chisholm, roderick m. (1990)—"symposia papers_the status of epistemic principles"

8/13/2019 Chisholm, Roderick M. (1990)"Symposia Papers_The Status of Epistemic Principles"

1/8

Symposia Papers: The Status of Epistemic PrinciplesAuthor(s): Roderick M. ChisholmSource: Nos, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1990 A.P.A. Central Division Meeting (Apr., 1990), pp. 209-215Published by: Blackwell PublishingStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215523.

Accessed: 19/10/2011 12:33

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Blackwell Publishingis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toNos.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=blackhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2215523?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2215523?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black


2/8

The Status of EpistemicPrinciplesRoderick M. Chisholm

BROWNUNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTIONSince the terms epistemology and theory of knowledge arenow used in many different ways and refer to many different in-quiries, I will first say just what that inquiry is that I callepistemology and theory of knowledge. It is that traditionalSocratic and therefore internalist inquiry that is suggested bythe three following questions: (1) What can I know? ; (2) Howcan I distinguish things I am justified in believing from things Iam not justified in believing? ; and (3) What can I do to replaceunjustified beliefs by justified beliefs about the same subject-matter,and to replace beliefs that are less justified by beliefs that are morejustified?The epistemic principles with which this paper is concerned arethe principles to which one is led if one is successful in answeringthe three Socratic questions. I shall discuss what I take to be threeexamples of true epistemic principles. They are what I shall call(1) the self-presentation principle, (2) the principle of percep-tual taking and (3) the applied concurrence principle. The prin-ciples are these:

Pi If (i) the property of being-F is such that every property itconceptually entails includes the property of thinking, if (ii)a person S has the property of being-F and if (iii) S believeshimself to be F, then it is certain for S that he is F.P2 If (i) a person S thinks he perceives that there is an F, if(ii) it is epistemically in the clear for S that there is somethingthat he perceives to be F, then it is beyond reasonable doubtfor S that he is perceiving an F.

NOUS 24 (1990) 209-216? 1990 by Nouis Publications209


3/8

210 NOUSP3 If (i) there is a set of concurrent propositions such that allof the propositions are epistemically in the clear for a personS and if (ii) one of them is beyond reasonable doubt for S,

then all of them are beyond reasonable doubt for S.I choose these particular principles because each of them has logicalfeatures not shared by the other two. The first two principles arenormative upervenience rinciples; and the third presupposes the ap-plication of normative supervenience principles.Consider the following principle of ethics. It tells us that thereis a duty that supervenesupon certain natural properties.

If an act is such that (i) performing it would result in more pleasureand in less pain than would any other act that a person S couldperform and (ii) if the act is one of those that S is able to perform,then S ought to perform it.

Our present concern is not with the truth of this normative princi-ple but with its general features. For simplicity, however, I willassume that the principle is true.We will distinguish normative tates and their substrates.The con-

sequent of the principle just cited describes a normative state andthe antecedent describes the non-normative substrate of that state.In saying that the normative state supervenesupon its substrate, wemean, in part, that the principle is necessarily rue: in every possibleworld, anyone who statisfies the non-normative substrate that isdescribed in the antecedent is in the normative state that is describ-ed in the consequent. (The necessity, therefore, is not causal orphysical.) A further feature of such principles of supervenience issometimes put by saying that they are synthetic a priori. Theexpression synthetic is suggested by the fact that the principlescannot be said to be true in virtue of their form. And since theprinciples are necessary, it is concluded that if we can know themto be true, then such knowledge is a priori.

THE SELF-PRESENTATION PRINCIPLEThe first of our three epistemic principles - the self-presentationprinciple - is Cartesian, telling us, in effect, that our consciousstates, or our thoughts (in Descartes' sense of the word ''thought ),are immediately evident to us. In formulating the principle, I willintroduce the concept of conceptual ntailment,a concept that is usefulin explicating the psychological concepts that epistemic principlesinvolve.

D1 P conceptually entails Q = Df P is necessarily such thatwhoever conceives it conceives Q and whateverhas it has Q.


4/8

EPISTEMIC PRINCIPLES 211The relation of conceptual entailment, as here defined, is a relationbetween properties.

Pi If (i) the property of being-F is such that every property itconceptually entails includes the property of thinking, if (ii)a person S has the property of being-F and if (iii) S believeshimself to be F, then it is certain for S that he is F.(A property P may be said to include a property Q provided thatP is necessarily such that whatever has it has Q.)The properties that would satisfy the expression being-F inany instance of this principle are those properties that have beencalled self-presenting - properties which are such that, if youhave them, and if you believe that you have them, then it is certainfor you that you have them. Examples are: feeling; hoping; liking;disliking; being appeared to; and (to use a more specific example)thinking that one sees a cat.The normative character of P1 may not be immediately apparent,for it is concealed by the use of the epistemic expression certainin the consequent. But this epistemic expression, like the others tobe used here, may be explicated in terms of epistemic referability ForS, A is to be preferred epistemically to B ). To say that a proposi-tion h is certainfor a subject S is to say this: for S, (i) acceptingh is to be preferred epistemically to withholding h and (ii) thereis no i such that accepting i is to be preferred epistemically to ac-cepting h.Let us introduce another convenient abbreviation. We will saythat the state which is evaluated or prescribed by the consequentof a normative principle is the objectiveof the substrate of that prin-ciple. Ordinarily the substrate and the objective of a normative stateare logically independent of each other. But those substrates thatare self-presenting (for example, my thinking that I see a cat) areidentical with their objectives.

THE PRINCIPLE OF PERCEPTUAL TAKINGOur second epistemic principle is one telling us that perceptual tak-ing, or thinking that one perceives, provides a kind of justifica-tion for what it is that one thus thinks.

P2 If (i) a person S thinks he perceives that there is an F, if(ii) it is epistemically in the clear for S that there is somethingthat he perceives to be F, then it is beyond reasonable doubtfor S that he is perceiving an F.

A proposition may be said to be espistemically in the clear >, pro-vided that withholding it is not to be preferred epistemically to ac-


5/8

212 NOUScepting it; and a proposition may be said to be beyond reasonabledoubt provided that accepting it is to be preferred to withholding it.The antecedent of P2 contrasts in a significant way from thatof P1. The antecedent of P1 is entirely non-normative. But theantecedent of P2 contains a normative core, expressed by clause (i),along with a normative rider, expressed by clause (ii). The antece-dent, therefore, is mixed and not purely non-normative or'naturalistic.

PROBABILITY AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGEIn order to formulate our third epistemic principle, the appliedconcurrence principle, it is necessary to make certain fundamen-tal points about the relations between probability and the theoryof knowledge. These points concern: (A) the epistemic concept ofprobability; (B) the logical probability relation (or confirmation rela-tion); and (C) the applied probability relation (or confirmationrelation).

(A) The epistemic concept of probability pertains to the wayin which we ordinarily understand probable or likelywhether or not we know anything about epistemology, statistics orinductive logic. It is the sense we have in mind when we ask ourselvessuch questions as: Is it likely that the Senator has seen his mailtoday? and Is it probable that I might get him to change hismind? This fundamental sense of probability has been the con-cern of epistemologists since at least the time of the Greek sceptics.The concern may be defined this way:

D2 h is probable for S = Df For S, accepting h is to be preferredto accepting not-h.We will say, of course, that, if h is probable for S, then not-h isimprobable or S.If it is probable for you, in this sense, that you will be takinga trip on Tuesday, then, for you, believing that you will be takinga trip on Tuesday is to be preferred to believing that you will notbe taking a trip on Tuesday.(B) The logical, or formal, probability relation may be expressedeither by saying e confirms h or by saying e tends to makeh probable. The relation is a necessary one that holds betweenpropositions. The mathematical theory of probability investigatesa more complex form of the relation. One version of this complexrelation may be put by saying: h is more more probable than iin relation to e. The simpler relation with which we are here con-cerned may be defined in terms of the more complex relation as:h is more probable than not-h in relation to e. 1


6/8

EPISTEMIC PRINCIPLES 213(C) The applied probability or confirmation relation may be ex-pressed either by saying e confirms h for S or by saying e makesh probable for S. The logical relation, e tends to make h prob-

able, as we have said, expresses a relation that holds necessarilybetween propositions. But the applied ocution expresses a contingentproposition. It applies the logical relation to the epistemic situationof a particular person and tells us that that proposition confirmsor makes probable another proposition for that particular person.Since we are concerned with the epistemic sense of probabilityand therefore with the probability that a proposition may have fora given person, our conception should be adequate to the follow-ing. Most of us are such that: (i) there are necessarypropositionsthat are merelyprobablefor us; (ii) there are necessary propositionsthat are neither probable nor improbable for us; and (iii) there maywell be impossiblepropositions that are probablefor us. These facts,although they are overlooked by many writers on probability, shouldnot be surprising. For there are mathematical and logical proposi-tions that most of us are justified in accepting only on authority.Such propositions are made probable for us by the evidence we hap-pen to have about the authorities involved. And, if this is so, thensuch evidence could even make impossible propositions evident for us.

In order now to formulate our applied probability principle, weintroduce the concept of the defeat of confirmation.If a proposition e tends to make a proposition h probable, andif another proposition i is such that e & i does not tend to makeh probable, then the proposition e & i may be said to defeat e'stendency to make h probable. The relevant concept of defeat is this:

D3 d defeats e's tendency to make h probable =Df e tends tomake h probable; and d & e does not tend to make hprobable.Our definition of the applied probability or confirmation rela-tion is this:

D4 e makes h probable for S (e confirms h for S) =Df (1) eis evident for S; (2) e tends to make h probable; (3) thereis no d such that d is evident for S and d defeats e's tenden-cy to make h probable; and (4) if e implies h, then it is evi-dent for S that e implies h.(A proposition may be said to be evident for a person S, providedthat, for that person S and for any proposition i, accepting e isto be preferred to withholding i. Accepting an evident propositionis even preferable to withholding those propositions that are counter-balanced - those propositions such that there is as much to be


7/8

214 NOUSsaid for accepting them as there is to be said for accepting theirnegations.)

Our definition allows us to say that some but not all necessarypropositions are such that something makes them probable for aperson S. And it also allows us to say that impossible propositionsmay be made probable for S. As we have noted, these consequences,however questionable they may seem at first, are actually desideratafor the theory of epistemic probability.In considering the application of probability, we must take carenot to be misled by writings about so-called subjective probability.Some writers are interested in applying the probability relation tothe set of beliefs hat a person happens to have, whatever the epistemicstatus of these beliefs may be. But the theory of knowledge isconcerned with applying the relation to what it is that is evidentfora person. Some propositions that are evident may not be believed;and some propositions that are believed may not be evident.Since our definition of the applied probability relation containsthe expression any proposition that is evident for S, the definitionmay be said to apply the logicalprobability relation to the total evidenceof a particular subject.2 But, given the way in which we have usedthe concept of defeat in our definition, we need not make use ofthe concept of total evidence.

THE APPLIED CONCURRENCE PRINCIPLEWe are now in a position to consider our third and final epistemicprinciple-the applied concurrence principle.The principle presupposes the following definition of concurrence:

D5 A is a set of propositions that are concurrentor S =Df Ais a set of three or more propositions each of which is madeprobable for S by the conjunction of the others.The following three propositions provide a somewhat simplified ex-

ample. (1) Most of the people who are in the Embassy buildingare employed by the Embassy; and the tallest spy is in the Embassybuilding if and only if the ambassador's wife is there. (2) The tallestspy is in the building and is employed by the Embassy. And (3)the ambassador's wife is in the building and is employed by theEmbassy.It should be noted that this principle makes use of the appliedprobability relation just defined, for it speaks of propositions thatare probable for a particular subject S. This restriction enables usto avoid a number of unacceptable consequences (for example, thatall necessary propositions stand in the relation of concurrence).


8/8

EPISTEMIC PRINCIPLES 215Our third epistemic principle is this:

P3 If (i) there is a set of concurrent propositions such that allof the propositions are epistemically in the clear for a personS and if (ii) one of them is beyond reasonable doubt for S,then all of them are beyond reasonable doubt for S.This final principle has no normative core in its antecedent. Butits application presupposes that the person S satisfies the objectiveof other supervenience relations. And these other relations involveepistemic concepts other than that of concurrence.

REFERENCES[1] Bolzano, Bernard1942 Theory f Science Oxford: Basil Blackwell).[2] Carnap, Rudolf

1951 The Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).[3] Chisholm, Roderick M.1989 Theory f Knowledge, hird Edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, Inc.).[4] Jefferies, Harold

1939 The Theory of Probability (Oxford: The Clarendon Press).[5] Keynes, John Maynard

1921 A Treaties on Probability (London: Macmillan and Co.).[6] Kneale, William1949 Probability and Induction (Oxford: The Clarendon Press).

NOTES'This more complex relation is taken as primitive by Harold Jeffries, in [4]. He usesthe locution, Given p, q is more probable than r. For purposes of our present discussion,I shall take the concept of tending to make probable, or confirmation, as undefined. In[3], p. 55, I have suggested a procedure for defining it by reference to epistemicpreferability.2Bernard Bolzano in [1], first published in 1837, seems to have been the first to beclear about this point. More recent philosophers who have stressed the importance of theconcept of total evidence in applying probability are John Maynard Keynes [5], William

Kneale [6], and Rudolf Carnap [2].

chisholm, roderick m. (1990)—"symposia papers_the status of epistemic principles"

Documents