China’s Gathering Amphibious and Airborne Expeditionary Capabilities

Richard D. Fisher Jr., Senior Fellow International Assessment and Strategy Center

www.strategycenter.net For IDGA’s Amphibious Operations Summit

May 21, 2012

Credit for LHD photo here and slide 16 : DTM

Summary China’s Communist Party leadership views the acquisition of greater global power as necessary to sustain its political dictatorship. As China deploys increasingly modern and long-range naval and air assets, there will be an increase in China-US military posturing combined with both coercive and cooperative diplomacy. China is using its considerable and growing “soft power” to leverage strategic influence. China’s record of participation in Peace Mission exercises is one of increasing sophistication. By the 2020s ,China could have a force of 4 to 5 aircraft carriers and up to 12 large amphibious assault ships. PLA development of modern carrier fighters and possible STOVL fighters will put it on a near par with the U.S. Navy and Marine air forces. Both PLA Marine, and much larger PLA Army Amphibious, forces have stressed increasing mechanization and firepower. Current limited formal PLA airlift assets could be expanded considerably with civilian “militia” cargo lift. Expected development of the “Y-20” could give the PLA an airlifter similar in capability to the C-17. Formal PLA Airborne forces have been mechanized over the last decade, and new medium-weight armor and the Y-20 will give the PLA a formidable future air expeditionary capability. China’s space program is a PLA-Space program to the Moon and beyond, and the PLA will derive “dual use” benefits all along the way toward controlling the “Earth-Moon System.” Bottom Line: By the 2020s , US Marines will not be alone in the Expeditionary business, and may have a tough competitor.

Indications of China’s Expeditionary Power Projection Ambitions “we will not seek hegemony…” -- Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guangli, June 5, 2011 Singapore This common phrase used by Chinese officials for decades belies China’s requirement to exercise greater world leadership in order for China’s Communist Party to sustain its continued dictatorship. The last decade has provided significant indicators that China will seek military power commensurate with its economic power. 1. Increasing dependence on overseas resources and markets creates strong interest in a globally-capable navy to secure maritime access—don’t want to depend on Washington. 2. December 2004, new “Historic Missions” for the PLA announced by the Communist Party Leadership, to include increasingly defending the Party’s interests abroad. 3. For the first time, the 2011 Defense White Paper highlights “Maintaining World Peace and Stability” as a major mission for China’s military. 4. From 2007 onward, Chinese academics and officials debate whether China should seek overseas military bases, while investing in the “String of Pearls” -- building new civil port facilities that could in the future lead to naval access. In November 2011, China “invited” to base anti-piracy forces in the Seychelles. 5. The need to secure the South China Sea and East China Sea for military and resource goals necessitates new military forces able to operate 1000+km from China’s shores. 6. “Land-locked” Shanghai Cooperation Organization trends toward being far more “maritime” with potential addition of Pakistan, India and Iran as formal members. 7. Preparing to control the Earth-Moon System and reach the “ultimate high ground,” the Moon — strategic position and Helium-3.

Early 2011: China-US-Neighbors Military Interaction March 4: The Philippines files a protest with China over an incident near the Reed Bank in which Manila said two Chinese patrol boats threatened to ram a survey ship. March 28: The Philippines says it has increased air and naval patrols and plans to upgrade an airstrip on an island it occupies in the South China Sea to strengthen its claim on the disputed area. April 13: The Philippines protests to the United Nations over China's claim's to disputed areas in the South China Sea, saying Beijing's stance has no basis under international law. May 18: PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli visits Singapore. May 20-21: Chinese survey ships spotted off of Palawan; PLA fighters intercept Philippine OV-10s on patrol. May 27: Vietnam says three Chinese patrol boats challenged a Vietnamese ship exploring for oil in the South China Sea, damaging equipment and warning the ship that it was violating Chinese territory. May 28: China criticizes Vietnam for its offshore exploration of oil and gas in the South China Sea. June 1: Manila says Chinese navy boats erected pillars, set a buoy and unloaded materials near Amy Douglas Bank, inside the Philippines exclusive economic zone, and says any construction would violate a the code of conduct. June 1st week: 11 PLAN ship formation spotted by Japanese aircraft near Ryukus. June 5: U.S. Sec Def Robert Gates suggests U.S. may want to station two new Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore. June 5: China's Defense Minister Liang Guangli in Singapore tells an Asian defense forum that his country's growing economic and military power was not a threat, saying Beijing is not seeking hegemony and will not threaten any country. June 5: PLA and Indonesian Special Forces in Indonesia for exercise “Sharp Knife 2011.” June 8: China steps up criticism of the Philippines in a fresh exchange of invective over disputed waters, calling on Manila to stop infringing its sovereignty with irresponsible claims over the South China Sea.. June 11: Vietnam announces live fire drill, and welcomes international support to maintain peace in the “Eastern Sea.” June 12: 11 ship PLA Navy force exercises east of Taiwan. June 12: Taiwan legislator calls for redeployment of Marines to Taiping Island, the major Taiwan island in the Spratly Group. June 13: Vietnam holds live-fire exercise off of coast. June 13: Reports that the U.S. will send to destroyers to exercise with Philippines Navy near Palawan. June 13: Reports that China will move a new huge oil exploration rig into the South China Sea. June 14: People’s Liberation Army Daily resolutely “opposes any country unrelated to the South China Sea issue meddling in disputes, and it opposes the internationalisation of the South China Sea issue.” June 14: Chinese Foreign Ministry says China will not use force or threat of force in South China Sea. June 14: Two U.S. Senators co-sponsor resolution critical of China’s actions in South China Sea, call for U.S. leadership in mediation. June 14: U.S. Ambassador in Manila states, “The Philippines and the US are strategic allies. We will continue to consult and work with each other on all issues, including [the] South China Sea and Spratly Islands.” June 16: Singapore Center for International Law conference on joint development of South China Sea. June 17: China starts three days of military exercises in the South China Sea. June 20: Chinese reports say maritime surveillance personnel will increase to 15,000 from 9,000. June 28: U.S. Navy destroyers arriving in Palawan for Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises.

Early 2012: China-US-Neighbor Military Interaction—After the US “Pivot” Oct-Nov 2011: Sec. State Clinton then President Obama make clear the U.S. “pivot” or “rebalance” toward Asia. Early April, 2012: US Air Force “Operation Chimichanga” exercise reportedly prepares for long-range strikes against China. April 8-10: Chinese trawlers intercepted in Scarborough Shoal by Philippine Navy; two Chinese Fisheries protection ships appear. April 14: After week of intense standoff, apparent stand down reversed as China sends new ships to Shoal. April 15: 28th Philippine-US Balikatan exercises begin; US and Philippine troops exercise on Palawan Island. April 15: In North Korea’s military parade, a new North Korean ICBM is revealed to be carried by a Chinese-made TEL. April 22-27: 18 PLA Navy ships and 7 Russian Pacific Fleet ships hold exercises. April 24: Chinese Y-12 patrol aircraft buzzes Japanese destroyer in East China Sea. May 8: Japan MSDF reports formation of five PLAN ships led by LPD 988 are 650km Southwest of Okinawa, amid continued standoff at Scarborough Shoal. Preceded by weeks of intensifying Chinese government approved vitriol against Manila. May 7: In a Pentagon press con, PLA Defense Minister Liang Guanglie implies his visit was a response to Washington’s 2011 decision not to sell new F-16s to Taiwan. Liang visits LCAC in San Diego, rides MV-22 and tours F-15E base. May 11: Chinese government denies that its Guangzhou MR and South Sea Fleet have entered state of “combat readiness.” May 11: Thailand sends 126 of its Marines to China to begin exercise “Blue Commando 2012.” May 15: USS North Carolina, SSN 777, makes port call at Subic Bay.

“Soft” Military Power Projection Ten PLA Navy squadrons sent to anti-piracy patrols off of Somalia since the end of 2008. Increasing interaction and demonstrations for Foreign Military Attaches; increasing global naval interaction. China now one of the largest contributors to UN sponsored peacekeeping operations; 2/11 PLA General Cmdr of Cyprus PKO Participating in multinational naval exercises sponsored by Pakistan and Singapore. PLA Air Force exercises Turkish Air Force, September 2010, with Pakistan AF in April 2011. Increasing military interaction in Southeast Asia: PLA Marines to Thailand October 2010 ; PLA Spec Ops to Indonesia in June 2011; host Thai Marines in May 2012; muted interest in joint ASEAN military exercises in 2008 Willingness to consider joint operations: Indonesia-PLA joint maritime patrols in 2010 Greater promotion of military arms sales, CETC at FIDAE, Chile, March 2012. Hospital ship cruise to Cuba and Caribbean in late 2011-2012.

Seychelles: First Overseas PLA “Base” ? December 2, 2011 “invitation” by Seychelles President James Michel to visiting Defense Minister Liang Guanglie preceded by “offer” to host a Chinese military presence as early as a year before. Offer also preceded by significant diplomacy: economic aid for Seychelles; Peace Ark hospital ship visit in October 2010; two PLA Navy frigates visit in April 2011; gifting of two Y-12 aircraft in June 2011. Seychelles has publicly mentioned it has discussed stationing of Chinese Y-12s for anti-piracy patrols, though ship logistic support is likely under consideration. The Seychelles has hosted U.S. drones since 2009, which have been used for anti-terror and anti-piracy missions.

PEACE MISSION 2005—In China—PLA Army+PLA Navy+ PLAAF August 2005, Shandong Peninsula—moved from Fujian Province First time PRC invites a foreign military for exercises on its territory; 20,000 total troops Tri-service exercises; Russia sends Backfire bombers, Su-27, ABN, Naval Infantry Naval exercises near Vladivostok; air exercises; joint amphib landing

Peace Mission 2007—To Russia—PLA Army + PLAAF August 9-17, 2007; 1st foreign deployment of PLA units—to Russia PLAAF joint force Cmdr; Hu Jintao attends New “projection” strategies formulated 1,600-1,700 troops from Nanjing and Beijing MRs ABN, JH-7A fighter bombers, Z-9G attack helos by air; WZ551 IFVs and PTL02 anti-tank by rail

Peace Mission 2009—In China—PLA Army + PLAAF July 22-26, 2009 Taonan Combined Tactical Training Base, Shenyang MR About 3,000 total troops Followed high profile Xinjiang riots

Peace Mission 2010—In Almaty, Kazakhstan—PLA Army + PLAAF September 9-26, 2010 Represents “exercises becoming institutionalized and standardized…strategic projection gradually increased, and gradually resolve our lack of training in foreign countries.” 1,000 PLA troops sent; T-99 tank, PTL02 anti-tank, WZ551; Type 95 AAA, PCL03 122mm sp arty, “Humvee” First foreign use of complex PLAAF force of H-6 bombers, J-10 fighters, H-6 tankers and KJ-2000 AWACS First joint “projection” across the Chinese border that involved “airpower” supporting ground forces, albeit in a staged exercise

Naval Expeditionary Asset: Aircraft Carriers First STOBAR carrier transferred from Ukraine in 2002; rebuilt; 7x trials by May 2012; first jet aircraft tests expected in 2012; may start training/exercises/demonstrations by 2015. Electronics and systems development/training carrier being completed in Wuhan. February 2009: Asahi Shimbun reports from Chinese sources that two nuclear powered carriers will be built in the 2020s, following the construction of two non-nuclear powered carriers. May 2012: Taiwan’s National Security Bureau director states China will build two carriers starting in 2013 and 2015, with delivery expected by 2020 and 2022. Carrier training in North Sea Fleet, first major carrier base in Sanya on Hainan Island.

Naval Expeditionary Asset: Gathering Carrier Air Wing

Speculation: Shenyang J-15 and Boeing F/A-18E/F

China’s Potential Carrier Fighters Vs Boeing F/A-18E/F

Boeing F/A-18E/F Block 2

Shenyang J-11B+/J-15 (data estimated)

Multi Role: Anti-Air and Ground/Naval Attack Capable

Yes Yes

G Limit +7.6 8+ Wing Area 500 sqft 666sqft Max wing loading (less is better)

132 lbs/sqft @100lbs/sqft

Engine 2x GE-414-400 (2x 22,000 lbs thrust)

2x WS-10A (2x 29,106lbs)

Aerial Refueling Yes Yes

Supercruise potential None None

Thrust vectoring No Available option Helmet Display Joint Helmet Mounted

Cuing System Yes

AESA Radar AN/APG-79 Range: 150+km ?(air target) Tracking ?; Targeting: ?

Soon will feature a Chinese developed AESA radar

High Off-Boresight Air to Air Missile

AIM-9X 10-20km range PL-10, 10-20km range

Self-Guided BVR AAM AIM-120D, @100km range

PL-12 70-100km range

Very Long Range BVR Missile Development of ramjet powered AAM cancelled in 2011.

Ramjet powered AAM in development; estimate 100-200km range

Anti-Ship Missile AGM-84H SLAM-ER, 270km range

“YJ-62” 500+ km range; C-803K , 200+km; YJ-91, 110km range

Source: Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft; Jane’s Air Launched Weapons; Yefim Gordon and Peter Davidson; press reports; interview data; and author estimates

Naval Expeditionary Asset: Type 071 Landing Platform Dock (LPD) 3x Type 071 LPD launched; two in the South Sea Fleet, up to 6 expected. 14-20,000tons displacement; 800-1,000 troop capacity; 2-3 Z-8 size helicopters; 3-4 LCAC hovercraft in well deck. Well deck can also accommodate 30+ ZBD-05 size armored fighting vehicles; additional space for heavy tanks.

Naval Expeditionary Asset: Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) Type 081 ? Existence of LHD program to compliment LPD program first reported in 2006, confirmed in May 2007 at IMDEX show in Singapore. Reports indicate the PLA Navy may acquire up to six LHDs. While the subject of considerable speculation, in April 2012 at a Bangkok arms show the China Shipbuilding Co. reveals a new model of a LHD that shows considerable influence from the French Mistral design. Specs: 20,000 tons; 180 meters; capacity for 1,000 troops; 2x Type 730 CIWS; 4x 25mm guns. Well deck not shown on model, but assumed to be there. No. of aircraft and vehicle capacity unknown.

Army Expeditionary Asset: Amphibious Army Modernization and expansion of Army amphibious capabilities has been a key focus for PLA Army modernization. In the last decade an estimated 25 infantry and armored divisions and brigades have conducted some kind of amphibious training, or about a quarter of the total force. Leading amphibious would be followed by more numerous regular units. While the main focus in against Taiwan, there is ample capability to support Korean, South China Sea and Vietnam scenarios. Mechanization has seen two generations of new amphibious vehicles enter leading amphibious units in the last decade. Armored units include the new 3rd gen ZBD05 tank/IFV family and increasingly, the T-96 medium tank. 2nd gen T-63C amphib tank only now with 31st Group Army. There has also been a clear emphasis on gathering the requisite specialized engineering and beach breaching systems to support amphib ops. There is a distinct lack of formal amphibious lift that would have to be supplemented by ships taken up from trade (STUFT).

Estimated PLA Army Leading And Follow-on Amphibious Capable Units Nanjing MR 1st Group Army 1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry DIV

10th Armored DIV 9th Artillery DIV 3rd Motorized BDE 5th Army Aviation RGT

31st Group Army 86th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry DIV Armored BDE 10th Army Aviation RGT

12th Group Army 179th Special Landing BDE Guangzhou MR 42st Group Army 124th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry DIV

9th Armored BDE 163rd Motorized Infantry DIV 1st Artillery DIV 6th Army Aviation RGT

41st Group Army 123rd Amphibious Mechanized Infantry DIV Armored BDE 132nd BDE (Hainan Island) 121 Motorized Infantry DIV

Jinan MR 54th Group Army 11th Armored DIV (?)

1st Army Aviation RGT

Naval Expeditionary Asset: PLA Marines Subordinate to the PLA Navy Two Brigades based near South Sea Fleet HQ of Zhanjiang Taiwan and South China Sea focus Marines contributed to PeaceMission 2005 and to Gulf of Aden missions; small garrisons for Paracel/Spratly islands No organic aviation assets, relies on PLA Naval Aviation Joint exercises with Army Amphib units Will likely have access to more helicopters, perhaps future VSTOL fighters, following entry of Type 081 LHD

PLA Marines Unit HQ Year Founded 1st Brigade Zhanjiang, South Sea Fleet 1980 164th Brigade Zhanjiang, South Sea Fleet 1997 Total Troops: 12,000 Brigade Structure: 1-2 BTN Amphib Armored, each w/ 30-40 ZBD-05, T-63A tanks 4-5 BTN Amphib Infantry, each w/ 30-40 ZBD-05 IFV, T-63C APC 1 BTN Arty w/ Type 89 or PLZ 07B 122mm SP arty 1 Amphib Recon Unit 1 BTN Missile w/ ATGW and shoulder launched SAMs 1 BTN Engineer and Chemical Defense 1 BTN Communication and Guards I BTN Maintence

Investing in Specialized Amphibious Assault Systems “Informatization” enables increasing “jointness” with other services. Purchasing/producing up to 4-6 Ukrainian Zubr large hovercraft; 3x MBT or 10 APC + 140 troops or 500 troops Specialized beach obstacle breaching rockets launched from LCUs Specialized beach breaching surfacing for vehicles Experimentation with artillery on civilian ships; MLRS put on older ships

3rd Gen ZBD05 Amphib Family vs U.S. Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)

ZBD05 vs EFV

Weight 20+ tons 38tons

Water Speed @12-15kts 25kts

Versions IFV, Tank, Command, ARG IFV/Command

Armament: Gun IFV: 30mm cannon Tank: 105mm gun w/

30mm cannon

Armament: Missile

Laser-guided gun launched missile for tank; HJ-3 for IFV

None

Crew/Troops 3/9 3/17

Status In service in PLA Army and Marine units since 2006-2007; about 500+ in service

Cancelled

Naval Expeditionary Asset: Type 07B/ PLZ07B 122mm gun armed amphibious howitzer First seen in November 2009; by mid-2012 about 130 are deployed in PLA Army amphibious and PLA Marine artillery units. Weight: close to 20 metric tons. Uses wave plane derived from that on ZBD-05. Derived from the Norinco PLZ-07A, which is non amphibious, of which about 260 have been built since 2008. This variant has also been seen participating in amphibious exercises; requires transport to beach by LST or LCU. Such an amphibious howitzer is unique to the PLA and provides heavy fire support for opposed landings, perhaps to compensate for the PLA’s lack of sufficient air support for amphibious assaults during the current period.

Naval Expeditionary Asset: Type 726 Hovercraft Model revealed in 2005; prototype emerges in 2007. First distant deployment in 2010. One built; engines for two more built in 2011.

Type 726 vs U.S. Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Type 726 (1) LCAC

Deployed 2009-2010 1982 Length 33m 26.4m

Width 16.8m 14.3m

Deck Length 28.8 20.4mm

Engines 2x QC-70 turbofan, 7,000kw each

4x TF-40/ ETF-40B turbofan, 3,400kw each

Weight 170 tons 165 tons

Payload 60 tons 60-75 tons

Speed 50 kts ? 40-70 kts

Range 200 nm 200nm

1. Estimates, though from a Chinese source.

Naval Expeditionary Asset: Possible Program for STOVL Fighter In early 2005 this analyst was told of the Chengdu Aircraft Co.’s interest in a “F-35 like program” by a Chinese source, which might have meant that a possible program decision was meant for the next, 2006, Five Year Plan. Numerous Russian and Chinese sources have noted the PLA’s high interest in the Russian Yak-131 STOVL fighter. Though it yielded troubled prototypes, Yakovlev reportedly proposed better version of the Yak-131. On or about April 18, 2012, the Asahi Shimbun reported that a “J-18” V/STOL fighter had been tested.

Air Expeditionary Asset: Current Lift @ 20 Ilyushin Il-76MD transports, 40-50 tons cargo capacity. Lingering chance of buying 30-40 more. @ 20-30 Xian Y-8 medium transports, 18-20 tons cargo capacity. Xian Y-9, modern medium transport with a 20 ton capacity, sees first prototype in 2011. Huge potential for cargo lift in civil airlines integrated into “militia” support: Up to 80+ Boeing 747F, 777F, 757F; and 737 Combi + @ 10 DC-10F cargolifters. This total would include Hong Kong airlines. This asset is increasingly exploited for PLA trans-regional mobility exercises, and could be used for follow-on force inputs after airports are captured by formal PLA Airborne or Special Forces units. April 2012: First exposure of China Southern B747F carrying ZBD-03 ABN IFV. 1,000+ civil Boeing and Airbus airliners also available for “militia” support operations. @20 H-6 refuels in PLAAF and PLANAF, PLAAF exercises with Russian Il-76MD refuelers.

Air Expeditionary Asset: Xian “Y-20” Strategic Transport, Appearance Imminent Program likely dates to 2001 Five Year Plan, prototype could emerge in 2012 or 2013. Four turbofan transport; 50 to 60 ton cargo capacity. Benefitting from Ukrainian (Antonov) and Russian technology inputs. Two-to-three indigenous Chinese 30,000 lbs thrust high bypass turbofan programs may support Y-20. Or it could initially use Russian turbofan engines.

Air Expeditionary Asset: Potential Refueler, Xian 4-Turbofan Passenger Transport Images emerge in 2005 time frame, indicating it may be a program dating to 2001 Five Year Plan. Despite repeated inquiries, Chinese officials from AVIC and Xian will not explain this program. In December 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao was famously photographed by a model of this airliner concept. It appears to be a wide-body aircraft similar in size to the Boeing 767, which would require about 4x of the 30,000 lbs thrust turbofans being developed by China. In late May 2012, China’s COMAC and Russia’s Ilyushin sign pact to co-develop a widebody airliner based on Il-96. Production may take place in China, meaning that China could produced its own version with Russian technology, repeating the history of Sukhoi Su-27 “co-production” in China. This aircraft will likely be used for multiple military missions by China, such as a refueling platform to enable global reach for a future “Y-20” heavylift transport.

Air Expeditionary Asset: 15th Airborne Corp High priority for modernization in last decade. 1 ABN Corps; 3 ABN Divisions, @35,000 troops Under Direct Command of CMC as Rapid Reaction Unit. Strategy/Doctrine indicators toward “independent” and “decisive” operations; significant influence from Russian VDV. Taiwan priority, but also exercises in Tibet, Chengdu quake. Increasing mechanization: ZBD-03 IFV, also basis for new tracked carrier; light trucks, SUVs, and jeeps. Artillery: towed 122mm; 107mm MLR; 25mm AAA; MANPADS; 60mm mortar; ATGM; PF98 rockets. Use of Russian “Shelf” ram-air cushion landing system.

15th Airborne Army (HQ: Xiaogan, Hubei, Guangzhou MR)

Division Headquarters 43rd ABN Div Kaifeng, Henan Province Special Operations Unit 43rd Div 44th ABN Div Guangshui, Hubei Province 45th ABN Div Wuhan, Hubei Province

Air Projection: PLA 15th Airborne Corp Airfield Attack Exercise, 2011

New Addition: Organic Helicopter Units for the 15th ABN 2x Regiments of 18x Z-9W Attack Helicopters, likely starting after 2005 No indication they are “air droppable” but likely can be moved to support internal or regional scenarios. In May 2012, a Chinese report notes that the Jingdazhen helicopter combine is in the process of expanding its production facilities to support production of nearly 300 helicopters a year by 2017 time frame.

Air Expeditionary Asset: Future Medium Weight Armor Advent of the “Y-20” will allow airborne projection of new medium weight armor mechanized units now being built for the PLA Army. The Norinco ZBD-09 18-25+ ton 8x8 APC family includes: IFV; 105mm tank gun armed; 122mm howitzer armed; command; recovery/repair; and ambulance. The Poly Type 07P 8x8 APC family is less developed, but includes: IFV, 120mm mortar and 105mm gun armed versions. There is also the “Yitian,” a SAM/MG armed 6x6 air defense APC. So far the PLA Army has not yet developed mechanized armor/infantry units based fully on wheeled medium-weight armored combat and support vehicles, but existing divisions and brigades are gaining increasing numbers of new subordinate units based on these new medium weight vehicles.

Space Projection: PLA Moon Base by 2049 ? Informal Chinese sources suggest Moon landing by 2024, Moon Base by 2049. PLA controls China’s manned and unmanned space program; both designed to benefit the PLA. All Shenzhou capsule and the first Tiangong pre-space station all performed military missions. The Shenzhou-7 mission could be viewed as combat interception exercise against the International Space Station. Change-3 soft Moon lander scheduled for 2013 may have “scientific” payload of a radar and laser rangefinder. Chinese space officials often justify their Moon program to ensure China gets its share of Helium-3, which it may use for its expected fusion energy program. It is very likely that when the PLA goes to the Moon it will do so to gain military advantage.

Thankfully, Marines are not strangers to this theater of operations.