fits into the

calculus. The author suggests that Southeast Asia might best be thought of as a backyard laboratory where China first tests new

ideas and experiments with new approaches in its foreign and security policies. Southeast Asia was deemed fertile ground forsuch experimentation because there was no regional hegemon nor was the subregion totally dominated by any great power.

Moreover, the subregion is of considerable importance to China. While the United States has been the most significant external security

actor in Southeast Asia, its footprint has shrunk as a result of the withdrawal of military bases in the Philippines in the early

1990s. Furthermore, the United States does not completely dominate economically or diplomatically. Indeed, it is Japan that

has been the most important external economic actor but Japan has not dominated diplomatically nor had any military

presence. Thus, Southeast Asia proved to be a valuable location where China has tested multilateral diplomacy and experimented with other soft and hardpower initiatives.

Moreover, the Soviet collapse heralded the end of a bipolar world and the emergence of regional multipolarity. By 1992, the global system was no longerdominated by two superpowers. The system had been replaced by a chaotic situation in which power in Asia was becoming more diffuse and world politics

more complicated and confusing. Beijing, long a proponent of multi-polarity, suddenly confronted the adage of be careful what you wish for, and

scrambled to adapt to the new reality. Although the emergence of a multipolar Asia appeared to be an unmistakable trend, global

unipolarity was the overarching reality because of the preponderance of American power. For China this meant the greater

salience of a U.S. threat to China. Another core concern was the perpetuation of economic growth and prosperity. As a

result, in 1992, ageing patriarch Deng Xiaoping sought to personally reinvigorate the reform effort and ensure there was no

turning back from the course he had set the country on more than a decade earlier. Thus, Deng launched what became known as theSouthern Tour (nanxun) on which he urged Chinese to embrace energetically reform and opening.

The situation forced Beijing to rethink its foreign policy outlook and Chinas own neighborhood suddenly loomed much

larger in its thinking. Securing regime stability and national borders required greater attention to neighboring countries.

Countering the greater perceived challenge of a hostileor at least unfriendlyUnited States meant serious efforts to build a

network of relationships with other states, especially within Asia. This impulse was reinforced, in Beijings view, by the

transformation of the United States from a prime catalyst for Chinas economic trade and investment to a key obstruction to

Chinese growth. Thus, Beijing began to seek commercial opportunities elsewhere. In short, China awakened to itsgeographic realitiesit was first and foremost an Asian power.

Withdrawal increases Chinese influence, and causes an arms race

Kelly, 9 (Robert E, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science & Diplomacy, Pusan National University, Should the USPull Out of South Korea (2): No, Asian Security Blog, http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-

south-korea-2-no/, NJ)

1. If we leave, everyone in Asia will read it as a sign that we are weakand that we are leaving Asia generally. Yes, this is the credibility

argument straight out of the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan debates. But the world sees US power today as wavering; we are the totteringgiant, especially in Asia. If we leave during the GWoT, that image will be confirmed, and the Chinese will push hard in Asia. AUS

departure will touch off an arms race as regional uncertainty rises. Asia is not where Europe or Latin America are in terms ofregional amity. The US presence is more needed in this region, and it earns the US the friendship of the local democracies. It is

hard to see how a spiraling arms race, as Japan and China openly start competing for regional leadership, plus perhaps India

and China, would help the US. The US could very well be pulled back in later. A US departure from Korea (and Japan

next?) will be read as a clear victory for China in the Sino-US regional competition.
http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/


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1NC

And, lack of US presence causes China rise, which kills heg and causes nuclear war

Mauro, 7 (Ryan, geopolitical analyst for Tactical Defense Concepts and for the Northeast Intelligence Network, founder of

WorldThreats.com, national security advisor to the Christian Action Network, and an intelligence analyst with theAsymmetricalWarfare and Intelligence Center (AWIC), The Consequences of Withdrawal, Front Page Magezine,

http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=496 , NJ)

Asia may appear far removed from the military theater,but even there the consequences of premature withdrawal may make

themselves felt. The perception of American weakness could lead to a struggle for supremacy among rival Asian powers.

With China ascendant, Japan would have no option but to develop nuclear weapons. Two scenarios could then arise: China would

dominate the Pacific and Americas status as a superpower would quickly recede; or there would be a region-wide nuclear

stalemateinvolving Burma, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and possibly Taiwan and Australia.
http://www.worldthreats.com/http://www.awic.us/http://www.awic.us/http://www.awic.us/http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=496http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=496http://www.worldthreats.com/http://www.awic.us/http://www.awic.us/http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=496


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***Links


6/27


South Korea

Troops in South Korea key to deter Chinese aggression.

Oh, 8 (Kongdan, specialist in East Asian affairs at the Brookings Institute, USROK: The Forgotten Alliance, BrookingsInstitute, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/10_south_korea_oh.aspx, NJ)

As an additional facet of its global war on terror, the George W. Bush administration has adopted a policy of strategic flexibility, whereby

U.S. forces must be prepared to respond to conflicts anywhere they are needed, not just in the neighborhood in which they are located. U.S.

troops in South Korea are no longer stationed there simply to prevent a North Korean invasion,but might be used, for example,

to respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. If such were the case, South Korea, which is working hard to develop good relations with China,would find itself hosting troops that are attacking its friend. The Koreans refer to this strategic flexibility policy as a water ghostwhich will drag anyonewho pursues it into deep water. In February 2008, a new South Korean administration was inaugurated under the leadership of President Lee Myung-bak of

the opposition political party. President Lees new foreign policy is one of pragmatism, which translates into a more confrontational approach toward North

Korea, which for its part has always believed that South Korea should extend the North unlimited aid for the good of the Korean nation without requiring

anything in return. From the first days of the Lee administration, the North Korean press has routinely called President Lee a Korean traitor. President Lee isalso committed to repairing weaknesses in the U.S.-ROK alliance. North Korea remains a threat, but not so much because of its capability to launch a

second invasion of South Korea, which would ultimately fail. China and even Russia pose more existential threatsto Korea.

US withdrawal prevents Chinese influence

AP, 4 (Associated Press, U.S. plans to reduce troops in S. Korea, AP,http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5155285/ , NJ)

China, a major regional power that has preserved its traditional alliance with North Korea while developing close economic ties with South

Korea, might also view a withdrawal of troops as an opportunity to expand its influence on the peninsula. The U.S.delegation inSeoul, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless, told the South Koreans the troop reduction would not affect U.S. defense capabilities in the

theater because the United State plans to bring in more modern weapons systems, according to Kim Sook, head of the South Korean Foreign MinistrysNorth American bureau. The U.S. troop cut would include some 3,600 soldiers already earmarked for redeployment this summer from South Korea to Iraq,

the statement said. Details are being worked out as the process of consultation with the Republic of Korea continues, the statement said. South Koreas

650,000-member military is a modern, well-equipped force that routinely conducts joint training with its U.S. counterparts. Most of the combat-ready troops

are concentrated close to the border or around Seoul. Seoul has talked of strengthening its military to make up for the sizeable U.S.

withdrawal, but no official plans have been made public.

Troop Withdrawal is a reversal of ROK-US alliance results in Chinese adventurism

China Hand 10 ("China Hands" came to refer to a group of American diplomats, journalists, and soldiers who were known for their knowledge ofChina and influence on American policy, http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Analyses_12/It-s-Official-America-Has-a-China-Containment-Policy_printer.shtml )

China is absent from both exercises, and that's no oversight. Many nations in the eastern Pacific, includingAustralia, Japan, Indonesia, South

Korea and Vietnam, have been encouraging the U.S. to push back against what they see as China's increasingly aggressive actions

in the South China Sea. And the U.S. military remains concerned over China's growing missile force - now more than 1,000 - near the Taiwan Strait.The Tomahawks' arrival "is part of a larger effort to bolster our capabilities in the region," Glaser says. "It sends a signal that nobody should rule out our

determination to be the balancer in the region that many countries there want us to be." No doubt Beijing got the signal. If, after all that, anybody believesthat the joint US-ROK exercises in the Yellow Sea are primarily a response to the Cheonan sinking or, for that matter, part of an effort to deter the apparently

undeterrable North Koreans, well, I have in my possession a stately edifice spanning the swelling bosom of the East River to link the County of Kings to the

Island of the Manhattoes, available for purchase exclusively by such trusting souls. The South Koreans get it, and Chosun Ilbo weighed in with an

uncharacteristically cautious editorial on July 6: These developments are showing signs of creating a Cold War atmosphere whereSouth Korea, the U.S. and Japan face off against China and North Korea. The U.S.-South Korea alliance forms the cornerstone of the South'snational security and diplomacy. But China is South Korea's largest trading partner, and it also has a huge influence on peace and reunification on the Korean

Peninsula. The time has come for Seoul to factor into its diplomacy and security policies both China and its intensifyingcompetition with the U.S. The code word for "containment" in the Asian press, by the way, is "Cold War atmosphere".
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/10_south_korea_oh.aspxhttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5155285/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5155285/http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/10_south_korea_oh.aspxhttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5155285/


7/27


Japan

Withdrawal from Japan increases Chinese influence

Shirashi, 9 (Takashi, visiting professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo and president of the Institute

of Developing Economies of the Japan External Trade Organization, Japan-U.S. ties crucial for East Asia community, East AsiaForum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/10/japan-u-s-ties-crucial-for-east-asia-community/, NJ)

Two things are crucial. First, all East Asian countries have formulated their security policies with the Japan-U.S. alliance as agiven.If the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance were to come under question, security in East Asia would become unstable. In the

worst-case scenario, the United States would withdraw its military forces to the Guam-Hawaii line and shift its strategy from the current

forward defense to an offshore balancing act. Japan will then be forced to allocate far greater resources for its defense than it does

now. If Japan chooses to strengthen its defense capabilities, China likely would further accelerate its military growth, with South Korea

and Vietnam following suit. When East Asian countries have no choice but to prioritize defense expenditure over economic

growth, the common political will to build an East Asian community will be lost. Keeping the current system in place heightens thepredictability that security will be maintained. The government should bear this in mind as it decides on the kind of assistance it will extend to Afghanistan

and Pakistan in their nation-building efforts, and on the issues of cooperation with Washington on its military realignment plan and relocation of the U.S.

Marine Corps Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture.
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/10/japan-u-s-ties-crucial-for-east-asia-community/http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/10/japan-u-s-ties-crucial-for-east-asia-community/http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/10/japan-u-s-ties-crucial-for-east-asia-community/


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South Korea/Japan

Military presence in East Asia key to prevent Chinese influence

Marquardt, 3 (Erich,Senior Editor with the Combating Terrorism Center, China's Distant Threat to U.S. Dominance in Asia,Information Clearing House, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4654.htm, NJ)

This realization has preoccupied members of the Bush administration, in addition to select members of the U.S. Congress, who consistently talk of the need

to contain China. These individuals are pushing for an increase in military ties with various Asian states, such asJapan, Taiwan, SouthKorea and the Philippines. They have also advocated the positioning of U.S. military bases and forces on China's western flankinKyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan. In countries such as Taiwan and Japan -- which are dependent on U.S. economic and military aid -- these officials

have called for allowing these two countries to further develop their military programs in order to act as a bulwark against the powerful China of the future.

These policies are controversial as Japan previously had hegemonic ambitions in Asia. Supplying boosted amounts of military aid to Taiwan is also a

divisive issue, as any such aid is an obvious threat to the Chinese leadership which considers Taiwan part of the mainland. U.S. officials are aware

that China's future economic and military might is inevitable. This is part of the reason why there are roughly 41,000 U.S. troops

in Japan, 37,000 in South Korea, and 19,000 on naval vessels in East Asia. Yet as China's power grows, the U.S. will likely have to increase

its military might in order to continue to rival China . But since U.S. troops are usually stretched thin, augmenting current U.S. forces in Asia to

keep a growing China in check may not be feasible. Therefore, bybuilding up the strength of U.S. allies in Asia, the United States canattempt to contain China's potential power projection without actually having to commit and risk U.S. forces. However, there is plenty of time

before China would be able to rival the United States in power in Asia.

US Troop Presence in East Asia contains China withdrawal allows China to seek territorial goals such

as Taiwan

Joseph F. Cheney 99 (China: Regional Hegemon or Toothless Tiger? Joseph F. Cheney, Lt Col, USAF A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty atMaxwell Air Force Base www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/99-079.pdf)

A clear definition of hegemony is critical to the debate over Chinas future goals. To illustrate, a recent US Department of Defense(DOD) report commented that China does not seek hegemony in Asia or elsewhere, although its leaders hope to achieve a position where Asian countries

and those with interests in Asia take no actions which conflict with Chinas interests. This comment, while at first dismissing hegemony as a Chinese goal,then goes on to contradict itself by asserting Chinas desire to achieve what is in effect peace by hegemony as described by Aron. Such confusion over the

meaning of hegemony is common. China does not seek empire, it seeks hegemony in East Asia. This is a situation where China

would have complete freedom to peruse its interests, including territorial goals in Taiwan and the South China Sea. For this

reason, China fights against any attempt to build bilateral or multilateral defense alliances in East Asia. The Chinese hope to

create a situation where they can dominate any other state in East Asia on a bilateral basis. The key factor that currentlyprevents them from achieving this goal is the powerful presence of the US military in East Asia, supported by bilateral

defense alliances. This arrangement keeps the East Asian system in equilibrium and has fostered regional development. SinceChina has clearly benefited from this equilibrium, the next question to ask is Why would China want to upset this stable system to seek hegemony?

US Military Presence in East Asia is the only barrier against Chinese domination of East Asia

Joseph F. Cheney 99 (China: Regional Hegemon or Toothless Tiger? Joseph F. Cheney, Lt Col, USAF A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty atMaxwell Air Force Base www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/99-079.pdf)

Hegemony is a product of power. This power is drawn from many required sources including geopolitical strength, economic strength, military strength and

power projection capability, and political stability. Analysis of all these factors will show that China has made incredible progress

developing some of the required elements of hegemony. In other areas, it has made painfully little progress. In short, China is years away from

credibly exerting East Asian hegemony in the face of continued American military power and regional influence. On the other hand, Chinas potential

power in the future cannot be overlooked. The lack of strong multilateral security alliances makes it possible that Chinacould divide and dominate the rest of East Asia if the US were to withdraw its military presence. Analysis of the

required elements of hegemony reveals not only the extent to which Chinese power has increased in the past 20 years, butalso the degree to which China is still a weak and divided state.


9/27


South Korea/Japan

Troop Withdrawal Causes East Asian arms race

Joseph F. Cheney 99 (China: Regional Hegemon or Toothless Tiger? Joseph F. Cheney, Lt Col, USAF A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty atMaxwell Air Force Base

www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/99-079.pdf) The key to long term stability in East Asia is a continued policy of US military presence in East Asia. Policy must be developed,therefore, to cope with the changing East Asian environment. As this paper has continually stressed, the abdication of US presence in East Asia

would create a vacuum that only China has the power and desire to fill. As Robert Ross clearly expresses, U.S. strategicretrenchment would do far more to alter the Sino-American bilateral balance of power and the regional balance of power than

any combination of Chinese military and economic policies.3 Japan and other East Asian states would have to rearm in theface of Chinese hegemony. The Japanese-US military alliance is critical to containing Chinese designs for hegemony. Japan and the US must worktogether to cooperate on trade and financial issues, not only to create a 39 stable trading relationship, but to create continued support for US military forces

in Japan. The US should not encourage Japan to expand its military influence outside of its own self defense region. East Asia is still not ready for an

expanded Japanese military presence. US policymakers must also plan ahead for a reunified Korea and the prospects for continuedUS military presence on the peninsula. Can and should the US presence on the Korean peninsula continue after reunification?

If US forces must leave Korea, can they be redeployed to another location in East Asia? These options should be studied now anddecisions must be made considering the vital importance of the continued US military presence in East Asia.

Reduction in US Military Presence in East Asia is the only counterbalance to Chinese regionalhegemony.

Paul H.B. Godwin 04 ( China as Regional Hegemon? Professor of International Affairs at the National War College, Washington, DC, Graduate ofDartmouth College (1960) and received his M.A. in Asian Studies (1963) and Ph.D. in Political Science (1967) from the University of Minnesota.

http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Godwin,%20China%20as%20a%20Regional%20Hegemon.pdf )

In maritime Asia, the United States functions as the countervailing power to China. With alliances and access to military facilities along

Asias littoral from South Korea and Japan in the north, down to Australia in the south and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, the United Statesperforms the role of offshore balancer to Chinas continental dominance. Certainly from the US perspective, the United States

with its alliances and access maintains the current continental-maritime military balance in East Asia.4 As long as there is a

second regional great power in Asia, by definition China cannot become the regions hegemon. With its strong alliances and

access to naval and air facilities along Asias periphery together with its diplomatic and economic influence within the region, the United States is in

an extremely robust offshore position. In this sense, as Robert Ross has suggested, East Asia has become bipolar; China and the United States share

the regional balance of power.5 The question therefore becomes whether Chinas regional security objectives have as their ultimatepurpose the removal of the United States as Asias other great power. This question becomes important when it is recognized that Chinas

principal objection to the current distribution of global and regional power is focused on the role of the United States. China resents the manner inwhich the United States employs the dominant military, economic and diplomatic power it achieved with the Cold Wars end

in global as well as regional affairs. Before evaluating Beijings perceptions of the United States, however, it is necessary to

assess Chinas security priorities.


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***Uniqueness


11/27


Uniqueness Wall

US influence in east Asia prevents China from becoming regional hegemon

Godwin 3 [Paul H. B. Godwin, 2003- Senior Fellow, retired as professor of international affairs at the National War College,Washington, D.C. China as a regional hegemon? http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Godwin,%20China%20as%20a%

20Regional% 2 0Hegemon.pdf]

In maritime Asia, the United States functions as the countervailing power to China. With alliances and access to military

facilities along Asias littoral from South Korea and Japan in the north, down to Australia in the south and Diego Garcia in

the Indian Ocean, the United States performs the role of offshore balancer to Chinas continental dominance. Certainly fromthe US perspective, the United States with its alliances and access maintains the current continental-maritime military balance in East

Asia.4 As long as there is a second regional great power in Asia, by definition China cannot become the regions hegemon. With its strong

alliances and access to naval and air facilities along Asias periphery together with its diplomatic and economic influence

within the region, the United States is in an extremely robust offshore position. In this sense, as Robert Ross has suggested, East Asia has

become bipolar; China and the United States share the regional balance of power.5 The question therefore becomes whether

Chinas regional security objectives have as their ultimate purpose the removal of the United States as Asias other great

power. This question becomes important when it is recognized that Chinas principal objection to the current distribution of global and regional power isfocused on the role of the United States. China resents the manner in which the United States employs the dominant military, economic and diplomatic

power it achieved with the Cold Wars end in global as well as regional affairs. Before evaluating Beijings perceptions of the United States, however, it isnecessary to assess Chinas security priorities.

American military presence is necessary to balance Chinas growing power

Fillingham 9 [Zachary Fillingham December 9. 2009- a foreign policy analyst for geopolitcalmonitor.com. Geopoliticalmonitor.com is anopen-source intelligence collection and forecasting service. They provide research, analysis and up to date coverage on situations and events thathave a substantive impact on political, military and economic affairs.http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/us-military-bases-a-glob al-footprint- 1/]

While the American basing footprint in East Asia may find itself shrinking due to American decline and the nebulous nature of

many post-Cold War international threats, just how big this reduction will end up being very much depends on Chinese

military powerand its neighbor perceptions. It is no secret that with every passing year, the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) are

expanding their operational capacity. If Chinas neighbors are convinced that Chinas rise will be a relatively benign one, and the government in

Beijing is going to play by the rules of international society, then there will be a growing tide of political pressure in South

Korea and Japan to reduce Americas permanent military presence. If however Beijing is unable to convince other East Asian

countries that its rise will remain a peaceful one, other East Asian countries will desperately seek out an Americancommitment to balance out Chinas growing influence.

China is on the fast trackUS military presence key to prevent rise in influence

Marquardt, 3 Erich Marquardt 09/08/03 SeniorEditor with the Combating Terrorism Center. He is also the editor-in-chief ofthe CTC Sentinel, a leading counter-terrorism journal. Prior to his work at CTC, Mr. was the head of Global Terrorism Analysis at

The Jamestown Foundation, currently based in Washington. ''China's Distant Threat to U.S. Dominance in Asia'' The Power and

Interest News Report (http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=87,)

09/08/03: (PINR) A country that borders thirteen others with a population of 1.3 billion people, China stands to be a major powerforce in Asia. Though currently a relatively weak country, China is on a fast track toward economic modernization as its economy

continues to rapidly grow. If China is able to continue its economic modernization program without any major obstructions, it

will become the richest and most powerful state in the world -- at least from a statistical point of view -- surpassing even the projected

economic and military power of the United States. While exciting for Chinese leaders and the Chinese population, this destiny has resulted inthe opposite effect for American policymakers and the American population, who are very wary of this emerging great power. Moreover, the current U.S.

leadership has articulated quite clearly in their National Security Strategy that the United States will take actions to stymie

China's power ascension and work to prevent the massive country from equaling or surpassing U.S. power. Indeed, this policypaper argues that "in pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path

that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness." The paper further states, in an indirect reference to China, that the U.S. "must build andmaintain our defenses beyond challenge."
http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/china-india-the-new-naval-arms-race-1/http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/china-india-the-new-naval-arms-race-1/http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/china-india-the-new-naval-arms-race-1/http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/china-india-the-new-naval-arms-race-1/http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/china-india-the-new-naval-arms-race-1/http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/china-india-the-new-naval-arms-race-1/


12/27


Uniqueness Wall

US hegemony in east asia is not threatened by China in the squo.

CRS 8 [Congressional Research Service August 15, 2008 Comparing Global Influence: Chinas and U.S.Diplomacy, Foreign Aid,Trade, and Investment in the Developing Worldhttp://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL34620.pdf]

Despite Chinas growing influence, the United States retains significant strengths, including latent reserves of soft power,

much of which lie beyond the scope of government. Furthermore, by some indicators, Chinas soft power has experienced some recent setbacks,

while the U.S. image abroad has shown signs of a possible renewal. The United States exceeds the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) inglobal trade, although the PRC is catching up, and far surpasses China in GDP and foreign direct investment. It continues to

be the dominant external political and military actor in the Middle East and political and economic influence in LatinAmerica. The United States maintains formal alliances in Europe and Asia, and far outweighs the PRC in military spending and capabilities.


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***Impacts


14/27


Heg Impact Thayer

Hegemony is the only guarantor of international stabilitythe alternative is nuclear wars worldwide

Thayer, 6 (Bradley A., Prof of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Missouri State University, In Defense of Primacy., National

Interest; Nov/Dec2006 Issue 86, p32-37)

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain

or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of

international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary

regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponentsseem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be

reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages

followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order

created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (untilyou lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies,

American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a morepeaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West

Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel

and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision ofending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's

likelihood,particularlywar's worst form:great power wars. / Second, American power gives the United States the ability to

spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as theUnited States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and

be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed

democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing

interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicablyin concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United

States.


15/27


2NC Heg AT: Military Dominance

Military dominance is irrelevant presence in Asia is key

White, 9 (Hugh, Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, Custom Search ControlThe geostrategic implications of Chinas growth, East Asia Forum,http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/13/the-geostrategic-implications-of-chinas-growth/, NJ)

Of course America will continue to enjoy a significant advantage over China in many other aspects of power, including the soft powerof

culture and the hard powerof armed force. It will be a long time, if ever, before China could emulate Americas position in recent decades as the worlds

leading military power. But China does not have to replace the US as the global hyperpower in order to overturn the US-led

global order of recent decades. China does not need to compete with the US globally in order to erode US primacy in Asia. And to do that China does

not need to equal the US in military capability, but simply limit US options. In both these respects, the military-strategic competition between the US and

China is asymmetrical, in ways that benefit China. The shift is already underway. American capacity to project power in Asia is

slipping away as China develops the capacity to deny important areas of the Western Pacific especially those closest to China to

the US Navys surface fleet.
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/13/the-geostrategic-implications-of-chinas-growth/http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/13/the-geostrategic-implications-of-chinas-growth/http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/13/the-geostrategic-implications-of-chinas-growth/http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/13/the-geostrategic-implications-of-chinas-growth/http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/13/the-geostrategic-implications-of-chinas-growth/http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/13/the-geostrategic-implications-of-chinas-growth/http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/13/the-geostrategic-implications-of-chinas-growth/http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/13/the-geostrategic-implications-of-chinas-growth/http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/13/the-geostrategic-implications-of-chinas-growth/


16/27


2NC Impact Taiwan

Presence key to prevent ChinaTaiwan war

Christensen, 1 (Thomas J, Associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at theMassachusetts Institute of Technology, Posing Problems Without Catching Up, International Security,http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v025/25.4christensen.html, NJ)

Even if the Chinese programs have only limited effect against more technologically advanced foes, they may still pose a future security

challenge to Taiwan and the United States. IfBeijing elites believe that they are in a protracted war of wills over an issue that they care about

much more than do the Americans, such as Taiwan, those elites might stillbe emboldened by the perceived capability--however limited--to

increase costs to American and Taiwanese forces and to reduce costs to mainland assets in such a struggle. This problem is only exacerbated byany perceptions that Chinese elites might have about America's supposed limited willingness to fight such protracted wars and to suffer

casualties.Implications and Prescriptions for U.S. Strategy If the analysis above is correct,preventing war across the Taiwan Strait and between

the United States and China is much more difficult than a straightforward net assessment of relative military powerin the region

might suggest. To deter China from launching attacks against Taiwan and escalating crises and conflicts by attacking American assets in the region, theUnited States must do more than demonstrate an ability to prevail militarily in a conflict; it must also demonstrate

American resolve and, perhaps, the ability to protect its forces not only from defeat but also from significant harm. On the other hand, if

Beijing believes that Taiwan is moving toward independence, it might be impossible to deter, regardless of the degree and nature of American militarysuperiority. So the United States must take actions not only to deter China but also to reassure it that Washington has no intention of backing Beijing into a

corner by supporting Taiwan's legal independence now or in the future. 68

Taiwan war goes nuclear

Lee J. Hunkovic 08( The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and theUnited States of America American Military University http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf )

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world

war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both

Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in

the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex

Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East

and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff anddeployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict,

there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan andUnited States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in

this study
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v025/25.4christensen.htmlhttp://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v025/25.4christensen.htmlhttp://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v025/25.4christensen.html


17/27


2NC Impact Capitalism

Increased Chinese influence collapses capitalism, causing extinction

Li, 3 (Minqi, Assistant Professor of Political Science at York University, THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE DEMISE OF THECAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY:EXPLORING HISTORICAL POSSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY,http://www.networkideas.org/featart/mar2004/Rise_of_China.pdf, NJ)

As Arrighi and Silver discuss the possibility for the China-centered civilization to lead the transformation ofthe existing

world system, they also point out that: Since the mid-1980s, China has been the key site of industrial expansion and new working-class

formation. Given past experience, we should expect a vigorous workers movement to emerge in China as well. And given the size and

centrality of China in the East Asian region and globally the trajectory of this movement will have a tremendous impact on the

trajectory of the transition as a whole (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 286). If the prediction turns out to be accurate, what exactly will be the nature of this

vigorous workers movement? It is very likely that the movement will force a substantial re-distribution of income and wealth within

China. Further, given the arguments presented in the previous sections, it is unlikely that, from the point of view of capital and

the elites, the re-distribution can be compensated by an upward mobility within the world system. In this case, what now appears to many asthe least likely outcome a socialist-oriented workers revolution may emerge as the only viable solution. What will happen next? One possibility is that

the revolution will turn inwards and try to build socialism in one country. The historical experience of the 20th century suggests that, under persistentmilitary and economic competition from more powerful capitalist states, and excluded from the possibility of upward mobility, such an approach is a recipe

for eventual defeat. The other possibility is that the revolution will and has to lead to the transformation of the world system. By the mid-21stcentury, not only most of the production of energy and raw materials, but also most of the manufacturing industries may be located in the periphery and thesemi-periphery. The concentration of the bulk of the material production facilities and the organized working classes in the South may provide these

countries with an unprecedented bargaining leverage against the North. Will China, India, and other Southern countries manage to effectively use the

leverage, imposing a massive global re-distribution on the North and transforming the world system from a capitalist world-

economy based on extremely unequal exchange and large, monopolistic profits into a socialist world market economy basedon production for use and a more egalitarian exchange system? Will the socialist world market economy succeed in providing system-levelsolutions to the system-level problems left by the capitalist world-economy? Will the world market economy allow its member communities to be

sufficiently freed from the drive towards endless accumulation and deal successfully with the global environmental crisis? Or, if it fails, will the resolution of

the global environmental crisis eventually require the development of a world socialis t government? Will the worlds incumbent hegemonic power U.S.imperialism accommodate these developments? If it tries to resist with all of its weapons of massive destruction, will humanity

prevail in its struggle against the most powerful, most destructive imperialism the world has ever seen? Or will the struggleend up with the mutual destruction of both sides? Will humanity, realizing the impossibility of defeating the U.S. imperialism, choose to give in,

and pave the way for the American world empire? Will the end of capitalist history turn out to be the end of all history? Or, as Marxput it in the Preface toA Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, it will only bring to a close the prehistory of human society?9 All of these

questions will have to be answered by real historical actions.


18/27


2NC Impact Japan ReArm

Chinese Military action sparks Japanese Nuclear Rearmament

Hunkovic, 8 (Lee J, The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the UnitedStates of America American Military University http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf )

From a national security standpoint, Marquand (2004) states that Chinese military action could also destabilize Asia, giving nationalist

factions in Japan every excuse they need, according to one Japanese scholar, to develop the nuclear weapons capability that many

in Tokyo are already in favor of. He lists another economic liability of invasion as the possibility that the Japanese would do

everything in their power to redirect the markets of Asia, including their own, away from China, even at the expense of losing

their own money in trade. A further economic and national security risk that Marquand (2004) notes is the possibility that Russia could use

Chinese aggression as an excuse to sell oil exclusively to Japan, as Russia is not desirous of China developing quickly into a

superpower and China reportedly [as of then] only has a 20-day reserve and is 75 percent reliant on Middle Eastern oil, which

could have disastrous repercussions. Additionally, he notes that China has no desire to destroy its relationship with the U.S.

Rearm causes nuclear war

Ratner, 3 (Ellen, news analyst on the Fox News Channel, Engage North Korea!

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=30541)

Experts predict that with Japan's high-tech, industrial economy, they could assemble afull nuclear arsenal and bomb delivery

systems within three years. This would be a disaster. Not only would it trigger a new, intra-Asian arms race for who could doubt that if

Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea would be joined by South Korea and even Taiwan in building new and more weapons? Likewise, given the

memories, who could doubt that such a scenario increases the risks ofa nuclear war somewhere in the region? By comparison, the old Cold War world,where there were only two armed camps, would look like kid stuff.


19/27


2NC Module South China Sea

Troop Withdrawal undermines US security umbrella in the South China Sea and its commitments to

friends and allies in the region.

Ralph A. Cossa 98 (president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, Hawaii. Senior editor of the Forums quarterly electronic journal, ComparativeConnections. Board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Member of the InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies and the ASEAN Regional Forum Experts and Eminent Persons Group, Founding member of the Steering Committee of the

multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Cossa,%20Security%20Implications%20of

%20%20Conflict%20in%20the%20S.ChinaSea.pdf )

The clearest and most effective symbol of America's commitment to regional stability and the peaceful settlement of disputes

in the South China Sea is the continued forward presence of U.S. military forces in Asia. The U.S. protective umbrella over

Asia not onlyprotects the security interests of regional friends and allies, it also protects and promotes America's political, economic, and

security interests as well. U.S. forward-deployed forces help promote regional stability while guarding against unilateral acts of

aggression, they increase the U.S. ability to respond to crises throughout the region, they demonstrate a U.S. commitment to

friends and allies, they serve as a hedge against uncertainty, and they avoid a "power vacuum" that others who do not

necessarily share our interests might be tempted to fill.


20/27


South China Sea Impact Econ

South China Sea Confrontation results in loss of sea lanes

Ralph A. Cossa 98 (president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, Hawaii. Senior editor of the Forums quarterly electronic journal, ComparativeConnections. Board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Member of the International

Institute for Strategic Studies and the ASEAN Regional Forum Experts and Eminent Persons Group, Founding member of the Steering Committee of the

multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Cossa,%20Security%20Implications%20of


As stressed earlier, theproximity of the Spratlys to South China Sea shipping lanes adds an important strategic element to the

dispute. A threat to freedom of passage through the South China Seas would severely disrupt regional economies. If, during

any military action in the Spratlys--or, for that matter, in the course of defining its claim over the currently occupied or

coveted territory--any nation threatened to inhibit the free flow of maritime traffic along these critical SLOCs, the U.S. would

almost certainly become involved since America's economic growth and security depend upon continued freedom ofnavigation for both merchant and military shipping. Other nations heavily dependent on maritime commerce could be expected to at leastendorse, if not actively participate in, any U.S.-led enforcement of freedom of navigation along the South China Sea's heavily-travelled sea lanes.

Key to global economic growth

Tangredi, 2 (Sam J., Captain United States Navy and Editor Globalization and Maritime Power, December,http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/01e_intro.htm)

These changes in international security may be most evident in the direct and indirect effects of globalization on the maritime environment and on the

military forces that operate in and from the maritime environment. Such changes become readily apparent due to the nature of the maritime world: through

the historical evolution of international law, the oceans have effectively been globalized for over a centurythat is, their use as what Alfred Thayer Mahanwould call the great common has been open to all nations with the desire, access, and resources to master it. (A discussion of this historical evolution is

found in chapter 12.) The maritime world can also be seen as a primary sourcein recent parlance, a root causeof globalization because it is the medium

by which 90 percent of world trade (when measured by weight and volume) is transported. Without the method ofoceanic trade, the barriers toglobal commerce would be insurmountable, and the history of the world would have been vastly different. E-commerce and the Internet may bethe symbols of the most modern version of globalization, but historically the symbols have been the ever-increasing size and speed of ships and the shrinking

cost of commercial transport. Ultimately, the open ocean is still the prime medium and symbol of globalizationfor the thoughts transmitted along the

Internet must be translated into products, which must in turn be transported to far markets. Even the financial flows that might travel along the wires and

fiber-optic cables of todays information network have the eventual purpose of producing goods that are sold and consumed. If these goods are to be sold and

consumed in somewhere other than a localized, domestic market, they are likely to be transported by sea. Effects on the maritime environmenthave very practicalthough easily ignoredconsequences for U.S. national security and economic well-being. That over 90 percent of

international trade travels by sea is a fact taken for granted; the dependence of the global economy on maritime transport is hardly remarked

upon because, like oxygen, its existence is primarily evident in its absence. Most would agree that seaborne trade is the linchpin of

global economic developmentdevelopment that is ultimately fueled by the transfer of raw materials from sources of supply tomanufacturing centers to markets. It is also acknowledged that, although the transfer of investment and financial services can be done by electronic means

and personnel and light products can be transferred by air, the most practical and lowest-cost method of transferring durable goods is by

water. Clearly, any substantial interference on seaborne commerce would thus have a severe effect on the global economy,

including its leading national economythat of theUnited States. But few can contemplate a drastic disruption or absence of such a critical economicelement.

Nuclear war

Bearden, 2k(T.E. Bearden LTC U.S. Army (ret) Director of Association of Distinguished American Scientists and Fellow

Emeritus, Alpha Foundations Institute for Advanced Study, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly, 6-24-2K,http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm)

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions . Priorto the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have

increased the intensity and number oftheirconflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by

some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starvingNorth Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and

South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China, whose long-range nuclear missiles (some)

can reach the United States, attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutualtreaties involved in such scenarios will quickly drawother nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once

a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The

real legacy ofthe MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/01e_intro.htmhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/01e_intro.htm


21/27


South China Sea Impact Econ

[CONTINUED, NO TEXT REMOVED]

has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible.

As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already

on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of thebiosphere, at least for many decades


22/27


South China Sea Impact Heg

Likely PRC action in the South China Sea risks US Credibility Loss

Ralph A. Cossa 98 (president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, Hawaii. Senior editor of the Forums quarterly electronic journal, ComparativeConnections. Board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Member of the International

Institute for Strategic Studies and the ASEAN Regional Forum Experts and Eminent Persons Group, Founding member of the Steering Committee of themultinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Cossa,%20Security%20Implications%20of


The U.S. has generally maintained a policy of neutrality when it comes to conflicting territorial claims, be they in the Spratlys orelsewhere. Washington has also pointed out that the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty does not automatically cover the Spratlys since they are disputed

territory which were not even claimed by Manila until after the Treaty was signed. For this reason, the PRC's encroachment into uninhabited Mischief Reefin 1995 did not automatically invoke the Treaty--although it did launch endless speculation and complaints from the Manila press that the U.S. was a

"faithless" ally. A PRC military action against a Philippine occupied reef or islet is a different matter, however, as would be a

PRC hostile act against Philippine naval vessels within recognized territorial waters or the high seas--perhaps even within

contested waters in close proximity to the Philippines as well. In all probability, either the Treaty would be invoked under

such circumstances or some other means would be found to provide U.S. support to its Philippine ally. Treaty considerations aside,in my view--and in the opinion of several senior U.S. diplomats and mili tary officers interviewed on a not-for-attribution basis--a serious military action by

the PRC in the Spratlys, particularly (although not necessarily only) if it were against Philippine-occupied territory, would most likely necessitate a strong

U.S. response. If the U.S. is serious about continuing its leadership role in Asia, it could not ignore a blatant PRC act of provocation anymore than it could have ignored the threatening PRC missile tests and military exercises opposite Taiwan in March 1996. A

failure to respond would undermine U.S. credibility and call into question the value of America's bilateral alliances in

Asia.

Resolve and credibility are key to heg---weakness invites revisionist powers to challenge U.S. dominance

Fettweis 4 Christopher Fettweis, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, December 2004, Resolute Eagle or Paper Tiger?Credibility, Reputation and the War on Terror, online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147_index.html

The credibility of a stateforms the basis of its reputation, which is little more than an impression of fundamental national character that servesas a guide for others trying to anticipate future actions.12 The loss of credibility can lead to reputations forweakness, fecklessness, and

irresolution, which, the thinking goes, emboldens enemies and discourages the loyalty of allies. Credibility can be damaged in

many ways, depending on the situation and the observer,but perhaps the surest is to fail to rise to a challenge or to pursue a goalwith sufficient resolve. By doing so, a state may earn a reputation for irresolution, which canencourage more aggressive

actions by revisionist powers.13 Threats made by a state without credibility may not be believed, inspiring the aggressor to

press his advantage, which may lead to a challenge to an interest that is truly vital making a major war unavoidable. Thus the credibility

imperative is also intimately related to the post-war American obsession with appeasement, which is of course a code word for ashow of weakness that inadvertently encourages an aggressor.


23/27


***Aff


24/27


AFF WITHDRAWAL GOOD

Presence in Asia causes China war

Chan, 10 (John, Writer for the San Francisco Gray Panthers, US-China tensions the result of rise of Chinas power, SFGP,

http://mlyon01.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/us-china-tensions-the-result-of-rise-of-chinas-power/, NJ)

These remarks sought to send a message that the US would not allow Beijing to use its economic power to exclude the US from the

region, and would contain China militarily. Clinton was more explicit in comments to reporters on Monday, declaring: Everyones aware that China is arising power of the 21st century. Butpeople want to see theUnited States fully engaged in Asia, so that as China rises the United States is there

as a force of peace. Far from being a force for peace, the US military build-up raises the dangers of conflict between the

two powers. As its economic power has waned, Washington has increasingly used its military might to further its interests. Its alliances

in Asia form part ofa longstanding US strategy of encircling China with allies, strategic partners and military bases. As planned in 2006, the USwill deploy 6 of its 11 aircraft carriers and 60 percent of its submarine fleet in the Pacific this year, shifting from its previous strategic focus on the Atlantic.

The Pentagon is acutely aware of Chinas rising military strength. A recent assessment by the US Office of Naval Intelligence estimated that

Chinas naval expansion would be at its height in the next 1015 years, with one or more aircraft carriers and 75 submarines operating

beyond Taiwan and South China Sea to protect Chinas vital sea lanes, particularly to the Middle East and Africa. The growing rivalry between the

US and China is reverberating throughout the region. Every government has been compelled to try to balance economic relations with Chinaagainst concerns to maintain relations with the US. Those issues would certainly have dominated Clintons discussions in Australia, which relies heavily on

exports of minerals and other raw materials to China, but depends on its military alliance with the US, not least to back its interventions in neighbouringisland states.
http://mlyon01.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/us-china-tensions-the-result-of-rise-of-chinas-power/http://mlyon01.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/us-china-tensions-the-result-of-rise-of-chinas-power/


25/27


AFF Japan Checks

Japanese Regionalism sufficiently contains China

Garret and Glaser, 97 (Banning Garrett, Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council and Bonnie Glaser, Director ofthe Atlantic Council's South Asia Center, 97, Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliancehttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2645655)

The Chinese thus fear that the U.S.-Japan alliance will no longer be a force containing Japan as it has been in the past. Thedirector of a leading foreign policy institute in Beijing indicated that he and other experts are primarily worried "about a stronger Japan under less and less

control of the United States."'0 Many Chinese analysts and commentators predict that if the Defense Guidelines are modified to

allow for regional wartime cooperation, there will be new pressure in Japan to accept the right of collective self- defense,

which would allow Japanese forces to come to the defense of allies under attack. Chinese analysts privately raise the question of

whether the revised Defense Guidelines-to be issued in Fall 1997-will call for Japa- nese forces to cooperate with U.S. forces in combat roles. Even a

logistics role for Japan is viewed as potentially involving combat. A senior PRC Ja- pan expert and former military attache to

Tokyo contended that a logistics role is not only a significant contribution to combat forces but could lead Japanese forces

into direct combat. If a Japanese ship supporting U.S. forces is attacked, he asked, "how should Japan respond? Should itretaliate?" An- other Chinese Japan specialist suggested that Tokyo could face a similar di- lemma in the event that Japanese

military aircraft were shot down attempting to rescue Japanese citizens in Taiwan during a cross-strait military conflict. The

analyst noted that there was a historical precedent for Japan using such a tactic to justify military intervention. "After World War I, the Japanese gov-ernment invaded Shandong under the excuse of rescuing its citizens," the analyst added. This enduring suspicion of Japan's intentions underlies

Chinese concern about the possibility that Japan will revise its Constitution to allow for the right of collective self-defense.Revision of the Peace Constitution would be seen by the Chinese as a dangerous watershed in Japanese post-World War II history. People's Daily assertedthat the Peace Constitution, which re- nounces war forever along with Japan's right to retain armed forces, "repre- sents a demarcation line," and noted that

"once this demarcation line is broken through," there will be reason to worry that Japan will move toward remilitarization.1 Chinese experts maintain

that "rightist forces" in Japan- the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Shinshinto-have been seeking to amend Japan'sConstitution to allow for a broader security role for Tokyo.


26/27


AFF Deterrence Checks

China is deterred from attacking Taiwan Multiple reasons

Office of the Secretary of Defense 09 (ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 2009http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf )

Several factors may deter China from taking military action against Taiwan. First, China does not yet possess the military

capability to invade and conquer the island, particularly when confronted with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Moreover, an

insurgency directed against any PRC presence could tie up PLA forces for years. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would also affect the

interests of Japan and other nations in the region that advocate a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait dispute, and would

likely result in a fundamental re-ordering of the East Asian security architecture. Beijing would also have to factor in its

calculus the potential political and economic repercussions of a military conflict with Taiwan. Chinas leaders recognize that

a war could severely retard economic development. Taiwan is Chinas single largest source of foreign direct investment, and an extendedcampaign would wreck Taiwans economic infrastructure, leading to high reconstruction costs. International sanctions could further damage Beijings

economic development. A conflict would also severely damage the image that Beijing has sought to project and would undermine

the goodwill Beijing has attempted to build through its Harmonious World campaign leading up to and following itssuccessful hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. A conflict could also trigger domestic unrest on the mainland, a

contingency that Beijing appears to have factored into its planning. Finally, Chinas leaders recognize that a conflict over

Taiwan involving the United States would lead to a long-term hostile relationship between the United States and China aresult that would not be in Chinas interests.


27/27


AFF No China Rising

China will not threaten US power now-- focus on economics

China Daily 10 [China Daily: Renowned Chinese politics journal. China's reemergence as a major power doesn't challenge US

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-05/07/content_9822621_2.htm]

Some American experts worry that its leaders' sense of vulnerability could cause China to behave rashly in a crisis. Or as

President Bill Clinton put it in 1999, while most people worry about the challenge of a strong China, "let us not forget the risk of a weakChina, beset by internal conflict, social dislocation and criminal activity; becoming a vast zone of instability in Asia." A

China that cannot control flows of migration, environmental effects on the global climate, and internal conflict poses aserious set of problems. As long as China's economy does grow, it is likely that its military power will increase, thus making

China appear more dangerous to its neighbors. Official Chinese reports of military expenditure do not include many items that are listed in theAmerican defense budget, but regardless of its composition, from 1989 to 2010 China's official military budget increased by double digits every year. TheGulf War in 1991, the tensions over Taiwan in 1995-96, and the Kosovo campaign of 1999 showed Chinese leaders how far China lagged behind in modern

military capabilities, and as a result they nearly doubled military expenditures over the course of the 1990s. Deng Xiaoping once told the UN General

Assembly in 1974 that "China is not a superpower, nor will it ever seek to be one." The current generation of Chinese leaders,

realizing that rapid economic growth is the key to domestic political stability, has focused on economic development andwhat they call a "harmonious" international environment that will not disrupt their growth. Even if this were an accurate

assessment of China's intentions, it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to make this possible. Moreover,Chinese leaders will have to contend with the prices imposed by other countries, as well as the constraints created by their

own objectives of economic growth and the need for external markets and resources. Too aggressive a Chinese military

posture could produce a countervailing coalition among its neighbors in the region that would weaken both its hard and soft

power. But generations change, power often creates hubris, and appetites sometimes grow with eating. Martin Jacques argues that "rising powers in timeinvariably use their newfound economic strength for wider political, cultural and military ends. That is what being a hegemonic power involves, and China

will surely become one."

Chinas military power will not challenge US

Thaindian 10 (Thainidian News March 4, 2010 Chinas military development will not challenge US: PLA Major Generalhttp://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/chinas-military-development-will-not-challenge-us-pla-major-

general_100329548.html0)

Beijing, Mar 4(ANI): A Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Major General and member ofChinas top political advisory body has said thecountrys military development will not challenge the United States. China is the only permanent member of the United

Nations Security Council that has not achieved territorial integrity, The China Daily quoted Major General Luo Yuan, a member of the

Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and senior researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences, as saying. We need to think

more on how to preserve national integrity. We have no intention of challenging the US, he added. Luos remarks came in response toSenior Colonel Liu Mingfu, who recently said in his newly published book that China should build the worlds strongest military. Meanwhile, Zhao Qizheng,

spokesman for the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), said that Chinas military power does not

threaten other countries. Chinas defense spending was just about 1.4 or 1.5 percent of the countrys GDP in recent years.

US defense spending was more than 4 percent of its GDP, which is three times as big as Chinas , Zhao said. Chinas military budgetin 2009 was 70 billion dollars, while US military spending, by contrast, was about 494 billion dollars.
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/chinas-military-development-will-not-challenge-us-pla-major-general_100329548.html0http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/chinas-military-development-will-not-challenge-us-pla-major-general_100329548.html0http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/chinas-military-development-will-not-challenge-us-pla-major-general_100329548.html0http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/chinas-military-development-will-not-challenge-us-pla-major-general_100329548.html0

china influence da seniors ndi 2010

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