choosing to run: why house members seek election to the senate

18
Choosing to Run: Why House Members Seek Election to the Senate Author(s): Gary W. Copeland Source: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Nov., 1989), pp. 549-565 Published by: Comparative Legislative Research Center Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/439958 . Accessed: 12/06/2014 22:17 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Comparative Legislative Research Center is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Legislative Studies Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Upload: gary-w-copeland

Post on 12-Jan-2017

213 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

Choosing to Run: Why House Members Seek Election to the SenateAuthor(s): Gary W. CopelandSource: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Nov., 1989), pp. 549-565Published by: Comparative Legislative Research CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/439958 .

Accessed: 12/06/2014 22:17

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Comparative Legislative Research Center is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend accessto Legislative Studies Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

GARY W. COPELAND University of Oklahoma

Choosing to Run: Why House Members Seek Election To the Senate

This paper considers the factors that influence whether a member of the United States House of Representatives runs for the Senate, including personal circum- stances, the opportunity structure, and political factors. It concludes that many specific conditions do have an influence on the desire of a House member to exercise progressive ambition, but that the process of decision making is fluid and individualistic. Potential candidates not only are influenced by conditions, but have the ability to act so as to pro- mote opportunity for themselves.

Accounts of why individuals choose to seek election to the United States Congress, whether the House or the Senate, have in- creasingly focused on recruitment processes and on the decisions of potentially strong candidates to take the risks involved in seeking pub- lic offices of substantial prestige and responsibility. Such decisions have been used to explain many of the significant features of recent congressional elections. Why are House members virtually guaran- teed reelection? Why are senators so much more vulnerable than members of the House? For both cases, a frequent answer is the quality of the challenger.

Most observers believe that, under most circumstances, incum- bent members of the House of Representatives cannot be defeated. A strategic and ambitious politician, then, will normally not run to cer- tain defeat. Who does run against House incumbents under normal cir- cumstances? A small town mayor, a shoe salesman, a flight attendant, or someone else who no one believes can win. Hence, no one sends con- tributions, no one goes door to door, no one mans phone banks, and the unknown challenger remains invisible. Like certain NCAA powers, in- cumbents pad their records on patsies and present the image of invinci- bility. The more invincible they seem, the more awe they inspire; the more awe they inspire, the less likely they are to attract serious competi-

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XIV, 4, November 1989 549

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Gary W. Copeland

tion. Further, even potentially serious challengers will have difficulty attracting the resources necessary for a competitive race.

But the Senate is a different story. Senators do lose. About one-third of them have been defeated in recent elections. Why? Sena- tors face the difficulty of confronting "quality challengers." These are people who are highly visible. These are people for whom citizens will write checks, people who can get on television, people who can inspire campaigners. In short, these are people who offer a viable alternative to the incumbent.

Much of what we know about congressional races, then, focuses on the quality of opposition to incumbents. This paper, looks at a pool of potentially powerful challengers in Senate elections-sitting mem- bers of the U.S. House-to identify circumstances under which they opt to run for the Senate. The results of this analysis suggest a modifica- tion in the traditional view that strategic decision making is the pri- mary determinant of "quality challenges."

The Importance of Challengers

Incumbents in both House and Senate elections have enor- mous advantages over challengers. Some advantages are provided at public expense-staff, office space, travel support, media studios, pub- lishing and mailing, etc. Other advantages accrue to them as incum- bents, such as access to the media and name recognition. And incumbents have the benefit of experience and all that it provides-for example, a network of campaigners and contributors, campaign experi- ence, and issue expertise. Moreover, as previous winners, they are likely to represent the majority party in their area.

So how do these incumbents ever lose? On the House side, the answer is that they rarely do. When they do lose, the reasons ap- pear to be that they were elected in a marginal district, tainted by scandal, redistricted out of a job, or suffered from some similar ad- verse set of circumstances. All but one or two incumbent defeats in any given House election are explicable in these terms (Bauer and Hibbing 1989). The election of 1988 provides an example, when only seven candidates seeking reelection lost. One candidate lost in the primary after allegations of sexual harassment in his office. Of the re- maining six, only one was completely clear of allegations of ethical misconduct. The number of defeated incumbents set a record low- down one from the previous election.

On the Senate side, we have a different story. Real, honest to goodness, high quality incumbents lose. Senators have all the same ad-

550

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Choosing to Run

vantages that House members have and perhaps more. Yet Senate members are vulnerable. As few as 55% of incumbents seeking reelec- tion have been victorious in recent elections. What makes the outcome of Senate elections so different from House elections?

There are, of course, a number of important differences be- tween House races and Senate campaigns. The size of the constituency, the frequency of election, the amounts of money involved in campaign- ing, the stature of the office, and the ability to command media atten- tion are all potential explanations or partial explanations for the different patterns of outcomes that we detect. Increasingly, though, our attention has been focused on the differing quality of the individuals who challenge the incumbents.

Questions regarding the electoral security of House incum- bents dominated research on congressional elections in the 1970s (e.g., Mayhew 1974; Abramowitz 1975; Ferejohn 1977; Fiorina 1977; Cover 1977; Alford and Hibbing 1981). Answers focused on the incumbents, what incumbents do to promote their reelection, and the generally posi- tive evaluation of them by their constituents. The 1978 American Na- tional Election Study of Congressional Elections brought the Senate side to light, moving our understanding of both House and Senate races forward in a very substantial manner (e.g., Abramowitz 1980, 1981; Hinckley 1980a; Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Parker 1981; Jacobson 1981; Maisel and Cooper 1981; Ragsdale 1981). Hinckley, as an exam- ple, concludes, "the few differences observable between House and Senate incumbents make no difference to the vote. It is with challeng- ers, rather, where critical differences appear. Compared to Senate chal- lengers or open seat [House] candidates, House challengers stand apart in low visibility and contact, and a preponderance of neutral ratings" (1980b, 646).

House incumbents and Senate candidates (both incumbents and challengers) are well known, wage active campaigns, and evoke re- sponses from voters. The typical House challenger is virtually invisible. House incumbents, then, rarely face a legitimate challenge-a chal- lenge where the opposition is able to make his or her case to the elec- torate and to have the electorate consider the challenger as a viable alternative to the incumbent. The incumbent normally gets a free ride, but there is rarely such a thing as a free ride for a Senate incumbent. Re- cent research by Abramowitz (1988) decisively reiterates the points that Senate incumbents are vulnerable and that they are easily endan- gered by challengers who possess political experience and can raise and expend considerable sums of money for their campaigns.

As Abramowitz suggests, the differences between House and

551

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Gary W. Copeland

Senate elections are traceable in part to the ability to finance a cam- paign. Senate seats up for election in any given year are relatively few in number; hence, it is easier to raise adequate funds for a viable cam- paign. Even less well-known candidates may feel that in a Senate cam- paign they will have the opportunity to take their case to the public should they receive their party's nomination. House challengers can- not have the same expectation, since they must compete with about 400 incumbents and a like number of challengers for campaign contributions.

The Role of Strategic Politicians

Politicians, by and large, are an ambitious group of people who make strategic career decisions to satisfy those ambitions. In the classic work on the topic, Joseph Schlesinger (1966) identifies three types of ambition: discrete, static, and progressive. Discrete ambition, the de- sire to do one's job for a limited term and return to private life, seems rarely to be found among members of the U.S. Congress. Static ambi- tion, the desire to hold one's office indefinitely, is found at the congres- sional level, but, presumably, largely among those who have achieved substantial power in their chamber. Progressive ambition, the wish to move to higher office, seems to be very common. In fact, some recent research has made the not unrealistic assumption that almost all elected officials have progressive ambition (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Rohde 1979).

Those with progressive ambition, then, are potential candi- dates for offices higher up the ladder of influence and prestige. In any given election, some decide to pursue that ambition and others do not. That choice is based on a personal decision calculus that incorporates the value of the office, the probability of winning the office, the risks and costs involved in seeking it, and the individual's propensity to take risks (see for example Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987, 4-16; or, similarly, Jacobson and Kernell 1981, 22-24). Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde found a general willingness on the part of U.S. senators to seek the presidency because benefits are high. But individual decisions are reasonably well explained by a model that incorporates the risks or costs of such a campaign and the probability of its success. Other works have found that factors that affect the likelihood of success influence whether potentially strong candidates decide to seek election to the House of Representatives (Jacobson and Kernell 1981; Bond, Coving- ton, and Fleisher 1985; Bianco 1984). The argument in that research is that high quality candidates will choose when to run on the basis of the

552

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Choosing to Run

probability of success and that factors such as the vulnerability of the incumbent and national political forces affect that probability.

Increasingly, strategic decision making by potential candidates considering the exercise of their progressive ambition has been used to explain our election conditions. Specifically, the quality of the chal- lenger is deemed a key factor in the competitiveness of any given con- test. When there is a strong challenger, the potential for a competitive race exists; when there is a weak challenger, the incumbent is secure. In general, House races do not attract high quality challengers, a fact that accounts for the electoral success of those incumbents. For the Senate, though, strong challengers do present themselves to the voters; hence, the elections tend to be competitive.

Why strong challengers run for the Senate is not perfectly clear, but there appear to be at least three factors. First, there is a gen- eral perception that candidates can make Senate elections competi- tive and that funds can be found to launch a serious campaign. The probability of success, then, is likely to be judged as reasonable-by reasonable candidates. Second, the benefits of a Senate seat are higher than those of most other offices, and specifically those of a House seat. Third, while there is no firm evidence on this point, the pool of poten- tially strong candidates may be larger for Senate races than for other races. Therefore, even with the same utility function, the number of challengers would be greater.

Testing the Strategic Politician Theory

The strategic politician theory, advanced in its most complete form by Jacobson and Kernell (1981), is a general theory that intends to account for events in a relatively broad portion of U.S. electoral pol- itics. While the theory may have some deficiencies, in many ways it re- ceives empirical support. Voting analyses are convincing in finding that the quality of the challenger is a significant determinant of out- comes. Evidence also is strong that the quality of challengers differs from office to office and differs over time for the same office. Further, there is a growing body of evidence that politicians do, indeed, act in this strategic manner. It is this latter point that is of interest in the pres- ent analysis.

To test the hypothesis that politicians act strategically, re- searchers commonly develop lists of factors that should affect a poten- tial candidate's utility function-that is, factors that should increase or decrease the probability of success. Examples of those considerations are whether the seat is an open seat, what the partisan character is of the

553

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Gary W. Copeland

seat, and how national political trends such as the state of the economy or the evaluation of the president may affect the election. When those factors operate so as to increase the likelihood of electoral success, we should see stronger candidates than would otherwise be the case. Strong candidates are typically defined as individuals who possess political ex- perience and are capable of raising substantial campaign funds. Analy- sis, then, is generally cross-sectional (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Bianco 1984) or combines cross-sectional and time-series meth- ods (Jacobson and Kernell 1981). These studies have been relatively successful in explaining why some districts have a stronger set of candi- dates than others or why a party has a stronger set of candidates in one election than in another one.

An alternative method of testing the strategic politician theory has been to identify a pool of strong potential challengers and to deter- mine why some of them exercise their progressive ambition at some particular point in time and why others do not. This method has a num- ber of potential benefits, but because of the difficulty in identifying the pool of potential candidates, it has been used rarely. Without identify- ing the pool, one cannot examine those who did not run but who might have been strong challengers had they done so. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1987) took members of the U.S. Senate as their pool of poten- tial candidates for the presidency. Based on each senator's cost of run- ning for the presidency, liabilities that would hamper his or her chances for success, and risk-taking propensity, the authors were able to account for the decision of senators to exercise progressive ambition-or not to do so.

Another example is a study similar to the present one, con- ducted by David Rohde (1979). Using those who served in the House from 1954 to 1975 as a pool of potential candidates for the U.S. Sen- ate or for their state's governorship, Rohde concluded that the prob- ability of winning and the tendency toward risk taking are significant determinants of the decision to seek election to the Senate and, to a lesser extent, to the governorship. A similar study by Paul Brace con- cludes that the decision of House members to seek a Senate seat is shaped by the "fundamental importance of the nature of the oppor- tunity" (1984, 568).

The analysis to be presented below builds on those studies by utilizing more recent data (the 1980-86 Senate elections) and by con- sidering some alternative variables. Substantively, the difference be- tween this study and the earlier ones is a decreased ability to explain or predict the exercise of progressive ambition. The major theoretical dif- ference is the conclusion that ambitious politicians can do much to

554

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Choosing to Run

shape the opportunity structure and do not simply rely on the course of events to determine the direction of their career. For ambitious politi- cians, the question is not whether to seek higher office but when to do so. The timing is partially the result of exogenous factors, but also the result of factors that can be manipulated by politicians.

Analysis of Progressive Ambition in Senate Elections

This analysis of the exercise of progressive ambition is based on the Senate elections held in 1980 through 1986. In these elections, the number of House incumbents representing districts in states that held a Senate election ranged from 224 to 323. The number of House incum- bents who launched a Senate campaign in any given year ranged from 8 to 17. The percentage of House members opting to run for the Senate increased in each election, starting with 2.5% in 1980 and reaching 5.4% in 1986. (In 1988, a year not studied here, the numbers declined somewhat.) The success rate for House members running for the Senate was impressive over the time studied, except in 1982. In 1980, the suc- cess rate was 75%; in 1984, 40%; and in 1986,47%. In 1982, only 1 of 13 candidates (8%) succeeded.

Rohde discovered for the 1954-75 period that 3.7% of House members sought election to either the Senate or governorships. The numbers here, while slightly higher, still suggest that few members pur- sue their progressive ambition in any particular election. That conclu- sion is not surprising, but it does speak to the nature of the competition in Senate elections. Obviously, high quality challengers do not come only from the House, but few states holding Senate elections have an in- cumbent House member as a candidate, either in the primary or in the general election. The numbers for the four elections studied here range from 6 to 13 states. If the assumption is that most, if not all, profes- sional politicians have progressive ambition, they are very selective about exercising it.

The fundamental conclusion of this research is that politicians considering whether to run for office employ a very complex decision calculus-probably not quite idiosyncratic, but certainly multivariate. Members of the House (or strategic politicians in other settings) do not ask whether they should seek higher office but when they should seek it. Some fundamental parameters influence that thinking, but there are also numerous slippery, individualistic factors that help potential can- didates choose when to run. Interviews with members of Congress on the topic reveal that they consider how their families would view the de- cision, whether a colleague has a greater claim to the office, whether

555

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Gary W. Copeland

potential financial and campaign supporters may have been lined up early for a rival, whether those potential supporters may be drained by another candidate for another office, what national political forces may influence the election, and so on.1

Still, some order can be brought to the chaos of possible consid- erations in a decision calculus. This analysis accepts the theory that po- tential candidates consider primarily the costs of seeking higher office and the probability of winning it when making their decisions. But it also considers the possibility that political and policy factors play a role. First, we consider the conditions that a member of the House would face by remaining in the House. Second, we consider the competition that the potential candidate would face should he or she seek the Senate seat. Finally, we look at the political factors that may motivate or dis- courage a member considering a challenge.

In the House members' personal situations, we will consider their age, any leadership positions they hold in the House (broadly de- fined to include committee and subcommittee leadership, and whip positions), their length of House service, their vote percentage in the previous election, their previous campaign expenditures, and their party affiliation.

The Senate election circumstances that we will consider in- clude how much cash the incumbent had on hand at the start of the elec- tion year, whether the seat was an open seat, whether the House member and the Senate incumbent are members of the same party (this variable is also considered as a policy and political factor later), how long the Senate incumbent has served, how much the House member spent on the total campaign, the total disbursements, and what the ulti- mate outcome was for the election in question.

The two political factors to be considered are ideological differ- ences between the House and Senate incumbents and their partisan dif- ference or congruence.

Analysis of Why House Members Run for the Senate

The analysis presented here reaches several conclusions. First, it finds some patterns related to the situations that members find them- selves in as representatives, the opportunity structure surrounding the Senate election, and general political factors. Second, the patterns are not consistent over time and in no case do they completely explain why certain members of the House run for the Senate. Third, the decision process appears to be quite individualistic and to take place over a pe- riod of time. Members seem to see the issue as when to run rather than

556

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Choosing to Run

whether to run. Obviously, many never get around to running for higher office, but in most of those cases the members probably never saw the right time to exercise their progressive ambition.

The analysis is made difficult because the data set is highly skewed and because a very small number of House members seek a Sen- ate seat at any given time. The highest percentage of those who ran for the Senate when confronted with the opportunity was less than 5.5%. Standard multivariate analytic techniques do not fare well when the data are skewed to this extent. The nature of the theoretical issue pre- sents additional problems. The ability to explain decisions like these is very limited; multivariate regression equations rarely show explained variance of more than 10 to 12%. Also, the equations were not stable over time. Pooling the data is not a reasonable option because some key variables change substantially over time. The Senate incumbent's cash on hand at the start of the election year increased tenfold over the four elections studied. Total campaign expenditures tripled. The situation in 1986 was not the same as that in 1980.

The analysis is presented, then, in tnrce tables. Table 1 pro- files the conditions under which House members opt to run for the Senate and consists of means and percentages. Table 2 presents a vari- ety of univariate analyses that include correlations and significance tests. Table 3 is a composite of a series of multiple regression analyses. While regression is not an ideal form of analysis with skewed data or with a dichotomous dependent variable, it is at least as good as other statistical techniques under the circumstances. As was noted above, no equation that was reasonably parsimonious was very successful in explaining the decision of specific members of Congress to run for the Senate. Also, there was little consistency over time. Table 3, then, sim- ply identifies the approximate level of significance for key variables in this analysis. In all significant cases, the hypothesized direction of the variable was correct.

The results presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 indicate certain pat- terns, but only the personal circumstances of incumbent House mem- bers show relatively stable patterns over time. Those who opt to challenge Senate incumbents tend to be marginally younger than those who do not and tend to have less seniority. In fact, the second pattern is stronger than is indicated by Table 1. Nearly all representatives who chose to exercise their progressive ambition served in the House be- tween 4 years and 10-12 years. (When that pattern is violated, it tends to be violated by candidates such as Senator Mark Andrews (ND), who was considered the clear successor to long-term senator Milton Young.) The average seniority of those who run and those who do not is similar

557

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

TABLE 1 Profile of Conditions Under Which House Members Run for the Senate

1980 1982 1984 1986

Condition Ran Did Not Run Ran Did Not Run Ran Did Not Run Ran Did Not Run

Yearof Birth 1935 1929 1933 1932 1940 1933 1938 1934 Previous Election Results 72.1 69.4 73.5 69.2 70.5 68.5 68.2 69.1 Previous House Campaign

Expenditures 144,645 127,688 304,460 158,357 290,752 257,514 394,486 273,616 Years in House 9.4 10.4 10.8 10.1 8.6 10.7 10.9 11.0 House Leader 1.0% 99.0% 1.1% 98.9% 2.9% 97.1% 5.8% 94.2% Not House Leader 5.0% 95.0% 7.9% 92.1% 6.8% 93.2% 4.6% 95.4% Democrats 1.5% 98.5% 1.7% 98.3% 4.1% 95.9% 5.4% 94.6% Republicans 4.2% 95.8% 7.8% 92.2% 5.1% 94.9% 5.3% 94.7% Senate Incumbent's Cash

on Hand 18,477 40,177 51,882 109,450 87,844 181,073 189,408 405,923 Open Seat 4.4% 95.6% 7.4% 92.6% 9.8% 90.2% 21.0% 79.0% Not an Open Seat 2.0% 98.0% 3.1% 96.9% 2.9% 97.1% 3.2% 96.3% Election Result 54.6% 55.0% 55.4% 58.4% 56.4% 61.1% 53.9% 57.4% Total Senate Campaign

Expenditures 3,493,800 2,558,972 6,326,879 5,033,432 8,900,138 6,771,155 8,391,401 9,147,040

C)

p 0 -t

~0 '0

t3 cl

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Choosing to Run 559

TABLE 2 Correlation of Key Variables

with House Members' Decision to Run for the Senate

Variable 1980 1982 1984 1986

Birth Year .12 .03 .12 .11 p=.03 p =.63 p = .06 p =.05

House Leader -.12 -.17 -.09 .02 p= .03 p = .002 p = .17 p = .66

House Member's Previous .03 .06 .03 -.10 Vote Percentage p = .61 p = .27 p = .68 p = .79

House Member's Previous .03 .16 .04 .14

Campaign Expenditures p = .66 p = .0045 p = .59 p = .01

Open Seat .06 .09 .14 .26 p=.26 p=.12 p=.04 p=.0001

Incumbent Senator's .15 -.03 .13 .23 Length of Service p = .009 p = .65 p = .05 p = .001

Senate Winner's Vote -.008 -.11 -.10 -.12 Percentage p = .89 p = .058 p=.13 p = .03

Incumbent's Cash on Hand -.04 -.07 -.08 -.06 p=.53 p=.18 p=.32 p = .32

Total Disbursements for .13 .06 .07 -.02 Senate Candidates p = .018 p = .26 p = .26 p = .66

Difference between ADA Scores .04 .02 .04 .10 for House Member and for p = .51 p = .74 p = .59 p = .07 Senate Incumbent

House Member and Senate -.03 -.09 -.05 -.12 Incumbent in Same Party p = .64 p = .11 p = .39 p = .03

in Table 1 only because those who do not run are very junior or senior members of the House. This difference in seniority is also related to whether the member is a leader in the House. Except in 1986, leaders were less likely to run for the Senate than were nonleaders. Moreover, research (not shown) indicates that the party affiliation of leaders has had no effect on their propensity to seek the higher office.

We also find that those who run for the Senate tend to do so from a position of strength. They have fared well in previous elections and have shown the ability to raise substantial sums of money for their campaigns.

Changes in the personal and political circumstances of House incumbents over time indicate some notable patterns. Already noted is the fact that in 1986 House leaders were more likely than nonleaders to run for the Senate. Whether that change was an aberration or a judg-

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Gary W. Copeland

TABLE 3 The Significance of Regression Variable by Year

Significance Variable 1980 1982 1984 1986

Total Disbursements in High High None High Senate Race

Open Seat Moderate None None None House and Senate Incumbents Moderate Moderate Moderate High

in Same Party Leader High High None None Senate Incumbent's Cash Moderate None None None

on Hand Senate Winner's Vote None Moderate None High Previous House Disbursement None High None High

Note: High significant = p <.05. Moderately significant = .05 :< p . 10. Not significant = p >.10.

ment by House incumbents that leadership has decreased in value is not clear. The other notable change is that the probabilities of Republi- cans and Democrats seeking election to the Senate converge. The the- ory of ambition suggests that Democrats should be less likely to run for the Senate than Republicans since, as members of the House majority party, they would give up more than would Republicans.

The opportunity structure that confronts a House member con- sidering a run for the Senate also influences his or her decision. Whether the seat is an open seat makes a notable difference in the likeli- hood that a House member will run for it. Moreover, that pattern be- came increasingly evident over the four elections studied. In 1986 over one-fifth of House members with the opportunity to run for an open Senate seat took advantage of it.

Another key indicator of the opportunity for victory is the size of the campaign fund that the incumbent senator had at the start of the election year. For every election, the amount of the incumbent's cash on hand when House members ran was less than half the amount when House members did not run.

When a representative ran for the Senate, the outcomes were also marginally, but uniformly, closer. It is not possible to determine whether House members see vulnerability and opt to exploit it or whether they tend to be strong challengers once they decide to make the

560

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Choosing to Run

race. But it is clear that House members are often involved in races that prove to be competitive. We also see that, when House members are in- volved in the Senate race, the cost of the campaign increases. The elec- tion of 1986 was the only, minor, exception to that pattern.

One of the theoretically important findings of this research concerns opportunity structure. Normally, it is expected that junior members are more vulnerable than senior members. If that premise were accurate, there should be a negative relationship between the ten- ure of the incumbent senator and a campaign by a House member. One of the strongest set of relationships is the opposite, however: there tend to be strong, positive, and significant relationships between the sena- tor's service and a challenge by a House member. That finding rein- forces the conclusion that ambitious politicians look for the right time to run. Many of them wait too long, missing whatever opportunities might have been available. Others seem to sense that the time of oppor- tunity may be passing them by and take a chance, challenging a long- time incumbent rather than letting their time get away from them.

Finally, political factors show little consistency in relation- ships. If political or policy factors are relevant, we would expect a per- son to be more likely to run against someone who is ideologically different. Further, we would expect House members to be noticeably less likely to challenge Senate incumbents of their own party. Neither pattern firmly holds, but in 1986 we do see some evidence to support those propositions. If, as some have suggested, our partisan politics are becoming more ideological, we may see a continuation of that trend in the future.

In short, there are patterns over time, but there are also incon- sistencies. Opportunity structure is a key to a House member making the decision to run, and it may become increasingly important. The personal circumstances of House members are also important. Most evident is the finding that they tend to run when they have served a modest amount of time and rarely before or after. Finally, party and ideology have been relatively unimportant, but may be developing greater significance.

The decision to run for the Senate appears to be individualistic. Ambitious politicians calculate when to run for higher office. They lay groundwork over a period of years and look for the right opportunity. Evidence for that conclusion is the fact they have a modest length of House service before running. They run from established positions of electoral and financial strength. They prefer to seek an open seat or to challenge an underfinanced incumbent, but they are willing to chal-

561

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Gary W. Copeland

lenge an established veteran of the Senate if the time is right. When they run, races are close, highly contested, and expensive.

Qualitative analysis of evidence supports the same conclu- sions. Elizabeth Holtzman sought what was sure to be a highly con- tested New York seat, but a difficult primary with the chance to face a split Republican party seemed to be her best chance to exercise her pro- gressive ambition. In Connecticut, Toby Moffett opted not to challenge Christopher Dodd for the Democratic party nomination in 1980, when it seemed certain that the Democrat would win. But two years later he could wait no longer and challenged Republican incumbent Lowell Weicker, Jr. His time was slipping by and he took the risk. A careful analysis of case after case reinforces the statistical evidence.

Conclusions and Implications

The standard interpretation of strategic decision making tends to downplay two key dynamics. First, potential candidates undoubt- edly see their decision as one of when to run at least as much as whether to run. Second, candidates help shape the setting and, therefore, affect the likelihood of success or failure.

Politicians frequently tell political scientists that timing is a key component of political success (and one that we do not deal with adequately). We have found that the probability of a member of the House running for the Senate in any given election is around .04. Over the course of the four Senate elections studied, 48 House members sought Senate seats. That number, for a body of 435, is not trivial. If we extrapolate to two Senate election cycles, House members will have four opportunities to exercise that option; hence, over a 12-year pe- riod the probability that a member of the House will run for the Senate increases to . 16. On average, about one in every six members will run in that period.

That point leads to the second dynamic. Members fully under- stand that they are part of a process that they can influence-not just be influenced by it. Periodically, of course, an opportunity structure pre- sents itself that is very hard to ignore. In 1982, for example, Nicholas Brady was appointed to complete the Senate term of Harrison Williams (convicted in the Abscam investigation) but announced he would not be a candidate in the election. Ten candidates lined up in the Democratic primary. More often, however, circumstances exist that may be manip- ulated by a candidate with a strong base.

Potential candidates do not sit in their studies (or at their home computers) and calculate. They talk to people who can help shape elec-

562

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Choosing to Run

toral dynamics. Can potential supporters be lined up? Can potential contributors become committed? What do the polls show? If a potential candidate starts too late or shares the same base of support with other potential candidates or runs into any of a number of possible problems, he or she may opt to wait. But if potential candidates feel that they can manipulate the circumstances to their advantage, then they may choose to make a race of it.

The specific findings of this study reflect those considerations. First, it is hard for members to forsake the bird in the hand if they al- ready wield power in the House. Second, representatives who seek elec- tion to the Senate do so from positions of strength. Third, the opportunity structure is important, but less so than the House mem- ber's ability to manipulate conditions. Members who have a strong per- sonal base seem more likely to run for the Senate than members who simply see an opportunity. Finally, partisan differences play only a very minor role, and ideological differences an insignificant role, in the deci- sion to run for the Senate.

Clearly, House members considering a Senate run act strategi- cally. But this study suggests that having a personal political base is a key factor in those strategic calculations. A fundamental element that can account for differences between House and Senate races is that po- tential candidates for the House are much less likely to have a base from which to launch an attack and, hence, rarely choose to do so. Sen- ators, though, confront a state full of House members who may have that base and who may become strong challengers-when they feel the time is right.

Gary W. Copeland is Associate Professor ofPolitical Science and Associate Director, Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma 73019.

NOTES

The author thanks Jean Shumway Warner, Robin LeBlanc, and Steve Van Win- kle for their research assistance on this project. Comments made by John Hibbing were also very helpful.

1. Over the past decade, the author has interviewed about 20 representa- tives, formally or informally. While the question of careers has not been the primary focus of these interviews, it has frequently been addressed in interviews. Staff and po- litical advisers have also been interviewed on the same topic. In all cases confidential- ity was guaranteed.

563

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

564 Gary W. Copeland

REFERENCES

Abramowitz, Alan. 1975. "Name Familiarity, Reputation, and the Incumbency Effect in Congressional Elections." Western Political Quarterly 28:668-84.

Abramowitz, Alan. 1980. "A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in 1978." American Political Science Review 74:633-40.

Abramowitz, Alan. 1981. "Choices and Echoes in the 1978 U.S. Senate Elections."Amer- ican Journal of Political Science 25:112-18.

Abramowitz, Alan. 1988. "Explaining Senate Election Outcomes." American Political Science Review 82:385-404.

Abramson, Paul, John Aldrich, and David Rohde. 1987. "Progressive Ambition among United States Senators, 1972-1988." Journal of Politics 49:3-35.

Alford, John, and John Hibbing. 1981. "Increased Incumbency Advantage in the House." Journal of Politics 43:1042-61.

Bauer, Monica, and John R. Hibbing. 1989. "Which Incumbents Lose in House Elec- tions: A Response to Jacobson's 'The Marginals Never Vanished'." American Journal of Politics 33:262-71.

Bianco, William. 1984. "Strategic Decisions on Candidacy in U.S. Congressional Dis- tricts." Legislative Studies Quarterly 9:351-64.

Bond, Jon, Cary Covington, and Richard Fleisher. 1985. "Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections." Journal of Politics 47:510-29.

Brace, Paul. 1984. "Progressive Ambition in the House: A Probabilistic Approach." Jour- nal of Politics 46:556-71.

Cover, Albert. 1977. "One Good Term Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections." American Journal of Political Science 21:523-42.

Ferejohn, John. 1977. "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections." American Political Science Review 71:166-76.

Fiorina, Morris. 1977. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It."' American Political Science Review 71:177-81.

Hinckley, Barbara. 1980a. "House Re-elections and Senate Defeats: The Role of the Chal- lenger." British Journal of Political Science 10:441-60.

Hinckley, Barbara. 1980b. "The American Voter in Congressional Elections." American Political Science Review 74:641-50.

Jacobson, Gary. 1981. "Incumbents' Advantages in the 1978 Congressional Elections." Legislative Studies Quarterly 6:183-200.

Jacobson, Gary, and Samuel Kernell. 1981. Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elec- tions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kazee, Thomas. 1980. "The Decision to Run for the U.S. Congress: Challenger Attitudes in the 1970s." Legislative Studies Quarterly 5:79-100.

Maisel, Sandy. 1982. From Obscurity to Oblivion. Knoxville: University of Tennes- see Press.

Maisel, Sandy, and Joseph Cooper, eds. 1981. Congressional Elections. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Mann, Thomas, and Raymond Wolfinger. 1980. "Candidates and Parties in Congres- sional Elections." American Political Science Review 74:617-32.

Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni- versity Press.

Parker, Glenn. 1981. "Interpreting Candidate Awareness in U.S. Congressional Elec- tions." Legislative Studies Quarterly 6:219-34.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Choosing to Run 565

Ragsdale, Lyn. 1981. "Incumbent Popularity, Challenger Invisibility, and Congressional Voters." Legislative Studies Quarterly 6:201-18.

Rohde, David. 1979. "Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of the United States House of Representatives." American Journal ofPolitical Sci- ence 23:1-26.

Schlesinger, Joseph. 1966. Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:17:29 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions