chisholm - the foundations of knowing

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The Foundations of Knowing


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Financial assistance for this book wasprovidedby the Andrew W.Mellon Foundation.


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TheFoundationsof KnowingRoderick M. Chisholm

University of Minnesota Press n Minneapolis


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Copyright 1982 by the Universi ty of Minnesota .A ll rights reserved.Published by the Un iversity of M inneso ta Press,2037 Universi ty A venue Southeast , M inneapol is , MN 55414Printed in the United States of America .Second printing, 1983.Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataChisholm, Roderick M .The founda t ions of knowing.

Includes bibliographical references and index.1. K nowledge, Theory ofAddresses , essays,lectures. I. Title.BD161.C467 1981 121 81-19707ISBN 0-8166-1103-3 A A C R 2ISBN 0-8166-1104-1 (pbk . )

The University of Minnesotais an equal-opportunityeducator and employer .


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Contents

Int roduct ion viiParti

1 A Version of Foundationalism 32 Conf i rmat ion and Concurrence 3 33 K now ledge as Jus tified True Belief 434 Know ing That One K n o w s 50

Part II5 The Problem of the Criter ion 616 The Foundat ion of Em pir ica l S ta tements 767 Verstehen . The Epistemological Question 868 W h a t is a Transcendental A rgum ent? 959 The Paradox of Analys is : A Solution (with Richard Potter) 100

Part III10 Theory of Knowledge in Amer ica 109

In t roduc t ion 109The Problem of Skepticism 113The M y t h of the Given 126Reason and The A Priori 148Appearances and Reali ty 167

Notes 197Index 213


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Introduction

This book is an a t t empt to deal positively and concretely with thefundamenta l quest ions of the theory of knowledge.O f the four essays that appear in Part I, the f ir s t "A Version ofFounda t iona l i sm" i s a revised version of a paper that appeared inVolume Five of the Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1980). I attemptthere to develop a phi losophical theory and express the hope thatproponents of alternative programs will be encouraged to do thesame. I conclude that no serious alternative in epistemology to foun-dationalism has yet been form ula ted .The other three essays in Part I were written expressly for this

book. "Confi rmat ion and Concurrence" is an account of the episte-m ic significance of confi rmat ion and certain analogous relations."Knowledge as Just i f ied True Belief" is a defense of the t radi t ionaldefinition of knowledge. And "Knowing that One Knows" appl iesthe results of the previous essays to a t radi t ional epistemologicalquest ion.The essays in Part I presuppose a general conception of thoughtand reference that is summar i zed in the first essay and defended indetail in my book, The First Person: An Essay on Reference andIntentionality. The essays in Parts II and II I , w hich were w ri t ten be-fore 1978, are readi ly ada ptable to the present point of view.Part II is an applicat ion of foundat ional ist principles to variousareas within the theory of knowledge. Most of these papers have

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viii C D INTRODUCTION

been revised for the present volume. "The Problem of the Criterion"first appeared as The A quin as Lecture and was published by M arquetteUniversity in 1973. "The Foundation of Empirical Statements" isconcerned in part with the relation of epistemology to other intel-lectual disciplines; it was presented to the International Colloquiumon Methodology of Sciences held in Warsaw in 1961 and was pub-lished in The Founda tion of Statements and Decisions (Warsaw:Polish Sc ientific Pu blishers, 1964), edited by Kazim ierz A jdukiewicz."Verstehen-. The Epistemological Problem" is a defense of the use of"intuitive understanding" in application to the problem of otherminds. It was presented to the International Colloquium on Knowl-edge and Understanding held in Biel in 1978 and first appeared inDialectica (Vol. 33, 1979). "What is a Transcendenta l Argument?"expresses certain misgivings about one way of doing philosophy. Itfirst appeared in Neue Hefte fur Philosophic (Heft 14, 1978). "TheParadox of Analysis," written with Richard Potter, offers a nonlin-guistic solution to a fundamental problem about the nature ofphilosophy. It first appeared in Metaphilosophy (vol. 12, 1981).

The t h i rd -and final part of the book, "Theory of Knowledge inAmerica ," is a critical history of twentieth-century American epis-temology. It first appeared in Philosophy, a vo lum e in the series ThePrinceton Studies: Humanistic Scholarship in America (EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964). It is here presented in its origi-nal form.I wish to express m y thanks to the editors and publishers of thesepublications for allowing m e to reprint them here.


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Parti


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Chapter 1A Version ofFoundationalism

IntroductionThe present essay is an attempt to deal with the basic problems of

the theory of knowledge. The general view that is here defended isappropriately called "foundationalism."

What are the presuppositions of the theory of knowledge? I shalllist six such suppositions. In formulating them, I shall use the firstperson, but I am quite confident that I am speaking for others as well.

1) There are certain things I know and certain things I do notknow. I can give examples of each. Like Moore, I know that I havetwo hands and that the earth has existed for hundreds of years. ButI do not know whether it will rain here a year from today and I donot know how many people now live in East Jaff rey . This first pre-supposition can be put more generally: I am justified in believingcertain things and I am not justified in believing certain other things.2) The distinction between the things I am justified in believingand the things I am not justified in believing need not coincide withthe distinction between those of my beliefs that are true and those ofmy beliefs that are false. In other words, it is quite possible that someof the things I am not justified in believing are true. Possibly mysenses are deceiving me, but even if they are, I am not justified in be-lieving they are not. And obviously, many of the things I am notI am indebted to critics of earlier formulations. These critics include William P. Alston,Bruce Aune, Fred Dretske, Herbert Heidelberger, Robert Shope, Ernest Sosa, an d TimmTriplet.

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4 a A V E R S I O N OF F O U N D A TI O N A LI S M

justified in believing are true. I cannot now say, of course, w hich ofm y justified beliefs are false. Perhaps there was a t ime when peoplewere justified in believing the false proposition that all swans arewhite. This means that they were not jus tified in believing the trueproposition that some swans are not white.We may say, of the relation between epistemic jus tifica tion andtruth, what John Maynard Keynes said about the relation betweenprobabil i ty and t ru th : "there is no direct relation between the truthof a p roposition and its proba bility. Prob ability begins and ends withprobability. That a scientific investigation pursued on account of itsprobability will generally lead to truth, rather than falsehood, is atbest only probable." 13) Y et there is a positive relation between the epistemically ju sti-fied and the true. For one thing, I am justified in believing a givenproposition, if and only if, I am justified in believing that that propo-sition is true. There is still another point about the relation betweenepistemic justification and t ru th , but this point is somewhat moredifficult to formulate. For the present, we may put it by saying that,if I want to believe w hat is t rue and not to believe w ha t is false, thenthe m ost reasonable thing for m e to do is to believe w hat is jus tifiedand not to believe w hat is not jus tified .4) Epistemic justification, unlike truth, is capable of degrees. Ofthe things that we are justified in believing, some are more justifiedthan others. We may say, more generally, that certain attitudes aremore reasonable on certain occasions than are other attitudes on thoseoccasions. (As we shall see, the concepts of the theory of evidencem ay be explicated in terms of the un defined epistemic locution, "is more reasonable for S at t than ")5) Some of the things I know, or am justified in believing, arejustified by certain other things that I know, or am justified in believ-ing. For example, I k n o w a n d am therefore justified in believingthat there were people in a certain bu ilding earlier today. W hat justi-fies m e in believing this m ay include the fact that certain people havetold me so and that I am justified in believing w hat they said. A ndpresumably my justification also inclu des certain general info rm ationI have about such buildings and the communit ies in which they exist.6) Some of the things I am justified in believing are such that byreflection, I can know that I am justified in believing them ; and Ican find out jus t what, if anything, justifies m e in believing them . ThusRussell once observed: "The degree of credibility attaching to a


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A V E R S I O N OF F O U N D A T I O N A L I S M D 5

proposi t ion is itself sometimes a d a t u m . I think we should also holdthat the degree of credibility to be at tached to a datum is sometimesa datum."2 This will hold of so-called em pirica l or a pos teriori beliefsas well as of beliefs that are a priori. H ence we have another respectin which the present concept of the justified differs from the conceptof the true. For in the case of w hat is em pirica l or a posteriori , delib-eration or reflection is not sufficient to enable us to find out whetherit is true . It is im po rta nt to d istinguish this final po int fro m the first .According to the first, there are som e things I am justified in believingand some things I am not just i f ied in believing. A nd according to thepresent point, some of the things I am justified in believing are suchthat I can find out by reflection that they are things I am just i f ied inbelieving; and similarly for some of the things I am not just i f ied inbelieving.3I t may be noted that these presupposi t ions of the theory of evi-dence are analogous, in fund am ental respects , to the presuppositionsof ethics.Let u s now consider certain basic facts abou t thou ght and reference.On the Primary Object of Intentional Attitudes

It is only within the last decade that philosophers have come toappreciate the difficult ies involved in what might be called the "he,himself" l o cu t io n th e locut ion "There exists an x such that x be-lieves himself to be wise," as contrasted with "There exists an x suchthat x believes x to be wise." The difficult ies arise because the firstlocution implies the second and not conversely, thus leaving us withthe question, "What does the first tell us that the second does not?"The second locution could be t rue and the first false in the follow-ing situation. I look in the mirror, or look at my hand, and believewith respect to the person that I see that he is wise; I am then an xsuch that x believes x to be wise. But it may yet be at the same t im ethat I do not believe myself to be wise, for I may have a very pooropinion of myself and not realize that / am the person I am looking at.Does the first sentence ("There exists an x such that x believeshimself to be wise") express some proposition that is not expressedby the second? It is not possible to give a plausible account of whatthis proposi t ion w ould be.

To understand the difference between the two locut ions, we haveto rethink the nature of believing and of other so-called prepositional


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6 a A V E R S I O N O F F O U N D A T I O N A L I S M

attitudes. Instead of thinking of these atttitudes as involving, in thefirst instance, a relation between a person and a . proposition, w e thinkof them as involving a relation between a person and a propertya.property that the person attributes to himself . If I believe myself tobe wise, then I directly attribute the property of wisdom to myself.If I believe you to be wise, then there is a certain other property thatis such that, in directly attributing that property to myself, I indi-rectly attribute to you the property of being wise. Suppose, for ex-ample , that you are the only person I am talking with. A nd suppose I(directly) attribute to myself the following p r o p er ty t ha t of talkingwith exactly one person and with a person who is wise. Then I in-directly attribute to you the property of being wise. The property Iattribute to myself singles you out as the thing to which I bear acertain relation; by directly attributing the one property to me, Iindirectly attribute the other property to you.Thus we begin with the undefined locution, "x directly attributesto y the property of being F." And we assume that direct attributionis necessarily such that, for every x and y, if x directly attributes acertain property to y, then x is identical with y. Given this undefinedlocution, we may now define the locution "x indirectly attributes toy the property of being F" as follows: There is a relation R such thatx stands in R to y and only to y; and x directly attributes to x theproperty of standing in R to just one thing and to a thing that is F."So-called de dicto be liev ing the acceptance of p rop os it ions m aybe viewed as one type of indirect attribution. If I accept a certainproposition, then I indirectly attribute to it the property of beingtrue. (In so doing, I may single it out as the sole thing I am conceivingin a certain way. The proposition, say, that all men are mortal maybe the sole thing pertaining to mortality that I am now conceiving.)But we shall assume that, whenever I do attribute a property to my-self, then I also accept a certain proposition. Thus if I attribute wisdomto myself, I will also accept the proposition that someone is wise.

I assume, however, that there are no "first-person propositions"e.g. , that although the first-person sentence "I am wise" expressesmy direct attribution of wisdom to myself , it does not express aproposition. M y reasons for holding this are set forth in detail in TheFirst Person: A Study in Reference and Intentionality.

The version of epistemology that follows, then, presupposes thisgeneral theory of believing. But everything that I shall say is readilyadaptable to the view according to which the basic form of believing


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A V E R S I O N O F F O U N D A T I O N A L I S M o 7

is prepositional. Indeed, if that view were true, the following couldbe considerably simplif ied.

Some Epistemic ConceptsTraditionally, knowledge may be identified with justified true be-

lief. If, as we are now assuming, the basic sense of believing is directattribution, then a kind of knowledge exists that may be associatedwith justified true direct attribution. We now consider this knowledge.

The simplest way of setting forth the vocabulary of the theory ofevidence, or epistemology, is to take as undefined the locution," is more reasonable than for s at t" (or, alternatively," is epistemically preferable to for S at t"). Epistemic rea-sonability could be understood in terms of the general requirementto try to have the largest possible set of logically independent beliefsthat is such that the true beliefs outnumber the false beliefs. Theprinciples of epistemic preferability are the principles one should fol-low if one is to fulfil l this requirement. (It should be noted that therequirement is so formulated that the requirement to have true beliefsreceives greater emphasis than the requirement not to have falsebeliefs.)

The epistemic locution we have taken as undefined is obviouslyapplicable to prepositional acceptance, or de dicto belief, where wecan say that accepting one proposition is more or less reasonablethan accepting another. But its application can readily be extendedto direct attribution.

To characterize the relevant epistemic concepts in their applica-tion to such attribution, we shall introduce the concept of withhold-ing the attribution of a property. Consider a person and a propertysuch that (a) the person does not directly attribute that property toherself and (b) she does not directly attribute the negation of thatproperty to herself: such a person may be said to withhold the directattribution of that property.

Among the general principles of epistemic preferability is that suchpreferability is transitive and asymmetric. If one attribution, or with-holding, is more reasonable for a given subject at a given time than asecond, and if the second is more reasonable than a third, then thefirst is more reasonable than the third. And if one is more reasonablethan another, then the other is not more reasonable than the one.

W e m ay also affirm the following principle: If, for a certain subject


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8 D A V ER S I O N O F F O U N D ATI O N ALI S M

at a certain tim e, withhold ing the direct attribution of a given pro p-erty is not more reasonable than the direct attribution of that prop-erty, then the direct attribution of that property is m ore reasonablethan the direct attribution of the negation of that property. Thisprinciple has its analogue in the following de dicto epistemic principle:if withholding a proposition is not more reasonable than accepting it ,then accepting it is more reasonable than accepting its negation. "Ifagnosticism is not m ore reasonab le than theism, then theism is m orereasonable than atheism."4Given these principles and others, w e may form ulate d efinit ions ofa variety of fu nd am en tal epistemic concepts. W e could say, for ex-ample, that the direct attribution of a given property is is epistemi-cally unacceptable for a given subject at a given time, p rovided onlythat withholding that property is m ore reasonable for that subject atthat time than directly attributing it. In saying that the attitude is"unacceptable," I do not mean that the believer/mds it unacceptable.I mean something more objective something that could also be putby saying that the att i tude ought not to be taken, or that it is an atti-tude that it would be unreasonable to take. W e could say that an at-tribution is counterbalanced if and only if the direct attribution ofthat property is no more nor less reasonable than is the direct attri-bution of the negation of that property.We may also distinguish several different epistemic levels that thedirect attribu tion of a prop erty m ay occ upy for a given subject at agiven t ime. Thus we have:

Having some presumption it its favor;Acceptabil i ty;Being beyond reasonable doubt;Being evident;Being certain.Each of these co ncepts may be said to provide a sense for the expres-sion "epistemically justified" certa in ty constituting the highest de-gree of epistemic ju stif ication, and having some presumption in itsfavor the lowest.A direct attribution of a property could be said to have some pre-sumption in its favor, provided only that the direct attribution ofthat property is more reasonable than the direct attribution of its ne-gation. A direct attribution of a property is acceptable if it is notunacceptable . A direct attribution of a property could be said to bebeyond reasonable doubt provided only that the direct attribution of


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A VERSIONO F F O U N D A T I O N A L I S M n 9

that property is more reasonable than withholding that property.Ascending to still higher epistemic levels, we may now consider

the evident. We may say that the direct attribution of a property isevident for a given person provided the attribution is beyond reason-able doubt for that person and is one of those attributions on whichit is reasonable for her to base her decisions. (A person may be saidto "base her decisions" on a given attribution provided she uses thatattribution as a premise from which she calculates those probabilitieson which she acts.)

Finally there is the concept of objective certainty. The direct attri-bution of a property may be said to be objectively certain for a per-son provided these conditions hold: the direct attribution of thatproperty is beyond reasonable doubt for that person; and it is at leastas reasonable for him as is the direct attribution of any other property.If the attribution of the property of being F is thus certain for a sub-ject, then he may be said to be certain that he is F.

These epistemic expressions may be read in another way. For ex-ample, if we may say, of the property of being F, that the direct at-tribution of that property is beyond reasonable doubt for a certainsubject x, then we may also say: "It is beyond reasonable doubt forx that he is F." And analogously for the other epistemic conceptsjust defined.

We must take care not to be misled by syntax at this point. Theprepositional locution, "It is beyond reasonable doubt for x that heis F," may tempt one to suppose that there is a certain propositioncorresponding to the expression "he is F" and that this propositionis one that is beyond reasonable doubt for the subject x. But "It isbeyond reasonable doubt for x that he is F" does not imply thatthere is a proposition corresponding to the expression "he is F." Inthis respect, "it is beyond reasonable doubt" may be compared withthe locution, "He believes himself to be F." The latter tells us onlythat he has directly attributed the property of being F to himself;and the former tells us only that, for him, directly attributing thatproperty is more reasonable than withholding it.The epistemic concepts that thus apply to direct attributions havetheir analogues that may be applied to propositions.

The Self-PresentingCertain propert ie s a l l of them implied by what psychological or" C a r te sia n " m a y be said to present themselves to the subject who


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10 n A V E R S I O N O F F O U N D A T I O N A L I S M

has them. O ne example is feel ing sad; another is th ink ing about agolden mounta in ; another is believing oneself to be wise; and stillanother may be suggested by the awkward locution, "is appearedredly to."5The mark of a self-presenting property is this: every property itentails is necessarily such that, if a person has it and also considers

whether he has it, then ipso facto he will attribute it to himself.6Thus we do not define such p roperties by reference to certainty, butwe will formulate a material epistemic principle relating such proper-ties to certainty.We m ay dist inguish the self-presenting from "the self-presented."A property that is self-presenting may not be considered by the per-

son who has it and therefore it will not be self-presented to that per-son.7 B ut if the person w ho has it considers his hav ing it , then he wil laccept the fac t that he has i t and the prop erty m ay be said, therefore,to be self-presented.Whatever is self-presenting is implied by what is psychological . Thatis to say, for every self-presenting property, there is a psychologicalproperty which is necessari ly such that, if one has the psychologicalproperty then one has the self-presenting property. And whatever isself-presenting involves w ha t is psycholog ical. Tha t is to say, everyself-presenting property is necessarily such that, if one conceives thatproperty, then one conceives some psychological property.8I would say that thinking, as Descartes conceived it, is self-pre-senting. C onsider the activities he refers to in the fol lowing passage:By the word thought I under s t and all tha t of which we are consc ious as operat-in g in us. A nd that is why not a lone unde rstan ding , wil l ing, imagining, but a lsofeeling are here the same as thought . . . . If I mean to talk only of my sensa-tion, or my consciously seeming to see or to walk , . . . my assertion now refersonly to my m ind, whic h alone is con cerne d with my feel ing or think ing that Isee and I walk .9The properties that Descartes here refers to are al l such that , if aperson has them and if he considers the quest ion whether he hasthem, then he wil l a t tr ibute them to himsel f .Many properties which are not psychological are also self-presentingby our definit ion. A n exam ple is the property of being either a s toneor considering something. Bu t this prop erty involves and is imp liedby the psychological property of considering something.

We should note, what may not be clear in the passage from Des-cartes, that there are ways of being appeared t o w a y s of sensing


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A VERSION O F FOUNDATIONALISM a l lthat are such that being appeared to in those ways is self-presentingThus there is wha t we might cal l "a way of being appeared to" thatis such that, if you are appeared to in that w ay, and if you consideryour being appeared to in that way, then you wil l a t tr ibute to your -self the proper ty of being appeared to in tha t way. We shal l returnbelow to such ways of being appeared to.Every self-presenting pro perty , then , is a pro per ty that is such that,if while having it , you consider your having it , then you wil l believeyourself to have it. Let us now note that considering and believingare themselves self-presenting. If you are sad and consider your beingsad, then you will attribute sadness to yourself. If you consider yourbeing sad and then consider your considering being sad, then you willbelieve yourself to consider your being sad. And if you believe your-self to be sad and consider you r bel ieving yourself to be sad, thenyou will believe yourself to believe yourself to be sad.Th ere is no regress here. W e are not saying that if you consider you rbeing sad, then you will believe that you are considering you r beingsad. And we are not saying that if you believe yourself to be sad, thenyou will believe yourself to believe yourself to be sad. For we canconsider and believe w itho ut considering our considering and believing.O ur definitio n of the self-presenting m ay be interp reted as tel l ingus that the presence of a self-preseting proper ty is "indubitable." Thisinterpreta t ion is correct if "doubt" is taken to im ply conscious w ith-holding of belief. For we have assumed that, if you have a self-pre-senting property and if you consider your having it, then you willbelieve yourself to have it; and if you believe yourself to have it, thenyou cannot at the same t ime doubt whether you have it. But thistype of indubitability should be distinguished from the epistemicconcept of certainty.Self-Presentation and Certainty

I have not defined self-presenting properties by reference to evi-dence and certainty. But the presence of such properties is also evi-dent to the subject who has t hem. And , if we th ink of certainty asconsti tuting the highest degree of epistemic just if ica tion, then w emay say that a person's self-presenting properties are objects of cer-tainty for that person.Indeed we may affirm the following "material epistemic principle"per ta ining to such evidence and cer ta in ty :


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12 D A V E R S I O N OF F O U N D A T I O N A L I S M

PI tIf th e property of being F is self-presenting, then, for every x,if x has the pro per ty of b eing F and if x considers his havingthat property, then it is certain for x that he is then F.

Every self-presenting property provides us with an instance of PI.Thus we could say:For every x, if x has the property of being sad, and if x considersthe question whether he is sad, then it is certain for x that he issad.

And if considering is also self-presenting, and if you consider yourconsidering whether you are sad, then it will be certain for you thatyou are considering w hether y ou are sad.O ur principle illustrates what some have called the supervenientcharacter of epistemic justification; for it tells us how posit ive epis-temic status "is supervenient on a set of non-epistemic facts."10 Otherm aterial epistem ic principles that I shall formulate also illustrate suchsupervenience. (W e could say that a normative property G "super-venes on" a non norm ative pro perty H , provided on ly: H is necessarilysuch that whatever has it has G, but not necessarily such that who-ever attributes it attributes G. A "normative" property for presentpurposes could be said to be any property definable in terms ofpreferability.) Thus the instance of P I cited above tells us that beingcertain that one is sad supervenes on the property of being both sadand such that one considers one's being sad.Principle P I pertains to what w e might call "nonproposit ional evi-dence and certainty." But we may affirm as a corollary the followingprinciple about prepositional evidence and certainty: For every x, ifit is evident for x that he has the property of being F, then the prop-osition that something is F is one that is evident for x; and if it is cer-tain for x that he has the property of being F, then the proposition

that som ething is F is one that is evident for S.The evidence that is thus yielded by those of our properties thatare self-presenting could be said to constitute that which is directlyevidentor, more exactly, that which is directly evident a posteriori.When we have such properties, then our direct attributions of themare directly evident. So, too, for the attribution of those propertiesthat are entailed by the self-presenting. Anything entailed (both im -plied and involved) by such attributions is also directly evident.Hence certain negative properties say, once again, the property of


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A VERSION O F FOUNDATIONALISM n 13

not believing that ghosts e x is t m a y be such that it is directly evidentto one that one has them. These properties will not be self-pre-senting by our definition but they may be entailed by what is self-presen ting say the property of thinking and not believing ghostsexist. (The latter property may be self-presenting even to those whodo not have the concept of a ghost. This consequence is essential tothe theory of evidence.) But in saying that such properties are self-presenting, we are not saying that they are self-presented.The Epistemically Unsuspect

The term "foundation," in its application to knowledge, suggeststhat our knowledge is comparable to a building or to a pyramid. Buta different metaphor has been proposed by Otto Neurath. He saidthat our knowledge is to be compared to a ship or a raft and that theepistemologist is to be compared to a sailor "who, unable to returnto dock, must reconstruct his vessel on the open sea, and is thereforeforced to make use of the best constituents that are at hand."11 Wehave here two quite different ways of looking at knowledge. Must wechoose between "the pyramid and the raft"?12

The figure of the pyramid suggests that we can use material thatis solid, firm, and absolutely reliable. That of the raft suggests wemust settle for what is at best makeshift and haphazard. B ut perhapsboth figures are accurate. I suggest that we do not have here two dif-ferent conceptions of knowledge. What we ha ve me t a ph or s aside are tw o different aspects of our knowledge, each of them of funda-mental importance. There are two moments of eplstemicjustification,one of them foundational and the other not.In considering what it is that we are justified in believing, w e shouldtake into account, not only that which is objectively certain and thusfoundational for our subject at any given time, but also certain thingswhich may then be said to have some presumption in their favor forhim. I have said that the direct attribution of a property has somepresumption in its favor for a given subject at a given time providedthat the direct attribution of that property is then more reasonablefor him than is the direct attribution of its negation. Let us now con-sider such attributions and see how they function in our general epis-temic principles.To locate that which has some presumption in its favor, I shallpropose an additional material epistemic p r inc ipl e and one that is


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extremely latitudinarian. This is the principle that anything w e findourselves believingmay be said to have some presumption in its favorprovided it is not explicitly contradicted by the set of otherthings that we believe. The principle may be thought of as an instanceof a more general t ru t h t h a t it is reasonable to put our trust in ourow n cognitive faculties unless w e have some positive ground for ques-tioning them.The principle is this:

P2 For every x, if (i) x directly attributes to himself the propertyof being F, and if (ii) x being F is not explicity contradictedby the set of properties that x directly attributes to x, then hisbeing F has some presumption in its favor for x.

The principle is readily extended to prepositional belief. Thus we maysay that, for every x, if x accepts a proposition or state of affairs thatis not explicitly contradicted by any conjunction of propositions eachsuch that it is accepted by x, then that proposition has some pre-sumption in its favor for x. (One proposition "explicitly contradicts"another provided only that it entails the negation of the other; therelation between properties is analogous.)In affirming P2, we follow Carneades w ho assigned a positive epis-temic status to "the uncontradicted."13 The apparent overpermissive-ness of this principle can be corrected by reference to a certain sub-set of these "uncontradicted" attributions; this subset constitutesour next category.

From among the attributions that thus have some presumption intheir favor for our subject, we may now single out those that are"epistemically in the clear." An attribution of a property P may besaid to be epistemically unsuspect, or epistemically in the clear, forany subject, provided only that it is not disconfirmed by the set of"uncontradicted" properties we have just singled out. More exactly,a property P is epistemically in the clear for a given subject providedit is not disconfirmed by the set of those properties other than P thathave some presumption in their favor for him. A nd analogously forpropositions or states of affairs. (The requisite concept of confirma-tion is discussed in the following essay.)According to our latitudinarian epistemic principle P2," anythingw e believe has some presumption in its favor provided it is not ex-plicity contradicted by anything else we believe. Given the conceptof the epistemically unsuspect, we may formulate an additional


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pr inc ip le , which will compensate for this permissiveness of P2. Wewill equate the epistemically unsuspect with that which is episte-mically acceptable. (We have said that the direct attribution of aproperty is "acceptable" provided that withholding that property isnot more reasonable than attributing that property. And, analogously,a proposition is acceptable provided that withholding it is not morereasonable than accepting it.)

Our third principle, then, is this:P3 For every x, and every property H, the direct attribution of H

is acceptable for S if and only if it is not disconfirmed by theset of all those properties having some presumption in theirfavor for S.

Analogously, a proposition is epistemically in the clear for x if andonly if it is acceptable for x. The principle thus tells us that anythingthat is epistemically in the clear is epistemically acceptable. But it alsotells us that nothing is epistemically acceptable unless it is episte-mically in the clear.

Our new principle thus enables us to single out, f rom the set of be-liefs having some presumption in their favor, a subset of beliefs thatare also epistemically acceptable.

We are now in a position to formulate our principles of perceptualevidence. These will all make reference to that which is epistemicallyacceptable, or in the clear.

Appearing and Being Appeared ToWe now apply the concept of indirect attribution to throw lighton a number of philosophical problems involving the nature of per-ception. For we may say that perception is, essentially, the indirectattribution of a property to a thing, the thing being considered as thething that is appearing in a certain way.

W e being, then, with appearing.The requisite sense of "appear" is both causal and psychological.

Traditionally one had spoken of "sensations" instead of "ways ofappearing." One had said that the object of perception, acting on theperceiver's sense-organs, caused him to "have certain sensations." ButI would prefer to say that the object of perception causes him tosense in a certain way. The subject, who was said to experience a redsensation, does not stand in a sentient relation to an object that is a


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red sensation; rather, is is sentient in a certain waya. way that wecould describe as "redly." (Compare "she experiences sadness" and"she feels sad": the for m er suggests, m isleadingly , tha t sa dness is oneof two things that are related by experiencing; the latter suggests,more accurately, that being sad is a way of experiencing.) for philo-sophical purposes it is convenient to use "is appeared to" in place of"senses."Let us note the distinction between (a) "There exists a y such thaty appears to x in a certain way" and (b) "x is appeared to (senses) ina certain way." The first implies something about an external stimu-lus object; it tells us, in part , that y, acting as a stimu lus object, causesthe subject to be in a certain sentient state. But the second impliesnothing about an external object and tells us only about the state ofthe subject. In cases of fantasy, dreaming, and hallucination, the sec-ond m ay be true whereas the first is false. For then one will be sensing o n e will be appeared t o i n a certain way even thoug h no externalstimulu s object is causing one to sense in that way.The expression "being appeared redly to," as we shall interpret it,must not be interpreted as having the same sense as any of the fol-lowing expressions: "being appeared to by something that is red":"being appeared to in the way one is normally appeared to by thingsthat are red": or "being appeared to in the way in which one believesthat red things normally appear." The expression "being appearedredly to" has what I have called its noncomparative sense in this use.14"Being ap peared red ly to," in this non com parative use, refers to aprop erty that is self-presenting in the sense that w e have defined. Thatis to say, being appeared redly to is necessarily such that, if a personis appeared redly to and if he considers his being appeared redly to,then he will attribute to himself th e property of being appeared redlyto. This use of "being appeared redly to" is "noncomparative," sincethe sense of the expression "red", in this use, has not logically con-nected with the sense that the word "red" has when physical thingsare said to be red.

Can w e, then, characterize "y app ears redly to x" in terms of beingappeared redly to and certain causal concepts? Here w e must pre-suppose the concept of functional dependence: if y appears in a cer-tain way to x, then the way x is appeared to will be functionally de-pendent on the nature of y. That is to say, y will be so related to xthat, merely by varying y continuously with respect to certain of itsproperties, one can vary continuously the way in which x is appeared


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to. More specifically, if y is appearing visual ly to x, then y has prop-erties that are such that, by varying them , one can vary the way inwhich x is visually appeared to. And analogously for the other sense-modalities.The funct ional dependence that relates the appearing object and

the way of being appeared to is also structural, since it essentiallyinvolves differentials of the object that appears. If, for the m o m e n t ,we permit ourselves the sense-datum language ("He senses a red ap-pearance") instead of the language of being appeared to ("He is ap-peared to redly"), we can easily describe this structural relation. Theappearance is divisible into parts that correspond to different partsof the th ing that presents the appearance. The table-top, for example ,may present a uniform visual appearance; yet by varying the color,say, of the left half of the table-top we can vary the color of the lefthalf of the visual appearance. (If we restrict ourselves to the languageof being appeared to, we cannot thus speak of the "parts" of a wayof being appeared to. But we can distinguish various aspects of thew ay of being appeared to and we can put our point by reference tothem.)The way that an external thing appears wil l be thus s t ruc tura l lydependent , not only on the thing that is appearing, but also on therelevant sense-organ. Perhaps we can distinguish the role of the sense-organ from that of the object of appearance by saying this: the na-ture of the appearance is directly dependent on the state of the senseorgan; and it is indirectly dependen t on the state of that physicalthing on which the state of the sense-organi is directly dependent.The medium in which an object app ears wil l also affect the way inwhich the subject is appeared to. Indeed, continuous variations in theformer may produce continuous variat ions in the lat ter . But the me-dium wil l not have the kind of structural relation that we have beenconsidering to the way of being ap peared to. For it wil l not normal lybe the case that different aspects of the way of being appeared towill correspond to different proper parts of the m ed ium. Hence weneed not say that it is always the med ium of perception that appearsto the subjec t . It is the object of perception that appears.

We may now formula te a simple appearance principle. What w ehave a right to affirm, I suggest, is a generalization on the following:''Being appeared redly to tends to make it evident to the subject thatthere is something that appears red to him.'" In other words, if aperson is appeared redly to, then it is evident to him that there is


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18 a A VERSION OF FOUNDATIONALISMsomething that appears red to h im p r ov i de d he considers the ques-tion whether something is appearing red to him and provided he hasno reason to suppose that it is not the case that something appearsred to him.O ur general principle is this:

P4 For every x, if there is a way of appearing such that (i) it isself-presenting and (ii) x is appeared to in that way, then thefollowing is evident for x provided it is epistemically in theclear for him and something that he considers: there is some-thing that is appearing that way to him.Being thus appeared to puts one in contact, so to speak, with externalreality. A nd such initial contact, it would seem, can only be via ap-pearances.Several Senses of Perception

"Perception," in its ordinary sense, is an epistemic term. If I canbe said, in this ordinary sense, to perceive that a sheep is in the field,then it is evident to me that a sheep is in the field. Since our presentconcern is with the question, "How is transcendent evidence pos-sible?", we shall not begin with this epistemic sense of perception.Ins tead , we will try to disentangle the epistemic and nonepistemicfeatures of perception and then single out those processes in virtue ofwhich we can be said, in this ordinary epistemic sense, to perceive those processes on which perceptual evidence may be said to super-vene. W e will ask: What is there about those processes that makestranscendent evidence possible? And then, having an answer to thisquestion, we can turn to the ordinary sense of perception.The objective reference that is involved in perception does not dif-fer in principle from what w e have considered already. A s w e havesaid, perception may be characterized as a special type of direct at-t ri b u ti o n o n e that essentially involves the concept of appearance.But several senses of perception must be distinguished.A n explicit formulation of a perceptual judgment will always makea reference to the perceiver himself. What one perceives is not merelysomething red or something round, but that something red or some-thing round stands in a certain relation to oneself. What would therelation be? If I perceive a thing, then, of course, the thing is relatedto me as being one of the objects of my perception. And presumably,


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for each thing that I perceive, I perceive it in some way or other thatdistinguishes m y perception of that thing at tha t t ime from m y per-ception of any other thing at that t ime. But this cannot be the identi-fying relation that is involved in perception. What one perceives isnot, in the first instance, that one perceives an object in a certainway. The fact of perception is not a part of the content of percep tion.The identifying relat ion that is involved in perception pertains,rather, to the concept of appearing. If I perceive a thing, then I j udgethat jus t one thing is appear ing to me in a certain way. I may judge ,for exam ple, that som ething app ears red to m e. If m any things aresuch that each one is appear ing red to me, then for each of them therewill be a fur ther w ay of app earing such that that thing is the sole thin gthat is appearing to me in that way. One thing might appear red andround, another th ing red and square , and so on.O ur first sense of perc eption , then , m ay be cha racterized as follow s:

(I ) The property of being F is such that x perceptually takes y tohave it =Df. There is a way of appearing such that y and only yappears in that way to x; and the property of being F is a sen-sible property that x indirectly attributes to y, as the thingthat appears to him in that way.

What is intended by the expression "sensible property" may besuggested by the following list: such visual properties as blue, green,yel low, red, white, b lack; such auditory properties as sounding ormaking a noise; such somesthetic properties as rough, smooth, hard,soft, heavy, l ight, hot, cold; such gustatory properties as sweet, sour,salty, bitter; and such olfactory properties as fragra nt, spicy, putr id,burned. Sensible properties would also include such "common sensi-bles" as m ovement , res t, num ber , figure, and m agni tude. A nd we m ayunderstand "sensible property" sufficiently broadly so that relationsof resemblance and differ enc e am ong sensible properties m ay also becounted as sensible properties.It should be noted that the final clause of our definit ion (I) exhib-its such perc eption as a type of ind irect attributio n. W e will cal l thisthe primary sense of perception. It is a very broad sense, for it doesnot imply evidence or veridicality. From the fact that one thus per-ceptually takes a thing to be F, it does not follow that the thing is F,nor does it fol low that the perceiver has evidence that the th ing is F.Given this primary sense of perception, we may now define theexpression, "x perceives y." Let us say:


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(II) x perceives y =Df. There is a property such that x perceptual-ly takes y to have it.

Let us call this the nonpropositional sense of perception. I assumethat the subspecies of such perception seeing, hearing , tasting, feel-i ngcan be described by reference to the kinds of ways of being ap-peared to that they involve.15 Still other senses of perception ("Sheheard the concert," "She saw the shadow move") could readily besingled out.16 B ut these are not relevant to our present concern.The two senses of perception just defined presuppose what w emay call the self-presenting sense of perception:( I I I ) The property of being F is such that x perceptually takes there

to be something that has it =Df. The property of being F is asensible property such that x is appeared to in such a way thathe directly attributes to himself the property of being ap-peared to in that way by something that is F.The definiendum m ay also be read as "x perceptually takes there tobe som ething that is F."Although perception, in this third sense, implies that the subjectis being appeared to in a certain way , it does not imply that anythingis appearing to him in that way. This last fact is our excuse fo r usingthe awkward locution, "he perceptually takes there to be somethingthat has it," instead of the simpler "he perceptually takes somethingto have it."The several senses of perception here distinguished do not yet in-clude the familiar "perceives that" locution of ordinary language asin "she perceives tha t som eone is app roach ing," or "she perceivessomeone to be approaching." W e will be in a position to explicatethis ordinary sense of perception after w e have formulated certainfurther epistemic principles.The Principles of Perceptual Evidence

A simple principle of perceptual evidence would be illustrated bythe following: If a person perceptually takes there to be a sheep inthe field before him, then it is evident to him that a sheep is in thefield. Thus Meinong had held, in effect, that the fact that w e thinkw e perceive confers "presumptive evidence [Vermutungsevidenzon the proposition or state of affairs that is the object of our osten-sible perception.17 And H. H. Price has said that the fact that w e'


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"perceptually accept" a certain proposition is sufficient to confersome positive epistemic status on that proposition. Price put thispoint as fol lows: "We want to be able to say: the fact that a materialthing is perceptually presented to the mind is prima facie evidenceof the thing's existence and of its really having that sort of surfacewhich it ostensibly has; or, again, that there is some presumption infavor of this, not merely in the sense that we do as a matter of factpresume it (which of course we do) but in the sense that we are enti-tled to do so."18 But such principles, as they stand, are somewhatoverpermissive, epistemically.

Using the concept of the "epistemically unsuspect," or of thatwhich is "epistemically in the clear," we might say that certain per-ceptual attributions are beyond reasonable d oub t provided they areepistemically unsuspect. In this way we could formulate a principlethat is less permissive than those proposed by Meinong and Price.But w e could add that, if such an attribution is a member of a set ofproperties, which mutually support each other and each of which isbeyond reasonable doubt, then the attribution is evident.

, What , then, is the requisite sense of "mutual support"? We maysay that the members of a set of two or more properties "mutuallysupport" each other for a subject S provided each of the propertiesis such that (1) the conjunction of all the others confirms it for S,and (2) it is confirmed for S by a self-presenting property that doesnot confirm any of the others for S. (The concept of confirmationand the relation of mutual support will be discussed in more detail inthe following essay.)This, then, is our perceptual principle:

P5 For every x, if (i) x perceptually takes there to be somethingthat is F, and if (ii) his perceiving an F is epistemically in theclear for x, then it is beyond reasonable doubt for x that heperceives something that is F. If, moreover, his perceiving some-thing that is F is amember of a set of properties, which mutuallysupport each other and each of which is beyond reasonabledoubt for x, then it is evident for x that he perceives some-thing that is F.

Let us note certain features of this principle. The first part of theantecedent of the first part of the principle ("x perceptually takesthere to be something that is F") refers to the "self-presenting senseof perception" singled out above. The second part of the antecedent("his perceiving an F is epistemically in the clear") pertains to the


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22 n A V E R S I O N OF FOtJNDATIONALISMclass of things we singled out by means of principle P3. The consequentof the first part of the principle refers to the "nonpropositional senseof perception" also singled out above. The proper ty of being F willbe what we have called a sensible property.The consequent of the first part of the principle reads: "It isevi-dent for x that he perceives something that is F." We should rem indourselves that one can perceive something that is F without therebyperceiving that the th ing to be F w i th ou t thereby perceiving thatthe thing is F. Thus if the person that I see is a thief, then I perceivesomething that is a thief. B ut even if I kn ow that he is a thief, it is notlikely that I perceive him to be a t h i e f i t is not l ikely that, in a nysense, I perceive that he is a thief .O ur principl e P5 states certain condit ions un der which w e may sayof a person that it is evident or beyond reasonable doubt for him thathe perceives something that is F. It does not enable us to say, do re,of that person and any external object y, that it is beyond reasonabledoub t for the person that he perceives that that particular thing y is F.In other words, our principle entitles us to say "x perceives that thereis a y such that y is F," but not "There exists a y such that S perceivesthat y is F." It may be self-presenting for x that he is being appearedto in a certain way (that he senses in a certain way). But it cannot beself-presenting for him that there is something that is appearing tohim in that way (i.e., it cannot be self-presenting to him that an ex-ternal stimulus object causes him to sense in that way).By means of what principle, then, can the person pass from a wayof appearing to a particular physical thing that "transcends" thatw ay of appearing? W e are looking for a principle that enables us tosay with respect to two things, x and y, that it is evident to x that yis F. We can find such a principle if we look to that which is self-presenting and also to that which is epistemical ly in the clear.

I propose, then, the following pr incip le :P6 For every x and y, if (i) x perceptually takes y and only

y to be F, and if (ii) it is epistemically in the clear for xthat he perceives something that is F, then y is such thatit is beyond reasonable doubt for x that it is F; and if itis evident for x that he perceives something that is F, theny is such that it is evident for x that it is F.

In the first clause of the antecedent we refer to the prim ary sense ofperception and in the second to the nonproposit ional sense of per-ception.


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This final perceptual principle introduces the de re epistemic locu-tion: "y is such that it is evident to x that it is F." Therefore the prin-ciple is, in a certain respect, less pure than the preceding principle,P5. For, in theory at least, one can ascertain merely by reflectionwhether or not the antecedent condition of P5 obtains. But the pres-ent principle, P6, is not applicable unless there is an external physicalthing causing the subject to sense in the way that he does. This factcannot be ascertained merely by reflection. It cannot be self-present-ing to the subject that there is a certain thing that he perceives to beF; it can be self-presenting only that he perceptually takes there tobe something that is F. Hence we might call P6 a "quasi-epistemicprinciple."

It may be noted that the final clause of the definition begins withthe condition, "if it is evident for x that he perceives something thatis F." But we have not yet specified the conditions under which itcan be evident to a person that he perceives something that is F.These conditions are discussed in the essay, "Knowing that OneKnows," which follows.

Our perceptual principles are instances of the more general truth:"It is reasonable to trust the senses until one has positive reason fordistrusting them."19

"But it's at least logically possible that our senses as well as ourmemories always deceive us. If that were in fact the case, then wouldit be reasonable to trust the senses?" The answer will be suggested bya comparable question: "It is logically possible that all our inductiveconclusions (strictly speaking, those that are logically contingent) arefalse. In such a case, would it be reasonable to follow the principlesof induction?" I am convinced that, in such a case, it would be rea-sonable to follow them.

The Ordinary Epistemic Sense of PerceptionWe are now in a position to explicate the ordinary epistemic sense

of perception, as expressed in such locutions as "x perceives that y isF" and "x perceives y to be F." It is this:(IV) x perceives y to be F =Df y is F; x perceptually takes y to be

F; and it is evident to x that y is F.Alternative readings of the definiendum are "x perceives that y is F"and "the property of being F is such that x perceives y to have it."


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The second clause in the defin iens "x perceptually takes y to be F"refers to what w e called the prim ary sense of perception . This pri-mary sense w as defined by reference to appearing and indirect attri-but ion. The final clause in the def iniens "i t is evident to x that y isF " h a s been defined in terms of epistemic prefer ability. A nd we haveseen in principles P5 and P6 the condit ions under which the finalclause may be said to be true.20

Is This Foundationalism ?In order to see the sense in w hich the present view m ay be said tobe a version of "foundationalism," let us now list the six epistemicprinciples w e have formula ted:PI If the property of being F is self-presenting, then, for every x,if x has the property of being F and if x considers his having

that property, then it is certain for x that he is then F.P2 For every x, if (i) x directly attributes to himself the propertyof being F, and if (ii) x being F is not explicitly contradicted

by the set of properties that x directly attributes to x, then hisbeing F has some presum ption in its favor for x.P3 For every x, and for every property H, the direct attributionof H is acceptable for S if and only if it is not disconfirmed bythe set of all those properties having some presumption intheir favor for S.P4 For every x, if there is a way of appearing such that (i) it is

self-presenting and (ii) x is appeared to in that way, then thefollowing is evident for x provided it is epistemically in theclear for him and something that he considers: there is some-thing that is appearing that way to him.P5 For every x, if (i) x perceptually takes there to be something

that is F, and if (ii) his perceiving an F is epistemically in theclear for x, then it is beyond reasonable doubt for x that heperceives something that is F. If, moreover, his perceivingsomething that is F is a member of a set of properties, whichmutually support each other and each of which is beyondreasonable doubt for x, then it is evident for x that he per-ceives something that is F.P6 For every x and y, if (i) x perceptually takes y to be F, and if (ii)it is epistemically in the clear for x that he perceives som ething


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that is F, then y is such that it is beyond reasonable doubtfo r x that it is F; and if it is evident for x that he perceivessomething that is F, then y is such that it is evident for x thatit is F.

We may now consider certain philosophical questions.1) Are there self-justifiersattributions or proposit ions that maybe said to consti tute their own jus t i f ica t ion?

The self-presenting w ould seem to be the closest we can come tothat which consti tutes i ts own jus t i f ica t ion. That one has a self-pre-senting property does not itself make it evident that one has thatproper ty . But that one has it and also considers one's having it doesm ake i t evident tha t one has i t . Self-presenting prope rties , m oreover,are distinctive in the following respect: it can be evident to one thatone has the property even though one has no n o n d e d u ct iv e n omere ly i nduc tive grounds for attr ibuting that proper ty to oneself.In other words, a self-presenting prop erty is a property such that itcan be evident that one has it even though the only thin gs that makeit evident that one has it are things that entail it.2) Is there a sense in w hich the self-presenting m ay be said to ju sti fythat which is not direct ly evident? Principles P4 and P5 state condi-t ions under which the self-presenting m ay m ake evident certain at tr i-butions that are not direcly evident. For in the case of each of theseprinciples, antec eden t (i) refers to w hat is self-presenting and theconsequent refers to something that is not directly evident. But ap-plication of the principles does not require that it be evident to thesubject tha t he has the self-presenting properties in q ues ti on f or theydo not require that he consider his having the m . It is the self-pre-senting, then, and not the directly evident, that may be said to jus t i -fy that which is not directly evident.

3) Is everything that is epistemical ly just if ied just if ied by thatwhich is self-presenting? Or is there a sense in which something otherthan that which is self-presenting can be said to serve as a ground orfoundat ion of our knowledge?Examina t ion of our principles m akes clear tha t , according to them,our knowledge is not a funct ion merely of wha t is self-presenting.Principle P2 refers to what I have called "the uncontradicted"; thisinvolves the logical relations that one attr ibution may bear to others.If these relations obtain, that they obtain wil l not be self-presenting.But , I would say, one can always ascertain by reflection whether or

not they obtain. Similar observations hold of "the epistemical ly


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unsuspect" (that which is "epistemically in the clear"), referred to inprinciples P 3 , P4, and P5.But the de re principle, P6, is an exception. For antecedent (i) "if x perceives y to be F " i s not something that can be ascertainedmerely by reflection. The requisite sense of "perceives," as we havedefined it, involves a causal relation between the object of perceptionand the perceiver. And one cannot determine by reflection whetheror not such a relation obtains. Hence I suggested that P6 might becalled a "quasi-epistemic principle."I had written in the second edition of Theory of Knowledge:

What , then, of our justification for those propositions that are indirectly evi-dent? W e might say that they are justified in three different ways. (1) They m aybe justified by certain relations that they bear to wha t is directly evident. (2)They may be justif ied by certain relations that they bear to each other. And (3)they may be justified by their own nature, so to speak, and quite independentlyof the relations that they bear to anything else. 1I would now replace "the directly evident" above by "the self-pre-senting"; otherwise, I would say, the passage describes the presentversion of foundationalism.4) Can we say that, according to our principles, the self-presentingconstitutes the basis or foundation or grounds w e have for the otherthings we know ?We could say that the attrib ution of E is a basis for the attributionof H provided only that E is necessarily such that, if its attribution isevident to a given subject, then the attribution of H is evident to thatsubject. Taking "basis" or "found ation" this w ay, we may affirm thefollowing foundational thesis: everything that is evident for any par-ticular su bject has a basis or found ation that is entailed by som e prop-erty that is self-presenting to that subject.5) Can we say that, according to our principles, the self-presentingconstitutes the justification for whatever it is that one is justified inbelieving? Here the answer must be negative.

I have said that there are two moments of epistemic jus tification one that is foundational and the other that is not. The nonfounda-tional element is provided by principles P2 and P3. Principle P2 tellsus that if an attribution is uncontradicted by the set of the subject'sother attributions, then that attribution has some p resump tion in itsfavor. Principle P3 tells us tha t, if an attribu tion is not disconfirm edby the set of all those attributions having some presum ption in theirfavor, then that attribution is epistemically acceptable.


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The just if ication for such attributions is not a func t ion m erely ofthat which isself-presenting.These considerations also apply to a priori knowledge. Thus wemight define an axiom as a proposit ion that is necessarily su ch that(i) it obtains and (ii) whoever conceives it accepts it . Then we couldaffirm a principle analogous to P I : "If the pro position that p is anaxiom, then, for every x, if x conceives the proposit ion that p, it iscertain for x that p." (Here "p" is schematic, replaceable by anyEnglish sentence.) Then we could say that that self-presenting state,which is the subject conceiving the proposition that p, is the basis orfoundation for his knowledge that p.Here it might be objected: "You are saying that logic and mathe-matics are grounded in certain subjective states. That is psychologismof the worst sort!" W e are saying only that even our know ledge oflogic and m athem atics begins w ith experience. W e are not saying thatlogic and mathemat ics are about that which is subjective. The objec-tion confuses th e ratio essendi with the ratio cognoscendi.Other Senses of Justification

The issues in theory of know ledge between "foundationalists" and"nonfoundationalists," so far as I have been able to ascertain, aremostly the result of m isunderstanding. Foundat ional ism , I believe itis agreed, is a theory about the justification of belief. But apparentlythose who accept it take "justify" in one way and those who rejectit take "justify" in another way .22The foundationalists take "justify" in the epistemic sense. This in-terpreta tion of justific ation is il lustrated, at least, by the concepts ofepistemic preferability I have tried to explicate. And the nonfounda-tionalists take "justify" in one or an oth er of several nonep istem icsenses so me of which seem to presuppose some further sense of"justify" and some of which do not. From the fact that foundation-alism is false, if "justify" is taken in one of its nonepistemic senses,it does not follow, of course, that it is false if "justify" is taken inits epistem ic sense.If you present one account of just if ication and I present another,is the difference between us merely verbal? Not if our respectivecounts are intended to be adequate to the same preanalytic data.A nd there is a set of data to w hich m ost versions of foun da tional ismand nonfoundationalism are intended to be adequate. Such data imply


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that there is a valid distinction between knowledge and true beliefthat isn't knowledge.

The term "justification," in its preanalytic sense, may be thoughtof as being the term for that which distinguishes knowledge from truebelief that isn't knowledge. The terms "warrant" and "grounds" areother possibilities, as are variants of "evidence" and "evident." Stillother possibilities are certain broader concepts, in terms of which ourordinary evidential concepts can be defined, such as "credible" or"reasonable." Thus I would prefer to make use of terms that can bedefined by reference to the comparative concept, more reasonablethan. But for the present let us use "justification." (In consideringthese questions, we will do well to keep in mind that such words as"perceive" and "remember" are generally used in away that impliesknowing, and therefore that the danger of circularity arises if w e at-tempt to explicate knowing in terms of perceiving and remembering.)

We presuppose, then, that there is a valid distinction betweenknowledge and true belief that isn't knowledge. In other words, wepresuppose that it is possible to have true belief with respect to acertain topic without having knowledge with respect to that topic.Let us cite certain examples of this distinction. For then we will beable to ask whether various proposed analyses of the distinction areadequate to the examples. I shall describe three different cases.a) W e contrast the astronomer w ho believes that there are at leastnine planets with the man who arrived at that belief solely on thebasis of an examination of tea-leaves.

b) Consider a case of the sort discussed by Brentano. I happen tohave a headache and you believe, solely on the basis of an exaggeratedpessimism, that someone in the room has a headache; then you havemere true belief with respect to a topic concerning which I haveknowledge.

c) The possible cases need not be restricted to empirical knowl-edge. Suppose I believe, solely on heresay, that a certain mathemati-cal or logical theorem is true; and suppose the theorem is one thatcertain mathematicians or logicians have proved to be true. Then Iwill have true belief with respect to the theorem and they will haveknowledge.Here, then, we have three examples of the distinction between truebelief that isn't knowledge and true belief that is knowledge. Theseexamples are readily describable in the terminology of epistemicpreferability that we have introduced. Let us now consider how they


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would fare under alternative conceptions of the justification of belief.1) Sometimes it is said: "A belief is just if ied if and only if it isarrived at by a reliable method." The word "reliable" may then becharacter ized either by reference to t ruth alone or by reference tosome other sense of justif ication. If we take it the first way, then w ecould form a simple version of the "reliable method" theory by say-ing: "A belief is ju stifie d if and only if the m ethod by m eans of w hich

it was arrived at is, more often than not, a method that leads to be-liefs that are t rue and not to beliefs tha t are false."Given such a simple interpretation of "reliable method," it is verydifficult to distinguish this sense of "justify" from that which mightbe put by saying that a belief is just if ied if and only if it is t rue. (Suc ha theory, of course, would not be adequate to our three examples.)If I have arrived at a true belief, however accidental ly, then I havefollowed a method tha t , on this occasion, has led to a t rue bel ief .Consider, once again, our three examples of true belief that isn'tknowledge. It does not take much ingenui ty to formula te , for eachcase, a general pro ced ure that has been fol lowed and that is such that ,whenever it is fol lowed, it leads to true belief. We need mention onlyour first case: the man whose decision that there were nine planetswas a result of his reading the tea-leaves in a certain way. If thisreading took place, say, on a Friday afternoon at 2:17 and if, pre-viously and subsequent ly , the man never consulted the tea-leavesabout the number of planets at that hour on a Friday af ternoon,then he fol lowed a procedure that always leads to tru th o n e he coulddescribe by saying, "Whenever I wan t to find out anything about thenumber of planets, I should consult the tea-leaves at 2:17 on a Fridayafternoon."

The simple version of the "reliability theory," then, does notenable us to distinguish knowledge from true belief that isn ' t knowl-edge. Hence one must place certain restr ict ions on the simple formu-la I have proposed. I t remains to be seen whether this can be donewithout importing some other sense of jus t i f icat ion.2 3

2) "Justify" might be taken to refer to the procedures of decisiontheory , or game theory. In applying such procedures one may reachconclusions of the following sort: "A course of action is justif ied (orreasonable) for a particular individual at a par t icular t im e, if and onlyif , in relation to the goals of that individual at that t ime and in rela-tion to the evidence he has, it is more reasonable for him to pursuethat course of action than not to pursue i t ." How would we apply


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such procedures to the acquisition of belief? O ne might say: "A be-lief is justified for a particular individual at a particular time, if andonly if, in relation to the goals of that individual at that time and tothe evidence he then has, it is more reasonable for him to have thatbelief than not to have it." Here, once again, we have a sense of "jus-t ify" that presupposes the epistemic sense, for it refers to the evidencethat the individual has."But might not this evidence in turn be characterized by referenceto the procedures of decision the ory ?" The answer is that the kind ofregress that would then be involved will not begin in the right place.("If there are recordings of musical performances, then there musthave been at least one actual performance at some time or other.""No; for all our recordings were made from other recordings ofmusical performances.")"It isn't necessary that w e characterize decision procedure episte-m ically. W e can say that the subject shou ld base her beliefs, not onthe evidence that she has, but merely on the other beliefs that shehas." We can, of course, form ul ate decision theory in such a way . Buthow would reference to such procedures help us to analyze our threeexamples?243) Som etimes justific ation is characterized by referen ce to "sci-ence" as in: "A belief is jus tified if and only if it has as its object oneof the statements of science." This says both too much and too little,for it is inadequate both to our first example and also to our secondexample. Consider first the case involving the planets. The man whofollowed the tea leaves did accept one of the statements of science namely, that there are nine planets. The second example knows thathe has a headache and therefore that someone in the room has a head-ache. In what sense was the object of his belief one of the "state-ments of science"?If, now, we say, "A belief is justified for a given person if and onlyif he arrives at it by means of a scientific procedure," then we haveonce again the difficulties we encountered with "the reliable method"theory.4) Sometimes, it would seem, "justification" is characterized interms of coherence: a belief or a statement is said to be justified inthis sense provided it coheres in a certain w ay with certain other be-liefs or statements. One may ask "In what way?" and, more impor-tant, "With what other beliefs or statements?" The answ er, once again,would seem to presuppose some further sense of justification. Thus I


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have made reference to mutual support in principle P5 above; and Ishall propose a more general concurrence principle in the followingessay. B ut principle P5 makes use of our basic epistemic concept.What would be an alternative to such a principle? Here, too, programshave been formulated, but not with such detail that we can applyany of them to our present problem.255) Justification has also been characterized by reference to proba-bility. Keith Lehrer has held, for example, that a belief may be saidto be completely justified provided only that the believer thinks ithas a greater chance of being true than any of its competitors.26

What is meant by saying of a belief that it has a "chance of beingtrue"?One interpretation of "chance" would be statistical. Then to say

of a given F that it has a "good chance" of being a G could be takento mean something like this: the particular F is a member of a set ofthings most of the members of which are G. But if a belief is true,then, ipso facto, it is a member of a set of beliefs most of which aretrue. And if it is false, then, ipso facto, it is a member of a set of be-liefs most of which are false. Hence, taken this way, the probabilitytheory of justification would seem to have the same limitations asdoes the reliability theory.But probability may also be taken epistemically. Then, to say of aproposition that it has a "good chance" of being true is to that it isconfirmed by what is evident. But if we take the probability theorythis way, then we are presupposing the epistemic concept of justifi-cation.

6) In recent years, it has also been contended that a belief or astatement is justified provided only it has a certain explanatory pow-er.27 But it would seem to be impossible to characterize the requisitesense of explanation without presupposing some other sense of justi-f icat ion. Normally, a hypothesis is not said to be an explanation fora particular formula unless the hypothesis has some positive episte-m ic s ta tus unless , say, it has some presumption in its favor: "theacceptability of an explanation must be assessed on the basis of thedegree to which the explanans as a whole is supported by factual evi-dence."28 Moreover, if the suggestion is to be applied to our threeexamples , then, presumably, we will need an explication, not merelyof the logical locution, "E explains O," but of the relativized locution"E explains O for S."29 How, then, are we to characterize the rela-tivized locution? W e will be back where w e started if w e say merely


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"S has an explanation for O." Suppose E explains O, in the logicalsense of ' 'explains." And suppose S has true belief, but not knowl-edge, with respect to E and with respect to O. Will he then "have anexplanation" for O? In one sense of "have an explanation," the tealeaf man who believes that there are nine planets "has an explanation"for many ast ronomical phenomena. But this sense of "have an expla-nation" has no relevance to the distinction between knowledge andtrue belief that isn't knowledge.It would seem, once again, that we are considering, not a theory,but a program that needs to be worked out.

7) "Justify" may be taken in a strictly ethical sense, as when onesays "I have a right to believe whatever I want, provided no one elseis affected by my beliefs." This ethical sense of "justify" does notseem to be relevant to the issues that separate foundationalists andnonfoundationalists .30 Certainly this concept does not help us in anyobvious w ay with our three examples of the distinction betweenknowledge and true belief that isn't knowledge. But I shall leaveopen the possibility that the epistemic sense of just if ication can beexplicated in purely ethical terms.


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Chapter 2Confirmation and Concurrence

IntroductionThe proposition that most swans are white may be said to confirm

the proposition that all swans are white. Confirmation, so considered,is a relation that holds necessarily between propositions and is there-fore comparable to logical implication and to entailment. But we mayalso speak of the application of this absolute relation of the con-f i rmat ion that one proposition provides another for a particular per-son S.

Let us use the expression, "e tends to confirm h," to refer to theabsolute or logical relation that holds between propositions. And letus use "e confirms h for S" to express the application of this relationto the epistemic situation of a particular person.A n intuitive characterization of confirmation in the first sensewould be this: if a proposition e tends to confirm a proposition h,then anyone who knows e to be true has, ipso facto, a reason foraccepting h. Can we put the matter more precisely?

One might attempt to define "e tends to confirm h" by saying this:necessarily, for every x, if e is x's total evidence (i.e., if e is evidentfo r x and if everything that is evident for x is entailed by e), then hhas some presumption in its favor for x.1 The epistemic conceptsused in this de f i n it i on t h a t of being evident and that of having somep r e su m p t io n a r e readily definable in terms of epistemic preferability.I had used such a definition in Theory of Knowledge. But the defini-tion, as it stands, is not adequate.

33


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The difficulty with the definition is this. It restricts confirmingpropositions to those that are capable of becoming someone's totalevidence. But certain propositions that are incapable of being any-one's total ev idence for example, the propositions that most swansare w h i te a r e such that we want to be able to say of them that theyare capable of confirming other propositions. That is to say, theproposition that most swans are white may confirm the propositionthat the next swan to be observed is white. But the proposition thatmost swans are white cannot be anyone's total evidence; there can-not be anyone who is such that the only thing she knows is the prop-osition that most swans are white.We shall then, refine on this preliminary definition. Then we shallconsider certain other epistemic r e la t io n s i n particular, the relationof making evident and that of concurrence or mutual support.

If, as I have contended, believing and knowing take propertiesrather than propositions as their primary objects, these epistemic re-lations should be thought of as holding in the first instance betweenproperties. But for simplicity I shall discuss them as they hold of prop-ositions. W h a t I shall say about propositions in this connection isreadily adaptable to properties. Thus one property may be to con-f i rm, or to tend to confirm, the attribution of another property; or,to put the matter somewhat differently, one property may be suchthat it confirms, or tends to confirm, that whatever has it has theother property.

The Absolute Sense of ConfirmationMak ing use of the epistemic concepts presupposed by the prelim-inary definition, we first introduce the concepts of an evidential to-tality and of an evidential basis. We will then be in a position to definethe requisite sense of confirmation.2

Dl e is an evidential totality =Df is possibly such that there issomething for whom it is evident and for whom everything isevident is entailed by e.D2 b is a ground of e =Df . Every evidential totality entailing b en-tails e.

Instead of saying "b is a ground of e," we could say: "b indefeasiblymakes e evident."


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Every proposition is a ground of itself, according to these defini-tions. Some but not all propositions are necessarily such that theyhave grounds that are other than themselves. Some propositions havegrounds that do not imply them. We may say in such cases that theirgrounds are nondeductive.

We next introduce the concept of a minimal e totality.D3 t is a minimal e totality =Df t is an evidential totality entail-

ing a ground of e and not properly entailing any evidentialtotality entailing a ground of e.

We use "h properly entails i" to abbreviate "h entails i, and i doesnot entail h."

We may now replace the condition "if e is x's total evidence,"which appeared in our original definition of confirmation, by a ref-erence to a minimal e totality:

D4 e tends to confirm h =Df. Every minimal e totality is neces-sarily such that anyone for whom it is the total evident issomeone for whom h has some presumption in its favor.

When we say that one proposition thus tends to confirm another,we are aff i rming a relation between the two propositions that holdsnecessarily and quite independently of the knowledge or beliefs ofany particular subject. The relation in question is sometimes put bysaying that the second proposition is probable in relation to the first.A n Objection Considered

To understand the concept just introduced, consider the followingobjection to our definition: "There are propositions that are such thatit is impossible that there is someone for whom they are evident andthat, therefore, cannot be entailed by any evidential totality. For ex-ample, consider a certain proposition to the effect that there are ex-actly n electrons, where n is some very large number. There is no onefor whom that proposition can be evident. Hence it vacuously satisfiesthe antecedent of D4 and therefore, by D4, it tends to confirm anyproposition whatever. But, clearly, the proposition in question tendsto confirm some propositions and does not tend to confirm others."

From the fact that there is no one for whom a certain propositione can be evident, it does not follow that e is necessarily such thatthere is no one for whom it can be evident. A general postulate of


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the theory of evidence should be t h is t h at unless a proposition is apriori false, or unless it entails its own nonevidence, then it is pos-sibly such that there is someone for whom it is evident.3

"But consider these two propositions: (e) nothing is evident toanyone and 55% of As are Bs and John i s an A; and (h) nothing isevident to anyone and John is a B. It is clear that e tends to confirmh. Yet neither e nor h can be evident to anyone. Therefore your def-inition is not adequate to this case."

From the fact that a proposition is evident it does not follow thatthat proposition is true. There is no contradiction in saying that it isevident to someone that nothing is evident to anyone. There is noreason to suppose, therefore, that the e and the h of the example arenecessarily such that they cannot be evident.

Two Logical PointsThere are two logical points to be made about the absolute sense

of confirmation.The first point is that the relation of tending to confirm is not tran-sitive. In other words, there are propositions e, h, and i, which are

mutually compatible and which are such that (i) e tends to confirmh, (ii) h tends to confirm i, and (iii

chisholm - the foundations of knowing

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