chinese entrepreneurial migrants in ghana: socioeconomic … · per ghana investment promotion...

Chinese entrepreneurial migrantsin Ghana: socioeconomic impactsand Ghanaian trader attitudes

KWAKU OPOKU DANKWAH

Department of Politics and International Relations, University ofAdelaide, Adelaide SA , Australia and Department of Geography,Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NO- Trondheim,

Norway

Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

and

MARKO VALENTA

Department of Social Work, Norwegian University of Science andTechnology, NO- Trondheim, Norway

Email: [email protected]

A B S T R A C T

This article explores attitudes of Ghanaian traders towards an increasingChinese influx into Ghanaian trading spaces and the impacts of Chinese mer-chants on Ghanaian traders and trading spaces. Despite a late entrance ofChinese merchants into Ghanaian trading spaces relative to Lebanese,Indians and Nigerians, the abrupt change in size of the Chinese trading commu-nity along with its huge capital and cheap goods have had big impacts on localtrading spaces. We maintain that relations between Ghanaian traders andChinese counterparts may be roughly described as complementary, collabora-tive and competitive. While the Chinese impacts are seen as positive by someGhanaian traders and landlords, they are negative for others. Yet, we arguethat these relations are also nuanced and rooted in each Ghanaian trader’s pos-ition amidst the Chinese presence. This article contributes to the literature ondynamics of South-to-South movements. It adds to growing studies on contem-porary Chinese emigrations and accompanying impacts in host communities.

J. of Modern African Studies, , (), pp. – © Cambridge University Press doi:./SX

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

This article explores the socioeconomic impacts of Chinese entrepre-neurial migration to Ghana. Africa has seen a significant increase inChinese investments and migration in the past few decades (Chenet al. ). Unlike large-scale investments by corporations and thelabour that moves along with them, Africa has also seen an increasingwave of individual Chinese entrepreneurial migration at the turn ofthe st century (Axelsson ). Chinese entrepreneurial migrantsare largely independent of huge Chinese firms and come to Africa topursue their own economic interests (Marfaing & Thiel ). The lit-erature on global migration has focused more on movements frompoor to developed regions. Such a pattern has little relevance to move-ments within the South (Bakewell et al. ) and the ensuing implica-tions. For the developing world, the impact of China on countries in Asiaand Latin America has been a focus, with relatively little work on Africa.Some studies on Africa have focused on China’s soft power (Amoah), as well as industrial competitiveness and macroeconomic per-formance with little attention to specific sub-sectors (Taylor ;Giovannetti & Sanfilippo ; Adolph et al. ). Relatively fewhave explored Sino-African relations below the macro level (Mohanet al. ; Giese & Thiel ) and discussed the social impacts onlocal African communities (Liu ).Departing from a micro perspective, this article explores the everyday

dispositions of indigenous Ghanaian entrepreneurs towards the Chinesepresence in local Ghanaian trading spaces. In addition, it explores theimpact of this presence on indigenous traders and the wider socio-eco-nomic effects in local trading spaces. Itsmicroperspective is distinguishedby its focus on Sino-African relations beneath the macroeconomic levelthat is prevalent in the literature. It thus diverts from the studies thathave explored the macroeconomic effects of China’s rise on Africa andadds to the relatively fewer but increasing studies that examine howSino-African encounters affect peoples’ lived realities (Rigg ) inAfrican communities.Despite the late entrance of Chinese traders into trading hubs in

Accra and their small numbers relative to Nigerian, Indian andLebanese traders, they constitute a highly visible section of the tradingcommunity in Ghana and continue to account for a large share of thetrading community, not only in numbers but in volume of trade andinvestments (GSS ; IOM ). By ‘starting from below’ (Rigg), this article sheds light on the dynamics of the bourgeoning

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Chinese presence in an African community. We do this by exploringthese questions: What are the everyday dispositions or attitudes ofGhanaian traders towards the Chinese presence in local tradingareas? How does the increasing Chinese presence affect Ghanaiantraders, consumers and local trading spaces? Are some indigenes ben-efiting from the Chinese presence whereas others suffer?This article is based on fieldwork conducted in in four suburbs

within the area popularly referred to as the Central Business District ofAccra, the major trading area in Ghana’s capital. It relies on the realisticgroup conflict theory to explain Ghanaian trader attitudes towards theirChinese counterparts. We compare with the contact hypothesis toprovide complementary and contrasting explanations where relevantto make comprehensive sense of the data. The article has threemain sec-tions. The first explores previous research and sets out the theoreticaltenets used in explaining data. The second discusses contemporaryChinese investment flows to Ghana vis-à-vis the attitudes of Ghanaiantraders towards the Chinese. The last explores the impact of Chinesetrading activities on Ghanaian trading patterns and communities.

P R E V I O U S R E S E A R C H

Three categories of studies are relevant for our article. First, are studieson the Chinese economic presence in Africa. Mohan & Tan-Mullins() note China stepped up its relationship with Africa at the turnof the millennium. Improved relations coupled with increased tradehave facilitated Chinese migration to the continent by state-backedfirms, and private traders who are among the new shapers of Africandevelopment. While several Chinese companies operate in key sectors,for most Africans, the Chinese presence is manifest by trading in localspaces (Mohan & Tan-Mullins ). Dobler () notes that acommon feature across African cities is that they have hosted at leastone Chinese shop in the past few decades. Chinese shops are at the fore-front of new South-South relations and are run mostly by petty entrepre-neurs who are behind the availability of cheap Chinese goods in Africa(Mohan & Tan-Mullins ). Their products range from consumablesto complex equipment, mostly imported from China. They purchase dir-ectly from Chinese producers, which reduces middlemen and importcosts (Park ).The second includes studies on Chinese investments in Ghana. China

and Ghana have agreements spanning diplomatic and economic

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cooperation (Tsikata et al. ). Per Ghana Investment PromotionCentre (GIPC) () statistics, China was the second main sourceof foreign investment in Ghana. Between and , the GIPCregistered Chinese projects with % in General Trade and %in Manufacturing. Tsikata et al. () note that Agricultural andManufacturing received the largest Chinese investments followed byGeneral Trade in . Despite a dip in , General Trade recordedan increase, making it the second largest after Manufacturing. Again,though the overall decrease continued through to , GeneralTrade continued to increase to .% relative to . in . By, General Trade (%) had overtaken Manufacturing as thelargest recipient. It continued to be the highest sector through to. The primary activity in this sector is the trading of goods(Tsikata et al. : –). Tables I and II show Chinese investmentsfrom to .Tables I and II show that Chinese companies have invested largely in

Manufacturing and General Trade. While investments in Manufacturinghave decreased over the years, they have increased in General Trade.Tsikata et al. () argued hypothetically that investments inManufacturing could create jobs and facilitate technological transfer.Conversely, it could displace domestic manufacturers. Indirectly, thiscould cause disinvestment and relocation of foreign investors, scaringaway potential ones. Increasing investment in General Trade, apartfrom displacing local traders, could mean less spin-offs to theGhanaian economy as Chinese profits could be sent abroad (Tsikataet al. ).While the studies above are relevant for our analysis indirectly, the

third category is of direct relevance as they discuss relationshipsbetween Chinese and Ghanaian traders. Scholars discuss these largelyalong complementary, collaborative and competitive lines (Haugen). Ajavon () applies this analogy to Chinese and Ghanaianstrading in Ghana. Complementary relationships, she notes, arisewhere experienced Ghanaian transnational traders are constrainedinto partnering Chinese peers due to the stress of importing fromChina, difficulties in obtaining Chinese visas and competition fromChinese traders. Collaborative relationships constitute petty traderswho do not have the capacity to import from China and therefore buyfrom Chinese merchants to re-sell. In addition, there are landlords,Ghanaian labour employed by the Chinese and consumers of Chinesegoods. Competitive relationships connote members of the GhanaUnion of Traders and Association (GUTA) who are sceptical of the




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Chinese and demand their withdrawal from markets (Ajavon ).Conversely, Liu () describes the relationships emerging from theChinese presence and goods in Ghana along the lines of place, goodsand people.Several studies discuss concerns about the growing Chinese presence.

Liu () suggests Chinese traders in Accra appear threateningbecause of their low-quality items and their transactions in a spacemarked by economic and historical importance. For Axelsson (),instead of characterising African concerns as anti-Chinese, taking acloser look at themmight reveal that the complexities of these responsesare better couched as contextually mediated constructions and strat-egies embedded in places where they emerge. Hinged on these, weexplore in which ways responses towards the Chinese could be whollyand partially divergent depending on settings and positions ofGhanaian merchants.

T A B L E IInvestments from Chinese companies to Ghana ($).

Year General trade Manufacturing Total*

, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

*These figures are inclusive of Chinese investment into Service, Tourism, Building &Construction, Export Trade, and Agriculture. Source: GIPC in Tsikata et al. (: –).

T A B L E I IChinese share as a percentage of total foreign investments in

Ghana (%).

Year General trade Manufacturing Total*

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

*These figures are inclusive of Chinese investment into Service, Tourism, Building &Construction, Export Trade, and Agriculture. Source: GIPC in Tsikata et al. (: –).




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T H E O R E T I C A L F R A M E W O R K

We believe the above-mentioned antagonisms may be associated withsociological perspectives on conflicts (Coser ). The realisticgroup conflict theory and contact hypothesis provide us with usefullenses. The former, according to Levin & Campbell (), posits thatprejudice and discrimination are underpinned by conflicts of interestbetween groups. Campbell () notes that when group objectivesare incompatible, conflict and negative intergroup behaviours arelikely to exist. On the contrary, where compatible, they generate positiverelations. The theory does not hold that actual competition overresources exists for prejudice to occur. Instead, it is the perception ofcompetition that results in conflict. Further, outgroups that are salientand distinctive from one’s group are more likely to be marked as com-petitors (Esses et al. ).For the contact hypothesis, interaction reduces intergroup prejudice

when optimal conditions are present (Schiappa et al. ). Conditionsinclude regular contact, balanced ratio of in-group to out-groupmembers, competition-free contact, and contact involving genuinefriendship amongst others (Dixon et al. ). Also, Schiappa et al.() notes that parasocial contact (human processing of mass-mediated communication) boosts positive parasocial responses andchanges in beliefs about minority groups.Inspired by these, we explore whether Ghanaian attitudes are based on

compatible interests with Chinese traders. Though the competitionexpected to generate resentment towards Chinese traders could be hap-pening based on GIPC data, what is relevant is whether there is perceptionof Chinese competition. We also use the contact theory to explore disposi-tions of Ghanaian traders who may not have negative perceptions. Wedetermine ifChinese-constructedprojects influenceGhanaianperceptionsin line with the parasocial hypothesis.A critique of both theories is that studies on intergroup relations often

equate in-group favouritism reciprocally to out-group negativity (Brewer). However, as Allport () acknowledged, affiliation to in-groupdoes not necessarily cause hostility towards out-groups. We address thecommon misinterpretation and critique by combining realistic groupconflict theory with contact hypothesis in analyses. By doing this, weuse one to cater for the shortfall of the other and fulfil theoreticaladequacy (Crang & Cook ). Further, we demonstrate what condi-tions underpin intergroup conflict/harmony that transcend mere diver-gence/compatibility of group interests using our data, and highlight the




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underlying and intersecting class/race relations. Despite distinctionsbetween the theories, their predictions are not incompatible and docomplement each other in explaining intergroup relations.

M E T H O D O L O G Y

This article forms part of a July–August study. We combinedvarious qualitative methods and data with interviews in exploring ourquestions. These included secondary data from GIPC, participant obser-vation and mass media debates. Combining diverse purposive sampling,we gathered data from Ghanaians selling in the same areas as Chinesetraders (primary informants); GIPC and Ministry of Trade; Ghanaiantrader representatives – GUTA; and a Sino-African expert – Director ofCentre for Asian Studies and lecturer at Department of PoliticalScience, all of University of Ghana (key informants – five males and afemale) via interviews and textual methods. In total, we interviewed

informants. Gatekeepers with decades of experience in the communitiesinformed our sampling. Some had experiences with both Ghanaian andimmigrant merchants. Further, feedback from initial interviewsinformed subsequent choices of participants via snowballing.Primary informants comprised four males and eight females aged

between and who hailed from different parts of Ghana but lived inthe capital. Most averaged between and with a few older than

and younger than . Five sold in Zongo Lane, three at Rawlings Park/China House and two each at Kantamanto and Okaishie. Four sold foot-wearandbags, threeelectricals, andonesoldclothingand footwear, under-wear andclothing, cleaningequipment, jewellery and sewingmaterials.Wesampled them fromdifferent sectors as regards kinds of wares to avoid bias.Diversity across how long theyhave traded (some as long as years, othersas recent as two),modes of sales (wholesalers or retailers, or both), kinds ofgoods and the different locations endowed the study with rich variety inexploring in-depth attitudes towards Chinese migrants.We sampled the communities/traders as field sites/primary infor-

mants because these communities host the highest concentration ofChinese merchants in Ghana. They represented the highest visibilityof Chinese trading activities, more so in Zongo Lane and ChinaHouse. Concurrently, they had the highest concentration of other immi-grant traders. They thus endowed the study with participants who pos-sessed a better comparative sense of indigenous attitudes towardsChinese traders as well as impacts from their influx.




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We anonymised our interviews and the huge population of field sitesprevents compromising identities. Interviews ranged between and

minutes. We encouraged informants to narrate their attitudes towardsthe Chinese. They described changes in their trade prior to theChinese influx and the aftermath thereof. We urged them tocomment on how they have been impacted by the Chinese influx. Forour key informants, we deployed unstructured interviews given theirdiverse institutions and portfolios. This allowed ‘new’ insights intoSino-Ghanaian relations in trading.Initial analysis influenced later choices of participants and data gath-

ering techniques. It was evident after the first series of interviews thatmoving from a semi-structured to unstructured approach would giveprimary informants the opportunity to assert what they find relevantin their relationships with the Chinese. As relevant codes such as ‘indi-vidual’ and ‘group’ conflicts, unassertiveness from local government,and definition of ‘market’ emerged, later analyses focused on intercon-nections between individual attitudes and group rhetoric vis-à-vis con-cerns of local authorities in a complex web of Sino-Ghanaianrelations. We also acquired GIPC statistics to comprehend the contem-porary trend of Chinese investments.We recorded our observations before, during and after interviews, and

over the fieldwork period through notes. Observations comprised scout-ing communities to observe shop owners’ nationalities, inquiring pricesin Ghanaian and immigrant shops, and observing the generic scene astrading transpired. We did some observations routinely duringfieldwork and others simultaneously when interviewing traders.Observations assisted in raising supplementary queries about unexpectedevents by inputting observed experiences into later interviews, using anunstructured approach to allow participants more room to tell theirexperiences. For our purposes, observation’s utility was not mutuallyexclusive (Kearns : ).We triangulated interview data with participant observation. Further,

we compared observations with not only the first author’s rich historicalexperience of the communities, having grown up within them but alsowith gatekeepers’ knowledge. The combination of interviews, observa-tions, gatekeepers’ insights and author’s first-hand knowledge enabledus to gauge traders’ perceptions with the socioeconomic impacts. Weexercised reflexivity throughout fieldwork enabling us to insert ambigu-ous issues from previous interviews into subsequent ones for clarificationand to generate new knowledge. To augment the theoretical and analyt-ical rigour of our findings, the first author’s insider perspective




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complemented the outsider perspective of the second author, an estab-lished scholar in migration and ethnicity. Both perspectives have advan-tages and disadvantages (Kusow ; Carling et al. ). Combiningdifferent positions and triangulating our interpretations, we achievedadvantages of both by using the strengths of each to offset the other’sweaknesses.

C H I N E S E F D I T O G H A N A A N D R E L A T I O N S B E T W E E N C H I N E S E

M E R C H A N T S A N D L O C A L T R A D E R S

Our analyses of available statistics provide us with insights into howforeign direct investments (FDI) at the macro level are intertwinedwith attitudes between host community members and nationals of FDIsource countries at the micro-community level. We infer from GIPCdata that Chinese investments in Ghana have undergone significanttransformation recently. We divide the years since ( to) into two periods, and compare the contemporary ( to) flows to the first half ( to ). Table III shows Chineseregistered projects from to and Table IV, to .As shown in Tables III and IV, Chinese investments have increased

since – relative to –. The total sum of registered pro-jects was $,, in . In , it was $,,, a -foldincrease. Total investments increased from $,, in the firsthalf of the studied period to $,,, at the end of the second,over a % increase. Except for Agriculture, which saw a dip at theend of the second half relative to the end of the first, all sectorsincreased. Also, Services, and Building and Construction surpassedGeneral Trade in sum as the second and third largest recipient in thesecond period respectively. From –, Liaison emerged as a sign-ificant destination for Chinese investments relative to the first half of theperiod and surpassed Agriculture, Export Trade and Tourism by the endof it. Our exploration of micro Sino-Ghanaian relations is embeddedwithin the ambit of a huge increase in Chinese investments over thepast decade.General Trade, Tsikata et al. () noted, had overtaken

Manufacturing as the largest recipient since up to , the lastyear considered by them. Our recent analyses indicate that by ,Manufacturing had regained its position. However, General Tradereceived a steady flow with not such sharp increases and decreasessince up to , except for where it saw a huge dip and




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TA B L E I I IGIPC Chinese Registered Projects across Sectors from to ($).

SectorBreakdown*

Year General Trade Manufacturing Building & Construction Services Agric. Tourism Export Trade Liaison Total*

, , – – – – , – – , – , , – – – , , – – – , , – – – , , , – – – , , , , , – – , , , , – – ,Total* , , , , , , – ,

*All figures represent direct investment flows (FDI). Source: Ghana Investment Promotion Centre.

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TA B L E I VGIPC Chinese registered projects across sectors from to ($).

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Year General Trade Manufacturing Building & Construction Services Agric. Tourism Export Trade Liaison Total*

, , , – – – , , , , , – , – , , , , , , – , , , , , , , , , , , , , – – , , , , , – , , , , ,, – , – , – – ,, , , , , – – ,Total* , ,, , , , , , , ,,

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unlike Manufacturing, which was erratic. The mean of projects from to in General Trade was $,, between a low of$,, and a high of $,,. For the same period, theManufacturing average was $,, between a $,, lowand $,,, high. Flows to General Trade were by far more‘steady’ in – although Manufacturing had overtaken it. It isin light of the more ‘steady’ flows to General Trade since the mid-s that we explore Ghanaian attitudes towards Chineseentrepreneurs.In addition to steady inflows into General Trade, we observed within

the communities and especially in Zongo Lane and China House/Rawlings Parks, a rapid surge in Chinese traders over the years. Forinstance, while traders dominating one stretch of road in Zongo Lanewere Ghanaians a decade ago, during fieldwork, we observed theChinese now dominated that road with only a few Ghanaians. Thesteady increase in Chinese investments based on GIPC data correspondsto an increase in the physical Chinese presence in the trading commu-nities. Gatekeepers, primary and some key informants including anofficial who used to be part of a government task force sanctioningtrading activities confirmed our observations.Our general impression is that trading patterns in the local spaces com-

plicate ‘strict’ categorization of relationships between Ghanaian andChinese traders. We noted the Chinese sell their goods at the sameprice to large capital (transnational) and small capital holders (collabora-tive relationship). Instead of buying frombig capital holders to re-sell, thepetty traders now have equal access to goods from Chinese merchants.This creates competitiveness for the ‘complementary’ trader on twolevels. First, they now compete with the Chinese for similar customers(petty traders). A trader who fits Ajavon’s complementary frame high-lights this:

I will go to Chinese and buy to boxes … and they (Chinese) give mesame price as petty traders (mostly women), maybe of them who willgather money and buy one box. Instead of the women buying from me,the Chinese sell that one box to those people at the same price theysold to me. (Footwear, Zongo Lane Street – close to UTC, Int.)

Second, petty traders now have access to goods at the same price as bigcapital traders and therefore they both compete for final consumers. Asone footwear trader decried: ‘the competition has doubled, becausenow I am competing with Chinese, I am competing with the women… Instead of the women buying from me, they buy from Chinese




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directly. I buy more boxes from them (Chinese), they (women) buy onebox at the same amount …’ (Footwear, Zongo Lane, Int.). Theseperspectives fit Ajavon’s typology, yet the designations of ‘competitive’and ‘complementary’ do not express the nuances in Sino-Ghanaiantrade relations in local spaces especially when examined in isolation.Ajavon’s ‘competitive’ relationship connotes a loose term for traderswho detest the Chinese presence regardless of whether they have a com-mercial relationship with the Chinese. A relationship close to a truly‘competitive’ one would be Ghanaians who import goods also importedby the Chinese, and who do not buy from the Chinese to re-sell. We notesuch a relationship in a wholesaler with three decades’ experience:

We are importers, so … we don’t buy from them (Chinese) … we importfrom … Thailand, Turkey and China … We (Ghanaians and Chinesetraders) are all wholesalers … but they (Chinese) have huge capital, so …their goods … a little bit cheaper than ours … they are our competitorsbut they have some advantage over us. (Bags and footwear trader, ZongoLane, Int.)

Thus, though ‘strict’ categorisations offer simplicity in describingGhana–China micro level interactions, they do not highlight the com-plexity. It is only by partially selecting elements from the categories,that the nuances become evident. The quotes above indicate that aGhanaian could be in a complementary relationship with the Chinesebut still suffer ‘new’ competition from others classified as collaboratorsdue to the Chinese calibre of trading.The relations not expressed by ‘strict’ categories are further high-

lighted by traders ‘collaborating’ with the Chinese who bemoanChinese selling of goods to final consumers and therefore also face‘competition’ from the Chinese. In the words of a ‘collaborative’retailer:

‘Even we buy some of the items from them (Chinese) on credit before weare able to sell and make some income … What is worrying is, theChinese are supposed to be wholesalers and we retailers, but if you digdeeper you will find out that they retail just like us’ (Footwear trader,Zongo Lane, Int.)

This retailer, a ‘collaborator’ to Chinesemerchants is also suffering com-petition from Chinese indiscriminate trading. This indicates Ghanaiantraders can simultaneously be in more than one relationship category.We triangulated the above examples and others with our observations,

and further with interviews of some hawkers. We observed some hawkersbuy footwear in smaller quantities from Chinese merchants in Zongo




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Lane, and sit in front of shops within the community to sell in pairs topersons passing by. A petty trader confirmed this: ‘The Chinese pres-ence benefits us, as we are able to contribute and buy some footwearfrom the Chinese and sell right here’ (Footwear petty trader, UTC, Int.). Thus, within the same trading space, Chinese merchantssell in big quantities to Ghanaians with shops and to hawkers. TheGhanaian shop owner in a ‘collaborative’ relationship with theChinese thus also faces competition from hawkers as they all haveaccess to the same source of goods – the Chinese.The relationship between Ghanaians and Chinese traders is therefore

a complex web, which partly informs the attitudes Ghanaians havetowards Chinese migrants. As we demonstrate in the next pages, howGhanaians uniquely relate to Chinese merchants and sometimes cutacross categories culminate in varying perceptions about Chinese andtheir trading activities.

Personal fears/threats towards indigenous Ghanaian livelihoods

As noted, the increased presence of Chinese merchants raised concernsamong local traders (Axelsson ). Burns & Gimpel () note thatindividual economic fears directly influence attitudes regardless of indir-ect impacts through others’ racial prejudices. We identified that nega-tive perceptions about the Chinese were informed by personal fears ofthreats by individual Ghanaians from Chinese trading activities.Personal fears largely underpinned the negative impacts Ghanaiansbelieved Chinese activities had on them. One such negative perceptionis the Chinese duplicating goods sold by Ghanaians to sell cheaply in thesame spaces. As a Ghanaian who has sold in varying spaces lamented:

For instance, the shoe we bring is cedis … you will realise with time, theChinese will… duplicate the shoe and be selling it for cedis… there area lot of differences. But our customers think they are the same…When youbring a new product, just give them (Chinese) at most three months, theywill duplicate it … at cheap prices. (Bags and footwear trader, ZongoLane, Int.)

Ghanaian wholesalers also held personal economic fears over Chinesesales in smaller quantities to petty traders, partly influenced by theirunderstanding of the GIPC Act.

They (Chinese) do not have to compete with us in retailing … But if theChinese will be selling to the (petty traders) in or dozen, then itmeans the ladies will not be coming to us … If they (Chinese) stick to




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wholesaling… we don’t mind… But you will find out that… they are sellingin smaller quantities. (Clothing and underwear trader, Okaishie, Int.)

The above fears reflect how Chinese traders negatively affect Ghanaians.For these traders, sales have slowed down in the wake of the Chinesepresence.

In the past when the Chinese were not here in their numbers, we wereselling a lot. Before you come to open the shop, people would havequeued up … At first, you open the shop latest by am … If you comeand open in the morning these days, you are just worrying yourself …Even by am, nobody will come to your shop … Sales have gone downa lot … (Bags and footwear trader, Zongo Lane, Int.)

Our observations confirmed personal feelings of threats by primaryinformants from Chinese trading. On goods duplication for instance,we noticed products that looked similar but were sold cheaply by somewho procured products from the Chinese and expensively byGhanaian importers. The latter group confirmed this by asking us tocompare their products with those of hawkers. Our checks revealedprice and quality differences from hawkers/petty traders sourcinggoods from the Chinese. We further triangulated this by conferringwith some petty traders/hawkers. ‘When we see a ‘new’ particular foot-wear that is selling … we take a sample … to the Chinese. In a fewmonths’ time, the Chinese will bring a similar type … at reduced priceand quality’ (Footwear petty trader, UTC, Int.). Some hawkers asindicated in the preceding section also confirmed the fear of Chinesesales in smaller quantities.Intense competition amongst the Chinese also propels further com-

petitive reduction in prices making it difficult for Ghanaians to sell.The dip in sales has reduced profits for Ghanaians and someGhanaian shops have closed. It is arguable the Chinese presence there-fore poses actual competition in accord with the realistic group conflicttheory as noted by Quillian (), although Quillian used objectiveeconomic indicators. A primary informant bemoaned:

At first, you … import things … The profit margin was OK. But now theChinese have brought the items … cheaply … Even when … they realise… fellow Chinese have brought similar goods, they reduce the price oftheirs. Then those who brought theirs maybe a week ago will also reducetheirs, meaning when you have bought items from them to re-sell … youwill be incurring continuous losses … I had four shops. Today … I amleft with two. (Footwear trader, Zongo Lane, Int.)




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Haugen & Carling () similarly documented ‘price wars’ among theChinese in Cape Verde albeit such competition culminated in a drop inChinese profits. Lyons & Brown () also captured the perception ofindigenous shops across the CFA (African Financial Community)closing from Chinese competition.These accounts are in harmony with Lancee & Pardos-Prado’s ()

delineation of the realistic group conflict theory that socio-economicallyvulnerable members of the host community are more likely to perceiveimmigrants, herein the Chinese, negatively due to a perceived competi-tion over economic benefits. Vulnerability is in the sense that informantshave been negatively affected due to the Chinese influx. Further, and inconformity with the theory as noted by Esses et al. (), their proxim-ity to Chinese worsens rather than improves their perceptions due to theperceived competition.

The brighter tale: Ghanaian traders in no commercial relationshipwith the Chinese

Despite negative perceptions largely held by Ghanaians perceiving theChinese as competition, we also met others with positive perceptions.Here, we identify two categories who gained from the Chinese presence.In the first are those indirectly employed:

The Chinese presence does not spoil anything of mine … Their items arecheap… the women … buy some and re-sell so that they can also get some-thing to buy food… They have provided … jobs to Ghanaians. If theChinese were not present, the hardship will be more. (Sewing materialstrader, Chinahouse/Rawlings Park, Int.)

These jobs are indirect as hawkers, mostly women who are not employeddirectly by the Chinese but take advantage of their cheap goods to earnan income. This evokes positive attitudes towards the Chinese, amplifiedby high unemployment levels in Ghana.In the second category are Ghanaian traders content with Chinese

activities because their presence increased local activity. Comparingfield sites across time, they noted Chinese influx made trading spacesrelatively busier.

Their presence makes this place busier than before … because people arealways coming for their goods … you see people going up and down … itwasn’t like this before, but now the Chinese presence has made herebusier than most streets in Accra’ (Electricals trader, Zongo lane, Int.)




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The Chinese presence does not pose a threat to this trader and instead,may be boosting his sales.Per previous research on migration and inter-ethnic contact, the basis

for conflicts/cooperation may be related to the intersection of race,class, gender and religion (Dankwah & Amoah ). It is clear thatopposing economic interests and Chinese visibility (skin colour differ-ences) as non-Africans informed perceptions as intruders. However,these perceptions blurred or reduced in cases where Ghanaian tradershad compatible interests. They may be related directly or indirectly tothe field of trade. Indeed, observations confirmed the greater activityin trading areas compared with a decade ago. As we noted, the ‘new’factor obvious in the now bustling spaces was the increasing presenceof Chinese shops, occupying spaces that hitherto were Ghanaian-occu-pied. A young male trader confirmed that his father, a landlord,rented most spaces to the Chinese because they offer higher rents. Headded that they used to use the shop next door as well as theircurrent one, but his father had rented it to the Chinese and reservedonly one for business (Electricals trader, Zongo Lane, Int.).We observed replacement of Ghanaian shops by Chinese in Arena, all

in the Central Business District. Ghanaians ran all the shops close to theArena station a decade ago. During fieldwork, we saw that the Chinesenow run most of these shops. Thus, in the now busier communities,one obvious change over the years was the increase in Chinese shops,some of which supplanted Ghanaians. Observations of activity inbuying and offloading of goods from container trucks at Chineseshops emphasised the impression of places being busier due to theChinese presence. A gatekeeper with over two decades’ livelihood inZongo Lane similarly considered the area to be busier due to theChinese.While cheap Chinese goods constituted a threat for some traders, they

generated positive perceptions in consumers and traders selling goodsnot popular amongst Chinese merchants. Thus, the particular positionof some traders, namely those not in any kind of trading relationshipwith the Chinese, has a determining effect on perceptions they haveabout Chinese merchants. Regardless of their level of capital, they seethe Chinese positively. For them, cheap Chinese goods affordGhanaians increased purchasing power.

They (Chinese) are selling their items, I am also selling mine… their shoesare cheap… if youhave something (money) small and…buy some, I feel thatis good in itself… at first, shoes were very expensive, but now if you are notrich, you have what you can buy per your standard … When they come




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here I receive them very well. At times, I even call themmy brothers… and Ilaughwith thembecause he’s coming to buy something fromme. (Electricalstrader, Rawlings Park, Int.)

In addition to the absence of a competitive threat, the above trader haspersonal friendly relations with Chinese in the local spaces. Drawing onDixon et al.’s () optimal contact, we argue that conditions necessaryfor positive attitudes, namely, competition-free, regular contact, whichalso involves genuine friendship, culminate in positive perceptionsabout the Chinese. Consistent also with Esses et al.’s () instrumentalmodel of group conflict, we add that the absence of a perception of com-petition from the Chinese entrepreneurs, along with a proximity to themin the trading areas, facilitates positive rather than negative attitudes.

Chinese daunting prowess: the macro-group (‘we’/GUTA) perception

Although we found local traders with positive attitudes to the Chinese,the general impression is that negative attitudes towards the Chinesedominate, including sentiments of members of the Ghana Union ofTraders Association (GUTA). In this section, we focus on perspectivesof GUTA traders and officials. These traders decried Chinese tradingas minimising the resources available for them. Here, they not only per-sonify their Chinese sentiments, but also bemoan how Chinese activitiesare detrimental to their group. First, Chinese entrepreneurs are per-ceived to repatriate profits. A trader who per a ‘collaborative’ relation-ship should be happy, bemoaned:

The Chinese are hindering the progress of the country … After selling …they immediately transfer the money to their country… how will… the gov-ernment benefit from their activities? … Instead … they should do massproduction. (Footwear trader, Zongo Lane, Int.)

Rooted in his position and complicated relationship with the Chinese,he instead expresses negative sentiments. This is because, despite the‘collaboration’, Chinese sales in smaller quantities creates a competitionbetween him and the Chinese for petty traders. The profit repatriationhe decries mirrors the interest of his group at the macro and nationallevel, herein GUTA and Ghana.

When they (Chinese) sell, and are repatriating not just their profits but thewhole money back, you find … pressure … if the two of you go to theexchange market … you the % (interest rate in Ghana) will have a cut-off point in which you cannot go further but with the % (Chinese interest




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rate) he can… if the supply cannot meet the demand that is where you findthe cedi depreciating. (GUTA official, Accra High Street, Int.)

In addition, the Chinese are perceived to sell not just cheap but inferiorgoods. Sub-standard Chinese goods are prevalent across Africa. Corkinet al. () for example talk about Sierra Leone whereas Mbachu() cites Nigeria, where authorities have gone to the extent of shut-ting down malls. The mass media is full of descriptions of cheap Chineseinferior goods in the continent. Osahon () for instance, publishedthis: ‘Their (Chinese) stabilizers, radios, electric bulbs, food blenders,fans, pressing irons, explode, two cases out of three, the first time theyare switched on … one that passes first-time use test, lasts … couple ofweeks’.Ghanaians also perceive their Chinese counterparts to have enormous

advantages over them. They perceive positive macroeconomic Chineseindicators afford Chinese entrepreneurs unfair advantages. Less favour-able Ghanaian macro-economic indicators exacerbate this.

If you are running ahundred-metrehurdle… theChinese…has already over-taken you…Becauseof themacroeconomic indicators (inChina) there, inter-est rate, exchange rate…Ghana seems to be very higher than theirs… so theycan cut down the prices and people will start trooping, buying items that arenot of good quality. (GUTA official, Accra High Street, Int.)

Indeed, the generic advantages of China’s economy over Ghana affordChinese merchants a competitive edge. The low interest rates are aug-mented by direct links the Chinese in Africa have to production inChina (Gu et al. ). The external support afforded to Chinese entre-preneurial migrants from cheap loans and their speciality of sellingshoes increases Ghanaian traders’ perception of competition. This isbecause Chinese merchants are similar to Ghanaian shoe traders in rele-vant dimensions (selling shoes) and this evokes competitive feelings. Inaddition to cheap loans, Chinese merchants are, according to localtraders, endowed with better access to capital enabling the Chinese tooutcompete.

It is worrying … because of their … huge capital … if you go to China rightnow and you are buying … the more you buy the lesser the price, so ifChinese can bring containers, and you sell the same goods … theirswill be cheaper. (Footwear trader, Zongo Lane, Int.)

The fact that immigrants trading in Ghana ought to meet a minimumcapital requirement of US$,, as required by the GIPC Act but-tresses the huge capital advantage of the Chinese. It is therefore very




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clear that Chinese traders in Ghana have bigger financial muscle andtherefore their physical presence evokes Ghanaian perceptions ofthreat.A GUTA official also blamed Ghanaian authorities for their lackadai-

sical attitude in ensuring Chinese are not present in markets, whichaccording to the GIPC Act are reserved for Ghanaians.

I don’t know whether they (Ghana government) are taking money fromChina and for that matter they don’t want to catch them … But … if youare taking loans, they will be paid back by us, the taxpayers … governmentshould not relinquish its responsibilities. (GUTA Official, Accra HighStreet, Int.)

Here, news about China’s extension of loans to Ghana underminedrather than improved perceptions about the Chinese due to perceivedcompetition emanating from Chinese merchants. We argue thatwhere there is perceived competition, positive parasocial contact doesnot improve intergroup relations.In sum, whereas strong anti-Chinese sentiments transpire in some

African states, for example Zambia (Negi ), this study argues thatsentiments in Ghana towards the Chinese are affected by the natureof Chinese activities in specific spaces as well as media news aboutChina. The fact that our informants had positive and negative senti-ments concurrently accentuates mixed perceptions. This is capturedamply:

It depends on the kind of business or what the person sells. For instance,some of them who sell Chinese shoes, when they need one extension,they will definitely come to me. But for me as an electricals seller, whenthe Chinese … want to sell electricals, we don’t want them … retailing.(Electricals trader, Rawlings Park, Int.)

Figure provides a tabular summarised representation of Ghanaian per-ceptions about Chinese entrepreneurial migrants. For Ghanaians sellinggoods also sold by the Chinese, and who have huge capital, Chineseduplication of goods is inimical to their livelihoods. Similarly, cheapChinese goods and their ‘indiscriminate’ selling pose a threat. Whilethe aforementioned evoked negative perceptions amongst wealthytraders, they triggered positive perceptions from traders with lesscapital who buy from the Chinese to re-sell. Indeed, some Ghanaiansmall capital traders aided Chinese duplication of goods. Tradersselling goods not popular among Chinese merchants had mixed senti-ments. While some perceived the aforementioned positively, othershad negative perceptions. This category of outsider traders did not




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Figure Perceptions towards Chinese merchants in local Ghanaian tradingspaces.




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demand complete Chinese withdrawal but instead streamlining of theiractivities. Furthermore, and despite varying perceptions among individ-ual traders, they expressed negative sentiments about perceived profitrepatriation, economic advantages and inferior goods of Chinese entre-preneurs. Not only GUTA officials expressed negative sentiments, butour interviews with individual traders revealed similar sentiments atthe individual level too. Commensurate with realistic group conflicttheory, these sentiments indicate protection is not only sought individu-ally but at the group level.

I M P A C T S O N G H A N A I A N T R A D I N G P A T T E R N S A N D S P A C E S

The Chinese presence has multiple impacts on Ghanaian trading pat-terns and spaces. While cheap Chinese goods afford consumersincreased purchasing power and indirect jobs, they displace importsfrom other countries and traders who import such goods. Several ofour informants noted goods from Togo are no longer coming in largequantities in the wake of the Chinese influx

The Chinese goods are cheap, so people do not buy the Ghanaian andTogolese made … With the arrival of the Chinese, goods coming fromTogo reduced … The Togolese goods are superior in quality to theChinese but the Chinese goods are cheap. (Footwear trader, Kantamanto, Int.)

Jenkins & Edwards () showed that preliminary statistics on Chineseexports to Africa in suggested increased Chinese exports havebeen at the expense of other countries’ exports to Africa. It seems,however, that Chinese imports to Ghana have not only displacedimports from non-African countries but also within the continentitself. Marfaing & Thiel () similarly note this displacing effectwhen they argued that interest groups in Senegal and Ghana are dissa-tisfied with the Chinese presence in local communities becauseChinese entrepreneurial migrants increasingly flock to a business thatindigenous traders have mastered for a long time, namely the importof cheap Asian consumables into West Africa. Per our analyses,Chinese entrepreneurial migrants are therefore at the heart of the dis-placing effect of Chinese imports.The Chinese influx has also altered trading profiles of Ghanaian mer-

chants in myriad ways. Some Ghanaian importers/wholesalers are nowlimited to selling in smaller quantities as wholesaling is no longer profi-table due to cheap Chinese goods being available in large quantities. An




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affected wholesaler noted: ‘Previously, we import … but now we are notimporting, we are not doing wholesale… The Chinese have forced us togo into retailing’ (Footwear trader, Zongo Lane, Int.). Othertraders have been ‘coerced’ into selling inferior goods. For them,there is no point in selling quality goods because they are relativelyexpensive and consumers are not willing to buy them.

The Chinese will bring in very inferior goods … they can sell it at anyamount. If I sell mine cedi, they will sell … pesewas … And manypeople don’t have much money, so they take advantage of buyingChinese goods. It is a disadvantage … to sell something quality … I alsohave to sell inferior goods … to stay in business. (Clothing and underweartrader, Okaishie, Int.)

Indeed, Ghanaian traders have experienced a change in their socio-eco-nomic positions over time along with the increasing Chinese influx. It isthus not surprising that for these traders, the Chinese are the competi-tion, and therefore their presence is unwanted.All our informants acknowledged that the increasing Chinese influx

has resulted in busier trading spaces. While this was good for someGhanaians as noted earlier, it was not positive for others. The surge inrents in prime trading locations is thought to be due to the Chineseinflux. Chinese entrepreneurs are willing to pay more than twice thenormal rent and this has triggered an increase in rent prices. A traderselling for more than a decade notes:

Because of the Chinese, now the rent for stores has increased… These daysthe landlords do not rent out to Ghanaians… a Ghanaian will want to rent ashop for years for ,. When the Chinese comes, he will say he willdouble it to , … so the storeowner will give it to the Chinese.(Cleaning equipment trader, Kantamanto, Int.)

The realistic group conflict theory and the contact hypothesis provideinference on how Ghanaians having a stake in renting shops will differ-ently perceive a Chinese impact on rents. In harmony with the contacthypothesis, we argue Chinese entrepreneurs’ contact with Ghanaianlandlords is free from competition, hence the latter will be pleasedwith the Chinese presence. For landlords, the Chinese trooping intothe trading spaces demonstrates a higher demand for stores which cul-minates in an increase in rents. On the other hand, rent increases nega-tively affect Ghanaian traders who are renting shops. In line with theinstrumental model of group conflict, we argue an increase in rentsdue to high Chinese demand presents a resource stress for Ghanaians.The scenario that higher rent prices means Ghanaian traders will be




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unable to rent shops or renew their tenancy at the end of contracts high-lighted this. Resource stress coupled with salience of a potentially com-petitive out-group, herein Chinese migrants, culminate in perceivedcompetition for resources and hence the Chinese presence is not desir-able for Ghanaian merchants.In ascertaining Chinese impacts, we triangulated interviews with

observations along with a comparative lens to a decade ago hinged onthe first author’s insider’s perspective. Data from traders used forgauging the impacts are based on traders’ real-life experiences, someof whom have been trading for three decades. Moreover, we subjectedinformation from traders to verification by cross-checking the largecapital traders’ assertions with Ghanaian vendors trading on tabletopsor in front of shops. Some large capital traders’ assertions matchedthose of petty traders who acknowledged their role in the impact ofthe Chinese, such as sending samples of superior quality goods to theChinese for duplication. Our findings of a Chinese willingness to payhigher rents culminating in the closure of shops run by Ghanaianswho could not renew their tenancy, based on interviews with thetraders, were triangulated by interviewing a landlord/trader and ourobservation of Chinese merchants supplanting shops that used to beunder the tenancy of Ghanaians. Figure summarises the majorimpacts of the Chinese influx.Figure indicates that Chinese entrepreneurial activities in Accra

exert two major direct impacts, namely displacing local traders andheightening activity, thus resulting in busier trading areas. Thegeneral impression is that Ghanaian traders would have different experi-ences of the Chinese depending on their position within the hierarchyof trading spaces. However, it is difficult to identify a general trend, asboth well-established wealthy traders and street sellers may face compat-ible and conflicting impacts from the Chinese presence. Busy tradingspaces further trigger indirect jobs, since hawkers who buy from theChinese re-sell their wares along Accra’s major trading streets due tothe crowdedness of the areas. Indeed, we observed some women buyfrom the Chinese just to sit in front of both Ghanaian and Chineseshops to sell their goods. Busier spaces have also led to an increasein rents in the trading areas. Higher rents present good news forGhanaian landlords within the area but pose challenges forGhanaians who have to renew their rent contracts. The displacing oflocal traders due to the Chinese influx along with cheap Chinesegoods have largely culminated in reduced sales for Ghanaians whoare selling goods also sold by the Chinese. Reduced sales links to a




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dip in Ghanaian profits. A persistent dip in profits has forced theclosure of some Ghanaian shops.

C O N C L U S I O N

Inspired by the literature on the impact of China’s burgeoning growthand influence in other parts of the world, this study sought to capturemicro Sino-Ghanaian relations by exploring attitudes of indigenousGhanaian traders towards Chinese entrepreneurial migrants trading inGhanaian spaces. We explored the perceived impacts of Chinese mer-chants on these spaces and on indigenous traders. We observed relation-ships between Ghanaian traders and Chinese counterparts identified byprevious studies, and our findings are in line with most of these.However, we argued that while strict categorisations between Ghanaianand Chinese traders provide simplicity in describing such relationships,they do not express the nuances in them. Our analyses show Ghanaiantraders could simultaneously be in more than one category and that therelationships are not clear-cut in all scenarios. Ghanaian and Chinesetraders are involved in relationships which can only be explained by

Figure Impacts of Chinese entrepreneurial influx into the central businessdistrict.




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partially selecting elements fromthe categories.Wemaintain that percep-tions of Ghanaians towards Chinese entrepreneurial migrants aredependent on the particular position of each trader amidst the activitiesof Chinese merchants.Without doubt, the increasing Chinese entrepreneurial migrant flow

has an impact on Ghanaian trading spaces. On the positive side, thecheap goods of Chinese merchants enhances the purchasing power ofaverage African consumers – this is acknowledged both by consumersand traders selling goods not known to be sold by Chinese. CheapChinese goods also indirectly trigger employment, mostly for womenwith little capital. On the other hand, cheap goods are generally inferiorrelative to local products and products from other countries, makingAfrica a dumping ground for sub-standard goods. Cheap Chinesegoods have also displaced goods coming from Togo and other countriesalongside Ghanaians who import them. Chinese trading makes parts ofthe Central Business District of Accra busier relative to the past.However, this has also culminated in a decline in sales for sometraders. The dip in sales has contributed to low profit margins and theeventual closure of some Ghanaian shops. The Chinese clamouringfor shops has escalated business rents in the Central Business District.In summary, while Chinese trading activities have been good for someGhanaian traders, this is not the case for many others, most of whomsell goods the Chinese have now come to dominate in selling.The general impression is that existence or absence of a perceived

threat from Chinese trading activities towards Ghanaian trader liveli-hoods shape perceptions about Chinese migrants. Further, intersectingrace and class relations highlighted in visible skin colour difference andlarger capital strength of the Chinese relative to Ghanaian traders alsoinfluence perceptions. However, the intersecting relations thatinformed negative intergroup attitudes blurred where group interestswere in harmony. Increased vulnerability over time also partly under-pinned negative sentiments about Chinese merchants. We noted thatwhere conditions necessary for positive relations existed between out-groups and in-groups, Ghanaian traders perceived Chinese colleaguesin a good way in line with the contact hypothesis. Conversely, absenceof these conditions evoked negative perceptions. Mass media,Ghanaian traders’ understanding of the GIPC Act and the larger pos-ition of their group, such as GUTA, also shaped Ghanaians’ perceptionsof Chinese merchants. Overall, while some Ghanaians perceive theChinese presence and activities negatively and therefore their presenceis unwanted in local trading communities, others were satisfied to the




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extent that some wished for increased Chinese immigration into tradingcommunities. There were also those whose perceptions about Chineseare neither exclusively positive nor negative but rather nuanced.Instead of a dislike for continuous Chinese entrepreneurial migrantinflows, they preferred policies be put in place and implemented accord-ingly for African societies to capture the benefits emanating fromChinese inflows.

N O T E S

. See <https://www.oecd.org/countries/ghana/.pdf>. ‘Starting from below’ is synonymous with a micro perspective that begins with individuals and

groups as the unit of analysis to emphasise the lived realities of relations that occur at the state andmacroeconomic level.. Local trading areas in this article refers to communities largely dominated by indigenous

Ghanaian traders that resemble market squares but are unlike malls. Rather than selling in stalls,traders sell in well-built shops.. GIPC is the government authority promoting investments in Ghana.. GUTA is a body that comprises subsets of groups of traders and artisans. Historically, they have

demonstrated against foreigners’ presence and criticised retail activities by foreigners in order toprotect their interests.. We offset insider perspective drawback of excessive familiarity with culture to raise provocative

questions or bias with outsider perspective strength of curiosity with the unfamiliar and perception ofnon-affiliation with groups. This balancing complemented the rich insight of the insider perspectivethrough easy access, raising more questions, interpreting non-verbal signals and asserting a moreauthentic understanding of the study (Merriam et al. ).. The GIPC Act reserves some business activities for Ghanaians only. For a full list of these

activities, refer to paragraph of the Act. Further, it allows foreign participation in business activitiesnot listed in Paragraph and pursuant to foreigners meeting certain capital requirements – refer toParagraph . However, it permits foreigners to engage in trading if they invest a minimum of US$,, and employ Ghanaians. As we observed during and upon conferring with GIPCand Trade ministry officials, we found contestations on interpretations of certain portions of theAct. This notwithstanding and for our purposes, some traders interpreted the Act to mean foreignersare not allowed to sell in the trading areas and especially via retailing. Though the Act forbids foreign-ers from markets, it does not bar them from trading per se. The challenges therefore included whatthe proper definition of a market was and whether the trading areas (field sites) constituted a market.For our purposes, what is relevant and informed negative perceptions about the Chinese merchants isthat some Ghanaians interpreted the Act to mean foreigners are not allowed to trade in the spacesthey find themselves and especially not to retail goods.. In addition to rigour in crosschecking our interview data, the second author’s expertise in

migration and ethnicity checked biases in the first author’s insider perspective, enabling us toutilise the strengths of both perspectives.

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Interviews

Male adult, footwear trader, wholesaler/retailer, Zongo Lane Street – close to UTC, ...Male adult, footwear trader, wholesaler/retailer, Zongo Lane, ...Female adult, bags and footwear trader, wholesaler/retailer, Zongo Lane, ...Male adult, footwear trader, retailer, Zongo Lane, ...Young female, footwear trader, petty trading, UTC, ...Young female, bags and footwear trader, wholesaler/retailer, Zongo Lane, ...Male adult, clothing and underwear trader, wholesaler/retailer, Okaishie, ...Young female, footwear trader, petty trading, UTC, ...Female adult, sewing materials, retailer, Chinahouse/Rawlings Park, ...Male adult, electricals trader, wholesaler/retailer, Zongo Lane, ...

Female adult, electricals trader, wholesaler/retailer, Rawlings Park, ...Representatives, GUTA, Accra-High Street, ...

Young female, footwear trader, retailing, Kantamanto, ...Female adult, cleaning equipment trader, retailer, Kantamanto, ...Official, Ministry of Trade and Industry, ...Officials, GIPC, Accra-Ministries, ...Afro-China Relations Expert, Director – Centre for Asian Studies, University of Ghana, Legon,

...



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https://www.modernghana.com/news/449389/1/china-has-taken-over-african-domestic-economies-an.html


https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X18000678


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