China May Be anAdversary, ButMaking It an EnemyWill Not ServeIndiaBY NIRUPAMA RAO ON 06/10/2017 • 16 COMMENTS

Taking a page from our inherent capacity to adjustand be �exible, India should practice a littleunemotional pragmatism.

Is China our enemy or adversary? Credit: Reuters

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Canadian academic and politician Michael Ignatieff once remarked

that an “adversary is someone you want to defeat. An enemy is

someone you have to destroy.” With adversaries, continues Ignatieff,

“compromise is honourable. Today’s adversary could be tomorrow’s

ally. With enemies, on the other hand, compromise is appeasement.”

Is China our enemy or adversary? Do we distinguish between

Ignatieff’s definition of enemy and adversary when it comes to to

China?

Bearing witness to the last three decades in their relationship, I

believe the two countries, India and China, have essentially attempted

to build a “partnership” on the foundations of what is an adversarial

relationship. In the 1950s, the “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” slogan

reverberated. Following the “betrayal” of 1962, we regarded China as

our enemy. Today, it is an adversary with which we must seek

solutions, even if we have not forgotten the battle of Rezang La or the

fall of Tawang.

The experience of the last four decades is our guide. On May Day

1970, Mao Zedong, China’s supreme leader, engaged our chargé

d’affaires in Beijing, Brajesh Mishra on the rostrum at Tiananmen

Square, to say, “We cannot keep on quarrelling like this. We should

try and be friends again” to which Mishra replied, “We are ready to do

it today.” Six years were to pass before the two countries restored

their diplomatic relations to the level of ambassadors. The initiative

was taken by Indira Gandhi, the then prime minister.

The relationship has continued to be an adversarial one, because the

conflict of 1962 is not forgotten. At that fateful time, the whole

country rallied around the flag in an outpouring of patriotic and

nationalist sentiment. Political differences ceased to really matter. In

recognition of the role played by the RSS in civil defence during the

conflict, then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru invited a 3,500-

strong contingent of the organisation to march in the Republic Day

parade of 1963. The Chinese were perceived as having aggressed on

Indian territory and occupied sections of it. Chinese territorial claims

on the northeastern sector of the border, then called NEFA and now

Arunachal Pradesh, were a reminder of an unsettled boundary

between the two countries.

Also read: Why Does India’s ‘Act East’ Policy NotExtend to China?

Chinese support for Pakistan, first with the so-called boundaryagreement of 1963 and then during the 1965 war, were an indicationof the lower depths to which relations had fallen after 1962. Theclashes on the Nathu La from 1967 and the harsh treatment metedout to two of our diplomats, Vijay Pillai and K. Raghunath (later to beforeign secretary), in Beijing by Chinese Communist Party RedGuards during the heyday of the Cultural Revolution only confirmedthe worst suspicions about our largest neighbour.

But by 1976, the border was relatively quieter. The last incidentinvolving loss of life (four Assam Rifles personnel in a Chineseambush) occurred at Tulung La in Arunachal Pradesh in October1975. The normalisation phase had begun with the return of theambassadors. Atal Behari Vajpayee paid a visit to China in 1979 asexternal affairs minister (the visit was cut short due to the Chineseinvasion of Vietnam), then Chinese foreign minister Huang Huafollowed with a visit to India in 1981 and Deng Xiaoping made his“package proposal” to resolve the border question (which we rejectedout of hand). Border talks commenced with little to show by way ofprogress – but dialogue and the “peaceful resolution” of problemsbecame the name of the game. Most Indians had ceased to regardChina as a friend. But, if Pakistan was an enemy, China was now anadversary.

We were crafting a modus vivendi with China. This was an adversarywe had reason to be distrustful of, but not an enemy in the mode ofPakistan. The relationship was no longer seen as a zero-sum game.There was benefit to be drawn from it, if peace could be maintainedon our borders with China, if tensions could be eased, ifcommunication channels were unblocked and trade and people-to-people ties recommenced. A well-managed relationship between twoof the largest countries in the world, in terms of their populations,could be a global public good. There was pragmatism in thisapproach. We could not destroy China. We could defeat it, ultimately,yes, by winning the race of economic development, improving ourinfrastructure, enhancing our military preparedness, proving theresilience of our democracy and our ability to manage diversity.

In Doklam, pragmatic diplomacy triumphed over the threat of dysfunctional conflict.

Credit: PTI

In the summer of 1986, a Chinese encampment was discovered atWangdung in the Sumdorong Chu valley in Arunachal Pradesh. TheChinese even built a helipad at the site of the intrusion. The IndianArmy scrambled to occupy the heights of the Hathongla-LungrolaRidge north of Tawang, overlooking the Namkha Chu and SumdorongChu Valleys. We were accused of (http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-

opinion/A-Himalayan-balancing-act/article14464983.ece) “jockeying forpositions” in the words of one Chinese diplomat. Our occupation ofthe heights, the reinforcing of two forward posts, Jaya and Negi, byour Army in close proximity to the Chinese camp at Wangdung,engendered a stream of hostile propaganda and invective from China.Then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988represented a brave attempt by India to de-escalate these tensions,and the overture succeeded. It built a modicum of mutual trust andseemed to open the way to an eventual resolution of the border issue.

The approach to build relations in all areas, even while continuingefforts to solve the border problem, essentially stems from the 1988visit. The 1993 agreement on peace and tranquility along the Line ofActual Control followed. This writer remembers working on the first,nascent, draft of the agreement in 1991-92 together with the thenChinese ambassador in Delhi, the late Cheng Ruisheng. We took ourinspiration from the experience of the Sino-Soviet border

negotiations, and the concept of “equal and mutual security” thatChina and the erstwhile Soviet Union, later Russia, had defined intheir negotiations.

Also read: At China’s Upcoming Party Congress,

Will Xi Jinping Further Consolidate His Powers?

Despite all this, it is easy to slide into bellicosity and mutualrecrimination as the recent experience of Doklam showed.Fortunately, before things got out of hand, pragmatic diplomacytriumphed over the threat of dysfunctional conflict. The mutualdisengagement practiced at Doklam (https://thewire.in/171738/doklam-

india-china-withdraw-troops-no-clarity-chinas-road-building-efforts/) in an act ofstrategic pragmatism and wise political leadership on both sides haseased the situation, no doubt. To draw reference from Ignatieff, therewas no appeasement, but a compromise was achieved.

From compromise, where do we go? Has the ‘refresh’ button beenpressed in regard to the relationship? This is where the doubtssurface. One cannot escape the impression that the Masood Azharmatter (the buzz among some Chinese officials is that the latter issuewas close to resolution until the Tawang visit of the Dalai Lama wasannounced), our membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and theChina-Pakistan Economic Corridor have together become the sinequa non on which our approach to China is based. Is the day-to-daybilateral relationship functioning smoothly? Maybe, not. In suchcircumstances, another Doklam-like crisis may have unforeseenconsequences.

Allowing an adversarial relationship to slip into a corrosive ‘enemy’mode would be unfortunate. What is the calculus of advantage to usin such a scenario? The Americans for instance, practice a great dealof give and take in their relations with China. When transactingeveryday business becomes obstacle-ridden, with no quarter given,then we need not be rocket scientists to determine where we areheaded. Let the relationship be process-driven in order to ensure amodus operandi that works and is not broken. Throwing the gauntletis only worth it if we have made sober calculations about our end

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game. Taking a page from our inherent capacity to adjust and beflexible, let us practice a little unemotional pragmatism. RestoringChina to enemy status is not a desirable, or sustainable, goal.

Nirupama Rao (https://thewire.in/author/nirupama­rao/) is a formerforeign secretary and ambassador to China and the US.

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• Reply •

Inst • 2 days ago

I'd also say that Indian elites are fundamentally aligned with

Vishnu; they do not favor growth because growth implies progress,

which implies the destruction of their political and economic

dominance. They are not revolutionary, as in Shiva, nor are they

constructive, as in Brahma. Indian elites are ultimately happy with

the society they have, with a society with themselves at the apex and

with poor social mobility. This is why every progressive Indian

leader has been outside the standard Brahmin hierarchy; Modi is

from a reserved caste, Manmohan Singh was a Sikh.

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• Reply •

Inst • 2 days ago

see more

The big problem of Indian politics is that it does not recognize that

it proceeds from a position of weakness. The Indians are positivistic

seeing things in terms of force as opposed to potentialities, and

waste money and time on military build-ups when it's better to

focus on the economy and exploiting Chinese trade-links.

It's sort of bizarre; India is a country dominated by Brahmins, while

China is a country dominated by Kshatriya. Yet in India, either the

Kshatriya run amok without Brahmin guidance or Brahmins

attempt to play the role of Kshatriya as parody. In China, however,

the Kshatriya act with Brahmin wisdom and have played their

position of weakness with skill.

India, basically, has two options. One, it can fully enter the

American camp and hope that the United States, indebted as it is, is

willing to finance aid and development projects to build up India's

competitiveness. This may be difficult considering that the United

States under the Trump administration is headed for an economic

bl t d th t th U it d St t i i i l i d bt d

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srinivasan vr • 2 days ago

A good piece of advice from a veteran diplomat.

But Nirupamaji,

Taking further the quotes from your article in different

paragraphs,reproduced below

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• Reply •

<<“adversary is someone you want to defeat. An enemy is someone

you have to destroy.” AND This (CHINA) was an adversary we had

reason to be distrustful of, but not an enemy in the mode of

Pakistan.>>

Does this mean Pakistan should be destroyed as per this theory?

I would appreciate your views on this.

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• Reply •

M Henri Day • 2 days ago

I suggest that one of the most important goals of Indian foreign

policy should be to neither make China an «adversary» or an

«enemy», but rather a friend and partner. The same, mutatismutandi should also be one of Chinese foreign policy's primary

goals. Antagonism between these two immense Asian powers only

serves to benefit another state actor, which is why that power

encourages it at every turn....

Henri

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• Reply •

RationalFearOfTerror • 2 days ago

China is an Enemy, Confronting an Enemy Will Serve India and the

Rest of the World

If one studies the duplicitous dissimulation policy of the

Communist Party to piece by piece take China's

political/social/geographical space and then appropriate neighbors

territories such as Vietnam's India's, Tibet,....space, and as the

rhetoric and behavior has not changed ie wishing peace and

harmony with all, claiming a desire unfulfilled of playing by

international norms, economic, diplomatic, military whilst moving

into others space, developing allies at the same time jettisoning

others as needs be = it is a very dangerous path to tread pretending

Adversary does not equal Enemy.

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• Reply •

Sethi • 2 days ago

I do not entirely agree with Ms Rao . Each nation state has to

pursue it's own self interest just like China does . Let us not be

emotional

about it . in international relations there are no no permanent

friends or foes . Let us very level headed about it . Be aware of what

is happening with China on the relationship front and carry a big

stick . That is the solution .

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Ravikumar • 3 days ago

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• Reply •

Time for India to push China to accept LoC as international border or move awayfrom one China policy and announce Tibet independence and recognise Taiwan'sindependence and open its embassy in New Delhi.△ ▽

• Reply •

Ankur • 3 days ago

Making enemies do not serve anyone ...and it works both ways. China has a superiority complex and he is trying to play big bosswith all his neighbors (including india). We must aim for goodrelation with china. But relation should be based on mutual respectfor each other.△ ▽

• Reply •

Ravikumar • 3 days ago

When China is relentlessly trying to destroy enemy India; there isno difference in India considering China as just an adversary in factit'll make India let its guard down. India has to treat China as anenemy whether we show it publicly or not India must take all itsdecisions considering China as its enemy only. 3△ ▽

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Rick Elgin • 3 days ago

Cover your eyes with wool if you like. But when you do awake thereality does remain the same. If China is not India's enemy ,who is?If the Chinese had not considered India as its enemy why are theymilitary encircling it? India had lived without Chinese imports till2000 ,but now believe it is invetible . If they dont pull up their actand get things together, industrially and militarily. India is in deepdeep trouble the biggest threat naturally , is the dragon of course. Their is another pathway which many are too willing to take . Accept the overlordship of China and become a vassal state like thedear neighbour next door. India its time you woke up from this deathly slumber .Get up andact NOW.△ ▽

Inst • 2 days ago> Rick Elgin

In Chinese history, multiple states have accepted theoverlordship of stronger powers, only to backstab theirformer master when they weaken. Yue's campaign againstWu is a case in point; Yue never forgot its humiliation by theWu kingdom, but was able to feign submission until Wuoverextended, all the while expanding its military andeconomic base. In Japanese history, of the three unifiers ofthe Japanese state, Nobunaga was said to threaten,Hideyoshi was said to contrive, and Ieyasu was said to wait.

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Hideyoshi was said to contrive, and Ieyasu was said to wait.

It was the last Shogun that stabilized Japan and inaugurated