chinese history and the foreign relations of contemporary china-feuerwerker-1972

8/10/2019 Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary China-Feuerwerker-1972

1/15

merican cademy of Political and Social Science

Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary ChinaAuthor(s): Albert FeuerwerkerSource: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 402, China in theWorld Today (Jul., 1972), pp. 1-14Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political andSocial ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1039201 .Accessed: 21/12/2014 20:58

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Sage Publications, Inc. and American Academy of Political and Social Science are collaborating with JSTORto digitize, preserve and extend access to Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 16 5.132.14.52 on Sun, 21 Dec 20 14 20:58:31 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sagehttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aapsshttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aapsshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1039201?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1039201?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aapsshttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aapsshttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage


2/15

Chinese History and the Foreign Relations

of Contemporary China

By ALBERT FEUERWERKER

ABSTRACT: t is frequently implied that there is somethingpeculiarly "Chinese," derived from the millennia of a separateand remarkable cultural tradition, which operates to motivatethe foreign relations of the People's Republic of China(P.R.C.). It is, of course, absurd to expect that there would beno residue of the past at work in the present, even after theprofound revolutionary changes that China has undergone inthe past century. That persistence of tradition, however, is notsimple and unproblematic. Precisely what out of the past hasa functional role in contemporary China requires explication. A

distinction between influences from the pre-nineteenth-century"Great Tradition" and those growing from the importunateimpact of the outside world on China in the nineteenth andearly twentieth centuries must be made. And the weight oftradition/history must be compared with that of other factorsinfluencing he formation and execution of foreign policy. Thispaper examines five components which have determined theforeign relations of the P.R.C. and suggests that they may beranked in the following order of importance:

1)nationalism;

2) the politics of the international Communist movement; 3)China's domestic politics; 4) Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideol-ogy; and 5) a strategic-political magery based on a traditionalspatial-ideological world order.

Albert Feuerwerker, Ph.D., Ann Arbor, Michigan, received his doctorate in Historyand Far Eastern Languages from Harvard University (1957). He has been Professorof History at the University of Michigan since 1960 and was Director of the Center

for Chinese Studies there from 1961 to 1967. He previously taught at the University ofToronto (1955-58) and was a Research Fellow, East Asian Research Center, HarvardUniversity (1958-60). He is the author of numerous books and articles on China andis currently on the Board of Editors of The American Historical Review and on theAdvisory Editorial Board of The China Quarterly. Since 1970 he has been Chairman ofthe Social Science Research Council-American Council of Learned Societies Joint Com-mittee on Contemporary China.

1

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/15

THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

IT IS frequently implied that there issomething peculiarly "Chinese," de-

rived from millennia of a separate and

remarkable cultural tradition, whichoperates to motivate the foreign rela-tions of the People's Republic of China(P.R.C.). This influence is describedin a number of different ways. In itsmost extreme form, the question is raisedas to the genuineness with which theP.R.C.-as the inheritor of China's past-accepts the nation-state system thatis central to the international order de-

fined by the assumptions of the policy-makers of the United States and theSoviet Union. Is it correct to assumethat Peking's participation in a "bour-geois" or "revisionist" nternational sys-tem, composed of formally equal andsovereign states of varying real powerwhich interact in changing combina-tions, is more than a temporary and tac-tical maneuver? Is the P.R.C. recon-ciled to a system of world politics inwhich states with greater power do in-deed impinge upon the lesser powers,but in which no single center exists orwould be tolerated; in which changes dotake place in the relative power of theparticipants, but only according to somecommon rules of the game that are vio-lated at great peril; in which communi-cation

amongstates is

possibleand con-

flict usually held within tolerable limitsbecause of shared assumptions andrules?

IS IT THE "PEOPLE'S MIDDLEKINGDOM?"

Because of the weighty cultural bag-gage which China carried into the mod-ern world, should not the foregoing

questions be answered no? Even if wedismiss for the moment the ecumenicalvision of utopian Maoism, is not theP.R.C. driven to attempt to reestablishthe Sino-centric world order whichcrumbled n the nineteenth century when

China was reduced to a semicolonialstatus? Is not the tone of superiority-Chinese "arrogance"-which is directed

not just toward the "imperialist" UnitedStates, but also toward the "modern re-visionist" Soviet Union, directly linkedto a traditional assertion of the superior-ity of the Confucian moral order whichidentified China as Civilization and alloutside its influence as Barbarism?Should we not see in the contemporaryclaim to leadership of the Third Worlda continuation of the ethnocentrism of

the past in which the Middle Kingdom,by its "virtue," rresistibly drew the non-Chinese world into enrollment in a hier-archic system of interstate relationswhose single center was Peking? And isnot the wining and dining, at the ex-pense of the P.R.C., of numerous em-bassies to Peking from the very smallstates of the Third World, and of Com-munist and non-Communist oppositionleaders from other states, only the mostrecent form of the tribute system bymeans of which the imperial dynastiesgranted trade privileges and politicalsupport in return for the kowtow andacknowledgment of Peking's suzerainty?This alternative is summed up in JohnFairbank's brilliant conceit of a "Peo-ple's Middle Kingdom"-though Ihasten to add that the above sentencesare a caricature and do not representProfessor Fairbank's views.

While it is, of course, absurd to ex-pect that there would be no residue ofthe past at work in the present, evenafter revolutionary changes as profoundas those which China has undergone inthe past century, several serious diffi-culties stand in the way of attributing

very much weight to this particular ver-sion of the pervasiveness of traditionalimages in contemporary policy. Aftercommenting on these difficulties, I shallsuggest alternative possibilities for ex-pressing the place of Chinese tradition

2



4/15

HISTORY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

and history in the formation and execu-tion of the foreign policies of the P.R.C.,and shall indicate the relative weight

that I would assign to the past as com-pared with other components in thisheady mixture.

AN INFLEXIBLE POLICY?

The attribution of continuing signifi-cant influence to a traditional strategic-political imagery, to begin with the mostgeneral demurrer, mplies a fixity aboutthe resulting policy which is contradicted

by the history of China's foreign rela-tions since 1949. While of course thefact that China is the largest country inAsia with the greatest population andthe most resources for potential develop-ment must always be considered in ana-lyzing the structure of world politics,these geographical and economic-demo-graphic capabilities do not autonomouslydetermine any policy for the leaders ofthe Chinese state. For these parametersto have any effect, they must be medi-ated by the implicit or explicit decisionsof specific policymakers who, in effect,assign them their values. To assert that"deep" and unchanging cultural factorsdetermine such decisions is to ascribe aninevitability and inflexibility to posi-tions on current substantive matterswhich are as

misplacedas the

parallelMaoist claim to unvarying ideologicalconsistency. In fact, the twenty-two-year period since the establishment ofthe P.R.C. has been one of great shiftsand unanticipated changes, in foreignaffairs as much as in domestic matters.Compare the "leaning to one side" alli-ance with the Soviet Union of the early1950s with the armed clashes on the

Ussuri River and in Sinkiang in 1969;or the "spirit of Bandung" of the mid-1950s with the anti-imperialist offensivein the Third World of 1958-65; or thexenophobia and isolation of the CulturalRevolution years of 1966-68 with the

entertainment of Richard Nixon andparty in the P.R.C. in February 1972.

An emphasis upon cultural continui-

ties, secondly, tends to give an unwar-ranted image of benignity to the for-eign relations of contemporary China.I do not attribute any more malevolenceto the P.R.C. than to any other greatpower-which, of course, China is, not-withstanding its denial in the Shanghaijoint communique of February 27, 1972:"China will never be a superpower andit opposes hegemony and power politicsof any kind." But its foreign policiesare not merely a replay in the present,with new actors and costumes, of thefeckless conduct of the decaying Ch'ingdynasty (1644-1911), which Lord Ma-cartney described in January 1794,toward the end of his futile embassy tothe court of the Ch'ien-lung emperor, as

an old crazy, First rate man-of-war, which

a fortunate uccession of able and vigilantofficers has contrived to keep afloat forthese one hundred nd fifty years past ....She may perhaps ot sink outright; he maydrift some time as a wreck, and will thenbe dashed o pieces on the shore ....

The P.R.C. is not an antique Chinesehulk, afloat in isolated serenity in anancient sea all its own, but a dynamic,

modernizingstate whose

strivingfor do-

mestic political integration, economicdevelopment, and social revolution oc-curs in an international context which itviews as, at least, unsatisfactory and istherefore desirous of changing. Whilethis unhappiness with the status quo ofworld politics is rooted both in the his-tory of the past century and in con-temporary exigencies-as I shall indi-

cate in what folloWs-China's efforts toalter the relative distribution of inter-national power are no more-nor less-benign than those of other states actingto assert or protect what they see astheir national interests.

3



5/15


COMPLEXITY OF CHINA'S TRADITION

A third difficulty associated withlooking to the traditional past for thesources of present policy arises from thecomplexity and dynamism of China'shistorical experience. Even at the apo-gee of pre-nineteenth-century imperialChina-before the importunate incur-sions of the West-China's tradition wasnot an unproblematic unity. To empha-size those strains of the past which pre-sumably favored current developmentsmay in fact distort our apprehension ofthe practice of international politics inlate-imperial China. The tribute sys-tem, for example-a congeries of insti-tutions for which the Chinese had nospecific term and which constitute asystem only in the eyes of later his-torians-may be said to have restedupon three ideological assumptions: 1)China's cultural superiority which pre-

cluded relations on the basis of equal-ity; 2) the sufficiency of the emperor'svirtue to win the peaceful submission of"men from afar"; and 3) the priorityof political over economic relations. Butso long as China de facto remained thecenter of the universe it knew, andwhile the assumptions themselves werenot challenged, there was no need-asindeed there was no possibility-of in-

sisting upon their literal implementation.I would argue, in other words, that wemay be misled if we treat the tributesystem ideology of the Ch'ing empire assomething radically different in its forcefrom the public and official commitmentto, for instance, free enterprise in con-temporary America or the "mass line" inthe P.R.C. What is really important inall of these cases is that the integratingmyths of tribute, free enterprise, andmass line not be contradicted withintheir respective societies, rather thanthat the actual practice of foreign rela-tions or economic enterprise conform inall respects and at all times to the ideol-

ogy in its purest statement. The spatial-ideological imagery of the Sino-centricand moralistic tribute system was a

critical component of the legitimationof imperial rule within China; its do-mestic function of raising the Son ofHeaven to a moral height above all othermen was as important as its role as apractical medium for China's interna-tional relations. The essential thingwas that the Chinese documentary rec-ord-and so far as possible the behaviorof foreigners n China-not depart fromthe ideology. Thus Lord Macartney,although he in fact refused to performthat ceremony, is recorded as havingkowtowed-the three kneelings and nineknockings of the head-when receivedby the emperor. Nor did George IIIpresent tributary gifts to the Chia-ch'ingemperor in 1804, though the Chinesedocuments so assert. Many similar ex-

amplescan be cited. And

lengthyevi-

dence can be offered that, notwithstand-ing the tributary ideology, the Ch'ingempire, on the one hand, used armedforce when it appeared necessary-rather than rely on moral virtue alone-in its relations with its smaller neigh-bors in Central Asia and, on the otherhand, dealt realistically and on terms ofequality with the expanding power of

Russia-as in the treaties of Nerchinsk,1689, and Kyakhta, 1728. Moreover,the tribute embassies from the smallmaritime states of Southeast Asia did nomore than opportunistically acknowledgethe Chinese definition of the world or-der in the interest of furthering theirtrade with the mainland. If Korea,which sent 664 embassies to China in theperiod 1637-1874-an average of al-

most three a year-was truly under theinfluence of Chinese culture, the dili-gent Ryikyu (Liu-ch'iu) tributary wasin fact under the domination of the hanof Satsuma in Japan which utilized theRyikyu island kingdom as an entrep6t

4



6/15


for an unacknowledged Sino-Japanesetrade.

The widening of the Sino-Soviet split

has perhaps seemed to vindicate thosewho have stressed the cultural bases ofthe behavior of the P.R.C. Does notMao Tse-tung, like the emperors of old,dwell inaccessibly in the Forbidden Cityin Peking, and once again proclaim thetrue-but now Marxist-Leninist-way tothe barbarians in Moscow's Kremlin?A striking image which resonates withtraditional overtones, but as a historical

analogy it is belied by the pragmaticflexibility which the emperors of old ex-hibited while the dynasty and its socialelite still retained an undiminished be-lief in their values and institutions. Un-til this self-confidence was weakened, bydomestic rebellion and foreign incursionsin the nineteenth century, the role ofConfucian ideology-although its claimswere formally universalistic like those ofMarxism-Leninism-was primarily a do-mestic one. What the foreigner did andsaid outside of China-how he inter-preted the tributary relationship-wasof no consequence. But as the discrep-ancy between China's assumed superi-ority and its actual weakness grew inthe early nineteenth century, romantictraditionalism was substituted for genu-ine

belief,and an irrational insistence

upon the letter of the tribute systemreplaced the previous flexibility.

DISSOLUTION OF THE TRADITIONALWORLD ORDER

The confrontation between this arte-riosclerotic ate-imperial China and nine-teenth-century Europe-pursuing thatcombination of civilizing mission, as

some saw it, and squalid greed, whichmore than half falsified the former mo-tive, that set it on the path to temporarydomination of the world-dissolved thetraditional Chinese world order as a po-litical ideology and as an actuality. This

is the fourth reason why it is difficult toaward any primacy to the persistence oftradition, in the sense of pre-nineteenth-century historical influences, in the for-mation of current policy. To do so ig-nores the main historical influenceswhich affect the present. The intrusionof European, American, and Japanesepower into the Middle Kingdom, theopium wars and the resulting unequaltreaties, the loss of imperial China'snominal dependencies to the imperialistpowers, large war indemnities to theforeigners, and a scramble for economicconcessions-all these helped shatter theold self-image of China's cultural superi-ority and political centrality. In itsplace arose-fitfully and with manyfalse starts-modern Chinese national-ism whose memory of the trauma of thecataclysmic impact of foreign imperial-ism on traditional China is the principal,but not exclusive, force which operatesnow to shape the actions of the P.R.C.in the world arena.

SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY

There are at least five influenceswhich together have determined the for-eign policies of the People's Republic ofChina during the past twenty-two years.I suggest that they can be ranked in thefollowing order of importance: 1) na-tionalism-in a particularly well-devel-oped form of the variety known in nine-teenth-century Europe; 2) the politicsof the international Communist move-ment; 3) China's domestic politics; 4)Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology; and5) the strategic-political imagery basedon a traditional spatial-ideological world

order whose saliency I have questionedin the foregoing paragraphs. The firstand the last of these five factors arespecifically historical in nature; havingundermined culturalism, I want now toconsider nationalism more closely.

5



7/15


There are aspects of the other threewhich merit attention as well.

MODERN NATIONALISM

While the content of modern Chinesenationalist demands is familiar to anystudent of recent world history-sover-eignty, territorial ntegrity, equality withother nations, autonomy in determiningits path to the future-there is a gen-erally acknowledged fervency, almostvehemence, in their expression. It is asif the classical contours of nineteenth-century nationalism had been replicatedin an exaggerated form when this peren-nial phenomenon of the modern worldmade its appearance in Chinese dress.The intensity of Chinese nationalist feel-ing has, I believe, two sources. Mostimportant is the gross sense of outragethat every twentieth-century Chinesehas felt at the actual indignities whichhis

country experiencedat

foreignhands

since the mid-nineteenth century.By the end of the Ch'ing dynasty in

1911, the foreigners in China had byforce acquired extraterritorial rights,that is, immunity from Chinese legaljurisdiction; had established foreign-governed enclaves in the treaty ports;had deprived China of tariff autonomy;freely navigated China's inland waters

not only with their merchant vessels, butalso with their gunboats; competed withthemselves for railroad and mining con-cessions and to place loans with theChinese government which would en-hance their influence over its decisions;had penetrated into the interior of thecountry with their missionaries whochallenged the dominance of the ruralsocial elite; and had begun to nibble at

the territory of the Chinese empire inManchuria, Shantung province, and else-where. But the imperialist bark before1911, we can now see, was more fero-cious than its bite. Foreign political in-fluence in late-imperial China was less

than the powers thought it was or hopedit would be. While the foreign role inthe very small modern sector of theeconomy was a significant one, the greatbulk of the Chinese economy did not be-come dependent upon an export marketfor primary agricultural or mineral prod-ucts-as was the case in parts of South-east Asia and Latin America. Thoughit may run contrary to the more com-mon view, I would also hold that the for-eign merchant in late-Ch'ing China in-creasingly served rather than controlledthe traditional Chinese commercial sys-tem.

If the direct effect of imperialism onthe Chinese state and society in thenineteenth century was a limited one, theperception of its consequences by theChinese elite was of an altogether largerdimension, disproportionate o the actualderogations of China's sovereignty bythe

imperialist powers. Here we have totake account of the second source of theparticular power of Chinese nationalism,and here also, if anywhere, we can seethe influence of traditional forces onmoder actions. For the modernnationalist (anti-imperialist) sentimentwhich began to appear at the end ofthe century, in particular after theshocking defeat inflicted by Japan on

China in the war of 1894-95, gainedintensity by incorporating nto itself theculturalist xenophobia of Confucian tra-dition. China's first nationalists weremostly men of elite background social-ized in the traditional society. If theynow focused their efforts on the survivalof the Chinese nation-state (kuo-chia)rather than the Confucian cultural ecu-mene (t'ien-hsia), the pain of losing the

latter was still a great one and added astrong emotionalism to their outlook.Here, for example, is a passage by a stu-dent nationalist writing in 1903:

Alas Is not today's world one in which hetides of struggle are more fierce than ever

6



8/15


before And is not China he most violentvortex of this world struggle The Rus-sian tiger, the British eopard, he German

and French foxes, the American wolf, andthe Japanese ackel deliberately nd eagerlybare their claws and expose their fangs asthey encircle and prepare o pounce uponthis 4,000-year old sick lion. They seizestrategic places and force the lease of navalbases n order o strangle him at the throat;they open mines and build railroads n orderto sever his muscles and tendons; theygrant loans, demand ndemnities, and en-large their industry and commerce n order

to feed on his flesh and blood; they "openthe door," carve "spheres f influence," ndspring upon the fat victim to devour him-without any misgivings.

CHINESE REACTIONS TOFOREIGN INCURSIONS

The first Chinese reactions to the in-cursions of post-industrial revolutionEurope, in the 1840s and 1850s, were a

combination of blind antiforeignism andfutile attempts to play off one barbarianagainst another-variations, that is, onthe old culturalistic theme that hadworked when the dynasty was domesti-cally secure, self-confident, and isolatedfrom any really powerful external chal-lenge. In the decades after 1860, untilthe Sino-Japanese War, this gave way toa more pragmatic effort to prevent fur-

ther foreign demands by, on the onehand, honoring the treaty privilegeswhich they had exacted and, on the otherhand, attempting a modest military andeconomic "self-strengthening," whichwas immediately directed to the repres-sion of internal dissension, but mightultimately deter the powers from enlarg-ing their foothold. Briefly, in the Boxeruprising of 1900, there was a partialreversion to the xenophobic response ofmid-century. Thereafter, the field washeld by modern Chinese nationalism.From the end of the nineteenth centuryuntil 1949, nationalist strivings to com-bine domestic reform-in the first in-

stance in order to achieve the politicaland material basis for ending foreignspecial privileges-with an attack on the

imperialist prerogatives themselves con-stituted the main content of China's his-tory. Each of the successive centralizingefforts of this half-century-the late-Ch'ing reform program, the brief rule ofYuan Shih-k'ai in the first years afterthe republican revolution of 1911, thenationalist revolution of the 1920s inwhich the Kuomintang emerged victori-ous and established its government atNanking, the road to power of the Chi-nese Communist Party (C.C.P.) itself-has in its own manner been a responseto this two-pronged nationalist programof domestic reform and anti-imperialism.When, after the brief or conditional suc-cesses but ultimate failure of theirpredecessors, the Chinese Communistscame to rule China, they did so as the

legitimate and authoritative inheritorsof the leadership of this nationalistrevolution.

But in the fifty-year course of thepassage of the mantle of nationalist lead-ership from the late-Ch'ing statesmen toMao Tse-tung, two critical developmentsincreased the intensity and saliency ofChinese nationalism even over the al-ready high levels of the first decades of

the twentieth century. Whereas beforeWorld War I the imperialist powers hadcollectively nibbled at the margins ofChina's sovereignty and territorial in-tegrity, between 1915 and 1945 one ofthose powers, Japan, in effect made anall-out political and military effort toturn China into its exclusive dependency,an attempt which culminated in the warof 1937-45. The memory of Japaneseimperialism in China remains deeplyetched in the minds of the present lead-ers of the P.R.C., for these men who arenow in their sixties and seventies-Maois seventy-eight; Chou En-lai is seventy-four-spent the prime years of their

7



9/15


lives fighting against it. That theyshould, as we might see it, over-react toa contemporary distribution of interna-

tional power which might lead even inthe distant future to a repetition of thatstruggle-and to a possible derailment ofthe domestic goals of development andsocial revolution-is not surprising.

MODERN MASS NATIONALISM

The second related development ap-plies to the people of China rather thanto their leaders. One major consequenceof the fifty-year nationalist revolutionwas the progressive mobilization, orpoliticalization, of ever broader sectorsof the population. While the principalimport of this process is in domestic af-fairs rather than foreign relations, it isnot without bearing on the latter. Late-nineteenth-century Chinese nationalismwas confined to the members of the of-ficial and nonofficial elite, for some ofwhom at least the motivation was theprotection of their traditional politicaland economic privileges against the for-eigner's competition. The nationalistmovement of the 1920s saw the begin-nings of the participation of persons whowere not members of the traditional so-cial elite-merchants, Western-type pro-fessionals, the new intelligentsia, even

some workers and peasants;it

was, how-ever, still largely an urban phenomenonwhich did not touch most of China'smillions; and it was only ambiguouslyrelated to the goal of domestic socialchange. In the course of the anti-Japa-nese war of 1937-45, largely through theefforts of the Chinese Communist Party,a significant part of the rural peasantpopulation was mobilized under the ban-

ner of nationalism and for a concomi-tant program of social change-thoughnot yet in support of the ultimate col-lectivist program of the C.C.P. Thepoint here is that the course of China'smodern history had produced not only

nationalism, but modern mass national-ism. Whatever weight one chooses togive to the importance of elite manipula-tion of the populace in China's domesticpolitics, it is manifest that in foreignaffairs the leadership has ready-madepopular support for any policy thatcould be seen as furthering broadly ac-cepted nationalist goals.

To place the force of Chinese nation-alism first among the determinants ofthe foreign policies of the P.R.C. impliesa particular answer to a question similarto those that I asked rhetorically at thebeginning of this paper: Would theachievement of an identifiable list ofspecific objectives turn the P.R.C. intoa "status quo power," or does it, on thecontrary, pursue the unlimited objectiveof overthrowing the present interna-tional system and substituting a Maoist-if not a traditional Confucian-worldorder? I can give my answer best inthe course of commenting on the second,third, and fourth of the factors determin-ing foreign policy which I rankedearlier: the politics of the internationalCommunist movement, China's domesticpolitics, and Maoist ideology.

SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

For Mao Tse-tung at least-and he

and those associated with him appear tobe in control of the foreign relations ofthe P.R.C. at present-opposition tothe Soviet Union is clearly a criticalcomponent in the formation of foreignpolicy. The most important sources ofthe Sino-Soviet conflict seem to lie, first,in Mao's reaction to Khrushchev's at-tack on Stalin and the "cult of person-ality" in February 1956, which had the

effect of weakening the legitimacy ofMao's position at a critical point in thedomestic policy deliberations of the Chi-nese leadership. In effect, Mao Tse-tung's effort to realize his utopian visionof the Chinese revolution was short-

8



10/15


circuited, and only revived over strenu-ous opposition within the C.C.P. andwith uncertain success in the Great LeapForward of 1958-60 and the CulturalRevolution of 1966-68. For this revi-sionist betrayal, he has never forgiventhe Russian leadership. This personalquarrel, however, represents only a par-ticular manifestation of a broader con-flict over which of the contending com-munist parties is the legitimate heir tothe Marxist-Leninist heritage-which,that is, is the authoritative

interpreterof that doctrine and consequently is ableto claim the support of the communistnations and communist parties of theworld. And to these personal and ideo-logical strains there was added, as theChinese saw it, a military, economic,and political betrayal by the Soviet Un-ion which failed to back the P.R.C. inthe second Taiwan Straits crisis, allied

itself with India, withdrew its economicaid and technicians from China, andattempted to interfere in China's do-mestic politics.

An extended treatment of the Sino-Soviet conflict is beyond the scope of thispaper, but its practical effect on theforeign relations of the P.R.C. is ap-parent and relevant to my argument.At present, the P.R.C. sees the Soviet

Union, whose troops are present on itsborders in large numbers, as the princi-pal threat to the realization of its na-tionalist goals of domestic developmentand the achievement of an internationalstatus commensurate with its dominantplace on the Asian mainland. So muchmore important are these considerationsthan any others that the P.R.C., in spiteof two decades of directing its sometimesvehement rhetoric against American im-perialism as the principal enemy of theThird World, has now joined in whatwill be a lengthy, complex, and probablymutually painful process of achieving adetente with the United States.

DOMESTIC POLITICS ANDFOREIGN POLICY

With respect to domestic politics as adeterminant of foreign policy, I can bebrief. For the People's Republic ofChina, foreign policy definitely stands insecond place as compared with domesticpolitical and economic concerns. It isdoubtful that Mao Tse-tung, the GreatHelmsman, has found his way easilybetween the Scylla of gross nationalproduct and the Charybdis of the Yenanideal. The radical

impulse provided bycollectivization had been dissipated bymid-1956; the failure of the Great Leapset the Chinese economy back by half adecade, forced Mao into retirement, andaroused bitter struggle within the partyand alienation among the populace; theGreat Proletarian Cultural Revolution,for all the claims of the Chinese press,has apparently ended in a compromise.

But neither has he been shipwrecked, asthe Russians and some in this countrywould have it. It has been altogether aremarkable performance, and if a Maoistutopia is essentially as impracticable asany other, no one in China is preparedto sacrifice even small progress towardthat ideal in aggressive international ad-ventures. The saliency for most Chineseof the goals of political integration and

economic development, in other words,makes for a generally realistic and cau-tious foreign policy. Domestic dis-equilibrium, as in the Cultural Revolu-tion, has at times produced an unpleas-ant rhetoric, but no movement of troopsoutside of the borders of the P.R.C.

MAOIST IDEOLOGY

It is clearly the cumulative implica-tion of the preceding paragraphs thatthe Maoist version of Marxism-Leninismplays only a minor role as a source ofChina's foreign policy. But is not thesupport of wars of national liberation inAsia, Africa, and Latin America a cen-

9



11/15


tral focus of that foreign policy, and doesnot this support derive directly fromMaoist ideology? Does it not, moreover,signify that the penultimate goal of thePeople's Republic of China is dominionover a Maoist commonwealth of have-not nations, as a step toward the finalconquest of the industrialized world-both the communist and noncommunistparts thereof-from the Third World"countryside," in the same manner asMao's peasant armies purportedly cameto power in China? The facile responseto these questions is that Lin Piao-author of the famous manifesto of Sep-tember 1965: "Long Live the Victoryof People's War "-in the summer of1971 disappeared from the Chinese po-litical scene, from all available evidencepurged by Mao Tse-tung; or, equallycorrect but only somewhat more helpful,that Lin Piao's manifesto is "intellec-

tuallyabsurd and politically impracti-

cal." I would suggest two additionaland, I believe, more germane observa-tions.

First, support of wars of national lib-eration by the P.R.C.-in the form ofclandestine arms shipments and militarytraining, but more importantly and morecommonly by favorable propaganda andpolitical relations with revolutionary

organizations-has in fact been morea

product of the short-range tactical needsof the Chinese nation-state than of anyultimate Maoist program. Such sup-port, in other words, can be and has beenturned on and off as it suited the policy-makers in Peking, without any particu-lar concern about ideological consis-tency. In 1965, for example, Chinaendorsed 23 out of a possible 120 revo-

lutionary and armed struggles in Asia,Latin America, and Africa. And the

pattern of endorsement, which mostlytook the form of propaganda support,identifies this policy as the tactic of arelatively weak state attempting-clum-

sily and with only minor success-tokeep the United States off balance and tocoerce support from other Third World

states for China's aspirations for alarger and recognized role in the interna-tional system. From the point of viewof the r volutionary movements them-selves, China has ignored or even be-trayed their interests as often as it hassupported them. I would expect thatsupport of insurgency in the ThirdWorld will continue, as it does today,but that it will become a less importanttactic as the P.R.C. is fully incorporated-through membership in the UnitedNations, and normal diplomatic andcommercial relations with other states,especially the United States-into theongoing system of world politics.

The ideology of a Maoist ecumene,secondly, is far more important as adeterminant of China's domestic politicsand of relations within the internationalCommunist movement thanl it is as asource of China's foreign policy in gen-eral. Its primary role is akin to that ofthe Confucian tribute system ideology ofold; that is, as a source of legitimacy forthe rulers of the P.R.C. within their na-tion and among the communist nationsand communist parties of the world.The ability to describe external events

for this audience in terms that seem toendorse the infallibility of the Maoistleadership is of some consequence forsecuring domestic support for a genu-inely ideological program of reshapingChinese society. But as I have alreadyindicated, there has been a strong realityfactor operative in the actual foreignpolicies of the P.R.C. since 1949, thoughnot always in its rhetoric.

CONCLUSION

My conclusion, then, is that in China'scontemporary foreign policy the strongemotional demand for undiminished sov-ereignty in its territory, for equality

10



12/15


with other nations, and for autonomy indetermining its domestic path to thefuture-that is, nationalism-is a su-

premely important fact. The sourcesof the P.R.C.'s international behaviorare not something peculiarly and mysti-cally Chinese, or even Maoist, but thesame national interests-as seen by therulers of the country and influenced tosome unknown degree by its popula-tion-that determine the actions of

other modern nations. These nationalinterests will in many cases not be thesame as ours, which means that dealing

with China will require hard bargain-ing and subtle negotiation. Undoubt-edly there will be victories and defeatsfor all parties, but one can expect thatthese confrontations will occur withinthe present international system whichallows no successful universal claim toany state, ideology, culture, or religion.

*QU * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Is the report from Peking of No-vember 3, 1971, published in the To-ronto Globe & Mail, of any relevance tothis lecture? The report claimed: Chinaset the theme for its participation in theUnited Nations tonight by affirmingthat it "will stand together with all thecountries and peoples that love peace,"but Chinese officials left no doubt thatthey remain committed to world revolu-tion. "Countries want independence,nations want liberation and people wantrevolution." This has become an ir-resistible trend in the world today.

That seems to be a commitment tothe policy of helping people who wanttheir freedom.

In 1969 the Detroit News reported"Blacks predict own nation in theSouth," and the leaders said that theyhad decided on a strategy to secure theSouthern states with the help of Africanand Asian countries, particularly RedChina. The newspaper on April 7 re-ported that a twenty-nine-memberAmerican Black Panther delegation hadcrossed the border into Hong Kong,representing a delegation from a possibleinternal struggle in this country.

Does any of this relate to what yousaid about China's policy of helpinginsurgents in other countries?

A: That certainly is a central matter.I see China as a great power-althoughit denies this-just like the other greatpowers whose motives are neither betternor worse. Given its size and its po-litical system, it is a power with whichone will have to deal carefully and withgreat deliberation, and not alwayssuccessfully.

But, looking at the history of the pasttwenty-five years, I tend to discountideological statements made by anycountry. I don't entirely ignore them,but see them as secondary to real con-siderations in relations with other

powers.American leaders, Russian leaders,

Chinese leaders, and the leaders of manyother countries as well have made hair-raising statements. But I believe oneshould take these with a grain of salt.Their primary importance is internal;they do not determine policy. Wherethey do-and we have some cases ofthis in world history-we have a seriousproblem. I simply do not believe thatit is accurate, historically, to see Chinaor Mao Tse-tung as another Hitler.I took Mein Kampf very seriously; Ithink Lin Piao now departed, maybefrom life, is a joke.

11



13/15


Q: I am interested in freedom of thepress and how the newspapermen ofChina obtain information. About six

months ago there were press reports ofa momentous event taking place inChina. I suppose that it concerned LinPiao or some of the Chinese hierarchy.But there were never any follow-ups.Something unreported must have hap-pened that would be of interest topolitical and social scientists. What hashappened recently regarding the hier-archy, and what has happened to LinPiao?

A: If I could tell you what has hap-pened to Lin Piao, I might get a goodjob in the White House. I don't thinkanybody knows. Certainly last summersomething occurred that we don't knowabout-at least I don't know about-with respect to a struggle within the topleadership. This was symbolized by thecancellation of the National Day cere-mony on October 1 and the disappear-ance of Lin and other leaders frompublic view. Perhaps they crashed ina plane in Mongolia.

This is not reported in the Chinesepress, if that was the purport of thequestion. There is no Chinese pressequivalent to the Philadelphia Bulletin

or the NewYork

Times. Noris it even

assumed that there is. But I neverimplied in my remarks that that wasthe critical matter.

Q: First, what are the possibilities ofearly change in the nature of the uni-versities in China? They are now reallytechnical institutes; what we know asthe liberal educational base has largely

disappeared.And second, what is the possibilityin the next few years of there being aresurgence of any degree of free think-ing in China making possible the freeexchange of professors, students, vari-ous professional people, and so forth?

A: I would make distinctions amongthe various disciplines. This kind ofdevelopment is easiest in the natural

sciences. It is next easiest in thehumanities, and most difficult in the so-called social sciences.

One can't say what the actual devel-opment will be, but it seems that in thesciences, the Chinese have a good baseand will continue to produce. I suspectthat production of works and studies inthe humanities-though not of the kindthat are appropriate for humanities insome other countries (but appropriatein China)-will probably thrive.

Whether there will ever be social sci-ences equivalent to our social sciences-or whether indeed, there should be-is more problematic. That would seemto be the last area where one could ex-pect a real exchange.

Q:I listened with

greatinterest to

your major theme that basic ideologyis not quite as important as realisticconsiderations in international politics;and certainly in many instances that iscorrect. But I am wondering, if theforeign policy, even though it is basedon realism, gets too far afield from theideal, whether there might not be a verystrong reaction which could trigger seri-ous problems? This, of course, can beapplied to what seems to be the over-whelming ideologically stated commit-ment of the Chinese People's Republic.

A: That's a very complicated ques-tion, but a very significant one in thissense: there are contending partieswithin any state who, with greater or

lesser power, try to influence the wayin which foreign policy is formed. Thisis true in China as well. If the present,shall we say, nonideological foreign pol-icy collapses, I can see the possibilityof men within the Chinese leadershipwho are more ideological, expressing

12



14/15


themselves by putting a larger ideologi-cal component into the policy.

I don't know what went on in the

conversations between Mr. Nixon andthe Chinese leadership. Maybe theAmericans were aware of this and weredesirous of supporting the Mao-Chouleadership, which they see, at this time,as less ideological.

Q: First, what does the term Maoistworld mean to you, and how do theChinese see a Maoist world. Second,

how do you interpret the Chinese ob-jective of establishing a commonwealthof nations, and how do you think theChinese see their relations with suchcommonwealth nations?

A: There is a theory, an ideology. Idon't mean to ignore it, for it is a matterto be taken seriously. But I empha-sized other matters because I thought

they were more practically important inthe formation of foreign policy. Thereis indeed a tradition, developed some-what vaguely by Mao, which sees aworld in which all powers, all states,have somehow successfully passedthrough revolution and live in some kindof utopian communist world. There isno war, no conflict; within and withoutall is peaceful and serene. That vision

exists, and I wouldn't deny wantingsuch a world to exist. But I am skepti-cal that we've yet found a way to over-come personal or political sin.

Q: What will the American people getout of Nixon's visit? China got admis-sion to the U.N.; she wanted Taiwanand got it. Nixon enhanced his re-election possibilities. But what was in

it for the American people?

A: A big TV spectacle One has todifferentiate between that TV spectacleand the content of the trip. The mediacan create a great interest in China-aSino-centric America in one week-and

destroy it the next. That you areaware of. It is unfortunate.

The possibility of dealing on realistic

terms-rather than through an ideo-logical screen-with the power which,given its population, resources, politicalstructure, and economic plans is indeedthe largest and potentially the mostpowerful in Asia, seems to be self-evidentally useful. It will not produceany immediate results of great conse-quence. But over time, I see or at leasthope that there is the possibility thatrelations between our country and thePeople's Republic of China can be suchthat the possibility of the two of usgoing to war-as we almost did in1965-may no longer exist.

Q: What importance do you place onthe domestic economic situation in Chinain terms of its growing conciliatory ap-

proachto

foreignaffairs?

A: It is my perhaps exaggerated im-pression that the People's Republic hasbeen able to obtain, through interna-tional trade, anything that it wantedand could pay for, without exception,and regardless of any embargoes or ef-forts to prevent it from doing so. In-volvement in economic relations withanother country, if indeed they are non-exploitative and have an element ofreciprocity, forms a positive bond whichhopefully implies a reduction in thechances for political fights. Related tothis is something which I believe Iimplied without developing because Iwasn't talking about domestic policy.This is my feeling that Maoist ideology

has to be taken very seriously, domesti-cally, in China, in terms of the way inwhich Chinese society may or may notbe reshaped over the next period of time.There, the thinking of Mao is a matterof great importance and is not to betreated as lightly as I dealt with Lin

13



15/15

chinese history and the foreign relations of contemporary china-feuerwerker-1972

Documents