china navy i

8/9/2019 China Navy I

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PART 1:

China's New Need for a Maritime Focus

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society domestically, from nearbyneighbors or through the great Silk Road.

In recent years, however, China has beg

to develop a blue-water expeditionarynavy, brought on by its transition from an

agricultural economy to an industrialeconomy. China now needs resources f

beyond its shores as well as new and

secure trade routes, and it must look tothe sea to achieve these imperatives. But

developing and deploying an oceangoing

force with global reach will not be easy

Editors Note: This is the first part of a three-part series

istorically, China has been very much a land power, getting most of what it needs for its agricultural

un

rom

.

on Chinas development of a blue-water

navy.

inese Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will mark its 60th anniversary April 23 with a fleet

review off Qingdao, the headquarters of the PLANs North Sea Fleet. The highlights of the review will

ent

centered along the Yellow and Yangtze rivers

and protected by a combination of natural features, such as mountains and deserts, and acquired

nd

ts own natural resources to support its

population. What it couldnt get or produce at home was brought in primarily by land. Chinese

lked the

tayed primarily within the confines

of the South China Sea, with some excursions into the Indian Ocean. While this period saw the

Yuan Dynasty in the 13th century, when China was part of the Mongol Empire, Kublai Khanattempted to use sea power to extend the empires reach to Japan and Southeast Asia. This brief two-

tes

The Ch

be the destroyers Haikou (171) and Wuhan (169), both of which are scheduled to return to China from

deployment off the Somali coast sometime in late March. The Somali anti-piracy operation represents

another step in an expanding role for the PLAN that is driven in part by Chinas changing economy.This new role places Beijing on a maritime collision course with its neighbors, including Japan and

India, and ultimately with the United States.

Limiters on Chinas Naval Developm

China historically has been a land power, with its core

buffer zones like Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. As such, China has developed over

time as an enclosed continental power surrounded by potential enemies, defending interminable laborders and harassed along the coast by regional rivals.

For much of its history, China was largely able to rely on i

international trade focused on the land routes into Central Asia and beyond, following the great SiRoad. This further focused Chinese military power on preserving these land routes, and it reducfunding and the need for a heavy focus on maritime power.

From the ninth through the 14th century, Chinese maritime trade s

establishment of Chinese trading settlements in Southeast Asia, the Chinese state did not pursue a

major colonizing effort or seek to establish a true empire through these trading ports. The Chineselandmass provided ample space and resources. As kingdoms in China rose and fell, the intervening

dynasties and competing states were focused firmly on the shifting land borders and terrestrial

threats.

During the

decade effort was abandoned, however, due to military failures and raw economics; the security andextension of the western land-based trade routes allowed the Yuan Dynasty to carry out whatever

trade it wished all the way to Europe. While Chinese states had been trading along the Silk Roadroutes for centuries, with varying degrees of security and control, under the Mongol empire the rou

were once again secured and expanded.
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With the decline and collapse of the Yuan empire in the latter half of the 14th century, the HanChinese Ming replaced the Mongol Yuan leadership. In the early 15th century, several factors coincided

to trigger a rapid (but brief) expansion of Chinese maritime trade and power.

The fracturing

of the Mongol

Empire and themilitary

activities of

Tamerlane in

Central andSouthwest Asiaat the end of

the 14th

centuryundermined

the security ofthe Silk Road

trade routesonce again. In

China,meanwhile, the

Ming

consolidatedand expanded

power alongthe southern

periphery and

beganlaunching

attacks to the north to keep the Mongols at bay; Tamerlanes planned invasion of China collapsed withhis death in 1405. With the Ming at the height of their power in the first quarter of the 15th century

and the land routes to the west disrupted, China embarked upon a series of major maritime

expeditions over three decades, seeking new trade and demonstrating the power of the Chineseempire.

From 1405 to 1433, the Ming court eunuch Zheng He, a Muslim, led a massive Chinese fleet complete

with treasure ships, support ships and a substantial military escort on a series of seven voyagesthrough Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and Africa. Zheng and his treasure fleets

carried out trade in goods and technology, demanded (sometimes with military force) recognition ofthe centrality of the Chinese emperor, established or enhanced Chinese trading ports throughout the

region and brought gifts and luxuries back to the Ming court.

While there are conflicting historical claims as to how far Zhengs fleets sailed, and the recorded size ofsome of his ships has been questioned, it is generally agreed that the flotilla was one of the pre-

eminent displays of naval power of that time. Yet just as quickly as China launched its foray into naval

exploration and power, it ended it, destroying the treasure fleets (and many records of their activities)after three expeditionary decades.

Three factors contributed to this. First was court politics, an ongoing factional conflict between inner-court eunuchs and Confucian scholars (the latter backed in part by Chinese merchants who were losing

out because of the state-run trading expeditions). Then there was the argument that expenditures on

the treasure fleet were emptying the Chinese treasury with little to show in return. This view held thatthe trips were not profitable, that they were merely the frivolities of a wealthy and powerful Chinese

elite and that money spent on sending expeditions abroad was not available for coastal defense

against the ravages of Japanese pirates. Finally, there was the fact that land expeditions into Mongolia


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Other minerals pose problems as well.While domestic production of bauxite

grew from 3.2 million metric tons in 1987to 30 million metric tons in 2007, imports

surged from a mere 323,000 metric tons

to more than 30 million metric tons overthe same period, causing imports to shift

from 9 percent of consumption to abouthalf. Perhaps most troubling for China is

the inadequacy of its domestic copper-

mining industry. Production of the metalincreased from 350,000 metric tons in

1987 to 946,000 metric tons in 2007.Imports, meanwhile, shot up from

116,000 metric tons in 1987 to morethan 3 million metric tons in 2007. This

disparity has caused Chinas reliance oncopper imports to increase from 25

percent in 1987 to a whopping 76

percent in 2007.

With China growing ever more dependent

on foreign commodities and markets, its

supply lines were becoming increasinglyvulnerable, and the Chinese navy had

little capability or even doctrinal guidanceto protect Chinas interests far beyond its

shores. By the mid-1990s, China was

facing a stark reality regarding its supply-line vulnerability if it wanted to maintain

its economic growth. Options werelimited:

Accept the vulnerability(particularly if the cost of

developing and deploying navalprotection exceeds the potential

risk and cost of a disruption oftrade) or ally with a naval power

to protect Chinas interests.

Reduce vulnerability bydiversifying trade routes and

patterns, including pushing intoCentral Asia and Southeast Asia.

Devise a counterweight to defend Chinese trade routes and supply lines i.e., develop a morerobust navy.

Chinas economic shift and rising economic power meant that the risk of inaction finally outweighed

the cost of ensuring maritime security. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China began tapping intoCentral Asian energy resources, but this was only a stopgap measure. It was time for the Chinese

navy to reassert itself not only as a defender of the coast, but also as a force that could travel the

worlds oceans and protect Chinas emerging maritime interests.

Next: Chinas plan for a blue-water fleet


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