Assimilation and Civilization: China’s Ethnocide in Tibet

Leah Campbell MA in International Relations

Supervised by Professor Beatrice Heuser

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Dissertation Title:

Assimilation and Civilization: China’s Ethnocide in Tibet

Dissertation Supervisor: Professor Beatrice Heuser

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the relationship between China and Tibet, notably the

systematic destruction of Tibetan culture and whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has

committed—and continues to commit—ethnocide, or cultural genocide, in the region. Although

ethnocide itself was eventually omitted from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of Genocide, Raphael Lemkin, who coined the terms “genocide” and “ethnocide,” stressed the

significant damage of destroying an entire culture, even if the individual members themselves

survive. Various definitions of ethnocide, as well as cases where the term has been employed,

all describe the same occurrence: incidents where the defining characteristics, such as

language, religion, and customs, of a group are eliminated resulting in the disappearance of

that culture. In addition to exploring events in Tibet, this paper also studies examples of

ethnocide concerning native people throughout history. Using those cases and various

definitions of ethnocide, the paper then extracts criteria with which to recognize ethnocide and

applies those elements to the case in Tibet. Examination of the Sino-Tibetan history is included

to provide background for both the Tibetan and Chinese arguments regarding the status and

treatment of the region. From there, the research delves into the last six decades since the CCP

took control of Tibet, examining the policies and actions of the CCP in Tibet through the lens

of ethnocide criteria obtained in previous chapters. The evidence for ethnocide is separated

into several groups, including restrictions on religion, language, and movement, as well as

increased surveillance and control in Tibet. Each of these sections outlines the ways in which

those actions qualify as ethnocide. The research includes responses from the Tibetan people,

such as protests and self-immolations, as well as concerns raised by other governments and

non-governmental organizations. This dissertation argues that ethnocide continues to occur in

Tibet, inflicted by the CCP.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank my dissertation supervisor Professor Beatrice Heuser, who has been

a constant source of guidance and encouragement, not only in this thesis but for the entire year.

Professor Heuser went above and beyond the call of duty to help her students, using her own

time to provide us with an informal lecture on research methodology. She has been available

throughout this endeavor, answering questions and providing support all summer. Without her

help, this thesis would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank my mother and father Don and Emma Campbell, who have always

supported me in all of my endeavors. They provided me with love, strength, and

encouragement throughout the last year, and I do not know how I would have made it through

without their support and patience.

I would like to thank my friends here in the UK. Abi Brennan, Marc Gravett, and Emy Germano

offered solace and encouragement during hard times and cheered me on throughout the year.

They have been my family-away-from-home, and I am grateful and lucky to have them in my

life.

Finally, I should thank Officer Dawa and his partner for that terrifying night in Lhasa and for

opening my eyes to what has been going on in Tibet. Without their lengthy interrogation and

threats of incarceration should I ever tell anyone what happened, I may never have decided to

do this thesis at all.

Leah M. Campbell

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION PAGE ............................................................................................. i

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... iv

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction ................................................................................ 1

CHAPTER TWO: Methodology and Literature Review ....................................... 3

CHAPTER FOUR: Definition of Ethnocide and Case Studies .............................. 5

CHAPTER FIVE: Sino-Tibetan History ............................................................... 11

CHAPTER SIX: Evidence of Ethnocide in Tibet .................................................. 17

Threats to Religion ................................................................................................ 18

Threats to Language ............................................................................................. 25

Government-Controlled Schooling ...................................................................... 27

Restrictions on Movement .................................................................................... 28

Ecosystem Destruction ......................................................................................... 29

Han Immigration .................................................................................................. 30

Increased State Surveillance and Control .......................................................... 30

Backlash ................................................................................................................. 32

CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion ............................................................................ 34

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 37

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1

CHAPTER ONE:

Introduction

There is not occupation of territory on the one hand and independence of persons on

the other. It is the country as a whole, its history, its daily pulsation that are contested, disfigured, in the hope of a final destruction. Under these conditions, the individual's breathing is an observed, an occupied breathing. It is a combat breathing.

Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism

“You need to be serious with us, or it would be bad for you.”1 These chilling words sent

shivers down the teacher’s spine, as the two policemen who appeared at her Lhasa hotel just

before midnight continued to interrogate her regarding several text messages she had sent to a

friend. Having spent the previous three days exploring the temples and streets of Lhasa, the

American ESL teacher quickly saw the error in communicating her distress and concern regarding

her perceptions of Tibet. Her messages included comments ranging from the propaganda being

played on the train to the number of Han Chinese establishments overwhelming the Tibetan city.

Interrogated for three hours and then detained two days while the authorities decided what to do

with her, the teacher realized that the situation in Tibet went beyond anything she had researched.

On the third day in the hotel, she was finally allowed to leave Tibet to continue her journey into

Nepal but not before being warned not to tell anyone—even other Chinese officials—of her

experience in Lhasa or with the policemen themselves. Upon attempting to reenter the mainland

via Hong Kong, she discovered that she had also been declared persona non grata in all of China,

forfeiting her belongings and the teaching job she had enjoyed for over a year. She feared for her

Tibetan tour guide who had, in the privacy and safety of their vehicle, away from what he assured

her were the prying eyes and ears of the many soldiers and policemen on the streets, described the

ways in which he feared his culture faced extinction. She hoped he had not suffered for her

mistake and sought to find opportunities allowing her to share both her own experience and the

stark reality of life in Tibet under Chinese rule.2

For over six decades, the Sino-Tibetan dispute has continued to flicker in the international

spotlight, from personal accounts from Tibetans in exile to documentaries, film, and experiences

such as the one described above. Governments and various non-governmental organizations

(NGOs) have shown cautious support of the Tibetan cause, from meetings with the Dalai Lama,

despite objections from the CCP,3 to attempts to bring Chinese leaders to court for crimes against

1 Aris Teon. “U.S. Teacher Deported after Sending Text Messages Critical of China’s Tibet Policies.” The

Nanfang (website), 27 April 2015, available at: https://thenanfang.com [accessed 27 April 2015]. 2 Ibid; Steve Tarter. “Teacher Recounts Unsettling Experience in Tibet, Getting Thrown out of China.” The

Journal Star, 18 April 2015, p.1. 3 Gregory Korte. “Despite Chinese Objections, Obama Meets Privately with Dalai Lama.” USA Today

(website), 15 June 2015, available at: http://www.usatoday.com [accessed 6 September 2016].

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humanity.4 Thousands of miles away from the Tibet, protests continue to rage against the human

rights violations and potential disappearance of Tibet’s culture: within the last year alone,

protesters in London bombarded Chinese president Xi Jinping with signs and chants about his

Party’s actions on the roof of the world.5 “Free Tibet” stickers and t-shirts appear throughout the

Western world, and the media occasionally reports instances of celebrities being banned from

China due to their support of Tibet. Several studies have investigated the complex Sino-Tibetan

history, China’s human rights violations, Tibetan self-immolations, and the ways in which both

sides might find resolution.

The aim of this thesis is to determine whether China’s actions in Tibet since 1950 may be

considered ethnocide. By first examining the history of the term “ethnocide” and its use by other

scholars to define events throughout the world, this thesis explores its application to the events in

Tibet. An additional goal of this work is to shed light on topics unfamiliar to many: the term

“ethnocide” and the severity of China’s actions in Tibet. In presenting this research, the thesis

also illustrates the repercussions of losing entire cultures and why ethnocide ought to be

reconsidered for inclusion in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.

Chapter 2 reviews the methodology and literature used in this research and discusses

some of the difficulties encountered. Relying on autobiographical accounts, media reports, and

government documents, this thesis reviews historical events now depicted as examples of

ethnocide and extracts a list of criteria with which to compare China’s involvement with Tibet.

This chapter also addresses the difficulty of obtaining information from states with government-

controlled media and restrictions on speech.

The fifth chapter provides a condensed account of Sino-Tibetan history up until the

1950s. Though Chinese, Tibetan, and other scholars offer different analyses of historical events,

piecing together a rough outline of each side’s story sets the background to the ongoing dispute

between Tibet and China, a problem now spanning over sixty years. As will be discussed in the

literature review, though a wealth of resources exist regarding both the Chinese and the Tibetan

side of the problem, finding primary sources can be daunting in a tightly-controlled and censored

state such as China.

Chapter 6 studies potential evidence of ethnocide in Tibet from the 1950s to the present

day, often making comparisons to the examples of ethnocide discussed in previous chapters.

Bearing in mind key components of culture, such as religion and language, this section examines

current and recent events found in news articles, as well as autobiographical accounts and reports

4 Giles Tremlett. “Court to Hear Genocide Case Against China.” The Guardian (website), 11 Jan. 2006, ,

available at: https://www.theguardian.com [accessed 6 September 2016]; Richard Finney. “Spanish Court to

Pursue Tibet ‘Genocide’ Case against Hu Jintao.” Radio Free Asia (website), 11 Oct. 2013, available at:

http://www.rfa.org [accessed 3 February 2016]. 5 Ben Geoghegan. “Xi Jinping Visit: Pomp and Protest Greet China’s President.” BBC News (website), 20

Oct. 2015, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news [accessed 21 Oct. 2015].

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from various governments and NGOs describing the situation in Tibet. These resources provide

evidence of the ways in which the CCP might arguably stand accused of committing ethnocide in

the region. Documents from the CCP and other Chinese media offer a different perspective on

the Sino-Tibetan relationship, explaining how Chinese authorities and citizens view Tibet and

how they justify their actions in the region.

The seventh chapter offers a conclusion arguing that China is, in fact, guilty of

committing ethnocide in Tibet. Chapter 7 also looks to contemporary Tibetan and Chinese

scholars, human rights groups, and government agencies for suggestions as how best to amend the

rift and whether it would be in China’s best interest to relax its policies, as it did in the early

1980s, and allow Tibet more autonomy. The comparison between various native tribes’

encounters with Europeans settlers and Tibetans’ fight with the Chinese reveals future actions

which could result in either resolution or the eventual extinction of yet another culture.

CHAPTER TWO:

Methodology and Literature Review

In investigating the CCP’s act of ethnocide in Tibet, thorough research of their shared

history proved a daunting and yet essential element. Literature concerning the Sino-Tibetan

history and relationship is diverse and vast. Due to differing accounts of historical events and

limited access to documents in both China and Tibet, discovering the truth about China’s claims

and the validity of its actions in Tibet is quite difficult. On the one hand, Tibetan sources argue

that the Chinese invaded illegally and are demolishing Tibetan culture; on the other hand, Chinese

accounts insist upon the legitimacy of China’s administration in Tibet and its positive impact on

the region in the way of economic development. For this thesis, personal accounts, newspaper

articles, and government papers were necessary to piece together the tumultuous and ever-

disputed history of China and Tibet’s interactions. These sources stem from before and after

China’s 1950 acquisition of Tibet into the present day, as finding personal narratives written as

close to the events as possible was an important factor in this research. Much of the literature

stems from Tibetan exiles and Western news articles, as access to Tibet itself and its historical

documents is limited by the Chinese government. As for the Chinese descriptions of events, both

on-going and past, government databases provided several white papers. Chinese newspaper

articles, too, provided insight into the CCP’s side of the argument.

Examining the history first provides context for the actions of the PLA in Tibet.

Government white papers found on the CCP’s website, press releases, and historical documents

such as the “17-Point Agreement” all contributed to explaining China’s desire to keep the Tibetan

territories under sovereign rule. Additionally, official responses to foreign interference, such as

Spain’s 2013 attempt to bring former CCP leaders to trial for war crimes, provide insight into the

mentality of the Chinese government and its hold on the region. Some of these claims and the

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history used to back them remain disputed by Tibetan, Chinese, and western scholars. Much like

the current problem in the South China Sea, the Sino-Tibetan issue continues to generate

challenges to widely-held Chinese beliefs about the Party’s sovereignty, feeding tensions between

the motherland and advocates for Tibet.

The state-controlled media presents a challenge, as the CCP keeps a tight rein on what is

available to the public and the extent to which citizens are allowed to discuss sensitive

information. Presenting a story of liberation and successful development—rather than invasion

and occupation—in the Tibetan regions is obviously in the CCP’s best interest, especially when

global onlookers have shown concern for the alleged human rights abuses and accusations of

cultural demolition presented in film, literature, and other media. Accounts from Tibetans,

Chinese, and foreigners who have attempted to collect and share information concerning Tibetan

affairs and subsequently landed themselves in varying levels of trouble provide strong indications

of the Party’s desire to maintain strict control on how the Tibetan story unfolds in the history

books. Aforementioned government white papers and Chinese articles aimed at Western

audiences—i.e., written in English—provide some insight into the beliefs held—or, at least,

promoted—by the CCP.

Tibetan writers, too, are not without their obvious biases, as are Western historians with

interests in Tibetan history and autonomy. The Dalai Lama himself offers considerable

information regarding the Tibetan side of the conflict. Authors such as Gyalo Thondup, brother

to the 14th Dalai Lama, and Tibetan human rights activist Tsering Woeser, also bring their side of

the struggle into light, describing their lives in and outside of Tibet. The political history of Tibet

brought to light by historian Tsepon Wangchuk Deden Shakabpa, the Dalai Lama’s representative

in Delhi, was praised for its thoroughness by western scholars. Additionally, the 10th Panchen

Lama’s “70,000 Character Petition” of 1962 provides examples of the complaints held by

Tibetans regarding Communist Control. Chinese scholar Wang Lixiong and Tibetan historian

Tsering Shakya also provide valuable insight to more recent events in the on-going conflict

between China and Tibet, recounting their experiences in Tibet and mainland China.

Relating Tibet’s history as recorded in various manuscripts now unobtainable to those

outside the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Tsepon Shakabpa describes the wavering Sino-Tibetan

relationship and the early Tibetan empire’s expansion into and alliances with neighboring

countries. Although Shakabpa’s work provides an in-depth coverage of Tibet’s political history,

he fails to mention anything about the 1793 “Authorized Regulations for the Better Government

of Tibet.” This glaring omission—included in several other non-Chinese historical documents—

is surprising for such a thorough researcher and suggests that Shakabpa’s main intention was to

argue for the independence of Tibet rather than provide an accurate account of history. Indeed, in

his translator’s notes, Derek F. Maher admits that

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while [Shakabpa’s work] provides a more thorough overview of Tibet’s past than any other

book now available in the English language, Shakabpa primarily narrates those episodes

that contribute to his main agenda of making the historical case for Tibetan independence.6

As with the Chinese sources, remembering that these accounts are colored by the authors’

backgrounds and comparing multiple sources was essential for piecing together a more cohesive

history. As talented a writer and historian as Shakabpa was, his intention remained firmly planted

in demonstrating Tibet’s independence. Nonetheless, his insight into Tibet’s troubled history

provides detailed background work for understanding modern complications.

Other government sources provided further insight. The United States Library of

Congress website offers the Tibetan Oral History Archive Project, put together by anthropologist

Professor Melvyn C. Goldstein and his students in 1992, which provided access to several

pertinent documents. The Tibet Justice Center’s website contains official documents from several

states, including China, Tibet, and Australia. The United Nations website provides access to

relevant proceedings and official documents, such as the Genocide Convention and the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. Chinese government websites proved to be useful, as well,

providing resources in both Mandarin and English.

CHAPTER FOUR:

Definition of Ethnocide and Case Studies

One cannot expect positive results from an educational or political action program which

fails to respect the particular view of the world held by the people. Such a program

constitutes cultural invasion, good intentions notwithstanding.

--Paulo Freire, Pedogogy of the Oppressed

The term “ethnocide” stems from the Greek “ethnos” for “group or tribe” and Latin

“cide” for killing. Although Samuel Lemkin’s term “genocide” stands as a universally-

recognized crime against humanity, the definition of “ethnocide”—also known as “cultural

genocide”— has yet to be made illegal under international law.7 Whereas “genocide”

encompasses well-known atrocities such as the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide,

“ethnocide” has not found a distinct place in international relations and remains loosely associated

with events which demolish a culture rather than the physical destruction of the people

themselves. While Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide presents clear guidelines for the definition of genocide, there is no mention of

ethnocide. Early drafts of the Genocide Convention included ethnocide as an international crime,

but that section was removed after several objections. Summary records of meetings of the

6 Tsepon Wangchuk Deden Shakabpa. One Hundred Thousand Moons: an Advanced Political History of

Tibet. Trans. by Derek F. Maher (Leidin: Brill, 2009), p.xvii. 7 Lawrence Davidson. Cultural Genocide (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2012), p.2.

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Drafting Committee of the Commission of Human Rights indicate that protections for minorities,

including the act of ethnocide, were considered but ultimately removed from the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights due to a debate similar to one presented in the Genocide

Convention.

Due to this lack of official acknowledgement, in examining how the Chinese government

has committed and continues to commit ethnocide in Tibet necessitates researching other events

which have been described as ethnocide and extracting from those examples the criteria

separating these acts from genocide or human rights violations. An examination of various

incidents labelled as ethnocide, where assimilation took the place of outright killing, such as the

native tribes of the Americas and Australia, will demonstrate the characteristics and gravity of

ethnocide. A list of defining characteristics of ethnocide is available from examining official

accounts and documents. This thesis will then apply those criteria to the reports from Tibet for

comparison and analysis.

Raphael Lemkin’s original text from Axis Rule in Occupied Europe defines ethnocide as

“a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the

life of national groups,” the objective of which being “a disintegration of the political and social

institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of

national groups.”8 Lemkin goes on to describe eight categories of genocide: political, social,

cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral.9 Ten years before he coined the

word “genocide,” Lemkin proposed that “Acts of Barbarity” and “Acts of Vandalism,” later

referred to as genocide and ethnocide, be added as transnational crimes. In defending the latter,

Lemkin argued that

the destruction of a work of art of any nation must be regarded as acts of vandalism

directed against world culture. The author [of the crime] causes not only the immediate

irrevocable losses of the destroyed work as property and as the culture of the collectivity

directly concerned (whose unique genius contributed to the creation of this work); it is

also all humanity which experiences a loss by this act of vandalism.10

The first drafts of the Genocide Convention distinctly mention and prohibit ethnocide, per

Lemkin’s definition.11 Later debates, however, questioned whether it was appropriate to “include

in the same convention both mass murders in gas chambers and the closing of libraries”12 Thus,

8 Raphael Lemkin. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 1944), p.79. 9 Idem. 10 Raphael Lemkin. “Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offenses Against

the Law of Nations.” (1933), available at: http://www.prevent genocide.org [accessed 14 August 2016]. 11 First Draft of the Genocide Convention prepared by the UN Secretariat in 1947, UN ESCOR, UN Doc

E/447, (1947), cited in William Schabas. Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,

2000), p.554. 12 Matthew Lippman. “The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide.” Boston University International Law Journal, 3.2 (Summer 1985), p.45.

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other than a provision about forcible removal of a group’s children, the final document omitted

mention of ethnocide, despite Lemkin’s original argument that destroying a group’s culture was

tantamount to destroying the group itself.

Physical genocide, however, remains the only crime addressed in the current Convention,

although individual rights to cultural existence appear in the 1948 Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and are reaffirmed in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and

Cultural Rights.13 More recently, ethnocide in the strict sense of cultural genocide was defined in

the 1981 UNESCO Latin American Conference, where it specifically refers to instances where

“an ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, develop and transmit its own culture and its own

language, whether individually or collectively.”14 Furthermore, the Charter of the European

Union and the 1998 Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National

Minorities both stress obligations to protect cultures. Scholars such as David Nersessian from the

Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs also call for changes to the Genocide

Convention, arguing that “cultural genocide is a unique wrong that should be recognized

independently and that rises to the level of meriting individual criminal responsibility.”15 In

determining how to define ethnocide and whether it applies to Tibet, research suggests that the

international community reopen the case for ethnocide’s incorporation into international law.

In “De l’Ethnocide,” anthropologist Pierre Clastres distinguishes between ethnocide and

genocide rather simply: “le génocide assassine les peuples dans leur corps, l'ethnocide les tue

dans leur esprit.”16 The easiest distinction lies in whether the damage applies directly to human

lives or to their way of living. Clastres draws heavily upon examples of ethnocide committed by

Europeans upon indigenous people. Rather than viewing their actions as wrong, he explains, the

perpetrators of ethnocide in these cases believed that they were helping these “Autres”—the

“Others”—in their journey to become more civilized.17 This process of civilization requires an

abandonment of these “uncivilized” characteristics that set the intended assimilates apart from the

dominant culture. The perpetrators of the assimilation often view it as helping “barbaric” people

attain the same level of civilization. In several examples of ethnocide researched, accounts

repeatedly point to this underlying theme of integration: a dominant culture attempting to

annihilate another by means of language, religion, or other cultural symbols. The minority

cultures thus diminish as members are coerced to give up their language, religion, resources, and

13 UN General Assembly. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. United Nations

Treaty Series, vol. 993, 16 Dec. 1966, available at: www.refworld.org [accessed 12 July 2016], p.5. 14 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). “UNESCO and the

Struggle against Ethnocide: Declaration of San Jose.” 11 Dec. 1981, UNESCO Doc. FA 82/WF.32.

Available at: http:// unesdoc.unesco.org [accessed 26 August 2016]. 15 David Nersessian. “Rethinking Cultural Genocide under International Law.” Carnegie Council for Ethics

in International Relations, Spring 2005, available at: https://www.carnegiecouncil.org [accessed 27 July

2016]. 16 Pierre Clastres. “De l’Ethnocide.” La Homme, 14.3, (July-Dec.1974), p.102. 17 Ibid.

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lifestyle to become part of the greater whole. In most cases, Clastres adds, the perpetrators either

truly believe, or at least claim, that their actions are beneficial to both those being assimilated and

to the dominant group.18

The first example of ethnocide concerns the native tribes in North America. Just as

Clastres suggested, the European colonists who arrived in the Americas regarded themselves as

superior to the natives they found. This feeling of superiority included the natives’ use of tools,

their religions, their style of dress, and their interactions and led colonists to believe that the

natives were, at best, in need of civilization, and, at worst, enemies. The extinction of such

people seemed not only necessary but inevitable: Justice Joseph Story in 1828 claimed that these

“forlorn children of the forest… seem destined to a slow, but sure extinction” and that

“everywhere, at the approach of the white man, they fade away.”19 Thomas Jefferson stressed the

importance of the assimilation of the native tribes and, in an 1803 letter to Benjamin Hawkins,

describes the need to teach agriculture to indigenous people. The benefits, he explains, would be

mutual: “while they are learning to do better on less land, our increasing numbers will be calling

for more land.”20 Jefferson adds that “the ultimate point of rest and happiness for them is to let

their settlements and ours meet and blend together, to intermix, and become one people.”21 In the

same spirit, an 1830 publication reminds readers of their duty as Christians not to give up on the

American tribes and that, as the more reluctant natives pass away, “their places are filled by those

whose habits have been formed under a greater degree under the influence of civilization and

Christianity.”22 More popular beliefs, however, held that the natives were beyond hope and that,

as “an inferior race of men,” they would never reap the “blessings and benefits of the civilized

and Christian state.”23 Whether optimistic about the potential for assimilation of the native

peoples or believing that they would naturally die out in the face of civilization, the colonists’

attitudes were clear: theirs was a superior race destined by both divine right and nature to conquer

the barbarians.

As the struggle for land between European settlers and indigenous peoples grew, all sides

quickly realized that total destruction of the other would be impossible. Some early colonists saw

the tribes’ violent resistance to assimilation as reason to forego restraint: Virginian Edward

18 Idem, p.103. 19 Justice John Story. “Discourse, Pronounced at the Request of the Essex Historical Society, September 18,

1828, in Commemoration of the First Settlement of Salem, Mass” (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, Little, and

Williams, 1828), p.74. 20 Thomas Jefferson. The Works of Thomas Jefferson. Federal Edition. Collected and ed. by Paul Leicester

Ford. Vol. IX. (New York and London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904-5), p.447. 21 Ibid. 22 Jeremiah Everts, George Barrell Cheever, and Convers Francis. The Removal of the Indians: An Article

from the American Monthly Magazine: an Examination of an Article in the North American Review: and an

Exhibition of the Advancement of the Southern Tribes, in Civilization and Christianity (Boston: Pierce and

Williams, 1830), p.72. 23 United States. House Committee on Indian Affairs. “Indians Removing Westward.” (January 7, 1828),

House Rep. No. 56, 20th Cong., 1st sess., available at: www.worldcat.org [accessed 15 August 2016].

9

Waterhouse argued that “our hands which before were tied with gentleness and fair usage, are

now set at liberty by the treacherous violence of the Sauvages.”24 Still, in order to fulfill its goal

of “manifest destiny,” the United States government decided to take action to eliminate the Native

American menace. When natives failed to “fade away,” as forecasted, and their physical

annihilation became ruled out by both practicality and, for some, morality, the colonists decided

instead to attempt forced migrations to reserves and to proceed with cultural assimilation to

eliminate—or, in their minds, assist in civilizing—the natives. Allotment—in the form of the

Dawes Act of 188725—became the solution for “saving” the Indian, though some critics pointed

out that the act failed to provide for population growth, foreshadowing the decline in native

numbers. The response was simple: allotment would lead to assimilation, which, in turn, would

lead to no Indians. Native children were removed from their homes and placed with European

families or forced into re-education programs to instruct them on the “proper” way of life, i.e., the

European style of living.26 Traditional native dress and religious rituals were banned, and the use

of tribal languages was discouraged.27 Only European-American religion, language, and dress

would be tolerated: displays of tribal beliefs and rituals would not be permitted. Though some of

its people survived, Native American culture was essentially destroyed in the name of civilization

and progress.

Not all settlers agreed with this strict policy, of course. There were those individuals, just

as in the modern world, who saw the importance of ideas that would later come into international

law: namely the right of groups to maintain their autonomy and cultural heritage. In 1871,

Harper’s published an article called “Our Barbarian Brethren,” in which the author questions the

rights and actions of European settlers in both North and South America and lays out the rich

cultures being destroyed in the explorers’ lust for land and resources. The article laments that

“the Civilized Man put out the Barbarian light that was shining so brightly.”28 Later, in 1902,

novelist Hannibal Hamlin Garland published an article regarding several Indian reservations he

visited throughout his travels. Garland describes problems with the Dawes Act and provides

suggestions on improving treatment of the natives, including allowing a level of autonomy in

religion, dress, language, and education of their young. Though his ideas apply to several areas of

24 Edward Waterhouse (1622), quoted in Brian W. Dippie. The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and

U.S. Indian Policy (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1982), p.6. 25 United States. House Committee on Indian Affairs. “An Act to Provide for the Allotment of Lands in

Severalty to Indians on the Various Reservations” (General Allotment Act or Dawes Act), U.S. Statutes at

Large 24, 388-91, NADP Document A, 1887, available at: www.digitalhistory.uh.edu [accessed 15 August

2016]. 26 Foley, Henry. Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus. (London: Burns and Oates, 1875),

available at: www.archive.org [accessed 15 August 2016], p.352. 27 Ibid, p.379. 28 Benson J. Lossing. “Our Barbarian Brethren.” Harper’s M., XL (May 1870), p.794.

10

living—lifestyle, rituals, dress, etc.—above all Garland stresses one point: “to break them is to

destroy them.”29

Both articles express the error in attempting to assimilate people who have long enjoyed

their own cultures and languages. The authors each list the ways in which the government

systematically committed ethnocide against these vast groups of people, including restrictions on

their language, dress, and religion, as well as forced re-education schemes aimed at assimilating

the young even if their parents refused to cooperate. Far from advocating a common nineteenth-

century belief that “[the natives’] only choice is civilization or extinction,”30 these articles

condemn assimilation and advocate a more autonomous approach. This method would allow the

tribal cultures to flourish and continue, before “the complicated and injurious machinery”31 of

European culture in which the tribes were left to diminish lead to their complete disappearance.

Similar to the destruction of Native American culture throughout the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries, Australia offers another example of ethnocide in its treatment of the

Aboriginal tribes. Historian Frank Chalk and sociologist Kurt Jonassohn explain how the British

colonists found the existence of the Tasmanians to be a nuisance and a potential threat. The larger

the colony grew, the more confidence it gained in response to the danger posed by the natives: by

the 1820s, the settlers’ need for land and their perception of the native people as inferior led the

former to perform horrific acts on the latter, including hunting them for sport, systemic rape,

forced sterilization, and the island’s own slave society.32 When the Tasmanians resisted, it was

the settlers who claimed victimization and ultimately decided that, although it would be ungodly

to annihilate the natives, they had a God-given command to both “replenish the earth and subdue

it.”33 The settlers decided it best to relocate the natives to nearby Flinders Island, where they were

dressed and educated as Christians and forced to give up their former ways. George Augustus

Robinson, a pious, dogmatic man who had educated himself in the aboriginal language, succeeded

where others had failed in collecting the natives. He also oversaw their assimilation into British

culture on Flinders Island. The Tasmanians, however, did not survive the drastic change: by

1847, with only forty-four aborigines remaining, the settlers decided they were no longer a threat

and shipped them back to Tasmania where they gradually wasted away. The last native

Tasmanian died in 1876, twenty-nine years after Robinson returned to England and passed away

with the ironic title “Late Protector of the Aborigines, Tasmania.”34

29 Hannibal Hamlin Garland. “The Red Man’s Present Needs.” The North American Review, 174.545 (April

1902), p.479. 30 Brian W. Dippie. The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (Middletown, CT:

Wesleyan UP, 1982), p.124. 31 Lossing (1870), p.811. 32 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn. The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies

(New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1990), p.212. 33 Idem, p.213. 34 Idem, p.219.

11

The world continues to reevaluate its actions concerning native groups and examine the

consequences of losing these cultures. A 2015 report by the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation

Commission accuses the Canadian government of committing cultural genocide against its

aboriginal people from the mid-nineteenth century well into the 1970s, namely by removing

children from their homes and placing them in boarding schools.35 Residential schools, it was

argued, were more effective at promoting “eventual assimilation into the white race” than day

schools, since students were unable to return to their families in the evenings and subsequently be

“re-exposed to the tribal culture, however diluted, from which the school is trying to separate

them.”36 The report provides a definition of cultural genocide in line with that of the early drafts

of the Genocide Convention and concludes that Canada stands guilty of eradicating aboriginal

culture based on that criteria. In addition to sending children to boarding schools for re-

education, the Canadian government seized lands and resources from the First Nation people; put

restrictions on their language, dress, and religion; and denied them social and political rights.37

The report also acknowledges that, although cultural genocide is not a term recognized by

international law, the removal of children from their parents is a violation of the Genocide

Convention. The report goes advises how best to reconcile the grievous errors committed against

these people, including helping to protect remaining elements of tribal cultures and educating

Canadians on aboriginal history and contributions to society.

Each of these cases illustrates the same criteria for ethnocide: restrictions on language,

dress, and religion; exclusion from social and political arenas; attempts at assimilation through re-

education schemes aimed at the youth; and the forcible removal of people from their lands and

resources, often resulting in drastic changes to their way of life and ability to sustain themselves.

The result, as David Nersessian argues, is that “fundamental aspects of a group’s unique cultural

existence are attacked…thereby rendering the group itself (apart from its members) an equal

object and victim of the attack”38 The actions in each of these three cases were sanctioned by

government agencies and seen as both necessary and useful: after all, “l’ethnocide s’exerce pour

le bien du Sauvage” and “c’est notre devoir que de les aider à s’affranchir de la servitude.”39

CHAPTER FIVE:

Sino-Tibetan History

35 Adam Taylor. ““Did Canada Commit a ‘Cultural Genocide’?” The Washington Post (website), 5 June

2015, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com [accessed 1 September 2016]. 36 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future:

Summary of the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. 31 May 2015,

available at: www.trc.ca [accessed 1 September 2016], p.6. 37 Idem, pp.1-3. 38 Nersessian (2005). 39 Clastres, p.103.

12

Elements of the historical relationship between China and Tibet vary depending on which

side is asked. China claims that Tibet has been a part of the motherland since the thirteenth

century when the Mongol empire took over China and Tibet and that the Yuan dynasty, upon

defeating the Mongols, inherited Tibet. Tibetans argue that they have never been more than a

neighbor to China and that both sides helped each other during various conflicts. At some points,

according to Tibetan history, Tibet controlled parts of China, as well as the vital Silk Road, and

has always been independent. An official announcement of Tibet’s independence, however, did

not arrive until 1913. Unfortunately for the Tibetans, their declaration was never formally

accepted by the rest of the world, who shared the British impression of Tibet being under China’s

suzerainty, a level of autonomy similar to Hong Kong’s position in China today. Upon its

invasion—or liberation from imperialism and serfdom, as the Chinese Communist Party prefers—

in 1950, Tibet did receive sympathy and meager assistance from other countries, but the looming

threats of communist China and the Soviet Union, as well as other conflicts such as the Korean

War, led potential allies to abandon Tibet. Tibet’s previous lack of participation in international

affairs and absence of foreign visitors did not help their cause: their leaders, unfamiliar with the

outside world, were somewhat naïve in their beliefs that they would be heard and assisted,

especially when facing the force and persistence of Chinese claims on Tibet.

The Tibetan perspective offers a history colored by alternating conquests on both sides,

alliances through marriages, and a significant peace treaty in 822 C.E. marking the boundaries

between the two countries and declaring their relationship as “being like a nephew and uncle on

the earth, as the sun and the moon are in the sky.”40 The Chinese perspective focuses on its

control of Tibet from the thirteenth century when the Mongols took control over both the Yuan

dynasty and Tibet, claiming that, because the Mongols ruled as Chinese—even adopting the name

“Yuan” and painting themselves as successors to the Song dynasty—the Mongol control of Tibet

qualifies as Chinese control of Tibet. The Mongols, however, viewed China as merely another

province of the empire formed by Genghis Khan and saw the Ming dynasty’s overthrow of the

Mongols in 1368 as a return to Chinese rule rather than a continuation of it.41 In their 1992 white

paper on the status of Tibet, the Chinese government claims that China “inherited the right to rule

Tibet” upon conquering the Mongols.42 The actions the CCP has taken in Tibet since the 1950s

stem from the belief that Tibet has always been a part of China and must be returned to the

motherland: their account of history, therefore, refutes claims that any form of wrong-doing has

occurred. For the Chinese government, their actions are in the name of uniting the country as a

40 Shakabpa (2009), p.159. 41 Sam van Schaik. Tibet: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p.82. 42 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. “Part One: Ownership of

Tibet” in Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation (white paper). September 1992, available at:

http://www. china.org.cn [accessed 6 July 2016].

13

whole, whereas Tibetans view the CCP’s operations as the demolition of their culture and

autonomy.

Before the arrival of the Mongols, however, the Tibetan empire conquered vast areas of

Asia. When Prince Songtsen came of age in the mid-seventh century, he inherited “the largest

kingdom Tibet had ever seen.”43 In 663, Gar Tongtsen led the Tibetan army in a successful

campaign to crush the Azha in modern-day Mongolia. Tongtsen pushed into Kashmir, forged an

alliance with the Turks, and conquered Kashgar, thus securing Tibet’s hold on the Silk Route and

cutting off China’s access. The Tibetans then managed an alliance with the Arabs and were able

to move as far as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In 763 C.E., after a military coup

weakened the Chinese empire, the Tibetan army under King Trisong Detson was able to seize

control of the Tang dynasty’s capitol of Chang’an—today’s Xi’an—and put a puppet emperor on

the throne. At its height in the late eighth century, the Tibetan empire stretched from Uzbekistan

to Myanmar and included portions of Nepal, India, Bhutan, and Chinese territories previously

ruled by the Tang Dynasty. Until civil wars began to break out, fragmenting the Tibetan

government and enabling Mongolian forces to conquer Tibet and surrounding regions, Tibet

retained vast amounts of power and shared its cultural influence throughout much of Asia.44

The Chinese, however, view their inheritance of Tibet and subsequent interactions as

proof of China’s sovereignty. The Mongol Khanate—the self-proclaimed Yuan dynasty—in

northern China maintained troops and various administrative offices and conducted censuses in

1268, 1287, and 1334. From the sixteenth century until the fall of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911),

China fortified its control in the region through more troops and high commissioners—or

ambans—in order to maintain order and enact regulations “rectify and reform old systems and

establish new ones.”45 In “The Authorized Regulations for the Better Governing of Tibet” (1793),

the twenty-nine articles state the Qing government’s power to supervise the handling of Tibet

through a “regular army of 3,000,” national boundary markers, and an official mint.46 Between

1727 and 1911, more than 100 high commissioners were stationed in Tibet.

Even while under control of the Mongols, Tibet was able to rule autonomously in a

relationship Shakabpa describes as “priest-patron,” in which the former—a lama, in this case—

provides spiritual instruction in return for material assistance and defense.47 This relationship,

which mirrored the previous “uncle and nephew” relationship between Tibet and the Tang

dynasty (618-907), remained intact and continued even after the Chinese overthrew the Mongols

43 van Schaik, p.4. 44 Idem, pp.4-20. 45 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Tibet: Its Ownership and

Human Rights Situation. Beijing: PRC, 1992, available at: http://www.china.org.cn [accessed 1 July 2016]. 46 Ibid. 47 Shakabpa (2009), pp.205-239.

14

until the end of the Qing dynasty.48 Although Tibet paid tribute to Mongolian government in

Beijing, its leaders were allowed to make their own decisions. In a discussion with Tibetan

spiritual leader Pakba Rinpoche, Kublai Khan, great-grandson to Genghis Khan, declared that “in

all matters relating to Tibet, commands will be received from the lama” and that “without the

lama’s consent, the king will not issue commands.”49 While there were ambans present in Tibet,

non-Chinese accounts insist that the ambans’ authority was in name only: serving only to report

to emperor, they “resisted interfering in politics.50 They were mainly ignored by the Tibetan

officials. From this account of history, Tibetans view the Chinese claim to have inherited Tibet

from the Mongolians as having no bearing. Tibetans like Shakabpa instead reference the Sino-

Tibetan relationship as being closer allies than to ruler and ruled.

This “priest-patron” relationship and the presence of the ambans remained until a 1911

revolution within the mainland produced the new government of the Republic of China and an

opportunity for Tibet to renounce Chinese sovereignty once and for all. Han sources point out

that the new Chinese republic declared itself to be “a unification of lands inhabited by the Han,

Manchu, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan people into one country . . . called national unification.”51

Tibetan accounts, on the other hand, claim that in 1911, “the amban and his military escort were

expelled from Lhasa” and that “it was not until 1934 that contact between Tibet and China was

renewed.”52 The 13th Dalai Lama declared Tibet to be an independent state in 1913, noting that

“the Chinese intention of colonizing Tibet under the patron-priest relationship has faded like a

rainbow in the sky” and that, since the fall of the Qing dynasty, Tibetans would continue to “expel

the Chinese from central Tibet.”53 This proclamation remains an essential piece of Tibetan pride:

in 2013, Tibetans around the world celebrated the 100th anniversary of their declaration of

independence, prompting Chinese media to respond that the celebration was a “farce” and the

proclamation a “fabrication.”54

When the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded—or “peacefully liberated”55 —Tibet

in October of 1950, the region had been functioning as a de facto independent state for nearly

forty years, requite with its own government, currency, military, and taxation. Nonetheless,

Britain—which quickly lost interest in Tibet after India’s independence—and other states

continued to view Tibet as under Chinese suzerainty. Tibet’s attempts to join the United Nations

48 Ibid, 231. 49 Idem, 217. 50 Idem, p.507. 51 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC (1992). 52 Tsering Shakya. The Dragon in the Land of Snows: a History of Modern Tibet since 1947. (New York:

Penguin Press, 1999), p.5. 53 Gyatso, Thubten (the 13th Dalai Lama), quoted in Tsepon W.D. Shakapba. Tibet: a Political History

(New Haven: Yale UP, 1967), p.246-247. 54 Richard Finney. “Tibet ‘Independence Day’ Marked.” Radio Free Asia (website), 12 Feb. 2013, available

at: www.rfa.org [accessed 21 July 2016]. 55 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC (1992).

15

were repeatedly denied on the grounds that Russia and China would immediately veto its

application. The Tibetan government’s pre-emptive letter to Beijing in February 1949 to inform

the newly-formed Chinese Communist Party that “Tibet has, from the earliest times up to now,

been an independent country” was met with silence.56 CCP leader Mao Zedong, fearing

“imperialist aggressive forces,”57 decided that reunification of the motherland was essential for its

defense. Attempts by Tibetan leaders to negotiate an agreement based on the traditional

relationship of priest and patron were met with a three-point proposal in which Tibet would

accept its place as part of China, leaving defense, trade, and international relations to the PRC.

The PRC would not budge, and, on 6 October 1950, convinced that Tibet was “supported by some

foreign forces,”58 the PLA began its liberation of Tibet with a massive military victory in

Chamdo.

Negotiations continued even after the defeat in Chamdo. The Tibetan government sent a

delegation led by senior official Ngabo Ngawang Jigme to denounce China’s claims on Tibet,

reject the placement of Chinese troops in the region, and reclaim Tibet’s right to conduct its own

foreign relations.59 The negotiations did not go well: “the words coming from the Chinese

mouths were polite, but they were in command.”60 Without the ability to contact the Tibetan

government and under increasing pressure to comply lest Chinese ambassador Li Weihan send

troops to march on Lhasa, Ngabo signed the “Seventeen Point Agreement.” Knowing that

Ngabo’s signature on the agreement would provide insufficient legitimacy in Tibet without the

Dalai Lama’s blessing, the CCP put pressure on the young lama. Still a teenager and lacking

international support, the Dalai Lama was helpless: “without friends there was nothing we could

do but acquiesce, submit to the Chinese dictates in spite of our strong opposition.”61 Although

various attempts to negotiate with the CCP would continue well into the present day, Tibetan

efforts to retain their cultural autonomy were futile: Chinese soldiers described the 1959 revolt

“like a monkey fighting an elephant or an egg being thrown at a cliff face.”62

Although much of the world viewed Tibet as being under the suzerainty of China, there

were a few states who attempted to assist Tibet throughout the 1950s and into the present day.

The United States reluctantly and covertly assisted Tibet only upon realizing that, “in the event of

a Communist victory in China, the US ‘should be prepared to treat Tibet as an independent state

56 Shakya, p.27. 57 Choekyi Gyaltsen (10th Panchen Lama). “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local

Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.” Xinhua, 27 May 1951, in Richard

Barnett. A Poisoned Arrow: the Secret Report of the 10th Panchen Lama, (London: Tibet Information

Network, 1997), pp.145-148. 58 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC (1992). 59 Gyalo Thondup and Anne F. Thurston. The Noodle Maker of Kalimpong (London: Penguin Random

House, 2016), p.110. 60 Idem. 61 Tenzin Gyatso (the 14th Dalai Lama). My Land and My People (New York: Warner, 1962), p.68. 62 Shakya (1999), p.238.

16

to all intents and purposes.’”63 Indeed, between 1951 and 1969, the CIA secretly provided

training and assistance to Tibetan resistance fighters against the PLA. This aid, however, was

insubstantial; lacked the necessary involvement of India and Nepal, both which were fearful of

repercussions by Beijing; and ended in the 1970s when the U.S. sought rapprochement with the

People’s Republic of China (PRC). This U.S. help, however, stemmed not from an earnest belief

in Tibet’s independence but rather from a fear of the spread of communism and Tibet’s vicinity to

both the Soviet Union and China.64 Meanwhile, the Philippines, Ireland, and Nicaragua brought

Tibet’s case before the UN Security Council in attempts to recognize its independence; however,

all attempts were in vain, and, gradually, distracted by conflicts with Korea, Vietnam, and the

Soviet Union, the world acquiesced to China’s sovereign claim on Tibet.65

Although Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” and “Cultural Revolution” contributed to the

deaths of millions throughout all of China, his ideas were especially detrimental to Tibetans.

Neither their land nor their culture suited to communization, Tibetans suffered under Mao’s

reforms. In addition to at least 45 million Han Chinese and minority deaths due to famine,66

Mao’s plans to decimate “The Four Olds” (Old Ideas, Old Culture, Old Customs, and Old Habits)

had a “devastating effect on Tibet’s culture.”67 In his “70,000 Character Petition,” Choekyi

Gyaltsen, the 10th Panchen Lama, lays out the extent to which Mao’s reforms served to “destroy

Tibet’s separate identity.”68 This 1962 document outlines the Panchen Lama’s apprehension

regarding Chinese rule while prudently praising the CCP for its efforts to unify the motherland.

Although Gyaltsen’s many concerns include the excessive use of force by cadres in the region and

the rapid implementation of reforms, the Panchen Lama’s strongest fears revolve around religious

oppression and the loss of Tibetan autonomy: “once a nationality’s language, costume, customs,

and other important characteristics have disappeared, then the nationality itself has disappeared,

too—that is to say, it has turned into another nationality.”69 Although the 17-Point Agreement

included provisions for religious freedom and cultural autonomy, an overarching focus on

ideology, rather than practicality, resulted in reforms being implemented too quickly and an

abandonment of “all of the [CCP’s] previous policies of accommodating differences and

tolerating the local culture and traditions.”70

Witnessing the rapid implementation of Mao’s reforms and fearing for his life, the Dalai

Lama fled Tibet in 1959; renounced the 17-Point Agreement, claiming that it had been signed

63 Idem, p.20. 64 Ibid. 65 Idem, pp.212-236. 66 Frank Dikötter. The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution 1945-1957 (London:

Bloomsbury, 2013), p.333. 67 Shakya, p.321. 68 Idem. 69 Gyaltsen (1951), p.70. 70 Shakya (2009), p.300-301.

17

under duress; and founded the Tibetan Government-in-Exile in Dharamshala, India, which still

functions to today, albeit unrecognized by any official institutions. Immediately after the Dalai

Lama’s departure, Lhasa erupted into the infamous March 10th riots that resulted in the deaths of

hundreds of Tibetans at the hands of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The anniversary of

this protest, known as Tibetan Uprising Day, remains special to Tibetans and carefully monitored

by the PRC. Massive riots in Lhasa broke out in March 2008, and, since then, Tibet, having been

reopened to foreigners in the 1980s, remains closed annually throughout the month of March to

all but Han Chinese tourists for fear of future demonstrations.71 The more Tibetans attempt to

express their autonomy, the more the PRC tightens restrictions on the region. The tighter the

government-imposed restrictions, the more Tibetans are likely to protest.

The most disputed portion of Sino-Tibetan history ends here in the 1950s as the CCP

gained complete control of the region and began implementing reforms aimed at the economic

and political advancement of the motherland as defined in the Chinese constitution of 1912, i.e.,

including outlying regions such as Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. Although debates

continue regarding Tibet’s historical relationship with China, no one can deny that, for over sixty

years, Tibet has been under the complete control of the CCP and that the cultural, economic, and

political changes that continue to occur are a direct result of Tibet’s status as a region of the PRC.

Events in the last sixty years provide more relevant evidence for China’s ethnocidal engagement,

but a look at both sides of Sino-Tibetan history remains an essential element in determining the

differences in destroying a culture through assimilation or a clumsy attempt at the reunification—

albeit it with multiple human rights violations—of a state torn apart by civil war and foreign

interference.

CHAPTER SIX:

Evidence of Ethnocide in Tibet

Every empire, however, tells itself and the world that it is unlike all other empires, that its

mission is not to plunder and control but to educate and liberate."

--Edward W. Said, Los Angeles Times, 20 July 2003

The history of post-1950s Tibet to the present is where the question of ethnocide begins.

Although the 17-Point Agreement included protections for Tibet’s religious and cultural

differences, the reality of Mao’s plans for Tibet, and indeed, all of China, rapidly became

undeniably bleak. The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution brought famine and painful,

public interrogations known as “struggle sessions” to every corner of the motherland, while

71Katie Hunt. “Tibet Closed to Foreigners Again but Tourism Booms.” CNN (website), 26 Feb. 2016,

available at: http://edition.cnn.com [accessed 2 August 2016].

18

Mao’s stance on religion as “poison”72 continues to bring about the destruction of Tibet’s most

sacred institution and the backbone of its culture. Even after Mao’s death in 1976, China

persisted in its destruction of Tibet’s monasteries in the name of subverting potential “splittists,”

many of whom have been Tibetan monks and nuns. Although several Chinese leaders since Mao

have been accused by various states and NGOs of committing human rights violations, China’s

newest leader Xi Jinping stands charged with an almost Mao-ist intolerance to journalists,

lawyers, human rights groups, and anyone who questions the actions of the CCP.73 China’s

government views any questioning of their regime as detrimental to state security and has

implemented harsh new laws to counter any criticisms. Additionally, CCP fears of uprisings have

led to further restrictions on the Tibetan people, affecting their ability to travel, practice religion,

and educate their young. Tibetans argue that they are becoming a minority in their own lands,

unable to compete with the flood of Han Chinese migrants moving into the region, and rapidly

losing their language to Mandarin. Using the criteria obtained from examining other alleged

cases of ethnocide—namely restrictions on religion, language, education, and movement—this

section will examine the actions of the PRC in the last sixty years.

In her book Tibet on Fire, Tibetan scholar Tsering Woeser lists the five areas in which

Tibetans feel they are most oppressed. These five elements coincide with the criteria for

ethnocide discussed in chapter four, and several scholars openly compare what is happening in

Tibet to those populations devastated by imperialism. In this list of grievances, Woeser names

religious suppression; the destruction of land and resources, causing mass migrations of Tibetan

agriculturists; restrictions on language use, especially in schools; a flood of Han Chinese

immigration into Tibetan regions; and, finally, a drastic expansion of surveillance and control, all

aimed at monitoring civilians, especially monks and nuns, for any signs of “splittist” ideas.74 In

addition to Woeser’s five examples, this chapter will also look at restrictions on Tibetan travel

and education. This ection also demonstrates the ways in which the Chinese government has

committed—and continues to commit—ethnocide in the Tibetan region.

Threats to Religion

Since the 1950s, China has encouraged a “Sinicization” of Tibet through language,

religion, lifestyle, education, and Han Chinese migrants. One of the most threatening of these

changes comes in the form of religions reforms. With “religious life an indispensable part of the

lives of the [Tibetan] people,”75 the lack of such freedom in the region threatens the continued

72 Tenzin Gyatso (the 14th Dalai Lama). Freedom in Exile: the Autobiography of the Dalai Lama of Tibet

(London: Abacus, 1998), p.108. 73 John Simpson. “Critics Fear Beijing’s Sharp Turn to Authoritarianism.” BBC News (website), 3 March

2016, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news [accessed 15 March 2016]. 74 Tsering Woeser. Tibet on Fire (London and New York: Verso, 2016), pp.15-19. 75 Gyaltsen, p.56.

19

existence of Tibetans as an ethnic group, increasing local resentment of the Chinese presence and

prompting demonstrations. During the Cultural Revolution alone, Tibet lost thousands of

monasteries to state-sanctioned destruction. Seen as “troublemakers and instigators who pose a

threat to the regime,”76 monks and nuns were sent home, forced to marry, given “patriotic

education,” and forbidden to speak about or display images of the Dalai Lama. Part of their on-

going patriotic education includes publicly denouncing their holy leader. So stringent are the

laws on religion, that even Lonely Planet guidebooks on Tibet—which are often confiscated at the

border77—advise tourists not to carry images of the Dalai Lama, lest they encounter trouble with

the Public Security Bureau.78 Finally, according to the U.S. State Department’s International

Religious Freedom Report for 2015, China has been listed since 1999 as a “Country of Particular

Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for “having engaged in or

tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.”79

Although tourists visiting Tibet may still see monasteries and temples “packed with

worshippers who are busy making offerings of butter lamps and incense,” Chinese author Wang

Lixiong reminds the world that, “one only needs to go one step further to realize that religious

confinement not only exists but prevails.”80 Wang discusses the visible—the buildings, texts, and

pilgrimages—and less visible—the philosophy, monastic lineage, and educational systems—

elements of religion: “the former is the form of religion; the latter its substance.”81 Wang goes on

to explain how the form without any substance “can no longer be considered a religion” but rather

a superstition.82 Far from the only writer to stress the importance of Tibetan Buddhism, Wang is

joined by other scholars in explaining the significance of religion in Tibet: the 10th Panchen Lama

discusses the heartbreak and loss of hope Tibetans felt about their religion during the Cultural

Revolution,83 while the Dalai Lama stresses the unity and contentment Buddhism brings to

Tibetans.84

The Panchen Rinpoche’s report, the “70,000 Character Petition of 1962,” claims that

Tibet lost more than 97% of its monasteries after Mao’s democratic reforms, with around 10,000

of its 110,000 monks and nuns fleeing abroad to escape.85 Those few who remained in the

76 Tsering Woeser and Wang Lixiong. Voices from Tibet: Selected Essays and Reportage. Ed. and trans. by

Violet S. Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014), p.33. 77 Bradley Mayhew, John Vincent Bellezza, and Robert Kelly. Lonely Planet: Tibet, 9th ed. (London:

Lonely Planet Publications, 2015), p.20. 78 Idem, p.474. 79 United States Department of State. Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor. International

Religious Freedom Report for 2015: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau). 2015, available at:

www.state.gov [accessed 22 Aug.2016], p.2. 80 Wang Lixiong. “The End of Tibetan Buddhism” in Wang and Shakya (2009), p.151. 81 Idem, 150. 82 Ibid. 83 Gyaltsen (1951), p.59. 84 Gyatso (1962), pp.197-212. 85 Idem, p.52.

20

monasteries faced hard lives “owing to attacks and so on” and democratic management

committees tasked with ensuring that remaining monks and nuns complied with the Party’s

demands.86 These changes included restrictions on meetings, scripture debates, rites of

consecration, teaching and explanation of precepts, scripture compilations, alter offerings, and

ceremonies, all of which the Panchen Lama laments as a loss of “normal religious activities,”

without which he “and more than 90% of Tibetans cannot endure.”87 With the closing of

monasteries, fleeing of monks and nuns, and the harsh restrictions upon those who remained, the

Panchen Lama feared “an elimination and cessation of religious life of the monastic and secular

people.”88 Despite his attempts to balance out his report by including ways in which China had

benefited Tibet, Mao described the Panchen Lama’s report as “a poisoned arrow shot at the Party”

and the lama himself as a “reactionary feudal overlord.”89 Tsering Shakya describes how,

beginning in 1959, many monks and nuns fell victim to various “projects,” including the “tulku

educational group,” which “forced monks and nuns to violate their religious vows and to accept

the mundane standard of life.”90

Although the early 1980s brought a brief relaxation of these religious constraints by Party

Secretary Hu Yaobang, who used the suggestions made by the 10th Panchen Lama in his report,91

the destruction of Tibet’s monasteries, and subsequently, its religious culture, continues. As

recently as July 2016, reports from Tibet lament the destruction of one of the largest Buddhist

academies and monastery, Larung Gar.92 While Chinese authorities claim the issue as being one

of overpopulation, Tibet advocates call the action “another tactic in China’s attempt to subvert the

influence of Buddhism in Tibet.”93 A student at the monastery points out that overcrowding

common in other parts of China is not addressed in this manner and wonders how these actions

demonstrate the “equal rights of all nationalities” promised in China’s constitution.94 The Dalai

Lama’s brother Gyalo Thundop, too, commented on the state of the monasteries after a Tibetan

delegation was permitted to visit Tibet in 1979 and the distressing news that Tibet’s leading

monasteries were in ruins and that “everywhere, monks had been forced back to the life of the

layman.”95 Shakya argues that, just as the 10th Panchen Lama feared, even though Tibetan

86 Idem, pp.52-60. 87 Idem, p.57. 88 Ibid. 89 Robert Barnett. A Poisoned Arrow: the Secret Report of the 10th Panchen Lama (London: Verso, 2009),

p.xx. 90 Wang Lixiong. “The End of Tibetan Buddhism,” pp.172-173. 91 Barnett, p.xxi. 92 BBC News. “Larung Gar: China ‘Destroys Buildings at Tibetan Buddhist Academy.” 22 July 2016,

available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk [accessed 22 July 2016]. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Gyalo Thundop. The Noodle Maker of Kalimpong: My Untold Story of the Struggle for Tibet (London:

Penguin, 2015), p.265.

21

Buddhism somewhat recovered in the 1980s, “there still remain all kinds of restrictions on the

tradition of teaching lineages” and that the monasteries are forbidden to interact with each other.96

The question of the Dalai Lama’s successor has also made news recently, as the PRC

claims the right to nominate its own religious leader for Tibet. In a white paper released in

September of 2015, the Chinese Communist Party, despite its firmly atheistic roots, reaffirmed its

right to choose Tibet’s religious leaders through its “Measures on the Management of the

Reincarnation of Living Buddhas of Tibetan Buddhism,”97 which were originally implemented in

2007 but have returned to the spotlight with the aging of the current Dalai Lama. The original

document, “State Religious Affairs Bureau Order No.5,” lists the processes for determining

Buddhist leaders in Tibet and the duties and restrictions to which they must adhere. Reincarnated

living Buddhas must, before all else, “respect and protect the principles of the unification of the

state.”98 Included in the “application and approval procedures” is a rule regarding the impact of

potential reincarnations, namely that those with relatively large, great, or “particularly great

impact” must be reported to the local governments, the State Administration for Religious Affairs,

and the State Council, respectively.99 The same reference to impact appears in Article VII, as

well—this time stipulating that the “reincarnation guidance team” selection will depend on “the

size of the living Buddha’s impact”—and again in Articles VIII and IX.100 Once approved, the

China Buddhist Association issues a “living Buddha permit” and requires the newly appointed

reincarnation to provide a teaching plan for approval. Any interference with the process or

unapproved searches for or recognition of reincarnate Buddhas results in persecution.101 The

painstaking detail included in these proceedings, as well as the repeated provisions for potential

“impact,” provides evidence of the PRC’s perception of threat from Tibetan Buddhism. These

restrictions also demonstrate the lengths to which the Chinese government infringes on the

religious freedom it claims to provide in its constitution.102

This is not the first time the government has attempted to elect its own puppet lama: in

1994, the boy chosen by Tibetan Buddhist officials to be the next Panchen Lama—a position

second only to the Dalai Lama himself—disappeared with his family not long after the

announcement of his new status had been made.103 The boy remains missing as of this writing,

96 Lixiong and Shakya (2009), pp.173-174. 97 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Successful Practice of Regional

Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet.” (white paper) Beijing, Sept. 2015, available at: http://english.gov.cn [accessed

21 July 2016]. 98 State Administration for Religious Affairs. Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living

Buddhas of Tibetan Buddhism. 13 July 2007, available at: http://www.cecc.gov [accessed 17 Aug. 2016],

art. II. 99 Idem, article V. 100 Ibid. 101 Idem, article XI. 102 The National People’s Congress. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. The National People’s

Congress, 14 March, 2004, available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn [accessed 6 Sept. 2006], Art.XXXVI. 103 Shakya (1999), p.446.

22

though various groups have called for his return.104 In his place, Chinese officials selected a boy

from the mainland, believing that control of Tibet’s religious leaders would, given the unfaltering

influence of religion on the region’s citizens, lead to greater control of Tibet itself.105

Unfortunately for the Party, most Tibetans rejected the Chinese Panchen Lama, referring to him

instead as “a stooge of the atheist Chinese Communist Party Government.”106 Although the

young lama performs his duties throughout China’s provinces, he remains illegitimate to the

Tibetan people.

As mentioned, even images of the Dalai Lama are banned throughout Tibet and the

Chinese mainland. Authorities continue to prosecute anyone found with his image, charging

violators with disturbing the peace and promoting unrest in the region. As recently as August

2016, a 22-year-old monk who had been arrested in the summer of 2015 was sentenced to three

years simply for staging a solitary demonstration with a picture of the Dalai Lama in his Sichuan

hometown.107 Officials also arrested two other former monks who had been involved in the social

media network WeChat celebrating the birthday of the Dalai Lama. The most recent arrestee,

detained in November of 2015, had already served a three-year prison sentence in connection with

the self-immolation of a fellow monk in 2011.108 News of his arrest comes only recently, as

Chinese authorities maintain tight control over reports from Tibet. In March of 2016, Gyaye

Phuntsok, an 85-year-old Tibetan monk, passed away after sixteen years of being bedridden from

beatings and torture he endured in a Chinese prison. Arrested in 1998 after returning from a visit

to India with “religious scriptures he had brought back from India, together with personal

messages written to him by His Holiness the Dalai Lama,” Phuntsok was released in 2000,

crippled and with several ailments.109 These harsh sentences and reports of mistreatment and

torture indicate the extent to which the PRC views religion as a threat to “national unity.” As the

government continues to repress and hijack religious expression, criminalizing even the mention

and image of the exiled leader, Tibetan Buddhism, the fabric of Tibetan culture and identity, may

disappear.

A patriotic re-education campaign aimed at monks and nuns—long seen as instigators of

separatist thought and action—began in April 1996 and was dubbed “Yan Da,” or the “Crack

104 BBC News. “China Urged to Release Panchen Lama after 20 Years.” 17 May 2015, available at:

http://www. bbc.co.uk [accessed 27 July 2016]. 105 Shakya (1999), p.446. 106 BBC News. “China Urged…” (2015). 107 Richard Finney. “Tibetan Monk Given Three-Year Prison Term for Ngabo Protest.” Reported by

Kunsang Tenzin, trans. by Karma Dorjee. Radio Free Asia (website), 1 August 2016, available at:

http://www.rfa.org [accessed 2 August 2016]. 108 Richard Finney. “Second Tibetan Jailed Over Dalai Lama WeChat Group.” Reported by Kundang

Tenzin, trans. by Dorjee Damdul. Radio Free Asia (website), 26 July 2016, available at: http://www.rfa.org

[accessed 6 August 2016]. 109 Dan Zhen. “Bedridden for Years after Torture in Jail, Tibetan Man Dies at 85.” Trans. by Ping Chen and

Richard Finney. Radio Free Asia (website), 25 March 2016, available at: http://www.rfa.org [accessed 6

August 2016].

23

Down Severely on Crimes” campaign.110 These lessons focus on the importance of national unity

over religion and paint the Dalai Lama as a dangerous terrorist who promotes violence and

intends to “split” the motherland.111 Monks and nuns must disavow the Dalai Lama publically in

the hopes of diminishing Tibetan support of the “old regime.” These re-education sessions

currently remain in place, mandatory for monks and nuns and used as punishment for anyone in

violation of the law. Refusal to partake in mandatory sessions of this patriotic reeducation often

leads to imprisonment and beatings. Such was the case for 40-year-old monk Khenrab Tharchin,

who was imprisoned in 2008 for refusing to participate and died on 7 August 2016 from “intense

mistreatment by the Chinese authorities while in prison.”112 An anonymous nun previously of the

Jhaden Gon Palden Khachoe Nunnery alleges that “they conducted ‘classes’ for us, telling us to

kill religious affinity and ‘love the nation.’”113 She added that monks and nuns are considered the

“lowest rung in society,” considered “as enemies… and ‘red dogs.’”114 Anonymous reports from

nuns across the region add their stories of being forced to disavow the Dalai Lama or refrain from

unsanctioned religious teachings. Their families are threatened with reeducation sessions and

prison time, as well, to ensure cooperation: while many Tibetans are willing to sacrifice their own

lives for their beliefs, the fear of endangering their loved ones is a powerful tool in getting them

under control.

A document released by Diru County officials as recently as September 2015 indicates

“the need to intensify and deepen the work of cleaning up and reforming the religious

institutions.”115 New regulations list stricter punishments both for monastery residents and the

cadres responsible for overseeing them and include restrictions on spreading religious instruction,

meeting outside of monasteries, engaging in the spread of harmful information, and leaving Tibet

without permission. The various punishments for monks and nuns include “six months of legal

education” and jail time. Tibetans who “illegally send their children or relatives to a monastery,

temple, or hermitage without government permission” are punished with six months of re-

education, a two-year ban on harvesting caterpillar fungus—a common form of income for rural

Tibetans—and a loss of state benefits.116

110 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy. “Yan Da: China’s Strike Hard Campaign in Tibet.”

30 December 1996, available at: http://tchrd.org [accessed 17 August 2016]. 111 Wang and Tsering, p.234. 112 Tibet Post. “Political Prisoner Who Opposed “Reeducation” Campaign in Tibet Dies.” 10 August 2016,

available at: http://www.thetibetpost.com [accessed 12 August 2016]. 113 Tibet Watch. Tibet’s Intolerable Monasteries: the Role of Monasteries in Tibetan Resistance Since 1950

(London: Tibet Watch, 2016), available at: http://freetibet.org [accessed 3 June 2016], p.44. 114 Ibid. 115 Diru County Government. A Notification of the Diru County People’s Government on the Need to

Intensify and Deepen the Work of Cleaning Up and Reforming the Religious Institution, Document no. 224,

19 Sept. 2015. Trans. by The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, available at:

http://tchrd.org [accessed 1 August 2016]. 116 Ibid.

24

As for schools, interviews with various Chinese citizens who were sent to “jianku”—or

“difficult”—places to work, such as Tibet, provide more insight into the political education,

namely those interviews conducted with Han Chinese teachers sent to Tibet. An announcement

board at one elementary school in Tibet reminded students (in Mandarin) of their many education

goals, one of which stating that

we must achieve the goal of modern socialist construction, and we must persevere in in

building the economy. We must carry out domestic reform and the policy of opening to the

outside world…. we must oppose the freedom of the capitalist class, and we must be

vigilant against the conspiracy to make a peaceful evolution toward imperialism.117

The overriding message regarding religion comes across clear, as well: a young Tibetan university

student stated that students are told they “can’t believe in religion because we’re supposed to be

building socialism and you can’t believe in both socialism and religion… of course eighty to

ninety percent of us are devout.”118

Authorities also restricted access to traditional religious education for monks and nuns.

Such training would normally begin in childhood; however, new laws require Tibetans to wait

until they are eighteen years of age before being sent to monastic studies. With monasteries

having served as centres for free education and given their significance both religiously and

politically, many Tibetans especially in rural areas, ignore the law and continue to send their

children to monasteries from an early age.119 China’s on-going religious restrictions also prompt

more families to violate this law, as they feel their religion is under attack and see sending their

children to monasteries as a means of alternative education and of “helping to regenerate Tibetan

culture.”120

In addition to being places of worship and education, monasteries provide another

essential component of Tibetan Buddhism. Unlike other religions such as Christianity, Islam, and

Judaism, which rely on single texts, which are easily modified to be accessible for people of all

ages and languages, to explain their doctrine, Buddhism is “a giant system consisting of many

texts, one that is vast and complex.”121 Different schools evolved from these texts, each one

attempting to unravel the “dialectical arguments and enlightening riddles that are not always

immediately comprehensible.”122 The monasteries serve as interpreters of the texts, bridging the

gap between the religion’s rigorous philosophy and the more popular elements of superstition and

117 Peter Hessler. “Tibet Through Chinese Eyes.” The Atlantic (website), February 1999, available at:

http://www.theatlantic.com [accessed 6 July 2016)]. 118 Ibid. 119 Tsering Shakya. “Tibetan Questions: Interview” in Wang Lixiong and Tsering Shakya. The Struggle for

Tibet (New York: Verso, 2009), p.208. 120 Idem, p.208. 121 Gyatso (1997), pp.168-169. 122 Ibid.

25

devotion under a unified religious system accessible to the public.123 Wang Lixiong goes on to

explain how Tibetan Buddhism could not, therefore, survive without its monasteries and how,

without these essential messengers, “[monasteries] are just big buildings in the sky: unreachable,

and thus irrelevant to the mundane world.”124 In a letter addressed to Chinese President Xi

Jinping and director-general of UNESCO Irina Bukova, more than a hundred Tibetan scholars

from all over the world argue that the Chinese restrictions on religion and travel—namely to

Lhasa—had started to affect the role of the city in the lives of its followers, “depriving Tibetans

and scholars of Tibet alike of a living connection to Tibetan past.”125 They also oppose the

destruction occurring in the city itself, pointing out that losing Tibetan historical monuments

adversely affects the international community, as well as the locals themselves.126

The level of influence held by monasteries threatens the Chinese government, which, as

indicated from Party Secretary Jiang Zemin’s speech at the 1993 Working Meeting of the United

Front Work Department, expects monasteries to “keep their religious activities in line with and in

service to the highest interests of the country and the total interest of their nationalities.”127 With

one of the “interests of the country” being to portray the Dalai Lama as a “wolf in monk’s

robes,”128 this demand extends far beyond what devout followers feel comfortable doing. In a

published response to the 2015 Chinese white paper about Tibet, the Central Tibetan

Administration suggests that one reason so many monks are in prison is simply that their prestige

“outshines Party representatives” and because “the people listen to them and not to the Party

functionaries.”129 The more the Party pushes against monasteries, the backbone of the cultural

element most essential to Tibetans, the less likely China is to gain supporters on the rooftop of the

world. If the CCP wants less trouble in Tibet, it must ease up on its restrictions, especially on

religion, and provide the area with a level of autonomy.

Threats to Language

Restrictions on language and the forced implementation of Mandarin throughout the

region also threaten the existence of Tibetan culture. In schools, for example, Tibetans fear the

emphasis on Mandarin. Even Tibetan teachers are meant to teach in Chinese—a duty some

educators shirk with the argument that their students would be unable to comprehend the

123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 Quoted in Tsering Woeser. Tibet on Fire: Self-Immolations Against Chinese Rule (London: Verso,

2016), pp.74-75. 126 Ibid. 127 Idem, 176. 128 Hong Kong Free Press. “Top China Official Slams Foreign Influence on Tibetan Buddhism.” 15 August

2016, available at: https://www.hongkongfp.com [accessed 20 August 2016]. 129 Central Tibetan Administration. Department of Information and International Relations. Tibet Was Not a

Part of China but the Middle Way is a Viable Option. Sept. 2015, Dharamshala, India, available at:

http://tibet.net [accessed 23 August 2016], p.3.

26

lessons—while important placement exams are administered in Mandarin, as well. Tsering

Woeser discusses her experience in Tibet when, in 2012, the government replaced Tibetan

learning materials with Mandarin, a procedure deemed essential for “maintaining harmony and

political stability.”130 When asked what the biggest problem in Tibet was, some Tibetans in

Sichuan answered that it was language and that “so many Tibetans can’t speak Chinese, and if

you can’t speak Chinese, it’s hard to find a good job.”131 Although recent developments such as

the debut of “Cloud Tibet”—“the world’s first search engine dedicated specially to Tibetan-

speaking people”132—suggest that the language is not headed for extinction, the omnipresence and

imposition of Mandarin nonetheless poses a problem for Tibetans who fear what they see as

continued Sinification in the region.

A 2003 the Congressional-Executive Commission on China held a roundtable meeting to

discuss the Tibetan language and its usage in the region and the danger both to Tibetan culture

and the quality of learning provided by an educational system that devalues and ignores the

students’ mother tongue. Calling on linguistic and Tibetan experts from all over the world, the

discussion acknowledges the positive economic developments brought to the region under the

CCP while expressing concern for the survival of both the Tibetan language and the subsequent

loss of Tibetan culture if the former were extinguished. The three speakers present various

arguments, including the potential extinction of the Tibetan language “within two—or at the most

three—generations” and the damaging effects of rural Tibetans being unable to find work in the

cities due to the marginalization of their language and culture. 133 The discussion also points to

studies in which students were found to perform significantly worse when educated and tested in

Chinese than if they were permitted to undergo the same tasks in Tibetan. All three speakers

point to the significant loss to humanity of not only the Tibetan language and a literary history

dating back to the seventh century but the loss of an entire original culture, “a unique identity

shaped over centuries, which is now in direct danger of succumbing to the forces of sameness.”134

The 2010 “Qinghai Long-Term Education Reform and Development Plan,”135 with its

measures for treating Mandarin and Tibetan as primary and secondary languages respectively,

caught the attention of Tibetan teachers in the province and serves as but one example of the

prioritization of a “national language” and its negative impact on students for whom Mandarin is

a foreign language. Teachers and students alike viewed the reforms as a threat both to the

130 Tsering Woeser and Wang Lixiong. Voices from Tibet: Selected Essays and Reportage. Ed. and trans. by

Violet S. Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2014), pp.61-62. 131 Hessler (1999). “Tibet…” 132 Chen Xia. “World’s First Tibetan Language Search Engine in Trial Operation.” China.org (website), 3

August 2016, available at: http://www.china.org.cn [accessed 25 August 2016]. 133 Nicolas Tournadre’s statement in “Teaching and Learning Tibet…” p.2. 134 David Germano’s statement in “Teaching and Learning Tibet…” p.8. 135 Qinghai News Network. “Qinghai Long-Term Education Reform and Development Plan (2010-2020).”

Ed. by Wang Hailian. 17 September 2010, available at: www.qhnews.com [accessed 25 August 2016].

27

existence of their cultural identity and to the quality of the students’ education. Using arguments

from the aforementioned 2003 meeting regarding the Tibetan language, they point out that many

Tibetan students hail from rural backgrounds, where they have had limited or no exposure to

Mandarin, and are already at a disadvantage in a learning environment taught in another tongue.

The teachers stress that, far from weakening the Chinese language, “using the mother tongue, the

study of Chinese should be strengthened,” adding that “if one wishes to stand up, one must study

one’s mother tongue well; if one wants to leave one’s home, one must study Chinese well; if one

wants to go out into the world, one must study English well.”136 The petition acknowledges the

importance of learning both Chinese and English as a matter of practicality but argues that

Tibetan students being instructed in Mandarin were failing to learn either Mandarin or English,

even after ten years of study. The petition concludes with the suggestion that “the choice of

which language is used for instruction should be decided entirely upon which language is not an

obstacle to the student’s studies.”137 While Mandarin is an important language to learn in any

Chinese province, using it as the dominant language in an educational setting not only leaves

Tibetan students at a disadvantage but also marginalizes an essential element of Tibetan culture

and widens the gap between modern Tibet and its rich literary history.

Government-Controlled Schooling

Comparing the action to the way white settlers in North America and Australia attempted

to “civilize” the natives by sending their children to boarding school, various scholars explain

how the Chinese government often sends students into the mainland for schooling, where “there is

nothing to offset the Chinese view of Tibet.”138 This attempt to “foster national unity and loyalty

to China” by educating Tibetan youth in Chinese schools sometimes backfires, as the Tibetan

students often “come out of [the inland schools] much more nationalistic… leading complaints

against the Chinese government for depriving them of their cultural identity and language.”139

This reaction, however, is not always the case: the Dalai Lama laments the “many thousands of

children, from fifteen years of age down to babies still at the breast, have been taken away from

their parents and never seen again.”140 Although some of these children often do wind up

rejecting Chinese ideology, “it would be useless to think that children taken away as infants will

136 Trainees at the Qinghai Province Elementary and Middle School Tibetan Language Course Reforms

Training Class. “Raising the Quality of Nationality Education Requires Adhering to Teaching the Mother

Tongue as the Dominant Language.” 15 October 2010, Trans. by the International Campaign for Tibet,

available at: www.freetibet.org [accessed 31 August 2016]. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid; Shakya. “Tibetan Questions: Interview” in Wang and Shakya (2009), p.204. 139 Shakya. “Tibetan…” in Wang and Shakya (2009), p.204. 140 Gyatso (1997), p.184.

28

not grow up as Communists.”141 Religious freedoms aside, the removal of Tibetan children from

their families stands as a clear violation of the Genocide Convention.

Restrictions on Movement

At present, travel, even around Tibet and mainland China but especially internationally,

proves difficult for most Tibetans. While citizens of other provinces enjoy ease of travel,

Tibetans must obtain official travel documents for travels even within the Tibetan Autonomous

Region. Tsering Woeser shares her experience traveling by train from the mainland to the city of

Lhasa: while all Han Chinese were able to pass easily through the station, Tibetans—and

foreigners—are stopped by armed guards and asked to provide their “Tibet travel permit.”142 If

unable to do so, they are turned away and sent back home. Those who present their permits are

required to endure further scrutiny as they provide the reasons for their trip, addresses where they

will stay, and their fingerprints in red ink. Tibetans from outside the Tibetan Autonomous Region

must supply even more documents, including an identification card, hukou registration, an

introduction letter from their village office, a background criminal check from the Public Security

Bureau from their town of residence, and, of course, the Tibet Travel Permit. Woeser adds that

monks and nuns, seen as a potential threat to the peace, must provide additional documentation.

Because of Lhasa’s religious and political significance, this important stop for those on a

pilgrimage has become “a land today that most Tibetans are unable to visit.”143

Meanwhile, Tibetans watch as Han Chinese breeze through security: they are permitted

free access to all corners of China and “can wander freely through this holy land covered in

garrisons an inspections points as if it was some kind of heavily fortified amusement park built

solely for their pleasure.”144 Woeser laments the fact that where thousands of Tibetan pilgrims

once made their way to these holy sites, Chinese tourists, now the majority, roam the streets

freely. They explore the region without the same guns pointed at them as the few Tibetans who

still manage to make pilgrimages. A 2015 report by Human Rights watch states similar

difficulties for Tibetans compared to their Han Chinese compatriots, infringements on their rights

both to movement and their religion.145 The report indicates that waiting times for passports for

Tibetans can be delayed for up to five years and that their travel documents still lack the same

freedoms that citizens from other provinces would obtain.146 Meanwhile, government agencies

regularly deny some Tibetans a passport at all, often providing no reason. Authorities also seize

passports of or even detain Tibetans who have been to India for religious training, claiming

141 Idem, p.188. 142 Woeser (2016), pp.69-70. 143 Idem, p.72. 144 Idem, p.76. 145 Human Rights Watch. “One Passport, Two Systems: China’s Restrictions on Foreign Travel by Tibetans

and Others.” July 2015, available at: www.hrw.org [accessed 25 August 2016], pp.1-2. 146 Idem, p.14.

29

participation in “splittist” activities; however, Han Chinese tourists who visit the same religious

conferences suffer no consequences.147 The process for obtaining a passport at all is quite

rigorous, requiring many of the same documents mentioned above, plus addition “political

examinations,” before even beginning the application.148 Even travel to visit loved ones requires a

letter not only from said family members but certification that they are legally allowed to live at

the address provided.149 These restrictions on movement not only damage Tibetan religious

culture but violate basic human rights.

Ecosystem Destruction

As Chinese companies continue to develop the region, the destruction to both the

ecosystem and the nomadic families relying on it grows significantly. The Chinese state has

waged a campaign against the nomads since its takeover in 1950. Tsering Woeser reports that the

authorities regularly uproot people from the “sheep, grasslands, and traditions of horseback

riding” to the confines of the edges of towns, where they can be better monitored.150 The move

disrupts the entirety of the families’ existence as they attempt to adapt from rural to urban

surroundings, often forced to change their language, diet, and lifestyle.151 The sacred lands they

leave behind are then developed by mines, dams, and buildings; too often, these developments

results in pollution while the changes to the ecosystem produce “increasing earthquakes,

avalanches, debris flows, and other disasters.”152 Adding fuel to the fire, the companies taking

over and developing the region are nearly always owned and run by Han Chinese, neglecting local

populations who, having lost their livelihoods to the new developments and projects, could use

the new jobs.

A New York Times article describes a mining disaster from 2013 in which an avalanche

crashed down the sides of the Gyama Valley and destroyed a mining village, burying eighty-three

individuals. Dubbed “A Mining Miracle” by Chinese newspaper Xinhua for its massive quantities

of copper, molybdenum, and gold, the mining project—and its man-made disaster—brought

attention to other conflicts, as well. In addition to the destruction brought on by the avalanche,

local Tibetans were outraged by the mining project, which wreaked havoc on one of Tibet’s most

sacred valleys and necessitated the forced relocation of over a hundred families who were told

their move was a “legal obligation.”153 As mentioned above, this project neglected to include

many Tibetans: out of the eighty-three bodies recovered, only two were Tibetan. Additionally,

147 Idem, pp.16-17. 148 Idem, p.10. 149 Woeser (2016), p.76. 150 Idem, p.16. 151 Idem, pp.16-17. 152 Idem, p.17. 153 Edward Wong. “Fatal Landslide Draws Attention to the Toll of Mining on Tibet.” The New York Times

(website), 2 April 2013, available at: http://www.nytimes.com [accessed 1 September 2016].

30

scientists discovered higher concentrations of heavy metals in local waters, further damage to the

ecosystem and “a great potential threat to downstream water users.”154 Damage to the ecosystem

is damage to the locals in more ways than one: in developing the region, the Chinese government

has disrupted the lives of countless Tibetans, excluded them from the benefits of jobs or use of the

resources, and destroyed their environment. The fact that the valley is considered a sacred place

in Tibetan Buddhism and now cut off from those who would make pilgrimages only increases the

tensions between locals and the Chinese government.155

Han Immigration

When asked to choose the greatest threat to Tibetan culture, the Dalai Lama responded

that it would be the great influx of Han Chinese and their developments, which tend to favor other

Han Chinese and leave Tibetans marginalized in their own land.156 The 1998 report from the

International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) indicates that the Chinese government encouraged mass

migration of Han Chinese into the Tibetan region, “where they dominate politics, security, and the

economy.”157 The report goes on to mention several problems already addressed in this chapter,

such as the decimation of Tibet’s monasteries, the appropriation of lands for Chinese agriculture

and development, and the exclusion of Tibetans in projects occurring in their own backyards. The

ICJ report also notes the widespread “Sinicisation” of Tibetan urban centers, in which Tibetan

commerce is scarce.158 Tibetan scholar Tsering Shakya adds that “even to the casual visitor,

Lhasa now feels much more like a Han city than a Tibetan one.”159 Even the English teacher, who

came into such trouble for her text messages, commented on the high number of Han Chinese in

comparison with Tibetans and suggested that Lhasa’s appearance was a “dull, boring city that

looked like any other city in China.”160

Increased State Surveillance and Control

Although surveillance throughout China is widespread, few regions experience the level

and pressure of state control as Tibet, and this omnipresence of the state remains one of the top

five concerns of Tibetans.161 “The grid,” a complex monitoring system covering the entire region,

allows authorities to maintain careful scrutiny over Tibetan communities, especially “critical

groups,” such as monks, nuns, former protesters, and Tibetans who have visited the government-

154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 156 Hessler (1999); Karin Kapadia. “Made Strangers in Their Own Land: International Jurists’ Report.”

Economic and Political Weekly, 3.19 (May 1998), pp.1073. 157 Kapadia (1998), p.1073. 158 Ibid. 159 Shakya. “Tibetan…” in Wang and Shakya (2009), p.199. 160 Teon (2015). 161 Woeser (2016), p.18.

31

in-exile in India.162 The “Stability Maintenance” campaign, which began with paramilitary

operations during the 2008 protests, has entered a third phase. Started in 2011 to impede future

protests, phase two, the then-dubbed “Benefit the Masses” campaign, involved the transfer of Han

Chinese officials to Tibetan villages and was meant to end in 2014; however, reports indicate that

the campaign has only been strengthened in recent years and has, in fact, entered a third phase

with more surveillance technology, stricter laws, and an increased number of transfers.163 The

campaigns are unprecedented in size and duration: nowhere else in China, at no other time, have

“full-time government and Party administrators” served such lengthy—and in this case,

indefinite—stations “below the level of township.”164 These campaigns are aimed at stopping

unrest before it begins and has resulted in arrests for activities that were previously deemed

harmless or politically-unrelated.165

The overarching goal of the stepped-up surveillance is to turn villages into “fortresses”166

against separatist conspiracies, though the campaign is officially designated to improve social

services. Party Secretary Chen Quanguo lists the “five tasks” of the campaign: building steadfast

organizations and a “strong fighting force”; maintaining public stability by intensifying “the

struggle against the Dalai clique…and ‘Tibetan separatist’ forces”; improving development in

communities; promoting Party education and exhibitions that indicate how “happy, healthy life is

better under the leadership of the CPC”; and, finally, ensuring assistance with “practical” matters

such as health and education “so that people of all nationalities feel the Communist Party is

good.”167 The official slogan behind the campaign states, “All villages become fortresses, and

everyone is a watchman.”168 Other sources report a level of control not seen since the Cultural

Revolution.169 Woeser describes her time in Lhasa in 2010 and seeing propaganda vehicles

blasting a song with lyrics expressing how “no matter how bitter Tibetan people’s lives were…the

bitterness turned to sweetness after the Communist Party came.”170 The exciting red banners and

loudspeakers were followed by a police van, five armored cars, five minibuses filled with

soldiers, and two more armored cars. According to one onlooker, “Lhasa had come to resemble

Baghdad” and the Han Chinese were “nothing but colonial settlers.”171

162 Idem, p.19. 163 Human Rights Watch. “Relentless: Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans under China’s ‘Stability

Maintenance’ Campaign.” 22 May 2016, available at: www.hrw.org [accessed 1 September 2016]. 164 Human Rights Watch. “China: No End to Tibet Surveillance Program.” 18 Jan. 2016, available at:

www.hrw.org [accessed 1 September 2016]. 165 Ibid. 166 People.cn. “Chen Quanguo: Strong Effort to Organize Activities that Benefit the Group, Arrange,

Implement Good.” People.cn (website), 11 Oct. 2011, available at: http://cxzy.people.com.cn [accessed 2

September 2016)] quoted in and trans. by Human Rights Watch (2016) “China: No End…” 167 People.cn. “Chen…” 168 Human Rights Watch (2016). “China: No End…” 169 Shakya. “Tibetan…” in Wang and Shakya (2009), p.217. 170 Woeser (2016), p.44. 171 Idem, p.45.

32

The surveillance also serves another important purpose: to prevent further self-

immolations. Self-immolation, along with various “separatist” activities—including “thought [or]

speech” that aims to “subvert state power” or “split the state”—are now considered acts of

terrorism.172 Guards are stationed throughout the region, checking clothes and bags before

allowing entry into especially sensitive areas, such as the Potala Palace and Jokhang Temple. In

the struggle against immolations, the Chinese government has also set out what Tibetans refer to

as “the seven no’s,” which outlaw images of the Dalai Lama; talking about the “Dalai Lama

clique,” complaining about the Party; organizing or encouraging self-immolations; supporting or

watching self-immolators, including “performing funerary rites”; participating in illegal marches

or other meetings; and “gatherings that endanger social order.”173 Additionally, the crack-down

on “separatist” crimes and increased surveillance means monitoring images on phones and even

text messages,174 as the aforementioned English teacher discovered on her ill-fated stay in Lhasa.

According to the Human Rights Watch China director, “China’s surveillance scheme openly and

massively infringes upon the basic rights of Tibetans protected under Chinese and international

law.”175

In addition to the stringent laws and constant monitoring, the Chinese authorities often

assign exceedingly harsh punishments for even the slightest crimes. Disappearances,

imprisonment without trial, beatings, torture, and death await Tibetans who break the wide range

of possible offenses. This month, for instance, 31-year-old Tibetan Tashi Wangchuk waits to hear

whether his case will go to court. Authorities arrested Wangchuk in January of 2016 for his

written work concerning the loss of Tibetan culture, namely its language, and subsequent

interviews with The New York Times shortly thereafter. Although Wangchuk mentioned nothing

about Tibetan independence or the Dalai Lama and has repeatedly stated that Tibet should remain

under China’s governance, he stands accused of inciting separatism. Despite laws stating that a

detainee’s family must be contacted within twenty-four hours of arrest, the police failed to notify

anyone of Wangchuk’s arrest or to file official arrest charges within the thirty days required by

law.176 This example demonstrates the delicate threshold of tolerance by the CCP and the extent

to which it views even the slightest hint of “separatist” thought as a threat.

Backlash

172 Shannon Tiezzi. “In War on Terror, China Takes Aim at Tibet.” The Diplomat (website), 3 February

2015, available at: http://thediplomat.com [accessed 15 May 2015]. 173 Woeser (2016), p.82. 174 Human Rights Watch (2016). “Relentless…” 175 Ibid. 176 Edward Wong. “Police in China Push for Trial of Tibetan Education Advocate.” The New York Times

(website), 30 August 2016, available at: www.nytimes.com [accessed 1 Sept. 2016]; Edward Wong.

“Tibetan Entrepreneur Has Been Illegally Detained, Say His Family.” The New York Times (website), 10

March 2016, available at: www.nytimes.com [accessed 2 September 2016].

33

Despite Chinese claims that their efforts in Tibet have brought peace and prosperity to the

region, numerous forms of demonstrations continue to fracture the Sino-Tibetan relationship,

even after the failed 1959 and 2008 protests. Since 2009, over 145 Tibetans in and out of their

homeland have self-immolated as a form of protest against what they see as a destruction of their

culture.177 Chinese officials have outlawed this action, persecuting survivors and/or their families,

while the Dalai Lama continues to call for a non-violent, “Middle Way” approach to sate

Tibetans’ desire for greater autonomy and the PRC’s demands for loyalty. Other demonstrations

include single-person protests carrying images of the Dalai Lama, which are banned, and small

group events outside various Chinese embassies around the world. As recently as October of

2015, a visit by President Xi Jinping to London prompted an outpouring of Tibet supporters who

protested the British government’s failure to address the human rights violations in Tibet and

China’s mainland.178 Despite six decades of Chinese control in the region, Tibetans and

supporters around the world continue to fight for greater autonomy for the region.

Other organizations have expressed concern over China’s encroachment on Tibetan

culture. In a recent letter to the United States president, Congressman Jim McGovern and

seventy-two other lawmakers called for more U.S. action in creating “new, creative strategies to

encourage meaningful dialogue, protect Tibetan rights, and preserve their unique cultural,

religious and linguistic identity.”179 The U.S. lawmakers referred to the Tibet Policy Act of 2002,

the United States’ legislation concerning its involvement with Tibet, which was set up to “support

the aspirations of the Tibetan people to safeguard their distinct identity.”180 McGovern and House

Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi traveled to Tibet in November of 2015 and remarked that, despite

the economic benefits China brought to the region, “investment should not come at the price of an

entire culture” and no one should “confine a people’s culture and heritage – their very sense of

identity – to a museum or a market of handicrafts.”181 Other governments’ criticism has been

more severe: in 2014, the Spanish Court attempted to bring several Chinese leaders—namely then

Communist leader Hu Jintao—to trial for actions “aimed at eliminating the uniqueness and

existence of Tibet as a country, imposing martial law, carrying out forced deportations, mass

sterilization campaigns, torture of dissidents.”182 Despite having taken the case from a Spanish

177 Woeser (2016), p.5; Edward Wong. “Tibetan Monk, 18, Dies After Self-Immolation to Protest Chinese

Rule.” The New York Times (website), 3 March 2016, available at: www.nytimes.com [accessed 5 March

2016). 178 Geoghegan (2015), “Xi Jinping…” 179 Jim McGovern, quoted in Yangchen Dolma. “US Lawmakers Urge President Obama to Make Tibet a

Priority Now.” Tibet Post (website), 23 August 2016, available at: www.thetibetpost.com [accessed 23

August 2016]. 180 U.S. Department of State. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Tibetan Policy Act of 2002. 16 May

2003, available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov [accessed 23 August 2016]. 181 Julia Makinen. “U.S. Congress Members tell of Their Visit to Tibet.” Los Angeles Times (website), 17

November 2015, available at: www.latimes.com [accessed 23 August 2016]. 182 BBC News. “Spain Probes Hu Jintao ‘Genocide’ in Tibet Court Case.” 11 October 2013, available at:

www.bbc.co.uk/news [accessed 1 February 2016].

34

citizen, which complied with Spanish legislation concerning international hearings, the High

Court turned down the case after new laws went into effect in March of 2014 restricting Spain

from investigating crimes against humanity abroad unless the suspect is Spanish or in Spain.183

Numerous NGOs and human rights groups also express concern about Tibet’s cultural existence

and attempt to improve both the situation in Tibet and its relationship with China.

As to ethnocide in general, the aforementioned 1981 UNESCO Declaration of San Jose

addresses the Native American tribes and their on-going battle against a loss of cultural identity,

though the arguments presented are applicable globally. Within its twelve articles, the document

outlines the ways in which ethnocide ought to be considered “a violation of international law

equivalent to genocide” and argues for universal recognition of “all the civil, economic, social,

and cultural rights.”184 The declaration calls attention to the problem of ethnocide and the need to

establish “an authentic process of ethno-development” in the form of “policies guaranteeing

ethnic groups the free enjoyment of their own cultures.”185 By granting minority groups a level of

autonomy in their own development and territory, governments will be able to avoid

“disequilibrium and lack of harmony within society,” rebellion, and the disruption of world peace.

If governments find those reasons lacking, the document adds that failure to acknowledge “the

right of all individuals and peoples to be different, to consider themselves as different and to be

regarded as such” constitutes violations of the 1978 Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice.186

Over all, the document demonstrates the gravity of ethnocide and the universal rights of groups to

maintain their autonomy.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

Conclusion

Tibetans are ruined by hope, Chinese are ruined by suspicion.

--Tibetan Proverb

Given the criteria obtained from government documents and historical examples, the

evidence suggests that the CCP has engaged in several of the actions that qualify as ethnocide and

exhibits the same attitudes towards Tibetans that countless colonists have expressed upon meeting

indigenous tribes. Similar to the European settlers in the Americas and Australia, the Chinese

government views their activity in Tibet as a service to people, as demonstrated by the insistence

183 BBC News. “Spain Drops ‘Genocide’ Case Against China’s Tibet Leaders.” 24 June 2014, available at:

www.bbc.co.uk/news [accessed 1 February 2016]. 184 UNESCO (1981). 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid.

35

that the 1950 interference was a “liberation” from the “shackles of serfdom.”187 Since 2008, the

Chinese government has even pushed “Serf Liberation Day” to reinforce the benevolence with

which it has treated its wayward province.188 In a government white paper released in 2015, the

CCP refers to Tibet as “dark and backward” and “a far cry from modern civilization,”189 echoing

the sentiments of early American settlers. Likewise, a Chinese visitor to a 2008 art exhibition on

Tibet in Beijing commented that he could “feel the barbarianism and darkness that permeated in

old Tibet.”190 The CCP’s focus has been to demonstrate how its presence in Tibet has developed

the region, including the areas transportation, education, and telecommunications.191 Han

teachers sent to Tibet for work feel that their work is important, comparing Chinese involvement

in Tibet to Lincoln freeing slaves in the United States or America’s use of war to “develop” the

Native Americans.192 In this way, the CCP expresses a similar sentiment to that described by

Clastres: “la spiritualité de l'ethnocide est l'éthique de l'humanisme.”193

The regional developments, however, fail to make up for the ways in which the Chinese

government fails to provide basic human rights for Tibetans, who feel that “economic

development alone is insufficient for creating political stability or loosening ethnic tensions.”194

Where the new educational opportunities are concerned, some Tibetans view them as “a sinister

ploy, comparable to the way the British, Canadians, and Australians tried to Christianize the

natives by sending them to boarding school.”195 As for transportation and other developments, as

previously noted, the changes are often negative for both Tibetans and the environment: as the

latter continues to be altered, the former are driven further away from both their livelihoods and

their culture. The developments meet resentment from those Tibetans who feel they have been

excluded from the modernized benefits, which often go to Han Chinese companies and workers.

Even if the CCP’s human rights violations cease and Tibetans are able to salvage what remains of

their culture, further studies would be needed to reveal a way to reconcile Chinese development

with Tibetan needs and ideology.

187 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Tibet: Its Ownership and

Human Rights Situation. (white paper) September 1992, available at: www.china.org.cn [accessed 3 July

2016]. 188 Tsering Shakya. “Echoes of the Past: China’s Response to Tibetan Unrest” in Wang and Shakya (2009),

p.253. 189 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Successful Practice of

Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet. (white paper) 6 Sept. 2015, available at: www.china.org.cn [accessed

13 August 2016]. 190 Xinhua. “Tibet Exhibition Draws Appreciation from Visitors,” China Daily (website), 5 May 2008,

available at: www.chinadaily.com.cn [accessed 7 September 2016]. 191 Ibid. 192 Hessler (1999). 193 Clastres (1974). 194 Wang Lixiong. “The End of Tibetan Buddhism” in Wang Lixiong and Tsering Shakya. The Struggle for

Tibet (New York: Verso, 2009), p.159 195 Tsering Shakya. “Tibetan Questions: Interview” in Wang and Shakya (2009), p.204.

36

Since its intrusion into Tibet in 1950, the CCP has restricted or harmed Tibetan religion,

language, mobility, and livelihoods, as well as the environment, and marginalized Tibetans in

their own land. Tsering Shakya argues that “the Chinese authorities equate any expression of

Tibetan identity with separatism,” fearing that “any kind of cultural autonomy will escalate into

demands for secession.”196 With Mandarin overtaking the Tibetan language, rural families being

forced into urban settings, religious customs relentlessly restricted, and Tibetans themselves

constantly being monitored, tested, and punished for the slightest offence, one imagines that the

opposite is true: that the continued cultural suppression—the continued ethnocide—would lead to

demands for secession. While even foreign elementary school teachers find themselves in trouble

with the CCP for text messages about what they find troubling in the region, Tibetans are

essentially being held hostage, unable to express themselves or to leave, clinging to fragments of

their rapidly diminishing culture and the hope of someday regaining their autonomy.

196 Idem, 221.

37

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