chinese social stratification

7/31/2019 Chinese Social Stratification

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Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2002. 28:91116doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.140823

Copyright c 2002 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved

CHINESE SOCIAL STRATIFICATION ANDSOCIAL MOBILITY

Yanjie BianDivision of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,

Kowloon, Hong Kong; e-mail: [email protected]

Key Words China class, inequality, mobility

s Abstract This essay reviews post-1980 research on class stratification, socio-economic inequalities, and social mobility in the Peoples Republic of China. Chi-nese class stratification has transformed from a rigid status hierarchy under Mao to anopen, evolving class system in the post-Mao period. Socioeconomic inequalities havealso been altered. State redistributive inequalities are giving way to patterns increas-ingly generated by how individuals and groups succeed in a growing market-orientedeconomy; rigorous empirical studies have been conducted on occupational prestige,income distribution, housing and consumption, and gender inequality. Finally, occu-

pational mobility, a rare opportunity under Mao, is becoming a living experience formany Chinese in light of emerging labor markets. Scholarly works on status attain-ment, career mobility, and employment processes show both stability and change inthe once politicized social mobility regime. There is relatively richer research outputon urban than on rural China, despite the greater and more profound transformationsthat occurred in rural China.

INTRODUCTION

Chinese social stratification and social mobility is a fast growing and exciting area

of sociological research. It is fast growing because Chinas post-1978 economic

reforms and consequent large-scale transformations have provided an unusual,

long-lasting opportunity for sociologists who are inherently interested in social

change and social differentiation. To prepare this review I built a bibliography of

more than 300 relevant English-language publications since 1980, and a greater

collection of Chinese-language research literature. This research area is also im-

mensely exciting to scholars, not only because it progressively accumulates socio-

logical knowledge about a highly dynamic country increasingly engaged in theglobal economy (Solinger 2001), but also because researchers have examined ques-

tions of fundamental interest to both China specialists and comparative/general

sociologists.

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This excitement can be felt in an impressive accumulation of major journal

publications on China since 1988,1 in a growing number of active sociologists

who have conducted original research in the country,2 and in two most recent

and highly relevant review essays in this journal. One essay was about Chinassocial change and included a review of research on social stratification and social

mobility up to the mid-1980s (Walder 1989a). The second review focused more on

evaluating theoretical developments and research findings for an ongoing market

transition debate (Nee & Matthews 1996), for which China has been a focal

point of observation. Anticipating that future researchers and classroom instructors

would use the present essay either alone or with the previous ones, I defined my

tasks as synthesizing post-1980 research achievements in three interrelated areas

of Chinas (a) class stratification, (b) socioeconomic inequalities, and (c) social

mobility. The main body of research literature under review is English-languagepublications by sociologists and other social scientists; I also included a few of the

more interesting Chinese-language publications.

CLASS STRATIFICATION

Overall Trend

China underwent extensive change in the wake of the death of Chairman Mao in

1976. Under Mao, a rigid status hierarchy grew out of a state socialist economyin which private ownership of productive assets was gradually eliminated between

1952 and 1958 by collectivization of farming and state consolidation of urban

economy, diminishing pre-revolution social classes in a Communist regime (Whyte

1975, Kraus 1981). Ironically, the post-1978 regime under the new paramount

leader Deng Xiaoping began what now is known to be a remarkable reform policy

that has decollectivized and commodified both rural and urban economies, eroding

the institutional bases of the pre-reform status hierarchy. Since then, an open,

evolving class system has been in the making (Davis 1995).

The Pre-Reform Status Hierarchy

Four structural and behavioral dimensions classified the Chinese into qualitatively

different status groups under Mao: (a) a rural-urban divide in residential status,

(b) a state-collective dualism in economic structure, (c) a cadre-worker dichotomy

1My library search indicates thatASR,AJS,and Social Forces published 19 articles on China

from 1949 to 1987 and 45 articles and commentaries in the most recent 14 years since 1988.2In addition to China specialists, well-known sociologists, but not otherwise known as hav-

ing expertise on China, include Peter Blau, Craig Calhoun, Randall Collins, Glen Elder,

Barbara Entwisle, Alex Inkeles, John R. Logan, Phyllis Moen, Ivan Szelenyi, Donald

Treiman, and Nancy Tuma. Many more researchers are currently engaged in China-related

research projects.

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CHINESE STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY 93

in occupational classification, and (d) a revolution-antirevolution split in polit-

ical characterization.

Key to the rural-urban divide was a rigid household registration institution,

or hukou, that restricted all Chinese to their place of birth for their lifetime(Cheng & Selden 1994, Solinger 1999). Bound to collective farming, peasants were

completely cut off from many urban privilegescompulsory education, quality

schools, health care, public housing, varieties of foodstuffs, to name only a few

and they largely lived in poverty (Parish 1975, Parish & Whyte 1978, Unger 1984,

Chan et al. 1992). Only a tiny fraction of the rural-born had the chance to move up

to cities or towns through military mobilization, marriage, or attainment of higher

education and subsequent job assignments (Kirkby 1985:114). Organized trans-

fers, or sent-down campaigns, of city-born youths to rural areas between 1958

and 1977 (more so after 1966) caused severe anxieties to the affected households(Bernstein 1977). Such an experience had lasting impact on the life trajectories of

these youths even after they returned to the cities (Zhou & Hou 1999).

The state-collective dualism characterized Chinese economic structure, but in

addition it created a status distinction between privileged state workers and their

deprived collective counterpartsits Western analogy is labor market dualism in

capitalist economies (Hodson & Kaufman 1982). While all peasants were confined

to therural collective sector, a workingurbanite was assigned a state- or a collective-

sector job. State workers, accounting for 78% of the urban labor force by 1978

(SSB 1989:101), were provided with iron rice bowls of lifelong employmentand an impressive array of insurance and welfare benefits, unavailable to collective

workers (Walder 1986:4445). This contrast was devastating because under the

work-unit (or danwei) ownership of labor (Davis 1990), only half the workers

could change jobs in lifetime (Walder 1992:526) or 1%2% per year (Davis 1992a),

and 85% of inter-firm mobility was within economic sectors (Bian 1994:116). Such

a regime of labor-control reinforced state-collective segmentation (Lin & Bian

1991) and gave rise to the unique Chinese phenomena of organized dependence

(Walder 1986), work-unit status (Bian 1994), and danwei society (Butterfield

1982, Lu & Perry 1997).While cadre and worker were crude job categories in the official coding

system, they were considered two status groups as well. State cadre (guojia ganbu)

referred to a minority grouparound 5% of the total workforce or 20% of the urban

labor force-of those individuals who occupied prestigious managerial and profes-

sional jobs. These individuals were provided with above-average compensation

packages (Walder 1995) and were kept in reserve for training and promotion into

leadership positions (about 2%) in party and government offices (Zhou 2001). In

doing so, Maos managers and professionals became fundamentally dependent on

the Communist party-state (Davis 2000a). In contrast, those classified as workers(gong ren) most likely stayed in the group throughout their lifetime; a workers

promotion into a cadre position was very rare (Bian 1994:14041). In the country-

side, salaried government employees were recognized as state cadres, and village

cadres, although unsalaried, were screened by the Communist party and exercised

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political and managerial authority over ordinary peasants (Oi 1989, Chan et al.

1992).

Finally, all individuals and households were politically evaluated into revolu-

tionary (red) or antirevolutionary (black) classes (Unger 1982). Reds werethe forces of Leninist party dictatorship, while blacks were the party-made class

enemies (jie ji di ren) of the regime. But these were not fixed categories. Primar-

ily, the deciding criterion was a persons family class origin before the land reform

of 1948 to 1950; a property-less class origin made a person intrinsically red, and

a property-class origin put a person in one of the few black categories (Whyte &

Parish 1984). In addition, and more important, a persons political performance

(biaoxian) in numerous party-led campaigns and activities could reverse a given

class label, and that person could consequently receive different political treatment

(Walder 1986). Each party-led campaign wave was the new moment of political re-labeling, recharacterization, and regrouping; many had to be reconfirmed for their

redness or blackness through political engagement, but new class enemies

would surely be in the making for the time (Kraus 1981). This political-labeling

culture reached its highest intensity during the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976),

the eve of a new era of depoliticization and development-oriented reforms to

modernize China.

Emerging Social Classes in Rural ChinaPost-Mao reforms started in rural areas by peasants themselves in 1978 (Wang &

Zhou 1994). A household responsibility system, which recognizes a rural house-

hold as the basic unit of production, distribution, and consumption, took property

rights from Peoples Communes back to individual families (Oi 1989, Nee 1991,

Chan et al. 1992). By 1983, collective farming became history (Lu 2001). As

autonomous producers, peasant households had residual income rights over their

crops, as well as the rights to specialize in farming or to free themselves from land

to work locally or elsewhere for higher income from a nonagricultural job (Nee

1989, Unger 1994). Both of these opportunities increased tremendously through

the 1980s and especially after 1992 (Parish et al. 1995). For instance, migrant peas-

ant labor flooded towns and cities (Ma 2001). By 1995, an estimated 80 million

peasant laborers worked and lived in the cities (Lu 2001:20). The once homoge-

neous peasant class (Parish 1975, Chan et al. 1992) differentiated in many ways.

A focused attention has been given to the faith of rural cadres. Nee & Lian

(1994) were the first to argue that cadres, rural and urban, would gradually give

up their political commitments to the Communist party while turning attention

to market opportunities. Their opportunism model was a serious and constructive

effort to formalize a theory about the declining political commitment in reform-

ing state socialism. Fieldwork in Chen Village (Chan et al. 1992), Daqiuzhuang

Village (Lin 1995, Lin & Chen 1999), and Zuoping County (Cook 1998), for in-

stance, indicate that during the reforms rural cadres gained control and income

rights over collective industry, exerted influence for salaried positions for family

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members in village enterprises, capitalized on information and influence networks

with private entrepreneurs, and even started insider privatization to strip off col-

lective assets (Nee & Su 1998). Other studies concentrated on developmental and

distributive issues (Parish 1985, Nee 1989, 1991, Knight & Song 1993, Rozelle1994, Lyons 1997, Oi 2000, Kung & Lee 2001). Synthesizing these and other

published findings, So (2001:6) argues that decentralization split Maos peasant

stratum into a rich peasant class and a poor peasant class and that the rich peasant

class capitalizes on the abundant supply of surplus laborers in the countryside.

Class conflicts arise, observes So, in the form of numerous protests from poor

peasants complaining about high and irregular taxes, state-imposed low prices of

their agricultural products, and encroachment on their land and houses, among

other problems.

For two decades, sociologists inside China have worked as a team to studyemerging rural classes. A thematic statement of the result of this teamwork can be

found in Lu (1989, 2001). Not restricted by any specific theory, Lus view mixes

neo-Marxist concepts of ownership and control, Weberian concept of authority,

and Bourdieus concept of expertise in defining eight emerging rural classes. These

classes and estimated percentages in the registered rural population as of 1999 are

(a) rural cadres are political elites who control, one way or another, collective

economy at all levels, 7%; (b) private entrepreneurs are the new capitalist class,

less than 1%; (c) managers of township and village enterprises are the rising man-

agerial class, 1.5%; (d) household business owners and individual industrialistsand commercialists are the petty bourgeoisie, 6% to 7%; (e) professionals are

the new middle class, 2.5%; (f) employees in collective industry and migrant

peasant-workers in cities are peasant laborers (nong min gong) whose house-

hold registration in home villages makes them floating population, 16% to 18%;

(g) wage labor in local private sector is considered the new working class, 16%

to 17%; and (h) peasants work and live on income from agricultural products,

48% to 50%. Although informative, this classification is sketchy at best; both the

defining criteria and the assessments of the distribution of emerging rural classes

are subject to the ongoing transformations.

Urban Social Classes in the Making

Urban reforms were implemented later than rural reforms and have been closely

guided and adjusted by the state (Wang 1996). First, the influx of peasant ped-

dlers to cities ignited the rise of household businesses (getihu) among otherwise

hopeless urbanites (Gold 1990, Shi 1993, Davis 1999). Then there was a move

to decentralize state industry and the fiscal system, giving financial incentives to

local governments, factory managers, and individual workers (Naughton 1995).

However, the redistribution-oriented polity and macro-economic structure were

coupled with a paternal factory culture, which presented resistance to reform di-

rectives (Walder 1987, 1989b, Shirk 1993). The emergence of labor and capital

markets after 1992 finally put the urban economy under a market allocation of

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resources, although the new policy of grasp the big, release the small created

a state monopoly sector containing strategically vital industries and firms and

sent the rest of state firms to an open sector to compete with nonstate entities

(Lin et al. 1998:2038). Massive layoffs and organized transfers of state-sectorworkers paralleled the flooding of migrant peasants who work in the informal, ex-

panding labor market in the cities (Solinger 1999). Maos protected working class

of state-sector workers became differentiated and de-empowered (Whyte 1999),

while state officials and managers gained executive control and income rights over

state properties and became capitalized (So 2001). Private entrepreneurs rose in the

growing market economy but lacked any political interest or autonomy (Pearson

1997). Intellectual class status remained ambiguous (Zhang 2000).

THE DIFFERENTIATION AND DE-EMPOWERMENT OF THE WORKING CLASS Maosworking class was officially and politically recognized as a leading class (ling

dao jie ji). Post-1978 market reforms eroded this status recognition and differ-

entiated the working class into wage labor in the private sector (12 million as of

1998), unprotected labor in the state sector (70 million), layoff labor wandering

in search for a job (30 million), and deprived migrant peasant-labor (60 million)

(Zhang 2000:30). There were also large numbers of collective-sector labor and

retired labor. The de-empowerment of the working class has drawn public atten-

tion, and stories about it have appeared in local newspapers. One vivid description

is the 3-no world of private-sector wage labor: no definite working hours, nomedical insurance, and no labor contract [wu ri ye, wu yi lao, wu shou xu, (Lu

1989:41819)]. While state properties are becoming productive assets for officials

and managers private gains (Lin & Zhang 1999, Lin 2000), the unprotected state

labor has begun to feel that they are truly proletarians (wu chan zhe). A new urban

poverty stratum is emerging from layoff labor and retired labor (Zhang 2000), and

labor opposition became a sensitive and serious issue in a changing structure of

state and society (Chan 1996).

THE EMBOURGEOISEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL CADRES Nee

& Lians (1994) opportunism model points to an embourgeoisement process in

which Communist cadres give up political commitments in order to catch op-

portunities in a growing marketplace. So (2001) argues that the statist society is

the trademark of Chinas reforms, and only the cadres are in a historically strate-

gic position to develop a capitalist economy. Thus, the first decade of reforms

saw the rise of local state corporatism (Oi 1992), under which local govern-

ments became industrial firms while local officials either make capitalism from

within (Walder 1994) or create network capitalism (Boisot & Child 1996) by

taking advantage of their political and social capitals (Goodman 1996). During

the second decade of reform, assets and profits of state enterprises were massively

diverted into the private hands of cadres through informal privatization, organiza-

tional proliferation, consortium building, and one manager, two businesses (Nee

1992, Nee & Su 1998, Ding 2000a,b, Duckett 2001). The most recent move is a

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state-imposed property rights reform, letting administrative and managerial cadres

be the shareholders of the transformed state enterprises (Zhang 2000).

THE PATRONIZATION OF CAPITALIST ENTREPRENEURS This theme is implied inthe image of a statist society with a bourgeois cadre class (So 2001). Patron-

client ties with state officials were the hallmark of private entrepreneurs in Xiamen

(Wank 1999) and elsewhere (Li 1995). Nationally, registered private entrepreneurs

reached more than 2 million in 1997 and hired 12 million workers (SSB 1998:49).

These business elites are understandably weak politically, having no interest,

no autonomy, and no class capacity to work for the cause of a democratic state

and politics (Pearson 1997). Despite the conflict between Communist ideology

and capitalist ownership, Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin announced in his

First of July of 2001 speech a call to recruit party members from all social strataincluding private entrepreneurs. Patronization may quickly change to a model of

political incorporation.

THE AMBIGUOUS CLASS STATUS OF INTELLECTUALS Intellectualsprofessionals,

cultural elites, and technocratshave always had an ambiguous class status

throughout post-revolution history (Kraus 1981). Intellectuals lost their slight au-

tonomy in the early 1950s when they were totally organized to work and live within

the confines of the party-state (Davis 2000a). Politically, intellectuals were Maos

stinky old ninths (chou lao jiu), ranking last among all nine black categories.They were flattered and cheerful in 1979 when given a working class status by

Deng Xiaoping, for that status meant that intellectuals finally had become a rev-

olutionary class in the reform era (Huang 1993). But this did not matter much;

while intellectuals educational credentials keep them in a professional elite of

high prestige, they still have to pass political screening to gain material incentives

and especially political authority (Walder 1995). Huang (1993) sees Chinese intel-

lectuals divided between in-institution and out-institution groups, depending

on whether they work primarily within the state sector or outside it. This insti-

tutional boundary implies no anticipation that out-institution intellectuals areautonomous humanists (zi you wen hua ren) who might otherwise work in an

independent sphere of civil society.

THE MIDDLE CLASSES State factory workers, because of their lifelong employ-

ment and a high level of benefits, were seen to be Maos quasi middle class

(Li 2001), and this once politically and economically protected group has become

differentiated in the reform era (Whyte 1999). Maos middle classesmanagers

and professionalswere incorporated into the Communist order from the early

1950s onward (Davis 2000a), but in the reform era these two groups, along with

private entrepreneurs, appear to have become the central players in the rising mar-

ket economies in rural and urban China (Qin 1999:2948). But Chinas middle

classes today do not yet share a commonly recognized image of their counterparts

in an advanced capitalist societya stable lifestyle, mainstream values, and active

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political participation (Wright 1997:2326). Instead, Chinas middle classes live

on unstable sources of income (Qin 1999:65), have not yet developed a middle-

class identity or value system (So 2001), and lack political motivations to fight for

the birth of a civil society (Pearson 1997).

Looking Ahead

Insufficient research attention has been given to emerging social classes in ru-

ral and urban China, and existing analyses are hampered by the still evolving

nature of social and economic structures in which social classes are in the mak-

ing. Thus, insightful analysis and reliable assessments are to be called for from

future researchers. An important starting step is to get a clear picture about the

complex and, oftentimes, ambiguous property rights structures. While informa-

tion about property structures is essential for any class analysis (Wright 1997),

getting it is not easy. Walder & Oi (1999) have suggested a local approach and

have sketched a road map about the kinds of work needed. The next step is perhaps

to research labor-management-capital relations in the production system. One ex-

ample is Lees (1995, 1998, 2000) expanded case studies on gender and women

in south China, a work that extends from Burawoys (1985) analytic framework of

socialist working class in Russia and Eastern Europe. These initial steps of original

research should lead to theoretical syntheses about how class differentiation results

in class conflict, class movements, or class politics in a new era. Such efforts have

already begun (Chan 1995, So 2001).

SOCIOECONOMIC INEQUALITIES

Overall Trend

Maos egalitarianism reduced socioeconomic inequalities (Parish 1981, 1984),

making China one of the most equalized among developing countries of the time

(Whyte & Parish 1984:44). Existing variations in income and income-in-kind wereredistributive in nature: They were explained by rural/urban identity, work unit sec-

tor and rank, job category and scale, political power, and age and senioritya set

of variables that measure the main dimensions of a socialist status hierarchy. The

introduction of market mechanisms inside work units and the rise of product, labor,

and capital markets outside work units both redefined these dimensions and created

new sources of inequality in post-Mao period. The system of socioeconomic strat-

ification remains mixedcontinuation and change are the parallel stories about an

emerging new order. This can be seen in several areas of research: occupational

prestige, income distribution, housing and consumption, and gender inequality.

Occupational Prestige

The term occupational prestige was totally ignored in Maoist class theory in which

all occupations were said to be of equal status under state socialism (Kraus 1981).

This was of course not true Data from Shanghai showed that despite a strong

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ideological influence, high school seniors held strong preferences for nonmanual

jobs over manual jobs (Lan & Chang 1982). Working adults, whether in Chinas

capital, Beijing (Lin & Xie 1988), or an industrial city like Tianjin (Bian 1996),

had no problem rating job titles into a prestige scale, even when income variationamong occupations was small. When income variation grew substantially in the

1990s, a quasi-national sample showed similar scaling results (Zhe & Chen 1995).

Overall, variations in constructed prestige scales were attributable more to vari-

ation in education than in income, a pattern that was also observed in the more

industrialized, more globalized, capitalist Taiwan (Tsai & Chiu 1991).

Constructed prestige scales from these studies provided helpful measurement

tools for examining Chinese occupational hierarchies, making it possible for com-

parative analysis with the United States (Blau & Ruan 1990) and elsewhere.

Chinese prestige scales are comparable to those from the United States and toan international scale (Treiman 1977), seemingly confirming theories of modern-

ization and societal convergence (Treiman 1970, Treiman & Yip 1989). These

interpretations, however, may have overlooked an important Chinese characteris-

tic: state allocation of resources led to the identification of work units, rather than

occupations, as the primary measure of social status (Lin & Bian 1991). Because

prestige scales are stable cross-nationally and over time, they are insensitive to the

political dimensions of social mobility peculiar to Communism (Walder 1985) and

to changes brought about by shifting state polices (Whyte & Parish 1984, Zhou et al.

1996, 1997). In current research, both prestige scales and occupational categoriesare utilized in empirical studies of Chinese social stratification and social mobility.

Income Distribution

From 1978 to 2000, the Chinese economy grew from one of the poorest to the

seventh largest in the world (World Bank, cited from New China Monthly 2001

[4]:141), per capita GDP grew by 5.2 times, and per-capita income had a net

increase of 4.7 times for rural residents and 3.6 times for urbanites (SSB 2000:56,

312). Much of this growth was generated in coastal areas, where a reoriented

central policy to prioritize developments there retained local savings and attracted

inflows of domestic and foreign investments. This resulted in increasing income

gaps between coastal and inland regions (Wang & Hu 1999). New riches grew

in coastal regions, but poverties persisted in inland areas (Lyons 1997). Overall,

income inequality grew considerably (Hauser & Xie 2001).

Scholarly research has been guided by an interest in changing mechanisms of

income distribution. This interest is intrinsically sociological, carrying Djilass

(1957) and Szelenyis (1978) questions about the social structure of power and

inequality in state socialism to a changing system of social stratification under

reforms. Nee (1989, 1991, 1992, 1996) has made a bold statement about the direc-

tion of change, and his theory of market transition has spurred a lively and fruitful

debate about the social consequences of economic transformation. More elaborate

reviews of this debate are available in this journal (Nee & Matthews 1996) and

elsewhere (Szelenyi & Kostello 1996 Nee & Cao 1999) The main theoretical

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differences lie in how to conceptualize the nature and characters of economic

transformation. Is the transformation to be found in the shift of resource allocation

from state redistribution to market domination that leads to the decline of political

power and the rise of human capital and entrepreneurial abilities (Nee 1989)? Oris it a result of dual transformation of economic and political institutions in which

both human capital and political power are rewarded (Bian & Logan 1996, Parish

& Michelson 1996, Zhou 2000)? Or is it ultimately a process of property rights

rearrangements that will have clear implications on income distribution (Walder

1994, 1996, Walder & Oi 1999)?

Accumulated research findings show that income returns for human capital and

entrepreneurship increase in rural and urban settings (see reviews by Nee & Cao

1999, Cao & Nee 2000), although these increases are small as compared to those

in advanced capitalist societies (Parish & Michelson 1996). Zhou (2000) notes aninterpretable difficulty of determining whether or not increasing returns to human

capital are uniformly attributable to market forces. In his view, both markets and

bureaucracies reward human capital and, empirically, the Chinese government has

in actuality made a continuous effort to raise pay for state officials and professionals

during market reforms.

More serious controversial results are about returns to political power (Cao &

Nee 2000). The concept, however defined, is operationalized in one or all of the

following three ways: (a) party membership, (b) cadre position, past and present,

and (c) jobs with redistributive power. Limited by feasibility designs and sam-ple sizes, researchers have not been able to partition cadre position into party

officials, government bureaucrats, and state enterprise managers; this makes it dif-

ficult to test hypotheses about whether redistributors gain or lose, relative to

direct producers or entrepreneurs and professionals, with market reforms. Be-

cause old-fashioned redistributors are increasingly irrelevant with time, such a test

is becoming practically unimportant. On the whole, income returns for rural and

urban cadres decline in the initial years of reform (Nee 1989, Walder 1990). How-

ever, in regions of local state corporatism (Oi 1992) rural cadres reap income

from profitable township and village industry (Peng 1992, Lin 1995, Cook 1998,Lin & Chen 1999), while in the urban sector from the mid-1980s, cadres and party

members continue to gain rather than lose (Walder 1992, Bian & Logan 1996,

Zhou 2000). This persistent effect of power, along with increasing returns to edu-

cation, is also the case among Chinese elderly (Raymo & Xie 2000). These results

are largely reconfirmed with analyses of two national sampling surveysChinese

Household Income Project in 1988 and 1995 (Griffin & Zhao 1992, Khan et al.

1992, Zhao 1993, Khan & Riskin 1998, Parish & Michelson 1996, Xie & Hannum

1996, Tang & Parish 2000, Hauser & Xie 2001).

Housing and Consumption

Rural housing and consumption have not been given much scholarly attention.

Urban housing, however, has been both a serious problem and a focal point of

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observation about socialist inequalities (Szelenyi 1983). Although basic low-

rent housing (1% to 2% of household income) was available to virtually all ur-

banites under Mao, public housing, which dominated the urban housing market

long before housing commodification of the mid-1990s, was constructed, owned,or allocated by work units (Whyte & Parish 1984:7779, Logan & Bian 1993,

Bian et al. 1997). People working in rich work units could easily get a comfort-

ably spacious apartment, while those in poor work units remained in near-slum

conditions (Lee 1988). Work units ability to provide housing varied between state

and collective sectors and with bureaucratic rank (Walder 1986, 1992, Bian 1994).

While work unit housing was allocated to satisfy needs (large or multigeneration

families were allocated first and got more total living space), spacious and quality

units were a work units resources and served as incentives to reward political

and managerial authority, seniority, professional expertise, and social connections(Logan et al. 1999, Tang & Parish 2000:89, Zhou & Suhomlinova 2001). In ad-

dition, cadres, professionals, and employees from high-ranking work units tended

to live in neighborhoods with proximity to leading public schools, piped gas fuel,

street parks, and other community resources (Logan & Bian 1993, Logan 2001).

This redistributive system had many unanticipated consequences, concisely

described in Tang & Parish (2000:37), and since 1988 these ignited several waves of

reforms to raise rents, to detach housing from work units, and finally to commodify

and privatize housing (Bian et al. 1997, Davis 2000c). While central and local

governments continue to be the main investor and constructor, a decisive StateCouncils Housing Reform Directive in 1998 required all new housing units to be

sold and purchased at market prices, terminating a 50-year system in which housing

was allocated basically as collective welfare (Jiang 2000). The newly rich have no

problem buying a home. As of 2000, a home of 100 square meters in an apartment

building in Beijing or Shanghai can cost 600,000 to 800,000 RMB easily, or 30

to 40 years of average income. There has been a trend to build luxurious homes

in a globalized Shanghai, as can be observed in real estate advertisements (Fraser

2000). Homes in city outskirts, smaller cities, and less developed inland cities are

considerably less expensive (Logan 2001).Buyers with no cash ability can take mortgage loans from a designated state

bank to pay for a new home, but a prerequisite is that their work units or private

employers have deposited a proportion of employee income as housing reserve

funds in the bank on behalf of their employees. While government offices and

nonprofit organizations (containing 10% of state jobs) can secure such funds in

state budgetary allocations, state-owned firms (90% of state jobs) must do so on

their own and many, ironically, cannotthey are struggling to survive and keep a

payroll operating in an economy in which state-owned enterprises are increasingly

likely to lose any competitive edge to private ventures and foreign corporations(Solinger 1999). A great many private firms and virtually all household businesses

probably do not invest such funds, either because they are unwilling to do so or

because their employees live in a two-system familyone spouse works in a

private sector job for high income and the other keeps his/her state job to secure

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housing and medical benefits (Davis 1999). Predictably large numbers of families

may still live in oldhousing units built before the1988 housingreform and are under

the old redistributive system, although such an estimate is not readily available.

Research interest in urban consumption before reforms largely lay in economicegalitarianism (Parish 1981, 1984), workers dependence on distribution of con-

sumer goods and services by bureaucratic fiat (Walder 1986), and variation by

work-unit hierarchy and political power (Bian 1994:Chap. 8). More recent scholar-

ship is oriented to how reforms eroded these redistributive patterns (Tang &

Parish 2000). Yet there are new interest and observations about the ongoing con-

sumer revolution (Davis 2000b). Daviss volume documents a decade of rising

consumerism and material culture (Table 1.1), which gave urban households great

autonomy in choosing how adults and children want to live in a consumer society.

Albeit preferences are diverse, inequalities remain primarily because of incomeand social class (Yan 2000). Political power is coupled with entrepreneurs money

in the pursuit of a luxurious leisure life, such as going bowling in nightclubs in

Shenzhen (Wang 2000).

Gender Inequality

Research on gender inequality has proliferated since 1980, but results remain

mixed and inconclusive (Entwisle & Henderson 2000). Recognizing significant

improvements in rural and urban womens employment and income in Maosera (Whyte 1984) and especially womens gains in basic education (Hannum &

Xie 1994), researchers also find such progress fell short of a promised revolu-

tion for gender equalization due to the states limited capacities, shifting gov-

ernment policies, and a persistent patriarchal culture (Croll 1978, 1983, Stacey

1983, Wolf 1985). When evaluating the impact of post-1978 reforms on gender

inequality, their observations led to different conclusions about the direction of

change.

One observation is that the growth of market economies created off-farm em-

ployment opportunities for rural women, narrowed the gender gap in household

income contribution, and enhanced womens status relative to mens (Entwisle

et al. 1995, Matthews & Nee 2000, Michelson & Parish 2000). Another observa-

tion, mostly from the cities, is that as the market developed, it eroded the power of

the state both as employer and advocate of womens rights, leading to labor market

discrimination against female workers in hiring and layoffs, job placement, and

wage determination in both state and nonstate sectors, thus lowering the economic

status of women relative to men (Honig & Hershatter 1988). Rising factory despo-

tism in the private sector is worsening the working conditions for south China

women, who are kept in heavy labor activities with long hours (Lee 1995). Simi-

lar depressing stories from rural China are that men are leading the expansion of

family businesses while women are left behind to specialize in agricultural jobs

(Entwisle et al. 1995). Yet a third observation is that in urban China gender gaps

in earnings and other work statuses have remained stable from the 1950s to the

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1990s (Bian et al. 2000). Intercity variation in labor market gender inequalities is

largely uncorrelated with measures of marketization (Shu & Bian 2001).

Inconsistent research findings may be explained at least on two levels, as pro-

posed by Whyte (2000). Substantively, they reflect the complexities of political,social, and historical processes that show that conflicting and contradictory forces

can be in effect at the same time, producing such observable inconsistent patterns.

Methodologically, inconsistent findings reflect diverse research designs, data col-

lection methods, and measurements and indicators used from early studies to the

most recent. Lacking reliable data is probably the most serious problem, for data

are too often cross-sectional and gathered in one or two localities, thus preventing

any reliable assessments at the national level. Whytes suggestion is constructive:

Serious scholarly work that assesses the impact of reforms on gender inequal-

ity must carefully identify a realm of research, must utilize a well-defined set ofindicators and measures, and must rely on comparable and systematic data.

Aside from objective analyses is an approach to exploring the subjective

world of womenwhat do women think about their gender roles and their relative

status to men in the workplace and at home? Revisiting Maos female labor models

and Iron Girls, Hershatter (2000) and Honig (2000) found their stories far more

complicated than a party-state described line that women broke gender boundaries

in work; in fact traditional gender roles were accepted by many of these women.

Other interview data indicate that traditional gender roles might be rising in the

reform era; some women fantasize about fleeing work and seeing womens place asbeing primarily in the family (Parish & Busse 2000:212, Lee 1998:3435). Married

couples in Beijing feel that both household work and paid work contribute to a

collectivized family, and exchange between these two spheres is a fair trade even

if one spouse has to specialize in one of the spheres (Zuo & Bian 2001).

Looking Ahead

Occupational prestige is not sensitive to institutional change but remains a scholarly

tool for research of comparative social stratification of industrial societies. In light

of growing prosperity and rising consumerism in China, housing and consumption

are increasingly important aspects of socioeconomic inequality. However, reliable

and systematic information is unavailable about either housing or consumption.

The research field of gender inequality is muddy, as diagnosed by Whyte(2000). All

these research areashousing, consumption, and gender inequalityalso demand

theoretical perspectives and analytic frameworks to guide future studies.

Research on changing mechanisms of income distribution has been a rigorous

and fruitful program, making Chinese social stratification the subject of one of

the leading and lively debates in top sociological forums in the United States and

elsewhere. This program has been hampered badly, however. The key dependent

variable, income, is vulnerable to seriousprobably systematicmeasurement

errors, for conflicting institutional rules in a transitional economy make rural and

urban wage earners deliberately, and rationally, hide many sources of income that

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104 BIAN

are regularly not included in employee paychecks (pay slips), not to mention that

the newly rich conceivably want to lie about their unbelievable high income from

gray and black sources (Lin 2000) in any questionnaire survey. Income-in-

kind is still relevant, but even the three main items of income-in-kindmedicalinsurance, pension, and labor insurancehave not been given sufficient research

yet. Equally problematic are the theoretical construct of redistributor, its operating

concept of cadre, and the measurement instruments of self-identified or researcher-

imposed categories of office authority, job duties, or political affiliation. These

research tools are problematic because the fast-changing economy makes socialist

redistributors increasingly irrelevant. One interesting line of analysis is about the

changing decision-making structure in firms in which local party apparatuses are

increasingly less likely to play a decisive role (Opper et al. 2001). On the individual

level, insightful studies should pay attention to the changing sources of power ofpolitical, economic, and professional elites as well as of nonelite social groups.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

Overall Trend

It was rare to change an individuals social position in Maos status hierarchy

because of the rigid institutional wallsthe rural-urban divide, work unit boundary,

cadre-worker dichotomy, and political classification. Post-1978 market reformsand the rise of labor markets eroded these institutional divides, making social

mobility a living experience for almost everyone. Millions of peasants now work

(in an informal sector) and live in towns and cities (Keister & Nee 2000), while

many of them had returned home to work in the cause of rural industrialization

(Ma 2001). Urbanites also searched for opportunities of economic prosperity by

migrating to developmental zones in coastal areas (Solinger 1999). Inter-firm and

inter-sector mobility, which was extremely difficult before reforms (Walder 1986,

Davis 1990), is now very common; job change is either voluntary with the purpose

of career advancement or coercive because of massive layoffs or organizedtransfersby state-owned enterprises (Solinger 2000). While these evolving trends call for

rigorous research, serious scholarly works have been published in three well-

defined areas of social mobility research: status attainment, career mobility, and

social networks in occupational processes.

Status Attainment

Standard status attainment models attribute a persons attained status in society

to two theoretically distinctive causes: inheritance and achievement. In capitalistsocieties, attained status is operationalized by the occupation of a wage job, status

inheritance is examined with reference to the effects of parental education and

occupation, and personal achievement is usually measured by education. When

these models are applied to China, three significant modifications are made, and

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all bring attention to the characters of the political economy of Communism. First,

legacies of the 1949 Communist revolution defined status inheritance in a politi-

cal perspective, making family class origin an important dimension of inheritance

in addition to parental education and occupation (Parish 1981, 1984, Whyte &Parish 1984). Second, in a social structure of principled particularism (Walder

1986), personal achievement is politically evaluated by party authority; member-

ship in and loyalty to the Party are qualitatively different credentials than education

(Walder 1985, 1995). Third, in a centrally planned economy, state redistributive

resources are differentially allocated through a hierarchy of state and collective

organizations (Walder 1992), thus workplace identification becomes a more pri-

mary criterion of social status than the occupation of wage work (Lin & Bian 1991,

Bian 1994).

Estimating these status attainment models requires census or survey data thatare extremely difficult to obtain in China even today. Earlier efforts by Parish

(1981, 1984) and Whyte & Parish (1984) were based on a sample of neighboring

households (581 families and 2865 members), established through interviewing

133 Chinese emigrants in Hong Kong. This sample found strong status inheri-

tance in educational attainment; children achieved higher education when their

fathers had higher education or high-income jobs. Family class origin was found

to significantly affect occupational attainment; one obtained a high-income job

when his/her father was a capitalist, merchant, or staff, rather than a worker or

peasant before the 1949 revolution. Finally, ones education led to a high-incomejob, but being a female was a disadvantage in both educational and occupational

attainments. All of these effects, however, became nil for the cohort of the Cultural

Revolution (1966 to 1976), a pattern that resulted from Maos policies of destratifi-

cation of the decade (Parish 1984). Davis (1992a), based on occupational histories

of over 1,000 individuals from 200 families in Shanghai and Wuhan, found that

as of the late 1980s the Cultural Revolution policies had reduced middle-class

reproduction, and more generally the bureaucratic allocation of labor and rewards

favored older birth cohorts or first comers (Davis-Friedmann 1985), into the

post-1949 Communist era.Large-scale, representative sampling surveys began to be conducted by United

Statesbased sociologists in Chinese cities from 1985 onward, and they have en-

riched our understanding about Chinese status attainment processes. A 1986 survey

of Tianjin showed that a decade after the Cultural Revolution neither fathers edu-

cation nor fathers occupation affected childs job status and that occupational

attainment was a result of ones own education, which seemingly implies an

opportunity structure in which status inheritance was eliminated (Blau & Ruan

1990). When work-unit sector was used instead as an indicator of attained status

in a 1985 survey of the same city, Lin & Bian (1991) found a strong father-sonlink in work-unit sector and a strong sector-to-occupation link within the gen-

eration. This brought attention to the institution of state job assignments, exam-

ined in detail with a 1988 Tianjin survey by Bian (1994): Upon graduation from

school, youths were assigned employment by state labor bureaus to hierarchically

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106 BIAN

organized workplaces, where specific jobs were finally assigned. All of these three

Tianjin surveys showed that education and membership in the Communist party

increased a persons chance of getting assigned to a state sector job and that women

were more likely to be allocated to collective-sector jobs with less pay and lesswelfare benefits than their male counterparts.

A multicity sample by Zhou et al. (1996, 1997) broadened research scope

beyond the city of Tianjin. Their event history analyses show that a distrusted

family class origin significantly lowered ones chance of getting a state-sector

job in all periods through 1993. A superior education increased ones chance of

working in public or government organizations, where desirable jobs were located,

in all periods, but a college education was becoming important for ones attainment

of a party membership in the first decade of post-1978 reforms. A clear pattern

showed by Zhou et al. is that stratification dynamics were greatly altered by shiftingstate policies at all times. This reconfirms what Daviss (1992a, 1992b) life history

analysis had earlier shown about the centrality of shifting state policies to patterns

of intergenerational as well as career mobility.

Career Mobility

Survey findings that education and party membership both affect status attainments

have been carefully attended in a growing research program about paths of mobil-

ity into administrative and professional careers (Walder 1995). Much theoreticaltension originates from earlier studies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

about the relationship between political loyalty and educational credential; rising

educational credentialism alters the political character of a Communist regime

and was seen as a cause for intellectuals on the road to class power (Konrad

& Szelenyi 1979). Market reforms in China were seen by some as the hope for

change from virtuocracy to meritocracy (Shirk 1984, Lee 1991).

Arguing that Communist party membership and education are qualitatively

different credentials, Walder (1995) advanced a dual path model and examined

it with two sampling surveys. The 1986 Tianjin survey shows that individuals

with superior education move into a professional elite of high social prestige,

while individuals with both educational credential and party membership enter an

administrative elite with social prestige, authority, and material privileges (Walder

1995). The 1996 national survey of China provides more forceful results from an

event history analysis: professional and administrative careers have always been

separated from Maos era onward, party membership has never been a criterion for

the attainment of professional positions, and a college education did not become a

criterion for administrative position until the post-Mao period (Walder et al. 2000).

Party organization preferentially sponsors young members for adult education and

eventually promotes them into leadership positions (Li & Walder 2001).

Other studies along this line of inquiry point to both stability and change in

Chinas politicized social mobility regime. Zang (2001) used scattered sources

to compile a unique profile of 757 (in 1988) and 906 (in 1994) central and

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local government officials. His models show that in both years college education

promotes a cadre to climb ladders in both party and state apparatuses, whereas

ones seniority in the party pushes the person into the party hierarchy rather

than to state bureaucracy. Bian et al. (2001) argue that membership loyalty is anorganizational imperative and survival strategy of any Communist party and show

that in Tianjin and Shanghai political screening persisted from 1949 to 1993 in the

attainment of Party membership and in the promotion into positions of political

and managerial authority. Zhou (2001) argues that the political dynamics induced

by shifting state policies cause bureaucratic career patterns to vary over time, and

his 1994 multicity survey shows that Maos and post-Maos cohorts of Chinese

bureaucrats have distinctive characteristics. Caos (2001) comparative analysis of

Shanghai and Guangzhou shows a pattern of change within the state sector: While

in less marketized Shanghai human capitals effects on career mobility are con-stant between profit-oriented firms and nonprofit organizations, increased market

competition in Guangzhou leads to a finding that human capital is a stronger deter-

minant of the success of career mobility in profit-oriented firms than in nonprofit

organizations.

Social Networks in Occupational Processes

Status attainment models and career mobility models attribute persons opportu-

nities for upward mobility to their positional power and qualifications. A networkperspective differs; it considers mobility opportunities as a function of informa-

tion and influence that are embedded in and mobilized from ones social networks

(Granovetter 1973, Lin 1982). This network perspective fits well a relational Chi-

nese culture ofguanxi, or interpersonal connections of sentiments and obligations

that dictate social interaction and facilitate favor exchanges in Chinese society, past

and present (Liang [1949] 1986, Fei [1949] 1992, King 1985). In post-revolution

China, guanxi became more instrumentally oriented in order for someone to secure

opportunities under party clientelism in the workplace (Walder 1986) or to break

free of bureaucratic boundaries to obtain state redistributive resources (Gold 1985,

Yang 1994), such as jobs. Indeed, guanxi networks were found to promote job

and career opportunities for guanxi users, while constraining those who are poorly

positioned in the networks of social relationships (Bian 1997).

Guanxi networks have been found to facilitate all three aspects of occupational

process: entry into the labor force, inter-firm mobility, and reemployment after

being laid off. On entry into the labor force, data from two Tianjin surveys show

that use of guanxi networks increased from 40% in the 1960s and 1970s to 55%

in the 1980s (Bian 1994:102), and to 75% in the 1990s when labor markets finally

emerged (Bian & Zhang 2001). On inter-firm mobility, the same Tianjin surveys

show a similar but sharper trend: Only half the workers had changed jobs prior to

1988, and half of them used guanxi networks to do so; by 1999 around 80% of

current employees had changed jobs, and only a slight fraction did not use guanxi

networks (Bian & Zhang 2001). Another Tianjin study shows that laid-off workers

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108 BIAN

in textile factories changed jobs through inter-industry ties to get reemployed in

a nontextile entity (Johnson 2001). Laid-off workers in Wuhan were reemployed

more quickly and matched to jobs with higher income when they had broader and

more resourceful networks (Zhao 2001:68).All of these studies show that guanxi contacts are predominantly relatives and

friends of high intimacy to guanxi users, but when they are acquaintances or distant

friends, connections are made through intermediaries to whom both guanxi users

and contacts are strongly tied (Bian 1997). This is in sharp contrast to western

countries, where weak ties of infrequent interaction and low intimacy are more

frequently used than stronger ties (see reviews by Granovetter 1995, Lin 1999).

This cross-national difference is due, argues Bian (1997), to different resources

being mobilized through networks: Weak ties in western countries are used to

learn information about job openings, whereas strong ties in China are meant tosecure influence from authorities that was more difficult to obtain. In a rising labor

market, guanxi ties of varying strengths may be aimed at both information and

influence, and ties that provide both influence and information, rather than either,

may allow someone to complete a successful search, a hypothesis that waits for

empirical testing.

Looking Ahead

The three lines of scholarly workstatus attainment, career mobility, and rolesof social networks in occupational processesare all guided by theoretical agen-

das in comparative social mobility, promoting our understanding about the social

and political characters of a durable Communist regime. Understandably, research

findings are constructed or patterned to a scholarly flavor in order to test hypothe-

ses derived from existing theories. China is an evolving world where tremendous

transformations surface in many directions. Massive migration from rural to urban

areas and between economic sectors opens opportunities of mobility in an econ-

omy of growing inter-region variation. Large layoffs and organized transfers of

state-sector workers are a social experiment of institutional change and industrialrestructuring, providing unique data about downward and upward mobility. Be-

cause paths to economic prosperity or to socially determined poverty in a society

of growing differentiation and uncertainty are not always in a predictable pattern,

more research, requiring a grounded approach and creative minds, is called for.

CONCLUSION

Chinese social stratification and social mobility will remain one of the most in-

teresting areas of sociological research in the decades ahead. China presents an

unusual research field of sociological experiments for many questions about class

stratification, socioeconomic inequalities, and social mobility. A great amount of

original research has promoted our understanding about status groups before post-

1978 reforms, but significantly less attention has been paid to emerging social

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classes in rural and urban China today. This is partly because property rights ar-

rangements in the production system, which are key to any rigorous assessment

about class stratification, are highly complicated and ambiguous, partly because

social classes are in the making and do not yet show clear class boundaries. Theo-retically exciting research has instead been conducted about human and political

mechanisms of income distribution, housing acquisition, and gender inequality in

the reform era. There is equally impressive research output about status attainment,

career mobility into elite groups, and social network approaches to occupational

processes. Despite these achievements, Chinas evolving political and economic

institutions conceivably create uncertainties and unpredictable patterns, calling for

grounded research from which to generate new theoretical perspectives that will

help us understand and explain agents, sources, and mechanisms of change in the

system of social stratification and social mobility.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Preparation of this chapter was supported by two grants from Hong Kongs Re-

search Grants Committee (HKUST6052/98H, HKUST6007/00H) and a Postdoc-

toral Matching Grant from the Vice-President for Academic Affairs, Hong Kong

University of Science and Technology (20002002). I am grateful to the many

authors for making available their work for this review essay, to Zhanxin Zhang

for his able research assistance, and to Karen Cook, Deborah Davis, Joe Galas-

kiewicz, Victor Nee, Xueguang Zhou, and Jiping Zuo for their valuable suggestions

and comments while I developed ideas and early drafts for this chapter.

The Annual Review of Sociology is online at http://soc.annualreviews.org

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