china's political discourse towards the 21st century: victimhood, identity, and political power

CHINArS POLITICAL DISCOURSE TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY: VICTIMHOOD, IDENTITY, AND POLITICAL POWER 1 Neil Renwick & Qing Cao

Political discourse is critical to the legitimisation of China's ruling elite and critically informs its formulation and execution of political action. This study explores the theme of victimhood in China's contemporary political discourse. The constructed nature of political discourse--the 'official story' in Benedict Anderson's phrase--draws upon a range of supporting sources. Of central importance is the role of history and one of its key features is the portrayal of China as victim.This offers a distinctive pole of identificatory attachment for the construction of a modernist reading of national Chinese political identity. The study conducts discourse analyses of three primary texts. It is concluded that objecti- fied discursive power remains an influential factor in Chinese politics.

"Without legitimacy, words are invalid; invalid words lead man to nowhere" (Mingbuzheng zhe yanbushun; yanbushun zhe shibucheng)

--Confi~cius

Introduction

This study explores the nature and role played by culture in the construction of China's evolving political discourse with spe-

This paper was presented at the 10th Anniversary Conference of the American Association of Chinese Studies, Washington D.C., 16-17 April 1999. The authors would like to thank their panel discussants, Professor Peter Li and Dr. Gary Rawnsley, for their comments and suggestions on this paper.

112 East Asia / Winter 1999

cific reference to a discursive theme of "victimhood." The reason lying behind this investigation is the assumption that modern China's political discourse has focused upon this idea of China as the victim of hostile external and internal predators. This has of- fered a convenient means by which an "official" story of Chinese history and destiny, in effect the "idea" of China's political identity, can be underwritten and used to consolidate the ruling 61ite's political legitimacy, authority, and continued power. This, in turn, informs the conduct of political behaviour in China. The study draws upon the conception of political identity as artificially constructed rather than inherently essentialist 2. The role of"official nationalism," as Benedict Anderson has called it, is central to this process of construction2 This 61ite-driven form of nationalism draws upon a range of supporting cultural sources such as ideological narratives, music, literature, poetry, drama, cinema, and the symbolic forms of flag, monument and anthem. Critically, such nationalism is a de- fensive stratagem concerned with the construction of a self-legitimating discourse that consolidates the established power elite and marginalises oppositional discourses. Although this discursive theme represents a long-standing historical characteristic, this paper is particularly focused upon the incidence of"victimhood" in Chinese political discourse of the 1990s.

Of central importance is the role of historical discourse. Clearly, historical discourse is not a "given" nor is it value-free; it is itself constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed. Historical record- ing is highly selective and subjected to the influences of"active for- getting." History, like political identity and discourse, is thus contingent upon the demands of the ruling 61ite and is written and re-written according to prevailing political patterns of power. The construction of historical discourse is thus about the play of power in the delimitation of who or what is recognised and valorised and who benefits from such a narrative. This sensitivity of perceived

2. Essentialism being defined as"the idea that humans and human institutions ... are governed by determinate natures that inhere in them in the same way that they are supposed to inhere in the entities of the natural world." Ronald Inden, Imagining India (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p.2.

3. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991 edn. ), p.101.

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victimisation is characterised by a number of simultaneously expe- rienced and enduring characteristics: "anti-foreignness"; "modern- ism"; "nationalism"; and "culturalism.'These are distinctive but heavily inter-related and overlapping discursive themes. Yet, it must be noted that China's evolving history exhibits both discursive discontinuities as well as continuities. The ideological interpretation of concepts such as modernisation and the manipulative play of culturalism and nationalism clearly alter in a revolutionary era of mass lines and systematised propaganda harnessed to the yoke of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) legitimation and the retention of political power. Even within the communist era, political discourse has demonstrated discontinuities between the Mao, Deng, and Jiang eras in the way that Marxist-Leninism has been re-interpreted and adapted to the needs of successive 61ite leadership groups. How- ever, in their continued evocation of victimhood themes, these leadership groups have a commonality of behaviour. Where they have differed it has been principally in the intensity, scale, or sophistica- tion of their use of China-as-victim.

Moreover, the hegemonic discourse must be viewed as actively engaged in a critical tension with a variety of oppositional discourses within the CCP and beyond. Oppositional discourses form ines- capable and necessary inter-discursive interlocutors with the dominant discourse. These micrological sites of contested power are to be found in a range of locations: intra-Party ("leftist"-"rightist" intra-socialist contests), extra-Party (aesthetic, generational, gender, sexual orientation), extra-"national" (Han and non-Han ethnic narrative affiliations; regional differences and geo-historical perspec- tives).

One of the key features of China's constructed political history is the portrayal of China-as-victim. From ancient invasion, nineteenth century Occidental "semi-colonialism," counter-revolutionary dangers and late twentieth century criticisms of commercial piracy, human rights abuses and its Taiwan policy, China is usefully portrayed by its political 61ite as victimised. This historical trauma was deeply ingrained in the national culture. Politically, in almost any subsequent act of resistance, from Lin Zexu's self-strengthen-


ing programme in the early 1840s to the rise of communism in the early 1920s, one important motivating force is the resistance to Western powers and striving for national independence. Culturally, almost any initiation of change is introduced with reference to self- resurrection so as to be able to "stand on an equal footing among nations of the world" (zili yu shijie minzhu zhilin). The narrative of a century of victimisation forms a collective cultural memory that contributes directly to a contemporary sense of victimhood strength- ened by history (the recounting of humiliating stories), symbolic art (statues of national heroes, museums, novels, music, poetry, and paintings), and legendary figures such as Qing court general Lin Zexu. Such selective memories identify with the CCP's denuncia- tions of imperialism and eventual victory. The CCP has claimed legitimacy on a portrayal of itself as the historic agency that restored national unity and practical independence, and ensured that, in Mao's words on the victory podium,"the Chinese people has stood up. "4

The thrust of such narrative power has been overtly modernist in character. The adoption of named definitional categories such as state, citizen, nation, and class, are tied to assertively iconoclastic goals of progressive historical development. This is a future-oriented discourse locating the Chinese people within a modernist trajectory grounded in industrialism, technological advancement, and techno- cratic managerialism. The story rests upon a belief in Humanity's intrinsic capacity to over-come natural, historical, and political obstacles to progress. This is Modemity's emancipatory story of political, social, and economic liberation wherein immediate sacrifice will reap a rich reward in the upward struggle towards a better future.

This paper seeks, then, to trace the theme of victimhood and evaluate its lasting impact upon contemporary Chinese political culture and behaviour. It does so by way of a methodology drawn from the general approach of deconstructionism and, more particularly, through the application of discourse analysis to a selec- tion of writings that illustrate the victimhood theme. As an initial example of this approach one may refer to a September 1989 national day address by Jiang Zemin:

4. Stuart Schram, The Political Thought ofMao Tse-tung (NewYork: Frederick Praeger, 1963, rpr.1969), p.167.

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It should be stressed here that the international reactionary forces have never abandoned their hostility toward the socialist system or their attempts to subvert it. Beginning in the late 1950s, after the failure of military intervention, they shifted the focus of their policy to "peaceful evolution" ... They support and buy over so-called dissi- dents through whom they foster blind worship of the Western world and propagate the political and economic patterns, sense of values, decadent ideas, and life-style of the Western capitalist world. When they feel there is an opportunity to be seized, they fabricate rumours, provoke incidents, plot turmoil, and engage in subversive activities against socialist countries . . . . The struggle be tween infiltration and counter-infiltration, subversion and counter-subversion, "peaceful evolution" and counter-"peaceful evolution" will last a long time. In this connection, people of all nationalities, and all party members, especially leaders, must maintain a high degree of vigilance, s

Clearly, much of this is propagandist rhetoric. However, the association of internal threat with external enemies forms a long- running central feature of Chinese political discourse. Moreover, as Bruce Gilley's recent study illustrates, Jiang Zemin has a long-standing predilection for "patriotism" exhibited in his quoting of Lu Xun; 6 his manipulation of foreign businesses whilst at the Ministry of Elec- tronics in the1980s7; his 1991"patriotic" educational materials ini- tiative to"heighten the self-respect and confidence of the Chinese people, especially the young and to help them guard against wor- shipping and blindly trusting all things foreign"; 8 and, in a throw- back to Deng Xiaoping's "Anti-Spiritual Pollution" campaign of 1983-1984, his attacks upon"cultural colonialism"in the mid-1990s. 9 To look more closely at this central discursive theme, however, the following study looks at three discursive texts of the 1990s: an offi-

5. Jiang Zemin, National Day Address, 29 September, 1989, in Geremie Barme and Linda Jaivin, New Ghosts, Old Dreams-Chinese Rebel Voices (New York: Times Books, 1992), pp.396-397.

6. According to Bruce Gilley, Jiang Zemin quotes Lu Xun's phrase that"We Chinese have backbone" and then following it up with his own comment that "We shall never yield to unreasonable pressure exerted on us by foreigners." See Bruce Gilley, 7~ger on the Brink-- JiangZemin and China's New Elite (Berkley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 16.

7. Gilley accredits Jiang Zemin with a 1984 statement that"We cannot allow our products to be excluded abroad and then let foreigners run our factories to make money." Bruce Gilley, p.70.

8. Bruce Gilley, p.272. 9. Bruce Gilley, p.271.


cial political report to the 15th CCP National Congress by Jiang Zemin in September 1997; an orthodox critique of a major television series espousing an oppositional discourse; and an obligatory university guidance textbook for the study of history.

At a time of major social change within China, it is argued that this central idea of China-as-victim adds to our deeper understanding of China's evolving political discourse. It is argued that this theme remains a central distinguishing feature of contemporary Chinese political discourse and a tracing of its presence moves us to a closer reading of its present social practice and political behaviour on the eve of the twenty-first century.

Methodological Issues

Discourse analysis denotes a theoretical and methodological approach to language and language use. This study relates linguistic analysis of texts and verbal utterances to a wider social context. 1~ Language as social practice means, firstly, that language is an integral part of society, not external to it; secondly, it is a social process; and, thirdly, language is a socially conditioned process. Lan- guage is thus both discourse and social practice, and discourse is used to refer to the whole process of social interaction of which a text is only a part. In addition to the text, this wider process includes the related processes of production and interpretation. Text analysis, therefore, is just one part of discourse analysis that should include productive and interpretative processes.

Discourse involves social conditions in which the production and interpretation of texts takes place in three dimensions: situational, institutional, and social. The situational dimension is defined as the immediate social environment in which the discourse occurs. The institutional dimension constitutes a wider matrix for the discourse. Lastly, the social dimension involves the whole of a given society as an organisational entity. The key to this methodological approach therefore lies in gaining an understanding of the relationship between the text, the way that it has been produced, and the social condition within which it is created, promulgated, and comprehended.

10. Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (NewYork: Longman, 1989) p.26.

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These three dimensions of discourse (situational, institutional, and social) establish one set of analytical parameters for the study of text. This methodology develops three additional analytical levels for examining and explaining text: description, interpretation, and explanation. At the descriptive level, the formal properties of the text contain experimental, relational, and expressive values. 11 This allows for the exploration of the experience of the text producer and the play of knowledge and beliefs in the textual content; the social relationships enacted through the text; and the text producer's assessment of the social reality, and thus to the relationship between subjects and social identities. The interpretative level explores the relationship between text and social interaction and allows the text to be seen both as the product of production and as a source of interpretation. The explanatory level focuses upon the dynamics of social interaction and social conditions.

The three types of descriptive value are realised through the use of vocabulary and grammar. However, one cannot directly ex- trapolate from the formal features of a text to these structural effects on the constitution of a society. The relationship between text and social structures is mediated largely through discourse because the values of textual features become real only when they are embedded in social interactions, where texts are produced and interpreted against a background of schema. "Schema" are usefully defined by Henry Widdowson as "cognitive constructs or configu- rations of knowledge which we place over events so as to bring them into alignment with familiar patterns of experience and belief. They therefore serve as devices for categorising and arranging in- formation so that it can be interpreted and retained. "12 These discursive processes and their dependence on schematic knowledge are the concern of the second analytical level-interpretation.

Interpretation is concerned with participants' processes of text production and text assessment. However, within the limits of this study, the focus is placed upon the latter in order to explore issues

11. Fairclough, op.cit., p.112 12. Henry Widdowson, Learning Purpose and Language Use (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1983) p.54.


of social power. Interpretations are generated primarily through a combination of the text's content and the interpreter's particular schematic knowledge. Formal features of the text are the" cues"which activate elements of interpreter's schemata. Interpretations are generated through the dialectical interplay of"cues"and schemata. There are three dimensions of interpretation: textual, intertextual, and contextual. The textual dimension consists of phonology, grammar, vocabulary, semantics, and pragmatics. The intertextual dimension relates the text to a historical series of texts. Therefore, intertextual interpretation is a matter of deciding which textual series a particular text belongs to, and what can be taken as interpretative common ground for participant readers. Contextual interpretation refers to what has previously described as situational, institutional, and social context as societal determinants of a text. Broadly, contextual interpretation can be formulated into four major questions: "What is going on (contents)?"; "Who is involved (subjects)?"; "In what relations (relations)?"; and "What is the role of language (connec- tions) ?" The stage of interpretation breaks-open received delusions of autonomy on the part of subjects in discourse. It renders explicit what, for many readers, is generally implicit: the dependence of discursive practice on the unexplicated schematic knowledge often presented in the form of "common-sense" assumptions and self- evident"truths." However, interpretation alone does not explain the relations of power and domination, and the ideologies built into these assumptions illuminate the way that discursive practice forms a site of social struggle. Therefore, a further analytical level needs to be introduced; that of explanation.

Explanation is a portrayal of"discourse as part of a social process, as a social practice, showing how it is determined by social structures, and what reproductive effects discourses can cumula- tively have on those structures, sustaining them or changing them. "13 Two dimensions will be examined closely in the present study: the reproduction of discourse and the relations of power. When aspects of schematic knowledge are drawn upon as interpretative proce- dures in the production and interpretation of texts, they are thereby

13. Fairclough,. Language and Power, p.163.

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reproduced. Reproduction is generally an unintended and uncon- scious effect of production and interpretation. It connects the stages of interpretation and explanation. The former is concerned with how schematic knowledge is drawn upon in processing discourse, and the latter with the social constitution and change of schematic knowledge, including their reproduction in discourse practice. In this sense, social determinations and effects are mediated by schematic knowledge in a dialectic relationship between social structures and schematic knowledge through discourse. Thus, social structures shape schematic knowledge, which in turn shape discourse; and discourse sustains or changes schematic knowledge, which in turn sustains or changes social structures. However, social structures are embedded in relations of power and social processes and practices are sites of social struggle. Therefore, explanation is a matter of as- sessing a discourse as part of processes of social struggle within a matrix of power relations. Power relations determine discourses and these relations are themselves the outcome of struggles, and are established and naturalised by power elites. The focus upon social determination places emphasis on the past; on the results of past struggle. Any discourse will have determinants and effects that op- erate in all three analytical dimensions and at all three analytical levels. In applying this analytical framework, a discourse is to be evaluated multi-dimensionally according to the situational, institutional and social dimensions and descriptive, interpretive, and explanatory levels of analysis.

This study also seeks to relate this methodological matrix to the more specific consideration of political discourse advanced by William Connolly in his 1974 study entitled The Terms of Political Dis- course. 14 This early study in the field usefully addressed the relationship of language, meaning, political thought, and action. Connolly argued that the terms of political discourse "set the frame within which political thought and action proceed. "is From this basic assumption, a convincing argument is made that "[t]he language of

14. William Connolly, The Terms of PoliticaI Discourse (Lexington, MA: DC Heath & Co., 1974).

15. Connolly, ibid., Preface.


politics is not a neutral medium that conveys ideas independently formed; it is an institutionalised structure of meanings that channels political thought and action in certain directions. ".6 Specifi- cally, this work defined the terms of political discourse in three ways: as "the vocabulary commonly employed in political thought and action"; as "the ways in which the meanings conventionally em- bodied in that vocabulary set the frame for political reflection by establishing criteria to be met before an event or act can be said to fall within the ambit of a given concept"; and as"the judgements of commitments that are conventionally sanctioned when these criteria are met. "17 Only by examining these terms can the"tacit judgements embedded in the language of politics" be made explicit and "subject to critical assessment. "18

Textual Features of Chinese Political Discourse

It is useful to begin this part of the discussion with a brief comment on the Chinese"language of politics." As Hodge and Louie note, unlike the "word-centred'Western languages, "Chinese culture is strongly visual and semiotically promiscuous "19 Thus, the Chinese language of politics is rich in metaphor and allusion. Politi- cal meanings are understood by the author and the audience to be implicit and implied. Metaphoric references are, for individuals and masses alike, triggers to formulaic memories and to a particular, constructed discourse and official "grand narrative." The language of this narrative is charged with symbolic signposts: to sacrifice and overcoming; to martial terms and a siege mentality; to the"terrains of power" formed by the conjunction of landscape and memory. Such language is essentialist, patriarchal, and marked by historical silences. The apprehension of meaning, therefore, is made all the more complex as meaning is detached from the words themselves and reconstituted in the "dark corners" of political discourse. This is

16. Connolly, Ibid., p.1. 17. Connolly, Ibid, p.2. 18. Connolly, Ibid., Preface. 19. Bob Hodge and Kam Louie, The Politics of Chinese Language and Culture (London:

Routledge, 1998), p.8.

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evident not only in the bizarre Orwellian"doublespeak" of the Cul- tural Revolution 2~ but also in the less feverish and enduring practices of political discourse into the contemporary period.

At the strategic level of study, Chinese political discourse is characterised by three features: building a consensus (gongshi), a drive for unity (tuanjie), and a need for the propagation of this "consensus" through education O'iaoyu). Consensus is the highest priority and first step in mobilising the Party and the People for whatever goals the power elite strives to achieve. Building a consensus is fre- quently assumed to be consistent with China's supposed cultural tradition wherein a centralised, unified discourse has been habitu- ally favoured for legitimating action. Building a consensus in political discourse therefore constitutes the major site of, and strategy for, establishing legitimacy and authority. The exercise of power and the construction of knowledge are at full play in establishing and perpetuating a supposed national political "Truth"as seemingly self- evident and thus unchallengable. Unity is organisationally oriented, aiming at reducing internal friction to a minimum level. This chiefly takes the form of producing a public consensus at the top levels of state and Party and the absolute suppression of oppositional discourses inside and outside the CCP. Such exclusionary practice has been and remains a process viewed not only as necessary but also perfectly le- gitimate by China's power elite given the high value placed upon societal stability and order in the dominant political discourse. Education, for example, is one of the principal social channels through which the discursive mythology of consensus is constructed within the CCP mem- bership and the Chinese people more widely. The unique forms of such educational power include not only the integrating of the discursive consensus into formal national educational curriculum up to postgraduate levels, but through the establishment of a national political study system operating at all levels and every walk of life, constituting the politidsation of social life. This study therefore focuses upon the processes by which this political mechanism of discursive consensus is constructed in the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC).

20. See Jung Chang, Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China (London: HarperCollins, 1993 edn.), p. 298; Michael Schoenhals (ed.), China's Cultural Revolution, 196&1969 (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1996).


At the level of content, political consensus is constructed in two main domains: historical and theoretical. Historical discourse centres on re-formulating and re-defining events of the past one and half centuries in terms of historical materialism. The framework consists of a series of designation and/or naming. For instance, pre-modern, modern, and contemporary stages of Chinese his tory . 21 Each of these classificatory stages is historically positioned by a particular event: the Opium War, the May 4th Movement, and the founding of the PRC respectively. Similarly, China's political development is etched into the social fabric by way of a historical discourse that "names" particular events as signposts of progressive, modernising change: "Feudal reform, '"Old Democrat ic , ' "New Democratic," and "Socialist Revolution" (led, respectively, by Qing court reformers, Sun Yat-sen, and Mao Zedong). In such processes of "naming" and positioning, meanings are formulated or reformu- lated and established as forms of historical truth. For example, the focus upon the historically progressive role the CCP has played in overthrowing the "three mountains" on the back of the Chinese people: imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic-capitalism. The theoretical foundations for such claims are drawn from the Marx- ist-Leninist doctrine of historical and dialectical materialism as re- interpreted through "Mao Zedong Thought" or, latterly, "Deng Xiaoping Theory." Reflecting the emancipatory power of the modernist-influenced discourse, human society is seen as a progression from an original classless communitar ianism, to slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally to its most advanced form of a classless communist condition. Each stage is claimed to be economically and ethically more advanced than the previous one, and therefore history is inherently progressive and forward- oriented in character. The agent of change is material in the form of productivity (technology) and modes of production (economic base and its related superstructure). History's prime mover is portrayed as that of the Chinese people, and the leading force in the last three stages are a working class (proletariat). The working class is made

21. Pre-modern (jindai), modern (xiandai), and contemporary (dangdai) of Chinese history starts respectively in 1840, 1911, and 1949.

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conscious of itself as a class by way of class antagonism sharpened by shifting modes of production and through raised self-consciousness by its political vanguard-- the Communist Party. Over the course of the post-1949 period of CCP rule, this Marxist--Leninist reading of history, interpreted through Chinese revolutionary experience, has been established as "the" universal, "scientific" truth, and has become the official discursive ideology of the CCP. The in- tersection of the two domains of political discourse (practice and theory), praxis, constitutes the principal discursive site where the legitimacy of the rule of the CCP is positioned. Here we see, as Ann Anagnost has pointed out, a distinctive disjuncture between class- centred discourse with the working and peasant class as the progressive force of history and an oppositional discourse in which the peasantry is no longer a revolutionary force but one of backward- ness holding China back. 22 This discursive tension is evident too in Text 3 in the criticism levelled at"leftist stagnant ideology"and"class- struggle-take-command" opposed to "reform and opening-up."

Three Study Texts

Extracts of three primary texts (see appendices) are evaluated below. First, an official political report to the 15th CCP National Congress by Jiang Zemin in September 1997. Second, the critical response of orthodox adherents to a major television series espousing an oppositional discourse. Third, a principal educational guidance book for the study of history set by the Central Government as required reading for all Chinese university students. These three texts have been selected, respectively, in order to consider an official, and indeed, primary political statement central to official political discourse; to examine the nexus of orthodox and oppositional discourses; and to assess a major educational text of orthodox history.

Text 1: In terms of descriptive analysis, Jiang's statement is characterised by extensive "experiential values" realised in the use

22. Ann Anagnost,"Who is Speaking Here? Discursive Boundaries and Representation in Post-Mao China,'in John Hay (ed.), Boundaries in China (London: Reaktion Books, 1994) pp.260-261.


of declarative sentences throughout and a vocabulary specific to the CCP's history (i.e., "people's revolution,""people's liberation," "old China,""reactionary rule,""social nature,""collective leadership," and "national democratic revolution"). 23 This "names" major historical events in a ideologically significant form, locating the CCP in a teleological story harnessing the political past, present, and future in a unified presentation of the world. In so doing, Jiang is reaf- firming the "revolutionary" identity of the CCP:"... from 1900 when the Eight-Power Allied Forces occupied Beijing, subjecting the Chi- nese nation to great humiliation and bringing the country to the verge of subjugation, to the year 2000 when China will enjoy a fairly comfortable life on the basis of socialism . . . . "A noticeable refor- mulation is the three named historical figures, Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping, each identified with a (progressive) revolutionary stage of progressive development: "Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, three great figures who stood at the forefront of the times." Importantly, the positioning of Deng Xiaoping in this historical dimension seeks to establish the continuities of CCP leadership rather than the unspoken discontinuities as the basis for contemporary CCP legitimacy to rule. Thus, the text is positioning itself in direct descent from these antecedent revolutionary totems and in immediate descent f rom"Deng Xiaoping Theory." This central theme of the logic of inevitability in the leadership of the CCP is evident at the outset with Jiang's assertion of a social consensus (gongshi) ("a common realisation') underpinning CCP rule grounded in a trajectory of historical progression ("a lofty responsibility for the destiny of the Chinese nation"). This is rein- forced at the closure of the text in the careful use of the word "conclusion" (j'ielun) to confirm CCP leadership: "Our conclusion drawn from the great changes over the past century is as follows: Only the Communist Party of China can lead the Chinese people in achieving victories of national independence, the people's liberation and socialism, pioneering the road of building socialism, rejuvenating

23. In the case study, many linguistic units are counted in Chinese due to the nature of textual analysis of the original Chinese version. However, analysis of the English version is also included wherever necessary.

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the nation, making the country prosperous and strong, and improving the people's well-being." The text between these two opening and closing ideas, a selective reading of revolutionary history, is carefully crafted to offer a cumulative line of argument that builds to a seemingly inevitable and unchallengeable "truth."

In terms of the address's "relational values," social relationships are textually enacted through a discursive projection of progressive history. The emphasis placed in the text upon the process, patterns, and implications of historical"change" seeks to present an inclusive narrative embracing the Party and the masses. Thus, Jiang's speech discursively"names" three historical subjectivities of change. The first is found in the use of"we':"we have a common realisation that our Party shoulders a lofty historical responsibility for the destiny of the Chinese nation." Dajia ("we") in "we have a common realisation" is significant. The meaning of the word in Chinese is ambiguous and elusive in denotation, meaning something between "we" and "everyone" depending on the specific context of usage. Again, the use of "we" in the context of the emancipation struggle ("we overthrew the three big mountains of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism") is ambiguous. Following on immedi- ately from references to the establishment of the CCP, leadership of Mao and liberation victories, the usage could be interpreted to refer to the Party, to the masses, or to both. The second is the reference to the "three great figures." Notably, the references to Mao and Deng are deliberately encoded with symbolic significance for the Jiang leadership in the linking of their names to"collective leadership.'This is further considered later, but the immediate point is that they did not act alone in their leadership roles. Unsurprisingly, the third element is "the Chinese people." The text is marked with this phrase and to "the Chinese nation." Assumptions of homoge- neity, "sameness," and common cause are implicit in this projected imagery and are thus characterised by the exclusionary play of discursive power.

With respect to expressive value (the text producer's assessment of the social reality and social identity expressed through the text), the speech actively draws its audience together as participants


in a common heritage of "humiliation" at "the verge of subjugation.'To this activated memory of victimisation is associated the optimistic expression of pride in a soon-to-be-realised "comfortable life" and thus a discursive line of emancipation, progress, and betterment is established in the minds of his audience by the speaker. The deployment of metaphor in the representation of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism as "three mounta ins" symbolises the Party's role as a liberator of the nation and the people from victimisation and therefore its leadership credentials. Yet, it carries additional meaning in the mythology of the Party. The image of the mountain suggests a hard, difficult ascent from the foothills to the peak. It reconstitutes the powerful narrative of the Party's Yanan legacy. It triggers, too, associations with the long traditional aesthetic discourse of the Yangtse Gorges and the emotional essence of Chinese identity. Further metaphoric usage in references to "road of advancement" and to "the road of building socialism" carry encoded meaning in associations with the story of the Long March. Finally on this point, allusions to leadership"generations"suggests a sense of "fam- ily" succession, continuity, and reassurance.

In exploring the interpretative analytical aspects, textually, the extract is a self-contained narrative of the history of the Chinese State and people victimised, liberated, and actively pursuing strate- gies for "self-strengthening." Intertextually, the text suggests a rich repertoire. China as a victim is activated in a number of schematic dimensions. Firstly, Jiang's text links into a solid corpus of historical writings detailing the rising-up of China against its historic experience of victimisation. 24 Jiang's text intersects with a broad discursive background in referring to the wars with Western powers, subsequent defeats, and unequal treaties in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Secondly, the text draws upon Party writings, including those of Mao, reflecting upon China's status as a victim of

24. Representative authors on this subject include Lin Zexu, Gong Zizhen, Wei Yuan (first generation of Qing Court reformers in mid-19th century), KangYouwei, Liang Qichao, Yan Fu, Tan Sitong (reformers in late 19th century), Zhang Binglin, Zou Rong, Chen Tianhua (radical scholars in early 20th century), Sun Yats-sen, Huang Xin, Cai Yuanpei (revolutionaries and scholars in early 20th century), and Li Dazao, Chen Duxiu, Lu Xun (leading scholars in the first quarter of this century).

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imperialism. These form an immediate discursive space linked closely with the anti-Japanese conflict, the civil war, and the anti- imperialist confrontation. Both types of writing are characterised by a denunciation of imperialist invasions of China, and the exposition of internal reform or revolution as the necessary prerequisites for national independence, "rejuvenation," and international standing. Thirdly, a textual discourse interwoven tightly into the fabric of this speech comes from Deng XiaopingVs writings in the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, the guidance line of"one centre, two basic principles" (Yige zhongxin, lianggejibendian). 2s Fourthly, the speech is en- twined with a number of key statements by Jiang during the period from 1995 onwards. These include his address to the September 1995 CCP Plenum in which he initiated his "pay attention to politics"campaign and his May 1997 speech to the Central Party School in which Deng's economic reformism would be balanced by moral and political concerns.

Contextually, the speech is "situated" by the nature of the activity of promulgating the text, its topicality, and i t s purpose. 26 Jiang's report is significant primarily in declaratory terms in signposting the shape of China's policies to the year 2002 (the 16th National Congress) and beyond. The importance of the text is un- derlined by the formation of a small group of advisers to help draft the speech as early as October 1996. 27 The topicality of the speech lies in the issues of legitimacy and authority sought by the CCP by way of material promises after the long decades of sacrifice and suffering. The capacity of the reform programme to deliver on these promises is crucial to these legitimacy issues and is recognised in the programme outlined by Jiang in his address. The programme confirmed by the Congress provided for the end of state owner- ship of enterprises, for an expansion of private enterprises, and

25. One centre means "economic development." Two basic principles are "adhering to reform" and "opening up, and four cardinal principles."

26. For a fuller description of contextual analysis, in particular, of these three terms, see Fairclough, Language and Power, Chapter 6. Norman Fairclough Media Discourse (London: Edward Arnold, 1995) chapters 4, 5.

27. Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink--Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1998), p. 312.


wider shareholding. In the textual extract, Jiang makes sure that his "expositions" of Party policy are perceived as building upon" Deng Xiaoping Theory" and"socialism with Chinese characteristics." 28

The purpose of the address was to publicly identify the core principles upon which the latest national political consensus was to be based. For Jiang, the speech was a major moment in the consoli- dation of his own leadership. This was intended to demarcate his distinctive policy contribution as a formal leader before he would anticipate moving to the more mystical informal leadership behind the bamboo screen; and for establishing the"fourth generation"leadership he wanted to succeed him.

The text is institutionally contextualised in relation to the political balance within Jiang Zemin's "third generation" leadership elite and the size of the president's room for manoeuvre. Although in 1997 Jiang held the Presidency, chairmanship of the Central Mili- tary Commission, as well as the position of General-Secretary of the CCP, the limits to his power were defined by the army, resilient Leftist ideological guardians, and senior members of the Party such as Qiao Shi (then Chairman of the National People's Congress). These limits had been apparent in 1995-1996 in a retreat over his "pay attention to politics" campaign when confronted by significant Leftist criticism. It was evident again in the weeks leading-up to the Congress in Jiang's decision not to restore and occupy the post of Party chairman (abolished by Deng in 1982) in the face of opposition by the most senior Party members.

The social context is marked by the authoritative power of the text in the society as a whole. The meanings enclosed within the text are given, in an absolute sense, within a closed Party discourse before wider public dissemination. But, as Bruce Gilley has illus- trated, the discursive authority of the CCP was largely lost by 1997 in a popular nihilistic angst identified both in the official Xinhua

28. For exemplary texts shaped by this report, see, Guidance Reader for the study for the 15th CCP National Congress Report (Beijing: People Publishing House, 1997), Yah Changgui, Lu Jining, and Gao Lu, et. aI., Outline for the Study of Some Theoretical Issues for the Building of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (Beijing: Xuexi Publishing House, 1998).

Renwick & Cao 129

newspaper and a government survey . 29 A central aim of the speech, therefore, was to confirm the basis upon which a strong China was to be constructed; one in which welfare reform and income redis- tribution would be central, crime and corruption attacked, and effi- cient and effective governmental management instituted.

In respect to the features of explanatory analysis, the extract opens Jiang's political report that in turn confirms a new era for the CCP, which is the third generation of Party leadership. The objective in the reiteration of history is as significant as it has been in the past in legitimising the CCP's leadership role. It is central to mobilising consensual legitimacy derived from the anticipated fulfilment of two key historical tasks: preventing China from being victimised by foreign powers and building a prosperous and strong nation. China witnessed one hundred years of foreign invasions from the Opium War (starting in 1840) to the Resistance War against Japan (ending in 1945) with devastating consequences for China. It was a hundred years of desperate struggle for survival to be ended by the restora- tion of national independence (wai qu lieqiang) and internal resurrection (nei qiufuxin). These two tasks naturally have a strong appeal among the broad masses. The appeal is particularly strong, however, among intellectuals. Framing history by giving prominence to these tasks and making them goals of the CCP establishes a common cause with the people and, by assigning responsibility to itself for the attainment of these goals, establishes a legitimacy. This is the fundamental claim made by the CCP and it is a core function of this text. Therefore, in this text's functionality, what has changed from previous similar documents (e.g., political reports of previous CCP's national congresses) is a refraining of contemporary history through the redefining, reformulating, addition, deletion, or repositioning of

29. See Bruce Gilley, op.cit., p.264, he quotes the May 1995 Xinhua article as commenting that"even though the market economics propounded by Deng Xiaoping have won the support of the Chinese people, complaints about the fall in moral standards have increased day by day.... [the] disappearance of social norms, the death of morals, and the disintegration of traditional values." Gilley also quotes the conclusion of the State Economic Reform Commission 2,000 household survey that the"level of people's satisfaction with the reforms has continued to fall year by year, ... [whilst] demands for a greater sense of security have clearly risen."


the CCP in relation to certain events. 3~ For instance, as we have seen, three figures (Sun, Mao, and Deng) and three corresponding events (the Revolution of 1911, socialist revolution, and socialist construction) are identified as significant in the past century. 31 But this leaves many post-1949 socio-political events as a historical blank. In 'naming' the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolu- tion, the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the War of Liberation before 1949, the CCP's historical credentials are meant to be established as incontestable. What has never changed is the portrayal of the CCP's leading role in overthrowing the three mountains and the historical inevitability of such a role. Thus, truth and power are used simultaneously to enable a legitimated and legitimating authority to be constructed through a monopolised discursive space. This is the broadest social context in which this textual extract is produced, understood, propagated, and eventually implemented. The effect of the text is to attempt a reproduction of existing relations of power and to exclude potential or sublimated oppositional discourses. The discourse is understood in a matrix of social structures as reorienting the Party and the nation towards a revised economic reform programme. Jiang overtly calls up the (selectively chosen) legitimating cloak of "Deng Xiaoping Theory," his "primary stage theory," in order to provide a sense of continuity and legiti- mate his point of departure. The distribution of relatively larger text space to Deng Xiaoping's reform era indicates a continuation of policies by the"third wave" leadership. This textual feature also high- lights a priority of economic development tempered by Jiang's "pay attention to politics" campaign initiated at the September 1995 CCP Plenum. Jiang's political p ragmat i sm led h im to orient his

30. An typical example is the Cultural Revolution which was framed as a positive dominant theme in the CCP's 9th National Congress, as a disaster in 6th Plenary Session of the 11th National Congress, and made a absence as a topic in the 15th National Congress. For an official authoritative text guiding the CCP's redefining of contemporary history, see, Deng Xiaoping, Some views on drafting "Resolution on Some Historical Issues of the CCP since the Founding of the PRC" in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping: 1975-1982 (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1983), p.255-274.

31. Also known as Xinhai Revolution, referring to the revolution led by Dr. SunYat-sen overthrowing the last dynasty of feudal China.

Renwick & Cao 131

programme towards the unacceptable face of economic reform and high-speed, high-level growth: poverty, crime, corruption and "socialist spiritual culture."

Text 2: This extract is part of a critique article of a Chinese television series, Heshang ("River Elegy"), a mini-series broadcast by China Central Television in 1988. 32 Originally conceived as a tribute to Chinese tradition, the director and authors reversed this goal to present a dramatically iconoclastic work. 33 This is encapsulated in the claim that" there does not exist by any means an eternal, unchanging influence or determining role." Heshang is the most con- troversial work since 1949, which "set off a debate comparable in nature to the Death of God controversy in the West. "34 Its central theme is the "need for a new civilisation ... industrial civilisation." The authors use the metaphor of the river flowing to the sea to represent a flow from traditional culture to modernity. Thus, Chi- nese (yellow) civilisation, symbolically represented by the Yellow River, should be given up completely and thus give way to the blue (maritime) civilisation of the West. This perspective aroused strong criticism among scholars9 Even one of the authors of the series, Su Xiaokang, believes in retrospect, that Heshang treats Chinese history and culture simplistically. B6 Simplistic or not, its appeal to a mass television audience cannot be denied.

However, what we are interested in, in this extract is the political thrust of the critical discourse directed towards the series. This criticism is significantly grounded in the discursive schematic of

32. Heshang, means in Chinese the sad song for the passing away of loved ones. We prefer the translation River Elegy to Deathsong of the River as in the title of the series.

33. Xia Jun, Su Xiaokang, Wang Luxiang. 34. Richard W. Bodman, From History to Allegory to Art: A Personal Search for Interpretation

in Su Xiaokang, Wang Luxiang (eds.), Deathsong of the River: A Reader's Guide to the Chinese TV Series Heshang (NewYork: East Asia Programme Cornell University, 1991) p.1.

35. Among these critics, the most prominent is Tu Wei-ming, Professor of philosophy at Harvard University. For one of his articles, see, "Deathsong of the River: Whither Chinese Culture?" in Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang (eds.), Deathsong of the River, pp.301-309.

36. Su Xiaokang, Heshang, Student Movement, and the Changing Trend of Culture in China Digest (an electronic journal), Issue 14-5, at (www.cnd.org).


Marxist-Leninist "scientific" historical materialism. Thus the series' authors were charged with heterodoxy in their failure to apply Marx- ist-Leninist theory in the analysis of history. In this textual critique of the series, the critic uses classical Marxist historical materialism as his weapon. The framework is the role of productivity and production relations in moving history forward in a dialectic relationship between economic base and superstructure, and a progressive view of history from a low level classless society to an advanced society of communism: "The birth, development and evolution of the whole capitalist system was the result of the mutual interaction of the economy, government and culture of all of mankind; it was a product of a definite stage of historical development .... "

Descriptively, it shares similar textual features with Text 1: It is marked by experiential values throughout; the relational value is polarised between Marxist and non-Marxist views; and the text purports to offer a straightforward evaluation of historical reality. The cumulative result is the unreconstructed application of Marx- ist-Leninist-defined 'truth' as the benchmark for the interpretation of Chinese history and civilisational development.

Discursively, this extract integrates a number of key issues in a coherent account of capitalism: Firstly, the text assumes the inevitability of colonial expansion under capitalism. Thus, the nature of capitalism, the insatiable desire for profit, made it inevitable that China would fall victim to such insatiable expansionism. Secondly, capitalism, as a product of a definite historical stage of production and production relations, ensures that the potential for continued attempts to exploit and subordinate China remains salient. Thirdly, the dynamics of economic, governmental, and cultural interaction will eventually result in the downfall of capitalism. Fourthly, the categorisation of "blue" and "yellow" civilisations is, clearly, non- Marxist and therefore unscientific and invalid. As a result of such a critical interpretation based on an intertextual reading, a discursive unity is achieved by relating the past (victimisation by colonial powers and liberation by the CCP of China), the present (the need for vigilance against capitalist countries and for the rule of the communist party), and the future (the fall of capitalism and prevailing

Renwick & Cao 133

of communism); the capitalists (victimising force) and communists (devictimising force), the blue (Western more advanced stage of human development) and yellow (East Asian less advanced stage) civilisations; truth (Marxism) and fallacy (those against Marxism), knowledge (Marxist account of history) and power (CCP's legitimacy to rule).

An immediate situational context is that the extract is part of an organised criticism of Heshang by five editorial departments of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in late 1989 following the events of June 4th. 37 Though no new theoretical formations are made in the critique, it signals an important attempt to re-assert Marxist-Leninism as the guiding ideology. Institutionally, a wider context exists in the relationship between the CASS and the CCP, in which the former is subject to the latter. The extract, therefore, echoes the official line of the CCP. At the social level, such criticism of a television programme could well be understood as framing a new wave of the ideological purification campaign.

The intertextual background is extremely rich, and China as a victim has been meshed into a mass of historical narratives in a variety of forms, in particular, in the domain of history. Two distinctive features of this intertextuality can be noted here: the use of an environmental metaphor and a contemporaneous discourse of pes- simism and crisis. Landscape and memory are intimately connected in national cultures and consciousness. 38 The use of the"Yellow" imagery is powerfully evocative in conjuring-up the sense of common origins, ethnic continuity and contact with the land that has been so evident in the mythology of the essentialist and nativistic readings of Chinese history and identity to be found in Mao Zedong Thought and elsewhere. 39 The second intertextual reading is that of the "Chinese crisis" mentality of the late 1980s and 1990s. This has been, in part, considered earlier. However, as Barme and Jaivin have noted, the conjunction of 1988 as the year of the dragon and the

37. See, Su Xiaokang, Wang Luxiang (eds.), op.cit., p. 311. 38. Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (London: Fontana, 1995). 39. Frank Dikotter, The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan (London: Hurst,

1997).


experiencing of natural disaster and popular unrest with resurrected bad memories of 1976 (the previous year of the dragon) fueled a sense of impending calamity. Heshang contributed to a sense of alien- ation and crisis in its challenge to the hegemonic discourse and to traditional culture. The orthodox critiques such as Text 2 sought to emphasis the mythology misapprehension of those enamoured of Western superiority. The past strength of the Western Powers was temporally-specific ('a definite stage of historical development') and was thus not to be held as"eternal, unchanging.'The future, by im- plication, was to be that of socialism as capitalism's"blue civilisation" would inevitably come to an end.

Text 3: This extract is characterised by pervasive expressive values with an overall assessment of the realities of Chinese life and a resulting formulation of the tasks to be fulfilled. Most importantly, the text extols the virtues of Party policies aimed at solving the core social problem or "principal social contradiction"; rising social ex- pectations and "backward social productivity." The first paragraph constructs a solidarity between the CCP and the people by a repositioning of the Party's central task as"representing the fundamental interests of the people, therefore having decisive effect on the whole country. "The second paragraph privileges the role of economic development in contrast to the ideological dimension of"the basic policy"; the need to adhere to the "four cardinal principles." The validity of the central policy is, interestingly, established by its being"Marxist" as defined and redefined according to prevailing political imperatives and by "the valuable experience of the people" whose power in affecting political processes in China is but very small.

Relating to Text 1, CCP legitimisation forms a recurrent pattern in this text in two forms. First, with respect to practical historical experiences evident in the "big step" in economic improvement in the past twenty years. Second, theoretically, the scientific nature of Marxism evident in the Marxist account of the importance of material "productivity." Two legitimising sources are evoked here - -a crystallisation of China's economic development as an overarching policy that, in turn, advances the historical mission towards a more moderated social condition: "to set economic development as a

Renwick & Cao 135

central task is a historical mission that must be adhered to unre- mittingly on a long-term basis."The text thus portrays a smooth reorientation away from the political imperatives of revolution towards the economic imperatives of renewal: "The practical experience of reform and opening-up has demonstrated that, new roads cannot be explored and created, the old institutions cannot be broken, productivity cannot be released, the economy cannot be developed, even socialism will be buried, if reform and opening-up is not practised . . . . " Such discursive deployment, as a principal means of establishing authority, not only enables a reproduction of relations of power but also reinforces the very method itself as an end- lessly creative mechanism through which a legitimising discourse is manufactured in accordance with the needs of the political elite.

The victimhood theme can clearly be identified in the last paragraph with the exposition of the necessity of upholding "the four cardinal principles." Exposition of the classical class struggle doctrine, though minimised during the reform era, is still used as the ideological justification for practice. The creative nature of the victimhood theme as a discourse lingering into modern times links the past experience of being oppressed and exploited by external (imperialist powers) and internal dominant (feudal and bureaucratic capitalist classes) forces with a new danger; internal opposition and international pressure as a continuation of the mountain-like evils. The vigilance called upon for this new form of victimisation is combined with a fresh memory of the past experiences where schematic knowledge of victimiser/de-victimised is instanced as a discursively rich intertextual domain. However, such a theme is not routinely invoked thus avoiding overbalancing the overarching im- perative of economic development. The central feature of the text is the emphasis it places upon the notion that policies are overwhelm- ingly directed towards a theme of"construction"; in particular, the theme of building a strong socialist market economy which legiti- mates reform and facilitates the "opening-up" of China. In contrast, an ideological theme represented in the Party's basic policy line of "one centre, two basic principles" theoretically incorporates the"four cardinal principles" and constitutes the other arm of the text.


Relational values, as evident in Text 1, are marked by the text producer presenting universal truth to a need-to-be-educated audience. However, given the weaker position of the student reader in the existing power relations, the presentation focuses upon a re- cycling of knowledge within an established domain of discourse. This forms a pre-condition for engaging in a process of political participation of which reading the present text is an indispensable part. Like the previous two texts, textually, subjective agency is made absent. This serves two functions. Firstly, it creates an impression of presenting an objective, factual reality. Secondly, it engages the reader in the text producer's position and forges a universal producer that includes "the Party, the people," and the reader (as a member of either or both of the two groups). The reader is made to feel a truth is revealed by a universal voice. The concealment of the voice of a dominant elite over the popular masses by the disappearance of subjective agency not only dissolves relational divi- sions within the textual domain, but establishes a discursive base as a first step for mobilising consensus beyond the text. This thereby constitutes the dynamics of socio-political processes. In contrast to Texts 1 and 2, experiential values are overshadowed by expressive values. The former entails most often an account of history in a particular perspective with the aim of establishing new grounds for future action. The latter, however, is a direct exposition of ideational guidelines for such action. The present extract is characterised by a graphic explication of policy lines. But all three texts are similar in terms of the relational values constructed into the discourse.

Interpretively, the most obvious contextual feature is the educational nature of this text. It is part of a textbook for the compul- sory foundation course of History of the Chinese Revolution that every Chinese university student has to take. 4~ Within the situational domain, this text needs to be studied, understood, and presented in examinations under the condition that basic assumptions are not open~ for challenge, but with considerable freedom as to methods

40. This text is taken from a companion book for the national textbook for the course of History of the Chinese Revolution. The 1994 edition of the former prints 35,161 copies; and the 1993 edition of the latter prints 1.1 millions copies.

Renwick & Cao 137

of presentation, materials drawn upon within established data, and individual styles. Given the existing matrix of relations of power at the societal level, educational institutions are subordinated and used as a tool for the reproduction of the status quo rather than a source of oppositional discourse (which is, unsurprisingly, rare). Conse- quently, educational textbooks in social sciences and humanities are channels for institutionalised, closed, official discourses.

Within such a context, intertextual reading is inevitably essential in not only making sense of the present text, but situating it in a large mass of formations of Chinese political discourse that domi- nates national life. An immediate intertextual space is constituted by textbooks for other university foundation courses running par- allel with this History course, namely: Marxist Philosophy, and Politi- cal Economy, which, as one of the course name indicates, provides classical Marxist views of politics, economics, society, and history. This is the first rigorous training of Marxist theory in an educational context, introducing to the student fundamental principles such as historical and dialectical materialism, productivity, and modes of productions. These two courses, together with the History course, establishes the application of Marxist principles in the Chinese context and constitutes the orthodox theoretical basis for the study of all disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. An intermediate intertextual domain can be discerned beyond educational institutions. This consists of nearly all official discourses published in various forms but chiefly by publications used for political study discussed earlier. The highest level of intertextual space is occupied by the original works of Marx, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping, where the highest authority can be derived to establish validity and legitimacy for indMdual texts. Within this hierarchical intertextual structure, the full meaning of the present extract, and indeed of other individual texts as well can be properly understood, including not only textual but socio-po- titical, and historical meanings. The political function of an educational text is thus realised and hence relations of power perpetuated through the exercise of discourse practice. 41

41. For definition of "discourse practice" used in this article, see previous sections on Norman Fairclough's formulation of discourse and discourse analysis.


Conclusions: China's Discursive Space as Consensus and Contestation

In China's official political discourse, a large number of commonly used words have acquired ideologically charged meanings in daily life. They, together with other more formal "naming" political lexicons, form a pervasive discursive space penetrating every single cell of society, contributing to the politicisation and erasure of distinctions between public and private lives. The continual el- evation of 'the political' to discursive pre-eminence serves to mar- shal control of this discursive space to the grand narrative of Chinese revolutionary history. Political meaning is thus characterised by dis- placement of the linguistically signified from the signifier, opening- up meaning to the contingencies of elite-driven official systems of signification and representation.

Patterns of inclusion and exclusion, recognition and non-recognition, legitimacy and illegitimacy are thus defined through the exercise of discursive power. The dominant discourse forms a powerful teleological narrative defining meaning, value, and historical position through a complex linking of traditional symbols of identi- fication to progressive emancipatory trajectories.

Renwick & Cao 139

Appendices

Text 1: jiang Zemin, Report at the 15th CCP National Congress (Ex- tracts) 4212 September 199743

When the National Party Congress is being held toward the end of the 20th century, we have a common realisation that our Party shoulders a lofty historical responsibility for the destiny of the Chinese nation.

Earth-shaking changes have taken place in China over the past century from 1900 when the Eight-Power Allied Forces occupied Beijing, subjecting the Chinese nation to great humiliation and bringing the country to the verge of subjugation, to the year 2000 when China will enjoy a fairly comfortable life on the basis of socialism and will make big strides towards the goal of being more prosperous and strong.

After the Opium War of 1840, China was reduced to a semi- colonial and semi-feudal country. The Chinese nation was faced with two great historical tasks: to win national independence and the people's liberation, and to make the country prosperous and strong and achieve common prosperity for the people. The former task was set to remove obstacles and create essential prerequisites for the fulfilment of the latter task.

The past century has witnessed the Chinese people undergo- ing three historical changes on their road of advancement and the birth of Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, three great figures who stood at the forefront of the times.

The first change was represented by the Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the autocratic monarchy reigning in China for thousands of years. It was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He was the first man who raised the slogan of "rejuvenating China" and pioneered

42. The title of this speech is Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All- round Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21st Century.

43. In Selected Documents of The 15th CCP NationaI Congress (Beijing: New Star Publishers, ~997) p. 3-5.


the national and democratic revolution in the full sense in modern times. The Revolution of 1911 failed to change the social nature of old China and free the people from their hard lot, but it opened the sluice-ages for progress in China and made it impossible for the reactionary rule to remain stale any longer.

The second change was marked by the founding of the People's Republic of China and the establishment of the socialist system. This was accomplished after the founding of the Communist Party of China and under the direction of the first generation of collective leadership with Mao Zedong at the core. Through the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolution, the War of Resistance against Japan and the War of Liberation, we overthrew the three big mountains of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. The Chi- nese people rose to their feet. Proceeding from New Democracy, they took the road to socialism and scored tremendous achievements in socialist construction. This was a great victory of the people's revolution which has never been recorded in Chinese history, a great victory of global significance for socialism and national liberation.

The third change was featured by the reform, opening and en- deavour to achieve socialist modemisation. It was a new revolution initiated by the second generation of collective leadership with Deng Xiaoping at the core. Basing itself on achievements scored in revolution and construction since the founding of the People's Republic of China, our Party reviewed historical experiences and lessons and blazed a new trail in building socialism with Chinese characteristics. The exuberant vigour and vitality of socialism displayed in China has attracted world attention.

Our conclusion drawn from the great changes over the past century is as follows: Only the Communist Party of China can lead the Chinese people in achieving victories of national independence, the people's liberation and socialism, pioneering the road of building socialism, rejuvenating the nation, making the country prosperous and strong, and improving the people's well-being.

Renwick & Cao 141

Text 2: Historians in the Capital Criticising Heshang: A Summary 44

As for the colonial expansionism and commercial activities of some Western European countries, there were profound economic and social causes, as well as scientific knowledge accumulated over a long time and the corresponding material guarantees; they were not brought about merely because they bordered on the sea. The birth, development and evolution of the whole capitalist system was the result of the mutual interaction of the economy, government and culture of all of mankind; it was a product of a definite stage of historical development; and in history there has never existed an eternal "blue civilisation" determined by the geographical environment. Because the influence of the geographical environment--including climate and natural resources--on mankind is different in each stage of historical development, the degree of influence of the geographical environment is in an inverse relationship to the degree of development of the civilisation; there does not exist by any means an eternal, unchanging influence or determining role.

Text 3: Guidance for the History of the Chinese Revolution 45

Firstly, the Party's basic policy 46 concerns the whole country, guides the whole country, and has a decisive effect upon the whole country. The basic policy of the initial stage of socialism is a correct Marxist policy. It is based on the most valuable experience of the broad masses, and the concrete conditions of initial stage of socialism in our country, it therefore represents the fundamental interests of the people.

Secondly, to adhere unshakeably to the Party's basic policy for a hundred years, but principally to the key policy of economic construction as a central task. Marxism is most concerned with the development of productivity; the most basic task of socialism is the

44. In Su Xiaokang, Wang Luxiang (eds.), op.cit., p. 314. 45. See, Yang, Xiancai (ed) Guidance for the History of Chinese Revolution: National Textbook

for the Foundation Course of Marxist Theory at Institutions of Higher Education (Beijing: Higher Education Press, 1995) p.226-227. Translated by Cao Qing.

46. For the Party's basic policy formulated as "One centre, two basic principles."


development of productivity. The metabolism of human society is, at the final analysis, determined by the development of productivity, so is the full play of the superiority of socialist system. In the modern society, the contention of comprehensive national power based on economic power and level of science and technology has become the key issue of international competition. The principal social contradiction of our country at the present stage is the one between the increasing material and cultural demands of the people and the backward social productivity. For an economically and culturally backward China, whether productMty can be rapidly developed, and thereby substantially raising the material and cultural standards of people's lives, is the question whether China can be strong, our people can enjoy a happy life, and socialism can be con- solidated and developed. Due to the whole-hearted devotion of the Party and the people to the course of four modernisations and never relaxing economic development for a single day since the Third Ple- nary of the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP, even during the internal and external turbulence around 1989, a graver situation than that of the 1950s, the economic development as a central policy has been not been compromised for a single moment, the problem of providing basic security for the people has been substantially solved in our country, a big step has been made in improving national economy, people's lives, and comprehensive national power. Ac- cording to the strategic planning of the Party, by mid-21st century, our country will enter a stage of prosperity from a previous fairly comfortable life some people are enjoying now, and modernisation will substantially be realised then. We will make continuous progress from that basis. To conclude, to set economic development as a central task is a historical mission that must be adhered to unremit- tingly on a long-term basis.

Thirdly, to unshakeably adhere to the Party's basic policy, the reform and opening-up must be combined with the four cardinal principles. The reason why socialism with Chinese characteristics has such a vigorous life is because it is a socialism with a programme of reform and opening-up. Socialism is constantly developing, not stagnant, open, not closed. The newly established socialist system

Renwick & Cao 143

is not perfect and mature. Deepening reform is required in order to change fundamentally the mode of production that restricts productivity. All civilisational achievements created by human society, such as foreign advanced science and technology, advanced methods of management, etc, that reflect the laws of modern social mass production, must be absorbed and taken as reference bravely, so that a vigorous socialist market economy system that adapts to the nature and level of development of productivity can be establish. The practical experience of reform and opening-up has demonstrated that, new roads cannot be explored and created, the old institutions cannot be broken, productivity cannot be released, the economy cannot be developed, even socialism will be buried, if reform and opening-up is not practised, and the"leftist" stagnant ideology that opposes reform and opening-up, believes that the danger of "peaceful evolution" comes chiefly from economic sector, even uses "class-struggle-take-command" to influence and distract economic construction is not fought back.

Furthermore, socialist modernisation, reform, and opening-up must have a peaceful, stable international and internal environment, must proceed step by step and in an orderly manner under the leadership of the Party. Due to the existence of class struggle to some extent for a long time, and the danger of penetration and sabotage of international hostile forces, the four cardinal principles must be adhered to; the political situation of unity and stability must be con- solidated and developed; all factors that may lead to disorder and even turmoil in China must be resolutely eradicated. Only by adhering to the four cardinal principles, shall a strong political guar- antee be provided for the development of productivity. Practice has demonstrated that, if the four cardinal principles are not adhered to, bourgeois liberalisation is not explicitly opposed, there would be no political stability, but social turbulence, not to mention the carrying out of reform, opening-up, and economic construction.