church committee: hearings-- volume 1

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IMELLIGENCECTIVITIESSENATEESOLUTlON1

HEARINGSBBIFORHIRB

SELECTCOMMITTEE O STUDY

QOVERNMENTAL PERATIONSWITHRESPECT O INTELLIGENCEACTIVITIES

OB TEBl

UNITED STATESSENATENINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

VOLUME 1

UNAUTHORIZED STORAGE OF TOKIC AGENTS

SEPTEMBER 16, 17, AND 18, 1976

Prin,ted for the use of the Select Committee To Study GovernmentalOperations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

684810 WAS HINGTO N : 1978

For sale by the Supetintandent of Documen ts, U.S . Oovernm ent Printing Ofike

Weshiryton, D.C. 20&X - Price S2.48



SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERdlllIONS

WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIUENCB ACTIVITIES

FRAN3 CHURCH, Idaho, Uha4morc

JOEIN 0. TOWH IR, Texas, Vtce Uhairnroa

PHILIP A. HAR T, Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER, JB., Tennessee

WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota BARRY OOUDW ATER, Arleona

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES McC. MATHIA S, Ja., Maryland

ROBERT MORGAN. North Carolina RICHARD SCZIWEIKER, Pennsylvania

GARY HAR T, Colorado

WILLIAM a. MILLm E, Stafl ~h30:0,-

FR~DDQRICK A. 0. SCEWAEE, JR., Oh&j Oounasl

CURTIS R. SHOTH ERB. Counsel to tha Minority

ACDUEY HATBY, Clerk 01 the. Com mittse

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CONTENTS

HEARING DAYS

Tueedey,September16,1975---------------------------------------Wednesday September 17, 1975-------------------------------------Thursday, $eptember 18, 1975- _ _______________________ ______ _______

LIST OF WITNESSES

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1975

William E. Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, accompaniedb Sayre Stevens, Assistant Deputy Direotor, Science and Technology,E IA; and Mitchel Rogovin, Special Counsel, CIA _______________ :--

Nathan Gordon, former Chief, Chemistry Branch, Technical ServicesDivision, Central Intelligence Agency- __ __ _-_ _ _ __ _ _ - __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBIOE 17, 1975

Richard Helms, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, former Director of the CentralIntelligence Agency, accompanied by Thomas Karamessines, formerDeputy Director for Plans Central Intelligence Agency- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

James Leonard, president, United Nations Association of the UnitedStates-_--------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1975

Dr. Edward Schantz, professor, University of Wisconsin, former Depart-ment of Defense em loyee _______________________ ________ __ _ _.____ _

Charles A. Senseney, 5 epartment of Defense em loyee formerly m theSpecial Operatione Division at Ft. Detrick, &de-:-- _____ - _______

Robert T. Andrews, senior advisor to the General Counsel, Office of theSecretary of Defense---------------------------------------------

HEARINGS EXHIBITS 1

No. l-February 16, 1970 DDP memorandum from Thomas Karamessinesto Director of Central Intelligence- - __-- ________ -_-__ _ _ _______

No. 2-Excerpts from a CIA inventory of lethal and incapacitating agentsfound at a CIA building (excerpted by the aelect committee)----

No. ~-TWO sheets of paper dated February 18, 1970, found at the CIAwith shellfish toxin ____ _ ________ - _____ __ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ -- -

No. kNovember 25, 1969 White Housethe President conoerning chemia af

ress release with a statement byand biological warfare ______ __

No. B-February 14, 1970 White House press release concerning bio-logicalandtoxinweapons ___________ - ____________ - ______ - --.--

No. 6-October 13 1967 memorandum from Chief, Technical SerwceDivision, B!ological Branch to Chief, Technical Services Division-

Page

1

lfl

4

52

93

125

139

159

178

189

192

198

200

202

204

‘Under criteria determined by the committee, in consultation with the White House,the Department o! Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency certain materials havebeen deleted from those documents. come of which +re prevlouaiy class ified, to maintainthe integrity of the internal operatin

fprocedurea of the agen clee involved and to Protect

certain information of 8 nation al recur ty nature.



No. 7-November 25, 1969 National Security Council Decision Memo-randum 35 from Henry A. Kissinger to: the Vice President; theSecretary of State; the Secretary of Defense. the Director Central

Inteih ence Agency. the Director, Arms bontrol and Disarma-ment s gency. the Director Office of Emergency Preparedness;and the Director, Office of Science and Technolo

B__ _________

No. 8-February 20, 1970 Nationa Security Council e&don Mem-orandum 44 from Henry A. I&sin er to: the Vice President; theSecretary of State; the Secretary of % efense. the Director CentralIntelligence Agency; the Director, Arms dontrol and Disarma-ment Agency; the Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness;and the Director, Office of Science and Technology-- ___________

No. 9--“Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Aa hyxiating,Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological ltl ethods ofWarfare.” Signed at Geneva June 17, 1925 ___________-________

No. 16-Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

and Stock iling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weaponsand on F heir Destruction. Signed at Washington, London,Moscow, April 10,1972-____-___--__------------------------

No. 11-List of persons who received toxins from Fort Detrick (receivedfrom)----------------------------------------------------

No. la-Excerpt from “Summary Re ort, Working Fund Investigations”from the Special Operations division--- _ - _ _ _ __ ___ __ __ - _-_ _ ___

No. la-February 17, 1970, Special Operations Division, Toxin Inventory-

207

210

211

212

216

240244

APPENDIX

September 16, 1975 letter from William E. Colby to Senator Church----- 245



INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES-UNAUTHORIZEDSTORAGE OF TOXIC AGENTS

TUESDAY, SEPTE IKBER 18, 1976

U.S. SENATE,SELECT COMMITTEE To STUDY GOVERNMFJTWAL OPERATIONS

Wrr~ RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE Acrrvrrrzs,Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 318,Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)presiding.

Present : Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan,Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater, Mathias, and Schweiker.

&O present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. 0.Schwarz Jr. chief counsel ; Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the minor-ity ; and Pad Michel, professional staff member.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will oome’to order.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities opens itspublic hearings today with an inquiry into a case in which directorders of the President of the United States were evidently disobeyedby employees of the CIA. It is the purpose of this hearing, and thosewhich shall follow for the next 2 months, to illuminate the need tomake certain in the future that Federal law enforcement and intelli-gence agencies perform their duties in ways which do not infringeupon the rights of American citizens.

The committee has not held public hearings prior to this time, be-cause of its concentration on charges that the CIA has been involved

in assassination plots directed against certain foreign leaders. In thatinvestigation, the committee has taken over 8,000 pages of testimony,interrogated nearly 100 witnesses, examined a vast array of documents,and,compiled a record on the assassination issue alone that comparesin size to the entire investigation of the Senate Watergate Committee.

Because of the serious damage that protracted public hearings onsuch a subject could do to the United States in its relations with foreigngovernments, the committee chose to conduct these hearings behindclosed doors, but the committee intends to publish a full and detailedreport of its findings within the next few weeks.

It is the right of the American people to know what their Govern-ment has ,done-the bad as well as the good-and we have every con-fidence that the country will benefit by a comprehensive disclosure ofthis grim chanter in our recent history.

In examining wrongdoing bv such agencies as the FBI and theCIA, the committee in no way wishes to denigrate the imnortance oft.heir legitimate work. I know, firsthand, the wartime worth of intel-Jipence gathering because T served in the military intelligence as anArmy lieutenant in World War II.

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2

Today, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, 1 am fullyaware of the

Feat value of good intell i ence

out it, an inin times of peace. With-

ormed foreign policy cou d not be conducted ; withoutit, nuclear arms controls could not be policed ; without it, the United

States would be left groping in a .dangerous world,At the same time, we must insist that these agencies operate strictly

within the law. They were established to spy on foreign governmentsand to fend off foreign spies. We must know to what degree theyhave turned their techniques inward to spy on the American peopleinstead. If such unlawful and improper conduct is not exposed andstopped, it could, in time, undermine the very foundations of freedomin our own land.

So the committee intends to hold public hearings, not only ondomestic abuses of the CIA and the FBI, but on improper activities

of such other Government agencies as the Internal Revenue Service,the Post Office, and the National Security Agency.

Later in the fal l, the committee will hold a series of hearings onproposals for reforming our national intel ligence system and for es-tablishing legislative oversight of its activities. New legislation willbe needed to preserve for the United States an efticient intelligenceapparatus that remains outward reaching, and operates within thelaw in the service of our legitimate national security needs.

The particular case under examination today involves the il legalpossession of deadly biological poisons which were retained within the

CIA for 5 years after their destruction was ordered by the President,and for 5 years after lthe United States had entered into a solemn inter-national commitment not to maintain stocks of these poisons exceptfor very li ,miited research purposes.

The main questions before the committee are why the oisons weredeveloped in sue!1 quantities in the first place ; why (the !P residentiorder was disobeyed ; and why such a serious act of insubordinationcould remain undeteoted for so many years.

In exploring lthese questions, which go ti 6he very heart of ourwork, I wish rto acknowledge the cooperation of the White House, the

Defense Department, ,and those offici,als who are presentlv in chargeof the CIA, including its Dire&or, Mr. Colby. Upon the discovery ofthe cache of forbidden toxins, the executive branch immediately cameto this committee and indicated that an investigation was underway,the results of which were later report& to the com>mittee. We thenconducted our own independent, inquiry, T,he outcome of these twoinvestigations is the matter before the committee today.

Now, ,before we turn <to our first witness, Mr. Colby, the Director ofthe CIA, I would like to recognize the ranking Republican member ofthis committee, Senator Tower, of Texas, for such opening remarks as

he might care to m’ake.Senator Tower ?Senator TOWER. Thank you.Mr. Chairman, you have ,alluded to, and I think .it is important for

al l of us to keep in mind, tihe comprehensive nature of this committee’stask .as mandati by Senate Resolution 21. Our assignment to conductthis first full-scale examination of the Nation’s intelligence activitiesin more than 25 years must be viewed as a national determination tocome to grips with a wide range of deferred decisions in this vitalarea.



3

Since the end of the Second World War, this Nation has haltingly-and with no small degree of ambivalence-sought to insure its sur-vival by recognizing and legitimizin the role of intelligence andclandestine aotivi,ty. Our ambivalence 1 as been due, no doubt, to the

inherent confliots that tare created when an open society faces up ;tothe need for secrecy in the intelligence arena. But it :has been an lam-bivalence sanctioned by decisions of Presidents, Congresses, and ourjudicial s stem.

In the ischarge of its responsibilities, this committee has avoided-Iand will continue to avoid-the temptations of political expediencywhich would lay aside ~historical perspective and simply pomt thefinger of blame.

When the CIA advised the committee of its discovery of the toxinswhich are the subject of today’s hearings, the Agency was acknowledg-

ing its responsibility to a5rmatively contribute to the solutions thatwe all seek.

In making this matter” a subject for public hearing, it is my hopethat we will, in an ,atmosphere free of sensationalism, promote agreater public understanding of the full ,and fair nature of the com-mittee’s recesswhile demonstrating our concern-a concern shared bythe intel Pgence community-for the complexity ,and sensitivity of &hetask of recommending changes or refinements in this component of ournational security struoture.

In the coming weeks and months we will hear much of the problemsoccasioned by such intelligence concepts as compartmentation, limitedaccessand need-to-know. These principles are an inherent part of thevery fabric of intelligence. They are not, and may never be, fail-safe.Our task is rto examine how well we have done, and to search formethods of doing better within the parameters of a democraticsociety.

So l’t is in Ithat spirit that we welcome your appearance here today,Mr. Colby.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Tower.Mr. MICHEL. Exhi(bit No. 1 is a draft memorandum, prepared

February 16, 1970, for Director of Cerrtral Intelligence. Subject:“Contingency Plan for Stockpile of Biologioal Warfare Agents.” Thedocument consists of three pages, and on the third page is the indica-tion that it was dictated by N. Gordon.1

Exhibit NO. 2 is a document, “Inventory of Lethal and Incapaci-tating Agents Found at a CIA Building, Excerpted From CIAInventory.” z

The document consists of six pages and was prepared by the SelectCommittee staff, and reviewed by Dr. Sayre Stevens of the CIA.

Exhibit NO. 3 consists of two documents, each one page long, datedFebruary 18, 1970, and titled “Paralytic Shellfish Poison-WorkingFund Investigations.” s

Exhibit No. 4 is a press release from the White House dated Novem-ber 25,1969, consisting of two pages.’--

18eep.189.9 See p.192.a Seep. 199.~Seep.290.



4

Exhibit No. 5 is a press release from the White House dated Beb-ruary 14,1970, consisting of two pag=e5.sExhibit No. 6 is a memorandum to Chief, TSD, Subject MKNAOMI :

Funding, objectives, and accomplishments, dated October 18, 1967,and consisting of three page~.~

Exhibit No: ‘7 is a docpment consistinber 25,1969, titled “National Security E

of three pages, dated Novem-ouncil D&slon MemoFndum,

No. 35.” It 1s addressed to the various parties, including the Director,Central Intelligence A

Exhibit No. 8 is a 5ency.’ocument consisting of one page, dated Feb-

ruary 20, 1970? titled “National Security Council Decision Memoran-dum 44,” which includes among it8 addressees, Director, ‘CentralIntelligence.s

Exhibit No. 9 is a document consisting of one page, titled “GenevaProtocol of 1925.” DExhibit No. 10 is a document consisting of four pages, tit led “Con-

vention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-pil ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and onTheir Destruction.” lo

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Colby, if you would please stand to takethe oath. Mr. S,tevens, if you would stand too, in the event that youhave any testimony to offer, I will administer the oath to both of you

at the same time.

Do you both solemnl;y swear that al l of the testimon you will givein these proceedings, will be the truth, the whole trut E , and nothingbut the truth, so help you God ?

Mr. COLBY. do.Mr. STEVENS. ,I do.

A’

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Colby, I understand you have a short openingstatement, and I invite you to read it at this time.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEL-

LIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY SAYRE STEVENS, ASSISTANT DEP-

UTY DIRECTOR, SCIEMCE AJiD TECHNOLOGY, CIA; AND MITCHELROGOVIN, SPECIAL COUNSEL, CIA

Mr. COLBY. I do, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared statement whichhas been distributed. I will omit certain elements of it to save a lit tletime. I think I can cover the main points.

Mr. Chairman! this hearing typifies the difficulty of modernizingour approach to intelligence in America. We are resolved that intelh-gence operations be conducted in America in conformity to our lawsand constit.utional procedures. This does not mean that intelligence

can have no secrets. We have many secrets in America, from grandjury proceedings to the ballot box, where secrecy is essential or theprocess will not work.

We are engaged, in these investigations, Mr. Chairman, in resolvingthe dilemma between the necessary secrets of intell igence and theequally necessary exposure of our Government’s workings to our peo---

6 seep. 202.OSeep. 204.7Seep.207.8 seep. 210.‘Seep. 211.lb smn. 212.



5

ple and their representatives to insure that they respond to the pw@e’sWill. I

In former times, this contradiction was resolved in favor of almosttotal intelligence secrecy, which is at the base of President Kennedy’s

remarks that intelligence_ _-_ failures are trumpeted, while the successesgo unheralded.

As we lift this veil to open intelligence to the kind of1

ublic reviewand control we Americans want today, we have two pro lems. One ishow far to go, on which we must jointly develop some guidelines andunderstandings, or we risk seriously and unnecessarily inju~ring ourintelligence.

The other is to insure that our peowhat modern intelligence really is. %

le have an accurate perception ofitbout this, an individual act is

seen as the norm, in a

describing a whole e ephant as only an extension of the part he

plication of Aesop’s fable of each blind man

perceives.To this committee and its staff to date, we have tried to resent the

Tlhole of intelligence today, and not just its parts. I hope t is will *bethe basis for the decisions we will reach as to the guidelines and su-pervision we want to establish for intelligence tomorrow.

I thus ask for B suspension of final judgment until the whole pic-t,ure of intelligence can be presented in its true proportions-good andbad-while we respond to your requirement of public exposure in thishearing of one portion bf it.

With other Government functions, like our Army or our welfareservices, the whole isP

erceived and the individual act and even mistakeis seen in proportion.. n intelligence, we must modernize our

::erception

of its whole contribution to our country while we insure t at it con-forms with the standards we Americans expect. I hope we can do bothjobs.

The specific subject today concerns CIA’s involvement in the devel-opment of bacteriological warfare materials with the Army’s Biolo +-cal Laboratory at Fort Detrick, CIA’s retention of an amount of she l-fish toxin, and CIA’s use and investigation of various chemicals and

dru .x4?e relationship between the CIA and the Army Biological Labora-tory at Fort Detrick as an activity requiring further investigationsurfaced in late April of this year. It resulted from information pro-vgded by a CIA officer not directly associated with the project, inresponse to my renow be considere f

eated directives that all past activities which mightquestionable be brought to the attention of Agency

management.r$nformation provided by him, and by two other officers aware of

the project, indicated that the project at Fort Detrick involved the

&&lopment of bacteriological warfare agents-some lethal-and@#$ated delivery systems suitable for clandestine use.+* 1 search was made for any records or other information available

This search produced information about the basiceen the Army and the CIA relating to the project and

records covering its activities from its beginnmg in 1952

c+rse of the investigation, CIA’s laboratory storage facili-searclied, and about 11 grams-a little less than half an



ounce-of shellfish toxin, and 8 milligrams of cobra venom, were dis-covered in a little-used vaulted storeroom in an Agency ‘burlding.

The White House was notified as soon as the existence of the ma-terials became known, and was kept informed ae the investigationprogressed. The chairmen of CIA’s four oversight committees werealerted immediately to the c&cove

3of the toxin. Records and reports

were exchanged with the Defense epartment as it ‘began its own in-vestigation of the matter. This c0nnmtte.e was notified of our investi-gation of the program in mid-June, and has been provided all projectfiles ,and reports of the investi tion.

,CIA association with Fort ?a? trick involved the Special 0 erationsDivision (SOD), of that facility. This division was re’sponsib e for de-veloping special applications for biolo ‘cal warfare agents and toxins.Its principal customer was the U.S.

Em CT Its concern was with ltzledevelopment of both suitable agents and elivery mechanisms for usein paramilitary situations. Both standard biological warfare agentsand ,biologically derived toxins were investigated by the division.

The CIA relationship with SOD was formally established in May1952, through a memorandum of agreement with the Army chiefchemical officer for the performance of certain research and develop-ment in the laboratory facilities of the Special Operations Divisionof the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick. The initiative forestablishing this relationship was a belief that the special capabilities

of the Fort Detrick group, and its access to biological materials of allsoi-@, provided the Agency access to research and development ex-pertise and capabilities which were appropriate to its function andnot otherwise *available. The need for such capabilities rwas tied toearlier Office of Strategic Services World War II experience, whichincluded the development of two different types of agent suicide pillsto be used in the event of capture, and a successful operation usingbiological warfare materials to incapacitate a Nazi leader temporarily.

Through the course of years, Agency objectives in the project be-came better defined. Thus, a project approval memo of 1967 identified

four functional categories of project activity : maintenance of a stock-pile of temporarily incapacitating and lethal agents in readiness foroperational use ; assessment and maintenance of ‘biological and chemi-cal dissemination systems for operational use ; adaptation and testingof a nondiscernible microbioinoculator-a dart device for clandestineand imperceptible inoculation with biological warfare or chemicalwarfare agents--for use with various materials and to assure that themicrdbioinoculator could not he easily detected by later examinationof t’he target; and providing technical support and consultation onrequest for offensive and defensive biological warfare and chemical

warfare.In the later years, the activities dwindled to the point of simply

maintaining a stockpile of agents and delivery systems for possibleAgency use.

From its outset, the project was characterized by extreme compart-mentation, or ‘a high degree of secrecy within CIA itself. Only two orthree Agency officers at any time were cleared for access to FortDetrick activities. Though some CIA-originated documents have beenfound in the project files, it is clear that only a very limited documentation of activities took place.



7

A mejor early requirement of the Agency was to find a replacement&r the standard cyanide L-pill issued to agents in hazardous situationsd&m&g World War II. This was the Ibasis on which eventually we&&evered the shellfish toxin. The only ,application of this toxin was&the, U-2 flight over the U.S.S.El. in May 1960, during which &ryP&wers carried such a device concealed in a silver dollar.“, &n the Powers case, the grooves of the drill bit were tiled with shell-

Wrslr~&txin. He obviously did not use it, and was not instructed to doSIZSQ~;:~~.as offered to him to provide him with the option. The Powersfbght W&S the only time we are aware that the toxin ;erlasprovided for$perational use, although the L-pill was made available for earlier3it&$a&

“:The primlary Agentt&m devices ‘to ,be SeJ

interest was in the development of dissemina-u wilth standard chemicals off the shelf. Various

,&kemination devices, such as a fountain pen dart launcher and anen ,*

Ye head bolt designed to release a substance when heated, appeared

to 8, peculiarly suited for clandestine use. Available records do notindicate that all specific items were developed exclusively for the CIA,aswork on similar devices was also done for the Army.

A large ‘amount of Agency attention was given to the problem ofInca&eve o

acitating guard dogs. Though most of the dart launchers were

rd for the Army, the Agency did request the development of

~ma hand-held dart launcher for its peculiar needs for this purpose.~.~~~ork was also done on temporary human incapacitation techniques.

1 support elements of CIA received continuing requests fortive, and rapidly acting incapacitating devices.

e related to a desire to incapacitate captives before they could#@n&r &hemselves incapable of talking, or terrorists before they could

retaliatory action.rk! w&s done in tr to develop the dart system for such pur-

since a larger ,amount of an inca-y inactivate a human than of a

he Agency in the development ofmaterials and facilities. This is

r,~&&~e late sixties, a variety of biological warfare agents and toxins@w,, gnaintained by the SOD for possible Agency use. Varymp

~jj@nn@ .of these materials, ranging from 100 prams (about 3.5&nc&$ ,to 100 milligrams (about three thousandths of an ounce)

. . ntained. -h~peciflc accounting for each agent on the list is not on hand,

n&&e& of Defense reccrds indicate that the materitals were, in&roved in 1970 bv SOD personnel. extent for the 11 <Tarns ofan& in small medical bottles labeled shellfish toxin, plus thegrams of cobra venom, which were found on May 20 of this

me t.he toxin was found. the officer resnonsihle for the Droiectted he had no recollection ‘as to how it got there. On the 30th



8

of June, discussions were held with the retired Agency 0503 whohad provided the init ial lead.

This man, who had been the 4X3-15 branch chief in 1970, stated thatthe toxin had, in fact, been moved from Fort Detrick and stored in thelaboratory. This was done on the basis of his own decision after con-versations with the responsible project o5cer.

He further stated that he made this decision based on the fact thatthe cost and difficulty of isolating the shellfish toxin were so great thatit simply made no sense to destroy it, particularly when there wouldbe no future source of the toxin.

The current branch chief believes this explanation .is correct, but stilldoes not recall the actual act of receiving the material from Fort.Detrick. Both of these middle-grade officers agree that no one, includ-ing their immediate superior, was told of the retention of the shellfishtoxin.

The former branch chief recalls that subsequent to the delivery ofthe shellfish toxin to CIA, he was told by his chief to inform FortDetrick personallv that destruction of CIA materials should take place.He did so, but did not include the shellfish toxin, then in CIA hands,in his instructions.

Discussions with Mr. Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, andMr. Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans in 1970, have estab-lished that both were aware of the requirement that such material be

disposed of. They recall that clear instructions were given that theCIA stockpile should be destroyed by the Army, and that, in accord-ance with Presidential directives, the Agency should get out of thebioloRica1 warfare business.

With the discovery of the shellfish toxin this year, a complete inv’en-tory of the vault in which it was found was taken. The inventory con-sisted of a stock of various materials and delivery systems accumu-lated over the years, including other lethal materials, incapacitants,narcotics, hallucinogenic drugs, irritants and riot control azents, herbi-cides, animal control materials, and many common chemicals.

The small size of the vault (about 8 by 10 feet) and the few shelveslimi t the extent of this stockpile. The materials are, for the most part,the residue of a number of different CIA programs. These involvedCIA’s effort to keep a close watch on emerging technology-in this casepharmaceutical technology-to insure that we did not encounter anunanticipated threat from hostile intelligence services with which wecould not contend.

We also wished to capitalize on new advances which should substan-tially assist us in our efforts to collect foreign intelligence or in a war-time situation, The narcotics in storage related to CIA’s overseas efforts

to collect intell igence on the narcotics trade, to help in countering it. Wehave also supplied tear gas and mace to our officers overseas for usein defensive situations where firearms would not be appropriate.

The threat, as well as the promise, posed by newer types of drugs,particularlv the hallucinogenic drugs, made at least exploratory re-search on them essential. You will recall our concern over the possiblerole of drugs in the apparent brainwashing of American POW’s if iKorea, and the haunted eyes of Cardinal Mindzenty as he confessed ata Communist trial.



9

I mi ht add that we believe that a drug was administered to one ofour o B cers overseas by a foreign intelligence officer within the pastyear. Those responsible for providing technical support to clandestineoperations felt it necessar

these drugs could be u sed

that the understand the ways in which

, their ed ects and their vulnerabilities tocountermeasures.

In pursuing such concerns as these, many different materials wereobtained and stored for provision to contractors who did the actualscientific research involved.

One of the major results of these investigations of the CIA has beento impress upon our emthe fact that decisions a

loyees, and all of us involved in intelligence,t out our programs must be made in the light

of today’s world. As you are aware, m mid-1973, we tried to identifyall questionable activities. We did so for what I believe to be most

of them, and issued internal directives to insure that the CU remainwithin the bounds of the law.

Repeated emphasis on the importance of this did lead to the identifi-cation of our association with Fort Detrick as an activity to be reviewedbefore we were aware that one of its products had been improperlysequestered. The controls involved in the shellfish case seem to haveexisted but not to have been applied. The controls that would haveprevented or discovered this act were principally those which are thekind of management we must have for the intelligence business.

I am confident that proper management will exist as a result of thechanges we are making in our approach to intelligence, to insure itsconformity with American values and standards. These will includea better public appreciation of modern intelligence, better guidelinesfor its proper activities, and better supervision externally to stimulatebetter supervision internally.

With these, I am confident that such episodes as the shellfish toxinwill not be repeated.

‘1Thank you, Mr. Chairman.<[The full text of Mr. Colby’s prepared statement follows :]

PJ@PA~~z~ STATEMENT OF WILLUM E. COLBY, Drnxoro~ OF CEN TRAL IBTEL LIOER CEAQENCY

Mr. Chairman : Th is hearing typifies ‘the dif3culty of modernizing our approachto intelligen ce in America. We are resolved that intelligen ce operations be con-

ducted in America in conformity to our laws and Constitutional procedures. Th is

does not mean that intelligen ce can have no secrets-we have many secrets in

America, from grand jury proceedings to the ballot box, where secrecy is esse ntial

OF the. proc ess wi ll not work.

We are engaged in these investigations, Mr. &airman, in resolving the di-lemma between the necessary secrets of intelligenc e, and the equally necessary

~@Jsu re of our Government’s workings to our peop le and their representatives

l?jyxenfmtve that they respond to the peop le’s will. In former times, this contradic-thJ&was resolved in favor of almost total intelligen ce secrecy, which is at thebase of President Kennedy’s remark that intelligen ce failures are trumpeted,

%@ %tbe~successes go unheralded.‘&i@we. ,lift this veil to open intelligen ce to the kind of pub lic review and

mkwe &ue rican s want today, we have two problem s. One Is how far toome guide lines and understandings, or we

our intelligenc e. The other is to ensureion of what modern intelligen ce really

as the norm, in application of Aes op’s

e elephant as only an extension of the



10

To this committee and its staf f to date we have tried to present the wholeof intelligence today, and not j,ust its parts. I hope this whole will be the baaiafor the decisions we will reach as to the guidelines and supervision we wantto establish for intelligence tomorrow. I thus ask for a suspension of Anal judg-ment until the whole picture of intelligence can be presented in its true propor-tions, good and bad, while we respond to your requirement of public exposurein this hearing of one portion of it. With other government functions like ourArmy or our welfare services, the whole is perceived and the individual act andeven mistake is seen in proportion. In intelligence, we must modernlae our percep-tion o f its whole contribution t.o our country while we ensure that it conformswith the standards we Americans expect. I hope we can do both jobs.

The specific subject today concerns OIA’s involvement in the development ofbacteriological warfare materials with the Army’s Biological Laboratory at FortDetrick. CIA’s retention of an amount of shellflsh toxin and CIA’s use andinvestigation of various chemicals and drugs.

The relationship between the CIA and the Army Biological Laboratory at FortDetrick as an activity requiring further investigation surfaced in late April of

this year. It resulted from information provided by a CIA o5lcer not directlyassociated with the project in response to my repeated directives that all pastactivities which miaht now be considered auestionable be ,brouaht to the atten-tion of Agency maiagement. Informatlon~providecl by him aid by two otherofiicers aware of the project indicated that the project at Fort Detrick involvedthe development of bacteriological warfare age&e, some lethal, and associateddelivery systems suitable for clandestine use.

A search was made for any records or other information available on theproject. This search produced information about the basic agreement betweenthe Army and the CIA relating to the project and some limited records coveringits activities from its beginning in 1852 to its termination in 1970.

After the discovery of these project records, verlflcation of this disposition ofa stockpile of BW agents and toxins maintained by Fort Detrick for possibleAgency use became a major concern. It was not known whether or not thesematerials had been destroyed along with the Army’s BW stockpiles in responseto Presidential directives of November 1988 and February 1970. The recordsindicated that the question had been raised and it was the impression of thosewho were familiar with the project that the material had in fact been destroyed,although no records conflrming it could be found. In the course of the investiga-tion, CIA’s laboratory storage facilities were searched and about 11 grams (alittle less than half an ounce) of shellfish toxin and 8 milligrams of cobra venomwere discovered in a little-used vaulted storeroom in an Agency building.

The White House was notified as s6on as the existence of the materialsbecame known and was kept informed as the investigation progressed. Thechairmen of CIA’s four oversight committees were briefed immediately after

the discoverv <of the toxin. Records and renorts were exchanaed with the De-fense Deparbent as it began its own inv&tigatlon of the matter. This com-mittee was noti5ed of our investigation of the program in mid-June and has beenprovided all project Ales and reports of the investigation.

CIA association with Fort Detrick involved the Snecial Operations Division(SOD) of that facil ity. This Division was responsible for developing specialapplications for BW agents nnd toxins. Its principal customer was the USArmy. Its concern was with the development of both suitable agents and deliverymechanisms for use in paramilitary situations. Both standard BW agents andbiologically derived toxins were investigated by the Mvision.

The CIA r&tiOnShiD with SOD was formallv established in May 1862 througha memorandum of agreement with the Army Chief Chemical ofllcer for theperformance of certain research and development in the laboratory facilities ofthe Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratory at FortDetrick. The initiative ior establishing this relationship was a belief that thespecial capabllitles of the Fort Detrlck group and its access to biological mate-rials of all sorts provided the Agency access to research and development exper-tise and capabilities which were appropriate to its function and not otherwiseavailable. The need for such capa,billties was tied to earlier Ofece of StrategicServices World War II experience, which included the development of.two dif-ferent types of agent suicide pills to be used in the event of capture and asuccessful operation using BW materlals ta incapacitate a Nazi leadertemporarily.



11

Through the course of yearz, Agency objectives in the project became betterdeflned. Thus a project approval memo of 1907 identifled four functional cate-gories of project act ivi ty.

a. maintenance of a stockpile of temporarily incapacitating and lethal agentsin readiness for operational use ;

b. assessment ‘and maintenance of biological and chemical disseminating sys-tems for ouerational use :c. adaptation and testing of a non-discernible microbioinoculator (a dart

device for clandestine and imperceptible inoculation with BWJCW agents) foruse with various materials and to assure that the microbioinoculator could notbe easily detected by later examination of the target, and

d. provide technical support and consultation on request for offensive anddefensive SW&W.

In the later years the activities dwindled to the point of simply maintaining astockpile of agents and delivery systems for possible Agency use.

From its outset the project was characterized by extreme compartmentationor a high degree o f secrecy within CIA itself. Only two or three Agency ofacers

at any given time were cleared for access to Fort Detrick activities. Thoughsome CIA-originated documents have been found in the project files, it is clearthat only a very limited documentation of aotivities took place.

A major early requirement of the Agency was to find a replacement for thestandard cyanide L-Pill issue& to agents in hazardous situations during WorldWar II. Work on this nroblem was done at Fort Detrick and ultimacelv centeredon the coating of a small pin-sized drill with shellflsh toxin. In the course of thiswork shellflsh toxin was stored in our laboratory for the purposes of conductingstability tests. A considerable amount of work was done in developing conceal-ment schemes ,for the drill or pin to be used in the event suicide was necessary.The onlv annlication of this eifort was in the U-2 flizht over the USSR inMay lf$O, &ring which Gary Powers carried such a-device concealed in asilver dollar.:In the Powers case the grooves of the drill bit were filled with

shellfish toxin. He obviously did not use it, and was not instructed to do so;it was offered to him to nrovide him with the on&n. The Powers flizht was theonly time we are aware that the toxin was provided for operational use, althoughthe Lpi11 was made available for earlier flights.

The primary Agency interest was in the development of dissemination devices,to be used with standard chemicals off the shelf. Such dissemination devicesas a fountain pen dart launcher and an engine head bolt designed to release asubstance when heated appeared to be peculiarly suited for clandestine use.Available records do not indicate that all specific items were developed exclu-sively for the CIA, as work on similar devices was also done for the Army.

A large amount of Agency attention was given to the problem of incapacitatingguard dogs. Though most of the dart launchers were developed for the Army,

the Agency did request the development of a small hand-held dart launcher forits peculiar needs.Work was also done on temporary human incapacitation techniques. Technical

support elements of CIA received continuing requests for safe, effective andrapidly acting, incapacitating devices. These related to a desire to incapacitatecaptives before they could render themselves incapable of talking or terroristsbefore they could take retaliatory action. Work was done in trying to developthe dart system for such purposes, but success was never achieved, since a largeramount of an incapacitating agent is required to safetly inactivate a human thanof a lethal agent required to kill him.

Work was also done by or for the Agency in the development of materials forsabotage of various materials and facil ities. This is clearly related to the Agen-

cy’s mission. Discussions with those involved indicate that hand-launchers withdarts loaded with dog incapacitant were delivered for use in Southeast Asia.One such operation involved the penetration of a facility abroad for intelli-gence collection. The compound was guarded by watch dogs which made entrydiiflcult even when it was empty. Darts were delivered for the operation butwere not used. The guard dogs ate some meat treated with dog incapacitantwhich was offered by the entry team. Our records indicate that some of thesematerials were prepared for one operation, but we are aware that that operationwas not in fact completed. Beyond these, however, no record can be found thatthese materials or device8 were used for lethal operational purposes.

By the late lOtlO’s, a variety of BW agents and toxins were maintained bySOD for possible Agency use. Varying amounts of these materials ranging from



12

100 gr@ms (about 8.6 ounces) to 100 milligrama (about 8 thousandths o! anounce) were maintained. Though speci5c accounting for each agent on the listis not on hand, Department of Defense records indicate that the materials werein fac t destroyed in 1970 by SOD personnel, except for the 11 grams of a sub-stance in small medical bottles labelled ehellfleh toxin, (plus the 8 &lligrame of

cobra venom ) which were found on 20 May of this year.At the time the toxin was found the otecer responsible for the project in 1970stated he had no recollection as to how it got there. On SO June, discumionswere held with the retired Agency ofecer who had provided the initial lead.This man, who had been the QS-15 branch chief in 1970, stated ‘that the toxinhad in fact been moved from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory. Thiswas done on the basis of his own decision after conversationa with the reenonaibleproject o5icer. He further stated that he made this decision based on the f&t thatthe cost and difeculty of isolating the shell5sh toxin were so great that it simplymade no sense to deetroy it, par?icularly when there would be no fu&e sourceof the toxin. The current branch chief believes this exnlanation is correct butstill does not recall the actual act of receiving the mat&al from Fort Detrick.Both of these middle-grade 05lcers agree that no one, including their immediatesuperior, was told of the retention of the shellilsh toxin.

The former branch chief recalls that subsequent to the delivery of the shellfishtoxin to CIA, he was told by his chief to inform Fort D&rick personally thatdeetruction of CIA materials should take place. He did so but did not includethe shellfish toxin, then in CIA hands, in his in&n&ions.

Discussions with Mr. Helms, Director of Central Intelligence and Mr. ThomasKaramessinea, the Deputy Director for Plans in 1970, have established that bothwere awam of the requirement that such material be disposed of . They recallthat clear instructions were given that the OIA stockpile should be destroyedby the Army and that, in accordance with Presidential directives, the Agencyshould get out of the BW business.

With the discovery of the shellfish toxin, a complete inventory of the vault in

which it was found was taken. The inventory consisted of a stock of variousmaterials and delivery systems accumulated over the yeara, including other lethalmaterials, incapacitants, narcotics, hallucinogenic drugs, Irritants and riot con-trol agents, herbicides, animal control materials, and many common chemical+The small size of the vault, about 8 by 10 feet, and the few shelves limit theextent of this stockpile. The materials are for the most part the residue of anumber of different CIA programs. These involved CIA’s ebort to keep a cloeewatch on emerging technology-in this case pharmaceutical technology--toensure that we did not encounter an unanticipated threat from hostile intelli-zence services with which we could not contend. We also wished to aanitalize& new advances which should eubetantially assist us in our efforta to-collectforeign intelligence or in a wartime situation. The narcotics in ztorage related

to CIA’s overseas efforts to collect intelligence in the narcotics trade, to help incountering it. We have also supplied tear gas and mace to our ofecers ovemeasfor use in defensive &u&ions where flrearme would not be appropriate.

The threat aa well as the promise posed by newer types of drags, particularlythe hallucinogenic drugs, made at least exploratory reaearrh on them essential.You will recall our concern over the possible role of druga in the apparent brain-washing of American POW’s in Korea, and the haunted eyes of CardinalMindzenty aa he “confessed” at a Communist trial. I might add that we believethat a drug ~89 admtnistered to one of our o53cere overseas by a foreign intelli-gence seqice within the past year. Those responeible for providing technicalsupport to clandestine operationa felt it necessary that they understand the waysin which these drug8 could be used, their ef fect.8 and their vulnerabilitles tocountermeasures. In vursuine such concerns as these. manv different materials

were obtained &d et&d for~brovision to contractore who di> the actual ecientiflcresearch involved. This concern also led to the experiment@ which led to theunfortunate death in 1959 of Mr. Frank Olson.

In this regard, 0iA does very little in-house research. Our laboratories arelimited and are principally used to teet developed equipment and to tailor itfor epeciflc operational uses through concealment or special packaging. We donot have, nor have we had, the facili ties to produce or experiment with suchlethal materials as the shell&h toxin. For example, we relied up0

iiFort D&rick

to perform the actual work of coating pins or darts with tax or with dogincapacitant. In similar fashion, we relied on other laboratories or contmctorsto eupport us in other 5elds. Most o f the materials held in storage in the vault



13

were kept them for po&ble iwmance to contrmt.om engaged in varioue kimbof research.

One of the major reeulte of these inveetigatione of the CIA has been toimpreae upon our employees and all of us involved in intelligence the fact thatde&ions about our program8 mu& be made in the light of today’s world. AS YOU

are aware in mid-1973 we tried to identify all questionable activities. We did80 for what I believe to be meet of them, and issued internal directives to ensurethat OIA remain within the hounds of law. I&pea&d emphasis on the importanceof this did lead to the identitlcatlon of our association with Fort Detrlck a8 anactivitr to be reviewed before we were aware that one of its nro&mta had beenimm&erlv seouestered.

The controls involved In the shelltlsh ca8e seem to have existed but not to havebeen applied. The controls that would have prevented or discovered this act wereprincipally thti which are the kind of management we must have for the intelli-gence buaineee. I am confident that this manafpzment will exist arJ a result ofthe changes we are making in our approach to intelligence, to enaure its con-formity with American values and standards. These will include a better publicappreciation of modem intelligence, better guidelines for its proper activities and

better supervision externally to stimulate better superviulon internally. Withthese, I am comldent that such episodea a8 the shellfish toxin will not be repeated.

The &WR&fAN. Thank you, Mr. Colby. Mr. Schwarx, our chiefcounsel, will commence our questioning.

Mr. SCHWARZ.Mr. Chairman, I only have three areas of questioningt,hat relate to mar thnee documents.

%Mr. Colby, at the ttom of page 4 of your statement and runningover to pa e 5,that that i entif H

ou refer to a project approval memo of 1967, and stateed the functional categories of project activity. Would

you turn to exhibit 6,’ the document dated October 18, 1967; subject,

“MKNAOMI, Flmdmg Objectives ,and Accomplishments.”Is that the source that you were referring to 8Mr. COLBY.Yes, it is.Mr. SCRXVARZ.Would you read into the record, Mr. Colby, the four

items “a” through “d” under the heading “Objectives in the Exhibit,”please?

Mr. COLBY. The objectives :

a. To provide for a covert support base to meet clandestine operational re-quirements; b. to stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for thespecif ic use of TSD; c. to maintain in operational readiness special and uniqueitems for the dissemination of biological and chemical materials ; and d. to pro-vide for the required surveillance, testing, upgrading and evaluation of materialsand items, in order ,to assure absence of defects and complete predictability ofresults to be expected under operational conditions.

Mr. SCHWARZ. There are some differences between that and whatyou had in your statement; and in particular, Mr. Colby, there is nomention of defensive purposes, is there?

Mr. COLBY.No. But I think the overall purpose was both for offen-sive and defensive.

Mr. SCHWARZ.n addition to the shellfish toxin, Mr. Colby, as ouidentified in your statement, you found other materials in the 3ab.

Would you turn to exhibit 2 * which is an inventory prepared fromthe CIA’s invent0tating agents foun 3

, furnished to us, of all of the lethal and incapaci-

Mr. COLBY, I do.in the building. Do you accept it as that?

Mr. SCHWARZ.There are items on it, am there not, in addition to theshellfish toxin f

Mr. COLBY. There are indeed.



14

Mr. SC~WARZ. And there are lethal items which are in violation ofthe Presidential order in addition to the shellfish toxin, are there not p

Mr. COLBY. I think that ets into a technical question about whether

they are technically in vio ation or not. But they are certainl lethal,and I think that it is certainly appropriate to say that we ave no:need for this type of thing at this time.

Mr. SCHWARZ.All right.Now, as the footnote on exhibit 9 l indicates, prior to the transfer

of the material from Fort Detrick in February 1970, the CIA had inits laboratory already half a gram of the material, did it not?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.Mr. SCHWARZ. Finally, Mr. Colby, I would like to read to YOU from

the President’s order of February 14,197O [exhibit 5 ‘1.

The President has further directed the destructton of all existing toxin weap-ons, and of all stocks of tosins which are not required for a research program,for defensive purposes only.

You agree, do you not, that the retention of the shellfish toxin, andprobabl certain other materials, violated that order ?

Mr. OLBY. I think it was in a quantity which certainly is excessivefor research purchases.

Mr. SCHWARZ. And, in fact, no research was done on it after it wasdelivered to the CIA facilities. Is that right 8

Mr. COLBY. Right.Mr. SCHWARZ. And, in fact, it was not for defensive purposes only,

was it aMr. COLBY. No. I do not think you can say it, although some of it

might have been for the useof an agent for a suic.ide ill.Mr. SCHWARZ. I have no further questions, Mr. hairman.Senator CHURCH. Mr. Smothers, do you have any supplemental

questions ?Mr. SMOTHERS. Yes. Maybe we could clarify the point that the chief

counsel just raised. Mr. Colby, could, you be more clear on the respon-sibility of the people who are involved with these toxins? Do theirjobs x&&e to any operational needsof the Agency ?

Mr. COLBY. Well, they perceived it as a potential operational need.And the fact is that one of the toxins was used on an actual operation ;that is, the U-2 flight.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Were these persons involved in any decisionmakingwith regard to the use and implementation of these materials 8

Mr. COLBY. No. This was a section of a technical support divisionwhich did the research and deveIopment of the capability. It wouldthen be turned over to one of the other elements of the Agency forthe actual operation.

Mr. SMOTHEREA In the course of their duties, would these personshave had the opportunity to employ these substances in any manneragainst individuals or targets, if you will, that they might haveseleoted 8

Mr. COLBY. I do not quite understand the question.Mr. SMOTHERS. The scientists we are talking about-would they

have had the opportunity in the normal course of their duties withthe Agency to determine how these materials might in faot beemployed 8

1 seep.19a.SSeep.202.



15

Mr. COLBY. Oh, Ithey would certainly conduct experimenti at FortDetrick in various forms, but not on people.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Would they be responsible for any employment ofthese materials beyond experimenttiion in a laboratory ?

Mr. COLBY. Generally, no;although they would probably participtito some degree in the detailed planning of ,an opera’tion. This ~111 varyfrom operation to operation, Some operations cannot be establishedwithout a very close relationship between the rtechnical people and theoperational eople. In other cases, the technical people can merelyfurnish the c!evice, and there is sufficient explanation as to how to useit that they do not need to be informed of the details of the actualoperation.

Mr. SMOTHEREL-TO the best of your knowledge, either during the timeof your tenure of that of previous Directors, was there any effort made

by any of these persons who had knowledge of the toxins either tourge employment of them or to seek in some manner to use themagainst persons, or to use them in nonexperimental manner?

Mr. COLBY. There were various suggestions made over time, yes. Asa matter of fact, I had a job at one time when the idea w,as proposed tome, and I lturned it down.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Yes; but was it proposed by these persons who hadknowledge of the toxins 8

Mr. COLBY, It was proposed by an expert. It was not a toxin in th&case, but it was a very similar chemical. He was offering a capability,trymg to see whether we were itierested in using it.

Mr. SMOTHERS.ow many people work in this laboratory, Mr.Colby P

Mr. COLBY. This particular laboratory was really a storemm inrecent years, and it IS a very small room. The people who had accessto it were only the chief and deputy chief and the secretary of thatparticular section! except that some additional people would some-times visit it. But rt is in the neighborhood of nine, something like that,in that particular branch.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Now, in addition to the lethal substances indicatedon the inventory of exhibit 2,' were there not, in fact, other substances

and materials kept in this storage area?Mr. COLBY. Yes; there are a number of other materials, and I tried

to refer to that in my statement.Mr. SMOTHEFEI. Were some of those other materials such benign

substances as cough syrups and batteries and various kinds of thingsthat scientists may indeed have inquired into from time to time for avariety of Agencv purposes 8

Mr. CO-Y. Well, it was a storeroom in which various kinds of thingswere there. It was not restricted to the lethal business. There were lotsof different things in there, and a lot of very simple, ordinary prod-

ucts were in there, too.Mr. S~oruxns. You mentioned the capability of the Agency with iregard to this kind of technical or toxin research. Would this stor-age facility and the nine people we have talked about here representa capability for the conducting or the maintaining of expertise withregard to lethal substances ‘?



16

Mr. COLBY. Well, the individuals would obviously be technically

Bualified to discuss and advise with respect to the material in question.ut normally, the process by which CIA does its work in technical

fields is by contract or by arrangement with someone else to do the

actual work. And our officers follow the contract, and receive the resultsand evaluate the results, though this was not a working laboratory.It was merely a storeroom which had some facilities in it. But theseo5cels--the actual experimentation, the actual research, was done inFort Detrick in this situation.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Finally, to the ,best of our knowledge, Mr. Colby,as indicated b both your investigative e. orts and any other informa-

Kd

tion you may ave, was any unauthorized use made of these materialsat any time, since their storage in the facility in question a

Mr. COLBY. Not to our knowledge.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Thank you. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Thank ou, Mr. Smothers. Mr. Colby, in your tes-

timony, you emphasized t K at the amount of shellfish toxin, approxi-mately 11 gramsa little more than 11 grams-translated, representsabout half an ounce. I think that since it comes in a small container,we ought to better understand the potency of this particular toxin.,Earlier in the week, we had testimony from Carl Duckett of yourAgency, and he told us that if that amount of shellfish toxin were ad-ministered orally-which is one of the least efficient ways for admin-istering it in terms of its lethality-that quantity was sufficient to kill

at least 14,000 people. If it were administered with the sophisticatedequipment that was found in the laboratory, that quantity would besufficient to kill a great many more. Estimates vary upward into thehundreds of thousands. I

Now my first question is, why did the Agency prepare a shellfishtoxin ?or which there is no particular antidote, which attacks thenervous system and brings on death very quickly ? Why did the Agencyprepare toxins of this character in quantities su5cient to kill manythousands of people-what was the need for that in the first place,long before the Presidential order came down to destroy this

material ?Mr. COLBY. I think the first part of the answer to that uestion,Mr. Chairman, is the fact that the L-pill, which was develope % duringWorld War II, does take some time to work, and is particularly ago-nizing to the subject who uses it. Some of the people who would benatural requesters of such a capability for their own protection andthe protection of their fellow a nts, really do not want to face thatkind of a fate. But if they coul be given an iustantaneous one, theywould accept that. And that was the thought process behind develop-ing the capability. I

Now, I cannot explain why that quantity was developed, exceptthat this was a collaboration that we were engaged in with the U.S.Arm.y, and we did develop this particular weapon, you might say, forpossible use. When CIA retained the amount that it did, it obviouslydid it improperly.

The CHAIRBEAN. This quantity, and the various devices for admin-istering the toxin which were fonnd in the laboratory, certainly makeit clear fiat purely defensive uses were not what the Agency was lim-ited to in any way. There were detite offensive uses. In faot, there



17

were dart guns. You mentioned suicides. Well, I do not think a suicideis usually accomplished with a dart, particularly a gun that can placethe dart in a human heart in such a way that he does not even know

that he has been hit.Mr. COLBY. There is no question about it. It was also for offensivereasons. No question abut it.

The CHAIRBUN. Have you brou ht with you some of those deviceswhich would have enabled the &A to use this poison for killingpeo le?

J!vfL!

r. COLBY. We have, indeed.The CHAIBHAN. Does this istcl fire the dart ?Mr. COLBY. Yes, it does, J- r. Chairman. The round thing at the top

is obviously the sight., t,he rest of it is what is practically a normal .45,

although it is ,a special. However, it works by electricity. There is abattery in the handle, and it fires a small dart.The CHAIRMAN. So that when it fires, it fires silently ?Mr. COLBY. Almost silently ; yes.The CELLIRMAN. What range does it have ‘?Mr. COLBY. One hundred meters, I believe ; about 100 yards, 100

meters.The C-N. About 100 meters range?Mr. COLBY. Yes.The CHAIRMAN. And the dart itself, when it strikes the target, does

the target know that ,he has been hit and about to die?Mr. COLBY. T*hat depends, Mr. Chairman, on the particular dartused. There are different kinds of these flechettes that were used invarious weapons systems, and a s ecial one was developed which po-tentially would be able to enter t K e target without perception.

The CH-AN. And did you find such darts in the laboratory?Mr. COLBY. We did.The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true, too, that the effort not only involved

designing a gun that could strike at a human target without knowledgeof the person who had been struck, but also the toxin itself would not

appear in theauto s 8Mr. COLBY. We1 Pi t ere was an attemp6The CHAIBACAN. Or the dart.Mr. COLBY. Yes; so there was no way of perceiving that the target.

was hit.The CHAIBMAN. As a murder instrument, that is about as efficient

as you can get, is it not 8Mr. COLBY. It is a weapon, a very serious weapon.The CHAIBMAN. Going back to my earlier question, Mr. Colby, as to

the quantities of this toxin that had been prepared, can you conceive

of any use that the CIA could make of such quantities of shellfishtoxin 8Mr. COLBY. I certainly can’t today, Mr. Chairman, in view of our

current nolicies and directives.The &XAIRSIAN. Well, even at the time, certainly, the CIA was never

commissioned or empowered to conduct bacteriological warfareagainst whole communities; and quantities of poison capable of de-stroying up to the hundredsof thousands of lives-it seems to me to beentirely inappropriarte for any possible use to which the CIA mighthave put such poison.



18

Mr. COLBY. I think the !fact that we were joint1the Army, Mr. Chairman, probably led into this kin B

doing this withof a quantitative

approach to it. But we were talking about a weapons system, and wedeveloped some of the material.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, who paid for the development of this toxin ?Mr. COLBY. There was a great deal of joint activity. This particular

thing we paid for. .The CHAIRMAN:A~~ is it not true that over the years this pre ara-

tion, which is a costly and lengthy distillation process, from w K at Iunderstand, costs about $3 million ?

Mr. COLBY. Well, not just this toxin, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Well, development of guns of this k&id. *Mr. COLBY. The total

amount to that as arogram, from the years 1952. to 1970, did

tota . But in the later years of the sixties, thisdwindled down, as I indicated, to pretty much the maintenance of astockpile, and not any more development activity.

The CHAIRMAN. In the llater years, it was still costing the Agencyjust for the maintenance of a stockpile, about $75,000 a year.

Mr. COLBY. Yes; in collaboration with Fort Detrick, that was thesum that was involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, there is no uestion in your mind that Presi-dential orders were issued directing t1 e CIA to destroy these toxins, inaccordance with the national policy and treaty obligation assumed bythe United States that such substances would not be retained exceptfor purely experimental laboratories and experimental purposes.

Mr. COLBY. I would like to destrov it. As you know, Mr. Chairman,I must hold it for possible evidence here. I have also been approachedby some academic centers to have it transferred to some safe handling, ’where it can be used in normal research activities, and no longer main-tained by ,CIA. But they asked particularly that it not be destroyed,bemuse of the difficulty in obtaining it for perfectly proper uses inmedical research. I would be delighted to concede with tha.t, if thecommittee agrees with it, and the other people who have a voice in itagree with it.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are not suggesting by that that the CIAretain poisons in this quantity for experimental purposes, are you?

Mr. COLBY. No. But 1 think this was a little bit the mental processesof the people who actually did retain it.

The CHAIRMAN. During the &year period, no experiments were actu-ally conducted ?

Mr. COLBY. No, none. But I think the sense of it is it is very difficultto make, and therefore “let us not destroy it,” typified the mentality ofthe people who decided to retain it against the directives given to them.

The CHAIRMA~N. And you are not suggesting that the retention of poi-sons in these quantities did not, in fact, represent a violation of Presi-dential directive ?

Mr. COLBY. I do not contest that, no.The CHAIRMAN. Now; the committee will follow a lo-minute rule, so

that all members have fair opportunity to question the witnesses. My10 minutes have expired, and I will turn now to Senator Tower.

Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, are you cer-tain that these materials that have been the subject of testimony, spe-cifically shellfish toxin and the cobra venom, currently retain their orig-



19

inal potency? Is there a chance that over the passage of time theirpotent

Mr. 8has in any way deteriorated?OLBY. Senator Tower, I am really not enough of a technical BX-

pert to answer that.

Mr. STEYE~NS. t is possible but unlikely.Mr. COLBY. It is possible but unlikely.Mr. STEVJDNS. That the ’ have l&Mr. COLBY. That they IiTave lost some of their potency.Senator TOWER. M~A Colby, turning to the dart gun, was it ever em-

plgdtorr;yP

urpo$e by the Agency Pthmk merely experiments, Senator Tower. I do not

know-of any actual use. There is no record of any actual use.Senator Townu. No actual oDerational use of it at all?Mr. COLBY. No.

Senator Towmz. Prior to the discovery of the substances this summer,did anyone in the AMr. COLBP. We di

ency know of the actual quantities on hand?d no15even r&Iv know that we had anv quantities.

Senator Towna. You did not evenknow thatMr. COLBY. No, although the individual w K

ou had any oi; hand ?o kept them obviously

knew that there were some there.Senator Townn. Now have you in fact merely accepted the assertion

that the substances are in fact poison8 Have you conducted any test-ing to real1 identify these substances to make sure that they are thesubstances escribed here?r

Mr. COLBY. No, we have not tested them. We have rested upon thelabels on them and the other records indicating that that kind of aprogram did exist.

Senator TOWER. The, only thing you have to go by are the labels andthe records ?

--

Mr. COLBI+. And the testimony of some of our people.Senator TOWER And the testimonp. But there has been no test to

make sure, in fact.-

Mr. COLBY.There has not been, Senator Tower, I did not want torisk letting the material out of our hands for a while.

Senator TOWER. In trying to locate and identify these materials that

have been described, don’t you think discretion would dictate thatyou should make sure that you have indeed located these materials?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think we have enough to alert us to the need todo something about these materials. Whatever they are, they are la-beled. The people say that they recall having sequestered them as thatkind of material. And I think that we want to make sure that we arehandling this case in the proper form and not being subject to a pos-sible problem of having destroyed them by mistake or anything ofthat nature.

Senator TOWER. At the time of the Presidential order in l!XO, did

the Agency have responsibility for custody of anything other thanlaboratory samples of toxins of various types ?

Mr. COLBY. Well, we had, as I said, Senator Tower, the actua1need in some of our operations for some kinds of chemicals overseas,and I think a legitimate need for a lethal substance certainly for de-fensive, if not for offensive, purposes.

Senator TOWER. Were they not in fact stored at Fort Detrick?Mr. COLBY. They were indeed stored at Fort Detrick.



20

Senator TOWER. They were not in your actual possession.Mr. COLBY. I believe first there was a ve

down to CIA before the 1970 move. But tTsmall. amount brought

certainly at Fort D&rick.e main depository was

Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Colby.Mr. COLBY.Thank you, Senator.The C~~mm~.‘Before I turn to Senator Mondale, I want to observe

that Senator Hart of Michigan, who has been a very valued memberof this committee, cannot be with us today because he is presentlyhospitalized. And I just want to express the regrets of the commit-tee that he cannot be here to participate in this hearing because hehas been of great service. And we hope that he will soon return tothe committee table.

Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, if you would yield, let me second

your remarks and associate myself with them. Senator Hart has beena valued member of the committee and we hope he has a speedyrecovery.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Mondale.Senator MONDALE. Mr. Colby, in your opening statement you ob-

served that the Agency which you head must operate in a secret envi-ronment. I think most of us would accept that fundamental concessionand serious concession in a society which is based upon the theorythat the American people must know what is going on. But whattroubles me is that this record seems to disclose an additional con-

cession, namely, the lack of accountability, so that we not only havea secret agency, but we have an agency about which there is somequestion as to its accountability to the authority of the President orto the authority of the National Security Council. The record seemsto disclose that there is no Presidential or National Security Councilorder in the first place directing the CIA to establish this programat all. I

Second, there appears to be no report by the CIA to higher author-ity of the existence of these toxins or biolo

Third, there seems to be no evidence tTl‘cal weapons.at those in charge of the

CIA inquired of subordinates as to the existence of toxins or biologi-cal weapons, or that following the Presidential order decreeing de-struction of such toxins, that any formal order went forth withinthe CIA to require their destruction.

Moreover, the record seems to support the notion that it was onlyby chance that the leadership of the CIA became aware some yearslater of even the existence of these lethal toxins, which were in viola-tion of a direct Presidential order.

In short, the record is a mess and we may never know just exactlywhat happened. Does it bother you that this kind of record could be

available to us and should exist in something as serious as this ?Mr. COLBY. It certainly does, Senator Mondale. And I think wehave taken some steps to try to overcome that problem. I think that theexistence of the rogram did stem from the World War II experienceand the fact of tR e Technical Services Division having a role of sup-port for our intelligence activities was reported to various super-visory committees of the time.



21

I: do not think there is any great detail on that in line with thestandards of those times. But I think there is no indication that the

Agency wanted to defy a Presidential order. There is an indication thatMa suggestion was made to the Agency management or to some leveloh 4t that the material be maintained. But there is no indication thatthat was approved. There is an indication that the Presidential in-struction was passed down the line to the various elements of the Agen-cy.. And I think that there are steps that we are taking to prevent thisl&nd.of thing happenin

iii.

The reason we foun out about this was precisely because of them&rated demands and directives that I issued that we be informed of‘anything questionable in the Atin13 of detailed supervision an r

ncy’s past, that it is recisely thismanagement that we Eave to have,

and I think that we now have and I think that we will have.*Senator MONDALE. Why would it be that after an exhaustive study

of this matter by the committee and by your own Agency, we cannotfiud a single order of any kind inquiring as to the existence of toxinsBP Biological weapons, any order requiring their destruction follow-ing the Presidential directive at all ? Not a single document exists. Whywould that be?

Hr. COLBY. Well, the theory of the intelligence operations in the&ties-and that gradually has changed-but at that time, clearly thoserm&ters were not made in a great deal of record. There was some severe

~&npartmentation of sensitive matters, things of this nature. This,$ken, reduced the amount of recordkeeping, the amount of involvement&&hervery smal $”

ple in sensitive activities, and you reduced it down to agroup who knew anything about it.

* :‘f think this then explains the difficulty today of reconstructing some,of these matters.

Senator MONDALE. But it also apparently created situations wheret.he Agency, or someone in the Agency, pursued a course which violateda fmdamental order of the President of the United States and thes@it of a solemn international convention against biological and toxic

warfare.I&3r. 'COLBY. There is no question about it that a middle-grade o5certiade a ,decision which was wron

Senator MONDALE. The troub e is we have seen this same phenom-.

onen with respect to other matters that are not before us today, where,&# something happened? people at the toIclaWtbey knew about it and said it shou P

did not know about it, ordn’t happen. Then someone

%&wer did it, claiming higher authority, not knowing who, no docu-mentation. So, as we seek to reach the issue of accountability in a secret:a$$hc’y, WB are left repeatedly with a record which is utterly beyond

eerstanding. And I wonder if that does not go to questions of man-t and control and Presidential authority in a profound way, as

OLBY. I thinkvities

it goes to a question of the cultural pattern ofand the traditions, the old traditions of how they

And those are being changed in America and I for one

ONDALE. Thank you very much, Mr. [email protected]. Thank you, Senator Mondale. Senator Baker.



22

Senator BAKER.Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Before 1 didrect a few questions to Mr. Colby, I have a brief statement I wouldlike to make with respect to these hearings. The will come as no sur-

prise to you, Mr. Chairman, nor to you, Mr.J

ice Chairman, that Ithink we are making a mistake. I think that we should have startedpublic hearings at the very outset and one fully into the question ofassassinations or whatever else might f egitimatcly come before thiscommittee in the scope of its inquiry. I do not think, Mr. Chairman,Mr. Vice Chairman, that we ought to have an interim report, for in-stance, on assassinations, because I think it tends to segregate and toemphasize a particular area of our inquiry out of perspective- to thetotality of the inquiry.

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I also want to say that I admireyou and Senator Tower for the di li ence of your effort in bringing us

to this point. I do not criticize you Bor the decision that has been madeby a majority of the committee. I simply -want to register mydisagreement.

I think that particularly on a matter of this sensitivity that hasreceived this much public attention, that if the country is not fullyinformed, if we do not have a public forum from which they can gainthe information they require to make their judgment, that no judg-ment we make for them will be adequate.

Therefore, I think, Mr. Chairman, that the committee ought to re-consider its determination to conduct its inquiry on assassinations or

any other aspect of this matter in secret, in executive session, that weought to reconsider the matter of fil ing an interim report, and insteadwe should have public hearings and forebear an interim report so wehave a full report and that the country would then be well served inaccordance with rights to know. Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I dohave a few questions I would like to put to Mr. Colby.

The CIL~IRMAN. Very well.Senator BAKER. Mr. Colby, it is clear to me from the evidence at hand

that somebody authorized the formulation, the development and theretention of these toxic materials. Can you tell me who did it?

Mr. COLBY. The development, the research and development, I think,was begun in the sixties, the early sixties. I cannot tell you specificallywho authorized it.

Senator BAKER. Is there a record that would tell us who did it ?Mr. COLBY. The records are very incomplete, as you know, sir.Senator BAKER. Why are they incomplete ?Mr. COLBY. Some of them apparently have been destroyed.Senator BAKER. Do you know who destroyed them ?Mr. COLBY. I do. I have a report that one set was destroyed by the

Chief of the Division in question before his retirement.

Senator BAKER. Do you know who that was PMr. COLBY. Mr. Gottlieb.Senator BAKER. Is that Mr. Sidney Gottlieb?Mr. COLBY.Y~S. -Senator BAKER. What was his title at the time 8Mr. COLBY. He was Chief of the Technical Services Division.Senator BAKER. Have you interviewed Mr. Gottlieb PMr. COLBY. I have not,



23

Senator BAKER Has anyone at the Agency interviewed Mr. Gottliebas to why these records were destroyed?

Mr. COLBY. There is a memorandum in the Agency between the Di-rector and Mr. Gottlieb at that time.

Senator BAKER. What does that mean? Does that mean yes they haveor no thhey haven’t ?

Mr. COLBY.That they were destroyed explaining-Senator BAKER. What I am asking ou is, do you know-has anyone

at the Agency interviewed Gotthe t as to why the material wasdestroyed ?

Mr. COLBY. We have had one contact with Mr. Gottlieb in recentdays. We have pretty much-

Senator BAKER. Is it true that Gottlieb was at the Agency at Lang-ley just a few days ago, going through his records and other material

out there ?Mr. COLBY. tie w&s.Se&m BAKER. And did somebody at that time say, “What was it you

destroyed, Sidney ?” or “how come you did it ?”Mr. COLBY. Senator, we have taken the position with this committee,

as we have with the other committees and with the Rockefeller Com-mission, that we would not o outside the current employees of theAgency to try to run down t 5 ese stories. We did not want to be sub-jetted to a possible charge that we were somehow cooking their testi-mony. And, as a result, we have restricted our connections with these

people to providing them the information that they had while theywere in the Agency.Senator BAKER. I am not trying to press you, but the way I interpret

the totality of those remarks.is that no one has interviewed Gottliebas to why he destroyed the material or what they contained-therecords.

Mr. COLBY. No, we have not interviewed him as to the reason.Senator BAEER. Do you know what documents he destroyed?Mr. COLBY. We are very unsure as to the total. We do not have an

inventory of it.Senator BAEEFL Do you think they might have said who authorized

the formulation or the retention of this stuff? Do you have any reasonto think it might or might not contain that information !

Mr. COLBY. In this case, I doubt it would have very much, becausethis case, from the evidence we have at hand-

Senator BAKER. Does it say anything or have any reason to indicatethat it might say how, if at all, this material was used in an aggressiveway against someone to kill someone 8

Mr. COLBY.Well, t,here may well be some of that in the material.Senator BAKER. When was the documentation destroyed ‘?Mr. COLBY. In 1978.

Senator BAKER. It did not happen to be destroyed at the same timeaa those tapes that the CIA destroyed ‘l

Mr. COLBY. In 1972.Senator BAKER. In 19’72. When in 1972 8Mr. COLBY. November, I believe it was.Senator BAHER. In November of 19’72. Do you have any idea what

volume of records were destroyed ?Mr. COLBY. I do not know.



24

Senator BAKER. Do you know who authorized the destruction, ifanyone 8

Mr. COLBY. As I said, there was a memorandum of agreement between

the Director and Mr. Gottlieb at that time.Senator BAKER. And the Director at that time was?Mr. COLBY. Mr. Helms.Senator BAKER. Mr. Helms is here in this room, I believe, Mr. Chair-

man, and I take it we will have an opportunity ,$o hear ,from him?The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Helms will be our witn&s at tomorrow morn-

ing’s hearings. I believe he is the leadoff witness.Senator BAKER. I will not

the witness much longer, Mr. 8rolong m op ortunity to examinehairman. I fn erstrind we are going

tot

2

to operate under the lo-minute rule

ay I ask you only this further question, then, in general, Mr.Colby ? You have heard of the doctrine of plausible deniability ?

deMr. COLBY. Yes, and I have rejected it now, Senator. I say we cannot

end upon that an more.!4 enator BAKER. 4 he question I was going to put to you-is that

a phrase of art in the intelligence community ? Does it have a separatesignificance that you understand P

Mr. COLBY. It was a rationale used in earlier years.Senator BAKER. What does it mean ?Mr. COLBY. If the United States could deny something and not be

clearly demonstrated as having said something falsely, then the UnitedStates could do so.Senator BAKER. In the case of assassinations, in the case of any

other--of domestic surveillance, in the case of the formulation of poi-sons, under that previous rationale, would the doctrine of plausible de-niability have led the Agency to destroy records to conceal evidence orto compartmentalize to the point that it would be-that a committeesuch as this later would have been unable to establish what reallyhappened ?

Mr. COLBY. I think the plausible denial concept was used in the sense

of international diplomatic relationships, that our country-Senator BAKER. Are you saying by that it would not have appliedto the formulation of toxic materials?

Mr. COLBY. I would not say it did not have anat all, but I think that the basic rationale for the rir

hing to do with itoctrine of plausible

denial was so our Nation could deny something and not be tagged withit.

Senator BAKER. Senator Mondale pointed out that in another areawhich is not being covered here--I take it he meant assassinations-and an area that I think should be covered here-that we run up

against a stone wall, that we get so far and leads get fuzzy. You knowwhat we are driving at. You are familiar with our record so far.Mr. COLBY. I have the same problem.Senator BAEER. Without going into that, is that an application of

the doctrine of plausible d&ability ?Mr. COLBY. No ; I do not think so. I do not think that would apply

to internal records. Plausible denial would be to One’s posture Vis-a-ViSsome foreign nation. That is the basic rationale behind it. It does nothave anything to do with the keeping or nonkeeping of internalrecords.



25

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I am a little beyond the scope of thisinquiry here, but not much and not for that primary purpose. YOUare familiar, I take it, with the Inspector General’s report on the

assassination situation 0Mr. COLBY. Yes.Senator BAKER. As I recall, the first few sentences in that re ort dealt

with the difficulty of reconstructing, finding records, and ealt gen-rerally with the question of plausible deniability. Are you familiar withthe language I am referring to?

Mr. COLBY. I believe so.Senator BAKER Is that the sort of thing that would prevent us from

finding records of responsibility and causal connection to this matterof the formulation and retention or the failure Ito destroy toxic mate-rials?

Mr. COLBY. The effect of it would, but the urpose of the doctrine wascertainly not to deprive our Government o any knowledge about ourGovernment’s own activities.

Senator BAKER. But it had that effect ?Mr. COLBY. It could have that effect.Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Thank ou, Senator Baker. Senator Huddleston.Senator HDDDLEBTON. l! hank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, first,

I would like to commend you for the forthright way that you havedealt with this committee. In my judgment, you have made every

effort to provide us with the information we needed and have adoptedthe policy on your own that certainly would tend to eliminate manyof the alleged abuses and apparent abuses that occurred in recent years.

I would also reiterate what you said in your own statement, that theseparticular hearings, this series on biological warfare and toxins, shouldnot be considered as typical of the operation of the CIA, nor should itbe considered as unique or unusual. It is simply one piece of a iantjigsaw puzzle that, until we see more of the entire picture, we will I avea hard time assessing the total operation.

Mr. COLBY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HUDDLESTON. I would like to refer you to a memorandum[exhibit 1’1, that was purported to have been prepared by Thomas H.Karamessines, who at the time was Deputy Director for Plans of theCentral Intelligence Agency, directed to the Director of CIA at thattime. I understand that thus memorandum was not signed by Mr.Karamessines, that the person to whom it was directed indicated thathe did not, in fact, see it.

However, it sets out very specifically the situation at that time, in1970, following the President’s order to eliminate our activity in bac-teriological and toxin warfare, As a matter of fact-let us go through

it very briefly.In the first paragraph it calls attention to the President’s order inNovember 1969, which was to eliminate this program. In the secondparagraph, it points out the President’s clarrfication in January of1970, to state very specifically that this order did, in fact, apply to theCIA. Then, in the third paragraph, it goes on to say, to point out, thatthe CIA did have at Fort Detrick certain supplies. It then says thatthis stockpile did not appear on the inventory list.

2 Beep. 189.



26

Now, does that not indicate to you a specific knowledge on the partof this individual, at least, that the CIA was in violation of the Presi-dent’s order9

Mr. COLBY. Well, it certain1 indicates that the material held by CIAdid not appear on the Fort IY etrick list. That is certainly so. In thatres

Bect, it certainly indicates awareness of President Nixon’s directive.enator HUDDLESTON. And that this inventory should have been in-

cluded so that the Army could piocecd with its plan of destruction, asit had been ordered to do ?

Mr. COLBY. I think there is that implication, that it should haveappeared.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Further, then, in paragraph 5, tbii memo-randum suggested that if-the Director wishes to continue this specialcapability-now, does that not also indicate that the Director mightwant to violate outright the President’s order 9

Mr. COLBY. It certainly gave an option that that particular orderwould not be followed. Now, that does not indicate that the Directorwould necessarily do that without consultation with the President.

Senator HTJDDLESTON. I recognize that..But someone in the Depart-ment, either Mr. Karamessines or his deputy or someone, was suggest-ing this as an option.

Mr. COLBY. I think the originator of the particular draft memo-randum is one of your witnesses, and there is no indication of the levelto which t.he memorandum got beyond him, although it is clear thatMr. Karamessines did not sign it.

Senator HUDDLEBTON. Except that what he suggested did, in fact,take place.

Mr. COLBY. Yes; thait is right. It in fact took place, according to hisaccount, by his own decision, in violation of the directives he wasgiven.

Senator HUDDIS~TON. One more sentence in paragraph 5, “Ar-rangements have been made for this contingency.” Does that indicatethat someone in the Agency had already taken action or had madearrangements to specifically violate the order of the President of theUnited States 9

Mr. COLBY. They had arranged for the possible transfer of thematerials to a research center, a private research center, in Baltimore.That was what that “Arrangements have been made” referred to.

Senater HUDDLESTON. But the memorandum had already indicatedthat they reco nized that is in violation of the President’s order.

Mr. COLBY. 1 contingency that, if the Director approved, it would+&ne. And it of course was not. The material was kept in the Agency

Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, that memorandum also lists an inven-

tory, I presume at that time, which differs somewhat from the inven-tory that you have submitted from the material that has recentlybeen located. Is that correct 9

Mr. COLBY. Yes, there are some differences in it. I think a numberof those items were actually included in the destruction by FortDetrick.

heSenator HUDDLESTON. Do you know who made the decision and whyselected certain items to retain illegally and allowed certain items

to be destroyed?



27

Mr. coLBy. The on17 one WSSI the shellfish, which was rebi?ed inviolation of the directive. Of the remaining material, some of It wasnot included within the directive and some was and was destroyed. SOthe story, as we can reconstruct it today, is that this certain officer

wanted to save this material because it was very valuable.Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Colby, it has already been established that

the cost of this research work and development was in the neighbor-hood of $3 million.

Mr. COLBY. I would not apply that only to the shellfish but to thetotal activit .

Senator IJDDLESTON. You indicated that, as far as you know, therehas been only one application, and that was Francis Gary Powers, theU-2 pilot.

Mr. COLBY. Well, of course, that wasn’t an application either. There

we”re certain other situations in which clearly some consideration wasgiven to analogous material, if not this material.Senator HUDDLESTON. Are you saying, for $3 million we supplied

one U-2 pilot with a device with which he might do away with his ownlife, which he decided not to use, a decision I would say was very wiseon his part, personally. Is that correct ?

Mr. COLBY. No. I think that is not quite correct, Senator Huddleston.The $3 million refers to the whole activity and includes the researchand the stockpiling, not only of this particular material, but of othermaterials. And I indicated some of the other materials have been used

on other operations, the guard dogs and things of that nature.Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, most of the material there, the toxicmaterial, was applied by some sort of injection. Consequent1 , youdevelo ed the dart guns and drill bits that you put in silver ollars

1CT

and w atever. Was there also material there that would be admin-istered in some other way ?

Mr. COLBY. Oh, yes; there were various ways you could administervarious of these materials, no question about it, both orally and undersome kind of a guise and so forth.

Senator HUDDLESTON. And what devices were prepared for that kind

of administration ?Mr. COLBY. It was really rather the developmen&to see what theeffect of putting the particular material into another substance, whatchemical reactions and stabilities were.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, the inventov for the fir&, ,q& of mate-

rials that were held at Fort Detrick included an agent that, I presume,W&S designed to induce tuberculosis.‘:Hs that correct?‘ Mr. COLBY. Yes. There is that capability.‘Senator HUDDLEBTON. What application would be made of that par-

tfkdar agent 8“Bfr+ COLBY. It is obviously to induce tuberculosis in a subject that

pu want to induce it in.’ ?%nator HUDDLEST~N. For what purpose ‘4

Mr. COLBY. We know of no application ever being done with it, butthe idea of giving someone this particular disease is obviously thethought process behind this.



28

Senator HUDDLESTON. You mentioned earlier in your testimonB

thatthe primary purpose for collectin

fthis material was to in uce a

temporary situation to prevent harm

Mr. COLBY. That certainly does not apply to the lethal agents.Senator HUDDLESTON. I would not thmk it did.Mr. COLBY. No.Senator HUDDLIEITON. What about brucellosis, which we are trying

to eradicate in Kentucky. It affects cattle, That was also on the inven-tory. What was the purpose of that ?

Mr. COLBY. I think we were talking about an experiment. We weretalking about what its capabilitieswere, what its properties were, whatthe reactions were, and so forth. I do not think anybne had gone downthe trail to a particular use, a particular purpose there. They were

dealing as scientists with the different materials.available to them.Senator HUDDLESTON. Was this at the direction 9-b. he CIA to de-velop this or for scientists just looking around trying to find out?

Mr. COLBY. These were CIA officers who were responsible for keep-ing up with the state of the art in various kinds of technical and

Pharmaceutical areas to see what applications might be appropriateor intelligence-related pur

Roses.

Senator HUDDLEWON. T ank you. I believe my time has expired,Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Huddleston. Senator Gold-water.

Senator GOLDWATNR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I only have onequestion, Mr. Colby, but I have a short statement I would like to maketo ou.

F riticism and analysis are important ingredients in making *ourdemocrat

iwork. However, we are now ap roaching the point where

both are ein5

abused to the point of se1 -destruction. I submit wemust get out o the morass of doubt and pessimism into which we havesunk. We must not let the quarrels of the past interfere with ‘buildingfor the future. A tidal wave of criticism has swept over the intell igencecommunity of our countr , much of which is mistaken or unwarranted.The dama e is severe. I

f-lP continued, its survival is uncertain.

Before t is committee have appeared men of t,he CIA, both on activeduty and retired. Al l have been impressive because of their dedicationand loyalty. Nothing we have heard detracts from the re utation ofthe CIA as a highly competent or anization. The men anthe CIA are doing a great job un 8

x women ofer very trying conditions.

And I say to them, as our Nation ‘gets back on course, I believe therewill be change for the better. I ask you to hold on until that happens.You were never more needed by this country than right now. And, asone American, I am proud of you.

To those youna desire for pub f

people who may be looking for careers and who haveic service, I can think of no better way to serve our

Nation than.as an intelligence officer. Many skills are required to ii eepthe CIA a useful and productive organization, and continuity is vitalto America.

Now, Mr. Colby-Mr. COLBY. Senator Goldwater, if I may, on behalf of our employ-

ees, thank you for that statement. They are under a lot of pressurethese days, and they will appreciate that.



29

SenFtor GOLDWATER. The question I have to ask you, have other~oun~~~~~~~lo

. c!!?d bacteriological warfare ability ?

warfare that the

rtamly, Senator; that IS one aspect of bacteriological

President’s directive in 1969 and 1970 tells CIA tocontinue, and that is to follow the activities of other nations. We willsee the capabilities and activities of other nations in this field and wehave some officers who do follow these activities abroad. And theyare quite general. There are some veare just not sure what the actual capaT

? very dubious areas where wellities are in some respects, but

we do follow it indeed and there is extensive effort done by othernations in this line.

Senator GOLDWATER. But you are now prevented from-Mr. COLBY. No; we can follow the foreign ones, that’s no problem.

Senator GOLDWATER. You can follow them, but can you do anythingto offset them ?Mr. COLBY. I think that the defensive against those possible things

is a matter for the Department of Defense.Senator GOLDWATER. You feel you are safe in that field?Mr. COLBY. I think in cooperation with the Department of Defense,

and advising the Department of Defense of foreign developments inthis area, we are giving them the basis for developing such defenseefforts as we need them.

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you, that is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

TheC -AN. ThankSenator MORQAN. Mr. C ou, Senator Goldwater. Senator Morgan?x

Public

airman, Mr. Colby, since this is the firsthearing of this ‘committee, I think we should note that we

eel and I certainly f6el that the rolevital one, and a very important one. I t K

layed by the CIA is a veryink the fact that you quoted

from President Kennedy who said that quite often our failures aretrumpeted and our succasses go unheralded is ap

This committee has been told by witnesses that hpropriate here.ad the CIA existed

prior to World War II, Pearl Harbor miif it had ha

ht never have happened or

if

pened, the loss in deaths an tf

much less.’

property might ,have been

o I want you to know that we do recognize the role ofthe CIA. We cognize the fact that we in this country must be ableto know in a Vance what our potential adversaries and potentialiYenemies may be planning so that we can cope with them. So I dothink it is important.

Mr. COIBY. Thank you, Senator.senator MORGAN. I believe, Mr. Colby, that most of the questions

have been asked excex

t that earlier the reference was made to thePresidential order an we alluded to what was in fact, I think, thepress release concerning the Presidential order. But as I read the

Presidential order, I found this statement. The U.S. bacteriologicaland the biological programs will be confined to research and development for defensive purposes, immunization, safety measures, et cetera.This does not preclude research into those offensive aspects of bacterio-logical, biological agents necessary to determine what defensive meas-ures are uir4.

NOWear) ier you stated you thought it might have been the mentalityof’ those who made the decision to keep these toxins that they might& needed in order to develop defensive weapons. Do you think if



30

that was their thinking that it would be in keeping with the Presi.dential order as I just read it to you?

Mr. COLBY. Well, we looked at that. I think that you might be able

to make a case for that, Senator, if you were actively involved andhad responsibilities for these defensive measures. But, as I think thechairman ppinted out, the quantities maintained by CIA are difficultto defend under that directive.

Senator MORGAN. What was your position with the. CIA at thattime!

Mr. C~LB’P. In 1970 I was on detached service. I was assigned tothe Department of State in Vietnam.

Senator MOROBN. You had nothing to do with ‘retaining thesetoxins ?

Mr. CO-Y. No ; I hsrd nothing.Senator MORGAN. And you knew nothing about them until youmade the discovery ?

Mr. COLBY. IIntil we had discovered this in Ma .Senator MORGAN. I would commend you, Mr: E olby, .again for taking

these steps to determine what has happened. I think’most men in theCIA, as well as those in the IRS and the FBI, are dedicated publicofficials that want to do whatis riiht. I think our method of askinfor any known violations has ‘been helpful to t K s committee. I woul 8commend it, Mr. Chairman, to the IRS, to the end that the mightask their field agents if they know of known violations in t E s areaand I would commend it also‘to the Director of the FBI.

Senator Goldwater mentioned, and I believe the Presidential orderdirected the CIA to continue to maintain surveilIance on the bagteriological and biological warfare capabilities of other states. Yousay you have done that ?

Mr. COLBY. We do so ; yes, sir.Senator MORGAXG. Are” you in a position to tell this committee

whether or not other states and especially !potential adversaries,enemies, now have stockpiles’of such toxins?

Mr. Corny. I do not think I can sa much about stockpiles but I doknow that there are installations w Kl ch appear to us to be experi.mental stations of some sort.

Senator MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Colby.Mr. COLBY. In the chemical field, certainly there are stockpiles. We

are aware of that also.Senator MORGAN. I have no further questions.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Senator Mathias ?Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Mr. Colby, some of America’s greatest victories and some of Amcr-

ica’s greatest defeats have represented failures of intelligence. Tren-ton? Ant&am, Pearl Harbor, I think all illustrate the vital necessityof intelligence. A year ago, almost exactly a year ago, when SenatorMansfield and I introduced the legislation which has resulted in thisinvestigation, we had that very much in mind. We wanted to be surethat we had the best intelligence system that was available. But Ithink we also had in mind John Adams’ warning that a frequent recur-rence to the principles of the Constitution is absolutely necessary topreserve the advantages of liberty and to maintain a free government.

I think the discovery of this toxin raises some interesting questions



31

which are within the purview of this investigation and which, I think,have to be answered before this committee completes its work andmakes its recommendations to the Congress. For example, I accept,your statement that this toxin was never used except in the one in-

stance that you described. But I then have to ask you this : If you hadused t.he toxin, what provision in the Constitution would have affordedauthority to do so?

Mr. COLBY. I think CIA’s operations are certainly overseas opera-tions. They fall under the National Security Act of 1947 and they fall,consequent1 ,the nationa 9

under the provisions of the Constitution that call fordefense and the foreign relations of the United States.

Senator MATHIAB. The use of a toxin of this sort is, of course, theuse of force.

Mr. COLBY. It is a weapon ; yes.

-Senator MATHIAB. It 1s a weapon, it is a use of force and normallyif a force is to be employed against another nation, congressionalnpproval is re

Mr. COLBY.uired, is that not true ?

a, ell, I think we are now in the midst of the War PowersAct, and this activity of course receded that.

Senator MATHIAS. Yes, it di dpprecede it, but what occurs to me hereis that we have an illustration of the use of force in the relations ofthe United States to other powers in the world, or at least the potentialuse of force. As you say, it has never been used in this instance,which differs only in degree from covert operations in Laos or otherexamples that we could think of. And so it seems to me that the dis-covery of this toxin raises very fundamental questions about the reln-t,ionship to covert activities of any intelligence agencies, be it the CIA,the FBI, or others, with the constitutional process on which thisGovernment is conducted.

Now I would think, Mr. Chairman, that there is no responsibility,greater upon us than to define that relationship as accurately as pos-sible before the close of these hearings. Thank you.*, “Mr. COLBY. It is, of course, contained within the amendment to the&reign Assistance Act, passed last December, which now requires‘&at any activity of CIA, other than intelligence gathering abroad,

.shall be found to be important to the national security by the Presl-dent ,and shall be reported to the appropriate committees, and thatincludes six committees of the Congress at this time. This is a statu-\toryprovision which we are in compliance with.

..Senator MATHUS. Let me say, Mr. Colby, that%&me say this

I agree with you.imposes respon&bilities on the ‘Congress that I do not

been discharged very well. I can recall members ofiled from the responsibility of knowing what wasrs of Congress who said, “Don’t tell me, I do not

ink that is an indictment of the Congress, just as

ment as those labeled against any of the intelligence

BP. I would not call it an indictment of the Congress, Sena-it rather reflected the general atmosphere, political atmos-

ward intelligence that was the traditional approach and IAmericans are changing that. This act is an example of thats is this committee.



32

Senator M~THIAB. I think you are more generous than I am inclinedto be. I cannot be that permissive. I do not think climate will excusewhat is really a dereliction of duty and if there had not been that

dereliction of duty,The CHAIRMAN. Herhaps we would not be here today.must say, Senator Mathias, I agree fully. We

have been victimized by excessive secrecy, not only with respect tofailure of Congress in the

Past to exercise pro er surveillance over

intelligence activities, but a so excessive secrecy R as created this kindof mischief within the executive branch. Here we have a case wherethe very methods of secrecy concealed for 5 years an act of insub-ordination within the CIA that came to light only by the happenstancethat Mr. Colby, the present Director, asked the Age&y if th8j’ pleasewould tell him what. has been going on that is wrong. And as a

result, somebody knowing something about this gave him a tip, as aresult of which he then conducted investigations that led to this dis-closure. So I believe that the internal workings within the Agencyitself are a matter that we must look at very closely to be sure thatthis kind of thing does not happen acessive secrecy may have victimize f

ain and can be prevented. Ex-

Congress.this Agency as well as the

Our next Senator in line 1s Senator Hart.Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Mr. Colby, can you be absolutely sure that there are not in other

vaults any poisons in this town or in this country or in our possessionin some part of the world ?

Mr. COLBY. I cannot be absolutely sure, no, Senator. We obviouslyare conducting such investigations and releasing such orders as pos-sible, but I cannot be absolutely sure that some officer somewhere ha‘snot sequestered something.

Senator HART of Colorado. Could you concisely as possiblestate for the committee your understanding of the pract.ice ofcompartmentation ?

Mr. COLBY. Well, the compartmentation process is merely the stricta

f

plication of the “need-to-know” principle. If an employes in the in-

te ligence business needs to know something in order to do his job, thenhe has a right to the information. But if he does not need to know thatparticular information, he does not have a right to the information.And if the information is one which is required for large numbers ofemployees, then large numbers of employees will be allowed to know it.

If the particular activity is a very sensitive matter and only a veryfew employees need to know it, then it will be known to only a veryfew employees. W8 make a particular effort to keep the identities ofour sources and some of our more complicat8d technical systems re-stricted very sharply to the people who actually need to work on

them. And many of the rest of the people in the Agency know nothingabout them.Senator HART of Colorado. Does that need-to-know principle apply

in cases of sensitivity to the Director of Central Intelligence?Mr. COLBY. Certainly not. It does not with one exception. I do not

believe I need to know the name of an agent in some foreign countrywho is serving us at the risk of his life. I know he is there, I knowwhat kind of a person he is, but T do not need to know his actual name.I have k~~t-~~~;;~~~ my knowledge because I travel and I do not---L l - .a -4 tbkn R-t that ie tha nnlv n.r+a that 1



33

would apply it to. I am responsible for everything that happens inthe Agency, I need to know everything that happens in the Agency.

Senator HART of Colorado. Based upon this case and other mattersthat we have under consideration and past practices in the A

how can you? as the Director of Central Intelligence, be abso utely

ency,

sure that activities of this kind are not going on within the Agency,shielded from your knowledge by the practice of compartmentation ?

.Mr. COLBY. I think I have an adequate system today, both in ourproma cf

ram review of what the activities of the Agency are, the decisionse about resource levels, personnel levels, things of this nature,

devoted to different kinds of projects. I look at results from thosecommitments to see whether they are compatible with the kind of fundsexpended on them. I also have an independent Inspector General andwe have most recently increased the size of his staff in response to

@requirement of the Rockefeller Commission.We have made certain organizational changes in the Agency totry to break down the former high degree of compartmentationwhich in some cases was not really based upon a need-to-know prin-ciple, but became a little bit identified with the normal bureaucraticprocesses of developing a small wall between different organizations.This particular office, for instance, was transferred from our opera-tional directorate to the science and technology directorate.

Senator HART of Colorado. But in the final analysis, there is noabsolutely certain guarantee that incidents of this type might notoccur in the future.Gn,&fr.CODBY. There is a guarantee in the sense that the employees areshown a statement each year and sign it, a set of standards for theiractivities, and included in those is our requirement that if they knowof any questionable activities or activities beyond CIA’s charter, thatthey’re instructed to bring it to either me or the Inspector General.

This is a process I have insisted on to my subordinate deputies, thatI be subjected to no surprises; and it is the latest one of these particu-lar directives that actually instigated this exposure here, that my sub-ordinates are responsible for bringing to me anything that they findthat is sensitive in any fashion and to keep me advised of any suchmatters going on.

As you say, Senator, it is certainly possible that some person some-place in the world can do an improper thing without my knowledge ofit beforehand.

Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Colby, I think your exposure to thiscommittee is sufficient to know that none of us w’ishes to question theloyalty or patriotism of any of your employees. What we are tryingto ,do, as the chairman and Senator Mathias and others have stated,is to work with you and your colleagues in preventing the kind of&uses and misconduct that has gone on in the past. In that connection,

can you suggest any further guidelines in addition to the statementt%at you made which would guarantee that this compartmentation&es not prevent the knowledge of the command and control officers in&he&ency of kev aotivities?‘*%4r. COLBY. Well, I think, as I did say in mv statement, Senator, I%&eve that intensive external supervision will generate intensive~r”na.1 supervision. That is a normal working of bureaucracies and I%%&k that that kind of supervision I welcome from lboth the Executive



34

and the Congress because I think it will keep our intdligenmp”

Pieabsolutely confident that they do not do things that they shou d not.

Senator HART of Colorado. So you do not find the work of this

committie unwelcome?. Mr. COLBY. No; I do not. As I have said to the chairman, I welcomethe chance to try to describe to the American people what intelligenceis really about today. And it is an opportunity to show how we Ameri-cans have modernized the whole concept of intelligence and I hopewe can do that.

Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Colby, one brief line of inquiry inconnection with the case under study. Are you familiar with a reportedseries of so-called vulnerability studies that were conducted probablysometime in the sixties in connection with this program of toxicwea ons and so forth?

rx r. COLBY. I think this was a Def&&:Department activity of deter-mining what possible.vulnerabilities our country might have to thesekinds of wea ns.

Senator ART of Colorado. To your knowledge, were CIA person-p”nel involved in this ?

Mr. COLBY. CIA was aware of some of them because they were con-ducted with Fort Detrick and sometimes there,are lessons to be learnedfrom it that were picked up.

Senatir HSART of Colorado. But to your knowledge, your employeesdid not participate ?

Mr. COLBY. They reported on the activities to us, but it was myimpression that they did not actually participate in the experimentitself.

Senator HART of Colorado. And you are familiar with the fact thatone of these experiments was conducted in the Food and Drug Admin-istration here in Washington ?

Mr. COLBY. I’m aware of a report to that effect; yes, sir.Senator HART of Colorado. And you are alsvMr. COLBY. There were other installations around the country that

we looked at to determine what possible vulnerabilities large mstal-lations would have.

Senator HART of Colorado. Major urban subway systems and SOforth 1

Mr. COLBY. Yes.Senator HART of Colorado. Did any of these studies in any way

jeopardize human life and safety ?Mr. COLBY. According to my records, they were not conducted with

hazardous substances. They were simulated rather than real.Senator HART of Colorado. So, to your knowledge, no actual jeop-

ardy occurred to any individual during any of these tests?Mr. COLBY. I do not know of any that were in these studies, I do not

know of any. Obviouslv we did have the problem of the testing ofLSD on unwitting subjects. That would fall within the category ofyour question.

Senator HART of Colorado. I am talking more about the mas8---Mr. COLBY. No, the mass ones, it is my impression that they did

not risk lthe lives and health of the people involved.Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you, and as far as you know,

that one study on the subway system was conducted in New YorkC&y 8



35

Mr. COLBY. I have seen a report to that eflect. Thb is all I knowabouk that articular program.

Senator AR T of Colorado. There was further indication that somefi-

of these toxic elements might have had something to do with thedestruction of crops in parts of the world. Do you know if that wasever im lemented 8

Mr. OLBY.I believe it was not. I know it was considered but it wasdecided not to do itt.

Senatir HART of Colorado. That is all I haave, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hart. And the Chair now

recognizes Senator Schweiker.Senator SCHWEIKER.Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.Mr. Colby, you testified in our o ening statement that there were

basically 11 grams on the she f of t is toxin, discovered by the CIAR*in the storage lab in Washington. I take note of the fact that thedocuments the committee has m front of it also indicate ‘that whenthe committee, or when #the CIA took its own inventory in thatunsigned memo [exhibit 11] that we were discussing a moment ago,which was dated February 16, it only refers to 5.2 milligrams, sothere is obvious discrepant of almost 100 and some percent betweenthe amount that an interna CIA memo said existed and Itheir inven-to from the amount that was finally discovered at the CIA lab,a iscrepancy of a very substantial nature. I wonder if you could

account for that?Mr. COLBY.The difference is the amount the CIA had earlier, whichwas the 5 milligrams, and then the 11 grams which i,t colleoted fromFort D&rick. That material was moved from Fort Detrick to CIA,the additional 11 milligrams, or 11 grams., excuse me.

Senator SCHWEIKER.I believe Fort Detnck’s inventory only showssome 5 milligrams for CIA, and I also believe-I have ‘an inventorylist here [exhibit 11, unclassified from the Army, when they tookinventory at the same time that the CIA letter [exhibit l] was written,Eebruary 17, 1970, the Arm listed on its inventor 2.8 milligrams.

%t,tihe logical question is, di CT n faot the Army also J isobe tthe Presi-$ential order, and did it end up at the same lab? And P think youcan take the question one step further, since 5.2 and 2.8 only accountIf;o;r .8 milligrams, did some other person generously cooperate insrtpplying zln inventory of 3 milligrams, or 3 grams, as opposed totilligrams 8 How do we explain this rather obvious discrepancy,pertrcularly when there wes 2.8 grams-1 should have said 2,800 milli-@ams, 2.8 grams, in this regard?:,:,&Lb. COLBY. If I may, Senator, consult?

Senator SCHWEIEER. Yes, sure. You are entitled to that.

$$%r. COLBY. Senator, we do not know where those other 5 grams,yYg pmken or CHWEIKER. think it is important for the record lto show

@n&i Mr. Colby, and I a preciate your ,frank answer that the CIAat port Detric E showed very clearly there were only 5.2e Army inventory at Fort D&rick, m the same period of

owed that Army had 2.8 grams. There is a pretty obvioushere that somebody at the Army decided they were going

r supply up to CIA.

eWtep.160.



36

What concerns me more is, we are still unaccountable for 3 gram,and do we, in faot, have three agencies deciding to circumvent *aPresidential order : The CIA, the Army, and some unknown supplier.

I think that is a very serious question, and I would hope that wewould pursue it.Do we know who authorized the Fort D&rick, CIA to take away

that supply ? Certainly someone from the Army would,,have had toaulthorize the removal of that supply.

Mr. COLBY. We have no record of it, Senator.Senatir SCH~JXEER. We do not know that, so we could not possibly

know, then, if the 2.8 grams was also ship ed out at that time.Also, do I understand correctly, Mr. Co1 y, that in order to locate

this-and I want to make clear that it was a CIA discovery, I thinkthat is a significant point, and a fair point to make-but do I under-stand that in discovering this material, that they had a code namefor this material that was not presently available to you as Director?

Mr. COLBY. There was a code name for this particular activity, andthe code name was recorded, but I did not know it. It came to thememory of one of our oflicera. One of the problems we have is thatfrequently, on sensitive macltivities, we do not use the real names of theactiviities. We use these code names, snd the code names become aform of second language. I’m sure the code name was avdlable to me,if I had askeci specifically about this particular code name.

Senator SCHWEIEER. Does not the Director have, really, somewhere

in his command, a roster or a master index of what the ongoing codenames mean, and how relevant they are ? How could you exercise anycammand and control?

Mr. COLBY. This is an old oode name. We obviously do have a list”-ing from which the code names are chosen for

crrt’icular activities,

and I could Ihave found out about this if I ha had the tip. All Ineeded here was the tip, and we had the tip, and t,hen that led us tothe whole story, to the extent that we have records.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Does this not a.lso suggest the possibility thatt.he code name information was in those destroyed records? It seems

to me that is a pretty relevant question abou’t why the Dire&or, eventhough he didn’t know the code name, did not have access to the codename immediately. It seems to me that it would very likely be thatt,hat access or informational sheet might well have been destroyed too.Do we know Ithat?

Mr. COLBY. The code names are obviouslv kept in different centerswithin the Agency, and it is a matter of g&g through the differentcenters and selecting which ones to ask for for the particular informa-tion, and what the code names are.

NOW, there is a procedure by which we can find out what one ofthese o&de names refers to, or alternatively, to find the code nameapplied to a certain activity.

Senator SCHWEXKER. A project that would kill many thousands ofpeople-I would think it would be somewhere immediately at hand,in the Director’s drawer, to know what had or had not heppened.

Mr. COLBY. Well, this was a project tha.t had been closed out 5 yearsago, and the matter had been terminated, and the records were in ourrecords center.



37

Senator SCHWEXEER. Now, on this same inventory list, again, thatthe CIA discovered, is another toxin, a fish toxin, and we invento-ried that at 3 cubic centimeters, and only 1 milligram of this materialapparently is a lethal dose, indicating it is almost as lethal, at lea&weight-wise, as the shellfish toxin. Why was this also overlooked, andwhy wasn’t the fish toxin destroyed?

Mr. COLBY. Well, the fact here was that the various materials herewere not destro ed.

9I believe there is a technical argument about

whether the she lfish toxin is the on1 one that is directly coveredbt e other kinds of toxins, beyond the research into the possiblyT

the Pie&dent’s order. But obvious y, we do not have a need for

defensive uses.Senator SCH~EIKER. Well, the President’s order, Mr. Colby, is very

clear and specific. It said yesearch for defensive purposes only. TO

your knowledge, has any research for defensive purposes been goingon with the fish toxin ‘at CIA, or at any other laboratory?

Mr. COLBY. No, Senator. This was put on this shelf, aand just leftthere. It became an old storeroom, and the material w&s up there andforgotten.

Senator SCH~EIKEZR. Mr. Colby, you said earlier, if I recall yourtestimony, that at one point in your career, coming from the covertside, that you had been approached by a technical person about pos-sible use of this substance, and you had turned it down?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Senator SCRWEIKER. Whv did you turn it down?Mr. ,COLBY. Because I did not think it was a good idea. I do notbelieve in that kind of activity.

Senator SCH~EIKER. I gather, t,hen, from that statemen~t that therewss no policy, or no direotive, or no written document indicating thatwhoever apolicy of

proached you was operating out of the framework of atE e Agency. Is that not a fair assumption ?

Mr. COLBY. I just never got to that question. As far as I was con-cerned the thought was ut., and I turned it. down.

Senator SCIDVEIKER. x nd I t,hink the obvious question is, what if

the same Technics.1 Service person approached somebody who did nothave your judgement, conscience, and standards, and decided that hewould accept it? What would have happened then ?

Mr. COLBY. Well, today, he would run into very specific directiveson that point.

Senator SCI-IWEII(ER. Yes; and I commend you for that.Finally, I would like to ask a question as far as this memorandum

[exhibit 1’1 is concerned. The memorandum that said they wanted totransfer this poison, or toxin-poisons-to a location in Baltimore isunsigned. Is this the original or the carbon that the CIA found1

Mr. COLBY. It is apparently the carbon.Senator SCHWEIXEFC. So, ss a matter of speculation, one could specu-late that the original memorandum, which has never been found, couldwell have been signed and could have been destroyed.

Mr. COLBY. Normally not, I think the evidence here-there is notyped date on it, and there is no mark that the original had beensigned. This is a normal procedure in our machinery that this wouldbe so indicated.



39

Mr. COLBY.Some of their others are also included, and I believethere is a technical argument about which ones are and which onesare not. In effect, the are.

The CHAIRMAN. it ell, I am informed that 11 grams of shellfishtoxin+n the surface, it seems to be a small quantity-actually rep-resents about a third of the total amount ever reduced in the world.We have already covered the number of peo e that could be killed

&P

through the application of such quantities. at I would like to getat is this: The President declares it to be the national policy of theUnited States not to engage in the development of toxins of this kind.The President announces to the world, as a unilateral initiative, whichwas widely

ufublicized as an indicator of our peaceful intentions,

that we wo d, indeed, destroy such substances, and that we wouldbecome part of an international convention to this end. Now, t,hat is

rather a major statement of policy, broadcast to the world, and thegood faith of the President of the United States and of the Govern-ment of the United States is thus on the line. Would you not agree 1

Mr. COLBY. I agree.The CHAIRMAN. Now, we lind out 5 years later that the Presidential

orders were not, in fact, carried out. Why in a matter of this kind wasno written order given to destroy these toxins, in compliance withthe President’s directive?

Mr. COLBY. I do not know, Mr. Chairman. I think that it is quiteobvious that the suggestion was made that they not be destroyed.

There is an indication that it was not accepted. The President’s direc-tive was obviously passed down and made known to the people whohad this facility, and the degree to which a specific order is required,I,do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Why, in a matter of this importance, if no writ:ten order were used, why did not the Agency follow u in some way todetermine whether or not the President’s order had TM3 n obeyed!

Mr. COLBY. I think the assumption was that the material was atDetrick, and that it would be destroyed up there. The re uest was sentto Detrick to destroy the material there. The individua left out the

material-The CHAIRMAN. But no effort was made to obtain a count, no check

was made to see whether or not the material had, in fact, beenGtestroyed 8

Mr. COLBY, Apparently not, sir.The CHAIBMAN. Do you not think that is an exceedingly loose way

twun an agency,R

articularly the CIA 1.! .&r. COLBY.We , we are going to try to run it tighter.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you have said that in your opinion the manu-facture of these poisons and delivery devices, as you call them, was

slrJginally authorized by the law. I would like to ask a question or two&out that. The statute in the National Security Act that gives the6IA its basic power sets out the various duties of the Agency andin ,a well-known cat,chall rovision, whic,h is subsection 5 of sectiopB.of the act-that catcha provision reads, “to perform such otherf.u@ions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national se-curity, as the National Security Council may, from time to time,&ect.”‘. .%~w,. .f@t of all, poisons do not normally fall under the cate ory

&ntelli rice, as it IS generally understood. That is to say, the gat &-

)”

Tl

kw nf in nrmdion. Wnll1t-l vnu IWIVW with that 9



40

Mr. COLBY. Yes. Except to the degree--the tradition of ,the L-pill,and things of that nature.

The CHAIRMAN. Except as they might be used purely defensively 8

Mr. COLBY. Yes.The CHAIRMAN. And so that the offensive use of poisons would fallwithin the category that we generally refer to as covert operations?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.The CHAIRMAN. And based upon a ll of the testimony and documents

that this committee has received thus far, the CIA bases its authorityto conduct covert operations on this provision of the law8

Mr. COLBY. Correct.The CHAIRMAN. Al l ri ht. I will reread this provisi6n of the law:

“to perform such other fi ll nctions and duties related to intelligenceaffecting the national security, as the National Security Council may,from time to time, direct.” My question is, did the National SecurityCouncil direct the CIA to develop these quantities of poison?

Mr. COLBY. No ; but the National Security Council certainly expectsthe CIA to be prepared to conduct paramilitary operations tradi-tionally associated with the covert action area, and in the process ofpreparing for those kinds of operations; the CIA, has developed dif-ferent weapons, has maintained different stocks of weapons, and It,hink that this incident came from the thought process that is repre-sented by the development of that capability for the possibility of suchcovert operations.

The CHAIRMAN. But Mr. Colby, you have already testified thatpoisons in this quantity exceeded any use that the CIA might con-template or properly pursue in connection with its covert operations.

Mr. COLBY. In this quantity, yes, Mr. Chairman. But the idea ofdeveloping i&

The CHAIRMAN. Yes ; and my question is, since these poisons weredeveloped in such quantities, and since the National Security Councilgave you no directive to do so, is it not questionable that the CIAwas really authorized to develop such quantities of poisons?

Mr. COLBY. I think, Mr. Chairman, we have to get back to what this

related to. It was a joint effort between the Army and ourselves about,a weapons system, biological and chemical warfare, that were ac-ceptable and accepted up until t,he time of the President’s directives.Therefore, these were weapons which were in the national arsenal, ifyou will.

Now, I think the idea of the CIA being interested in these weaponsfor possible intelligence related activities is appropriate under thatprovision. However, I agree with you that t,he quantities were exces-she.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senav Tower has some further ques-

tions.Senator TOWER. We have spoken rather etinsively here about

apparent lack of clear lines of contr 1 and authority running down-ward and of clear lines of accountability running

this reached a



41

here, as a result of our discovery of a very significant instance of in-subordination?

If, indeed, it has been pervasive, is there not a need for much tightercontrols at the top ?

Mr. COLBY. Senator Tower, I believe that we are realIy-we havein CIA a very tight discipline. I’m not sayin it is total, obviously.It did not work in this case. I think with peop e scattered around theworld doing very sensitive work and hithere has been, indeed, a very high sense o

hly compartmented work,f discipline in the organiza-

tion and a high sense of compliance to the regulations and the rulesand the directives of the organization. And I think that the leadershipof the organization hahalways felt very much subject to direct Presi-dential control and responsive to it.

Senator TOWER. So you would say, actually, that this instance is an

exception to the rule ? Ordinarily, the discipline has been good, thatthe control has worked, and the accountability has worked in the wayit should, according to the proper tenets of good administration!

Mr. COLBY. In the business which we are in, intelligence and covertoperations, I think there have been very few cases in which the Agencyor its employees has done something they should not have. And inmany of the cases which we now question, we find that those. activitieswere approved by the appropriate authorities at that time. The senseof discipline within the organization seems to be quite tight.

Senator TOWER. In the absence of a written order, would a sub-

ordinate regard a verbal order as less serious or less emphatic than awritten order, or would he regard it just as seriously 8Is it the custom in the Agency to give verbal orders on extremely

sensitive matters, where you perhaps may not want something reducedto writing?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think the effectiveness of an oral order is exact1what a written order is, that the individual is sup osed to comply

KBit

it. It is clear that in the past there was a time in w ich various subjectswere not written down. The committee has been into one of these, andwe now have another on?, where very little was actually written downbecause of the belief of high sensitivity of the activity.

Senator TOWJZR. Now, isn’t the Agency expected to maintain thecompetence to perform anNational Security Counci 98

operation mandated by the President or the

Mr. COLBY. Any operation within the law.$enator TOWER. Any operation within the law. So in this connec-

Ttion, would specific NSC approval or knowledge be required from thest,andpoint of experimentation on weapons Z

Mr. COLBY. On the experimentation, I would say no.. I would say.&at, if there is an accepted national weapons system, that the intclh-gence agency can look at it to see if it has intelligence applications,possible applications.

As to the use of such a weapon, either this or another weapons SYS-

%m, then I think it falls clearly within the provision of the memo-randum which covers covert operations, which saps that I am requiredtureceive the approval for anything major or politically sensitive-andE%rink certainly this would fall into the category of politicallysensitive.

&enator TowER. Thank you, Mr. Colby. No further questions,



42

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tower. Senator Mondale!Senator MONDALB. Thank you ver much.I was wondering if I might ask a Pew questions of Mr. Stevens.The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stevens, would you come to the witness table,

please ? Just pull your chair up.Senator MONDALE. Mr. Stevens, as I understand it, you were orderedby the Director to conduct a study of the matter before the committeetoday, namely, the treatment and destruction of toxic materials.

Mr. STEVENS. That is correct.Senator MONDALE. How long did that study take?Mr. STEVENS.Well, it has continued from late April until, essentially,

the present time.Senator MONDALE. You were charged to make a thorough study, and

that is what you believe you did?

Mr. STEVENS.A thorou h study, within some very important limita-tions. We investigated t a e matter to the extent that we wanted toreally establish that it was an area that deserved further review, thatit was an area apt to be questioned, and so on. But it was not a thoroughinvestigation in the sense that the committee, for example, wouldconduct.

Mr. COLBY. One thing, for instance, is this rule against interviewingextensively former employees, although in this case we did make con-tact with one to find something about it.

Senator MONDALE. In other words, one way in which it was inade-

quate is that former em loyees were not interviewed !Mr. STEVENS. Severa P former employees were interviewed, but only

at their volition, and they were under no compulsion to go intoanything. 8’

Senator MOEDALE. Did you interview Gottlieb, Gordon,Karamessines ?

Mr. STEVENS. I interviewed Dr. Gordon.Senator MONDALE). Karamessines 1Mr. STEVENS. No, sir.Senator MONDALE. Is there any doubt in your mind that the top

leadership in the CIA was aware of the President’s order to destroythese toxins ?

Mr. L%WENS. No; I think there is clear evidence that they wereaware.

Senator MONDALE. That they understood that. Is there any doubtthat the persons in the department dealing with these toxins, Mr. Gor-don, Dr. Gottlieb, and so on, also were aware of the Presidential orderdirecting the destruction of these toxins P

Mr. STEVENS. They were aware of them.Senator MONDALE. So there is no question of knowledge here? Then,

if they knew the President had ordered the destruction of these toxins,yet the toxins were not destroyed, what happened !

Mr. STEVENS.Well, I think that the question as to what must be donewith the Agency stockpile, how it was to be destroyed and so on, wasaddressed. And I think that the memorandum that you have referredto earlier is the representation of that question being raised. Quiteapart from that, the shellfish toxin was brought back on the part of anindividual decision.



43

Senator MONDALE, Yes. But there was no question, &s gather fromyour response, that anybody in command, from the top to the bottom,was in doubt about the Presidential order directing the destruction oftoxin. Your answer to that was, yes, there was no doubt. Yet they were

not destroyed.What happened ? Let me ask you about the three options I can think

of : (1)) somebody deliberately disregarded an order of the President ;(2)) negligence or inadvertence;’ (3)) a back-channel order that doesnot show up anywhere, in which higher authority said something elseprivately to these officials, which was different from the official publicorder.

Which of these possibilities, or another if you can think of it, is thelikely explanation for what was obviously a policy which was differentfrom that recommended or ordered by the President Z, Mr. STEVENS. I think, really, none of those. I think what happened

was, the instructions were given that the material that was held for theAgency at Fort Detrick, that that be destroyed. Before that was done,some of the shellfish toxin was returned or brought to the CIA andstored there. That was done, I think, by people who were completelyenmeshed with the technical aspects of the problem, and were so im-pressed with the value, the difficulty of extracting that stuff, and so on,they simply could not bear to have it destroyed.

Senator MONDALE. So what you are saying is that, though the Presi-dent ordered its destruction, people lower in the Agency felt it was ofsuch value that they did not do it ?

Mr. STEVENS.That is a parently the case.Senator MONDALE. So t at they deliberately disobeyed a Presidential

order ?Mr. STEVENS. And apparently disobeyed orders within the Agency.Senator MONDALE. So that, in your judgment, based upon

%our

study, there was a decision at a low level to disobey higher orders.Mr. STEVENS.So far as I could see, hat was about it.Senator MONDALE. Was there any evidence of back-channel orders

that was different from the public order?Mr. STEVENS. have no evidence whatsoever that that was the case.Senator MONDALE. Maybe the Director would like to respond to these

questions, too.Mr. COLBY. No. I accept fully Dr. Stevens’ answers, and I think that

it is quite clear that there was a decision not to destroy it, and variouspeople knew it.

Senator MONDALE. We are not arguing that the President has theduty to find out who had this, and call him personally and plead with‘hi:m, or anything like that. This was an order that was known, and

someonedecided to disregard it.lHr. COLBY. No doubt about its application! I think, or the order. Ido not think that not only that there is no indication of any back chan-he1 advice not to do it, and don’t say an.ything about it. I think there isan indication in our interviews that no such thing occurred, because 1%@spect e would have heard about it in the interviews with Dr.Gordon, for example,

@en&or MONDALE Would you say that the pro osed memorandum-pared by Dr. Gordon clearly shows that he un cferstood the serious-amof this matter ?



44

Mr. COLBY. think it clearly indicates that some decision had to bemade as to whether to destroy the material in compliance with thePresident’s orders, or not to destroy it, either in violation of the Presi-dent’s order or under some other justification not expressed.

Senator MONDALE. But it is clear in that memo he understood thatthe President ordered its destruction, and these toxins were included.

Mr. STEVENS.Yes ; I think so.Senator MONDALE. And he went on further to suggest that the there-

fore be transferred to another private warehouse, but at pu ! lit ex-pense. SO I think it is quite clear.,from that memo that he knew theseriousnessof what he was doing:

This, in my opinion, is the point, &. Chairman. I very much believewe need a strong CIA, and we need a st.rong intelligence capability.There is no doubt about it: I think it has to operate in secret. But-what bothers me, ‘basedon this evidence-the evidence we have had inother hearings-is this whole issue, not of secrecy, I grant that,but of accountabilit , this difficulty of finding out what ha.ppened,and this gnawing ear that I have that things are occurring indeliberate contravention and disregard of official orders.

That is what bothers me, and I know it bothers you, Mr. Director.The CHAIRMAN. Senator, in that connection, would you inquire-

if you do not, I will-would you inquire whether any of those whofailed to obey the President’s order are still with the Agency? The

Agency has made a careful investigation on its own.All right, I will put the question. Are any of them still with theAgent y ?

Mr. COLBY. Apparently, yes. At least one still is.The CHAIRMAN. What disciplinary action hasibeen aken? ‘Mr. COLBY. I have not yet taken any. I have that under advisement

right now, and I am coming to a decision.The CHAIRMAN. Would you be sure to report to the committee what

action the Agency takes 8Mr. ,COLBY. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is determined that this individual willfullydisobeyed the President’s order.Mr. COLBY. Whatever action I take, I will report.The CHAIRMAN. Sometimes such people get promoted in our

bureaucracy, and we will be interested in knowing what action is takenin this case.

Mr. COLBY. Certainly.The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator Mathias.Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Mr. Colby, in response to Senator Mondale just a minute ago, you

said that your investigation had indicated that there was no evidenceof any back-channel order in violation of the Presidential command ;is that not right?

Mr. COLBY:Right.Senator MAT~HIAH. Is it not more than that ; did you not find evidence

that the official order had been to comply with the Presidentialdirective?

Mr. COLBY. Yes. There is indication that the instruction was tohave material destroyed at Fort Detrick. There was a gap there asto what was to ,be destroyed at Fort Detrick, and as to what was



45

physically in the CIA, and that gap was not covered by a specificdirective. But also, there is no indication that that gap was coveredby any back-channel arrangements.

Senator MATHIAS. I think it is important that the record show that

YOU answer affirmatively if t.hat is the case, that there was a goodfaith attempt to comply with the Presidential order, if that was yourunderstandmg.

Mr. COLBY. I think there was by the Agency itself ; yes.Senator MATHLAS. No.w, the chairman has raised the question about

the volume, the amount and quality of shellfish toxin. As I under-stand it, this was &tit seems a prosaic phrase to use for it but itwas not an operational supply.

Mr. COLBY. I think it was beyond that quantity, it appears, fromwhat you can see.

Senator MATHIAB. Well, let us establish this in the first place. FortDetrick was the national biological warfare center?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.Senator MATHIAS. And CIA had a continuing relationship at Fort

Detrick which, in fact, supported the SOD division at D&rick. Isthat not true?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.Senator MATHIAS. And that this was the facility in which experi-

ments were carried out, in which research was done?Mr. COLBY. Yes. It was not solely supported by CIA. It was also

supported by the Army.Senator MATHIAS. But *CIA was one of the principal customers ?Mr. COLBY. Princi al participants, yes. It wasn’t the principal,

but it was a substantia lpcustomer.Senator MATHIAS. It was a principal customer? Al l right.sow, when the idea of the shellfish toxin arose, you just do not

go to the Boston Cookbook and look up how to make it; is that notlime ?

Mr. COLBY. No ; you do not.Senator MATHIAS. You have to find out, and that was the job of the

SOD division.Mr. COLBY. Yes.Senator MATHIAS. And it was a costly, time-consuming process.J&r. COLBY. Yes, and a very difficult one, I guess..&nator M~HIAS. And one that probably no one could predict the

v@lumes which would be produced by a given mass of shellfish.Mr. COLBY. Well,, I’m not sure of that. I think that after we found

,out enough about it, we could probably predict at some pomt whereQurquantities would result from a certam uantity of shellfish.

Mr. STEVENS. Production capabilit , as(I Punderstand it, was devel-

o@ed by Fort Detrick. It was produce .: -Mr. COLBY. Some of this was of course produced by other Govern-

ment agencies as well.Genator MATHIAS. Fort Detrick was not normally a production

:‘@&l&y, though, was it ?Mr. COLBY. No. I think this particular material-it is indicated it

me from elsewhere. It was actuall produced somewhere else.ator MATHIAS; Which was a norma 9 procedure.COLBY. Which was, in other words--



46

Senator MATHIAS. After the techniques were developed at FortDetrick ?

Mr. COLBY. Fort D&rick contracted for the production of thisquantity.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, could that explain the discrepancy raisedby Senator Schweiker, the fact that Detrick had a certain amount oftoxin on hand as a result of experimentation, and that production wasthen im lemented, as in the case of other biological agents?

Mr. 8 OLBY. Well., I ,think here the inventories indicate that FortD&rick had a certain quantity available, but we ended up with consid-erably more. It may have been that there was more derived from else-where to make up the total that we finally found. ’

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddle&on 1

Senator HTJDDLESMN. I just have one auestion. It has been suthat one of the reasons for retaining this-quantity of toxin was

gestedf ecause

of its value and its potential research value. During the &year periodit was stored, is there any evidence that any request from any source,either outside of the Agency or within the Agency, that it be used inany way for experimentation Z

Mr. COLBY. No. No, there was none. It was just put away on the shelf,or in the freezer, and eventually was found. There was no indicationof any consideration for any purposes.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Whoever was so interested in it as a potential

research tool promptlythat purpose ?

forgot it, or made no suggestion it be used for

Mr. COLBY. Yes, although I did say I have a request now from, aquite proper research interest not to destroy it, but to make it availableto medical research.

Senator HUDDLESTON. But that has come since the public revelationof its existence?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.Senator HUDDLEST~N. Thank you.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Schweiker?

Senator SCHWFXHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Mr. Colby, there was a news account, when Gary Powers was shot

down, the silver dollar that contained this drill with the shellfish toxinon it was opened by the Russians immediately, and was tested on a dog,and the dog died in 10 seconds. Is that correct P

Mr. COLBY. I have heard that account. I cannot testify to thatspecifically. I just do not know. Gary Powers might know. It is myimpression that he separated the pin from the silver dollar and threwthe silver dollar away on his way down, hoping to keep the pin as a lessobvious device, and then was captured with the pin on his person.

Senator SCHWEIKER. I understand one of your people did verifythat account. I realize you may not know.

Mr. COLBY. Then I accept that. The shellfish toxin is veryquick-acting. -

Senator SCHWEIKER. That would not be inconsistent with the lethaleffect of the shellfish toxin?

Mr. COLBY. It’s certainlv possible, yes.Senator SCHWEIKER. The second is that the materials that were in

the vault in the storage facility in Washington, I believe some 15



47

pe;~l$ad access to that vault during this period of time. Is that

Mr. COLBY. Over the years, with the changes in personnel, I thinkthat is a fair total.

Senator SC HWEIKER. Would that not strike you, beinmentalized as you are, and limiting things to two and ta

as compart-ree people-and sometimes one, as we have seen in the case of that unsigned memo-randum-would that not be an excessively large number to have accessto those deadly toxins 8

Mr. COLBY. I do not think it was 15 at any one time. These reflectedreplacements and so forth, as I recall, and it is just adding up every-body who had access to% over that time? in&dinhad the combination to the vault and things like t%

the secretary, whoat. No, it is not an

excessive number for a highly compartmented thing, because you

do need that many people to be involved in a particular activity. Some-times, you have to have thousands involved in a highly compartmentedactivity.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Would you have some kind of fail-safe mecha-nism to make sure that oneit ? It seems to me you woul I!

erson could not just go on his own and dohave to have some check and balance.here.

Mr. COLBY. Well, in this cas+Senator SCHWEIXER. Just like the person that came ‘to you and of-

fered the opportunity for you to use it.Mr. COLBY. Well, I think in this case, the material was iu a locked

vault, a safe with a combination lock, three-numbered combinationlock. The combination was known to only specific people. It was con-trolled, in a guarded building. It was quite a safe situation, exceptfrom those people who had access to it. Now there, you depend thenon the discipline of the people involved, and as you know in this case,it did break down at one point.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Mr. Chairman, I just had aP

oint. I do not

know if this is the time to raise it, but I think we shou d at some point

mquire from the Army as to whether they can account for the 6 gramsof unknown toxin.

The CHAIRNAN. I agree, Senator, and we will do that. And I think,in connection with your question, it ought to be observed that afterMr. Colby and the present management of the CIA discovered thesepoisons in the laboratory, that a 24-hour special guard was placed onthem, which would indicate that previous security arrangements werenot thought to be sufficient. And I think that speaks for itself.

Senator Morgan ?Senator MORGAN. Mr. Colby, we have referred to Presidents’ orders

to destroy these stockpiles. The only two orders that I have before mesimply renounce the use of the toxins, and also direct the Secretary of

Defense to make recommendations about the disposal of existing stocks.Did the Secretary of Defense ever make’such recommendations?

Mr. COLBY. I do not know the answer to that. I believe the point thatthe directive refers to is that the United States will renounce the pro-duction or the stockpiling-and we are a part of the United States, asfar as I am concerned,

Senator MORGAN. And the next paragraph says, the Secretary ofDefense will submit recommendations. And my question is that this



48

would break down the claim of authority, it seems.Did he ever makeany recommendations a

Mr. COLBY. Well, obviously, Fort Dietrick was under instructions to

destroy the toxins it had.Senator MORGAN. Have you seen any recommendations from theSecretary of Defense !

I

Mr. COLBY. I have not seen hem.Senator MORGAN. Do you have any in your files?Mr. COLBY. We may, and I will certainly make a search for them

and see if I can hnd them.Senator MORGAN. Thank you.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart?Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Colby, you stated in your opening

statement that your awareness of the existence of these materials cameafter I think what you referred to as repeated directives. Woulddescribe for the committee what kind of difliculty you encounter-ec9

uin

finding out about these toxins yourself 8Mr. COLBY. Well, after we had the suggestion that there was an area

that needed to be looked at that was a uestionable area, then Dr.Stevens began to look for it. And eventual !Iy it was discovered. He didnot run into any attempt to conceal or hide at that point, after hebegan to ask the right questions. The difficulty was that, for a coupleof years, starting with Dr. Schlesinger’s instruction, and then repeatedadditional ones, 1t0 nform the management of anything questionable,and individual items would keep coming to someone’smind. Then wecould follow them up and find the details.

Senator HART of Colorado. What if you did not ask the right ques-tions ?

Mr. COLBY. If you do not ask the right questions, you have t,o dependu on a record search. And sometimes, this then gets into the difficultyof the available records and the ciyptonyms, and that sort of thing.ThEl,has been a problem. It 1s a problem we are going to have to

Senator HART of Colorado. Dr. Steven?, it is my understanding,,

based upon Mr. Duckett’s testimony, that inof this together, you inquired of people in the r9

our efforts to piece allgency who should have

known about this who discounted in 1963 the Inspector General’s re-port about the existence of this careally as serious as that report mig R

ability, and said that it was not

what happened the first go-round?t have indicated. Is that, in fact,

Mr. STEVENS.Generally, yes. I think they were not being untruthful,but they put emphasis on aspects of the program that were not reallypertinent, and I think that’s really the reason why I failed to followup on that with more vi

Senator HART of Co orado. Mr. Director, you are satisfied that as

or at that time.

you pursued the other questions that I asked., that you found out allof the so-called questionable activities? That is, you have asked all ofthe right questions!

Mr. COLBY. NO, I cannot say for absolutely certain. We are still ask-ing the same questions to all of our people, and will continue to do sofrequently. And of course, an incident like this then reiterates t.henecessity of getting our people to come forward. We are dealing some-times in an area where there is nobody currently in the Agency who



d to be offensive.

s has a final question.or MONDALE. Mr. Colby, we have a photograph, which I tihinke seen! of the containers in which the shellfish toxin was found.top of each of Ithese gallon cans is a la’bel which says, “DryPoisons” ; and it says, “Do not -useunless directed by P6OO.j’second can, in large handwritten fiber pen lettirs, it says

o find out whlat

udonutknow?You cannot find out who P600 wash

mator MONDALE. Did you check with Fort Detrick ‘to see what

’ sea p. 204.



50

Senator MONDALE. Can you find out who or what PBOO s for us?Mr. STEVENS. We will endeavor to do it, but the Defense Depart-

ment is in a much better position to talk to former Fort Detrick people

than we are.The CHAIRMAN. We can talk to the Defense De artment,and these photographs, of course, will be made K

I think,pu lit as part of &he

public hearing today, and now Senator IMath& has the final question.Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairmen, your bst statement just suggests

one other very brief?uestion. So we do not mislead anybody, could

you tell us in terms o some simple ‘measure, how much of &his toxicsubstance was involved in tea

Toons or tablespoons, for example.

Mr. COLBY. Well, <about a ha f an ounoe is what the total is of the11 grams. \,I

Senator MATHIAS. It would be ‘a couple of tablespoons?Mr. COLBY.A couple of teaspoons, probably, ‘a couple of teaspoons.Mr. STEVENS. couple of teaspoons of sugar would constitute about

the same.Senator MATHIAS. About 2 teaspoons of sugar because these pic-

tures would indicate something much more, because of the bulk of thecontainers.

Mr. COLBY. Well, each of those bottles is about 4 inches high and,of course, the substance is at the bottom. There’s a very small amountof the substance at the bottom of each of these bottles.

Senator MATI-IIAS. We are dealing with such a highly lethal sub-stance that 2 tablespoons is really what is involved here.

Mr. COLBY. Yes ; but it is highly potent.Senator MATHIAS. Now, what I really began to ask, Mr. Chairman,

is this. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense established very, very elaborate procedures for destruction of toxic ma-terials ,at Fort D&rick, so elaborate, in fact, that they were consideredredund,ant by many scientists. Having destroyed fall of the (agentsonce, they went back and did it t.hree or four .more times, land much ofthis was done publicly to impress ‘both the Americannations that we had, in fact, renounced this form oP

eople and other*warfare.

Did you have any such procedures within CIA or, first of iall, wereyou aware of the Department of Defense rocedures a

Mr. COLBY. Well, most of our materia P s at Fort Detrick, so all thematerial except for what was pulled away from it, was destroyed upthere.

Senator MATHIAS. Now, you were ,aware of those procedures atthat time ?

Mr. COLBY. The procedures up there, I oannot say that for sure. Ijust do not know.

Mr. STEVENS.We have no capability to destroy that kind of material.

Mr. COLBY. We cannot destroy it oumelves.Senator MATHIAS. Were you ‘aware of the DOD procedures that

were established ! _Mr. STEVENS. I am sure that the people working in this area were;

Ye-Senator MATHIAS. At that time?Mr. COLBY. At that time.Senator MATHIAS. But you did not attempt to establish any parallel

procedures 0



51

Mr. COLBY. No.Mr. STEVENB. We would never have destroyed it ourselves, but would

have relied on Fort Detrick.

it.

Mr. COLBY. We would have gone to somebody who could destroy

Senator MATHIAS. Just as you contracted with Detrick to produce it,YOU would have contracted with Detrick to destroy it.

Mr. STEVENS. That, in fact, is what happened with most of it.The CHAIRMAN. Xou must have been aware because the whole world

was made aware by the most elaborate television programs that wereintended to inform the world that these substances were, in fact,being destroyed.

Senator MONDALE. I was just going to suggest that if Mr. Stevenscould be around this afternoon, I would like to explore some thingsmith him..

The CHAIRMAN. We have a problem I would like to explain at this&me which will affect the schedule. Tomorrow morning we will meetagain here in this room to contlinue the public hearings, and our firstwitness will be Mr. Richard Helms, who was the Director of the CIAduring the time in question, and other witnesses whose names ,havealready been made available will then be called as time permits.

The public hearings will be held as they were today between thehours of 10 ,in the morning ,and approximately 12 :30. We are staying@r&y close to schedule, but this afternoon, owing to the fact that one,ofour scheduled witnesses has invoked a committee rule which I would&ke now to read, it will be necessar to hold a public hearing, but onerthat will not be covered b

i?live ra d9

6.7 (b) of the committee, wio or television, by virtue of rule

ich reads as follows :

.No witness subpenaed by the Committee shall be required against his will tobie photographed at any hearing or to give evidence or testimony while theWadcasting of that hearing by radio or television is being conducted. At the:;~eepneetof any witness who does not wi& to he suhjeeted to radio, television,WWll photography coverage, all lens shall be covered and all microphones used$or coverage turned off. So tar as practicable, a witness desiring to make such

.&reSueet shall so inform the Chief Counsel of the Committee at least 24 hours?&or to the time that that witness is scheduled to test ify.

&ow, Dr. Nathan Gordon has so advised the chief counsel yesterday&&has invoked this rule. The committee, of course, respects the ruleq&d, for that reason, Dr. Gordon will be the witness this afternoon,,;$&d or purposes of this afternoon’s sessiononly live television, radio,:+&&&photogra

Ph

%‘&k we shouic coverage will be prohibited. For that reason? I

d wait to ‘bring back Mr. Stevens, if you wish to bring&& back, until tomorrow, but the first witness tomorrow will be,@%hard Helms, and the committee will now stand adjourned until

@&is afternoon.~~h@Vhereupon, at 12,:4Eip.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at~@&,rn.he sameday.]

AFIVIRNCQN SJMSION

he CHAIRMAN. The hour of 2 o’clock has arrived. The hearingcome o order.

‘Pursuant to rule 6.7(b) the lights will be turned off; let there be no‘Rht. The live microphones and the television cameras will be turned



54

The CHAIRMAN. Can you answer the question and then tell US?Mr. GORDON. It would be a little more logical, Senator Church, if

you will allow me to give the history of my employment with the CIA.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, if in doing so you will. answer thequestions.Mr. GORDON. Of course.I joined the TSD/CIA in October 1967, as the Deputy Chief of

the Biology Branch of TSD. A few months later, in February 1968,when my ‘predecessor retired from the A envy, I assumed the functionof the Chief of the Biology Branch of T D.

In February of 1968, then, as Chief of the Biology:Branch-I con-tinued in that capacity through February of 1969,l year later: In myjudgment, and in my Division Chief’s judgment, we decided that theBiological Branch-which was a two-man operation, myself and Mr.

David Boston, a project officer, plus a technical consultant, Dr. AlexBatlin, who would consult with us roughly once a week on all (matterspertaining to our interests in the Biological and Chemistry Branches,because in February 1969, we merged the Biology Branch into the thenexisting Chemistry Branch. And as of that particular day, February1969, I assumed the function of Chief, Chemistry Branch.

I held that position until April 1970. At al l times I also wore anotherhat; that was entit led program manager of the behavioral activitiesprogram.

In April of 1970 I reverted to the full-t ime occupation of wearing a

single ‘hat ; that of program manager ‘for behavioral activities. I heldthat particular position within the Chemistry Branch until the date ofmy retirement from the Agency, which was September 30,1972.

Now I hope that I have not neglected to come back to the point thatMr. Schwarz made, and I will now be ready to answer it.

First, I would appreciate? after the few minutes of my discussion,would you repeat your question, sir.

Mr. SCHWUZ. What was your job in 1970 with the CIA?Mr. GORDON. What part of 19708Mr. SCHWARZ. Let us take February 1970.

Mr. GORDON. February 1970 I was Chief of Chemistry Branch andprogram manager of behavioral activities.

Mr. SCHWARZ. At that time waz the chain of command running fromyourself to a Deputy Director of the TSD, then to Dr. Gottlieb, thento Mr. Thomas Karamessines, who was the Deputy Director forPlans, then from hi-m to the Director of the Agency, Mr. Richard;Helms S

Mr. ~&mno~. That is correct, sir.Mr. SCHWARZ. Do you remember being examined under oath by

deposition by the staff on Saturday ?

Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.Mr. SCHWARZ. I am just going to read a couple of answers to youI

and ask whether they are your testimony. You were asked this quesdtion : “Were you ever told that either the Director of the Central In-,telligence Agency, or the Deputy Director for Plans, instructed tha@the CIA stock of biological warfare agents be destroyed?” Answer!“No.”

Is that your testimony?Mr. GORDON. That is correct, sir.



56

Mr. GORDON. In 1970, sir? I did not search the laborator . Ialso add that in my capacity as Chief of the Chemistry 5 ra1970, up through April of 1970, I relied upon Mr. Boston a

project officer to carry on with the everyday, if you will, detailsparticular matters pertaining to that partrcular laboratory.

I again repeat, I am not aware of any lethal agents, either chemicalor biological, in the laboratory prior to the time that we acceptedCIA Agency stockpile of 5 grams of shellfish toxin.

Mr. SCHWARZ. By the laborator3;,-by those answers, you ,rn

CIA facilities here in Washington, .C. ?Mr. GORDON. Yes.Mr. SCHWARZ. You testified thjs*afternoon, as you testified on S

urday? that you did not receive an order from the Director of Cent

Intelligence, or anyone else, to search out and destroy the CIstocks of biological agents.Mr. GORDON. That is correct.Mr. SCHWARZ. I am going to read to you now, Mr. Gordon., fr i

page 20 of the p.m. session,commencing on line 21, a question dlrecdto you-of what you would have done with respect to the SOU$

laboratory if there had been an order from the Director of Centf@Intelligence, and the question and answer read as follows:

Question : “Had there ,been from the Director of the CIA an order that 8,search out and destroy any biological agents,would you, under those circdstances, have searched the south laboratory?” Answer : “Very likely, very Bk

Yes ; I would have been a darned fool i f I did not.”And then you went on to give your explanation for the interpre,&-

tion of the order which we are going to come to.But your testimony is, Dr. Gordon, is it not, that first, there was!@

order transmitted to vou from higher authority to search out a$destroy CIA stock of biological agents. Second, had there been so, $$jwould have searched the laboratory because you would have, as’y$jsa.id, been a darned fool if you did not.

Mr. GORDON. To answer the first part of your question, it appe%“1to me--one moment please.

(Pause.] g:“!JTo the best of my knowledge, I never was aware of any CIA

tive to search out and destroy any biological agents and/or chagents at that particular laboratory.

On the second part of your question, I would repeat that if suorder had been brought to my attention bv the chain of cornwould have been-1 have been too long, I feel, a devoted teamcivil servant, if you will, dedicated to my responsibilities anI would never, never have ignored such a directive.

Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Chairman and members, as

is a CIA inventory which indicates that, in fact, inwere several lethal substances, including some ofbefore the transfer from Fort Detrick occurred.

Now you did know that there was some kind of a Presidentidid you not, Dr. Gordon?

Mr. GORWN. May ‘I be given, if the chief counsel and Senatorwould indulge me, a s-minute period to develop on that par@subject of the White House announcementa in my own way?



58

ber 25,1969, announcement. Because if this isis not done, it is simply looking at the subjectin left field, without any direct bearing or rela

announcements on biological or bacteriologicToxins are indeed a controversial subject. Iof this public tsstimony, ou will deem fit71call in an expert, certam y with far more exlthe field of toxins than myself. Those of usmyself-

The CHAIRMAN. I might say, Dr. Gordon, we will have an expert oitoxins.

Mr. GORDON. Very good, sir. I applaud $6~ for that. ’The Chemistry Branch, sir, comprised, of myself-a chemis

project officer, a chemist, and a tschnical consultant, also a micrologist/biochemist, all in discussions which I am sure will shortcome out by chief counsel, looked upon specifically the shellfish taxas a chemical entity, a chemical substance, not of bacterial origin!Toxins, indead, are chemical substances, not living organisms, and &so regarded by the Secretary General of the World Health Organ&tion. That is a statement right in the February 14,197O announcemen ,J

This is a crucial point I make in this particular testimony. Becau$!of their consideration, we felt-myself, my project officer and teecal consultant-that we were, indeed, considering a chemical substan ‘1not a biological agent, not a biological toxin, when the offer of retain,,ing and obtaining, and storing in a secure vault area, our own Agenc$stockpile of 5 grams of shellfish toxin was made to us during the lattepart of Februar of 1970.

7,.y”

Parenthetical y, ma. I please get into the record that eve@am talking about is re ying on no notes, but 54/2 years ago? hittimemory banks to the fullest extent, and it has been agonizing.rest.

The CHAIRBXAN. Mr. Schwarz, will you take up the queStioningP ‘1Mr. SCHWARZ. I am not quite sure where we are. Let us talk aboti

MKNAOMI quickly, and the decision to move the stuff down tofacilities. You were aware, were you not, that Fort Detrickcenter involved in biological warfare, righit?

Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.Mr. SCHWARZ. Not chemical?Mr. GORDON. Its mission was not chemical-essentially biol

warfare. I parenthetically add, they were doing experimentatwhat I personally consider, my project officer and technical consto be considered gray a.reas. These are the shellfish toxins.

I might also take this opportunity to indicate that at the Edgew

Arsenal, the chemical laboratory, a substance known aswas being researched, and they are still in research at thisaware, though I am away from the field for a I-yearand its insidious properties were being looked at;from ‘a bacteria or a virus or a fungi, but a little seathe sea anemone, hhat clings to the coral rock, And it iextracted, and isolated.

An ~attempt at purification is made to g8t out and isolate ancomponent, chemical component ; extremely complex protein chemris involved here. Again, I am sur8-I will rest on that one. Youhear at some future time in the next 2 days, 3 days, from an expert



01

Mr. C~ORDON. After the consultation with my project office andtechnical consultant, we agreed that the offer was valid for a numberof factors. We knew that many years of hard, cost1 reseamk hadgone into the development of shellfish toxin and that t 0.~0 p~dlcul~r

quantities 6 grams or more, were realistic quantities for purposes ofexperime t, research and development, because if one had to really, ineffect, study immunization methods for diseases vis-a-vis-who knows,cancer, anrgthing of that particular ilk, it would take a considerableamount of this particular antigenic material to develop immunization.So that we know that was a reasonable quantity for that kind ofpurpose.

It certainly was not a reasonable quantity for, as it turned out inmy tenure, any operational requirements or needs during my tenurewith the agency. However, I might add that that particular quantityof 5 grams of shellfish toxin had been on a list, of material held forus at Special Operations Division in Fort Detrick for many years be-fore I ever entered the picture. And in retrospect, I can see clearlynow that our project officer just continued, including myself, to con-tinue the listing, shellfish toxin being one of the listing of about Edozen or more dafferent materials, never questioning the quantities thatwere being held.

Mr. SCHWARZ.Did you do any research after it was brought downto the CIA laboratory ?

Mr. GORDON. No, sir.Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you do any research before it was brought down

to the CIA laboratory ?Mr. GORDON. No, sir, Pnever opened-1 am speaking for myself now.

Let me go back a minute. I did not quite finish.I believe the agreement was made among my small staff that, con-

sidering that we were looking at a chemical substance or entity, andsince we did, in our considered judgment, make that judgment thatshellfish toxin was a chemical, we elected to say yes to the offer. Andsu,bsequently, it was hand-carried down to our laboratory.

We did not feel at that particular time, we did not feel the necessity,because we were thinking in terms of a chemical substance, not a bio-logical warfare agent or bacterial toxin, We did not feel the necessityor need to inform our higher chain of command individual. We simplyhad it laced in our secure vaulted laboratory, in a freezer, in theorigina f ontainers that were brought down to us, thinking, in all goodfaith, at the particular time of delivery that we would be given ourAgency stockpile quantity of 5 grams of shellfish toxin. At that point,I might add, we did not have any idea as to the purity of that par-ticular material, except comments like, “It is good stuff.”

Mr. SCHWARZ.You in fact not only got your material but more than

5 additional grams that belon ed to someone else. Is that correct 8Mr. GORDON. That is right. f learned of that in May or early June

of this particular year.Mr. SCRWARZ. Did thev belong to the Army?Mr. GORDON. The additional grams, by deduction, belonged to the

Special Operations Division of Fort Detrick Army Biological Labora-tories.

Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you tell any of your superiors within the Agencythat you had retained this material ?



62

Mr. GORDON. No, sir.Mr. SCHWARZ. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.Mr. GORDON. Because of the explanations I hope I amplified and

clarified.The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smothers, do you have any supplementary quos-tions before we go to the members?

Mr. SMOTHERS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Gordon, to the best of yourknowledge, what kinds of substances were kept in this laboratory wehave talked about, the laboratory youworked in ‘4

Mr. GORDON. My predecessors-1 suspect, Mr. Smothers, we aregoing back about 10 yearstalking, maybe, in the mid x

rior to my> joinin , so roughly, we arele or late fifties-- suspect had a pen-

chant of a person who could be considered as a collector-

Mr. SMOTHERS. When you are speaking of your predecessor, are youspeaking of Dr. Treichler?Mr. GORDON. Treichler was my immediate predecessor. And to the

best of my knowledge, it could have involved others also. But to getback to your question, Mr. Smothers, the kinds of materials were! inmy opinion, considered as interesting samples of candidate chemicalsubstances that had been experimented with for some years at theU.S. Army Chemical Warfare Laboratory at Edgewood, Md., thingsof an incapacitant nature or some behavioral aspects. Some of thethings that interested us in the nature of incapacitating agents would

be, in effect, under the broad category of behavioral effects.What were the physiological reactions ? There are certain substancesthat can give you a real severe case of the “tummy’s,” as we know it.This has a potential application in the field. If we want to, in effect,;put an individual, shall we say, indisposed at a particular evening, ata particular place, and any other scenario that you want to mentionalong those lines.

Essentially, these were the kind of materials, to my recollection andknowledge. I never called for an inventory of the materials at thelaboratory. Frankly, I assumed that responsibility, or laid it on, if YOU

will, to the project o5cer. This was not carried out, because this wasnot a research or testing laboratory. This was a storeroom, a secure, safevault storeroom. All substances behind glass containers, sliding doorpanels were under lock and key. We were the custodians of the key.

Mr. SMOTHERS. You never inventoried the vault ?Mr. GORDON. That is correct, sir.Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you have any reason to believe that there were

lethal substances in the vault?Mr. GORDON. No, sir.Mr. SMOTHERL Was there any information in the transfer of control

to you from Dr. Treichler that should have put you on notice as tothe presence of lethal substances?Mr. GORDON. None to my recollection, sir.Mr. SMOTHERS. Are you saying that you would not have any reason

to tell your superiors m the Agency that this would be a likely placefor the presence of lethal substances ?

Mr. GORDON. May I have that question again, please?Mr. SM~THERB. Are you saying that you would have had no reason

to tell your superiors in the Agency, even after knowledge of the



63

Presidential order, that this would be a likely place to search forlethal substances?

Mr. Gonnoa. For lethal substances? Considering what I just indi-

cated to you, to the best of my knowledge that there were no lethalsubstances, I would not indicate any point in searching for a lethalsubstance, on the basis of my knowledge at that time.

However, if such an order came down, I would be possibly a littlebit foolishlPf I did not go through at least the steps of opening thatdoor, myself and my project officer, of taking a good hard look at whatwas m that laboratory, something that I had never done and, I sus-pect in retrospect, my project otiicer had never done.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Uld you from time to time receive substances fromFort Detrick! Were they ,transported from Fort Detrick to your

facility ?Mr. GORDON. Is that a general question ?Mr. SMOTHERS Any substances ?Mr: GORJION. Yes. My project officer at the time had a project which

pertained to a dart tran uilizer for animals, specifically dogs. Therewere certain substances o ,a temporary paralyzmg nature, a chemical.CS 4640, for example, has this kind of an effect.

Prior to my joining, s very simplified, if you will, field dart dis-seminating device had been developed, the purpose of which was to usealong with suchea physical incapacitant chemical substance. And I sus-

iYeect some tests-and I am not sure of this, and I Ibelieve it did happenfore 1967-same tests had been conducted under controlled conditionson dogs? and, I #believe, successfully.

This is parallel to the kinds of military efforts that were going on atthe Chemical Warfare Laboratories. I might add that our own interest,being charged with the responsibility of maintaining at all times atechnical interest, from the point of view of services support for anyfuture possible operational needs within the Agency, our interestswere parallel to what was going on at chemical warfare and !biologioalwarfare laboratories at all times.

The liaison had been established and maintained. We were invitedin to attend classified briefings from time to time. In effect, Mr. Smoth-ers, what I am indicating to you is that we were making every sincereattempt to stay abreast technically of the state of the art.

Mr. SX~THEIRS. Dr. Gordon, you knew of the existence of lethal sub-stances, did you not? You knew of the existence and the developmentof lethal biological and chemical agents ?

Mr. GORDON. To <an extent, certainly. To a full extent, possibly not.Mr. SMOTHERS. Did vou have any

were being kept, stock$ed or stored ?knowledge of where these agents

Mr. GORDON. We are talking about chemical agents and biologicalagents ?Mr. SMOTHERS. Yes ; we are.Mr. GORDON. To my knowledge, during the tenure that I served with

Army Intelligence in chemical and 3biological warfare, yes, sir, I wasaware of locations, classified locations of military and #biological agentsand chemical agents.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Were these materials being stored by the Army orthe Denartment of Defense?

Mr. GORDON. These materials were being stored by the Army/DOD.



64

Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you have any reason to believe that stockpileswere being stored by the CIA?

Mr. GORDON. No, sir.Mr. SMOTHERS. The laboratory we alluded to or elsewhere ?Mr. GORDON. Lethal agents?Mr. SMOTHERS. Yes.Mr. GORDON. There were no lethalagents going into the laboratory

until we a reed to accept our own ,Agency’s stockpile of 5 grams orsubsequent y, now, it turns out to he 11 grams of shellfish toxin, in ourjudgment, again, a chemical entity, a chemical substance.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Was it your belief, then, that if the Department ofDefense had complied wih its own di,rectrve, that, with the exceptionof the shellfish toxin you received, al l other stockpiles of lethal agents,even those belongin, u to the CIA, would have been destroyed?

Mr. GORDON. I think I did not get your question, could you repeat it ?Are you making a statement or a question, sir?

Mr. SMOTHERS. I can do either one. It was your testimony that youbelieve that al l the lethal agents being held for the CIA were beingheld by the Department of the Army or DOD, as you said. My ques-tion then, was it your belief at the time that, with the exception of theshellfish toxin which you received from Fort Detrick, al l other stock-piles of lethal agents would be destroyed?

Mr. GORDON. Lethal biological agents.

Mr. SMOTHERK Or a chemical 8Mr. GORDON. No, sir, lethal biological agents.Mr. SMOTHERB. Lethal biological agents?Mr. GORDON. There is nothing in the record indicating destruction

of chemical agents.Mr. SMOTHERS. All lethal biological agents would be destroyed as a

result of the Executive order.Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.Mr. SBHYTTIERS. At the time that you had agreed or you proposed

the retaining of this material, did you have occasion to indicate toanyone higher than your laboratory that there had been some discus-sion with the Army regarding CIA retaining t,he Armv stockpiles?

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Smothe,rs, because we consider shellfish toxin as achemical material and not as a biological material and/or bacterialtoxin we felt we are simply looking at a highly lethal chemical agentwhich would be secured in a maximum security vault.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Cordon, I find your testimony rather astound-ing. You sav that you and your fellow scientists decided to retain theshellfish toxin and indeed to accept addit ional quantities of it fromthe Army.

Mr. GORDON. Unbeknownst to me, sir. That is a fact, it happened.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a fact, it happened ?Mr. GORDON. Correct.The CHAIRMAN. You and your associates decided to retain this toxin

although YOU knew that it might very well have been a violation of thePreside&% order because by your own testimonv you have just toldUS that YOU asked, you discussed with Mr. Gottlieb and Mr. G&,lieb

was going to prepare for Mr. Karamessines a memorandum to the Di-rector in which this very question was raised and an option was givento the Director to store It with a private firm. So it must have been in



65

your mind that this toxin was highly questionable in view of the orderthat the President had given.

Mr. GORDON.hat is not correct in my interpretation, sir.The CHAIRMAN. If it is not correct,, why raise the queetion and sug-

gest the option to the Director ?Mr. G&DON. At that particular time, we had considered the option

of whether we wanted to keep all of the agency’s stock ile, includingthe shell&h toxin. There were a dozen or so biologica 9 agents and afew other kinds of toxins. We wanted to consider the o tion as towhether or not we should retain our own materials whit K were notgoing to be placed on a Department of Defense destruction list. Theywere being held for us. If the decision was made by higher authorltles,and eventually Sid Gottlieb elected to make the decision, that he wouldnot go for the option if a decision had been made by higher authorities

to move that stockpile, I would have had no compunction to have doneso.The CHAIRNAN.According to your testimony, you did not give au-

thorities a chance to make that decision because Mr. Gottlieb and YOUand

dour associates decided to do it on your own.

r. GORDON.enator Church, I have prepared and you have a copyof the memorandum [exhibit 11-J with Dr. Gottlieb’s approval forthat memorandum to be signed by Mr. Karamessines to the Director.And Dr. Gottlieb’s judgment-to the best, of my recollection, he de-termined that it did not need to go forward. He would make a de-cision and he elected not to take that, option and indeed t,hat we would

once and for all get out of the classified project at the Special Opera-tions Division at Fort Detrick.

The CHAIRMAN. You would retain the poisons and tell no one?Mr. GORDON. egative. That particular sequence, Senator Church,

with all respect, is a consequence which occurred after the fact. At that

Harticular time it was our intention simindicated, terminate that project and ta %

ly to have Fort Detrick, ase all the materials that they

wanted. When the phone call-The CHAIRMAN. Let us not get into a discussion of points in time

because before this

the Army. They ma B

roceeding was over you got a phone call from

e sugge-stlons and you finally decided to kwp thestuff and not tell higher authorities about it. Is that not true?Mr. GORDON.ecause it was not considered, in our judgment at the

branch level, anything but a chemical poison.The CHAIRMAN. That is very curious because everybody else we

have talked to including the experts are of the opinion that it clearlywas of a kind of biological poison or toxin that came within the Press-dential order.

Mr. GORDON. o. you know where the material that was used forGa&ymyowers’ smclde weapon came from? It came from Edgewood

The &AIRMAN. What does that have to do with the question?Mr. GORDON.t means that it is a chemical considered substance that

was utilized and obtained from a chemical warfare laboratory. Thisis the kind of thing-excuse me Senator Church-this is the kind ofthinking that chemista have used. I indicated earlier in t.e&imony thatwe are getting into a gray area. Admittedly, it is a gray area.

18~ p. 189.



66

The CHAIRMAN. If it is k gray area ?Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.The CHAIRMAN. If you, by your own admission, say it is a gray area,

why then, in view of the Pr&dential order, did you take it upon your-selves to decide to set this oison aside 8Mr. GORDON. The Presi i!iential order, Senator Church, as I indicated

earlier, in our judgment, did not pertam to the CIA. It pertained to theDepartment of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the judgm&t of the Directors of CIA.Mr. GORDON. I understand that, sir, but we are talking in terms of

February of 1970.The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true, Dr. Gordon, that you‘disagree’with

Mr. Nixon’s order?Mr. GORDON. No, sir.T~~CHA~RMAN. Wel-Mr. GORDON. I was not a Department of Defense employee. I did not

feel under the obligation, Senator Church, to be responsible for theDOD directive, indicating destruction of bacteriological agents orbacteriological toxins.

The CHAIRMAN. I call your attent.ion to your testimony given underoath on Saturday, page 50 of that testimony from the morning record,if you would go to line 24 on page 50. Our counsel, Mr. Schwarz, askedyou the following question.

‘%et us be clear what we are talking about. President Nixon had

decided that the United States should destroy biological toxins.Right?”

And you answered, %ight.” Then Mr. Schwarz said, “The matteryou discuss that some new President or administration official mi t’come along and say, we would like to have such stuff in order to It ‘11people. Is that right S”

And you answered, “that is right.”“But again, this is ConversaCion in the philosophical category, that

is all.”Mr. GORDON. I do not see anything wrong with a group of people

like myself, my project officer and technical cons&an&by the way,Senator Church, I would appreciate if you do not already have thetestimony of m-y technical consultant, Dr. Alex Battin, you should getin the record his viewpoint as to whether shellfish toxin is considereda chemical substance. I think he considers it such, In our discussionswe are certainly-

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mondale has a point to raise on that veryquestion.

Senator MONDALE. I would like to point out that the whole reason forthe February 14 memo from the President was to solve the issue that

you continue to raise. I quote from the President’s announcement [ex-hibit 5 *J of February 14, he said, “Moreover though toxins of thistype useful for military purposes could conceivably be produced bychemical synthesis in the future the end products would be the sameand their effects would be indistinguishable from toxins produced bybacteriological or other biological substances.”

It continues, “the President has further directed the destruction ofall existing toxins.” Moreover, by the National Security memorandum

1Seep.202.



67

44, the Secretary of Defense will submit recommendations concerningthe disposal of existin

No. 1, “t e United‘a,

8stocks of toxins, weapons, and agents.

tional purptates will renounce the production, for opera-

stockpiling, and the use in retaliation of toxins pro-

duced either by) bacteriological or biological processes or by chemicalsynthesis.” In other words, the whole reason for the F’ebruary 14 memowas to settle the dispute which you continually raised as a defense andthat memo was directed, among others, to the CIA. That is the wholereason.

Mr. GORDON. I have never been aware of that memo. The only thingI alluded b

Senator MONDALE. What about the public statement? Were youaware of that P

Mr. GORDON. No, sir. The only tmhing I am alluding to is what I tiave

indicated to you and the testimony, both in closed session and public,and I have it in front of me and furthermore it says in that same Febru-ary 14,1970, directive &lnut the United States will confine its militaryprograms for toxins.

I think that really the point is ,being pushed in my hu,mble opinionto include the CIA in this particular category of a Department ofDefense responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Dr. Gordon, if you viewed it as merely aDepartment of Defense responsibility, why did you accept from theDepartment of Defense toxins that clearly should have been destroyed?

Mr. GORDON. The toxins that we accepted .at that particular time,thinking that it was our own Agency stockpile, 5 grams to be held ,a11thoseChurc H

ears for us, was considered as a ohemlcal substance, Senator, in our judgment. And that is the reason.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew the Army was going to destroy it, didyou not?

Mr. GORDON, The Army has still retained for experi,mentel purposes,I read, a little bit over 4 ams.

The CHAIRMAN. You cl ow they gave you ithis toxin so it would notbe destroyed. If they had not given it to you, they would have de-

stro ed it pursuant to Presidential order. You knew that.id r. GORDON. I could not speak for what they would have done ornot. They asked if we wanted our particular stockpile, and after care-ful deliberation land consideration amon our staff and I indicated thisto you, this is the particular rationale & at we optad for in taking itand considering ilt as *an ordinarily highly lethal chemical ,agent. AndI wish7

The CHAIRMAN. This is the other outstanding art of your testimony.When a second Presidential order was issu 8% just to clear up anym&ion about the inclusion of this shellfish toxin in the directive

R at none of these directives were passed down through the Agencyto you and that you testified about your knowledge of the Presidentialdirective on the basis of what you read in the newspaper. That is yourtestimony, is it not?

Mr, GORDON. That is my teetimony and I repeat &hat I never eaw-The CHAIRMAN. I did not say that is your fault, ;but that is an

astounding thing.Mr. GORDON. That is so.The CHAIRMAN. ‘I%& is 80. Senator Tower?



68

Senator TOWER. You received no direct order to destroy the sub-stance. Is that a fact or is it n&P

Mr. GORDON. That is a fact, sir.Senator TOWER. In fact, you asked the DC1 for permission to retain

and store these substances.Mr. GORDON. I did not seek additional guidance or consent from any

of the chain of command :higher than myself as chief of the chemistrybranch to obtain and store the high1 lethal shellfish toxin, which we inour technical judgment, consider-e1 as a chemical agent, sir.

Senator TOWER. What about Gottlieb? Did anyone propose to &heDC1 that this material be retained ?

Mr. GORDON. Dr. Gottlieb was not informed, Senator Tower, that thelethal shellfish toxin was being offered, received and stored in a secure

vault in the laboratory, since we in the .branoh, myself, project officerand technic.al consultant made the judgment that we were consideringshellfish ltoxin as a chemical agent, highly lethal, but a chemical agent.

Senator TOWER. Are you saying that you never had any indication ofHelms rejecting the notion of retaining the substance?

Mr. GORDON. This specific substance ?Senator TOWER. Yes.Mr. GORDON. He could not in m humble o inion have made that

kind of a statement becauseof the act, as I in icated, Senator Tower,fwe did not, considering we were ‘talking in terms of a lethal chemical,

we did not in our judgment feel that we, we were in need of inform-ing anyone.Senator TOWER. You were aware that you were not to retain lethal

chemicals ?Mr. GORDON. am not aware of any directives indicating that ‘a

lethal chemical could not be retained or stored.Senator TOWER. Do we not normally classify a chemical and a bio-

logical agent together 1Mr. GORDON. No, sir. That is a separate and distinct entity. There is

a chemical warfare laboratory which still today does research in chemi-cal agents. There is a munitions system still under development forchemical agents. There is a stockpile in the military for chemicalagents, both incapacitating and lethal.

Senator TOWER. Were you not aware that the order category in-cluded both chemical and biological a ents?

Mr. GORDON. No, sir. We made a f istinct distinction, if I may putit that way, between <the act that in our judgment this shellfish toxinw&s a lethal, highly lethal, chemical agent. And we took the propersteps to put it in our freezer, secure it, store it. I must say, over theyears, Senator Tower, we have never had ‘to my knowledge, in theperiod 1967 through 1972, any call for those kinds of materials.

That was in essence an example of maintaining to the best of ourtechnical ability, maintaining the technical capability in behavioralmaterials in the event that the need should arise to use these materialsone day.

Senator TO\KER. Let me ask you whether a substance is classified asgenerically chemical or generically biological, can they not be appliedto achieve the same kind of results. They are both a specific means to acommon end, are they not ?



69

Mr. GORDON. Senator Tower, I have to say yes ; and I have to quaI-ify it. I must say I still feel the sharpness somehow of some of thequesti&& and properly so, of Senator Church, and, Senator Tower,

may I indicate to you that technically that we always make a distinc-tion betfveen chemical and biolo ‘cal agents. Now there are gray areasand this toxin, this particular su stance, in our judgment, falls into agray area, depending on who you will be talking to in the public tes-timony in the next 3 days, depending on his viewpoint, I feel certainthat you will tid the testimony being given to indicate both sides ofthe question.

Senatir TOWER. If indeed this falls into a gray area or could be con-strued as falling into a gray ,area, was there not a certain res nsibilityon your part to inquire as to whether or not that was inclu t;” d withinthe urvvlew of the order to destroy these chemical substances?

rv?. GORDON. Again, relying u on discussions with m project officerand technical consultant, both tee nical

i-rople in the fie d of biological,

chemical warfare, including my own nowledge and judgment, wemade the decision at that particular level. Senator Church has askedwho made the decision, We made the decision at the patiicular branchlevel that we were indeed considering and looking at a lethal chemicalagent. We were not aware of any particular ban on lethal chemicalagents and in all good conscience, in all ood conscience and judgmentwe elected to retam that particular kin d of material as a lethal agentin our laboratory in a secure vault condition at all times. In the event

that one day we would ‘be called upon to prepare su plies of suicide

rills and/or any other uses that could be considere from a hi hereve1 of authori,ty than my own, certainly, for operational use of t?I ese

materials.Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mondale.Senator MONDALE. Dr. Gordon, the National Security Decision

Memorandum No. 44 [exhibit 8 ‘1, dated February 20,1970, says:

The President has decided that: the U.S. will renounce the production foroperational purposes, stockpiling and use in retaliation of toxins produced either

by bacteriological or biological processes or by chemical synthesis.The public announcement *on February 14 entitled “U.S. Policy on

Toxins ’ says among other thmgs :

The President has decided that the United States will confine its militaryprograms for toxins, whether produced by bacteriological or other biologicalmethods or by chemical synthesis, to research for defense purposes only, such asto improve ,techniques of immunization and medical technology. The Presidenthas directed destruction of all existing toxin weapons.

In light of that National Security mem-Mr. GIXDON. Excuse me, Senator Mondale, I have a question in that

particular last para r ph, sir, where the words-Is that the same para-graph that I am loo in at! sn, if you will indulge me. Does it read theUnited States will co ne Its military programs for toxins?d!

Senator MONDALE. Right.Mr. GORDON.Military programs, sir.Senator MONDALE. That is right. Had you ever heard of either one

of those paragraphs, either in the National Security memo or the Presi-dent’s public announcements B

1 8sS &I.210.



70

Mr. GORDON. I have a copy.Senator MONDALE. Did you at tk;e time? Were you aware of the

formulation of the President’s orders which specifically settled theissueof chemical or nonchemical basis for toxins a

Mr. GO~ON. Are you referring to the National Security Memoran-dum ?

Senator MONDALE. Either one. Both say the same thing. The toxinswould be defined as toxins whether created biologically or chemically.Were you aware that that policy decision settled the question that youseem o be raising ‘4

Mr. GORDON. n our interpretation, we did not ut the emphasis thatyou have just placed on that particular paragrap R sir.

Senator MONDALE. What emphasis?

Mr. ,GORDON. n our judgment, wg put consideration for that theshellfish toxin was indeed to be considered in the category of a chemicalsubstance or a chemical entity, regardless of how it was derived.

Senator MONDALE. So you would say that because you did so, it didnot come within the meaning of either the National Security memo orthe President’s announcement.

Mr. GORDON. I felt it did not come in the purview of the President’sannouncement of February 1970 and I cannot address myself to thatNational Security memo. I have never seen t,

Senator MONDALE. Since the President had decided to reduce the

programs, both biological and chemical, how do you arrive at the posi-tion that the shellfish toxin does not come in that definition?Mr. GORDON.Senator Mondale, we were not in a military pro-

gram-Senator MONDALE. I understand the chemical thing. We were takini

your second defense, the military. I want to know whether you are stillsticking with the che,mical defense, even though the Presidential direc-tives clearly settled that issue? If so, how 8

Mr. GORDON. Al1 I can say to respond to that particular query isthat we saw, in our own judgment this particular substance as a chemi-cal lethal aqent.

I Senator MONDALE. Did you further decide that because you saw it inthat light, that it does come within this order, even though the ordersays, toxins produced by chemical synthesis. Tf so, how could you con-clude that 8

Mr. GORDON. Because we tied it in with the previous statement thatthe United States will confine its military program for toxins.

Senator MONDALE, All right. We will set aside our chemical argu-ment, because really you are basing your defense on the sgrounds hatit is not a militarv program. Is that right ?

Mr. GORDON. This was a part of our consideration.

Senator MONDALE. Can we then set the chemical argument aside?Mr. GORDON. No, sir.Senator MONDALE. -Why ?Mr. GORDON. Because we felt strongly, and continue to feel, that this

was a chemical substance.Senator MONDALE. I know that is what they said, by biological or

chemical synthesis.Mr. GORDON. Shellfish toxin is not, in the truest senseof the term, a<.,

synthesis. It is a complicated process, starting with an algno and clam.



71

“Senator MONDALE. When you say it is a chemical substance-Mr. GORDON. A chemical substance, sir.

-’ Senator MONDALE, The second paragraph of the Presidential publicannouncement says, “Toxins are chemical substances, not living orga-nisms and am so regarded by the U.N. Secretary General of theWorld Health Or nlzation” That being true, is it not C~CSW hat. thePresident intende r it to mean such things as shellfish toxins derivedfrom a chemical synthesis or substance ?

Mr. GORDON. I would have to say, in listening to your detailed ex-planation, Senator Mondale, that that is true. I also have to s?ythat-and‘it has been some time, as you know, since we examined thisparticular thing-1 am trying to restructure it at some length, andm detail. Our thinking her-we were swayed, it would appear tome by the phrase, military programs.

4 enator MONDALE. Let us turn to that defense, and I will not go intothis, but I think the reading of the proposed Karamessines memoclearly reflects-and I believe that was prepared by you ; was it not?

Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.Senator MONDALE. Clearly reflects that you understood this toxin

to be included in the Presidential order. In any event, another defenseyou have for not destroying the toxin is that it .was not a militaryprogram ; is that correct ?

Mr. GORDON. That is correct, sir.Senator MONDALE.What is it, then ‘?

Mr. GORDON. It was a substance which we felt being in the categoryof ‘8 chemical could be used .at some future time for whatever opera-tional need or desire on the part of higher authorities within the@I+ ‘and we know that it had an application in the preparation of~pr&~lously prepared suicide weapons or devices.:’ Senator MONDALE. It says it can only be retained for research or

?% medical therap;.ensive purposes such as improving techniques in immunization

~~~&&2r.GORDON. Again, applied to military programs.‘?$!!nator MONDALE. So it does not come within that exception. It-&ornes ithin the military exception ; is that right ‘4M$~&.&RDoN. In our opmion, Senator Mondale.,$%Jenator MONDALE. So what the CIA was involved in was not

N. The CIA is not a military organization. It is not,never been charged with the functions of the Department of. Yes; it is not, a military organization.or MONDALE.Would you say that your memorandum proposed

aramessines reflects this viewpomt that you are not covered ?. At the particular time of that memorandum, a dis-

particular point had.never taken place. That particu-

described as an option which we had consideredDr. Gottlieb and myself as one for consideration. And as I

option was decided against, and at a subsequenter was made to receive the shellfish toxin.

That means something, and it indicates thatthat you did not want to destroy. The National

s not my opinion, sir.



72

Senator MONDALE, I recognize that. It W&S directed to the,CIA, aswell. AS far as I’m concerned, based u on your testimony, the oub’conceivable way that the President coul have his order executed wasti

to hjave you over for dinner and plead with you.Mr. GORDON. If there was a CIA directive that did not exist at that

particular time, implementing the White House directive for the De-partment of Defense, I have no doubt, at that particular instance,the proper steps would have been taken, and this day, there wouldnot be a discussion of the subject of shellfish toxins, Senator Mondale.

Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. In effect, you say it was a failure of higher au-

thority within the CIA to properly direct you that led you to t.hedecision ?

Mr. GORDON. cannot place the blame on Mr. Helms’ shoulder.The CHAIRMAN. Where does the blame lie? You say it does not liewith you? If you say it does not lie with Mr. Helms, where does theblame lie Z

Mr. GORWN. You asked the question, who in the CIA made thedecision. Now you know that it was the Chemistry Branch Chief, theproiect director, and his technical consultant.

The CHAIRMAN. The blame lies with you ?Mr. GORDON.The blame lies with the group I have just specified.The CHAIRMAN. Verv well. Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Dr. Gordon, I think you testified that you had been to Fort Detrick!Mr. GORDON.Yes, sir.Senator MATHIAS. Did you go there frequently?Mr. (jORDoN. I would say, Senator Mathias, during the course of a

year-and this is somewhat tenuous-certainly less than a dozen timesa year.

Senator MATHIAB. Did you know Dr. Housewright, for example SMr. GORDON.Yes ; I did, sir.Senator MATHIAS. Did -you have occasion to talk with the Detrick

staff by telephone on occasion, in addition to your visits ?Mr. GORDON.At times, sir.Senator MATHIAS. In other words, you had a working relationship

with the Detrick organization ?Mr. GORDON.My project officer more than I, sir, at ‘that particul,ar

point in time. I am sorrv to overuse that particular phrase.Senator MATHIAB. Were you aware that, following President Nixon’s

decision of November 25,1969, an interagency grou was assembled oconsider the verv question of the definition of toxins ap

Mr. GORDON.No; I was not, sir.Senator MATHIAS. That this Valentine’s Day memorandum did not

issue just out of the goodness of President Nixon’s heart on Valen-t.ine’s Day, but it was the considered judgment of a number of &en-tists in the Federal establishment 8

Mr. GORDON. will agree to that, sir. Yes, sir.Senator MATHIAS. You did not know that at the time?Mr. G’ORDON. did not know that at the time.Senator MATHIAS. Even with your relationship with the people at

Fort Detrick, this never came to your attention?



73

Mr. GO-N. No, sir. Again Senator Mathias, I would like to repeat.hopefully not ad nauseum, that in our judgment we considered thisparticular announcement directed only at the Department of Defense.

&?nator MATIxIAS. Again, I do not think either of us gain anythin

by ref

eating arout, t is was a r

ments already made. As Senator Mondaleecision that was lifted from your shoulders. T

a decision that had been made Government-wide, after an interagencystud b Presidential order.

&?B ORDON.May I&l$at.‘it is somewhat u s

oint out somethin%

Senator Mathias ? I thinkair to take this Fe ‘ruary 14 announcement in

%m&by itself without always looking back to the November 25, 1969,:iebnrrouncement, because the February 14 announcement, as you put it,&, the Valentine’s Day announcement is a natural extension of theNovember 25 announcement, which inc udes the sentence “I have or-

&red the Defense Department to make recommendations about thetiisposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons.”

This, I think, is, again to our judgment, a clear mandate, and again,&e,other version of the November 25 announcement-that the DOD hasL%en asked to make recommendations as to the disposal of existingstocks of bacteriological weapons. The toxins, again, m our judgment,despite Senator Mondale’s explicit pointing out to me the statementabout the chemical synthesis, and so on-1 think these have to be puthto a package for any discussion and consideration, because, again,$his& s the only way we make a judgment, by putting these papers

kegether, examining them carefully, agonizing over them, disagreeing,‘{agreeing, and final1looking at a lethal cK

, making the conclusion that, indeed, we wereemical agent, no different than any of the other

h’ hly toxics, but certainly, to be respected as a V agent, or a G a3

ent.flnator MATHIAS. You see, Dr. Gordon, this is exactly what I t ink

Fsconcerning the members of the committee. We do put the Valentine’s‘Day announcement in context with the November 25 announcement.‘We,take into consideration the fact that there is an interagency study,czeated by order of the President of the United States. We take intoconsideration the hi

,%cers of the CIA, c i

h 05ce that you held, as one of the

arged with knowled e and responsiB

1:

rincipal of-

ility m thisarea, and you come to us, and you tell us tof tke existence of the interagency group.

at you have not even heard

:dust let me finish. You will have plenty of time. I want to make thispoint, because this may not reflect on you, giving the thing the bestgloss you can give it. I have spent a good many years in the Navy, and Iknow there is always somebody who does not get the word, and ap-parently you were that guy in this instance. That is the best gloss wecan put on it. That is enormously concerning to us.

‘Let us leave Dr. Gordon out of it as an individual. Let us talk aboutpeople. When somebody does not get the word, serious problems canarise, in the course of any operation, and one of the objects of thiscommittee is to try to find out where these short circuits were, whythey occurred, how we can prevent them occurring again. Becauseobviously, when they occur at the high level of responsibility that youoccupy at this time, they can have serious national consequences.

Mr. GORDON.hank you, Senator Mathias. I would like to state, withall due respect to the description that you have placed upon my par-ticular function, at that particular time that I was a chief of a branch,



74

a chemist, who had the technical responsibilit of performing.a sup-port and service function for the Technica Services Dmmn, Inres

P

onse to ‘an oasible future use, operational requirements, if you

wil , of the D &!Certainly, I agree, I, was not in a policy

Certainly I would agree-and I do not think that you woul tpsition.expect

me to be privy to a National Security memorandum, or any otherpossible highly placed documents of that particular sort.

Senator MATHIAS. Just to refresh our recollection, the Valentine’sDay press release from the White I-f ouse, which was issued at 6 p.m.that day frum the press office at Key Biscayne said in part,, “thePresident has further directed the destruction of all existing toxinwea ns.”

MY . GORDON. Within the DOD-yes, sir, that is correct. As a-Senator MATHIAS. It was not so imited. We have been over that.Mr. GORDON. ight, sir. Exactly.Senator MATHIAS. Let me ,askyou this question-Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.Senator MATHIAS. Was the transfer an idea that originated with

you, or did the Army suggest it to you ?Mr. GORDON.The Special Operations Division of the Biological

Laboratories, Fort Detrick, Md., suggested it, sir.Senator MATHIAS. What did they actually say to you, to the best of

your recollection ?Mr. GORDON.Would we consider takin

of our own, the CIA stockpile of, ‘a-s unf, in effect, in the repositoryerstood it, 5 grams from our

old listings, of the shellfish toxin, and the reason being because-andI think it was generally agreed-we all had a keen appreciation ofthe extreme cost, resources, material, personnel that had gone in overa lo-year period for these materials.

I would like to add that since this has become publicized, I haveread in the newspapers Dr. Ritchie’s comment from Yale University.I suspect that it was in the nature of a plea to this committee in con-sidering the final disposition of these materials whether or not it couldbe considered-and that is a considerable quantity, now, 11 grams, togo back into the medical science research.

Senator MATHIAS. I em aware of that.One further question, Dr. Gordon. I want to be fair to you. I want

vou to understand that I am t ing to put myself into your shoesandinto your mind and try to un erstand the motivations which causedyou to take the acts that you did. But I did say earlier, and I meant it,that this is a problem that could have arisen because we used to say,someonedid not get the word.

The other possibility which is not as happy a one was suggested bya statement that you made earlier this afternoon, when you describedyour reaction to learning of the November 25,1969, decision of Presi-dent Nixon, when you, as I recall your words., vou said, you turned toMr. Gottlieb .and vou said, you realize that thls’is the beginning of thedemise of the military biological warfare system.

Mr. GORDON.From the point of view of any parallel interests, sir,that we might have in the field, there was nowhere to go to, to stayabreast of a BW capabilit

f.

Mathias, subsequently wasFort Detrick, as you know, Senator

c osed down and converted to the National



75

Cancer Institute. This, I believe, if my memory serves me correctly,was 197142, or thereabouts.

Senator MATH-. It took that long to get done. That is somethingelse.

Mr. GORDON. Again, as I recall, it was over a year from the timethat they said it would be done, and then, finally, it did get done. Letme rest there.

Senator MATHIAS. Having recalled to you your words, the onlyquestion that I raise is whether or not you had, in fact, a visceralreaction which perhaps clouded your judgment m order to preserve%rom disruption at least one small corner of this area of enterprise ?

Mr. GORDON. Senator Mathias, I appreciate the way you put that.I really do. I want to use this opportunity for my response, to repeatonce again-please bear with me, Senator Church-that our judgmentwas collectively made, and we considered it as a lethal chemicalagent. If that was not the decision at that particular time, wenever would have gone back to accept and say yes to the offer of ourown stockpile of 5 grams, sir.

Senator MATHIAS. My time is up, and I will only say that I cannotunderstand why your decision which was so agonizingly made-andI accept that it was agonizingly made, as you described it, why adecision so agonizingly made, and in the full consciousness of the diffi-culties under which you were operating was not referred to higherauthority within the Agency for some confirmation, before you wentthrough with it.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Senator Mathias.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddleston.Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.I do not wish to belabor the point, but I do think it is quite important,

as to what your understanding was at the time, back in February of1970 on why this decision was made. I find it very difficult to reconcilewhat ou are saying now about the concern that you had at that time

as to t I e true nature of shell&h toxin.Shellfish toxin is a toxin, is it not? There is no question aboutthat B

Mr. GORDON. That is correct, sir.Senator HUDDLESTON. It is also a weapon. You mentioned a mo-

ment ago it could be used as a weapon, against oneself as a suicideweapon, or against somebody else.

Mr. GORDON. We would consider it, I think, certainly, as a weapon,but the tactical description for that, Senator Huddleston, would beas an agent in a weapons system, our weapons system being any

means.Senator HUDDLESTON. It is a potential weapon or a part of a weapon.Mr. GORDON. Exactly.Senator HIJDDLESTON. In the first paragraph of the memoraudum

which ou prepared for Mr. Karamessines, you point out that m theNovem er 26 memorandum of the President or the order of the Presi-dent and then ou put in parentheses that on February 1% 1970, theValentine’s o er, he included all toxic weapons. There seems to meno doubt that at that time you understood precisely what the Piesi-dent said.



76

Mr. GORDON. As it applied to the Department of Defense that iscorrect, Senator.

Senator HUDDLERTON. If you felt at this time that this just applied

to the Department of Defense, I am wondering why you felt it neces-sary that Mr. Karamessines make a determination as to whether ornot the CIA should move to protect its su

Kply. It seems tc me it

would be perfectly clear that he would not ave to take any actionif it were perfectly clear that this would apply only to Departmentof Defense: ”

Mr. Gonno~. This was tied in with the relationship that we hadwith the Special Operations Division and, for that matter, the restof the Army Biological Warfare Laboratory with respect to stayingabreast of the state of the art.

Again, intuition indicated to us at that particular time that before

too long, as Senator Mathias said, if it took too long the BiologicalWarfare Research Laboratories would no longer exist. There wouldbe no sense n continuing to support a project, and I might add-andt,his has not been brought out by me-1 have never had .a. questionwith that respect. We were, in effect, piggybacking or qvnn? someadditional dollar technical sup art to Special Operations Division,who were being funded by the x rmy component, namely, the SpecialForces, for purposes which interested us and we wanted to stay withthe developments as time proceeded.

Senator HUDDLESTON. I do not see hat there is anything that would

have clouded your perception based on your own words and recom-mendations here that this toxin was, indeed, part of the order that thePresident had issued. Let me mlake one other point, again relying onyour own memorandum dated February 1970, when YOU list for theDirector those items that would be in jeopardy if some action werenot taken by the President’s order. You do, m fact, list paralyticshellfish poison.

Mr. GORDON. Which was part of the inventory being held, yes, sir.At that particular time, the other option, which is what we exerciseda day or two later, February 19 or 20, was to, as I indicated, let the

Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratoriesknow that we no longer would support them and terminate the projectand for them to do with what they saw fit with all the stocks.

It was subsequent, and only subsequent, that we rethought the mat-ter of the shellfish toxin. When the telephone call came down to uswith respect to the offer of retaining and considering for retainingthe shellfish stocks, at that time after careful deliberation we deter-mined that in our judgment, knowing we were in a gray area, goingthrough the same testimony, and deciding it was a chemical agent.

Ehator HUDDLESTON. You have changed your perception then from

what it originally had been, which seems o be crystal clear here, toraise the question as to whether or not there might be a slight loopholet,hrough which you migh6

Mr. Gonno~. We rethought the question of shellfish toxin.Senator Hr~on~~sro~. That was subsequent to this memorandum,

which, at that time, seemedvery clear and precise 1Mr. GORDON. Right, that is correct, Senator.Senator HuDDLEsTON.As to what the problem was and how it might

be amded by the Director, if he wan&d to take this action p



77

“. Mr. GORDON. That is correct.Senator HIJDDLEBTON. Just one other question. As I memioned this

morning to Mr. Colby, included in that inventory, were agents thatwere designed to induce tuberculosis in an individual. Were you in-

volved in that experimentation VMr. GORDON. No, sir.Senator HUDDLESTON. What about the one for brucellosis VMr. GORDON. We were not involved in any experimentation.‘Senator HKJDDLELVON. Do you have any knowledge of these agents

and what they were used for VMr. GORDON. From the nomenclature of those particular ones you

described, they would be the causative agents to produce that kind ofadisease. Those are biological agents.

senator HUDDLESTON. Did you ever have instructions from yoursuperiors to develop this kind of capability 0

Mr. GORDON. No, sir ; not during my tenure.Senator HUDDLESTON. How do you propose they were included in the

CZA inventory 8Mr. GORDON. I surmise that my predecessor or predecessors, that

over the years in their wisdom and judgment and with the expertiseof the people at the laboratories that determined in the event of someneed or use of these kinds of materials it would be technically feasibleto be considered and used. Hence, certain quantities were attributedas grams or whatever they may be in their listing to those particularorganisms and toxins, That is the way the list, I suspect, was de-

: a&loped and simply transferred from year to year to year.Senator HUDDLESTON. From your personal knowledge and experi-

ence, you had no contact with these agents.Thank vou, Mr. Chairman.

” ’ The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Huddleston. Senator’ Schweiker.‘* * ‘Senator SCH~EIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Cordon, can: YOU shed any light on the designation of P600 that appeared on the

cans he received in the lab 1Mr. GORDON. No; I cannot, sir. & of this moment, I do not recollect

~.:rtnyof the information that appeared on the cans. Are you referring,i senator Schweiker, to the cans of the shellfish~ontainers of shellfishfit&&n 1

,’Senator SCHWEIEER. Yes. The ones in this picture, I assume.Mr. GORDON. No, sir, I cannot. What does P600 mean?Senator SCHWEIRER. That is what I am trying to find out.Mr. GORDON. I think I could suggest who might give you the

answer, sir.Senator SCH~EIKER. I thought you would be in a good position to

tell us. It says, “DO not use unless directed by P600.” How can you

store a quantity of poison in your lab in a vault ,and lock it up, whenit days do not open unless you have permission of so and so, and youdo not even know so and so V

Mr. GORDON. Is “P600” a person VSenator SCHWEIKER. It is your code.Mr. GORDON. That particular label-we are on the subject of label-

ing, Senator Schweiker, was prepared at the Special Operations Divi-sion, Biological Laboratories.



Senator SCHWEIKER. At Fort Detrick PMr. GORWN. They would be in a position to give you that answer.

I’d like to know it myself.

Senator SCHWEIKER. The second part ‘of my question is, you keeptqment.ioning 5 grams in your testimony here with the other Senators,Yet it is clear from Director Colby’s testimony that, in fact, therewere 11 grams. The picture shows 11 grams. Can you account for theG-,-m discrepancy?

Mr. GORDON. When I received, or we received, the containers of theshellfish toxin, it was our best understanding that we received whatwas the Agency stockpile of shellfish toxin in the amount,of 5 grams,and we put it away in the freezer, and never, at least during my tenure,had occasion to ever open those containers, did not want to open those

containers unless there was a need, and that is the way it sat and gotforgotten about over the years, because no queries-obviously, noapplications-

If I may continue, in May or June.of this year-and I am told thisby my project officer at that time, Mr. David Boston-he was askedby the present Director, Mr. Colbv of the CIA, as part of an agent -wide query, to look into particular matters or things that he, d r.Colby, should know about. This is secondhand information. My under-standing is, as a result of that particular memo, directive--call it whatyou will-Mr. Boston then proceeded to then verv carefully look into

that particular freezer, end he called me, and asked, did I rememberthat there was shellfish toxin and I most certainly remembered thatthere was shellfish toxin containers. Then he proceeded to open it, thecontainers, laid the vials out, as I understand, added up the figures,and then informed me that there was not 5 grams, but close to it. I donot know the exact figures. It is 3 in decimal points, but 11 grams.

The inference, the only inference in my mind is that the SpecialOperations Division, in their wisdom, or lack of it, decided to sendalong the 6 grams that were in their particular repository.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Dr. Gordon, the part I have trouble compre-

hending, in view of vour testimony is that labels on these cans arestuck on the top of the cans. You could not possibly pick ,a can upand put it in a file, without reading the label. One label says veryclearly 5 grams of stockpile, manufactured in Ohio, which is probablyvery directly the 5 grams we have been talkmg about. The intere&ing1,abelon the other can-this may clear up the 6 gram my&my-it saysparalytic shellfish toxin, working fund investigation Northeast Shell-fish Sanitation Center. Then it says, USPHS-you do not have to beJames Bond to figure out that means U.S. Public Health Service,Narragansett, R.I. And my question is why the U.S. Public Health

Service is producing a deadly poison for this country, and who ispaying for it, and you could see that by just reading the label on thecan, SO why all the mystery about where these 6 grams came from?

Mr. GORDON. enator Schweiker, I do not recollect-and 1 saw whatyou are referring to in closed testimony as two exhibiband 1 wasasked in closed testimony, closed session, hat, did I recall seeing thoseparticular exhibits that you are referring to. I honestly do not remem-ber seeing those.

Insofar ss the Public Health Service or-as being a source of theshellfish toxin material, this reflects a program that had been going



ast in xtxmrces and value

Detrick. It came to

,.&I?. GORDON. I understand your question, Senator. I do not have a#qspense to it.‘:.$3enator SCHWEIEER. I have a great deal of difficulty understandingMy you could not size u&p~C!IA and Fort Detric E

the two cans, one being the stockpile fromand the other coming from Narragansett,

$1.. There’s a discrepancy. Does this not ring any bell, or do you notect a thin ?

GORDON. 5 honestly ,have to say no, sir. I do not understand. In$$.@ng to reconstruct events, I just do not remember seein$$ular listings. All I can indicate to t

those par-u, the materials-

%reyou saying those listings were attac Ped to the labels?y the way,

:,Senator SCHWIKER. They were not only attached ; they were on topo;f the can. You could not possibly pick a can uW, that is, 5 grams and 6 grams, and the manu -P

without seeing the

,@ealth Service.acturer, U.S. Public

&%r. GORDON.&&icular

I admit, Senator, I do not have any recollection of that

+§ t !Ghoto,mph or object.

ena or CHWEIKER. You testified earlier, Dr. Gordon, that some-tine called from Port Detrick asking if you would reweave or accept$titese oxins ; is that correct, in essence ?

‘Mr. Gmno~. Shellfish toxin ?Senator SCHWEEKER. Shellfish toxin.Mr. GORDON. Yes.Senator SCHWEIKER. What was the rationale or reason by which he

said you should accept it? Why was he not reporting? Because he didreport, Fort Detrick did report some 3 grams, as was testified to thatthey inventoried and got approval from the National Se+rity &oun-ea.. I am sure you are well aware of thatto go the accountability route. You elect ecr

rocedure,to follow K

et you ele:t notis suggestron to

ge the other route PMr. GORDON. The Agency’s stockpile of all those materials was not

on a reported destruction ii& at Fort Detrick. They were being held



separate and apart, ta the best of my understanding. They were kingheld separate and apart from their .own military or Amy holdmm

Senator SCH~IZIKER. The memd we have from the Army indicates

that they reported through official channels, and apparently re&vedNational Security Counc11 approval to keep the 3 grams for march

-u 9.r r. &~DoN. May I make a surmise, sir? I do not believe-1 may

be wrong, but I do not believe, that that was the S cial OperationsDivision, or the Biological L&oratories that mar e that mquest. Ibelieve that it was another component, &search component, seand apart from the Special Operations Division of the P

aptiBio 0g1-1

Laborabrim that made that request to retain the quantities-that iswhat I read myself in the newspapers the other day-and apparently

received the approval for experimental and R & D purposes, a verylegitimate request, in my opinion.Senator SCHWEIKER. There are two.things that I think this commit-

tee has to ascertain. First, after the order was issued, did someonemake a decision at Fort Detrick to send back your 5 grams. Also, didsomeone make a decision to include the U.S. Public Health Servicequantity that probably momentarily’ was up in Narragansett, R.I.,and throw that in.

Mr. Chairman, I have here a number of requests. As well as theArmy, we are going to have to call the Public Health Service to findout why they were producing deadly poison, why they were a part ofthis whole thing.

Mr. GORDON. I believe, sir, Senator Schweiker, if I could have amoment---

Senator SCHWEIKER.YM.Mr. GORDON. can surmise, sir, for what it is worth. I believe the

U.S. Public Health Service-I cannot address myself to the mechanismof how it arrived from the Public Health Service to Fort Detrick,specifically the Special Operations Division.

Senator SCHWEIKER. That is what we want to know, and that is ourjob to find out, Dr. Gordon.

Mr. GORDON. believe the Public Health Service-and I say thissincerely-I think, it is injustice, if I may say this, that the PublicHealth Service was raising or cultivating or making shellfish toxinfor the purpose of a poison, per se in my humbIe opinion, they weremaking these auantities to study defensively immunization techniquesagainst the shellfish toxin.

Senator SCH~EIKER. If they had kept it there, Dr. Gordon, and usedit for that purpose, I would not be questioning that either. It lookedlike thev were producing a supply of far more than they needed atsomebody’s expense.

Mr. GORDON. I follow your rationale.Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN+ I follow your view that there is a sugge&on here

that the committee will have to fully inquire into whether other de-partments of the Government in addition to the CIA undertook tocircumvent the Presidential order by depositing this toxin in this par-ticular cache. And we wiII look into that, becausewe want to rally etto the root of the whole question presented here. Senabr Morgan.



81

Senator MORGAN. Dr. Gordon, as I understand your testimony, J~OU

hake responsibility, along with the two of your colleagues for retamng:%hetoxins that we are talkin about.

‘Mr. GORDON. Because of t e rationale that I indicated earlier.Senator MORQAN. That rationale wa,s first, that the National Se-

lrcurity Decision Memorandum of February 20 [exhibit 8 ‘J-and I be-‘&haveyou refer to also the 1969 order-

+Mr. GORDON. The press releases of November 25,1969, and February$4,1970.,,. $enator MORGAN. You referred to military programs, wherein since:~o~;~rruary 20 order, which is actually the National Security Coun-

Mr. Gosnoti. Which I have not seen.Senator MORGAN. The memorandum that you have been referring

a,, or the document that you have been referring to is February 14,w&s actually the press release-that the memorandum itself was dated!Rbruary 20.

.Mr. GORDON, I understand tbnt.&enator MORQAN. That reads, following the review of the United

military programs for toxins, the President has decided-soart of your rationale was, it applied to military programs?

. GORDON. That is correct.$:, Senator MORGAN. And you contended that shellfish toxin was not abiological weapon ?

8.4:Mr. GORDON. In a true sense of the definition, sir-and again, par-@nthetically, we recognized and admit to a gray area here. Also paren-&eticall , that both chemical warfare laboratories and biological

&varfare aboratories, both groups worked on this particular substance,&ir. I would like to throw in that there is a chemical, or was a chemical@ ent program, polytoxin, at, and only at the chemical warfareQ&or atories.

or MORGAN. Dr. Gordon, I see some faults with your rationale,ly with regard to the toxin part. I must say I do not attributefaith or motives at your having arrived at that decision, but let

ou further-you say you have never seen any memorandume President or from the Director of the CIA, with regard toal of these toxins 8

. GORDON. That is correct, Senator Morgan.Senator MORGAN. Your decision not to destroy these w&s based on

k” ur rationale, without any guidelines from the Department of De.ense, the National Security Council, or anyone else ?

GORDON. That is correct, based on the announcements that I al-to in this testimony.ator MORQAN. Since you originally made that decision, have you,

ny time, ever seen a memorandum, even since this matter came up,ch later set forth any guidelines for the destruction of biologicalacteriological toxins?

.lVr. GORDON. Within the Department of Defense?AN. The Department of Defense, or the CIA?I have never seen anything along those lines in themy judgment, again, I am repeating myself, I know-

cause, m my Judgment, these particular press releases, and including

a see p. 210.



82

the National Security memorandum, referred to military programs,and was directed only to the Department of Defense.

Senator MORGAN. Dr. Gordon, as I read the memorandum of No-

vember of 1969 and February 20,1970, or the press release of February14, the President instructed the Secretary of Defense to make recom-mendations concerning the-disposal of existing stocks of toxins, weap-ons, or agents. To my knowledge I will state to you, Dr. Gordon, thatthese recommendations kave not been promulgated. I have not beenshown a copy of them.

As a matter of fact, I refer to a document dated January 25,1973,a memorandum for the- President, made by a committee of the Na-tional Security Council, and has been classified Top Secret. I under-stand, Mr. Chairman? I would have to have permission from the White

House to quote from it.The CHAIRRMAN. Very well ; I am told by staff that that is correct.Senator MORGAN. In this memorandum, Dr. Gordon, dated Janu-

ary 25, 1973, the Committee reports to the President as follows: “Noprocurement or production of offensive weapons was undertaken dur-ing the period under review; Within the framework of applicable envi-ronmental legislation, disposal or demilitarization of unneeded stock-piles of chemical weapons has continued.”

Then, let’s get down to the second aragraph, the main part, andstill classified, “All research and deve opment of biological weaponshas been terminated. Programs for disposal:of stocks of these weaponsis now virtually complete.” Does that not indicate to you-that as ofJanuary 25,19?3, the program for the disposal of biological weaponshad not been promul,Fated 8

Mr. GORDON. ithin the Department of Defense, Senator BSenator MORGAN. This is a memorandum from a committee of the

National Security Council to the President.Mr. GORDON.n my judgment, I construe that as pertaining to the

Department of Defense only.Senator MORGAN. It goes on to say, “The laboratory quantities of

agents (not weapons) will be retained to support defensive research.”

Does this not indicate that as late as January 25, 1973, the Presidentknew that biological weapons still existed and that some biologicalweapons would be retained for research? Is that not a logical conclu-sion to you P

Mr. GORDON. Within, again, the Department of Defense ; yes, sir.Senator MORGAN. Referring to the Department of Defense----Mr. GORDON. I agree. I put it in the context of my judgment, Senator

Morgan, that it applies to the Secretary of Defense, and the DefenseDepartment. I keep repeating that.

Senator MORGAN. If the Secretary of Defense had promulgated requ-

lations at the request of the President for the destruction of biologicalweapons, do you not think it would have applied to all of them, allagencies ?

Mr. GORDON. In my opinion, this is the directive promulgated bv theSecretary of Defense for his particular responsibilities, echelons withinthe Defense Department, ultimately,

Senator MORGAN. I am not reading a document of the Department ofDefense. What I am saying, Dr. Gordon-you may not understand



84

follows. If I were the President of the United States, and it bothersme to say this-in what way, it appears to me possibltional Security Council re

that the Na-

one of them, might have %

r&entatives--the Director o9 the CIA being

een a$ked in some manner whether or notthese. kinds of materials were materials that were of interest at anyone time, current interest-if so, a report on that whole sub’ect matter,pursuant to the White House announcementrequested from the CIA. If such -a report ha B

ossibly coul d have beenbeen requested, I think

much of this would have surfaced undoubtedly, in my mind, at thattime.

Senator HART of Colorado. Pollowing up on that point, if the Direr-tar of the CIA had asked you whether to your knowledge the CIApossessed, either in its own facilities, or someplace else, materials fall-

mg under the Presidential order, would you have responded a&ma-tively or negative1iiF

?Mr. Gonoon. A rmatively.Senator HART of Colorado. Is that with hi&i ht QMr. GORDON.Let me think this thing throug f , Senator Hart. If at

that particular time, the Director, through the chain of command hadindicated by memo or by some indication of a request which reachedme, to search and report and inventory-for that matter, I suspectany behavioral materials, whether they be lethal, incapacitating, of abiological and/or chemical nature, or in the case of toxins, the grey

area of both, that would have immediate1 d been corn Plied with.Senator HART of Colorado. If you ha used the anguage that thePresident had used, would you have printed these materials on thelist Z

Mr. GORDON. he President’s Ian~- Senator HART of Colorado. Wo UY

age in the public announcements P

your list, if the Director of the CIA,ou please put these materials on

%I r. Helms, had asked you to listall of the materials that you knew of that fall within the descriptionof the statement of the President ?

Mr. GORDON.Yes ; I would have so indicated that a stockpile of these

particular materials were being held at the Special Operations Divi-sion of the Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, Fort Detrick.Senator HART of Colorado. Contrary to what opmions you may have

formed this afternoon, this committee is not prosecutonal. Our func-tion is remedial and not one to find out who was wrong in the ast butprevent any wrongdoing from happening in the future. Base T; on thehindsight that you now possess, what kinds of guidelines would yousuggest that this committee recommend or would you recommenddirectly to the CIA to prevent misunderstanding of this kind ansmgin the future ?

Mr. GORDON. I do not see how this kind of a thing could ever occuragain within the Agency.Senator HART of Colorado. Why is that?Mr. GORDON. &cause of the fact of the discu*ions, testimony that

you have heard here from myself and will hear from others that therews,o a loose control existing, established by my predecessors and con-tinued to be established because of the nature of that particular vault,that of a storeroom. In hindsight and I am not at all sure onehind-sight, I do not know whether or not a storeroom is really ever mven-toried because there is no in or out traffic, Senator Hart.



85

SenatorHART of Colorado. I am talkin about the breakdown ofcommunications between mid-level and hig %&is particular vault:

er level officials, not just

$r. Gonno~. If, m your judrt, Senator, of the policy of the

est level, if they felt that t ese particular directives were appli-#a e to Agency policies and actions I suspect that there is a case&be made, Senator Hart, that some implementation for Agency con-sideration and interest should then have come down as a directive&Jirough channels.

Senator HART of Colorado. You are suggesting as a remedial step,that under circumstances such as this, not identical but such as this,that the Director and his deputies send down orders spelling out&at the CIA’s obligations are.,‘Mr. GORDON. I think that is a reasonable statement, sir.

Senator ti of Colorado. How about information flowing up?mat if they have no idea that this kind of capability exists; howare they supposed to find out?

Mr. GORDON. Correct. I think that it is a two-way street. I thinkj ,,T

riodically and I suspect to some degree at the time, I do not knowt e depth because I cannot speak past my particular position, con-,+&crsations were held. I am not aware of anything in writing, but I$uspect that conversations were periodically held ; to what depth Il&&e no idea, sir.

Senator HABT of Colorado. In your career in the CIA, were yousver aware of events or facts that you thought the Director or his@nmediate staff did not want to be aware of or did not want to know?

Mr. GORDON. Could I have that question again, sir?Senator HART of Colorado. In your career in the CIA were you

ever aware of a set of facts or a set of circumstances that you thoughtthat the Director did not want to know about and it was made clear6 you that you were not to convey up 1

Mr. GORDON. No, sir.:Senator HART of Colorado. That is all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

,$lShe CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart has suggested, Dr. Gordon., that per-:&ps you are overly generous in assuming for you and your munediateassoci.ates the blame for what has happened here. I would Iike to put&is one question to you and then Senator Mathias has a final question., If you had been shown the memorandum,of the National Security

Qouncil, dated Februarv 20,1970, and had read it, and had been told&at it applied to the CIA and had read the first paragraph of thememorandum, which reads: “The United States will renounce theproduction for operational purposes, stockpiling and use in retaliationof toxins produced either by bacteriological or biological processes orby chemical synthesis ;” would you have read that and understoodthat to mean the shellfish toxin?

Mr. GORDON. Senator Church, if I had seen such a directive from*he top management levels of the CIA. I seriously doubt whether I%>,rny little staff would have moved-in our judgment-1 seriouslytaoubt whether we would have not been triggered by such an announce-merit and certainly would have had a different kind of discussion whichwould have rendered a different kind of a decision.

,The CHAIRMAN. What you are saying is, had you been told of suchg directive and had it come down properly through channels to you,that you would not have taken the action that you did in fact take?



Mr. GORDON. I believe that is correct, sir.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias ? ,+Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, ‘it seems to me that this phone

call that Dr. Gordon received from Fort Detrick raising the questionof retention of the shellfish toxin may be of some importance in OUFinvestigation, as apparently it was in his thinking, because he testifiedthat is really where the idea originated. Dr. Gordon, were you awareof what was happening at Fort Detrick at about the time you receivedthe call 1

Mr. GORDON. With respect to ?Senator MATHIAS. Let me be rnol- specific : Were you aware that the

Army had set up an elaborate system of procedures, a very complicatedand dramatic procedure by which they were destroying the existingbiological warfare st.ockpiles 1

Mr. GORDON. That this was to occur, Senator, yes indeed.Senator MATHIAS. You were aware of that at the time of the call?Mr. GORDON. As of the DOD directive and program, hence the two

announcements.Senator MATHIAS. I do not believe you told me from whom the call’

came.Mr. GORDON. I believe I did, sir. I believe, to my recollection, it was

from the project officer, a Mr. Sensene , m the Special Operations,Division of Fort Detrick, Md., Army Bio Pogical Warfare Laboratories.

Senator MATHIAS. On whose payroll was he?

Mr. GORDON. Biological Laboratories payroll, the Army projectofficer, to my recollection.Senator MATHIAS. He was a Detrick employee and not an Agency

employee?Mr. GORDON. That is correct, sir.Senator MATHIAS. Now, since he was a Detrick employee, and since

he was presumably speaking for the Army, did you read anythingspecial into his message?

Mr. GORDON. No, sir, because I suspected his consideration for sal-vaging the shellfish toxin was no different than the considerations thatwe had ex ressed earlier of the extreme amount of time, money, andresources t K at have gone into getting the shellfish toxin in those quan-tities to the particular component.

Senator MATHIAS. You recounted the conversation. You said hemerely called up and said, “If you want to, come get it.”

Mr. GORDON. That is correct.Senator MATHIAS. Did he imply that this procedure had been con-

sidered or discussed by anyone in the Army or was this just his ownidea ‘4

Mr. GORDON. Procedure meaning the offering 8Senator MATHIAB. Yes; the offering.Mr. GORDON. I have to simply indicate in retrospect that he was rep-

resenting the feelings of the Special Operations Division to offer-Mr. Senseney being, in my opinion, the spokesman, for I suspect some’*conversation had taken place at the Special Operations Division.

Senator MATHIAS. The conversation did not reflect either that theretention of the toxin would or would not be violative of the Presi-dent’s order or that it would or would not be within the exceptionsthat might have been created for resenrch purposes.



87

Mr. GORDON. No,sir.Senator MA-S. Thank you.

@he CHAIRMAN. Senator Mondale P:%enator MONDALE. I believe that you just testified that Mr. Sensent\g

I&he Department of Defense in his conversation with you suggestedu$ransfer of their stocks to CIA. Did I understand that correctly?Mr. GORDON. Our stocks, the A ency’s holdin .Senator MONDAY. Let me un f m-stand, wou d it be that you would

&cie: t control of the DOD toxin, shellfish toxin ?1 M! r. GORDON. All these years they had been holdin in their reposi-I’ *L&ry, Senator Mondale, the Agency’s stockpil+is a 1 that was beingqffered, and again for the record, to the best of my recollection-and I,&&cated this earlier in closed session-I use the name of Mr. Senseney@,the reject officer. I do not have any documentation. The phone call;sauld K ave been made by his superior but it was the S ecial Opera-&ns Division representative-but it was our particular x gency stock-

Iiile, Senator Mondale, that was being offered back to us. We never&d it as a repository. Now, it is being offered back to us to maintain

&our secur0 safe vault.Senator MONDALE. As I understand it, in the same vault them were

*me CIA stocks of shellfish toxin at the Fort D&rick facility and&&re were also some DOD-owned stocks.: ,Hr. GORDON. It appears that way.

Senator MONDALE Both the DOD- and the CIA-owned stocks were&urned to Washington and placed in the warehouse here, is that

?i4nTe&?‘Nr. GORDON. In a secure safe.,&Senator MONDALE. Were you aware that these stocks which were

Isansferred then to the warehouse in Washington contained toxinsformer1 owned by the DOD 8

,Mr. ORM)N. No, sir.Senator MONDALE. You did not know that ?4fr. GORDON. No, sir. I thought in all good faith I was to be given

@he Agency stockpile of five grams. I read? of course-1 ‘ust do not@call the exhibit shown to me with the specific listings of t e contents1

&#hose cans.Senator MONDALE. As I understand it, as the testimony developed

?t&ay, your final jud-f?

ent was that the order to destroy shellfish toxinm directed at the epartment of Defense and not CIA?;, 3%. GORDON. That is correct, sir.

Senator MONDALE. All right. That decision was made by you, Dr.Qottlieb, and who else?

,@r. GORDON. Let me, if I may, refer back to the conversation thatZ indicated here, where after the memorandum outlining the options,$e possibility of transferring our stocks to the private laboratory was

~%nrned down. I w&5 informed by Dr. Gottlieb and I hastened to com-;l+Iy and I went up to Fort D&rick to tern&&e our particular project.a& told them that all the Agency holdings were to revert to their:,~wn articular repository, to do whatever they pleased with. Thatwas t i e extent, to the best of my recollection, of the conversation.

Senator MONDALE. The decision was that the CIA stocks need nothe destroyed because they were owned by the CIA and not the mili-



88

taK

and that the order was directed to the military, not the CIA ;is t at correct ?

Mr. GORDON.enator Mondale, after that conversation from FortDetrick subsequent totheirs for their use in t

ingr

up there, the particular stockpile was to bee disposition. The only subject that then became

a topic for wnvemation was shell&h toxin, not snything else.Senator MONDALE. Ri ht. Listenin

thought what you were te ling us was t fto your testimony today I

is : that the reason that it wasfundamentally determined that you need not destroy the toxin wssthat the order ran to the Defense Department, not the CIA.

Mr. GORDON.hat, plus the consideration that we, in our judgment,considered this as a chemical entity.

Senator MONDALE. All ri ht.dg

In urging that consideration,, you,Dr. Gottlieb, and who else ecided it?

Mr. GORDON.r. Gottlieb was not informed at the time that a smallgroup made the decision to receive the shell&h toxin. Dr. Gottliebwas not in the picture, Senator Mondale.

Senator MONDALE. It was you and others in your shop who made thedecision that because you were not in the military, the order ofdestruction did not apply to you.

Mr. GOFCDON.hat is co&.Senator MONDALE. You are all technicians, chemists, biologists, and

so on. What led you to believe that you had the authority to makewhat is essentially a legal judgment?

Mr. GORDON. e did not look at it in that light. We looked upon itas a technical consideration.

Senator MONDALE. How could you do that? This is a considerationof the order as to whether you were technically in the reach of thePresidential decree to destroy these toxins. You decided that you werenot because you were not in the military. Did you assume that you hadthe authority to make that legal judgment. ?

Mr. GOF~DON.can only repeat that I never, in our conversationsamong ourselves, ever considered or talked about, not being lawyers,any legal considerations or implications, sir. We worked on the sub-

ject matter strictly from the point of view of a chemist. Was thissubstance something that had definite, interesting, highly lethal qual-ities as a chemical agent? The answer collectively after much discus-sion apparently was yes, and we made the decision on that basis.Because the decision was rendered as, in our judgment, as a chemicalagent, we felt that this was an ordinary, highly lethal agent to be keptin a safe, secure storage area, and proceeded to do so.

Senator MONDALE. We have gone far enough.The CHAIRIUAN. It never even occurred to you to raise the question

with legal counsel as to the scope or direction of the Presidential order,

and how it would apply to you? Do you think that is a judgment thatscientists are competent to make?Mr. GORDON. have to answer candidly. It did not occur to us at

that particular time that we were in violation of a particular directivethat we had referred to the white House announcements and again,in our judgment, based upon earlier wnsideration, the course of eventswas made and followed, sir.

Senator MONIULE. It seems to me that when we press the defensethat this was not practicable within the meaning of the order because



89

ikas a chemical, we hear the military defense and when we press&he military, we get a chemical defense, There is no way to get an,mswer.

‘The CHAIRMAN. Senator Schweiker has asked for a final question and

bnator Hart will follow.Senator SCHWEI~R. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Dr. Gordon, when you received these two cans of material, did you

k them in in any way ?53 r. GORDON. No; we did not, sir. We did not have a

Practice of

iagging. We did not have a practice in that small, secure abo?tory&jogging in material because the degree of activity was practicallynil. We did not look at it as a use laboratory, Senator Schwelker. Itwas essentially, in effect, a storage, secure storage area-in the eventfiat it would ever be needed for an operational need, pill, or any

&Jaer application.:Senator SCH~EIKER. Here is a toxin that could kill thousands of

seople. If you walk into the CIA building you have to be lo ged in. IQ not know why we do not log a toxin that could kill many t ousandsl

“of people.Mr. GORDON. I would like to make a comment with respect to what

has been in the press a number of times. The only way admittedly, andFwequivocally, that is a large amount of material for any purposes ofbpplying it m a lethal form to

People-the only way that you could

rklll those large numbers of peop e as related to the quantity of stock-

$ile, is, in my humble opinion, to put some of them in one long line&&inoculate each and every one.it: Senator SCHWEIKER. My next question is, did you take periodic in-&zntories of your laboratory ?

Mr. GORDON. We did not, sir. I indicated, we did not ever take in-“Ilasntory during my stay. I relied upon my project officer for that kind&thing and I myself did not take inventory.

&mator SCHWEIEER. Is it true throughout the whole CIA that you30 not take inventory of the assets ou have, the investment you have@&de, and the materials on hand? 9 s that a normal policy throughout

%ke organization ?Mr. GORDON. I do not understand that.Senator SCH\KEIIFER. It is hard for me to understand. That is, I

,f%%ought he CIA pr&ty much had to OK everything that went. in or,‘@ut or had any money attached to it whatsoever. Do I understand we#hnd no policy for th is, none at all, no recordkeeping at all?

Mr. GORDON. I can only address myself to the specific laboratory or,%ecure vault area. We did not, in my particular period, even run antientory on those materials. They were simply there as they would be:b storage. If one were to inquire whether compound A was in the fa-,:&&it?, I would simply ask mv project officer to go down and inspect the,holdmgs and tell me or tell someone whether that substance existed.,In retrospect, and I concur, we should have had an inventory.

Senator SCHWEIXER. The other question I had-basically you testi-$ied earlier that you asked a scientific colleague of yours whether theeective issued by the President covered shellfish toxin; is that cor-@ect? You asked someone their opinion P

.&Ir. GORDON. My project officer and technical consultant and myselfwere the people concerned in the discussion.



90

Senator SCH~EIKER. Did you msk the General Co&d of CIA forhis legal opinion about the order!

Mr. GORDON. No ; I did not, Senator. We did not ever in our discus-

sions, not being lawyers, think in those particular terms-of legal corm-se1 or legal opinion, sir.Senator SCHWEIKEFLNot being a lawyer, Doctor, it seems the first

person to call is a lawyer to find out what the legal parameters are ofthe problem.

Mr. GORDON.We looked upon this as a technical consideration only.Hence, I have to indicate to you, Senator, that we did not think-or asa result of not thinking-we did not ask .for any legal opinion o?counsel.

Senator SCHWEIKER.That is all I have, thank you.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart?Senator HART of Colorado. One final question, Dr. Gordon. Is it your

view that, had you to do it all over again, you would have swallowedthese poisons Z

Mr. GORDON. No, sir.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddleston 8Senator HUDDLEBTON.One question. You said that Dr. Gottlieb was

not a party to this decision. Is that correct?Mr. GORDON. That is correct.Senator HUDDLESTON. Was he subsequently advised?Mr. GORWN. No; he was not.Senator HUDDLESTON. Was any person higher than you ?Mr. GORDON. No; the only eople informed among our own low

group was myself, my proiect o cer, and technical consultant.Senator HUDDLESTON. For what purpose did you conceive that you

were storing this and retaining it?Mr. GORDON. will answer that and then before I close this session,

Senators, I would appreciate if I could have the opportunity of a con-cluding statement ?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes ; of course.Mr. GORDON. We felt that we would retain this material first of all

because of an extremely high cost in resources that had gone into it aswe knew it at that time-into the preparation and accumulation of thiskind of material in that amount.

Second, we knew that this was information that I became aware offollowing discussion with my technical consultant, that this materialwas a kind of material that was used in the suicide device that wasissued to U-2 pilots.

Senator HUDDLESTON. How did you perceive that this might be.+-lized for this purpose and that the individuals who had a responnbti-

ity for.making that decision did not know that it existed?Mr. GORDON. If we were asked from the highest level on down whatsubstances we would recommend for the kind of purpose to su er-1cede the cyanide pill which was the state of the art. I would t enundoubtedly, after informing my colleagues, my project officer, andtechnical consultant, making our decision-this is hindsight-that wewould have informed those who had a need, that we had these mate-rials and we could service their requirement.

Senator HUDDLJWT~N. You just kept it as a hedge against a possibleorder or instruction ? 1



91

Mr. GORDON. Operational need.Senator HUDDIJBNN. Thank ou.

The CHAIRMAN. You would t%en be in the position to say, “We have

iitood news. In a litt le corner here, we have some of these poisons, ande have not said anything about them until now, and you have asked

&L We ‘ust happen to have a supply available.”Mr. E ORDON. One of the things I indicated, Senator Church, over

@rs years, my@any chemica f

edecessor-or predecessors, if you will-accumulatedagents that have been experimented with for a variety

& purposes in the physically incarng area. These are the things that

acitating or mentally incapacitat-

k%rhose particular areas.IL came physical objects, if you will,

The CHAIRMAN. That was before the President issued his order di-srecting the elimination ?

Mr. GORDON. Much before.The CHAIRMAN. All ri ht.

You have asked to m 9#ou please proceed?

e a concluding statement, Dr. Gordon. Would

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Senator Church. I appreciate the opportu-@iit

9to make this concluding statement.thank the committee and staff for the close attention they have

given me during the course of thisxmcerely that our action at the Tee R

ublic testimony. Finally, I believenical Services Division was in the

bt.erest of the Agency’s policy in the field of behavioral materials,&th biological and/or chemical, to maintain a potential capability-b emphasize potential capability-in the event that the need shouldiarise to use these materials operationally one day. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Gordon.The committee will meet at 10 o’clock tomorrow morning. Our first

Ambassador Richard Helms, who was Director of theime under examination this week.is adjourned until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.

at 4:40 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at

ay, September 17,1975.]



WEDNESDAY, SEP!l’EMBEE 1’7, 1975

U.S. SENATE,SELECT Commmm To S3runy GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH &c&mc~ To kl%LLICJENCE AC-,wa.&ingtolt, D.C.

The committee met pursuant to notice at 10 a.m. in room 318, Rus-sell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)presiding.

Present : Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan,Hart of Colorado, Baker, Mathias, and Schweiker.

Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. 0.Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel ; Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to theminorit .

The E HAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.Our first witnesses ap

was the Director of the f?rmg today are Mr. Richard Helms, who

IA during the period in question, and Mr.Thomas Karamesaines, who was the Deputy Director for Plans (oper-ations) during that period.

They are appearing together at the witness table, and gentlemen, Iask you to stand now to take the oath. Do you solemnly swear that allthe testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, thewhole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Ambassador HELMB. I do.Mr. KARAMESSINEB. I do.The CHIN. Before I ask counsel to commence with the ques-

tions, since I understand that you do not have an opening state-ment----

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR RICNARD HELMS, FORMER DIRECTOROF CENTRAL INTELLIC+ENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY THOMAS

KARAMESSINES,FORlER DEPUTY DIRECTORFOR PLANS, CEN-TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Ambassador HUMS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. I have a letter I would like to read that came to me

this morning from Mr. Colby, the present Director of the CIA. Itreads as follows :

Dear Mr. Chairman : At the proceedings of your Committee on the morning of16 September 1975, I may have conveyed an impression which I did not intend.If by chance you, or other members of the Committee, got a similar impression,it Is important that I clari fy the record now, since it might affect your line ofquestioning of future witnesses.

When I was ‘being questioned as to the destruction of certain CIA records Iwas thinking of the question in its broadest context; namely, drugs, bacterio-logical agents and chemical agents. I thus answered that there were indicationsof record destruction in November 19’72.

( 93 )



94

I realize that most listeners might have inferred that I was indicating thatrecords relating to the CIA-Fort Detrick relationship-in particular, recordsrelating to Project MKNAOMI-were destroyed.

The facta are these: records relating to .CIA’s drug program in general weredestroyed in January 1973, but there is no evidence that records of ProjectMKNAOMI or of the CIA-Fort Detrick relationship were destroyed, other thanpossibly as included in the general group in January 1973. I would appreciateit if you would advise the other members of the committee to this effect.

I also referred mistakenly to a memorandum between former DC1 Helms andDr. Gottlieb regarding the destruction of records. This was based on a miS*understanding which occurred during my hurried consultation with Dr. Stevens.We have no knowledge of any such memorandum.

And it is si ned by William E. Colby.Now Mr. 8

1chwarz, would you please commence the questioning?

Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Helms, without going throu

f B

h your

the CIA, is it correct to say that you started at t e OSS

edigree in

You werewith the CIA from its beginning?You were at the covert side. You became head of the Deputy Direc-

torate of Plans. You stayed in thatwhen you became Deputy Director oP

osition until approximately 1966the Agency. You became Dn-ector

of the Agency in 1967 until you left in 1973.Ambassador HELMS. No, sir, that is not quite correct. The positions

are correct, but I became Deputy Director in 1965, and Director, I be-lieve around June 30,1966.

Mr. SCIIWARZ. All right.And Mr. Karamessines, you were at the Agency in the covert side

for your entire career, is that correct?Mr. KARABCEMINES. That is correct, sir.Mr. SCHWARZ. And in 1970 you were Deputy Director for Plans?Mr. KARAMEBSINES. Yes, I was.Mr. SCHWA=. Mr. Helms, were you aware that the CIA had a

capability to use bacteriological and chemical weapons offensively?Ambassador HELMS. Yes, I was aware of that. If one has in one’s

possession or under one’s control bacteriological or chemical weapons,they can he used both defensively and offensively.

Mr. SCHWARZ. And Mr. Karamessines, you also were aware of that

as of 1970 and before, were you not?Mr. KAF~AMEBSINES. Yes.Mr. SCHWARZ. And by use offensively, we mean to include killing

people, is that right?Ambassador HELLMS. Well, they have the capacity to kill people, if

they were used in that way.Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you connect the CIA’s biological capability with

the Fort Detrick Army facility?Ambassador HELMS. I’m not certain I know what you mean by the

word “connect ” but the biological weapons, as you refer to them,which the AgeAcy was experimenting with were kept at Fort Detrick.

This was a joint program between the two organizations-the U.S.Armv facility at Fort Detrick and the. CIA. I believe we paid FortDe&k for that part of the facility and that part of the materialswhich we used.

Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you know., Mr. Helms, one way or the other,whether the Agency also had in Its possession and in its own facilitimcertain quantities of lethal biological or chemical materials?



95

Ambassador HELMS. It was always my impression that the bacterio-logical warfare a ents and thin of that kind were ke t at FortDetrick. I realize t la t the Agency ad in its possession in ashington,wpand in some cases at overseas stations, thin

fYlike L tablets and K

tablets which certainly were lethal, but whit had limited uses.Mr. SCHWARZ. Recognizing it is di&ult to be sure of a negative,

let me ask you the question, nevertheless.Did you know that the only location of CIA biological weapons was

at Fort Detrick, or was ther

ssibility in your mind that there weresuch weapons located within IA facilities themselves?

Ambassador HELMS. I thought they were all at Fort D&rick.Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Karamessines, did you have any different under-

standing ‘3Mr. KARAMESSINES. also understood that they were at Fort D&rick

with the modification that there might be a small amount -of some ofthese chemicals within the custody of the Technical Services Division.

Mr. SCLIWARL In a CIA facility?Mr. KARAMEBBINEB. Yes.Mr. SCHWARZ.Ambassador Helms, at some int did you learn that

President Nixon had concluded that the Unite r States should renouncebiological warfare and should destroy stocks of biological weapons?

Ambassador HELMS. Yes, I was aware of this. In fact, I was awarcthat the matter was under stud from the early days of PresidentNixon’s administration, because J attended a National Security Coun-

cil meeting at which he announced that he intended to have this studymade.Mr. SCEIWARZ. And Mr. Karamessines, did you at some point become

aware that President Nixon wished to have such materials destroyed?Mr. KARAMEW.NES. Yes.Mr. SC~VARZ. What did either one of you do, if anythin , to make

sure that such material in the possession of the CIA-Mr. 5s arames-sines-or in the possession of Port Detrick-Mr. Helms-should bede&o ed?

Am assadorT HELMS. Are you directing the first question to Mr.

Karamessines and the second one to me, or-Mr. SCHWARZ. Why don’t you take the first, Mr. Ambassador, andMr. Karamessines the second 8

Ambassador HELXB. My recollection is that, when the order ma-sissued to do away with these bactcriolo ical agents and toxins, thntMr. Karamessines and I agreed that we a ad no choice but to comply.And, in fact, when I say no choice, I do not mean to indicate that wewanted any other choice, I just meant that we had understood thatthis was an instruction that we were to abide by, and we agreed toterminate the program.

Mr. SCHWARZ.And by terminate the program, you mean terminate

the program with Fort Detrick ?Ambassador HELMS. At Fort Detrick, yes.Mr. SCHWARZ. What was your understanding of what was done,

Mr. Karamessines ?Mr. KARAMEEISINES.Precisely the same.Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, Mr. Karamessines, with respect to your answer

that you did know that TSD had in its own possession certain bio-logical agents, did you do anything to have those destroyed 8



96

Mr. KARAMESSINE~. Yes. It was my understanding with Dr. Gottliebthat not only would our program be terminated, but whatever mate-rials of this nature that might be in the custody of the Agency, or were

in the custody of the Agency, would be ‘returned to Fort Detrick fordestruction.

Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you instruct Dr. Gottlieb to accomplish that?Mr. KARABEEBBINEB. Yes, I did ; but I want to elaborate on that com-

ment, lest I leave the impression that there was some reservation onthe part of Dr. Gottlieb. There is no question in my mind about thefact that Dr. Gottlieb, Mr. Helms, and I were of one mind as to whutwe should do with the progralm and the materials-they should be got-ten rid of-and instructions were accordingly issued to Dr. Gottlieb.

Mr. SCHWARZ. In that conversation, was Mr. Helms made aware of

the fact that there were materials in the possession of the CIA itself?Mr. KARAMEBSINES. I can’t recall. .,Mr. SCHWARZ. Would you both look at the document previously

marked as exhibit 1,l which purports t,o be a draft memorandum fromMr. Karamessines to the Director of Central Intelligence?

Have you both seen that document previously?Mr. KARABEE~SINES. Yes ; and I would like to make a comment with

respect to that document if I may, Mr. Schwarz. The comment relatesto a story in the Evening Star yesterday. It was a mistaken story, butit does say that the committee provided the Star-or made available-a copy of this memorandum, “written by me.” Now, I did not write

that memorandum.The CHAIRMAN. I mi ht say, Mr. Karamessines, that that memo-

randum was made availa % e to all newspapers as a result of the publichearing which was featured yesterday.

Mr. KARAMES~INES. I’m sure it was. Thank you, Senator.I never saw this memorandum ; I never wrote the memorandum ; I

never signed such a memorandum ; and I was unaware of the contentsof the memorandum.

Mr. SCEWARZ. And, Ambassador Helms, you never saw such amemorandum 1

Ambassador HELMS. No, Mr. Schwarz.Mr. SCEWARZ. All ri ht. Now, Mr. Ambassador, I want to followone line with you and t it en my questioni

Yiwill be finished.

Relating to your comment that you hear early that the Presidentthat is, President Nixon-was interested in getting rid of biologicalweapcms-

Ambassador HELMB. Biological weapons in war. I think we ought toappear pretty precise about this, because he was trying to do away withthe use of bacteriological and chemical agents in wartime. In otherwords, to destroy populations and so forth, and this was the generalthrust of this whole-of that whole investigation.

Mr. SCHWARZ. Are you tryin to take ,the same. osition that Dr.$;Fp did yesterday 8 That the readent s order dl not apply to theP x

Ambassador HELMS. No ; I was just trying to correct what ou weresaying. You were far too general In your statement of what residentNrxon h&d in mind, that is all.

’ BeeP. LB@.



97

Mr. SCKWARZ.s it your understanding that the President’s orderaid apply t0 the CIA !

Ambassador HELMS. Certainly.Mr. SCIIWARZ. After the subject was first raised by President Nixon,

was there a studAmbassador Iii group formed up by the National Security Council?ELMS. I would have assumed so because when matterswere taken under advisement at the National Security Council, somestaff mechanism went into effect to draft the papers and the optionsand so forth so that the President could make a fitlal decision.

Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you, yourself, disclose to such a body, such agroup, the fact that the CIA had, and had had, stocks of biologicalweapons ?

Ambassador HELUL I do not recall having divulged to this group-in fact, I do not think that under normal circumstances we would have

divulged a secret activity of this kind to this particular study group.Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you divulge such activity to Mr. Kissinger, whowas then the Secretary of the NSC ?

Ambassador HELMS. I do not recall having discussed it with Dr.Kissin r.

Mr. IYCHWARZ. Did you disclose such activity to President Nixon ? .Ambassador HELMS. Well, the existence of the activity in the

Agency, and similar activities, I am sure were known to proper au-thorities over a period of time.

In the particular context of this event that you are speaking about-in other words, that the President decided to make a study of this, I donot recall mentioning this to him, or conveying the information to himin that context,

Mr. SCHWARZ. Let’s be quite recise in connection with that answer,Mr. Ambassador. Did you disc ose to President Nixon, from the timehe took office and thereafter, the fact that the CIA had a programwhich included the offensive use, capability to use offensively, biologicaldevices in order to kill pea le ?

Ambassador HELMS. I a on’t recall having briefed President Nixonon that, or several other programs, but you will recall, Mr. Schwarz,that he was once Vice President for 8 years and was privy to a lot of

things that were going on in the Agency then which he carried over tothe Presidency. So that the degree to which he was aware of this pro-gram, I simply do not know.

Mr. SCHWARZ.ut that is the point. You do not know, do you, Mr.Helms, based uhe was aware op”

n his prior service &9 Vice President, whether or notthe Agency’s proFam ?

Ambassador HELMS. No ; I don t.Mr. SCHWARZ. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smothers, do you have any supplementary ques.

tions at this time!

Mr. SMOTHERS. I have none at this time, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Helms, I am puzzled somewhat. It has beenestablished by your testimony that the CIA had in its possession bio-logical toxins that were subject to the President’s order that they shouldbe destroyed.

You have testified that a spursuant to that order, and t7l

ecial study group was set up by the NSCat that study group was not notified of



the possession of these materials. And you have said that you did notthink it waa appropriate to give them that kind of information.

Since this was a study group of the SC, and since, under thestatute you are to take your directions porn NSC in covert. oper-ations, why wasn’t it appropriate to tell this study group of thatparticular capability?

Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir, it is true that, the statute reads thatthe Director of Central Intell igence reports to the National SecurityCouncil, which, in effect, is reporting to the President when they reportNational Security Council, They do not necessarily report to theNational Security C.ouncil staff.

Many of these study groups-that were put together on a whole vari-ety of matters over the years would not have been made privy tosecret intel ligefice information unless there was some specific request

on the part of. Dr. Kissinger, or someone, that they should be sobriefed. So this was the custom, not an exception to the rule.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it also the custom not to inform the Secretaryof State or the President who indicated his i&era that thesematerials should be destro. ed!

Ambassador HELMS. We1P sir, you know, I think that, in fairness,when the President indicated that he wanted this matter studied, hehad not, at that time, made lthe decision. This National SecurityCouncil staff group studied the matter and then made a recommenda-tion to him, and it was after that that he made the decision that they

should be destroyed. He had not made iIt before.The CHAIRMAN. Well when he made the decision that they shouldbe destroyed, it was given great publicity. And then a memorandum,’which ,appears in your notebook-would you please locate it?

Ambassador HELMS. This National Security Council DecisionMemorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. I call your attention to this Decision Memo-randum 44, [exhibit 8 ‘1 whidh is dated February 20, 1970. It isdirected to you, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, alongwith the others-the Vice President, Secretary of &ate, and the

Secretary of Defense. The subject of the memorandum is U.S. Policyon Toxins. I read the first part to you:

Following a review o f U.S. Military programs for toxins; the President hasdecided that, one, the United States will renounce the production for oper-ational purposes, stockpiling and use in retaliation of toxins, produced eitherby bacteriological or biological processes, or by chemical synthesis.

Now, yesterday, when Dr. Gordon testified, he said that he hadnever received, at any time, any instructions from you or from Mr.Karamessines, or from any one of his superiors in the CIA, to carryout this order. He also testified that he had never seen the order, and,that had he been shown the order, he would have destroyed the toxins.I lthink that is a fair summation of his testimony.

He fur,ther testified that he read about the President’s policy inthe newspape?, and attempted to interpret the meaning of lthat policyfrom the way 1t was carried in the newspapers.

NOW why wasn’k this order given to hm in the form of a directiveto make certain that the PresidenG policy was implemenbd?

1 See p.210.



99

Ambassador HELMB. Well in the first place I was under the im res-sion that when I had asked to have the program terminated an the;President’s instructions <abided by, that Dr. Gottlieb would have issuedthe necessary orders to his people to see that &his was done.

In the second place, since it was my understanding that these toxinsand so forth were at Fort Detrick, that is the place they would havebeen destroyed.

And, third, as far as this document itself is concerned, I noticedthat it is classified secret. And, under the requests of the White Houseat that time, top secret and secret documents were restricted in theirdissemination in the Agent quite rigidly. These documents cameto me in the first instance. J his one I am sure I would have passedto Mr. Karamassines. Whether the document itself would have gonefurther than that I do not know, but I would not think so. So that

ex lains the fact that Dr. Gordon never physically saw the document.Ji he CHAIRMAN. Gz%tainly you are not testifying that a document of

this character cannot go to the very people to whom it is directed,in effect, the peo le who had custody of the very toxins that thePresident had o -zered destroyed?

Ambassador HELMS. Well, sir, I am sorry-The CHAIRMAN. Some directive to implement the President’s order

based upon this memorandum-Ambassador HELMS. Yes? sir, I agree.The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Should have been sent down to the

people who had charge of the toxins.Ambassador HELBCS. And I thought Dr. Got,tlieb had done this.The CHAIRMAN. Did you follow u , since this was national policy

that had been given worldwide pu licity, to see that your orderwas complied with 8

Ambassador HELMS. I never went and searched facilities, but I hadbeen given to under&and the program had been terminated, so I ac-cepted that. These were employees with whom I had heen associatedwith for many years. I had no reason to believe that they would mis-lead me or misguide me.

The &AIRMAN. Who told you that the toxins had bean destroyed?Ambassador HELMS. I md ,about it in the newspapers, in additionto everything else. [General laughter.]

Mr. KARAMEMINEEJ. May I make a comment on that Senator?The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Karameesines.Mr. KARAMESSINES. After the instructions were given to Dr. Gott-

lieb, instructions with which he was in full accord, he went 02; r;;them out. As I testified a week ago, he came back and Rthat the instructions had been carried out and he was appy to be”able to tell me further that, because Fort Detrick was going to be

permitted to continue to do defensive research in these areas, he hadestablished an arrangement wit,h one of the scientists at Fort D&rickwho would keep the Agency posted on the state of knowledge anddevelo ments in the defensive area. He was happy to tell me this andI was R appy to hear it. And, that, as far as I was concerned-and Iam sure as far as Mr. Helms was concerned, to whom I reportedthis-put a period to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then aren’t you shocked to discover 5 years laterthat your orders were not carried out and that not only we’re 5 grams



100

of shellfish .toxin retained, but also additional quantities have be8ndiscovered in a CIA laboratory ‘4

Mr. KARAMESBINE~. Not shocked, no, sir. Disappointed, perhaps,

but not shocked.The CHAIRMAN. Disappointed that your orders were not carried out

and that national policy was not implemented ?Mr. KARAMIWXNEB. That is correct.The CHAIRIKAN. But not shocked ?Mr. KARAMESSINEB. No, not shocked.The CHAIRMAN. Why not shocked?Mr. KARAMESSINES. I think Dr. Gordon answered t,hat in his t&i-

mony as I read it in the newspa rs.The CHAIRMAN. Well, Dr. Gor 8”on’s testimony was that he had reat

difficulty with the .order and that he and his associates decidd

notto comply with it.Mr. KARAMESSINES. Well, sir, you use the word shocked and it has

been used many times in connection with many of the activities ofthe Agency and I think it is conveying a misleading im ression andI would rather say that my own reaction when I hear a of this w&9surprise and disappointment. But to tell you, since I am under oath,that I was shocked, I do not shock easily, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently not.Senator Tower.Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Helms, it has been established that although you became awareof a Presidential directive to destroy biological and chemical weap-ons stockpile+ you did not issue a written directive to Agency person-nel transmitting such instructions to subordinates. It has been shown,however, that compliance was directed orally and may have taken theform of a direction to Mr. Karameasines to veto suggestions for CIAmaintenance of chemical and biolo

f:‘cal weapons after issuance of the

order. Now, what is unclear is w ether your order would have orcould have been applicable to such substances stored for the CIA atFort Detrick or other locations by the DOD, as well as any quantltles,however small, of such agents, which may have been in possession of theCIA itself. Now, what should 5 reasonably prudent Director of theCIA have done under the circulmstances ‘4

Ambassador HELMS. Well, Senator Tower, I must say that I alwaysregarded myself as a reasonably prudent Director of the CIA, at leastI tried to behave in that regard and in that way.

Senator TOWER. I did not intend to infer otherwise.Ambassador HELMS. I understand, but I had to start my statement

somewhere.Senator TOWER. Perhaps a little reconstruction would help you.Ambassador HELMS. I was dealing here with Mr. Karamessmes, and

Dr. Gottlieb, both gentlemen and officers that I had known in theAgency for many years. I do not know of any more trustworthy indi-viduals in the United States than these two individuals, at least basedon my long experience with them, patriotic, trustworthy, and loyal,so when we ,had a discussion about thus, this was as good as writing it inletters of blood as far as I was concerned. I have never known Mr.Karamessines to fail to do what I asked him to do or to come back andreport to me why he was unable to do it. And I think that when the



101

Chairman a moment ago was referring to our surprise that these toxinsshowed up in a vault many years later, I share with Mr. Karames-sines my own disappointment. Because,always regard the Agency as a very well

frank1 ., Senator Tower, wediscip 9med group of people.

I remember that when Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, who was myde uty for 2 or 3 years, left the A ency, he wrote a letter to PresidentJoLa on. And I remember in that etter he had words to the effect thathe had never seen a more disci

1lined outfit in his life, including the

United States Navy. After all, dmiral Taylor was a Naval Academygraduate and a career member of the Naval Service and once Directorof Naval Intelli ence.outsider, if you f

So, I felt that that was a compliment from anike, one who had not spent this life or his career with

the Awcy.So, when we learned about this, or when I learned about it, I really

was frankly surprised because it was one of the few instances I knew ofin my 25 years where an order was disobeyed.

Senator TOWER. Was it the usual practice for you to give oral ordersor instructions to your subordinates?

Ambassador HELXS, Constantly.Senator TOWER. On extremely important matters or perhaps e+pe-

cially on very sensitive matters, is it policy not to transmit these thmgsin writing?

Ambassador HELMS. Sir, when the day comes that in an intelligenceorganization, particularly a secret organization, everything has to beput in writing, it is going to come to a resounding halt, I am afraid.

Senator TOWER. Now, yesterday there was evidence produced re-

darding both the toxins and the delivery systems. And we were shown aevice resembling a GI .45 pistol. In a staff interview on September 10,

you were asked about these dart guns. I would like to read from yourtestimony of SeMr. Michel aske B

tember 10, where we find the following comment.the question :

Were you aware of something that could be fairly characterized as being adart gun as having been among the devices developed in stockpiling in thisprogram 7

Mr. HELMS. I think over the years I have heard of dart guns in a variety ofcontexts. I do not recall particularly in connectionwith the toxins. I have heard

of dart guns with poison on the end, you know. The natives use them in LatinAmerica. I believe the Agency had things of that sort, you know. You fire themwith rubber bandsor something of this kind. I have no doubt you know, therewas quite an arsenal of peculiar things developed by TSD over the years for useln one context or another.

NOW,during your tenure as Director, did you ever consider em-ploying this dart gun or similar weapons against a human target?

Ambassador HELMS. No, sir, I do not recall ever having consideredit, let alone authorize it. It might interest you, Senator Tower, toknow that when that gun was put on the table m front of the chair-man yesterday, that was the first time I had ever seen it.

Senator TOWER. So these kinds of things actually remained withinTSD and were not something that you were familiar with in detail,Ambassador HELMS. I ccrtamly could have seen them if I had chosen

at any time. I never chose and they were never brought to me andse I simply state the simple fact that by chance I had never seenthat dart gun until yesterday.

Senator TOWER. 1 have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.



102

The CHA=AN. Senator Mondale.Senator MONDALE. Mr. Helms, yesterday I believe you sat through

the hearings at which Mr. Gordon and Mr. Colby testified and heard

Mr. Gordon, in effect, defend the actions of his off ice in not destroy-ing the toxms on two grounds. One, that they were not chemical orbiolo ical toxins, within the meaning of the Presidential order requir-ing estruction. And, two, in any event the order for destructionran to the Department of Defense and not to the CIA, In your judg-ment, are either ‘ustifications valid?

Ambassador 2-IELMS. Well, sir, I do not want to characterize Dr.Gordon’s perceptions of thin

$at the time and which was proper and

which was improper. I did isten to him yesterday afternoon and Ithou ht that he made a very articulate case of what he had in his

min at the time and I have no interest whatever in criticizi him.I just simply want to say, in order to clarify this matter a litt e bit,g;that as I was listening to him yesterday, I realized that not beineither a chemist or a biologist and having no corn tence in either o

cl?g;

these areas, I would not have known how to write a irective that wouldhave encompassed everything that he was talking about yesterday.

So, I simply cannot contribute to this except to say that it was myimpression, and I say impression because I am not an ex ert, that wewere supposed to get rid of those things and that is w y I orderedthe program terminated and these things were everything that Ithought you could draw a circle around as applyin to the President’sdirective. But when a scientist comes to draw m t e circle, he wouldprobably draw it differently than I would.

Senator MONDALE. In other words you are testifying that in yourjudgment there is doubt as to whether these were toxms wrthin themeaning of the Presidential order.

Ambassador HELMS. Like I say, I do not know, sir.Senator MONDALE. Even today do you have doubts?Ambassador HELMS. I have heard no expert witness except Dr.

Gordon. I do not know whet,her some other witness would sup arthim or not. I understand that you have a distinguished witness ere:

who developed these things in the first place and who is going totestify before you. And whatever he would say, I would be preparedto accept. That is the way I have had to do these things.

Senator MONDALE. What of the defense that the order to destroytoxins, if included within the order, did not run to the CIA ?

Ambassador HELMS. Well, Senator Mondale, I do not think thatI want to take refu e in that kind of an argument. My understandingof what the Presi ent wanted was that he wanted these things gotfrid of and whether they were in the Army or the CIA, he wantedthem disposed of. I was not, in other words, taking a legalistic position

on this, I was just trying to abide by what I thought were his wishes.Senator MONDALE. But the other day when we had our off-the-record discussions, you indicated that what had hap ened was “a veryserious breach of their instructions.” Would you sti 1 stand with thatdescri tion 8

Am E assador H-s. That is the wa I felt, sir. But I had not, a.tthe time I made that statement, hear Dr. Gordon’s explanation. Ifhave not communicated with Dr. Gordon in many, many years, if ever,in that. 1 did not know what he had on his mind, I simply made that



103,

statement because that is based on the facts as I knew them at thattime. That was what I thought this was,

Senator MONDALE. In an event, at the time, it is your clear recol-lection that it was your un d’erstandin that the toxins within the con-

trol of the CIA were to be destroy . You ordered, orally, their de-lfstruction throu h Mr. Karameseines, and latar you were surprisedto find out that t ey had not been destroyed.

Ambassador HECMS. Not only later, some 5 years later.Senator MONDALE. That is correct. But in any event, this was a

breach of your instructions to destroy the toxins.Ambassador HCELMS. It seems so to me.Senator MONDALE. What authority does the CIA have for develop-

ing this chemical and toxic capability? I am now asking the questionin the context of the pre-Presidential order. Where do you draw your

authority to develop such a capability ?Ambassador HELMS. Sir, these activities, as I recall it, Senator Mon-

dale, started back in the early fifties. I do not remember whether theystarted when General Smith was the Director or when Allen Dulleswas the Director. Nor do I recall under what rubric at that time theymade the decision to go ahead with these things. I must confess thatwhen I became Director I do not recall going back into the legislativeor legal history of it. I simply had accepted the fact over the years thatthe Agency was expected to maintain defensive capabilities and be inthe vanguard of these exotic things for the sia le reason that a ood

intelligence organization would be expected to L ow what his ad ver-saries were doing and to be in a position to protect himself against theoffensive acts of his adversaries.

Durin the fifties and sixties, there were occasional incidents whichreminde us that we must be verv careful and stay involved in thiskind of activity. For example, I think it was in the year 195’7, and Iwant to say here that I have been tr ing to refresh my memory in thelast 24 hours about these events an J ? so if I get some dates wrong orsome names wrong, I hope the committee will forgive me. I am not in-tending to mislead or falsify, but I think it was some time around 1957

a Russian KGB agent, named Stachinsky, came to Munich. And, usingsome kind of a poison spray or dart or weapon of this kind, killed oneof the leaders of a Ukranian dissident movement that was located atMunich, Germany, by the name of Leo Rebet. A couple of years laterthe leader of that Ukranian movement, Bandera, was killed by a simi-lar assault by the same man using poison materials, as I recall it.If it wasn’t poison materials and there was a dart with poison onit, I am sure that the records of the West German Government willshow this.

But, in any event, there were two people that were murdered. And

it is not that we assume this. Mr. Stachinsky subsequently defected tothe West German Government and confessed these things and I believewas convicted and served some kind of a sentence or other. So, it is inthe public record that this occurred.

In the sixties, a West German Government technician, an audiotechnician, was sweeping. And for the benefit of those who are nottechnicians, there is a device whereby one can go over a room to- findout if there are any listening or audio devices having been plantedin the room. Having swept the West German Embassy in Moscow,



104

he came across various microphones and other audio installations inthe Embassy and obviously they were pulled out and the work of the

KGB or whoever put them in was obviously brought to naught.This poor fellow one Sunday went on a train ride up to some man

aster-y outside of Moscow and in the process of this holiday of his hewas sprayed with mustard gas or some similar poison substance on thelegs. the result of which he lost the use of his legs for the rest of his life.

These exotic matters are seldom in the hands of the ordinary citi-zen, so one would have to assume that this was a KGB or GRU oper-ation.

With these things recurring constantly in life, the Agency obviouslyfelt it had to keep up to speed on these, not only to protect our ownpeople against such attacks, but, if worst came to worst, and we were

ever asked by the proper authority to do something in this field, wewould be prepared to do so.

Senator MONDALE. Mr. Karamessines, could you tell us what youthink happened which resulted in the countermanding of your order todestroy the toxins ?

Mr. KARAMESSINES. Sir, of my own knowledge, I do not know whathappened which resulted in the countermanding of the order. I donot think there was a countermanding of the order, Senator Mondale.I think there was a failure on the part of someone to carry out aninstruction that he had been given. At least that is the impression I

get from what I have read in the newspapers of some of the testimony.Senator MONDALE. However, it is defined, you issued an order todestroy the toxins, and in fact, they were not destroyed.

Mr. KARAMESSINES. Mr. Helms, I, and Dr. Gottlieb jointly agreedthat this program had to come to an end, and Dr. Gottlieb took offwith that instruction.

Senator MONDALE. And were you surprised, then, to find out that thetoxins had not, in fact, been destroyed ?

Mr. KARAMESSINES. Yes, sir.Senator MONDALE. One final question-who or what is P600 ?Mr. KARAMESSINEB. I never heard of it before.

Senator MONDALE. Thank you.Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Mondale.Senator Baker.Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairmanu.Mr. Helms, I have reread now the letter from Director Colby to

the chairman dated September 16, ih which he indicates that he mayhave misspoken of the situation with respect to the destruction ofrecords. It is my summary of Mr. Colby’s letter t.hat he says that whenhe was being questioned- and I assume that was my question to Mr.Colby-about the destruction of certain CIA records, he was think-ing of the uestion in its broadest context, name1 , drugs, bacteriologicagents, an 1 chemical agents. “I thus answered t Kat there were indica-tions of record destruction in 1972.” To me, that sentence says that therewas a destruction in November of 1972, but it was not the records thatyou think, or that may have been inferred from my testimony.

You were Director of Central Intelligence at that time ; were younot ?

’ --L----J--Um*.ec4 Tn lQP2.aan. air.



105

fhnator BAKER. Yes, sir; in November of 1972. Can you give us anyfurther information in that respect? What records might Mr. Colbybe q-king of that were destroyed in November of 19728

hdmsador HELMS. I do not know of any records that were

destroyed in November of 1972. There were some records on thedrug testing program, which have nothing to do with bacteriologicalor chemical agents. It was an entirely different thing, I think, in 1973,just before I left the Agency.

Senator BAKER. But there were none destroyed, that you know of,in 1972 ?

Ambassador HELMB. No, sir.Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I would ask either that Mr. Colby

return or that he give us a further sup lement to his letter in thatrespect, because the second paragraph o r the letter would suggest to

me that something was destroyed in November of 1972, and it is notclear from the record, what; and in view of this witness’ testimony, Ithink that becomes important.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the committee will follow up in an appro-priate way.

Senator BAKER. Thank you, sir.In the third paragraph, Mr. Helms, Mr. Colby says that “I realize

that most listeners might have inferred that I was indicating thatrecords relating to the CIA-Fort Detrick relationship, in partrcularrecords relating to Project MKNAOMI, were destroyed,” MKNAOMIbeing the code word for chemical, bacteriological warfare agents.

Ambassador HELMS. At Fort Detrick, that whole prolect.Senator BAKER. Mr. Colby continues, “The facts are these : Records

relating to CIA’s drug program in general were destroyed in Jan-uary of 1973, but there is no evidence that records of ProjectMKNAOMI or of the CIA-Fort Detrick relationship were destroyed,other than possibl as included in the general group in January of1973.” During the TVatergata hearings, you and I .jousted a little aboutwhat was destro ed in January of 1973, I’m sure you recall, as I do.

Ambassador H ELMS. Yes ; I do, Senator Baker.Senator BAKER. I will not belabor that point, except to say that I

would appreciate an further information ou could give me about thedocuments that mig t have been destroye relating in general to thei!drug program in Januar of 19’73.

Ambassador HELMS. B ir, I do not understand Mr. Colby’s wordingthere, quite frankly. I have testified before the committee membersthis week about what I understood has been destroyed in connectionwith an entirely separate drug testing program. I wish you wouldread my testimony. But as far as MKNAOMI is concerned, and thisbacteriological and chemical business, I kuow of no destruction.

Senator BAKER. I think that robably is where we are going to end upin this line of questioning. 4 ould you now testify, or do you nowtestify, Mr. Helms, that you have no knowledge of the destruction ofany records at any time about MKNAOMI 8

Ambassador HEIXEL That is correct, Senator Baker. I have norecollection of any such.

Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not mean to pressthe point. In view of the implications of the letter, I do respectfullyrequest that we ask for a further clarification of the point; that is to



say, what, if any records were destroyed by the CIA relating to theirdrug program, relating to MKNAOMI, with respect to the January1973 destruction, and with respect to the November 1972 destructron.What I am after is to find out what records were destroyed, why, andon whose authority.

Ambassador HELMS. Senator Baker, may I ask your indulgen?e thatwhen this information is acquired from the Agency, if there IS any-thing about it that runs counter to my recollection, would you be kindenough to advise me?

Senator BAKER. I will, indeed, Mr. -Helms, and I fully understand thedifficulties that you have, not only in trying to recall with speclficltythe events of that period, but also to travel back and forth betweenhere and Iran?, where you are our Ambassador. I remarked to thechairman previously, it seems ike every time we run out of somethmgto do we call Dick Helms back from Iran to testify. But if there is anycon&t, most certainly I will see that you have an opportunity toelaborate on it.

Ambassador HELMS. Thank you very much, sir.Senator BAKER, Thank you, sir.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Baker, your request is a matter of record,

and I instruct the staff of this committee to pursue this matter, SO thatthe necessary answers and information is received by the committee.

Senator BAKER. Thank you.The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you that that question of the destruction

of records needs to be cleared u .Senator BAKER. Thank you, E r. Chairman. I do not allege that there

was a destruction of records, but it seems o me that, in view of thetestimony yest,erday, the letter today, and the testimony of this witness,that the whole question needs to be clarified? and it can be done in anumber of ways, and I appreciate your help in that respect.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.Senator Huddleston.Ambassador HELMS. Good morning, Senator Huddleston.Senator HUDDLESTON.Good morning, Ambassador ; Mr. Karames-

sines ; Mr. Chairman.In reference to Senator Mondale’s question to Mr. Karamessinesabout P600, Mr. Helms did not have an opportunity to respond to that.Have you ever heard of, or do you have any knowledge about P600?

Ambassador HELMB. No, Senator Huddleston, I do not. And whenI was listening to the uestionin of Dr. Gordon, I obviously was won-dering about this, an% %hen, su denly, I realized-am I not correct,that label was written by somebody at Fort Detrick? In other words,by an employee of the U.S. Army, and not by an employee of theAgency, and therefore, it possibly did not have to do with the trickywords, rubrics, code words, and so forth that we use. But in any event, I

have never heard of it.Senator HUDDLESTON. t is quite possible. I do not believe we have

established yet just who did place that label on this merchandise.You said YOU were surprised, or that you had never before seen, the

da* g- that was displayed here yesterday. You were surprised, butnot shocked to find that this material had been retained, contrary’to thePresrdent’s order. Would you be surprised or shocked to learn that thatRun, ‘I‘ One hke it, had been used by agents against either wat&&a orhuman beinPs ?



107

Ambassador HELMB. I would be surprised if it had been nsed againsthuman beinwatchdo . !F

, but I’m not surprised it would have been used against

fbelieve there were various experiments conducted in an

effort to nd out how one could either tranquilize or kill guard dogs in

foreign countries. That does not surprise me at all.Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know whether or not it was used, in

fact, against watchdogs?Ambassador HELMS. I believe there were experiments conducted

against dogs. Whether it was ever used in a live operational situationagainst dogs, I do not recall.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Karamessines, what is your knowledge?Mr. KARAMESSINES. I have no recollection of the actual use of any

of the materials we have been discussing, sir, operational use, I mean.I was never asked to approve an operational use of any of these ma-

terials, to my very best recollection.1 want to add this. In fairness, I am not sure I would have beenasked, if it were a question of putting out a watchdog in connectionwith a border-crossinI am not sure I woul d

operation in Southeast Asia or somewhere.have been asked, but in any case, I have no

recollection of having been asked, and I have no knowledge whateverof the actual use of any of these materials against a human being.

Senator HIJDDWTON. Let me put it this way, then. How low in theechelon of command within the CIA would an individual be thatwould have the ability to give permission for use of any of these

weapons in any kind of circumstance PMr. KARAMEBSINES. They would have to come to me, and needless tosay, I would not feel justified in giving a yes or a no on my own au-thority. I would take it to Mr. Helms.

.You are speaking now about using one of these operationallyagainst a human being-is t.hat correct, Senator ?

Senator HUDDLESTON. That is correct; yes, sir.Mr. KARAMESSINEB. Well, I would take it, without any question,

to Mr. Helms, if I entertained it at all. I would recommend againstit. And my guess is that Mr. Helms would take it further, but that isa

5Yess.want to add one thing. Mr. Helms and my other associates at

the Agency have known- my close associates have known for yearsthat I would not continue in the Agency if there were a requirementfor the killing of a human being.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Just to set the record straight, was thereever, at any time, a discussion between you two gentlemen, or be-tween you, either of you with Dr. Gottlieb, or any other person in theorganizationcome under t h

a question of whether or not shellfish toxin did, in fact,e j,urisdiction of the President’s order?

Ambassador HELMB. Sir, if I may answer the question first. I do

not remember any discussion of shellfish toxin, as such, and I certainlydo not remember a discussion of whether or not it came under the Pres-ident’s order. And as I, Senator Huddleston, was saying. when I wasaddressinso I woul 3

myself to Senator Mondale’s question, I am not a technician,not have even been able to debate the matter.

Senator HUDDLESTON. But you never discussed it ?Ambassador HELMB. No, not that I recall.Senator HUDDLE~T~N. Mr. Karamessines.



108

Mr. KARAMESSINES. Well, sir, if discussion-if you are includingin the word discussion the fact that we agreed to et rid of this Pro-gram- if that is what you mean-by discussion, we% we agreed to getrid of the program.

Senator HUDDLEBTON. “Bst in that agreement, arriving at that agree-ment, did ou ever consider whether or not shellfish toxm, or any othermaterial t h at you had, might not be included in the order?

Mr. KARAXESMNES. No material was identified to me by that name,sir. It was a question, really, of dangerous chemicals.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, we have had a great deal of testimonyfrom you entlemen and from others in the organization that referred“to my un erstanding that certain orders were ‘ven”, or “my under-standing that the orders were carried out,“or “I ad an understandmg

that we had approval from higher authority to do certam thmgs.”This has come up a number of times, in other phases of our mqulry.Mr. Helms, you said that it was not unusual for you to gve verbalorders, presumably to be transmitted on down the line. Are we to mferthat that not only is not unusual but that was a standard operatingprocedure, regardless of the nature of the order?

Ambassador HELMS. Well, it was certainly, Senator Huddleston, astandard operating procedure to give oral instructions. The questionof the sensitivity of the matter might have something to do with it.If it was inordinately sensitive, there was every chance that the dis-cussion would have been entirely oral.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Looking at this particular matter-and I’ rec-ognize we are lookin

fat it in hindsight4oes it not have a certain

sensitivity in reverse. That is to say that, recognizing that this was apolicy of the U.S. Government, which was being enunciated by thePresident for consumption around the world, and that at some futuredate, when some foreign country might have cause to uestion whetheror not the United States was sincere in this order, an whether it did,in fact, carry it out, would it not be very helpful under those circum-stances, to have wrltten instructions from an agency such as the CIAand all of the Government agencies that did, in fact, implement that

order ZAmbassador HELMS. Yes, I think it would have been helpful, sir.As a matter of fact, I noticed in this National Security Council De-sion Memorandum that the Secretary of Defense was given the chargeof carrying out this affair. I do not recall any correspondence fromhim with regard to it.

I think that maybe several other memorandums from various peoplemight have been helpful in this situation, includin a defmitlon ofexactly what a toxin was, if Dr. Gordon was as hot ered about it ashe indicated yesterday.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Let me say that also in our inquir there havebeen at least indications that in other instances in which t e CIA washinvolved, and in which the various embassies of various countries werevery much concerned, and also our National Secufity Council, greatpains have been taken to prepare minutes and inst.ructions in writing,and that those minutes and mstructions be very carefully devised sothat they would indicate precisely what the actions were, what theAmerican position was now, why, in a matter this important, thatinvolved a change in policy of the U.S. Government, was it not felt



109

that here, again, it would be important to‘have incontrovertible evi-dence-th& can only be done in writing, and even then, there is oftensome que&on-that your A ency dimd, m fact, implement the instruc-tions of the President of the 6 nited States?

Ambassador HEUCS. Senator Huddle&on, I cannot help saying thatif I had various things to do over a ain, I would have done them dif-ferently and I think in light of w1 at has transpired here, if 1 hadknown then what I know now, I certainly would have issued a directivein writing.

Senator HUDDLESTON. In light, too, sir, of your present position asAmbassador to Iran, how serious would ou ‘udge this kind of actionif it were discovered that an agency of t %lil ederal Government had,in fact, contravened, or failed to carry out, an instruction of the Press-dent on a matter of international concern ?

Ambassador HFLMS. Well, sir, I agree that when it is isolated as aparticular instance in time, that it can be made to assume large andsignificant proportions. I would like to remind you that the Agencyaotivity was a very modest one. It had nothing to do with vast bac-teriolo ‘Cal and chemical substances, large in quantity and large inscope. n addition, I have to say that all of us in the Federal Govern-fment, for better or for worse, have man decisions on many thingsthat we are obliged to do every day, and 9 cannot say at the rtxme thatthis particular Presidential order, of which there were many everyweek, loomed as large as you make it seem to loom. That is all I can

say.Senator HUDDLENON. But the President went to great lengths, thiscountry went to reat lengths, if I recall correctly, to make quite a pub-lic relations disp ei ay of this fact, and even to the extent of pubhcizingthe destruction of some of this material.

#Ambassador HELMB. I realize that, sir. And I testified earlier, Ithought the material had been destroy&, and did not give it anotherthought. And I must say that when it showed up, as 1 understand it,some days later, its existence in the Agency vault was unknown to me,and it is a little bit hard to look for something that you do not expect

to find.Sentir HUDDLESTON. Just one more question. In hhe matter of oralinstructions versus written instructions, was it assumed that when anoral instruction was given by ou as head of the Agency to Mr.Karamessines, who in turn wou d give the instruction, in this case,presumably to Dr. Gottlieb, that this would revail all the way downthe line; that all of the communication woul be simply by words 1;

Ambassador HELXS. Yes, sir, and this happened constantly.Senator HUDDLESTON. And iit was always carried out, but in spite of

this discipline that the organization h+and I have no reason $,oguestion it-Dr. Gordon testified yesterday that he had never seen anymstructions within the CIA for him to dispose of ithese lethal weapons.

Ambassador HELXS. I believe that was his testimony.Senator HDDDLESTON. That is correct. Thank you, Mr. %hairman.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Huddleston. Senator Math&s?Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.A few minutes ago, Senator Baker commented on .the very heavy

demands that we have ut on Mr. Helms ; the number of times wehave asked him to come t ack from Iran, and I think that is certainly



111

Senator MATHIAE. Would that third kind of category be in the crisissituation, the Cuban missile crisis, that kind of-

Ambassador HELMB. It might be in a crisis situation, or interestinglyenough, it mi ht

P

be in a dead calm situation. I do not think that the

President, at east in my experience? particularly calculated whetherthey were putting the request in wntmg, or whether they were makingit oral1 .thing CT

It just was the fact that on a certain day, they wanted some-one, and took whatever measure there mrght be to see that it

was done.I want to say that generally, at least Presidents Kennedy, Johnson

and Nixon, for whom I worked most closely, usually left it to me as tohow the order was to be carried out within the Athat any of them have ever gone to the

ency. I do not thinkains to a

the Agency hierarchy was, or who P

nd out exactly whatwou d be the next fellow to learn

about it. So they left that judgment to me. But these did come in atleast these three ways.Senator MATI-IIAS. And then what would you do to transmit these

orders into action within the AAmbassador HELMS. Well,

ency ?P like to think that I was an orderly

executive, and I would normally call in the Deputy Director who wasin charge of the particular activity, where I thought this request fitted.If it involved two of the Deputy Directors, I would cal l the two ofthem in. In other words, I would et into m office al l of those individ-uals that, it seemed to me, would % UK.instruction we had been given.

e helpf in carrying out whatever

Senator MATHIAS. Now, you say you would call in the ones whowere involved in the execution of the policy that the President haddirected ?

Ambassador Herds. Senator Mathias, may I-maybe not for yourbenefit, certainly, hecause I realize you know these things, but maybefor the benefit of others-the Aand there were four of them, an

ncy was divided into directorates,r the

There was a support directorate whit rlhad rather specific functions.had within it the various ele-

merits that suptration of the I.

orted the operations and the existence of the adminis-

There was a !tY.lncy.‘rectorate for Intell igence, which did the collation

and analysis on the various intell igence studies, current and otherwise.There was a Deputy Director for Plans in my time, who was in chargeof covert operations, and there was a Deputy Director for Science andTechnolog

Kwho had both o abilit ies in the

science an technology fie l Berational and analytic ca

. So, I would have to ju cfwhich one of these cate

ge exactly intories the instruction fell, or under which two

or three cata ories it fel .Senator rtf4

YTHIAS. Now, were these Directorates segregated very

carefully from each other, or was there intercommunication between

them ?Ambassador HELMS. The Deputy Director of Plans is segregated in

the building from other Directorates. In fact, there are signs in thehalls indicating when you got into that part of the building. As forthe rest of it, they were not so particularly segregated. There was a lotof visiting back and forth.

Senator MATHJAIL So that that was a watertight compartment. Butthere might be intercommunication elsewhere.



112

Ambassador HELMS. In Navy terms; sir, far from watertight inte-grity, I want to tell you. But nevertheless, there was effort made tose regate it.

x.-

‘enator MATHIAS. Well, if there was this compartmentation, didthat inhibit understandin of a Presidential directive which camedown through you, throug fl whoever was Director! Was it desirablethat knowled e of a Presidential direotive or direction was wide-spread throug out the Agency, or was it desirable to have it onlylknown by the people who were immediately involved in executing It!

Ambassador HELMB. Well, it was generally, sir, the latter, partic-ularly if it was on a sensitive matter. But I do not think in this partic-ular case that would have entered our minds. I think that in the’case ofthe toxins and the bacteriolo ‘cal weapons that we would have gone to

the man who had this under a is aegis, in this caseDr. Gottlieb, and askhim to carry out the instruction.I must say that, in hindsight-1 say even in hinds&h&this looks

like a fairly simple matter. And the fact that it has been so complicatedwith the passage of time is a great surprise to me.

Senator MATHIAS. How did you normally carry out the oversightin the execution of a Presidential order ?

Ambassador HELMS. I suppose that there is no good, clear-cut answerto that, because Presidential orders and instructions were of suchvariety. If the instruction, for example, were to produce some evi-dence or a document, then that was the answer, and that was the follow-

through. In certain other categories of things, we had an inspectorgeneral system that ran various checks through all elements of thehgency, or almost all elements of the Agency, periodically, in aneffort to find out if there was compliance with directives, and arrange-ments for covert agents and all kinds of things of that sort.

In other words, we thought it was what was an orderly procedure;to make sure, in these farflung field stations, for example, peoplewere doing what they were supposed to be doing in keeping with theregulations.

I want to say that, in this particular case, I realize that there was

no followup that found these toxins. But I have been scratching myhead ever since I heard about this as to what would have been a normalpractice in a situation where you did not know that something existed.I mean, I had genuinely thought these things had been destroyed atFort Detrick.

Senator MATHIAS. If, just as a matter of organization, and I amthinking now of the kind of recommendations this committee willultimately have to make-if, as a matter of organization, there hadbeen less compartmentation, more sharing of information, might asituation of this sort have come to light 8

Ambassador HELMS. I do not want to seek refuge in that, Senator

Mathias. I do not think so. I do not think that compartmentationin this case was at fault. Maybe human communication was at fault,but not compartmentation.

Senator MATHIAS. Of course, if there is greater communication, thenYOU have a wider participation, wider knowledge, wider sharing of anoversight capacity, rather than falling into the kind of trap that isdescribed by the old saw: Who is taking care of the caretaker’sdauphter when the caretaker is busy taking care ?



113

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Mathias. Thank you.Senator Hart ?Senator H&T of Colorado. Gentlemen, you both testified that ou

were generally aware that the CIA had some relationship with P ortDetrick’s Special Operations Division to investigate toxic capabilities.Is that correct 8

Ambassador HELMS. Well, I knew that we had an arrangement withFort Detrick in this

Senator HART ofeneral field, yes, sir.

8 olorado. That is my question.In connection with this investigation, I would like to cite three

experiments or studies that were conducted, to see or to test yourrecollection and knowledge of those experiments. First of all, I willquote from a June 1,1969, study report done by Fort Detrick on this

toxic experimentation. Quoting from that report, one study that wasconducted :

The General Services Administration and Fort Detrick entered into a co-operative project to investigate the vulnerability of drinking water in Federalbuildings to covert biological attack. After consultation with the design engi-neers in the GSA, the Food and Drug Administration Building in Washington,D.C., was selected for investigation. The engineers assured us that the drinkingwater system is typical o f that installed in modern multistory buildings.

They then proceeded to conduct two tests, one to eliminate chlorine in thewater. The second teat was a simulated covert test. A colipheed was introducedinto the system by back pressure . . .”

Ambassador HELMS. A what!Senator HART of Colorado. C-o-l-i-p-h-e-e-d, I think it is a non-toxicchemical of some kind. I am just laying out the background so youwill undetind the nature of the question.

was introduced into the system by a back pressure technique at a drinkingfountain. This is a technique a saboteur might use. Neither the building oc-cupants nor operating personnel were advised that such a test was planned. Wewere not challenged, and apparently undetected.

The final quotation from the study :

From limited consultation with design engineers, it should be possible to de-velop simple guidelines for planning an attack on a group of people that workin a building constructed with the circulating chilled drinking water system.

The question to both of you is, were you aware of this experiment?Ambassador HELMS. Senator Hart, I was not.Mr. KASAMESSINES. I never heard of it. This is the Department of

Defense and GSA, did vou say, sir PSenator HART of Colorado. That is right, at Detrick; Special

Operations.Mr. KARAHJZSSINES. Well, whoever it was, I never heard of it.Senator HANT of Colorado. Do you know whether or not CIA per-

sonnel were involved in this study ?Ambassador HELMS. I did not hear of the study, sir, so I do not

know whether they were involved.Senator l%wr of Colorado. But ou have no knowledge as to this

experiment or vulnerability study t B at your personnel were involved ?Ambassador HELMS. Not that particular one.Senator ti of Colorado. Let me cite another, with the same ues-

tions. This is quotin from an internal CIA document, which is%n

diatedGotUber l&1967, Tea ical Services Division.



114

In anticipation of a fu~ture need for information, and to establish a capability,a study on the vulnerability of subway systems to covert attack and develop-ment of Ia method to carry out such an asttack was conducted. The suitability

of the system was assessed and evaluated covertly, Willzing the New York ci tysubways as the trial model. The result provided information on distributionand concentrations of organisms which are obtained. I do not know what thatmeane.

The data provided the means of assessing the threat of infe&ion to subway

passengers. The study provided a threat .model and information on ease of dis-semination and methods of delivery which could be used offensively.

Now, because of the fact that this is a memorandum oriT

‘nating inthe CIA, I would ask if either of you were aware of this vu nerabilitystudy for the development of this defensive capability.

Ambassador H-s. Excuse me, Senator Hart. Did you say whohad written the memorandum to whom 8

Senator HART of Colorado. It is my understanding we have beenrequested by the CIA not to divulge the name of the individual. Itwas a middle-level officer in the Technical Services Division of theCIA, and the date was October l&1967.

Ambassador HELMS. I do not recall the study.The CHAIRMAN. I would suggest, Mr. Helms, that you take a look

at this memorandum. It might be pl,aced before you.Ambassador HELMS. That would be helpful.The CHAIRMAN. It is exhibit 6.’ So you can examine the document

itself before replying.

Ambassador HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Senator HART of Colorado. Now, to repeat the question, were eitheror both of you aware that this study or experiment was conducted?

Ambassador HELMS. I was not, sir.Mr. KARAMESBINES. was not.Senator HART of Colorado. Would it be your assumption, based upon

this memorandum, that CIA personnel were involved in this study ?Ambassador HELMS. I cannot tell from the wording of the ,memo-

randum whether these CIA people were involved, or whether it wasother people involved, and we were riding piggyback.

Senator HART of Colorado. Quoting from the same document, page2, paragraph 7 :

Three methods and systems for carrying out a covert attack against cropsand causing severe crop loss have been developed and evaluated under fieldconditions. This was accomplished in anticipation of a requirement which laterdeveloped but was subsequently scrubbed just prior to putting into action.

Were you aware of this study or experimentation 8Ambassador HELNS. Well, I do not know whether I was aware oa’%

this particular one, Senator Hart. But I know that at one time in thi&tGovernment-and it was not only in the CIA; it, was other places as:“?’well-there was a great deal of attention given to what wheat III&~

or rice rust would do to crops in various parts of the world. And.3’6know there were studies undertaken by someone to try to ascertain hdestructive this particular disease was.

It is my distinct recollection that nothing was ever done abobut I know there were studies being conducted, and I would notbeen at all surprised if the Agency was involved in those studies.

1 See p. 204.



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Senator HART of Colorado. Would you accept that answer, Mr.Karamessines ?

Mr. KARAMEBSINES.es. I am not sure we were involved in thestudies, but it would be my guess that we received the benefit of such

studies. In other words, we were kept posted through the liaison thatis reflected in this memorandum.

Senator HART of Colorado. Now, gentlemen, I apologize for pursu-ing this at some length, but the record we have developed so far hasto do largely with a defensive ca abil ity. That is, a lot of this toxicexperimentation was going on so tYl at we could be prepared to counterany threat posed by any other country and that we had to conductthese experiments lust to be on the safe side, to know whatever wecould find out about them. But in each of the cases I have cited, thereis strong reason to believe- in fact, the language in two of the passages

that I have cited specifically states that we were preparing in theseareas offensive capabilities.

Now, my question, to conclude this line of interrogation, is, if wewere preparing that kind of offensive capability, why did not individ-uals of your stature in the Agency know about this ?

Ambassador %LMS. Well, Senator Hart, I would have said, in con-*nection with the Fort Detrick study, there was no reason why weGhould have known about it. And in connection with the other matters,the ongoing responsibilities of these various elements were to makesuch studies.

‘The question that I think is most important, however, is that wenever gave any authorization for any offensive use of these things.And I think that, in the end, is the important question.

Mr. KARAMEBBINES.would simply add, Sena.tor Hart, that one of&ese is described, in part at least, as a vulnerability study. That wouldfifggest that the idea here was to-from those who are conducting@‘e experiments or studies, their purpose, at least in part, was to see:$&at effect the use of these methods against us would have and how

ive could counter the use of such methods.

,,* Senator HART of Colorado. I understand that.

4% r. KARAMESSINES.nd this is a recurring theme, as a matter of8&t, throughout al l of the work of the Technical Services Directorate.

letter bombs became fashionable 3 or 4 years ago and werein various offices here and abroad it was the TSD and

I think the language in the passages thatthat we were preparing, in the case of



116

sabotaging the drinking supply of buildings, of subway systems, andcrops, to be able to do this to somebody else.

Mr. KARAMESSINE~. Yes ; I think it weuld have been within TSD’spurview to be in a position to do this if they were directed to do soby proper authority, and I would assume that could only be the Presi-dent. And I cannot describe the circumstances under which that wouldhappen, because I do not know.

Senator HART of Colorado. Well, both- of you gentlemen have al-ready testified that you were surprised, although not shocked, thatyour understanding and direction was not followed in the matter ofthe destruction of the toxic materials. Is it a poesibilitsame midlevel people who disobeyed the understanding o T

that thosethe highest

levels in the Agency might also have taken it upon themselves to lmple-

ment these operating capabilities under some circumstances?Ambassador HELMS. Do you know of any case, Senator Hart?Senator HART of Colorado. We have been studying that subject for

8 months.Ambassador HELMS. I think you are drawing a very long bow and,

may I say, an unfair one.Senator HART of Colorado. I am asking a question. I am asking a

question.Ambassador HELMB. Would you rephrase the question ‘lSenator HART of Colorado. The question is, based upon your sur-

prise that your understanding and what you thought were your orderswere not carried out as to destruction of these toxic materials, whatguarantees would you have that the cathe studies and experiments that I have J

abilities being developed inescribed might not he carried

out by some people without proper authorization?Ambassador HELMS. I think in human life it is always possible that

something may happen that one does not expect, but I know of nocases in this category.

Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you Senator Hart.Senator Schweiker.

Senator SCH~EIXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Mr. Karamessines, when you were at the Agency and running youroperation and critical or dangerous materials came to your charge,either directly or through one of your subordinates, would it havebeen normal procedure under your administrative procedures to logthem in ?

Mr. KARAMESEINES. To log them in.-.Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes. In other words, if you received critical or ‘_

dangerous materials-Mr. KAR~MEGSINEB. I did not receive critical or dangerous matEriala

A component under my overall jurisdiction, one component out of aconsiderable number, would have received these dangerous materials,and that WPS the Technical Services Division.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Would it have been normal procedure, forge%!tinv t,his particular case now. to lop them in?

Mr. KAFUMEMINES. Probably, hut I am not sure.they did. I do no{know t,hat they did, how thev handled them. Thev were the best iud@&I could not try to tell a technician, a specialist in a certain field, ho*A- 3.. I..:” ;.&



117

Senabx- SCHWEIEER.ow about taking inventory 1 Did you periodi-cally take inventory of whatever assets you had under your controland command ?

Mr. KARAMEEWNES. No ; I did not.

Senator SCHWEIKER. You did not 1Mr. KARAMEEMNEB. I personally did not, sir. I assumed, however,

that this was in the records of the Technical Services Division.Senator SCHWEIEER. Did you si

tions for money spent through you $”spending vouchers or authoriza-

* Mr. KARAME~WNES. I would either sign-1 might have signed. I more

!Ylrobably recommended the signature, but I might have signed, too. Io not recall that.Senator SCHWEIXER. I was under the impression that, lacking over-

sight by Congress, that there was a very tight internal auditin pro-

cedure where each department head and agency head within CI !I hadts put his name on the line, because we lacked these controls. Is thatnot correct?

Mr. KARAMESSINES. It is correct.Senator SCHWEIHER. Well, then, in terms of spending money for

shellfish toxin, this normally would have come under your purviewas the job you held, even though it might have been two or three levelsbelow you. Is that not correct ?

Mr. KARAMESSINEB. Yes ; that is correct.Senator SCHWEIKER. Now, we were trying to identify yesterday

.from where some 6 grams, which was 60 percent of the whole supplythat was found there, came. Can you shed any light on this at all?Mr. KARAME~SINEE. No, sir, none at all.Senator SCHWEIKER Overnight, I found out that instead of being

ape Public Health Service laboratory involved, which, at that point,‘was Narragansett, R.I., the other can also come from a Public Health$&vice lab, which name was not, clear on the can but was clear on the!bbel itself, the Taft Center at Cincinnati, Ohio. Were you aware that/8noney was going from your department to the Public Health Service9n both cases for shellfish toxin research ?

;&$vlr. KARAMEBSINEB. I am not aware of that; no, sir, as I sit here@day. That is not to say that I was not aware of it at the time inending approval or signing off on expenditures for these

k SCHWEIKER. But somebody did have to sign for it. Normallyuld have been you. You are just saying you do not recollect thai

approvals for expenditures of funds

record should show what thenow that my memory simply

ET,~. Senator Schweiker, may I interrupt to ask aact ‘? Has it been ascertained that the Agency paid for the

Health Service at Narragan-

You are anticipating my next question, Mr.my next question. I was going to direct it to



118

either one of you, whether in fact the Public Health research labs werepaid from the CIA directly, or whether contracts were issued from theArmy to the Public Health Service stations involved.

Mr. KAHAME~STNES. The only one I was aware of was the Fort D&rickarrangement. I did not know about the others that you have mentioned.

Senator SCHWJXKER. So you are not certain whether or not the CIAcontracted directly or whether only indirectly, with the Army being theprime contractor ‘G

Mr. KARABXEMINEEL That is correct.Senator SCHWEIKER. I do have knowledge now that there was a

$194,000 contract on at least one of the instances between the Army andthe Taft Center at Cincinnati, Ohio.

Mr. KARAMESSINES. How does that relate to the CIA, sir ?

Senator SCHWEIKER Well, because that produced some of the toxinthat you ended up with at the CIA laboratory. So that was the pointI was making yesterday; that somewhere along the line, we used thePublic Health Service to produce deadly biological toxins and weapons.

Mr. KARAMESSINES. Are they biological or chemical, sir?Senator SCHWDIKER. They are toxins. You can argue it either way.Mr. KARAMEBSINEB. Biological sounds so terrible. Chemical sounds a

little better.Senator SCHWYNKER. Would you think that is a normal-The CHAIRMAN. No matter how you describe shellfish toxin, it does

not sound good.

Mr. KARAMEWNEB. It’s deadly, no question about it, sir.Senator SC-H~EIEER. As it came up the other day, 10 seconds and the

dog is dead. I do not think it is much of a question whether it is achemical or a biological weapon, sir.

Mr. KARAMESSINES. It is not as bad ae the atom bomb, sir, and we’have quite a few of those around here.

Senator SCH~EIKER. Going back to the issue at hand, you are corn:’pletely unaware, then-

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Karamessines-excuse me, Senator.Senator SCHWFXKER. Yes.The CHAIRMAN. I just think we ought not to begin to get flippant in

this hearing. Obviously, we have atom bombs. Obviously, the President?has not ordered them destroyed. We are discussing a failure to carry6out a Presidential order on a matter of national policy that was widely!publicized to the world. So let us not get off the subject.

Senator SCH~EIKER. I think it means an evasion, obviously, of th#question at hand, and it to me indicates a little bit of the attitude in{this situation. 4



119

Senator SCHWEIKER You had no discussion at all about Army sur-plus stocks or other surplus stocks that might be commingled withyours in the same safe u at Fort Detrick?

Mr. KARMESSINEB. 3 O,&Senator SCKWEIEER.Would you think, Mr. Karamessineg, that this

is a proper and apas the CIA and B

ropriate use of the Public Health Service, as farrmy are concerned? What is your rofessional

opinion, as a retired CIA officer, whether in fact the Pu % it HealthService should be utilized for this kind of chemical research, if youwant to call it that, but deadly toxin research?

Mr. KARAMESSINES. I would aaume, sir, that the Public HealthService would have a very vital interest in keeping abreast of devel-opments in the field of toxins. And if the Public Health Service wasparticipating in such an activity, I would not find that unusual, because+IS part of their job to protect the country, isn’t it, against this type,:of thing? So I would not find that unusual.

Senator SCHWEIKER.Well, it is part of their job, certain1i-t&t the f

, to pro-

,#ousan cfeople. I am not sure that making poison that kil s tens of

s of people is protecting anybody, and I think, really, that:amty be a normal judiperversion of the U.

ent of yours, but I happen to think this is ar . Public Health Service to use it for this pur-

various people are being subverted and suborned here, when It think that is the case at all. And I am sorry, but I just feel I

ts, Mr. Helms, tocontract, at least



120

$3 mil lion. You had to distill it, you had to compil? it, You had to seP-arate it and the Public Health Service was doing this-

And ‘I think it gets to the heart of the question of whose service

some of the Government services are serving. And I think it is avery direct issue, and I realize that you differ with me on it. But thatis what this is all about. That is why we are’here, that is why wegot to this state of debate between the intelligence community andthe rest of the Government and the people.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Thank youy Senator Schweiker. I believe Senator

Morgan is now to get a chance to ask questions. .Ambassador HELMS. Good morning, Senator Morgan.Senator MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Helms, I apologize for not

being here earlier but I had a hearmg on a bill that I had introducedthat was in the Banking Committee.

Mr. Helms, yesterdav I asked Mr. Colby whether or not the CIAhad ever received any instructions from the President or the NationalSecurity Council with regard to disposing of the toxins in carryingout the President’s announced orders on February 1970 and in No-vember, I believe, 1969. Do you recall ever receiving any instructionsfrom the National Security Council or the President with regard tothe toxins 8

Ambassador HELXS. Sir, we received the National Security Corm-cil Decision Memorandum on the subject of toxins and the Presidentialpohcy to include those in the ban that he had issued earlier inNovember.

Senator MORGAN. You sav now you received those memorandums.Is that the memorandum of February 208

Ambassador HELMS. May I check, sir, to see?Senator MORGAN. Yes.Ambassador HELMS. February 20, yes. sir.Senator MORGAN. Also the one on November 5,,19699Ambassador HELMB. Yes, sir, I believe that 1s he one just in front,

yes, sir.

Senator MORGAN. Now, in both those memorandums, the Secretaryof Defense was instructed to submit recommendations concerning thedisposal of existing stocks of toxin weapons and/or agents. Now, as ofyesterday, I have not been able to find anv report to the NationalSecurity Council that that had been done. As a matter of fact, I in-troduced, into the record yesterday parts of a memorandum from acommittee of the National Security Council to the President, datedJanuary 25, 1973, in which it was reported that the destruction ofchemical weapons was being carried out and then it made thisstatement.

All research and development on biological weapone haa been terminated.Programs for disposing of stocks of these weapons are now vintually complete.

Now this clearly indicates to me that they were reportinek

to thePresident as late as January of 1973, that they were still wor ing on,the program for how to go about disposing of the toxins. And thenext sentence is, “laboratory quantities of agents will be retained tosupport defensive research.”

Now, to your knowledge, was the CIA ever requested to give aninventory to the National Security Council of any toxins that It held f



121

Ambassador HETXS. No, sir, and I do not recall, Senator Morgan,ever having received any communication from the Secretary of De-fense as such or the Department of Defense on this subject.

Senator MORGAN. It is clear to me, Mr. Helms, from the memoran-

dum of the National Security Council that it was intended that theDepartment of Defense would devise methods and ways of destroy-in these toxins and also to determine the amounts to be retained forla ratory purposes. And I find no evidence that it was ever promul-o.gated to any agency other than interdepartmental agencies.

This morning I have been handed a memorandum from the Sec-retary of Defense addressed to the Deputy Secretaries and to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to various other officials with-in the Defense-Department on the subject of implementation of thePresident’s decision on chemical warfare and the ‘biological research’ , ograms. It was not addressed to the CIA or any other agency out-@ e of the Defense Department. Did you ever have any knowledge of6s having come up in the National Security Council?

Ambassador HELMS. I have no recollection of this memorandumIand I do not think I have ever seen it, Senator Morgan. It is not@niliar to me as I sit here now.

Senator MORGAN. Well, in all fairness to you, Mr. Helms, I find noreason why you should have seen it. It was not addressed or directed

$0 YOU. NOW, n this same package of materials, and I quite frankly

.ihave not had the time to go through all of them, at various places it$esignates the amount or quantities that are to be retained or deemed:necessary to complet,e current research in support of public health re-

J!h1 uirements and for future work in the defensive research department.

ere they list 1.53 milligrams of shellfish toxin. Under another section&at lists, for commodity devel ment and engineering laboratory,82grams of shellfish toxin : shellfis toxin A redried, 1 gram ; shellfishKkxin A clam, 1 gram ; and in another place I have noticed or observedwhere the Secretary of Defense apparently was saying what wasdeemed necessary. You never had any indication whatsoever with re-

Bard to any shellfish toxin you may have had 8Ambassador HELMS. Not that I recall, Senator Morgan. May I, sir,ssk ,you a auestion since you seem to be most familiar with this whole

broblem ? I read somewhere recently that the end of this year was the

: I rminal date for the destruction of all of these materials. Is that cor-kct! In other words, was there a period of 5 years during which they‘were all to be got rid of ?

Senator MORGAN. Mr. Helms, I do not know and I am quite frankly&raid and I doubt that we hav+

The CEIAIRMAN. May I iust respond to that, Senator Morgan?

Cur next witness is Ambassador James Leonard and he will describe#or .the committee the particular provisions of the convention and Ibelieve that that will answer the point that you have raised.

Ambassador HELMS. Thank you, thank you. Mr. Chairman.,$enator MONDALE. I think the situation is this. The President ordered

Be immediate destruction of our toxins. but under the internationalent, all countries, including the United States, must have de-their toxins by the end of this year.

Ambassador HELMB. I see. thank you. Senator Mondale-The COWMAN. Yes; I believe that is the mtuatlcn.



122

Senator MORGAN. I think, Mr. Helms, as I read the President’smemorandum to the National Security Council of February 20,1970,it looks to a further directive ES to how to destroy these and I thinkany logical reading of it would lead to that interpretation. And quitefrankly, I have found no followup. It seems to me somewhere along theway someone did not follow up and surely from this National SecurityCouncil memorandum to the President, or .from a committee to thePresident, as late as January 25, 1973, the President himself was ad-vised or should have been advised that programs for the disposal hadnot then been completed.

Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir.The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?Senator Mondale ?

Senator MONDALE. Mr. Helms, you have spent your whole life vir-tually, all of your adult life, in OSS intelligence services. There isabsolutely no one, I think, who is better equipped by experience at alllevels to help this committee understand what this evidence means andwhat policy implications it might have for the Con ress and for futurecommand and control directions, restrictions, an 8 the rest affectingthese kinds of matters.

As I try to piece together what we have heard, it seems to me theevidence 1s somewhat as follows. First, in late 1969 we had a Presi-dential decree ordering the destruction of biological weapons and sub-

stances. Then, because there was confusion as to whether toxins of allkinds were included within that order? a followup order was issuedon February 14,1970? specifically directing the destruction of all formsof toxins, whether biologically or chemically created. And that orderwas issued on February 14. There seems to be no evidence to contradictwhat you and Mr. Karamessines have said ; namely, that the two ofyou orally 0rdere.d the destruction of those toxins in pursuance of thePresident’s order,

But what seems to have happened is that once that February 14order came out, there was a good dealthe lower level where these toxins wereother things, a proposed memorandum was developed formess&s which he apparently never saw, suggesting that these toxinsshould not be destroyed, but in effect, what you might call lateralledinto a private warehouse to be leased. As a result of the need for publicfunds, that was turned down, Then the fact of what happened WUS,

that these toxins were transferred, both those owned by the CIA:at Fort Detrick and those owned by the Department of Defense atFort Detrick, except for a modest amount retained for research. Theywere all transferred to a warehouse in Washington under the controlof the.CIA. And higher authorities were not alerted to this transfer

because the day they were transferred or thereabout, an inventory WUQ

Rrepared that went up, that did not list the toxins, as Senator Moreas pointed out. I .;

I would not say that that inventory is a fraud, but I think it con&close to it because they waited until the toxins were gone and th@!they prepared an inventory which said they were not there. SO,‘@the basis of that, these memorandums were then prepared to the Pr&ident, to the National Security Council, for the head of the CIA, a&. 1-1.. T-n- ;n foot, a.ll he did a



123

So we are at this oint where a formal and profound, much debatedpublic Polic was etermined by the President of the United States

5cf

and by the ational Security Council to get rid of poisonous toxins,

except for modest amounts needed for research, but instead, lower levelemployees in the Department of Defense, possibly the CIA or both,decided to keep them.

Now 1 suppose we could get personal about it, but I had some sym-pathy for Dr. Gordon because he seemed to be saying he spent hiswhole life developing these things. He had spent al l of this money onit. He thought we might need it sometime later and therefore, hauseof his interest in servmg this country, kept them anyway. NO W, whatdo we do about it ?

Ambassador HELMS. Senator Mondale, I do not know. I think that

your understanding of Dr. Gordon’s position is very decent because,as 1 listened yesterday afternoon, it seemed clear that not only Dr.Gordon but several other scientists who had been familiar v&h thework on shellfish toxin had rather conspired, if you like, or colludedor whatever the most pleasant legal word is, to find someplace thatthey could put this material where it would be safe, secure, would nothurt anybody but would be there in case it were ever needed. I can~oQ assume that the reason that they came to this conclusion was‘that they had enormous difficulty acquiring the clams, or whatever it

is in the first place, and that the process of extracting the toxin is

iextraordinarily difficult and that maybe some of them had thoughts,about immunization and other things, or treatment of disease whereit might be useful.

And I think that they were yielding to that human. impulse of the

f

eater good. That is the only way I can explain this because, as 1,istened to Dr. Gordon yesterday, I did not listen to a man, it seemed

‘,$o me, who was doing something criminal or dirty or anything else.

:.I% seemed to be inspired by perfectly decent motives.Senator MONDALE. And we can understand that. But in fact, what

the ,mas doing was deliberately disobeying a serious Presidential orderN&h hd profound implications in terms of international relations$n4 which raises questions about the whole process of command and&ntrol in an institution which, I think, must be secret but which,

nk, cannot be unaccountable. So, what do you believe are the



124

Ambassador HEIXS. Senator Mondale, I have no problem with Yourstatement. I think you state the case accurately and I think in 1975

there are new national perceptions of these matters, if I may SaY so,at least they are different than they were 10 years ago or ‘20 Years ago.I do not know how different. I am not here enou h to know what ex-act1 all the shifts have been, but I would certain y agree that in view

3:f

of t e statements made by all of you distinguished gentlemen, thatsome result from this has got to bring about a system of accountabil-ity that is going to be satisfactory to the U.S. Congress and to theAmerican peo le.

NOW, exact y how you work out that’ accountability in a secretintelligence organization, I think, is obviously

ring to take a good

deal of thought and a good deal of work and I o not have any easy

ready answer to it because I assure you it is not an easy answer. Inother words, there is no quick 6x.

Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIFWAN. Senator Morgan has a final question.Senator MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this observa-

tion that I think this very clear1 points up the dilemma in which wefind ourselves? as Senator Mon d ale has pointed out, and that is theunaccountablllty of anyone in the CIA. Now, as I heard Dr. Gordonyesterday afternoon, I heard him distinctly say that had he had anorder from the Director to destroy the toxins, he would have carried

that order out. And I think I heard him say he did not have an orderand as I understand it this morning, you have test,ified and so has Mr.Karamessines that both of you orally directed him to destroy it.

The dilemma in which we find ourselves is that the manner in whichthe Agency has been conducted is such that we cannot find the truth.We have conflicting testimony. Senator Mondale is perfectly reason-able in drawing the conclusion that he drew. I could draw the sameconclusion. I could draw another conclusion that Dr. Gordon did notknow and would have carried out the orders had they been given him.It seems to me that this points out very clearly an area which shouldbe looked into so that in the future there will be an area of accounta-bility or a degree of accountability and it seems to me, Mr. Chairman,this may be another area where we find plausible denial coming in.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morgan, I concur in your observations andin those that Senator Mondale has made. And I simply want to under-score the fact that this is not the first time that this dilemma has facedthe committee. We have faced it again and again in the course of ourdeliberations, investigations of the whole assassination issue. Andthat will become clear when the committee issues its report in whichthe evidence taken will be laid out in careful detail. Rut it goes to theheart of the reason for this investigation and I hope that we conduct

it in such a way that by the time we are finished we will have foundsome answers.Are there any further questions of these two witnesses?Senator MONDALE. I have a comment. I think we found out what

P600 is.Ambassador HELMS. Good.The CHAIRMAN. If you found out, let us hear it.Senator MONDALE. We are told bv Robert Andrews, a Defense De-

nmhwnt &i& l. who in witch IIR 6la.v. t,hR.t, ha thinkR it, iR & wor&np



125

fund number, work relating to CIA funds, and he thinks it is a ref-erence to an account number.

The CHAIIWAN. We will pursue that further because, as I recall

the labels on the containers, “Do not use, unless directed by P600.”That does not sound like a system of accounts or an account ledger.Senator MONDALE. I know it but--The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will track that down.Senator MONDALE. Could we ask them to give a full report 8The CHAIRMAN. Yes ; of course we will track it down. If there are

no further questions of these two witnesses I would like to move on toAmbassador Leonard.

Thank you, gentlemen.Ambassador HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentle-

men.Mr. KARAMIESSINES. Thank you.The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Leonard, if you would please come

forward at this time. Because of the confusion here, we will take a5 minute recess SO we can get back to order. Mr. Ambassador, if youwould come forward and take your place at the witness stand duringthe recess would appreciate it.

[A brief recesswas taken.]The CHAIRXAN. The hearing will please come back to order.Mr. Ambassador, would you stand and take the oath, please.DO YOU solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this

proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but thetruth, so help you God ?

Mr. LEONARD. I do.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.I understand that you have some opening remarks you would like

to make, and I invite you to make them now.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES LEONARD, PRESIDENT, U.S. UNITED

NATIONS ASSOCIATION

Mr. LEONARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.This is not a prepared statement; I simply would like to state

briefly for the record, my relationship to this question which you arelooking at.

My name is James Leonard. I am, at the present time, the Presidentof the United Nations Association in New York. I left the U.S. Gov-ernment in 1973, after 25 years in the State Department, and for thelast 4 of those years, I was on loan from the State Department to theArms Control and Disarmament Agency as an Assistant Director, andI wore a second hat during that period.

I was also the head of the U.S. delegation to the DisarmamentConference in Geneva, known as the CCD-the Conference of Com-mittee on Disarmament. That was in 1969,1970, and 1971. And in 19’71,basically between March and September, we negotiated at that con-ference, the Treaty on Biological Weapons.

That convention was then discussed in the General Assembly in thefall of 1971, and it was commended by the General Assembly by avote of 110 to nothing. There was one delegation that abstained, and-.... LL..L A:2 w-4. -......A:,:,-&- :, CL- r-mL:..-



126

And the treaty was then opened for signature in April of 1972.It was ratified by the United States after appropriite advice andconsent of the Senate, and brought into force only in March of this

ct;;March 25, 1975. So that treaty became.binding on us only in

The ‘treaty has been signed b something over 100 nations, andthe last count I had, had been rati d ed by 40 to 50.

This question of chemical and biological warfare had gotten a highplace on the international agenda along in 1967 and 1968, and therehad been a proposal in 1968 from the United Kingdom that the twoquestions of biological warfare and chemical warfare should ‘beseparated. And that the question of biological warfare should be dealtwith first as a more simple, and in some respects, though not a11

respects, a more urgent questlon.The matter was placed under study very early in 1969-early in the

Nixon administration-in the spring and summer of 1969. I did notparticipate actively in the process within the U.S. Government inWashington here, since, I left for Geneva in July of 1969 and wasthere in Geneva during the principal part of the period during whichthese decisions were being taken.

The decisions were, of course, reached and reflected in the President’spress conference on November of 1969. The subsequent year-I’msorry. When I came back from Geneva in the latter part of 1969, I

found that the process of weighing what sort of a decision should bemade about chemical and biological weapons was really very far ad-vanced, and m memory is not precise on this, but just about the timeI got back in i6ovember, a memorandum was sent from the DefenseDepartmentfrom the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Laird, to the WhiteHouse suggesting a course of action with regard to chemical and bielogical weapons. And that memorandum from the Defense Departmentessentially became the decision which Mr. Nixon approved and issuedlate in November.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, Mr. Ambassador, the action taken

by President Nixon was a unilateral action.Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.The CHAIRMAN. That preceded the treaty.Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.As a part of that, he decided that we would su

posal that there be a separate treaty on biologica Pport the British pro-weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the President took a position which was akind of initiative, was it not?

Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.The CHAIRMAN. You wanted to say to the world, the United States

not only favors this, but we are going to do it unilaterally before atreaty itself is negotiated.Mr. LEONARD. That is correct. That was the essenceof his decision

that was publicly announced. It was not a secret decision.The CHAIRMAN. It was a gesture for decency and a gesture for peace.Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.Basically, the President decided on Mr. Laird’s recommendation

that it was in our interests to et out of the BW business-to get totallyout of it-whether other peop e did so or not. We were better off out ofthat. hnsinw s. Thin nolrnt.rv WR.R frw. in fact. without biolotical wean-



127

And having taken that position, the President then directed that theState Department and the Arms Control Agency attempt to persuadeothers of that and put this in treaty form.

The CHAIRMAN. And that decision that we get out of this businessfor the reasons that you stated was a decision that was concurred in bythe Defense Department.

Mr. LEONARD. Mr. Laird, in fact, advanced the original-took theinitiative.

The CHAIRNAN. In fact, the recommendation that we get out of thisbusiness was one that came from the Secretary of Defense,

Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.NOW that decision taken in November of 1969 did not clearly deal

with the problem of toxins, and it became necessary, as you know from

9

our investi ations, to have a further quick study of the toxin rob-

em, which t i?en produced a further National Security Decision lb!emo-randum in Februa

f;yof 1970, and which did, in fact, include toxins

within the sco e o the renunciation-the unilateral renunciation-that we had ta Pen on ourselves and proclaimed.

As a consequenceof that, we also su gested to the British-and, ofcourse, they a reed-that toxins shoul also be included in the treaty

f3

which was to e negotiated.The proposal that we negotiate a treaty on this really did not go

an where m particular durmg 1970. We were engaged m negotiatinga d fferent treaty at that time, known as the Sea Bed Treaty, and we

were attemptin to persuade other governments that our approach tot.his question oB chemical and biological weapons was a correct one ;that we should separate the two categories of weapons and deal withbiologicals first.

And that was not readily accepted by other governments. It was notaccepted b the Soviet Union, nor was it accepted, in general, by othernonaligne countries. It was accepted by our allies-our NATO allies,in eneral.

8 evertheless, during 1970, the President’s order to get out of thisbusiness unilaterally was moved forward and the process of destruc-

tion was lanned--carefully planned-and it is my understanding,was actua ly begun in 1970 ; certainly production of these was haltedduring 1970.

There was no question in my mind-the question was never raisedas to whether CIA was in the business of producing or dealing withthese matters. That simply was not, from our point, something that weeven thought about to the best of my recollection ,at this time.

Well, we finished up this Sea Bed Treat , and it became clear thatchemicals and biologicals was the next tK ng on the agenda. Andwe went back to Geneva in early 1971 and did, at that point, succeed n

scoring a breakthrough, so to speak.We persuaded the Soviet Union to alter its position and to join-us

in agreeinf

to take care of the biological question first, and deal withchemicals ater. And that was done, then, durin the spring and sum-mer of 1971. The treaty was drafted and broug f t back to New Yorkand agreed upon in its final form, as it stands today.

Just one comment on this whole diplomatic effort. I think it is clearthat what we were doing was basically a British-American way ofhandling the chemical and biological problem. It was very much



128

criticized by most other countries, They felt it was improper to sefarate biologicals because then nothing would be done about chemica

which they were :far more concerned about, really.

s,

And they tended to down lay the importance of biological weapons.We ar Hbasica P

ued the other way, o course. When they did agree to this, it wasly BS a concession to us because they wanted to move the whole

question of disarmament forward? and if this was the way we preferredto do it, well and good, let’s do it that way. Then we would turn tochemicals. So it is particular1of which we were the principa 9

unfortunate that this event-a treatysponsors-should have been handled in

the way that it evidently has been handled in ~ his particularcircumstance.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question on that very point.

From what you have said, the President, acting unilaterally, andin an attempt to make a gesture of decency and peace, and in com-

liance with a recommendation that came to him from the Defense5 epartment itself, announced to the world that we would not stock-pile, or use, bacteriological weapons.

Then, on the-Mr. LEONARD. Could I, Senator, just on that

Toint.

We had already renounced the use of chemica and biological weap-ons, not in treaty form, but by our repeated assertion in internationalforums, that we would abide bv the principles and objectives of the

Geneva Protocol which deals with the question of use.We later, as you know, have ratified that and become a formal

party to that agreement. But use was not really in question. We al-ready had excluded the use of biological weapons before Mr. Nixoneven announced it.

The CHAIRMAN. But the President went further in his announce-ment. He said we would not stockpile them, and further, we woulddestroy them.

Mr. LEONARD. That is correct. Absolutely. But that we would simplynot possess hese weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we initiated a treaty to secure an internationalagreement that other countries would do it’likewise.

Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.The CHAIRMAN. And now we find that toxins were preserved in vio-

lation of the President’s orders. And it has taken us 5 years to makethat discovery.

Now what do you think went wrong?What do you think should be done about it to protect against lfailures

of this kind’in the future PMr. LEONARD. Well I would like to offer a few thoughts if I could

on that.Let me just say first, however, that in terms of the internationalimnlications of this I would not want to exaggerate the impact thatI think this particular discovery will have on the attitudes of othergovernmenm.

I think that it will not discourage them from entering into furtherarms control agreements with us, and that sort of thing, for reasonswhich I believe are quite obvious-that this WR.S ot a deliberate eva-sion of the treaty bv the hinhest levels of the U.S. Government s.t all.

The CHAIRMAN. And we have assumed throughout that the Presi-



129

dential order was honestly given and that there was no back-channelcommunication by the President, or anyone in a policymaking posr-tion, to disregard the public announcement. The public announcementdid, in fact, represent national policy.

Mr. LEONARD. I believe that to be the case, and I think others willbelieve that to be the case.

I think there will be something troublesome in all of this, in that inthe future when assertions are made that it is not necessary to writeparticularly complicated provisions for oversi ht and enforcement inthe treaties, other governments may be somew at more exigent, moredemanding, of us than has been the case in the past when our simpleassertion that you would know we will corn ly with that, you couldnot be in any doubt about that, would general P have sufficed. And thatis a disadvantage, but I think it is a secondary one in this wholecontext.

On the question of what might be done to prevent analogous diffi-culties in the future, I would t,hink there are a couple of what onemight speak of as administrative measures that would be obviouslyappropriate. And several of you Senators have, in fact, referred t,othem this morning and perhaps yesterday, although I was not hereyesterday.

It seems o me that in a matter of this sort it is very desirable tohave a clear written record; a written record that runs from the topdown, and that then comes from the-1 will not say the very bottom,but at least the middle levels of the Government back up, so that theorder comes down in a written, unambiguous form, which no onecould possibly misinterpret, and it has attached to it some sort of acertificate, if you like, that the official has read and understood thisinstruction, and that he, to the best of his knowledge, he, and every-one in his office, and everyone-every ofice of which he has any directknowledge, is in compliance with this obligation.

I am told-1 cannot say this is my own knowledge, but I have beentold that something of this sort was done in the Defense Departmentin connection with quite a different treaty-the Treaty Against Pro-hibiting Antiballistic Missiles, or limiting them. And that they did,in the Army, in the area concerned with antiballistic missiledef ens+

The CHAIRMAN. There has been so much testimony about secrecy andthe highly secret nature of these compounds and toxins, yet there wasnothing secret about this at all, was there ?

In fact, the President gave great publicity to the order. It wasknown at the time that he gave the order that the Government was inpossession of certain toxins of this kind, and he ordered them

destroyed.Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.The CHAIRMAN. So that there was no reason whatever in view of the

circumstances that a direct written order shouldn’t have gone rightt,hrough any agency of the Government that may have possessed uch

forbidden substances.Mr. LEONARD. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. And an unclassified,

written order. I seeno reason it should have been classified.The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There was no need to classify it in any sense.

That should have been a public order and a written order in order to



130

make certain that the Government itself was in compliance with thePresident’s directive.

Mr. LEONARD. I think that should go, obviously, not simpl to the

top levels who have this supervisory bureaucratic responsibi ity, butdown far enough in an organization so that one can be sure that thepeople who really know what is being done are aware of what theirguidance is; that it comes from the top.

The second thing, I would think, is of a somewhat different charac-ter that might be done. It seems o me that there is a debate that. goeson within the Government of a more philosophical character which it.would be well to clarify. And that is, what sort of things are legitimateand what sort of things are not legitimate.

And this is quite a confused area. There are many people in thiscountry who feel that if somebody else, some other government isdoing certain things, then that means it is legitimate for us to do thosethin .

TAnd, in fact, there is a general rule, I believe, in international

law t at something that is not prohibited is permitted.It is not an invariable rule, but it is a general sort of principle that

one goes by. I would think it very desirable .for the President of thiscountry at least to lay down some more unilateral rules as to what weare constrained not to do and what officials of this Government areconstrained not to do. That can get rather philosophica!, but I thinkwe have a President whose character, whose abilit to dlstinquish be-tween right and wrong, is very widely respected. 1 nd I would like tosee him take stands on these issues and make it perfectly clear wherehe stands and where he expects other officials to stand on what is per-mitted and what is prohibited to agents of the U.S. Government, in thebroad sense in which all of us, who at one time or another, draw aGovernment salary, are agents.

And then there is a third area which is obviously much more com-plicated, it seems to me, than simply issuing directives. And that isthis question of what I might call the span of control in an organiza-tion of the sort that we are dealing with here.

And here it does seem o me that a very real question is raised, and

it has been rather differently illustrated by the testimony of Mr. Helmsand Mr. Karamessines.

These are very large organizations in which the senior officials aredealing with an enormous number of totally diverse problems, and itis difficult for them to really be confident that they know what is goingon down in one or another small part of an organization that is as argeas that.

And it seems o me that there is, therefore, since not everything couldbe reduced to writing, not everything could benot always be laid out in categorical and legal P

ut-the guidance can-orm. It certainly could

have been here, but the question of dividing an agency as large as theCIA is really a legitimate area of discussion.It seems to me that the functions there are quite disparate; for

any large agency performing a wide variety of functions.The CHAIRMAN. When you say dividing it, you mean taking an

agency of this size and breaking it up BMr. LEONARD.Breaking it up.I would certainly not want to see he CIA abolished. As a person who

spent a good deal of time in arms control, I am very conscious of the



131

contributions that the CIA has made to arms control. We just sim, the kin cp

lycould not have the kind of arms control we have got toda ofai $

eements on strategic weapons that we have with the B oviet Unionit were not for the inblligence that the CIA provides. And I cer-

tainly would not want to see that caI do not think that is necessarily in R

ability im aired in any way. Buterent in t Re resent structure of

the Agency. I do not think it necessarily would tecan even imagine that, in fact, command and control

impaired, and Imight be some-

what improved if these were less ponderous, less huge, organizationsthan the one we presently have.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is certainly true that the organization hasgrown very large, and that may complicate the question of commandand control. Your suggestion is it might be broken into several com-ponent parts, over which more effective command could be established

by virtue of their-Mr. LEONARD. More compact and more homogeneous nature.The CHAIRMAN. Of a more compact, more homogenous nature.Mr. LEOXARD. Precisely, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything further to say in the way of

openin remarks, Mr. Ambassador?Mr. f EONARD. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Al l right. I think we can go to questions, then. I

would turn first to Senator Mondale.Senator MONDALE. Mr. Leonard, you spent, I think, over 20 years

in the Foreign Service and were assigned in a whole range of assign-ments in a host of countries where you could see the operation of theCIA,as we R

articularly covert operations, in action,. It has been *my beliefave gone through these hearings., most of them in private, that

one of the problems with covert activities is that they are usually de-cided and determined in a way that does not fully appreciate the pos-sible damage and cost to this country should it fail or should it becomeknown, and that the failure to consider that part of CIA covert activi-ties often encourages our operatives to undertake projects which arevery foolish, very costly, and often bear a cost far disproportionateto any kind of return that we could conceive. Is that a fair conclusion ?

Mr. LEONARD. I think it is a fair conclusion, Senator, although Iwould not want to seem to be levying some sort of a blanket chargeagainst the CIA and its people abroad of general irresponsibility orbeing out of control in some fashion or another, because my experiencewith them is precisely to the contrary. They are not. But there is, asyou suggest, this possibility there, in the covert character of some ofthe things they have to carry out, and in the problems of insuring andoversight of those activities that is not somehow involved or com-mitted to the activity that is being contemplated.

Senator MONDALE. I understood that you were of the impression thatone step which might be taken is to separate the covert action sideof the CIA from the receiving or collecting of jnfomation and intel-ligence-gathering side, separate them into separate institutions. IS thatcorrect F

Mr. LEONARD. There seems to me two kinds of covert action, and thecovert gathering of inteIlip;ence, simply finding out what is going on,I think, sometimes does have to be done in a covert fashion. It cannotbe carried out in public. I think the need for that sort of intelligence---- 1- _-* _._.-.-L. .,



132

Basically, most of what the U.S. Government needs to know aboutforeign countries comes to it either through the press or through StateDepartment channels. The contribution from CIA intelliP?c% inmany situations, is really quite marginal. But there are sltuatrons rnwhich it is extremely important, and I would not want to see thatthrown away.

But I would distinguish that sort of covert activity from covert a~-tion that is directed at some sort of having an effect on the politicallife of another country, whether it is by removing individuals or pro-viding money to individuals, or in some fashion or other warping orskewing or diverting the course of political life in that country fromthe direction it’s going to take on its own, so to speak.

Senator MONDALE. You think it makes sense o take that function

out of the CIA and put it into someother institution?Mr. LEONARD. I would renounce it totally, Senator. I would not takeit out of the CIA and ut it somewhere else. I do not think we haveany business being in t R s, if I may call it, covert action, operationalaction, whether one labels it offensive or whatever. I just do not thinkthe United States needs that capability. I think we can give it upunilaterally, just as securely and safely and benefit from giving it up

the way we benefited from giving up biological warfare, biologicalweapons.

Senator MONDALE. Thank you.Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN, Senator Mathias.Senator MArrrrAs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.I would like to ask a hypothetical question relating to our commit-

ment to destroy the biological weapons that we had created and stock.piled. The Department of Defense, in response to the President’s orderdid, as I understand it, develop very elaborate procedures for the de-struction of these toxic substances. Would it have complied with ourinternational commitment had these substances, instead of physicallybeing destroyed, had been destroyed as far as purpose was concerned,by making them available for scientific purposes to medical schools

and research laboratories in this or any other countrv?Mr. LEONARD. Well, it would not, strictly speaking, have been in

compliance with the treaty to do that! if lthe qnan)tities involved werelarger than was necessary for the purposes involved : the treaty is quiteclear on that. And at ‘the time, both in its negotiation, we made thatsuite clear on tihe reoord, *and I (believe in the document transmitted tothe Senate for ,advice and consent that was also made quib clear.

There is a paragraph in this small pnblication whiih underlinesthat point. :

The treaty allows the Governmmt to retain only quantities that have a justl-flcation for prophylactic, protective, br other peaceful purposes, and nut quan-tities in excess of that, even if the intent eventually may be to dir& them in thatfashim.

Senator MATHLAG.-MY thinking is not directed onlv at this shellfishtoxin that we are considering ‘today, hut really on the ,whole biologicalarsenal ‘at Fort D&rick. in which the American people have investedhundtwds of millions of dollars, which may have ,been of some im-portance to ‘the scientific communilty in view of the fact ‘that medicalschools all over the country very &ively participated in the creation



133

of that facili ty and in the continuation of its work. But [that hy o-

tihetical questibn does have some practical impact at the moment, L -cause as has been testified here, t.1~er-ehas been a request made by vari-

ous medical schools for this toxin that is in point, for research urposes.Now, would it be possible for the appropriate authorities, wit R out vio-lating any international commitment, to make this toxin available formedical research ?

Mr. LEOSARD. It would be quite legitimate to do so, if the quantitiesare appropriate. If the quantities are clearly in excess, then it is nollegitim&e.

Senator MATHIAS. It mibut if it were divided up

ht be in excess for a single medical sc11001,Por research purposes iamong several, would

that be within your interpretation of what, is permis.sableP

Mr. LEONARD. Oh, yes ; there is no question.Senator MATHIAS. As long as no single agent received more than wasactually physically required for its research work?

Mr. LEONARD. Well, the question really is one of intent, Senator. Ifthe intent is hone&Iv and clearly to usethese for these researc,h prophy-lactic purposes, then there is no question t.he quantitilty such as is np-propriate to that. But if t.he intent is otherwise, if tlie intent is lto holdthem as a contingency reserved for some other possible use, then thatis not legiltimate. _

Senator MATHIS. But if they were exposed, and t.he whole worldknew where they went and in what quantities, and for what purposes,you would find no objection?

Mr. LEONARD. I would not. I cannot really imagine that a foreigngovernment would charge us for a violation for tha;:. sort of action.

Senator MATHIAB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAS. This is ,a very important. subject that Senator

Mathias raises, because when this committee was first established Sena-tor Mansfield, the majority leader, and Senaltor Scott, Ithe minorityleader, advised the CIA sand other agencies t.hat we will be investigat-ing, not to destroy an

2hing for obvious reasons, and when this cache of

toxins was discovere , the Agency quite

a release, ,because it may very well be t f:

roperly came to us to ask foi

at the executive branch willnow want to destroy these toxins.

One possibility for using them for proper purposes is the point ofSenator Mathiss’ inquiry, though, clearly, other testimony h,as shownthat the quantities that have been found in this particular cache go farbeyond the experimental and legitimate needs to which this particularpoison could be put.

But if there is a purpose th’&t can be served that comes within t.betreaty, 90 that trhe United States does not violate its commit.mentt thenit. is important for US to know that, it is important for the executive

branch to know t.hat, in determining what disposition to make of thisparticular cache.

Senator Huddle&on.Senator HUDDLEBTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Amplifying somewhat on the need for information from lthe CL4,

particularly foreign intelligence, and expanding somewhat on the

statement that you have already made, would you say that it wouldbe virtually impossible, or at leagt somewhat unwise, for this countryto en&r into agreements involving armaments decreases or many other



134

subjects without information that is .gathered and supplied by theCIA ?

Mr. LEONARD. Senator? there are clearly agreements that it wouldbe ver unwise to enter into without knowi

x 5what is being done on

the ot er side. There are others, such as the iological treaty, wherein fact we entered into it knowing that we could not know and berewnciled to the fact that we could not know, as illustrated, of course,we could not know about our own situation, much less about someforeign government.

Senator H~~~LESTON.’ But it would not be prudent for us to setour country on a particular course without having information uponwhich we can total1 rel or information that has been gained byour own devices, rat K Tlr t an relying on what might be supplied to

us b another country 8ax r. LEONARD. That, Senator, would de end, really on the weapons

that we are talkin about controlling or isarming. Some, obviously,f

t;one needs a hi h egree of certainty with, and others, one can makedo with a g CA deal less accurate detailed, current mformation. Itdepends, really, on the risks that this Government would run, as aconsequence of a violation unknown to us of the agreement that wehad entered into.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Another example, and somewhat in a dif-ferent area is the joint space venture between this country and the

Soviet Union. Would you say t,hat would be highly improbable orperhaps imprudent for us to engage in that kind of an operationwithout information that would be supplied by the CIA relative to theSoviet Union’s real capability in that field?

Mr. LEONARD. I honestly cannot see the relevance to that enterpriseof information the CIA would supply. It seems to me it is up to theSoviets themselves to supply us with the information that we needto be confident of the safety of our astronauts, or whatever is involved.

Senator HUDWESTON. Are you suggesting that we should rely upont,he information that they supply, or should we rely on information

that we may have gathered ourselves?Mr. LEONARD. I think we would rely upon the information theywould supply, because the would supply it in a form that wouldbe utterly unambiguous. B ur technicians would be looking at theSoviet instruments, satisfying themselves that they work the way theyare supposed to. I just do not think the CIA capability is relevant.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Back to the particular treaty and our involve-ment with the toxins and biological warfare agents, subsequent tothis agreement, did other countries, to your knowledge, undertake adestruction program of their biological weapons and toxins?

Mr. LEONARD. To my knowledge, I do not know of any, to my ownknowledge. No other country acknowledged publiclv and formally.to the best of my memory, that they had any stockpiles of biologicalweapons, and therefore, there was no acknowledgment by them thatthey had an obligat ion in conformity with article 2 to carry out anydestruction procedures.

Senator HUDDLESTON. But t.here was no effort bv anyone to verifywhether other countries in fact did have a stockpile f

Mr. LEONARD. Quite the contrary, Senator. The intelligence servicesof this Government have been trying for many years to gain informa-



135

tion <about the stockpiles of other countries, but given the nature ofthe wea ens, it is just extremely difficult and I think one of theclearest essons from all of the study of chemical and biological wea-

pans that went on, 196’7,1968, on through the present time, is that itIS extremely difficult to know what another country is doing, especiallya large country.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know whether or not any questionh.as been raised in any international forum subsequent to this treaty,as to whether or not the various countries’ signatures were complied.

Mr. LEONARD. I do not, Senator. I’ve been out of the Governmentduring this riod.

Senator UDDLEWQN. Would ou say that in a matter of an interna-?tional treaty and the uestion o whether or not this country complies

%e

P

to it, that it would a reasonable standard o erating procedureemanating erhaps from the White House or at east from the De-P

P

Rartment o State, that any a ency of this Federal Government thatas any responsibility for Imp ementing any part of an international

agreement should have a w&ten record of all actions taken whichwere taken for the urpose of implementing that treaty?

Mr. LEONARD. I t R nk the eneral principle is a sound one, but tomake it absolutely categorica f , applying to all treaties, all situations,all a encies, could get one, I think, into very complicated problemswhit f I honestly have not thought through. I think in the case of an

arms control treaty of this sort, it is important. that the a encies thatmight possibly have something which is prohibited should % e requiredto make it clear that they do not, but we have an enormous range oftreaties with other countries, economic character, consular character,all sorts of things, and that is another matter, I think.

Senator HUDDLESTON. There could hardly be any harm, in the caseof international treaties, which are seldom secret in nature to startwith, in having some tangible proof that this country did, in goodfaith, attempt to implement that treaty, and did issue whatever neces-sary instructions or orders might be to implement that treaty.

Mr. LEONARD. That is very desirable, yes.Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Huddleston.Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if the next Sen-

ator would yield for ‘ust one observation at this point.The CHAIRMAN. d ould you ask him ?Senator SCHWEIKER. I would be delighted to.Senator MATI-IIAS. Thank you.I do not think the record ought to remain in the state in which I

now perceive it to be. We are m a state of innocence and ignoranceabout the activities of other nations in this field. There is a great dealthat is known about what other countries are doing in biological andchemical warfare and aradoxically, some of that information comesfrom the cooperative e orts of scientists.

When Fort Detrick was in full bloom, they had some difficulty in de-veloping strains of Tuberine and they obtained strains from the SovietUnion, and that kind of scientific exchange went on during the depthsof a cold war, so that a great deal is known, and I do not think therecord should reflect that we are in complete ignorance of what is hap-pening on the international scene.



136

Mr. LEONARD. Could I just comment on that, if you please, Mr.Chairman. I did not want to imply that I was addressing myself sim-ply to the question of stockical area. Those are particu f

les, stock Eles in the chemical and biolog-

it is overtly or covertly.arly dif licu t to gain knowledge of, whether

The CHAIRMAN. But having made a very careful study of the ques-tion, the Department of Defense evident,ly decided that for PURPOSES

of protecting the United States, it was not necessary for us to stock-pi le such weapons, regardless of what other countries did.

Mr. LEONARD. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. And therefore, that decision became a unilateral

decision., made in advance of the treaty, which we then advocatedand initiated ; is that correct ?

Mr. LEONARD. That is correct, that we are best protected by defen-sive measures, prophylactic measures against this, not by the threatto retaliate in kind. If you hit us with biological weapons, we will hityou-that was not the way to go, and that was what Mr. Laird andMr. Nixon saw very clearly and decided in,terms of.

Senator MATHIAS. I think one of the elements of that decision is,of course, the availability of these weapons to any primitive society.Any society that has the capability of brewing beer has the capabllrtyof creating a biological weapon. So the dangers involved are very, verygreat.

Mr. LEONARD. Senator Mathias’ point, I think, is very valid. Ithink we have learned more through peaceful cooperation with othercountries than we have by attempting to spy on their defenselaboratories.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we have already placed the shellfish mar-ket in jeoI do thin E

ardy. I don’t know whether we should extend that to beer.though, that when our expert witness comes on he will

make clear’that this particular toxin takes a great deal of synthesisand concentration and that ordinary shellfish are very healthy and canbe eaten without serious dangers to anyone’s health. We have gotproblems enough in this committee without beginning to affect the

markets for various products.Senator Schweiker.Senator SCHWEIKER. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions.The CHAIRMAN. Very well,Senator Hart ?Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Leonard, I have three factual ques-

tions. Based upon the President’s statement of November 25,1969, it ismy understanding that the CIA or its representatives participated inthe working groups or study grouns that led up to the U.S. positionwith regard to biological warfare, Is that correct?

Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.Senator HART of Colorado. During those working sessions or study

groups did the CIA representatives ever indicate, to your recollection,the need to stockpile a supply of toxic materials for experimentationor whatever ?

Mr. LEONARD. Senator, I honestly do not think I can testify on that.I was not personally involved in those discussions.

Another officer of the Arms Control Agency was our representativein the meetings and I simply was not involved. I had only second- or



137

third-hand knowledge of the discussions that went forward and sawreally what came out of them.

Senator HART of Colorado. So, based upon the discussions and therecord with which you are familiar, you do not know whether this sub-

ject ever arose n those discussions1Mr. LEONARD. I real1 do not know, Senator.Senator H&T of Co4orado. Mr. Chairman, those are the only ques-

tions I have.With the indulgence of my colleagues and with reference to a com-

ment I made to you at the break, I make an observation out of contextand outside the scope of the work of this committee.

We got into the question of the purity of Dr. Gordon’s motives andthe good intentions that he may have had in disobeying orders. Itoccurred to me in that connection that, if purity of motives were a

sufficient reason to disobey orders and rules, thousands of youngAmerican men would now be walking the streets who, out of conscience,disobeyed draft orders for Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.Mr. LEONARD. May I just make a brief comment on that question of

motives. ,4nd it gets back to this area of what is permitted and what isprohibited. It seems o me this illustrates the desirability of some sortof categorical ruling-out of whole areas of activity, so that a personlike Dr. Gordon, whose testimony I did not hear, could not be in anydoubt that so-called offensive usesof the mat,erial that he had was notlegitimate, was not within the permitted area of U.S. Government ac-

tivities. It seems o me that it has got to be a very broad prohibition.But it is only in that fashion that these various complex doubts andquestions can really be resolved in a categorical fashion.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I might say to you, Mr. Ambassador, thatwe have found in our investigation to date that ambiguity seems oplague the CIA and when you sugvested, as you did a few minutesago, that it would be well for Pre&ents to ‘begin to get very preciseabout what agencies must not do, it was a very good suggestion indeed.If previous Presidents had been a great deal more precme about whatthe CIA must not do it is possible tfhat we would not now <be nvesti-

gating the Agent .All of that wil P come out in due course, but, nevertheless, I want tosay that this recommendation I take to be a very good one. And I hopethat Presidents in the future deal with the Agency and all departmentsof the Government in such a way as to make it very clear the kinds ofactivities that they are not to en

Mr. LEONARD. I think, Mr. 8age in.hairman, it should be clear that the

kind of activities that we are talking about is notP

rohibited. It isprohsbitcd to kill people with toxins today because oit is not prohibited to entertain the idea of killing

the treaty. Buteople. There is no,

to my knolwledge, directive. I am very pleased to Rear Mr. Karames-sines say that he personally would never, that he would resithe Agency sooner than approve that. But that was his personaY

frompolicy.

That was a matter of his individual moral character. It was not anational policy and to the best of my lmowledge it is not a nationalpolicy today.

The CEIAIRBXAN. That depends upon how national policy is defined.Today there are directives, two directives, that have been issued by



138

the Director one b Mr. Helms, when he was Director, and one by Mr.Colby, which do, Por the first time clearly declare that no one in theAgency is to be involved in assassination plots or assassination at-

tcm&ever Por an other activity related to assassination.agree with you that a matter of this seriousness shouldnot be left t!o the Director of the Agency or to an administrative orderthat can be changed as Directors are changed, but ought to be a matterof law. And this committee will have recommendations to make whenit completes its investigation of that articular issue.

If there are no more questions oft 1 is witness, thank you very much,Mr. Ambassador.

We will complete our bearings on this sub’ect tomorrow morningwhen our first witness will be Dr. Edward Sc h antz, who is an ex ert

on these toxins and was at Fort Detrick. Our second witness wi beMr. Charles Senseney, who was a Fort Detrick official Q whom Dr.Gordon referred yesterday afternoon and to whom Dr. Gordon saidthat he had offered the toxins.

Perhaps come of the unanswered questions can be cleared up in to-morrow’s testimony. That will complete the public hearings on thisparticular subject.

The hearing is adjourned until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m, the hearing recessed to reconvene the

following morning at 10 a.m.]



THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 19’75

U.S. SENATE,

SELECT COMMITTEE To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONSWITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,

Washington, D.C.The committee met pursuant to notice at 10 :05 a.m. in room 318,

Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Tower? Mondale, Huddleston, Hart ofColorado, Baker, Mathias and Schwelker.

Also present : William G. Miller, stati director; Frederick A. 0.Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel ; and Curtis R, Smothers, counsel to theminority.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearin will please come to order.This is the third and final f ay that the committee will devote to the

puzzlement of the oisons, and our first witness this morning is Dr.Edward Schantz. 8 r. Schantz, would you please come to the witness

table. And Dr. Schantz, if you would just remain standing for amoment for the oath, please.

Do you swear that all of the testimony you will give in this proceed-ing ~111be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, sohe1 you God P

8 r. SCHANTZ. I do.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Schantz. Please be seated.Do you have any opening remarks you would care to make at this

time ?

STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD SCHANTZ, PROFESSOR,UNIVERSITYOF WISCONSIN

Dr. SCHANTZ. None, other than to say that I am now a professor atthe University of Wisconsin, and I am in the Department of FoodMicrobiology and Toxicology.

I have spent about 30 years of my professional life studying themicrobiological toxins, mainly those that are problems in food poison-ing, such as shellfish poisoning, the poison itself, clostridium botulinurntoxins, the staphylococcal enterotoxins and the like.

The CHAIRMAN. You are one of the foremost experts on this subject,ai e you not ?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, that’s what people tell me. I don’t know.The CHAIRM~N. Well, I want to congratulate you on the brevity of

your opening statement. Let us go directly to questions. First, I willturn to our chief counsel, Mr. Schwarz.

(139)



140

Mr. SCHWARZ. Doctor, rior to going to the University of Wisconsin,were you at Fort Detrick r

Dr. SCHANTZ.~~~; Iwas.

Mr. SCHWARZ. And for how long a period of time were you there?Dr. SCHANTZ. Twenty-eight years.Mr. SCHWARZ. And during that time, you did research, asyou say, on

a number of matters, including shellfish toxin. Is that right?Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct.Mr. SCHWARZ. While you were there, Doctor, were you aware that

the CIA had a relationship with Fort Detrick?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I did not know that directlv. Now, there would

be good reason to guess that, but I did not know it at the time.Mr. SCHWARZ. So you were working on the shellfish toxin, but you

did not know that the CIA also had an interest in shellfish toxin?Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct.Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Would you turn to exhibit 8,’ which is Na-

tional Security Decision Memorandum No. 44.Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes.Mr. SCHWARZ.The document dated February 20,197O.Dr. SCHANTZ. I have it.Mr. SCHWARZ. You heard Mr. Helms say yesterday that such a docu-

ment was so secret that it could not be shown to lower level employeesin the CIA, including the very persons who were involved in biological

warfare matters. Were you shown this document at the DefenseDepartment?Dr. SCJXANTZ. I can’t say that I saw this actual document. I saw,

spelled out for us, essentially this very samestatement.Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you hear Dr. Gordon’s testimony the other after-

noon 8Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes; I did.Mr. SCIIWARZ. Do you read this order as covering shellfish toxin?Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes ; I do.Mr. SCJIWARZ. There is no doubt about that, is there?Dr. SCHANTZ. That’s correct; there’s no question whatsoever.Mr. SCHWARZ. What proportion of the amount of shellfish toxin

ever produced in the history of the world is 11 grams?Dr. SCHANTZ. My estimate would be about one-third.Mr. SCIIWARZ. How lethal is shellfish toxin?Dr. SCHANTZ. It is considered an extremelv lethal substance.Mr. SCHWARZ. If it is administered intramuscularly, such as with a

dart, how much does t take to kill a person?Dr. SCHANTZ. The answer to that question can only come from ani-

mal experimentation, extranolated to humans. I would estimate thatprobably t.wo-tenths of a milligram would be sufficient.

Mr. SCI-IWARZ. Three-tenths of a milligram ?Dr. SCHANTZ. Two- or three-tenths.Mr. SCIIWARZ. Two- or three-tent.hs of a milligram?Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct.

1 Seep.210.



141

Mr. SCHWARZ. Could you translate that into the number of peoplekilled er gram?

Dr. CILQNTZ. Well, if it was two-tenths of a milligram, it would besufficient for 5,000

Ip”

ple.

Mr. SCIIWARZ. or gram. And if you had 11 grams, that would be55,000 people?

Dr. SCIXANTZ. Yes; that is correct.Mr. SCHWARZ. In addition to the ability t,o kill people, are there

more benign uses or shellfish toxin, such as n hospitals?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, in Public Health there is; yes.Mr. SCIIWARZ. And what are those uses?Dr. SCBANTZ. There are-well Public Health has several applica-

tions for this. One is the standardization of the bioassay to controlshipments of shellfish poison or shellfish in commerce that may con-

tain poison, and that was an important point., and stiIl is, with theFood and Drug Administration.

Mr. SCIIWARZ. And are there other benign uses?Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes. We anticipate that the.re are many applications

in medicine where the knowled e of the structure of shellfish poisoncould be applied. One is deve opment of an antidote for shellfishpoison, which we do not have at the present time. And the medicalprofession would need this, or needs this for cases that might occuralong the coast, where they most generally have shellfish poisoningproblems.

Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, whatever benign uses there are, ob-viously they cannot be realized if it is sitting in a CL4 vault 1

Dr. SCIIANTZ. Well, that is true; yes.Mr. SCH~ARZ. I have no further questions, Mr. Cl?airman.z’&e C&IRMAN. Mr. Smothers, do you have questIons Z

OTHERS.Yes, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Schantz, during the periodof your employment at Fort Detrick, did you work primarily in thePublic Health aspects of this toxin?

Dr. SCHANTZ A lot of my work was with the Public Health Service;

Yes*

Mr. SMOTHEIW. Were you not, in fact, retained for the purpose ofassuring the purity of the shellfish toxin for Public Health purposes?

Dr. .!~~~L~NTz. Yes. That was one application.Mr. SMOTHERE.Did you, during the period of your tenure, receive

from a separate branch, other than the one you worked for, requestsfor t.his toxin? Did you receive such requests specifically from theSpecial Operations Division?

Dr. SCIIANTZ. If I understand your question properly, I furnishedto SO Division, that was Special Operations Division, toxin as I hadpurified it, and as they asked for it.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Approximately how much of this toxin did you fur-nish to the Special Operations Division ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. I cannot answer t.hat accurately. but I would assumet.hat over the years from-as it was prepared, I furnished them prob-ably 10 or 15 grams.

Mr. SMOTHERS. To the best of your knowledge, did the Special Opera-tions Division receive shellfish toxin from other sources, other thanthat which you furnished them directly?

Dr. SCHANTZ. There was some prenared. of course. too, by thePublic Health Service, which was supplied to the SO Division.



142

Mr. SIKOTHERS. When you say prepared by the Public Health !&z-v-ice, are you referrin

%to the Public Health Service facilities at Taft

and at Narragansett.

Dr. SCHANTZ. That’s correct.Mr. SMOTHERS. Did these facilities ,provide toxin directly to the

Special Operations Division 8Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes ; they did.The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smothers, just for clarification, Special Opera-

tions Division was located at Fort Detrick. It was the Army Bac-teriological Warfare Division.

Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes; it was one of the divisions at Fort Detrick.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.Mr. SMOTHEREL Dr. Schantz, during your tenure at Fort Detrick,

did you also supply shellfish toxin to persons outside the Government BDr. SCHANTZ. Yes; I did, And after the project was cleared by theArmy for this purpose, I sent toxin to many laboratories throughoutthe country, and to other countries, except to those behind the IronCurtain, which I was not allowed to send to. And the poison WM forphysiological studies, and it was soon learned what the mechanism ofaction was from these studies, and also it was a very valuable tool forthe study of nerve transmission in medical work.

Mr. SMOTHERS. How were these poisons physically transferred fromFort Detrick to the reci ients ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. At S Division it was mainly directly. They cameand got it from me, or I took it to them.

Mr. SMOTHERS. How was it transferred to the scientists and otherorganizations that received it ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. When it was sent off from Fort Detrick to laboratories,we conferred with the Post Office Department how to safely do this.They suggested we put it in a glass vial, pack it in cotton, put i t in ametal container which was sealed. The metal container went into acardboard mailing carton, and it was sent in that form.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it survive the Post Office treatment? [Generallaughter. J

Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes ; it did. I have no reports of broken vials.Mr. SMOTHERS. Dr. Schantz, was there further Government control

of this substance after it was transferred t,o the recipients outside ofFort Detrick ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, Public Health h:ad their interest, and they alsohad some control of this. There was an arrangement made betweenthe Chemical Corps Chief, and the Surgeon General of the PublicHealth Service, for a cooperative study, and of course, there wassome control there, t,oo.

Mr. SMOTHERS. As a final inquirv. going back again to the time

mentioned by the chief counsel earlier, after the Presidential orderhad come down on destruction of these materials. did there come atime when you requested of Special Onerations Division that theyreturn to YOU anv shellfish toxin which they had on hand?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes. Thn,t is correct. When SO Division was closingout. 1 went to Chief of SO Division and asked if 1 could have, forPublic Health work, the poison that they did not use in their research.

Mr. SHOTHERE. And how much did they indicate to you they hadon hand at that time ?



143

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, thev did not tell me, but a short time later,they gave me 100 milligrams, and I assumed that this was it.

l&r. SMOTHERS. Based on the supplies that ou had turned overto SO Division, would it have been, or was it at t e time, your expecta-ition that they would have had more than 100 milligrams on hand?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I had no way to know, hecause, although I had atop secret clearance, I did not know all of the things that they wereusmg the poison for.

Mr. SMOTHFJRS. But you did transfer to them, over a period of time,more than 15 grams, or approximatelv 15 grams, of the substance?

Dr: SCHANTZ. It could have been that much.Mr. SMOTHERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further ques-

tions.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smothers.Dr. Schantz, how is this shellfish toxin manufactured or created ?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, it is created by marine dinoflagellate. And shell-

fish become poisonous only when the marine-this poisonous marinedinoflagellate hap ns to grow out in the water. Shellfish consume, al lthe time, the dino r agellates and other microorganisms in the water forfood. NOW, when a poisonous dinoflagellate happens to grow out whichis very often or usually a rare circumstance, the mussels, clams, andother plankton-consuming shellfish bind that poison in the body andthey become very poisonous, and when the dinoflagellate has run itscourse in the ocean and other dinoflagellates come in, usually not poi-sonous, the shellfish excrete this poison within a matter of a few weeks.So then they are safe to eat again, and this is often a sporadic occur-rence. You cannot predict it, and so that is the reason so many peopleget oisoned, and so on.

T! C HAIRBEAN. In order to develop the toxin, does that t,ake a greatmany infected shellfish? Is it a long and difficult process to develop thishi hly otent toxin ?

!bz . CHANTZ. The purification procedure, that is, getting the poisonout of the shellfish and purifying it, was a difficult procedure to workout, and it took us several years study in order to do this. And muchof the poison, as we were

f!urifying it, went back into research to im-

prove the method of puri cation. But i t was not an easy matter to dothis. It is easy now, of course. It is not so difficult.

And I worked out with my co-workers and various well-knownchemists throughout the country-we develo ed this procedure, andit is published in the Journal of the American e hemical Society.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose what I am driving at is that our discus-sion of this particular ,toxin and the way that it has been developedought not to be misunderstood by the public as meaning that peopleshould be wary of eating shellfish.

Dr. SCHANTZ. That is an important point. I think that everyoneshould understand that shellfish going on the commercial market isgoing carefully screened by the Food and Drug Administration andthis poison, now, the purified poison, has established an accurate assayand has helped the Food and Drug Administration greatly in control-ling the commercial fisheries, so that none of this, no poisonous shellfishget on the market. And I would like to make that very clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.



144

Once you had developed the toxin itself, how long does it remainpotent ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. I have-well, the material that we have purified, and

I had Public Health back in 1954 or 1955, I have assayed within thepastAnd P

ear, and it is every bit aswould imagine that it wi 1 last 100 years, and so on.

otent as it was the day I prepared it.

The CHAIRMAN. It has lost no potency at al l in 20 years?Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct.The CHAIRMAN. So there is no question in your mind that this cache

that has been discovered, about which we are conducting this particu-lar hearing, consisting of about 11 grams, which you say representsabout one-third of al l the toxin ever manufactured, still is as potent asit was when it was developed ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. I would expect it to be every bit as potent today as itwas the day it was made.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one final question, Dr. Schantz. I think, sinceyou have been present at the earlier hearings that you know that thiscommittee has been asked to lif t a ban that applies generally to all thea encies we are investigating against the destruction of any materialt f at. they may have in their possession. In order that a proper disposalcan be made of the 11 grams of this shellfish toxin that have been dis-covered, I would like some guidance from you.

We have entered into a treaty in which we have undertaken to de-stroy substances of this kind, except in such amounts as may be use-

fully used in laboratories for benign and decent purposes. Would it beyour recommendation that part of this particular cache of shellfishtoxin be distributed to medical schools and laboratories that are en-gaged in this work, within the limi*ts of the treaty, or is there anyspecial need to consider that use? I have in mind possible medical uses

that might help us in solving some of the problems of disease and anyother good and decent purpose.

Dr. SCHANTZ. At the present time, we have in the biochemistrydepartment at Madison, a NIH grant to study shellfish poison. Withinthe past year, we have determined the chemical structure of it, and

this is now published in the Journal of the American Chemical Society.We are now/in the process of altering the molecule to determinewhether we,‘can produce substances of medical interest.

One such example might be the possibility of developing localanesthetics from this molecule, and we are much in need of toxinfor this purpose. There are many physiologists throughout the countryand one, of course, we are working with is Dr. Ritchie, at Yale 1Jni-versity. And I know laboratories like his and others would appreciatevery much getting material.

I have usually kept the supply of toxin and have supplied it to

manv laboratories throughout the world, as I have mentioned before. Iwould continue to do that, if I had t.he supply. And- I must assureeveryone t,hat we are putting it to good medical use, and are notdoing anything else with it, other than medical applications.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Schantz. Senator Tower?Senator TOWER. Dr. Schantz, did you serve as the custodian of the

Phvsical Sciences Division stockpile of toxin?Dr. SCIIANTZ. Yes ; I did.



145

Senator TOWER. Were you also custodian for the amounts that weretransfered to SOD 8

’r. SCHANTZ. No ; I was not.

Senator TOWER. To the best of your knowledge, did anyone keepan accounting of the toxin that was kept on hand by SOD ?Dr. SCHANTZ. I do not know, but after it was transferred to SOD,

I had nothing more to do with it.Senator TOWER. What was the formal procedure for the acquisition

of shellfish toxin ?Dt SCHANTZ. By whom ?Senator TOWER. By anyone.Dr. SCHANTZ. By anyone ‘4Senator TOWER. Yes.

Dr. SCKANTZ. Well, it was in the Army. We passed it just back andforth, and I do not know as there was any formal-Senator TOWER. No written requests or anything like that? No

formal rocedures at al l PDr. 8 CHANTZ. No. If they needed it, we gave it to them. But any

material that was sent outside of the Army was done by permissionof headquarters at Fort Detrick. And whenever I had a request forpoison -let us say from a physiological laboratory that wanted toinvestigate the mechanism of action-I first would make sure that thisman was a competent investigator, and that the university wanted

the poison used in their laboratory.If that were ascertained, then I filled out a litt le form designed byFort Dotrick stating who it was to go to, how much they wanted, andwhether or not I recommended that they et it. This went to head-quarters; it would come back to me, usua ly approved. And then Iwould send out some material packaged as mentioned before.

Senator TOWER. Did you keep records of the amount of toxin thatyou gave to the Special 6 rations Division ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. No ; I di rr not really.Senator TOWER. What accounting records were kept by you, or by

your office?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I must say this about turning it over to SO Di-vision, that when I first prepared toxin-and I think it was in 195P-we had about 20 grams then, and this wasto be distributed. And I assume that SO

assed on up to headquartersIYl vision got a portion of this.

Senator TOWER. Did the Army levy a charge to any scientist or orga-nization that received this toxin ?

Dr. SOHANTZ. I do not quite understand, Senator Tower.Senator TOWER. Did they place any conditions! Did they try to

mandate what the parameters of its use were?

Dr. SRANTZ. Well, do you mean that they defined who could get it,or what their qualifications-Senator TOWER. And what they could use it for.Dr. SCKANTZ. Oh, yes. That was my responsibility ; to recommend

to headquarters that these are competent peo le to handle this.Senator TOWER. But after it left your han iii! , you actually had no

control 8Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct, except I used to check at times. And

often these universities that had investigated it would send me letter



146

reports on what they had found out, and often reprints of papers theyhad published on the use of the shellfish poison.

Senator TOWER. Were there any reports required from the scientistsor the organizations or institutions to whom this toxin was given ?I notice quite a number of foreign establishments--University of Glas-gow, University of Leeds, Norwegian Defense Research Establish-ment-that looks a little ominous-Italy, Japan, and so forth.

Dr. SCHANTZ. There was no particular report required.Senator Towzn. In other words, they did not have to report to you

periodically what thev were doing with this stuff 8Dr. SCHANTZ. That-is correct.Senator TOWER. In response to Mr. Smothers’ question earlier, you

indicated a direct relationship between Public Health and SOD. Now,

could you explain the nature and extent of any agreement or workingprocedure between Public Heslth and SOD ‘?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, SOD, as I understand it, made the contractagreement with Public Health Service, and the first one ~8s at theTaft Center in Cincinnati, to prepare toxin.

Now I had nothing to do with setting up the contract; I do notknow how much money it was and so on. But I was sent to Cincin-nati on occasion to help them get the purification procedure under-way, and I also checked samples of the n&son that supposedly werepurified. And I checked it to make sure it was up to standards, so to

ipeak.Senator TOWER. Thank vou, Dr. Schantz.Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that a list be placed in the

record of recipients of the toxin.The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done. [Exhibit ll.l]The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mondale?Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you testified

earlier, Dr. Schantz, that you had seen orders come down to destroytoxin in language that was identical to the language appearing in theNational Security Decision Memorandum.

Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct.Senator MONDALE. Was there any doubt in your mind that thatPresidential order of destruction of toxins included shellfish toxin?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Noquestion whatsoever.Senator MONDALE. Do you believe there could be any reasonable

doubt in the mind of a chemist or a te.chnician working m this field,other than the one you had, concerning the applicability of the Presi-dential order to these shellfish toxins?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, this shellfish toxin is a chemical of high potency,that is highly lethal, of biological origin, and I do not know how elseyou could classify it. It is a biological product.

Senator MONDALE. And thus, in your opinion, at that time, when yousaw the Presidential order, there was utterly no doubt in your nnndbut that this included shellfish toxins.

Dr. SCHANTZ. Absolutely. Yes.Senator MONDALE. First of all, I would ask the staff to provide Dr.

Schantz with two documents: One dated February 17,1970, entitled“Special Operations Division’s Toxin Inventory,” and another, datedFebruary 18, 1970, entitled “Paralytic Shellfish Poison WorkingFund Investigation.”

-.-. ..a..



147

As I understand it, Dr. Schantz, at the time these inventories were

Iirepared, you were still with the Government working on these shell-sh toxins at Fort Detrick.

Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct.Senator MONDALE. Can you help us understand these two inven-

tories? The first dated February 17, entitled “Special Operations Di-vision Toxin Inventory” reports to higher authority that only smallquantities of shellfish toxin remain in their inventories. Is that correct ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, when I asked them for the toxin, at the time theDivision was being dissolved, they presented me with 100milligrams-

Senator MONDALE. I’m not trying to get to that, Dr. Schantz. I amt ing to establish that we have inventories prepared only a day apartw ich differ dramatically in the amount of shellfish toxin in theirinventories.

Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes, I see hat.Senator MONDALE. The one on the 17th of February reports very

modest quantities remaining, quantities I would think appropriate forresearch purposes : 0.2 grams of paralytic shellfish toxin; redriedtoxin, .Ol grams; shellfish toxin, clam, .Ol grams. Then, on the fol-lowing day, on February 18, there is an inventory, and on top of itit says “U.S. Public Health Service, Taft Center, Ohio,” and it lists,on the two pages, a total of 5.9-or 10.9 to 7 grams, which is an enor-mous quantity of shellfish toxin. Can you help .us to understand thedifference between these two inventories?

Dr. SCHANTZ. I really can’t. I don’t know anything about them.Senator MONDALE. You see, what worries me is this: The Defense

Department was ordered to destroy a massive quantity of shellfishtoxin which could be used for offensive purposes under the Presiden-tial order. They had substantial quantities of this toxin at FortDetrick. But when the inventory came forth, it showed that practicallyall of that toxin had disappeared somewhere.

Dr. SCHANTZ. It looks that way, yes.Senator MONDALE. So I am ver suspicious that whoever did it,

instead of following a Presidentia 9 order, sneaked the stuff out theback door, and then prepared an inventory for higher authoritieswhich suggested that it had all been destroyed. But I gather that youare not in a position to help us understand these inventories.

Dr. SCHANTZ. I cannot explain this at all.Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Dr. Schantz. Thank you, Mr. Chair-

man.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Mondale. Senator Baker.Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Doctor, I really do not know that I can cover any ground that you

have not already covered except to ask you if you could tell me whatsort of recordkeepin you did do. Was there a manufacturing recordas you formulated a atch of shellfish toxin! Did you make a recordof how much the yield was 1

Dr. SCHANTZ. Oh yes. That is in our notebooks. It could be located,I suppose.

Senator BAKER. Have you tried to locate it 8Dr. SCMNTZ. Well, I haven’t, no.Senator BAKER. Do you know whether anyone has tried to or not P



148

Dr. SCHANTZ. No, I really don’t,Senator BAKER. Would that notebook say how much had been manu-

factured in toto by the Department of Defense or the Public HealthService or by anyone else in Government 1

Dr. QCHANTZ. I imagine that. a complete examination of al l of thenotes over the years-one could get a good estimate of what actuallvwas produced.

Now, I know that in 1954, or along in there somewhere, I cannotpin a specific date to it, but we had about 20 grams.

Senator BAKER. In 19549Dr. SCHANTZ. About 1954 or 1955, along in there. ‘And this was, as

I mentioned before, passed onto Headquarters for distribution. And

I retained some for research and some for the Public Health Service.Senator BAKER. You estimated that &out 10 to 15 grams were at

Fort Detrick at one time or another.Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct.Senator BAKER. How much material did you handle in the course

of your professional lifetime? Could you give us some estimate ofthat 8

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I prepared directly approximately 20 grams. Iwas involved in helping, or assisting, Public Health in the preparationof, I figure, maybe another 10 or 15 grams.

Senator BAKER. Do you know of any records that were ever de-stroyed in this connection, Doctor ?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, none of mine were ever destroyed that I know of.

Now, when Detrick was closed, I guess these notes and everythingwent to Kansas City, we were told-1 know nothing about them afterthat.

Senator BAKER. So you have no personal knowledge of it, but youhave no reason to think that any records were destroyed 8

Dr. SCHANTZ. I do not know why they should have been destroyed.Senator BAKER. Do you know what else was in the cache of material

that was found at the CIA facility in Washington besides the shell-fish toxin? I remember there was cobra venom and a few other thingsthere, too.

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well. I had other toxins on hand which were de-stroyed.

Senator BAKER. Do you know the material I am referring to? Thematerial that was found-what do they call it 8

Dr. SCHANTZ. You mean the cobra venom? I never worked withthat, and I don’t know.

Senator BAKER. What else did you work with ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Clostridium botulinum toxins, staphylococcal entero-toxins mainly, and of course shellfish poison.

Senator BAKER. If there are records extant from the Fort Detrickoperation, can you give us any clue as to who has them or where wemight locate them 8 -

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, we were told that after a certain length of timeall reports that we wrote at Detrick went to a depository, I think mKansas City. I am not sure about that, but it seems o me that was it.

Senator BAKER. Really, all I’m reaching for is this, Doctor. I wantto know whether or not you have any reason to think that any records

of this program were ever de&roved.



149

Dr. SCHANTZ. I know of none.Senator BAKER. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRXAN. Thank you, Senator Baker.

It hardly needs to be stressed that this is a very serious subject,but Senator Tower asked that I include a list in the record of all ofthose who have received this toxin, presumably for laboratory andmedical purposes. And I have just been looking through the list, andI find on the second page a listing of someone who is said to have beenassociated with the department of pharmacology at Geor etown Uni-versity Medical School, and his name is Lieutenant Jgames Bond.[General laughter.

1r. SCHANTZ. We 1, I see this--Senator MONDALE. Do you notice his zip code number is 20007?

[General laughter.]Dr. SCHANTZ. I’m sorry I missed that.Senator MONDALE. There is also a Dr. Covert who gets it.The CHAIRMAN. Do you know any of these gentlemen? Do you know

James Bond ?Dr. SCHANTZ. I’m sorry, I do not know any of them. I knew Dr.

Covert.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddleston ?Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since we have

raised a specter of 007, do you have any knowledge or informationabout who P600 is ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. P600? Well, if that was at Fort Detrick, I would beinclined to say it is a building number.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Are buildings able to give instructions?Dr. SCHANTZ. For authorization to do something with it.Senator HUDDLESTON. From a certain building?Dr. SCHANTZ. That would be my guess. Now. I did not see anything

with that on it, but we often used that around Detrick. P would be fora permanent building, and T was for temporary buildings.

Senator HUDDJ.,EFT~N. I recall those myself back in my Arm? days.Et;; does the bulldmg P600 Identify anything for you ? Did that

Dr. SCHANTZ. I don’t remember.Senator HUDDLESTON. You do not remember?Dr. SCHANTZ. No.Senator HIJODLF~TON. Dr. Schantz, was the shellfish toxin stored in

liquid form or powdered form?Dr. SCHANTZ. You can store it anv way. It should be-normally, it

is stored in an acidic solution, and it would be in a solution such asthat. I have no reason to believe that it would not be always stable.

Senator HUDDLESTON. I would like to determine the :&mount that

would be required to render a lethal dosage to an individual. Would,for instance, dioping a pen or the point of a dart into this liquid, andthen iniecting it into an individual, be enough to kill him?

Dr. SCHANTZ. It might be. There are snecially-designed things thathold enough to-that I’m sure would kill a human being.

Senator HUDDLESTON. In your research, did you involve yourselfwith these kinds of delivery svstems?

Dr. SCHANTZ. No; not at all. But on occasions, SO Division hadshowed me some of them.



150

Senator HUDDLEBTON. We were talking about how a manufacturingprocess took pl,ace. Can you tell us how many shellfish would be re-quired to produce, say, 1 gram of toxin?

Dr. SCHANTZ. I think we said-and I am only making an estimatenow-probably, well, 100 pounds.Senator HUDDLEBTON. 100 pounds? How many actual fish would that

be. do you think?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, you caught me off guard on that. It would be

several thousand shellfish.Senator HUDDLEBTON. Shellfish are not very large, are they, gen-

erally 1Dr. SCHANTZ. They would weigh, probably-a butter clam, the meat

would weigh 100 grams or so, something like that, which would be aquarter of a pound.

Senator HUDDLESTON. What arrangements did you have for securingthese large numbers of shellfish ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. In securing them?Senator HVDDLESTON. Yes.Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, at one time, of course, we worked with people

at the University of California Medical Center in San Francisco, andthey would watch the toxicity of cl.ams or mussels along the coast.And when the toxicity rose to a good level, about a dozen of us, mostlyfrom the IJniversity of California Medical Center, would all go out

and. at l,ow tide, collect mussels. -4nd this was our start& materialfor isolation.Senator HLJDDLESTOS. We.re there any other institutions you worked

with that would supply you with the--Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, now, one problem was the scarcity of it along

the California coast, and we had heard rumors from the Canadiansthat this material, or the butter clams in Alaska, were very toxic attimes. We went up there and worked with the Alaska ExperimentalCommission. They were very cooperative in helping us collect clams.We used their boat, we used their help, and we collected many hun-

dreds of pounds of these clams’ siphons for this purpose.Senator HUDDLXBTON.What kind of security did you work under atFort Detrick?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I had a top secret clearance. The project wasclassified “secret” in the early stages, and I do not remember the datethat it was declassified. But I think it was along in 1956 or 195’7.

Senator HUDDLEBTON. It was declassified at that time?Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes., it was declassified to “restricted,” which meant

t.hat it was not published in the newspapers.Sen,ator HUDDLMTON. Were you required to report to any individual

on the state of your experimentation in this field ?Dr. SCHANTZ. A report every quarter of the year.Senator HUDDLESMN. And to whom did that report go?Dr. SCHANTZ. Now, over the years-I think in the beginning they

went to a Dr. Hill, -who was chief of, I think they called it the BasicSciences Division then. These were passed on up, of course, to Dr.Wopert, who was Director at Fort Detrick, and to the commandingofficer.

Senator HUDDLESTON. believe you have stated to the committee thatwhen the Special Operations Division was closing down, you obtainedfrom its laboratory a small quantity of shellfish toxin.



151

Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct.Senator HUDDLESTON. From whom did vou obtain this, and under

whose authority ‘?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I obtained it from-1 do not know who actually

handed it to me, but I talked to the Director at that time, and his namewas Andy Cowan.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Did you obtain this for a specific purposedDr. SCHANTZ. Yes.Senator HUDDLESTON. Did you indicate to him what that purpose

was?Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes. I told him it was for Public Health.Senator HUDDLEBTON. And you did than turn that over to the FDA,

is th,at correct?Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct, and it was used in making up these

standards for the shellfish poison assay.Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know whether anybody else in the

world is producing shellfish toxin at this time?Dr. SCHANTZ. Not that I know of.Senator HUDDLESTON. Dr. Schantz, while you were at Fort Detrick,

were YOU aware of programs and experimentation in drugs or poisonsthat would produce tuberculosis or brucellosis?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Poisons that would produce these?Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, bacteria or whatever that would produce

tuberculosis.Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I know about it. I do not know specifically.Senator HUDDLESTON. Did you participate in any of those

experiments ?Dr. SCHANTZ. Really not, but I knew a great deal about them. There

was a big program on brucellosis.Senator HUDDLEBMN. Do you know what the objective was, what

they were seeking tc accomplish ?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, at Fort Detrick, we were interested in how you

handle an enemy’s attack with one of these agents, supposing-well,the brucellosis organism-there was experimentation going on in aero-solizing these micro-organisms, and we studied symptoms of diseaseproduced in this manner, and mainly to learn how to combat these ifit, was used a ainst us.

Senator If ODDLEBTON. It was your understanding that the objectivewas to develop defenses against the useof this material ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes. But to develop,a defense, you first of all had to-what the agent would dv

Senator HUDDLIBTON. How it might be used ?Dr. SCHANTZ. And I think that was in line with policy of this coun-

try-defensive.Senator HUDDLESTON. I believe my time is up. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. And I might say, it is still in line with the policy

of the country, because nothing we have undertaken to do in the treatydeprives us of continuing to develop defensive means to protect againstthese oisons.

Dr. 8 CHANTZ. Yes.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias?Senator MATXIAB. Mr. Chairman, I perhaps, from a parochial point

of view, have had to take notice of the fact that. as Dr. S&ant2 has



152

described the sources of toxic shellfish, he has referred exclusively tothe west coast of the United States and not to one mussel, one clam,or one oyster from the Chesapeake bay. [General lau hter.)

Dr. SCHANTZ. I must say that-+General laughter. TSenator MATHIAB. You are ahead now, D,r. Schantz. Do no+Dr. SCHANTZ. But in the last 3 or 4 years, along the coast of New

England, there has been considerable trouble in the shellfish industrywith the poison dinoflagellates growing and causin toxic shellfish,And we have had quite a problem, and the Food an cftration is

Drug Adminis-uite involved, and the local food and drug agencies in the

States up a ong there are very concerned.Now, in the Chesapeake Bay, we have never discovered any poison

dinoflagellates that I know of, so you should feel safe,

Senator MATHIAS. Well, we thank you very much for that endorse-ment, and I am sure that all of the watermen of the Chesapeake Baywill be very glad to get that assurance.

Dr. SCHANTZ. I must add, too, that the Food and Drug Adminirl.tration is checking those, too.

Senator MATHIAS. Dr. Schantz, we all had a chuckle at the expenseof Mr. Bond at the Georgetown School of Pharmacy, but I would liketo make sure that the record is clear with respect to what went on inthe exchanges of scientific knowledge at Fort Detrick. Now, in the28 years that you were at Detrick, did you observe that Detrick was a

very secure Army installation? Was there a high awareness of securityprecautions?Dr. SCHANTZ. I felt so, yes.Senator MATHIAS. There was both an inner and outer fence!Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes.Senator MATHIAS. And very elaborate arrangements when anyone

visited Fort Detrick ? Is that not so ?Dr. SCHANTZ. I thought there was, yes.

Senator MATHIAS. And yet, at the same time, there was a constantexchange with medical schools and research institutions, was therenot?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, with shellfish poison.Senator MATHIAS. Well, I am talking generally at Fort Detrick.Dr. SCHANTZ. Oh, yes, there was. That is true, There were many

programs that extended to universities around the country.Senator MATHIAB. Harvard Medical School ?Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct.Senator MATHIAS. Baylor in Houston, Tex., other medical institu-

tions that are world-famous all sent representatives to Detrick. Is thatright?

Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct, yes.

Senator MATHIAS. And was there a program at Detrick which en-couraged the materials for research purposes, bacteriological samplesfor example, and other scientific mat,erials?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I don’t know as there was a special group forthis.

Senator MATHIAS. I do not mean a special Lgroup,but did it happen PWhat I am asking vou i-

Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes: it did. I always felt that the Army was verycooperative with medical institutions around the country, and if we



153

had something of value to medicine, that this was commuted to them,within the limits of security.

Senator MATHIAS. And this was not limited to scientific institutions

in the United States a In fact, there was an exchange with many insti-tutions in various parts of the world?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, the only ones-well, yes, of course. Britain,

which has an, establishment like ours, and Canadians, for instance,too.; there is close coordination between Canadians, the British labora-tories, and our own laboratory.

Senator MATHIAS. And did this exchange of people and materialsresult in any scholarly publications which were not c1as.sifie.d and whichwere therefore available to the scientific community throughout theworld ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. I would say yes. One example would be that theEnglishman by the name of Dr. Evans was the first to discover themechanism of action of shellfish poison. He was at the agriculturalresearch council at Cambridge.

Senator MATHIAS. So that what is illustrated in connection’ withthe exchan e of these toxins is not an isolated or an unusual or a uniqueexample o P what was happening at Fort Detrick ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. That is riSenator MATHIAB. Than %

ht ; yes.you very much.

The CHAIRIJAN. Thank you.Senator Hart !Senator HART of Colorado. Dr. Schantz, one question. Were you at

Fort Detrick when the Special Operations Division was closed down ?Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes; I was.Senator HART of Colorado. Were there discussions among you and

your colleagues in regard to the distribution of the toxins?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I had to give a report on what I had on hand

and I suppose that that was for-well, it was for decisions up inheadquarters.

Senator HART of Colorado. Were you involved in discussions with

the people around you, or that you worked with, about how to avoid

complete destruction of these toxins?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I had no such authority at al l.Senator HART of Colorado. It is not a

.authority. The question is whether there was 1uestion of your haviniscussion among you an a

your colleagues as to how to avoid destroying these toxinsDr. SCHANTZ. No.Senator H-T of Colorado. It is not a question of your having

thought in discussions with staff members that you were involved incomplicated procedures.

Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes.

Senator HART of Colorado. Did those procedures have to do withthe destruction of these toxins or with the avoidance of the destruc-tion of these toxins? What were those complicated procedures?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I do not exactly know what you mean. Theprocedures for destruction were clear enough to me. There is noquestion about that. Later they were clarif ied and did not apply tomaterials for research or for public health and so forth and that waswhat I meant by complicated.



154

Senator HART of Colorado. Well, did toxins that might have haddestructive, wartime, or offensive capabilities suddenl become be-

% rmedically oriented materials that everyone coul

eknt research purB reorient for

tlioees?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes; at is true.Senator HART of Colorado. All of a sudden eve bod be an to

think of other noncombative or nonoffensive purposes t at t eaeK f-toxic materials could be used for. Is that not the case?

ighly

Dr. SCHANTZ. I think that is a natural thins to do. But shellfishpoizon was set aside for the Public Health Service and the Food andDrug Administration many years before this order was issued.

Senator HART of Colorado. But materials at Fort Detrick were notfor medical researohspurposes. This was a Defense Department installa-

tion experimenting with these materials presumably for some activi-ties that the Department of Defense undertakes. The Department ofDefense is not the Public Health Service. It has a different mandateI think all would agree.

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, now the ,material I had in Public-at FortDertick was held for the Public Health Service and I was custodianof this material. They asked that I keeunder the auspices of the Public Health 3

it there, but it was done soervice.

Senator HART of Colorado. But I think you have testifiedi just toclarify tthe record, that there were discussions.of materials, let us say

hel$ bgz;y;ZeoP

le with whom you were working.

S&&or HART o?Colorado. Materials which might be made avail-able for nonmilitary

Dr. SGHANT~. Yes, 3;urposes and thus avoid the destruction order.thmk that is indicated in these documents that

you handed to me.Senator HART of Colorado. That is all, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hart. Senator Schweiker.Senator SCH~EIEER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Dr. Schantz, which de artment were you working with at Fort

Detrick? Were you in SO 8 ZDr. SCHANTZ. I was in what was called Physical Sciences Division.Senator SCHWEIKER. And were you with them most of the 28 years

or all of the 28 years?Dr. SCHANTZ. Through the years the name of the Division changed.

I think it started out as the Basic Sciences Division and there were someother changes in names, but it ended Physical Sciences Division whenFort Detrick closed down.

Senator SCHWEIKER. As I understand it, originally the work thatyou did on this area of shellfish poison was primarily with the Physical

Sciences Division and then at some point in time the Special 0 era-xions Division, or SOD, really became the primary interest and P ysi-cal Sciences Division either lost interest or did not pursue it muchfurther. Is that correct and when did that occur Z

Dr. SCHANTZ. Generally, sir, that is correct ; yes.Senator SCHWEIKER. What was the initial purpose of the work when

you first started it there in Physical Sciences as far as shellfish toxinwas concerned ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. It was started off in early discussion ri ht after thewar. The chemical corps was looking for new toxic su6 tances and



155

T suggested to them, “Well, why not look at some of the biologicalpoisons that are produced?” And I sshellfish that we might-maybe we coul I

gasted this problem with the

and, from that know1“dgy

isolate this, get its structure,

Senator SCHWEIKER.e, devise new chemical agents.

ou indicated, I believe, that you were awareof an inventory of 20 grams in 1954 and your work was affil iated withthat quantity indirect1

Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes.or directly ?

E xcept that I had to turn most of this over tothe headquarters at Fort Detrick.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Meaning SOD ?Dr. Sc~u~r+rz. No, meaning headquarters, Fort Detrick.Senator SCHWEIKER. Now, of the 20 grams, about how much of that

came from the U.S. Public Health Service centers, either at Narra-

ganset&Dr. SCHANTZ. None of it. That was another preparation.Senator SCH~~KER. None came from either the Taft #Center or

Rhode Island 0Dr. SOHANTZ. Well, the material from Taft Center and from Rhode

Island was not included in this 20 grams. It was 10 or 15 grams pre-pared by them which was

Senator SCHWEIKER. I??

assed, as I understand it, directly to SOD.ell, did the 20 grams, was that made in-

house by the Fort Detrick people then?Dr. SCHANTZ. That is correct.

Senator SCHWFJKER. So 20 grams was made in-house at Fort Det-rick, about 10 grams came from the U.S. Public Health Service labs?Dr. SCHANTZ. I would say that is approximately correct, but I do

not have the exact figures for that.Senator SCHWEIKER. Were there any other U.S. Public Health

Service offices involved that you worked with or communicated withbesides those two ‘4

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, there was a Public Health liaison officer atFort Detrick.

Senator SCHWEIKER. An

cinnati and Narragansett t K

other physical location other than Cin-

at you tested the material with?Dr. SCHANTZ. No ; not t,hat I know of.Senator SCHWEIKER. And the relationship was a contractual re-

lationship between the Army and the Public Health Service and Ibelieve we cited a $194,000 contract between t,he Army and the TaftCenter. Is that ri ht ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. # hat is what I heard, yes.Senator SCH~JXKER. Do you have any idea how many grams that

$194,000 would be accountable for or not ?Dr. SHANTZ. I have no idea.

SenatorSCHWEIKER.

Now, when the FDA Came into it, were theyin any way involved in the part that, Fort Detrick was interested in orthe CIA was interested in or were they involved in what phase of it a

Dr. SCHANTZ. They were only interested in making sure that com-mercial shellfish contain no poison.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Strictly on that basis?Dr. SCHANTZ. That is right, that is as far as I know.Senator SCHAFER. You have no knowledge of other contracts be-

yond the Taft Cen’ter contract or are you saying that is the only oneyou know, but there might be others?



156

Dr. SCHANTZ. That is the only one I know of that produced poison.Now we had contracts with Northwen University, for instance, and

the University of California.Senator SCHWEIKER. For whatDr. SCHANTZ. To he1 P

urpose?

Senator SCHWEIKER. itiin deve oping the purification procedure.

o were they then producing the poison toxin 1Dr. SCHANTZ. They were not.Senator SCHWEIKER. The testinDr. SCHANTZ. Well, they were 8

and chemical procedures?

tion with us.eveloping procedures for purifica-

Senator SCHWEIKER. Purification is a bit of a misnomer, it sort ofmeans how deadly it is, does it not? I mean, we take a contamination,

we try to make it pure, but we are really talking about how effective ordeadly it is. Is that correct ?Dr. SCHANTZ. Essentiallv, yes, because the more pure you would

have it, the higher the specific potency would be.Senator SCHWEIXER. By a rough count of the list that we saw, there

are 184 dispersals of some kind of toxin or poison, and a;bout 63 wererelated to shellfish. Does this list show the operations where you weredispensing these toxins for medical, medicinal, or research purposes?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Is that from the Department of the Ar,my or fromFort Detrick 8

Senator SCHWEIKER. Right. And a typical dispersal would amountto how many milligrams?Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes, it would be-it could be one milligram or some-

times it was %,30, depending upon-Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, would you give us a rough estimate of

how much toxin was involved in these 63 dispersals ?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, if I t,ook an average of 10 milli,o?-ams for e.ach

one, I would have 600 milligrams, and that is a little over a half agram.

Senator SOHWEIKER. OK, a little over half a gram total.

Dr. SCHANTZ.~~~.Senator SCHWEIKER. So, in essence,we have a pict,ure where thereare 30 grams U.S. production of which one-half of 1 gram is used formedical, medicinal, health or environmental research. Is that an ac-curate proportion ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Yes ; that was sent out to laboratories not connectedwith Fort Detrick or the Public Health Service.

Senator SCHWEIKER We are not sure about James Bond though, arewe?

Dr. SCHANTZ.NO.Se,nator SCHWEIKER. Incidentally, if y?u are relieved, he did not get

the shellfish toxin, he got the botuhsm polls, according to the list any-way.

The other P600 designation, could you t,ell us who the highest rank-ing officer headquartered in P600 was 8 In other words, you said thatwas a building at Fort D&rick. Who would be the highest officer thatwas located in building P600 of Fort Detrick?

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well; I said that I thought it was a building number.Senator SCHWEIKER. Were you aware of what safe those toxins were

stored in, or what building, or what, vault, those two cans?Mr. SCHANTZ.I do not know anything about those two cans.



157

Senator So~wxrxx~ When you want to get your supply that you dis-pensed, where did ou get it from?

Dr. SCHANTZ. l!

it.

hat I dispensed from my laboratory, where I kept

Senator SCHWEIXER.You kept it in the vault, your own vault?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I kept it in my laboratory which was locked.Senator SCHWEIKER. What was the ‘largest quantity that you would

keep there?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I had several grams. I do not remember exact

amounts.Senator SCHWEIKER. So you are saying you do not know where the

other vault or storage place was located that might have containedthese 11 grams 1 Would that be correct ?

Dr. SCHANTZ. No ; I really do not, none whatsoever.Senator SCHWEIKER. Using the Public Health Service for this pur-pose troubles me as a Senator because it looks to me as if we have thetail wagging the dog. At some point we were doing legitimate researchto protect our people from the red tide and from the contaminationof shell&h poison. But then at some point we decided that it was abiological weapon or toxic wea on and went all out in this regard.And I real1

9do have great dou & ts that we should be using the U.S.

Public Hea th Service whose function, by my concept as rankingmember of the Health Committee, is to prevent people from getting

poisons and toxins and to prevent the spread of disease instead ofmanufacturing it.It is a little bit like.saying you are going to stop the plague, but

in stopping the plague they research enough of the plague bacteriaand pass it out to people who can use it to kill other people for theplague. Does this not trouble you a little bit, this usage, getting awaynow from the pure research and the other aspects which nobody isquestioning and, as you have documented it here, probably is a legiti-mate usage 8

Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, I do not know why the contracts were estab-lished with the Public Health Service but I can understand why theCincinnati laboratory would be interested in this material and aIsthe Narragansett laboratory. The laboratory at the Taft Center is in-volved in the food poisons, and shellfish oison is one of these. TheNarragansett laboratory is a national she lfish laboratory and I cansee their interest in this. And I think that they just felt that here isa chance to gain some experience in shellfish, poisonous shellfish andI suppose that the money of the contract looked good to them.

Senator SCHWEIKER.Well, again I can understand if all of the 30grams were being used for that purpose but with a half a gram beingused for that and 29.5 being used as an obvious weapon of war, it justseems to me we sort of have the tail wagging the dog.

Dr. SCHANTZ.Well, now several grams have gone into Public Health.Senator SCHWEIKER.Well, in addition to the three now, because they

obvious1.y kept some there, did they not keep some of their own labsfor that research at Narragansett?

Dr. SCHANTZ. I imagine they did, yes, but I have furnished and Ihave on hand-well let us see-when we were developing the standardassay for shellfish poison I furnished Public Health a considerableamount of poison.



158

Senator SCHWEXER. How much?Dr. SCHANTZ. Well, it probably took a gram or two just to develop

this standardized assay and then after that I have to keep up a sup-ply on hand to put up in these little vials that are sent out to labora-tories that assay shellfish poison, and so I still have an obligation withthe Food and Drug Administration to have a supply on hand for them.I am still custodian of the toxin for them and whenever they need thesefor distribution in the assay. I prepare the vials for them and I stand-ardize them and make sure they are what they are supposed to be.

Senator SCHWEIKER. That’s all I have, Mr. Chairman, thank you.The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Schantz? since you are the fol*most expert in

the country on this shellfish toxm and have given us the benefit of yourtestimony and have responded to ithc questions that have been asked by

the committee, I think that we are prepared now, on the basis of yourtestimony, to reach a commitftee decision with respect ts the reque&that has been made of us to lift the application of the general banagainst the destruction of documents, substances or materials withrespect to the particular poisons that we have been inquiring (about.

And so I have prepared a letiter to Mr. Colby and I would like toread it to the members of the commit.tee and then ask the committee’sapproval. The letter has been prepared for my signature as Chairmarand for the sign’ature of John Tower qs Vice Chairman of the cornmittee and itt reads as follows. I ask the attention of the members. X

is dwted September 16 addressed to Mr. William E. ColbT- snd reads ahfollows :

Dear Mr. Colby. Last January, when the Select Committee was created,Senator Mansfield and Senator Scott asked that the Central Intelligence Agencynot destroy any material that would relate to the Committee’s investigation.

The biological toxins that are the subject of the Committee’s 5rst publichearings are subject to the ban on destruction. The purpose of this letter i8 toinform you that at the completion of the Committee’s investigation into theimproper retention hg the CIA of these deadly toxins, the Committee votes t0approve the destruction of the toxic materials in your possession.

However, before the CIA proceeds to destroy these toxine, we would directyour attention to the attached testimony. If adequate safety and security cautions

could be talten, the Committee believes that it might be appropriate for theCIA to consider donating these toxins, consistent with our treaty obligations toproperly supervised research facilities which can use these poisons for benignuses, such as curing such debilitating diseases as multiple sclerosis.

It is Btting that out of an admitted wrongdoing some benefit might be had. Itis hoped that in this partfcular instance the Committee and the Blxecutive Branchcan rectify past abuses and reach a mutual solution for the diBposa1 of theselethal poisons that will be directed toward bettering the lives of our citizens.

Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, I move the authorization of theletter.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been moved that the letter be authorized by

the committee. Isthere

,any discussion ?Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I have a question I would like to ask.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Baker.Senator BARER. This is the find time I have seen the letter and it

appears to be satisfactory to me. I think I will have no objection toit; but as a matter of clarifioation, I take it that the tone of theletter is that we no longer as a committee have any objection to thedestruction of the material but we invite your attention to its useful-ness for either purposes. We make no effort ,to direct the Agency to dothat.



159

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.Senator BAKER. After all that is an executive branch decision to be

made with the President and by the CIA. But this is our suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct, Senator. That is exactly what theletter says ; it is the responsibility of the executive branch to makethe decision. But we su

examine these possible fgest that the CIA and the executive branchenign medical and decent uses to which this

poison could be put in limited quantities. The balance, I assume,should and would be destroyed.

Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Any further discussion ?Senator Hart ?Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, like Senator Baker this

is the first indication I have heard of this letter. I for my part wouldlike to withhold a vote on this at the present time,.just my own vote.The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The committee ~111 not proceed to a

vote at this moment in view of the objection of Senator Hart. But Iwould like to pass the letter down for the examination of each member.And later this morning we might reconsider the taking of a vote.And we will have further consultation.

The reason that the letter was prepared and presented was in orderto bring an end to the impasse that has existed for some months. AndI would hope that the committee could reach a vote this mornin . The

letter will be made available to all members and we will procee d withthe remainin witnesses.I want to t a ank you, Dr. Schantz, very much.Dr. SCHANTZ.You are very welcome.The CHAIRMAN. For your testimony this morning. And I will call

a 5 minute recess during which I would like to ask Mr. Charles Sen-seney if he would come forward and take his position at the witnesstable.

The committee is recessed for 5 minutes.1A brief recess was taken.]The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come back to order.Mr. Senseney, would you please take the oath ?Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this

proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,so help you God ?

Mr. SENSENEY. do.The CHAIRMAN. Thank YOU.Mr. SenseneT, do you h.ave an opening statement you would like

to make at this time?

TESTHdONY OF CHARLES A. SENSENEY, DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE

EMPLOYEE, FOB.MERLY IN TKE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DMSION

AT FORT DETRICK

Mr. SENSENEY.Not really. Let USproceed.The CHA~M.AN. All right, Then I will ask Mr. Schwarz to commence-

the ouestioning.Mr. SCEWARZ. In February 1970, were you employed at Fort

Detrick?Mr. SENEIENEY.YCS, sir.



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Mr. SCHWARZ. Had you been there for a while beforehand?Mr. SENSENEY. Since 1948.

Mr. SCH~ARZ. And you worked in the Biological Warfare Section ofFort Detrick ?Mr. SENBENEY. I was hired in the Physical Defense Division in 1948

and transferred to the SO Division in about 1953.Mr. SCHWARZ. Do you know a Dr. Nathan Gordon?Mr. SENBENEY. Ido.Mr. SCHWARZ. Have you been made aware of his testimony about

you in this proceeding.Mr. SENBENEY. I read it this morning.Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. I will read to you just’ one of several

answers he gave referring to you and stating :

I got a call from Charlie Senseney. In effect , the nature of the phone call wasthat the stocks of the shellflsh toxin that they had at the SO Division faci litywould be destroyed in the near future, in implementation of the directive tellingDOD to destroy these materials, and did we want to think in terms of acceptingthe particular quantity of material to keep in store at our own CIA storagelaboratory.

Did you make that suggestion to Dr. Gordon?Mr. SENSENEY. I didn’t, but I think it possibly was at a higher level.Mr. SCHWARZ. A higher level of what ?Mr. SENSENEY. The Division. I was just an employee in the Division.

I was a member of the Development Branch, I had nothing to do withpolicy or making decisions.

Mr. SCHWARZ. Is it your understanding that the suggestion to retainthe material came from the Army or the CIA in the first instance?

Mr. SENSENEY. I think it would go this way. The materials in thestockpile were theirs, and the question was what to do with it. So theywere called to seewhat they want,ed to do with what they owned. It wastheirs; they had bought it.

Mr. SCHWARZ. And your understanding is that they said-Mr. SENSENEY. It was not offered. It was just-what do we do with

it?

Mr. SCHWARZ. And your understanding is that someoneat the CIAsaid, yes, we want it?

Mr. SENSENEY. Well, it had to be, I think.Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.Mr. SENSENEY. Let me stress I was in the hardware section and not

t,he agent section. I do not know really much about the agent part ofthis.

Mr. SCHWARZ. So that makes Dr. Gordon’s testimony-first, YOUdeny his testimony, right?

Mr. SENSENEY. I think that he was contacted, but not by me.Mr. SCHWARZ. Do you deny his testimony, as far as you are con-

cerned ZMr. SENSENY. Ido.Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.I just have one further question.Were you aware that the CIA was working with Fort Detrick?Mr. SENBENEY. After a while. Not when I first went with the SO

Division, but it became apparent later.Mr. SCHWARZ. Did the CIA people use a false name to describe

+hnmonlrraoQ



Mr. SENBENEY. Staff Support Group.Mr. SCHWARZ. And that was a false name ; was it not ?Mr. SENSENEY. And it was also- ou asked another question earlier

this morning, at least someone did, J 600 was their funding citation.Mr. SCHWARZ. P600 was their funding citation? And the Staff Su -port Group was a false name? And who was it designed to mislea ?

Mr. SENSENEY. I don’t know.Mr. SCHWARZ. Is that a name that sounds like an Army group?Mr. SENBENEY. Well, you would have thought so to begm, because he

first two that I was aware of were a colonel in the Air Force and acolonel in the Army. It looked like an Army support group of somesort at the start.

Mr. SCHWARZ. So both the name and the personnel made it look as f

it was an Army group, even though, in fact, it was CIA personnel ?Mr. SENBENEY. That’s ri ht.Mr. SCHWARZ. I have not fl ‘ng further, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smothers.Mr. SX~THERS. Mr. Chairman, just one brief line of inquiry.Mr. Senseney, you indicated that you were in the hardware business.

Was a part of your hardware business the development of a dartlauncher B

Mr. SENEEIVEY. I was the project engineer of the M-l and followingon micro-organism projectiles and so forth.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Is this a device that looks roughly like a .45-caliberpistol with a sight mount at the top ?

Mr. SENSENEY. This was a follow-on. It was to replace the M-l pro-jectile to go into the army stockpile. It did look like a .45.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Let me then ask you a question regarding your testi-mony before the members of this staff on September 9, when you wereasked about that M-l dart launcher.

Reading from the transcript, Mr. Snider was questioning you :

Did the CIA people ever receive any of the M-l dart launchers to fire humandarts 1

Your response :

They had some, but they did not have agents, to my knowledge. They had themjust, for instance, to 5re the projectile, the bare projectile, to see whether it couldgo through human clothing, that type of thing. I do not recall them ever havingor asking for one that was coated.

Now, by the reference here, the one that was coated, are you talkingabout the projectiles that this dart launcher would have fired?

Mr. SENSENEY. Yes.Mr. SY~TI-IE~~. Is it then your testimony that the Agency neither

had nor requested from you or from Detrick, to your knowledge,coated materials for use n this dart launcher 8

Mr. SENSENEY. They had some.Now, let me say it this wa .

9I do not know how many they took,

but they had some for surveil ante purposes. They were going to con-duct heat, moisture tests? cold tests, and so forth, to see what wouldh pen to the projectile m its coated state. These were returned.

xl d what happened was that there was a reaction between the agentand the metal, to the point that it cemented the rojectile inside thecartridge, and there was no way this could be use at that time.



162

Now, this was good information to us, because it told us that weshould change that metal. And we did. We changed it from what it wasoriginal1 to latinum. Platinum was something that was-that seemedto be 0 K? +iit the use of muscle poison.

Mr. SBZOTHERS. Is it our testimony, then, that the only darts theyhad were teated by the K gency and then returned to you?

Mr. SENSENEY. That is correct.Mr. SXOTHERS. Is it your further testimony that they did not sub-

se uently ask you for a stockpile of poison darts?XI r. SENSENEY. Not of that type.Mr. SBKITHERS. Well, then, did they have, Mr. Senseney, the where-

withal to utilize this dart launcher against humans?Mr. SENSENEY. No. They asked for a modification to use against a

dog.Now, these were actually given to them, and they were actually ex-

Kended, because we got all the hardware back. For a dog, tha projectilead to be made many times bigger. It was almost the size of a .22

cartridge, but it carned a chemical -compound known as 4640.Mr. SMOTHERS. And their interest was in dog incapacitants?Mr. SENSENEY. Right.Mr. SMOTHERS. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Were you aware of the amount of shellfish toxin

belonging to the CIA that was in the custody of the Army SOD?

Mr. SENSENEY. I knew it had to be between, say, 1 and 10 grams,in that area somewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Actually, we are told that it was 5 grams. But whent.he laboratory in which it was stored was discovered a few monthsago and opened up and the cache was examined, it turned out thatthere was an additional 6 grams, approximately 6 grams. No one hasyet been able to tell us where the additional 6 grams may have comefrom. Do you know?

Mr. SENSENEY. No, I can’t tell you. I did not have access,or I didnot know the record keeping for the agent part of the house.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions. Senator Mondale, doyou have any questions!

Senator MONDALE. Mr. Senseney, what do you do now 8Where do you work?Mr. SENSENEY. I work for the Department of Defense. I am now

with Edgewood Arsenal, Director of Engineering Development, Bi-ological Protection Branch. I am currently on temporary duty in Eng-land, in a collaborative effort with the United Kingdom.

Senator MONDALE. Do you recall any discussions about the disposalof these shellfish toxins at the time of the Presidential order and the

delivery of these toxins to the CIA warehouses here in WashingtonaMr. SENSENEY. Well, I would look at it this way. We were prepared

to actually destroy everything. However, much of the material thatwas stored in the SO Division was being stored there for anotheragency. It did not belone: to the Department of Defense.

Senator MONDALE. It belonged to the CIA BMr. SENSENEY. That is correct.Senator MONDALE. Now, did you participate in discussions as to

how that should be dealt with 8Mr. SENBENEY. No.



163

Senator MONDALE. Did you participate in discussions as to whatshould happen to the DOD-owned toxms ?

Mr. SxNsxNxY. Not really. I really do not know what happened.

s?nfltOr MONDALE. What do ou mean by %ot really!” Did youparticipate in any discussions, B d you listen in on discussions, con-cernin the disposition of those toxins P

Mr. ENsxNEY. For instance, Dr. Schantz said he ot 100 milligrams.3I did not even know that happened, but it certainly id.f

Senator MONDALE. Did you partici ate in or listen in on or wereYOU aware of any discussions about t e dis ositions of these toxins,either those on assignment from the CIA or t e toxins, shellfish toxins,owned by the DOD 1

Mr. SENSENEY. Well, at that time-1 guess this is gettin close to1970--at that time, there were very few people left in the SO ivision.I was one of them that happened to be there. The Division Chief, Dr.Cowan, and the agent side of the thing, either Mr. Leonard Thompsonor Mr. Wally Pannier-we were in the midst of an RIF at that time,so people were coming and going rather quick1 . It had to be oneof those two last persons mentioned that were in t 3:e agent category orin the agent area.

And the on1 thing that I can say is, I just have to suppose that,having been to d to maintain the sort of show and tell display of hard-ware that we had on sort of stockpile for them, these were not itemsthat could be used. They were display items like you would see in a

museum, and they used those to show to the agents as well as to theFBI, to acquaint them with possible ways that other people couldattack our own people.

Senator MONDALE. Now, Mr. Senseney, let me ask the qUeStiOn again,and I want you to listen very closely.

Did you participate in or listen in on or were you aware of anydiscussions about, the disposal of these shellfish toxins, either those onassi merit from the CIA or those owned by the DOD 1

Mg”. SENSENEY. Will you restate your question in the context ofwhere to who, was I awae

Senator MONDALE. Any discussions ,about from where to whom atall 1

Mr. SENSENEY. Let’s say I knew none of the negotiations, let us say,between the SO Division and the CIA in their decision to do whatthe did. I was told to do certain things that I did.

Benator MONDALE. What were you told to do with the toxins?Mr. SENSENEY. I was not #told to do anything with the toxins, sir.

I was told to give a development display.Senator MONDALE. I ‘am ust talking about the toxins. Did you parti-

cipa.ta in, did you listen in on, or were you aware of ‘any discussions

relating to the disposition of those shellfish toxin+ whether on aassign-ment from the CIA or owned by the DOD ?

Mr. SENSENEY. Yes.Senator MONDALE. All right. And what were they ?Mr. SENSENEY. They were told by our division head contacted

through channels, whatever that channel was, what to do with theirstockpile.

Senator MONDALE. All right.



164

Mr. SENSENEY. And they came back to, say they wanted the develo -mat-type prototypes, plus saving TZ. That’s the only thmg m tEe

stockprle they wanted.Senator MONDALE. TZ is shellfish toxin 1Mr. SENSENEY. That is correct.Senator MONDALE. What was the discussion about TZ toxin or shell-

fish toxin 1Mr. SENSENEY. Pre are it for delivery to them. They wanted it back.Senator MONDALE. Pn other words, you were told that an order was

given that the CIA wanted their shellfish toxin back. And did youpartici ate in preparing the packaging?

Mr. i!iENSENEY. No, I was not in the agent category. I’m scared ofthat.

Senator MONDALE. How did you happen to hear about that order,then Z

Mr. SENGENEY. It was only WaIly Pannier, Dr. Cowan and myself,about, in that area at the time. So he just came and ltold us both atthe same time what he wanted. There were two thing-

Senator MONDALE. Who came and told you that PMr. SENSENEY. Dr. Cowan.Senator MONDALE. Dr. Cowan? He said, get this toxin ready for

shipment back to the CIA?Mr. SENSENEY. He told that to Mr. Pannier. He did not tell it to

me.Senator MONDAIZ. All right.And then what other discussions did you hear concerning the dis-

position of these toxins?Mr. SBNSENEY. That is it.Senator MONDALE. Did you participate in any or hear about any

discussion relating to the DOD-owned shellfish toxin?Mr. SENSENEY. No. I assumed that was taken care of under the nor-

mal destruct order. Anything that belonged to Detrick, we got backinto t.he channel and got rid of it real quick. That, in turn, was thehardware. We cut. it up with hacksaws and hammered it together, putit into ovens, and melted it up into a junk heap.

Senator MONDALE. Now, what you are saying, then, is that the onlydiscussions that you participa,ted in, or had knowledge of, concern-ing the disposition of these shellfish toxins, whet,her they-were ownedby the CIA or DOD at the time you were at Fort Detrmk, was thesingle conversation that you testihed to, in which you were told thatthese CIA toxins were to be pack mad or return to the CIA ?

Mr. SENSENEY. That’s correat. TK ere was no reason to discuss it.Senator MONDALE. And that came from Mr.-Mr. SENSENEY. It came from the division head.

Senator MONDALE. It, came from Mr. Cowan.Now, you say you heard no instructions concerning the disposition

of DOD toxins, shellfish toxins.Mr. SENSENEY. Well, I am sure Mr. Pannier was told to destroy

them.Senator MONDALE. Do you have any knowledge of orders or instruc-

tions relating to the DOD toxins?Mr. SENSENEY. Not directly, no.Senator MONDALE. What do you know indirectly?



165

Mr. SENBENEP. Just by association with Mr. Pannier, I k?ow t.hJhe took car8 of all that.

Senator MONDALE. And how did he take care of al l that?

Mr. SENBENEY. By destroying it, except what he gave to Dr. Schantz,I 8%k enator MONDALE. Gave to who?Mr. SENBENEY. Dr. Schantz.Senator MONDALE. He destroyed the other toxinal Do you know that

of your personal knowledge?Mr. SENBENEY. No. I ham no evidence. I was not there when it was

done.Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Mondale.Senator Baker is next.Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.Mr. Senseney, it is my underst.anding from your testimony that no

one from ,the CIA ever contacted you about the shellfish toxin.Mr. SENSENE~. No.Senator BI\KER. But it is your surmise that the CIA did contact

one of your superiors about it?Mr. SENSENEY. I think we probably contacted them because we

wanted to know what to do with it.Senator BAKER. who was it, that contacted them?Mr. SENBENEY. Somebody higher in the chain, either at the divi-

sion level or a scientific director or commanding officer or someone.Senator BAKER. I need to do a litlt le better than that. If you do not

know, giw me your judgment on who it might have been that wasI higher than you in these categories.

. Mr. SENBENEY. It was probably our division chief, I would think.Senator BAKER. Who was that?Mr. SENSENEY. Dr. Cowan.Senator BAKER. Dr. Cowan. Where is Dr. Cowan now?Mr. SENBENEY. He works for the University of Maryland? I believe.Senator BAKER. Have you talked to Dr. Cowan about this subject?

’ Mr. SENBENEY. No.Senator BAKER. Or has he talked to you about it 1Mr. SENSENEY. No.Senator BAKER. You have no personal knowledge, then, of what

the conversartion would have been with the CIA ?Mr. SENSENEY. No.Semtor BAKER. Nor whom Dr. Cowan would have called, if in

fact it was Dr. Cowan ?Mr. SENSENEY. Not at all.Senrutor BAKER. Nor when it occurred 1

But it is your best impression, under the circumstances, and becauseof the actions that were taken, that apparently someone superior toyou, probablyou want to Ii!

Dr. Cowan, called the CIA and probably said, wha.t doo with your toxin 8

Mr. SENBENEY. Correct.Senatir BAKER. And it is also your surmise that they must have said,

we want it back.Mr. SENBENEY. I would say that.



166

Senst,or BAKER.But this is based entirely on what happened, andnot on our personal knowledge of the conversation?

Mr. ii ENSENEY. That is true.

Ssn&br BAJXER. According to the information we have from pre-vious witnesses and other documents, the inventory at Fort Detrickshowed that the CIA had approximately 5 grams of shellfish toxin.And et, according to the records we also have, almost 11 grams werefonn cr at the storage cache that the CIA maintains near the KennedyCenter. Do you know how they came by that extra, approximately 6grams 8

Mr. SENSENEY. No; because I am not aware of the amount that wasin the stockpile.

Senator BAKER. So you have no personal knowledge about whether

the 5gram figure is correct or the 11-gram figure?Mr. SENSENEY. That is correct.Senator BAKER. You did not personally participate in the return of

the toxin to the CIA !Mr. SENSENEY. That is right.Senator BAKER. Do you know anything else about this toxin, any-

thing that I have not asked you about it, that would relate to thequestion of how the CIA got xt back, on whose order and for whatpurpose ?

Mr. SENSENEY. No.Senator BAKER. Your principle job with the DOD, I take it, was to

develop new or exotic devices and weapons ; is that correct ?Mr. SENSENEY. I was a project engineer for the E-l, which was

type-classified and became the M71. They were done for the Army.Senator BAKER. Were you an Army employee ‘4Mr. SENSENEY. I am an Army employee. I still am.Senator BAKER. But in the course of your employment by the Army,

you madeto the FB I!

our work product and developments available to the CIA,, and to anyone else.

Mr. SENSENEY. I think the only other ones that possibly looked atthe display was U.S. Customs.

Senator BAKER. Anyone else ?Mr. SENSENEY. Not to my knowledge. There could have been.Senator BAKER. Did you ever have any contact with anyone else

about special devices, anybody at the White House, the IRS, at theDEA, the DIA, any of these other agencies? There are about 60agencies of Government that do either intelligence or law enforcementwork.

Mr. SENSENEY. I am sure most all of those knew of what we weredoing; yes.

Senator BAKER. Did you have any other customers ?

Mr. SENSENEY. To my knowledge our only customer was SpecialForces and the CIA, I guess.Senator BAKER. Special Forces meaning Special Forces of the

Army ‘4Mr. SENSENEY. That is correct.Senator BAKER. And the FBI 8Mr. SENSENEY. The FBI never used anvthing. They were only

shown so they could be aware of what might be brought into thecountry.



167

Senator BAXER I see, they were never a customer in the sense theynever took delive

Mr. SENBENEY. 3of any material ?hat is right.

Senator BAKER. Did you describe for us in the previous executivesession some of the exotic devices that you developed and displayedto kyrtorners.

ENSENEP. Well, I was project en ‘neer for the M-l, so all ofthe missile type, dart type or this woul f have been from my part. Iknow of others but they came under the other four project engmeers,they were road depositor-

senator BAKER. What are road depositors ?Mr. SENSENEY. A bacteriological aerosol you put on roads, on rail-

road tracks and things like that.

Senator BAKER. Who did you give that to?Mr. SENSENEY. It was not given to anyone. The Army asked for it.It was type-classified for the Army, period.

Senator BAKER. Did the Army use it 8Mr. SENSENEY. Not to my knowledge.Senator BAKER. But it was delivered to the Army. It’s an aerosol

that sprays a bactariological agent on the roa.d or railroad frmk orsome other place.

Mr. SENSENEY. It is a matter of putting the material on the roadwayor in between tracks, just like dumping a sack of flour.

Senator BAKER. Did you ever give that to the CIA.Mr. SENSENEY. No.Senator BAKER. Or any of the other agencies?Mr. SENSENEY. They had all of the prints and specifications for

these things but they never asked for them.Senator BAKER Looking at your previous executive session testi-

mony, apparently you developed for them a fountain pen. What didthe fountain pen do?

Mr. SENSENEY. The fountain pen was a variation of an M-l. AnM-l in itself was a system and it could be fired from anything. It

could be put into--Senator BAKER. Could it fire a dart or an aerosol or what?Mr. SENBENEY. It was a dart.Senator BAKER. It fired a dart, a starter, were you talking about a

fluorescent light starter ?Mr. SENSENEP. That is correct.Senator BAKER. What did it do ?Mr. SENSENEY. It put out an aerosol in the room when you put the

switch on.Senator BAKER. What did that aerosol do ?

Mr. SENSENEY. It would contaminate anybody in the room.Senator BAKER. Meaning kill them or disable them ?Mr. SENSENEY. It depends on the agent. If you are using a lethal

agent, it would probably kill. If it was a debilitating thing, it wouldjust make you sick for awhile.

Senator BAKER Did you give that to the CIA ?Mr. SENSENEY. No.Senator BAKER Only the Special Forces for the Army?Mr. SENSENEY. The Special Forces did not even want that. [General

laughter.]



168

Senator BAKER. Did you feel hurt ?Mr. SENBENEY. Well, not really.Senator BAKER. OK, what about a cane, a walkin cane?Mr. SENSENEY. Yes; an M-l projectile could be lf

also an umbrella.red from a cane,

Senator BAKER. Also an umbrella. What about a straight pin!Mr. SENSENEY. Straight pin?Senator BAXER. Yes, sir.Mr. SENBENEY. We made a straight pin, out at the Branch. I did

not make it, but I know it was made and it was used by one Mr. Powerson his U-2 mission.

Senator BAKER. As a matter of fact, it was not used’by Mr. Powers.Mr. SENSENEY. He did not use t but he had it. Let us put it that way.

Senator BAKER. And buttons. I noticed in the testimony some refer-ence to buttons. What kind of buttons are you sMr. SENBENEY. You can make a button from iological material,?

king of 1

compress it in such a way that you could actually put it on your shirtor a coat, button it up and you could walk into another country witha starter for coming up with a biological agent.

Senator BAKER. Did you ever do anything about cigars 1 Did youever try to impregnate a cigar with a biological agent?

Mr. SENSENEY.1 did not ; no.Senator BAKER. Do you know of any such?

Mr. SENSENEY.Not really.Senator BAKER. That was not done in your department, then, ifit was done at all?

Mr. SENSENEY. No; that would be too easy. I don’t think we wouldhave fooled with that one.

Senator BAKER. You don% think that would have been a goodtechnique? Well, I don’t mean to press unduly,, but of the list thatwe went into here, did you manufacture or deliver any of these forany of the intelligence agencies of the Government at any time?

Mr. SENSENEY. No ; they were only shown <andmost of the intelli-gence groups knew of what we could do ,and it sort of edified them tothe point that they could observe and be able to see these things ifthey were in foreign countries.

Senator BAKER. How did you do that 1 Did you have a case ike asalesman, you opened it up and showed it to them?

Mr. SENBENEY.Just about.Senator BAKER. Where did you do that PMr. SENSENEY. Mainly it was done in our division, of course.Senator BAKER. Did you send out invitetions or what ?Mr. SENSENEY. They usually invited themselves, somehow, I don%

know how all this worked, but they showed up.

Senator BAKER. All ri ht.Mr. SENBENEY. And P might add that many of your own members

here, not on this panel, but many of the Members of Congress alsoobserved these.

Senator BAKER. Well, you are very generous. None of us saw them;is that right?

Mr. SENSENEY. I am not sure, I wouldn’t know, but I know manydid.

Senator BAKER. I don’t know either.



169

Was the toxin pro ram or the chemical-biological agent programnecessary in your ju If gment, for the utilization of the exotic devicesthat you have described to us? Were athese poisons from shellfish,

from cobra venom and the like, an adjunct to and a part of *theseexotic devices? Your straight pen, your fountain pen, the starter andthe like, did you use these poisons in those devices ?

Mr. SENSENEY. No; not shellfish. I think you have got a misnomerbetween poison- a biological material itself is not a

3oison in my

estimation. Yes ; shellfish poison is ‘a poison, shellfish. he others arebiological agents, such as say, anthrax, tuleremia and that type ofthing. The only thing that you’mentioned there that could be usedwith shellfish poison are the dart-type Ithings. The rest used biologicalpowders.

Senator BAKER. The last question, ,and my time has expired, Mr.

Senseney, do ou know of any records of this program that havebeen destroye c9?

Mr. SENSENEY. I could not tell you whether they have been de-stroyed or kept intact. I know when the division closed, a lot of stuffwas sent, they told us, to Kansas City.

Senator BAKER. If I wanted to find out more about the conversationwith the CIA and the destruction of records, would Dr. Cowan bethe one to talk to?

Mr. SENSENEP. Possibly.Senator BAKER. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Baker.Senator Huddleston is next.Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Carrying on the line of questioning by Senator Baker as ‘to the

kind of items you experimented with and developed, would it beaccurate to say that you worked on ,and experimented with gadgetsfor which nobody ever yet has found a use?

Mr. SENSENEY. I think there were some intended uses. For instance,the Special Forces gave us SDR, Small Development Requirements,indicating that they had a military requirement to meet a certain

situation.Senator HUDDLESTON. Was mostly all of your work then done onj the basis of these special re uirement requests that came either from

the Special Forces or some ot l er source ?Mr. SENBENEY. That ia true.Senator HUDDLEBTON. Did these requests come from the CIA direct-

ly, to your knowled e ?Mr. SENSENEY. If o ; they sort of rode pig back on most of these.

They sort of rode piggyback on the Army’s evelopment and pickedoff what they thought was good for them, I guess.

Senator HUDDLESTON. But you did not undertake a development oran experimental program of a particular wea on until you had somere uest from the S ecial Forces to develop a elivery system?

XI 4%z

r. SENSENEJ!. ere was one item. It was a hand-held item thatcould fire a dart projectile. It was done only for them; no one else.

Senator HUDDLEBTON. You developed that yourself?Mr. SENSENEY. I had a hand in it. I did not do all of the development.Senator HUDDLEWIN. All right, durin the course of your work

there, did you have frequent contact with 5 r. Gordon?



170

Mr. SENSENEY. I would not say it was frequent, but it was periodic;yes.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Were some of these contacts by telephone?Mr. SENSENEY. Usually the telephones came through the Directorand he let us know when they were coming and they would come andsee us.

Senator HUDDLESTON. But you very seldom talked to him by tele-phone ?

Mr. SENSENEY. That is correct.Senator HUDDLESTON. Did you ever talk to him by telephone 1Mr. SENSENEY. I probably did.Senator HUDDLESTON. You do not recall any specific instances?Mr. SENSENEY. No.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Were there frequent transfers of material be-tween Dr. Gordon’s office and your office, either the hardware or thetoxin ?

Mr. SENSENEY. The only frequent thing that changed hands was thedog projectile and its loaders, 4640. This was done maybe five or sixin one quantity. And maybe 6 weeks to 6 months later they wouldbring those back and ask for five or six more. They would bring themback expended, that is, they bring all of the hardware except theprojectile, OK?

Senator HUDDLESTON. Indicating that they have been used ?

Mr. SENSENEY. Correct.Senator HUDDLEBTON. Did they advise you as to what use they were

making of them 1Mr. SENSENEY. No ; that was one bad part of it. You did not get

any feedback so you did not know whether your devices worked ordid not work.

Senator HUDDLESTON. They never advised you of whether or not theywere successful Z

Mr. SENSENEY. That is correct.Senator HUDDLESTON. And no information at all as to how they

were being used?Mr. SENSENEY. No, but I would sav they would have to be used ona dog. You may as well shoot a man if you are going to use somethingthe size that they were using there.

Senator HDDDLESTON. But it could have been used on a humanbeing ?

Mr. SENRENEY. There is no reason why it could not, I guess.Senator HUDDLESTON. How much time usually elapsed between the

time you gave them these weapons and the time they brought themback to you expended 1

Mr. SENSENEY. Usually 5 to 6 weeks.Senator HUDDLESTON. Five to six weeks, and absolutely no report

from them as to what the use was, whether or not they were used,whether they were ef&cient, whether they needed some adjustments orsomemodification to make them more workable?

Mr. SENSENEY. No, there really was not much feedback. They wouldbring them back but they would not say why they wanted them orwhat they used them on.

Senator HUDDLESTON. You never inquired?Mr !&~T.PNP~ Nn.



171

Senator HIJDDLFATON. You never thought to inquire?Mr. SENSENEY. I thought of it, but I never did.Senator HIJDDLEKIDN. Any other type weapons or any other materials

that you transferred to them that might have been expended to somedegree ?

Mr. SENSENEY. No; they were the only things that they really goton a regular basis and to m knowledge, used some way.

Senator HIJDDLESTQN. d ow, you have indicated to us what P600 isand I think you said it was the funding order. I take it this is the of-ficial Government document that provides for the funding for a par-ticular activity. Is that correct?

Mr. SENSENEY. Well, it identified the working investigation groupor the staff support group, whatever way you want to identify it. P600was a funding citation.

Senator HKIDDLESTON. All right, Would it be very specific as to whatthese funds are to be spent for, the type of development? Would Itindicate who had authority to actually expend these funds?

Mr. SENSENEY. Well, I guess hey would have to come down throughour division level there. The stockpile was maintained for them. Thistook quite a bit of money, of course. That is their agent stockpile.

Senator HUDDLEBTON. The material that was stored for 5 years hason it, “to be used only at the direction of P600.” Would that order,P600, give us the information as to what specific individual had theauthority to permit the use of that material Z

Mr. QENSENEY. I cannot answer that. I do not think P600 was anauthority. It was just a citation, That is all I know it to be.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, somebody must have thought it was anauthority or they would not have printed on the material that it couldbe used only as directed by P600, in my judgment.

Now in the instructions you received from Dr. Cowan to withholdthe destruction, I believe, of both the toxin and the hardware-

Mr. SENSENY. No, not hardware per se. I call them display items.They are mounted on boards, cutaway models, that sort of thing.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Prototypes, these were not actual weapons?

Mr. SENSENEY. They would not even be a prototype really because aprototype you could actually activate. These were inert type thingsthat were mounted on display models.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Just to show what the item was, what it lookedlike, the size of it ?

Mr. SENSENEY. Correct.Senator HUDDLEBTON. Then you have to detail what its capabilities

were. But in these nstructions, were they verbal ?Mr. SENSENEY. Yes.Senator HIJDDLESTON. He just told you to hold up on it 1

Mr. SENSENEY. Yes.Senator HKTDDLEWON. He did not say why ?Mr. SENSENEY. No.Senator HUDDLESTON. Did you receive any written instructions ?Mr. SENSENEY. No.Senator HIJDDLEBTON. None whatsoever reIating to your res onsibil-

ity to dispose of the material that you had responsibility for. B

Mr. SENSENEY. I got rid of all the hardware per se, yes.Senator HUDDLEBTON. But not on the basis of a written instruction !



172

Mr. SENSENEY. No.Senator HUDDLEBTON. Did you seean’y instructions on what manner

was to be used, what method ‘was to be ised for the destruction of anyof this material ?

Mr. SENSENEY. Not really. We had to come up with our own meansof getting rid of the hardware. It was not really veeasier to make these things than it was to get rid of t

easy. It was muchem.

Senator HUDDLJBTON. Why was that ? Why would it be difficult 8Mr. SENEENEY. You have got to do a lot of chopping and a lot of

tearing and a lot of heating to get rid of all that metal.Senator HUDDLESTON. Was there a great bulk of it? IMr. SENSENEY. Well, for instance, we were in the midst of a develop-

ment program with the Army. We had just gotten back 400 or 500

rounds from the Dugway Proving Ground that had to be destroyed.We had to go out to a contractor and get things back that we weredeveloping. They had to be destroyed. So, yes, there was quite a bulkof material.

Senator HUDDLESTON. What would the cost be of disposing of that?Would you have any idea?

Mr. SENSENEY. I would not have-1 could not even estimate it really.Senator HUDDLESTON. Did you assist in any way in the transfer of

any of this material to the CIA 8Mr. SENSENEY. The display items I did, yes.

Senator HUDDLESTON. In what way did you assist ZMr. SENSENEY. They came and picked-it up. I helped the guy carryit out and put it in his car.

Senator HUDDLESTON. I4%o is they 8Mr. SENSENEY. They-Boston.Senator HUDDLESTON. And he came in a car, his personal automobile !Mr. SENSENEY. Correct.Senator HUDDLESTON. And you helped him. Did you see any other

material or did you assist in transferring any other material?Mr. SENSENEY. No ; that is all I took out.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias?Senator MATHIAS. I thank Mr. Sensenev for being here, but I think

he has answered all the questions I had ‘in my mind, and I have nofurther questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart?Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Senseney, are you familiar with

so-called vulnerability studies, or experiments conducted by personnelat Fort Detrick 8

Mr. SENSENEY. Yes sir.Senator HART of Colorado. Are you familiar with studies of the

water s.vstem at the FDA building here in town?Mr. SENSENEY. I am.Senator HART of Colorado. Did you participate in that study?Mr. SENSENEY. I did not participate in it, but I deveIoped an item

that they could tap into the system with.Senator HART of Colorado. Would you explain that item?Mr. SENSENEY. It was a drill-tap-type situation, that you go through

a pipe that would withstand the pressure of the water and be able toinsert dye or material into the water stream.



173

Senator HART of Colorado. Was thatnerabil ity study 1

Mr. SENSENEY. As far as I know.Senator HART of Colorado. You did

participate S

instrument used in the vul-

not actually monitor it, or

Mr. SENSENEY. No.Senator HART of Colorado. Did you receive any report on how that

ex eriment worked out?b r. SENSENEY. Well, it is pretty evident that the dye got pretty

much throughout the entire watsr system of the building.Senator HART of Colorado. And to your knowledge, no one at FDA

was aware of this experiment being conducted?Mr. SENSENEY.hey asked for it to ‘b8 conducted. Only a very few

people knew it was being conducted, however.

Senator HART of Colorado. FDA asked for it?Mr. SENSENEY. That’s right.In a lot of the vulnerability studies we did do, we were requested

to do them.Senator HART of Colorado. I’m not sure you have a copy of this

document before you -1report conductsd ,by the !Y

essyou do not, but a June 1,1969 summarypecial Operations Division at Fort Detrick

summarizes that study. And it is my recollection-1 will try to findthe specific language-it is my recollection that none of the peopleat, FDA were aware of this. I do not think it is a major point.

Mr. SENSENEY. It may not have been.I seewhere we went through GSA.Senator HART of Colorado. Yes.Mr. SENSENEY. OK. Someone was aware of it; I’m not sure who.Senator HART of Colorado. Are you familiar with a so-called vulner-

ability study or experiment on the New York subway system ?Mr. SENSENEY. I participated in that.Senator HART of Colorado. To what extent did you participate?Mr. SENSENEY. I was a sampler.Senator HART of Colorado. What does that mean?

Mr. SENSENEY. I rode a subway and sampled the air. [Generallaughter.]Senator HART of Colorado. How was the study or experiment con-

ducted?Mr. SENSENEY. Well, there was one person that *as the operator-if

you want to call it. an operator-who rode a certain train, and walkingbetween trains, dropped what looked like an ordinary light bulb whichcontained biological simulant agent.

And then the next train came by and, of course, it would stir up theair. So, by driving over it at, say, 60 miles an hour-and this was con-tinuously done by certain subways, and it went quite well through theentire subway system, becausewe started down around 14th Street andsampled up as far as about 58th Street, and there is quite a bit of aero-sol all along the way.

Senator HART of Colorado. Just from one light bulb ?Mr. SENSENEY. One light bulb.Senator HART of Colorado. Were the officials of the city of New York

aware that this study was being conducted ?Mr. SENSENEY. I do not believe so.



174

Senator HART of Colorado. And certainly the passengers weren’t.Mr. SENSENEY. That is correct.

Senator HART of Colorado, At whose request were these two studiesconducted 3Mr. SENSENEY. I’m not sure whether it was requested or whether we

did it on our own. There was a special studies group in our branchthat was head of vulnerability studies.

Senator Hawr of Colorado. You had a special section that did noth-ing but vulnerability studies?

Mr. SENSENEY. Yes.They would come up with test plan8 and 80 forth. )Senator HART of Colorado. What other kind8 of studies did you con-

duct besides the subways and the FDA building?

Mr. SENSENEY.Well, there have been quite a few.Senator HART of Colorado. Well, name a few of them.Mr. SENSENEY. Well, McGuire Air Force Base, which was a SAC

activity that-it was requested by the Air Force to seehow vulnerablethey were.

Senator HART of Colorado. To biological attack ?Mr. SENSENEY. That’8 right. And the Pentagon and the White

House.Senator H41m of Colorado. How was the White House study con-

ducted 1Mr. SENSENEY. I do not know that one specifically, because I was not

involved. However, I do know that they made-asked them to do cer-tain things to make the thing so it couldn’t be attacked. They had leakyfilters in the White House.

Senator HART of Colorado. Now, Mr. Senseney, in the requests thatyou received from your superior8 to prepare, or participate in, thesestudies, was there discussion, to your recollection, of the actual use ofthese kinds of capabilities offensively?

Mr. SENSENEY. The main thing was to determine the vulnerability ofour country to biological attack through covert means, and this wasattack against people, crop& animals, things-by things, 1 mean ma-

chinery, airplanes.Senator HART of Colorado. But was there discussion of using this

kind of capability against other countries?Mr. SENSENZY. Not to my knowledge ; no.Senator HART of Colorado. I refer to page 14 of the document you

have before you [exhibit 12 ‘3 in the top sentence of that page. It says :

From limited consultation with design engineers it should be possible to developsimple guidelines for planning and attack on ‘a group of people that work in abuilding constru@d with a circulating, chilled drinking water system.

That does not say a defensa; it says attack.

Mr. SENSENEY. if you are going to have a defense, you have got tohave an offense, I suppose. 1 didn’t write this paper.Senator HART of Colorado. I understand.Mr. SET;TSEN-EY.’m not even sure I’ve really ever seen t before.Senat,or HART of Colorado. I understand.Mr. ,%NBENEY. That could be somebody’s conclusion, you see, not

mine.

1 Bee p. 240.



175

Senator HART of Colorado. The same kind of language, in strongerform, is contained in the report on the subway system study orex eriment.

I; ut your testimony is to the effect that these experiments, orpartici8

ation in these experiments, was for defensive purposes o J oury.

Mr. ENBENEY. That is correct.Senator H~wr of Colorado. And with no discussion of creating a

caR

ability to use against someone else.r. SENSENEY. Well, you have to realize that Det.rick-the overall

Detrick-was to do things for the Army. That is, in terms of offense.Senator HAF~Tof Colorado. That is all, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hart.Senator Schweiker ?Senator ScHwwrarnt.Mr. Sensene

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

ment 6’7 [exhi it, I would like to call your attention to a CIA docu-it 6 ‘3 which basically describes Project MKNAOMI.

or Project P600, whatever you want to call it, which, while funded bythe CIA, was actually run and operated by Fort Detrick. And I wouldlike to read into the record, at this point, a quote from paragraph 9of that document:

When funds permit, adaptation and testing will be conducted of a new, highlyeffective disseminating system which has been demonstrated to be capable ofintroducing materials through light clothing, snbeutaneously, intramuscularly,and silently, without pain.

NOW, I just have a little trouble, Mr. Senseney, reconciling youranswers in conjunction with this project, when tho CIA documentmakes clear that one of the very specific pur oses of the funding andthe operation was to find a weasubcutaneously, which P

on that coul cf penetrate light clothingobvious y means throu h the skin, and intra-

muscularly, which obviously means throu7

h t a e muscles of a person.And are you saying that you have abso utely no recollection at all

that tests or programs were not desi led to use any of these devices topermeate clothing on people and not !f ogs ?

Mr. SENSENEY. We put them on mannequins.

Senator SCEWEIKER.What’s that?Mr. SENSENEY. We put clothing on mannequins to see whether we

could penetrate it. These were the requirements. You almost read theexact requirements that the SDR quoted from Special Forces there.

Sentaor SMWEIKEIL I would not expect you to test them on livehuman beings. I would hope you did use manne uins, Mr. Senseney.

Rouldn’t that be directed toward people usage t ough? That is thepoint we’re trying to establish.

Mr. SENSENEY. That is what, Special Forces direction was.Senator SCHWEIKFX So it was not solelv dogs toward which the

program was directed. If you used mannequins, obviously people wereinvolved.

Mr. SENSENEY. Well, you have to look at it this way. The Army pro-gram wanted this device. The only thing that the CIA asked for was adog device. That is the only thing that was delivered to them. It was aspmoff, of course, from the M-l. The M-l was a lethal weapon, meantto kill a person, for the Army. It was to be used in Vietnam. It never

1Seep. 204.



176

got there because we were not fast enough getting it into the logis-tics system.

Senator SCHWEIKER. What about the device that you made, or

whose development you supervised? What was the most utilized de-vice of the ones with which you worked and supervised?Mr. SENSENEY. By whom?’Senator SCHWEIKER. The only thing that I know that was really

used was the dog projectile. The other things were in the stockpiles.I don’t think anyone ever requested them.

Senator SCHWEIKER. How do you know for certain it was for dogs?Mr. SENSENEY. Well, that is what they asked us to test them against.

They wanted to see whether they could put a dog to sleep, and whethersometime later the dog would come back and be on its own and looknormal.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Of course, as I recall, that is what they didwith Gary Powers’ drill with shellfish toxin. They tested it on a doto see if it would work. So I do not know that that at al l woul Ficonclude that it was only provided for dogs.

Of the devices that came through you, which of these were utilizedin any capacity other than for testing!

Mr. SENSENEY. That was the only one that I know of-the dogprojectile. I call it a dog projectile. We were developing it becausethe scenario read that they wanted to be able to make entrance intoan area which was patrolled by dogs, leave, the dog come back, andthen no one would ever know they were in the area. So that was thereason for the dog projectile.

Senator SCHWEIKER. And how many of these were made?Mr. SENSENEY. Well I would say there were probably as many as

50 at least. They took-Senator SCHWEIKER. About 502

Mr. SENSENEY. Yes.Senator SCHWEIKER. And didn’t you get any reports back from the

field on their effectiveness ?

Mr. SENSENEY. No. That is one thing you never get; you never getthe feedsback. You did not know what happened.Senator SCHWEIEER. I’m puzzled by that. You are the research and

development person ; you design the weapon-and I haven% seen apart of the military yet that did not have some feedback on whetherit was effective in hitting the target or missing it. How do you knowif you are doing things right ‘or wrong!

Mr. SENSENEY. We must have been doing right. They kept askingfor it.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Then somebody was using them, I gather. Is

that correct ZMr. SENSENEY. I would assume so. The missile was gone when theyreturned the hardware, sir.

Senator SCIIWEIKER. But you cannot give us any specific evidenceor proof that they were used solely for dogs, from your knowledge, orfrom your feedback 8

Mr. SENSENEY. No. Not at all.Senator SCHWEIKER. You said a moment ago that you also dis-

tributed the cans to Mr. Boston at the end of this shellfish reject.Mr. SF.NRENIPX. Nn mnr did 1 kiidrihnto tn him T nnlv OI)V~ F lm thn



177

Senator SCHWEIKER. No; I’m referring to the shellfish toxins.Mr. SENSENEY. I did not give him any shellfish toxins.Senator SCHWEIKER. What aid you ive Mr. Boston?

Mr. SENSENEY. All I gave him were display models.Senator SCHWEIKER. Of what ?Mr. SENSENEY. Of hardware.Senator SCHWEIKER. No shellfish toxin? Are you aware that along

with that went the shellfish toxin?Mr. SENSENEY. Well, I thought it should be. They had to pick it up

sometime.Senator SCHWEIKER. In addition to giving it to them, did you give

it to any other sources, any other branches of Government or theservice, or any other

Mr.SENSENEY.

I cf

arts of the Army ?

id not give it to anybody, so I really do not knowwhat the disposition of the material was. I was not in the agent area ; Iwas only in hardware develo

ament.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Diout the inventory ?

you have a responsibility for cleaning

Mr. SENSENEY. Only on the hardware side, not on the agent side.Senator SCHWEIKER. And where did al l of the inventory go ?Mr. SENSENEY. I don’t know.Senator SCHWEIKER. Where did the inventory of hardware go ZMr. SENSENEY. All hardware was destroyed, period.

The only thing that was distributed to the CIA were prototypes-and I would not even call them prototypes, they were display models,cutaway models. They were mounted on boards, on plaques, that type ofthing.

Senator SCHWEIKER. That’s al l the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.Thank-you

The CHAIRI&. Thank you, Senator Schweiker.I think it ought to be reemphasized that the document from which

you read was a document in which the CIA laid out its specificationsfor the research work for which the Agency was paying.

Senator SCHWEIKER. And for which purpose, too, Mr. Chairman,that they met quarterly to see if their funds were being well spent.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. And their specifications with respect to theparticular delivery systems we have been discussing were as follows:

When funds permit, adaptation and testing will be conducted of a new, highly

effective, disseminating system which has been demonstrated to be capable of

introducing materials through light clothing, intramuscularly and silently , with-

out pain.

So I think it is clear that the CIA was interested in the developmentof a delivery system that could reach human beings, since not manydogs wear clothing. And you would agree with that, wouldn’t you!

Mr. SENSENEY. Yes.The CHAIRMAN. OK.Mr. Schwarz here has one final question and then we will move to

the final witness this morning.Mr. SCHWARZ. Along the same line of the chairman’s and Senator

Schweiker’s questions, I assume you agree that spending money inorder to make darts of such a character that they cannot be detected inan autopsy does not have much to do with dogs.

Mr. SENRICNFT. Nn Y .hn.t. mn111rl nnt hawm anvthinm tn cfn with rlnm-



178

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.Senator Baker ?Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to renew my previous request.

I would like very much to talk to Dr. Cowan, who may have been thecontact between the CIA and Fort Detrick on the request for the toxinsand on the recordkeeping. When the time is appropriate, I would liketo interview him. And, if it seemspertinent and relevant to our in-quiry, I would ask that he be called as a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be arranged.Thank you very much, Mr. Senseney, for your testimony.Our next, and final, witness is Mr. Robert Andrews. Mr. Andrews,

will you please come forward? Mr. Andrews, will you take the oath!Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this

proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but thetruth, so help you God?

Mr. ANDREWS. I do.The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smothers will commence the questioning.

TESTIMOAY OF ROBERT T. ANDREWS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO TEEQENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF TEE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. SMOTHERS. Mr. Andrews, you are currently servinTi

as a SeniorAdvisor to the General Counsel, Office of the Secretary o Defense. Is

that correct?Mr. ANDREWS. I am.Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you have occasion to become familiar with

Defense Department efforts to destroy shellfish toxin ‘?Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.Mr. SMOTHERS, Would you explain the circumstances of your

familiarity to the committee, please?Mr. ANDREWS. By way of background, in June of this year, when

the Defense Department learned of this exercise, we appointed mvesti-gators from the Defense Investigative Service to examine witnesses

and review records. In the course of that investigation they uncovereda number of records which give us some ndication of the scope of thedestruction program and t.he inventory process.

Mr. SMOTHERS. It is that inventory process that I wish to addressnow, Mr. Andrews. I beheve you have in your possessiona copy of amemorandum dated February 1’7, 1970, entitled “Special OnerationsDivision Toxin Inventory” [exhibit 13 1.1 Mr. Andrews, you have pre-viously seen this exhibit, have you not!

Mr. ANDREWS. I have.Mr. SMOTHERB. What amount of toxin on hand does this inventory

reflect ?Mr. ANDREWS. It reflects sommhat. over 2 grams.Mr. SMOTHERE. Was this the inventory prepared at Fort Detrick?Mr. ANDREWS. It was.Mr. SMOTHERS. Was this inventory prepared

Pursuant to discus-

sions between Defense and Fort DetrickIf

ersonneinventory the material on hand and to in

requiring them toicate which materra should

be either retained or disposed of by dcst.ruction 8--

* See p. 244.



179

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes there is actually a directive issued January 9,1970, to the six Fort Detrick laboratorres requestin a complete inven-tory of biolo ‘c&l agents and munitions, and the ebruary 17, 1970,

a

B

inventory is 0 first step in that process.Mr. SXOTBERB. Was the spirit of this directive to identify an toxinwhich may have been in possession of Defense facilities an B to bethe

dB”undwork for a basis for destruction or retention decisions?

r. ANDREWS. Initially the directive was devoted to biological agents.Subsequently there are messages requiring inclusion of toxins in theinventory process.

Mr. SMOTHFZS. So that shellfish toxin would have been reportedpursuant to this directive?

Mr. ANDREWS. That is correct.Mr. S~OTHERK Now, looking at the February 17, 1970, inventory,

I ask you whether that inventory or an other inventory of which youhave knowledge reflected an amount o 9 shellfish toxin of 11 grams ormore in the possession of the Department of Defense?

Mr. ANDREWB. It does not.Mr. SMOTHERS. In your opinion, would some accounting for 11 grams

of shellfish toxin have been called for by the Director?Mr. ANDREWS. I would say that inasmuch as the .original directive

was issued in January and then later amended, that it should havebeen re or-ted.

Mr. MOTHER& Mr. Smothers, do your records reveal any Defenseguidance for the disposition of shellfish toxin or other substances thatwere distributed outside of the Department of Defense, any guidanceregarding ‘how a determination was to be made on disposition, howaccounting was to be handled, or any guidance at all on that subjectfrom Defense?

Mr. ANDREWS. We find no such records.I might add to the committee that in the process of checking over

our records we located 104 boxes of records in the Suitland, Md., reposi-tory. Four of these boxes were identified as coming from the SpecialOperations Divieion ; 13 more boxes referred to the demilitarization

program. We obtained this information from the inventory list, andour investigators did examine 17 jboxes to determine to what extentrecords still were available to us.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of thiswitness.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand, Mr. Andrews, that the DOD in-ventory that was supplied at the tnne that the President’s orders todestroy these toxins were issued, that your records do not show anyinventory in which about 11 grams of shellfish toxin appears ?

Mr. ANDREWS. No. I think there is a-

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we know there is about 11 grams in the possee-sion of the Defense Department. Wh does not any inventory showt,he existence of that position which tie President had ordered to bedestroyed 1

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I think there is a question of dates, and I thinkit is very important. On January 9 the first directive was issued ask-ing for an inventory of biological agents and munitions, and then onFebruary 14 the Presidential order was handed down. Now, on Feb-



180

ruary 17, ap arentl the first inventory reports were completed andsubmitted to rgher K eadquarters on the 18th.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was after the toxin had been slipped back

to the CIA.Mr. ANDREWS. That is correct. Your records indicate that on Febru-’

ary 16 there was then an unsigned memorandum containing the bot-tom line, Mr. Karamessines ; on February 17 our people went on ret-ord with a report. It is entirely possible that the toxins made a trans-fer somewhere between the 16th and the 17th, probably the 16th be-cause the 17th, if they were still in the Defense Department posses-sion, the should have been reported.

The J HAIRMAN. I would have to agree to that. I think that musthave been what ha ened. But, it seems very stran e to me that the

inventory presente LRJy the Defense Department shou d be made 1 dayafter these forbidden toxins had been slipped back to the CIA.

Mr. ANDREWS. I must say, as a lawyer examining a case, I find it veryunusual, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Since the testimony shows t.hat the CIA could laylegal claim only to 5 grams of this and witnesses have testified that theCIA agreed to take sepossession of its 5 grams, can you account forwhy nearly 11 grams turned up in the CIA laboratory!

Mr. ANDREWS. I was not on the scene, and I cannot explain it. Thatis one version that the CIA witnesses and others have made.

I think you should bear in mind, however, that the containers con-taining the 11 grams also contained a notation P600.. The CHAIRMAN. What did that mean ?

Mr. ANDREWS. I provided the Committee this morning with a state-ment as to what it does mean. It is not very sexy, not very much IL

James Bond matter. The Inspector General’s Office, Department ofthe Army has confirmed that P600 stood for a research and develop-ment account number. Fort Detrick used this designation to describethe working funds used by the Special Onerations Division at FortDetrick which had been supplied by the CIA.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean, then, according to your interpreta-tion or vour understanding, that all of it, the whole 11 grams, belongedt,o the CIA ?

Mr. ANDREWS. That is a reasonable inference.The CHAIRMAN. Your inference runs contrary to previous testimony.Mr. ANDREWS. You asked for my opinion, and I do suggest that the

PSOO appears on both containers.The CHAIRMAN. And the reasonable inference to be drawn from

that was that the whole 11 grams. not just 5 grams, belonged to theCIA, and that amount was returned to them ?

Mr. ANDREWS. That is the way I would read it.The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.Are there further questionsof this witness?Senator Tower? _Senator TOWER. Mr. Andrews, WR,S DOD aware of the transfer of

shellfish toxin to more than 60 individual institutions, some locatedin foreign countries, including the defense establishments of some for-eign countries ?

Mr. A NDREWS. This is a mat.ter that we disrovered durins the courseof the investigation, althouph the extent of this dissemination just. . . . . . w..



181

Senator TOWER. From where did the authority for that dissemina-tion come 1

Mr. ANDREWB. I do not know of any express authority. As I under-stand it, the scientific community has a way of exchanging its speci-mens, and there is, apparently, quite an interchange.

Senator TOWER. Are you suggesting this is something that was leftto the arbitraor civil servant 7

will and discretion of perhaps a field-grade officer

Mr. ANDREWS. I do not have the answer as to where the level of au-thority resides. I could obtain that for the record.

Senator TOWER I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias 0Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Andrews, are you aware of the procedures

that were established at Fort Detrick, and I assume at other Defense

installations, for the destruction of t.oxins, toxic material of al l kinds?Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.Senator MATHIAB. Could you describe those procedures 8Mr. ANDREWS. Well, there are really two kinds of material. There

is the demilitarization program, which has been referred to hereearlier in your hearings, which was conducted at Pine Bluff Arsenal.We have various documented records on that. However, the amounts ofthe disposal of the toxins in the laboratory is a matter that we havefound no records of, and we do know, for example, that one of the earlyinventories shows that certain toxins were to be retained for defensive

research purposes, and that certain other amounts were to be de-stroyed. The exact amount that was used in this case I do not know.

I did,ask our investigators to check with the experts as to how thisparticular toxin could be destroyed, and I was told that an bunsenburner properly applied for the right period of time woul cr destroythe toxin.

Senator MATHIAS. Now, with regard to the procedures that were es-tablished, was this by word of mouth, or were there carefully orga-nized procedures and publication of orders which detailed them?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, Senator Mathias.

I think it might be well to go over some of the major actions thatwere taken by the Defense Department. Following the President’sannouncement on November 25, the Assistant Secretary of Defense forInternational Security Affairs issued a memorandum on November28 announcing the President’s determination. On December 17, 1969,t,he Secretarv of Defense issued a memorandum assigning responsibili-ties for implementing each of the President’s decisions. On January 7,1970. an ad hoc task force on inventory matters was established.On January 9 the first orders were issued to make a complete inventoryof biological weapons. Following the President’s Valentine’s Day

order, as you referred to it, on February 14. the first of the inventoryreports was prepared and submitted to the Director of the CommodityDevelopment Engineering Laboratories on February 18. On February17, a Department of the Armv message wss sent to Fort Detrick andthe Army Materiel Command requiring the inclusion of bulk toxinsin demilitarization plans of biological stockpiles.

On February 20, the NSDM-44 was issued regarding the destruc-tion of toxin agents and weapons. On February 28, this.order was re-layed to the immediate offices in the Department of Defense concerned



182

with such matters. On March l&1970, the Assistant Scientific Dimctm-of Defense and Engineering referred to the lans for the inventory oftoxin materials and directed disposal of a 1 excess materials usingstandard labor&o

On June 15, a I7procedures.

bite House memorandum was sent to the Secretaryof Defense requesting his recommendations for the destruction ofbiological a ents and weapons and toxic agents and weapons. On July6,1970, the 8 ecretary of Defense reported to the President, submittinghis recommendations for carrying out the demilitarization program.On September 3, 1970, there was a White House memorandum to theSecretary of Defense directing an environmental impact statement inconnection with the Pine Bluff project.

On December X,1970, there was a White House memorandum sent

to the Secretary of Defense announcing the President’s appproval ofthe detailed plan. On November 10,1972, the Assistant Chief of Stafffor Force Development, Department of the Army? provided the Un-dersecretary of the Army with a report announcm the completionof the destruction of the entire U.S. stockpile, and a so indicated, in-cidentally, at a cost of $15 million.

On January 25, 1973, the National Security Council Undenecre-tary’s committeereview on the U. ii

rovided the President a memorandum reportin its. flhemical warfare and biological program, w ‘ch

had been laid on them by NSDM-35.

Senator MATHIAS. Now, Mr. hdrews, can you tell us what hato those materials that you mentioned which were retained for s penedefenseresearch? Did they go to Dugway, or did they go to some other labora-tory ?

Mr. ANDREWB. We have just made a complete inventory of all ofour facilities, and we have received reports from the Arm

cr,

and Air Force. The only facility that now has any toxins forNavy,

efensiveresearch purposes is the Edgewood Arsenal.

Senator MATHIAS. Nothing at Dugway?Mr. ANDREWB. There is nothing at Dugway ; no, sir.

SenatorMATHIAS.

One final question. We have discussed severaltimes during the hearings the materials that were sent out from FortDetrick for research purposes to scientists in various parts of theworld and all over the United States. Is it your understanding thatthis was a common practice at Fort Detrick?

Mr. ANDREWS. Based on the testimony today, it ap ears that it was.Senator MATHIAS. I am asking if you have any in if ependent knowl-

edge or any records which would indicate it.Mr. ANDREWS. In the course of our talking to a number of people

we learned this is a rather common practice in the scientific com-munity.

Senator MATHIAS. And it was not confined to shellfish toxin ?Mr. ANDREWS. No, sir. It applied to many items.Senator MATIXI~~. It applied to many items that were under study

at Fort Detrick. Of course, when this pattern or practice of movingmaterials of this nature was established, that made it much easieractually to handle, disburse, and dispense these materials, becauseit was a recognized course of action. Is that not true?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir, that is correct.Senator MATHIAS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.



183

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.Senator Huddleston ?Senator HTJDDLEBTON. Mr. Andrews, I think you mentioned that

the estimated cost of disposing of these materials was $15 million.Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.Senator HUDDLESTON. In your investigation, did you get any indi-

cation as to whether the suggestion or idea that the CIA would takepossessionof its stock and it would be stored away originated with theCIA or with the Special Operations Division there at Fort Detrick?

Mr. ANDREWS. We received conflicting reports on that and I thinkthe confusion as to what happened continues. I would ,be reluctantto speculate as to just how it ha

Senator HUDDLESTON. Woul ifpened.

the Army and ma

you say that there is a tendency within

requests from the ebe within other agencies of Government to treatIA differently than you would treat requests from

other agencies or other departments 8Mr. ANDREWS. I have been the recipient of very few CIA requests

until recently. They are not known for their loquaciousness. Sincethe investigation has been conducted, I must say, they have been mosthelpful and there has been a full and frank exchange, I think, betweenthis committee, between the CIA., and between the Defense Depart-ment. But I have some hesitanc;y m answering your question, becauseI just do not have enough experience as to what the response has been

to CIA requests. I think the Pentagon is a pretty big department and Ido not think we are easily impressed.Senator HUDDLEBTON. What do you think of the testimony by Mr.

Senseney that while he had questions about not getting any feedbackfrom the use of material that he had developed, he was never com-pelled to ask those questions. Is this typical of dealing with the CIAon the part of the Army ?

Mr. ANDREWS. I do not know whether it, is typical of the Army. Ithink the CIA has in the past conducted its operations in such a waythat there be a minimal amount of information flow back from them.

I think this is consistent with their strategy.Senator H~DLESTON. So that was to be cxpectcd. And even though

a person may have questions, even though the request may be some-what strange, the ,general procedure would be just to carry it outwithout going beyond the order itself 8

Mr. ANDREWS. I can assure you in the Defense Department thatwe have examined vev carefully into our working relationships withall Government agencies. We have reviewed this extensively in termsof detailing of people to us and detailing of people to the otheragencies, and I think that we are very aware of our responsibilities.

Senator HUDDLESTON. This review and this examination has beenrecent.Mr. ANDREWS. It has been before this particular investigation broke

forth.Senator HUDDLESTON. There was no hestitancy on the part of the

Army to accept, for instance, a false name to identify CIA participa-tion? Even on this particular project that we are talking about theywere identified as being an officer support group.

Mr. ANDREWS. That 19 my understanding as it existed in 1970.



184

for the Army or forthem knew that they

this was 5 most com-And in the course ofty defining who the

n well understand theo they were talking to.practice1 It was not a

:@z&&concern f theirs apparently.,I&. ANDREW~. I would just have to iudge that apparkntly it was an

accepted practice because it. continued during that period.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Thev were operating in a highly sensitive,B ~bighlgsecret, highly classified area, one demandinq great security,end yet they were dealing with people who were there under falsecredentials, so to speak, and this was acceptable to them.

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand that is the nature of some of the op-erations.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.The CHAIRMAN. Senator Schweiker ?Senator SCHWEIHER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.First of all, did you find any of the records of contracts besides the

one of the $194,000 from Army to the Taft Centera

Mr. ANDREWS. I have not yet, but I have laid on the requirementfor the Inspector General’s office to develop any additional informa-tion you need.

Senator SCHWEIKER. The other can or lid label would indicate thatthere is some arrangement. bec.nuse t said on the label of the secondcan ‘LWorking Fund Investigation”. which would indicate that wouldbe nomenclature that your bookkeeping system just quoted in the orig-inal memo. Would that be correct or not?

Mr. ANDREWS. I would assumeso ; yes.Senator SCHWEIKER. All right, now vou sRid a moment ago that

basically, Mr. Andrews, this transfer n-&pht have taken place on the16th or 17th of February and that is why it did not show up?Mr. ANDREWS. That is one Dossibilitv and I might add this and this

might help the committee, although it may only comnound the con-fusion. The memorandum which you have identified, the so-calledunsigned Karamessines memo vou have identified as being writtenon February 16. When we obtained our copy of that, from the CIAit did not contain a date on it, Perhaps you got. another CODY.So wewere in the dark. so to sneak, as to when the memu was written. AR-sumin,o that February 16 is right, then my answer to you is yes ;that it happened the 16th.

Sex&or SCHWETKER. Now, the ,inventorv that you tiok and the re-port shows, was taken by the Army on February 17, is that correct 1

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.Senator SCHWEIXER, The other dav nt the committee hearing, we

looked ,at this tGture of the labels t&ether. and the can label showsnn inventory date of February 18, 19’70. Now th& would certainlyindicate to me that somebody missed Ia day in inventory snd it W&S

inventoried a day after the other materi,als sandprobably in buildingc-l,-%- :-- AL-2 I^_^ .-.. 16 & ;+ mn~lrl indirmh tn me t:hat the material



185

Bobably did not leave Fort Detrick at that point since thy j,Is;\Flrt;ary

ate was .a day after the inventory.Mr. ANDREWE. Senator Schweiker, I had never seen &at p&w

untjl the other day. I did not realize there was ‘a FelSruaq B d’art;eon it.

Senator SCHWEIKER. All right.Mr. ANDREWS. I would agree that that just adds to the &onfusion

again.Senator SCEIWEIKER. The other thing that adds to the confusion is

that the Army has an annual report dated June 1969 in which theyshow ‘an inventory of their stock items, and there is 5.193 grams onthe Army’s own mventory ,at that point. This is not 3 grams or 2.8

ams,t rat in your ensuing inve&igation you would tlake into account tlm

but the exact amount of one of these cans. So I would hope

summary report, the working fund mvestigation of some 5.19 grams.Can you shed any light on that?

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me consult with the investigator to try to shedsome light on this.

Wa have noted that the figure in the 1969 report which you havejust referred to also is the same figure that appears on the Karames-sines unsigned memorandum. Now, we do not know the answer butthere is the possibility that the Karamessines memorandum merelytook the 1969 inventory report and put it in their memorandum. I amsure that the stockpile probably changed, may have changed, during

the course of that period of time.Senator SCHWEIKER. That might ,also indicate that only 5.19 wasin fact, the CIA quantity. I t,hink you can read that meaning twoways. It could indnzate ,that thlat was the CIA amount and we stillhave not *accounted for the other 6 grams, although I agree that isjust speculation.

Mr. ANDREWB. I will admit that we have generally had peo,ple referto the CIA stockpile. They have not referred to it as the CIA stock-piles, plural.

Senator SCHWEIKER. You have, as I understand it, an ongoing in-vestigation in this matter, is that correct ?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, we have.Senator ScHwETK ER. I see also on the same cans that the inventory

date is in a personal handwriting and it seems to me that one of yourobvious checks is UI find out w,ho it was that inventoried both canson February 18 and wh he or she did not, in fact, put it on the 17thlist and why he or she Bd not report it upon the chain of command,Whoever wrote that inventory date in personal handwritingwould obviously know why the material was not disposed of in theproper channels. So I would like to suggest, for your investigat.ion,that a check be run of who with that handwriting was in the lab land

had access to the vault, because Ith,at person could certainly shed anawful lot of light on what haMr. ANDREWS. Senator %

pened in this re ard.SC weiker, we wou d be very happy to work

with the committee staff in developing any further facts that will beof assistance to this committee.

Senator Scrrwxrx ER. Alleto the safe, so it would not I%e

edly only two or three people had accessvery $ard to find out whose handwrit-

ing it was.



186

That is al l I have, Mr. Chairman, thank you:The CHAIRMAN. Thank you? Senator Schweiker.I want to say that since this discovery the Defense Department has

been very cooperative, ‘es indeed the CIA has been, in trymg to piecetogether what happened. And we will pursue these lines of mvestlga-tion through the staff in hopes that we might complete the picture.And I want to thank you and others in the Defense Department forthe cooperation that you have extended to the committee.

Senator HUDDLESTON.Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for oneclarification that I think ought to be on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddleston?Senator HUDDLESTON.Mr. Andrews, you referred’to your receiving

the Karamessines unsigned memorandum and I presume you meant

that you received it during the course of your current investigation,and not back in 1970 at the time it was purportedly written.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is correct. This is a very new ballgame for us.Senator HUDDLESTON. think that ought to be made clear.The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator for clarifying that item.Mr. ANDREWS. On the part of the Department of Defense, I want

to say that I think this committee has operated in a very responsiblemanner and the Department of Defense, I hope, has been very respon-sive to your needs.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Now, earlier today I read into the record a letter by which theCommittee would waive the ban that presently prevents the executivebranch from disposing of these toxins. Members of the committee havesuggested some changes which have been incorporated in the text ofthe lett,er, and I would like to read the revised letter and bring it tothe vote of the committee.

As revised, the letter reads :

Dear Mr. Colby:Last January when the Senate Select Committee was created, Senator Mans-

Aeld and Senator Scott asked that the Central Intelligence Agency not destroyany material that would relate to the committee’s investigation. The toxins that

are the subject of the committee’s Arst public heaxlngs are subject to the banon destruction.

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that at the completion of the com-mit&e’s investigation into the improper retention by the CIA of the deadly toxins,the committee voted to waive further interest in these toxic materials. However,before the CIA proceeds to destroy these toxins, we would direct your attemionto the attached testimony.

If adequate safety and security cautions could he taken, and if it is consistentwith our ‘treaty obligations, ‘the Committee believes that it might be appropriatefor the CIA to consider donating these toxins to properly supervised researchfacilities which can use these poisons for benign uses such as curing such debili-tating diseases as multiple sclerosis.

It is fitt ing that out of an admiltted wrongdoing, some benefit might be had. Itis hoped that in this particular instance the Committee and the Executive Branchreach a mutual solution for disposal of these lethal poisons that will be directedtoward bettering the lives of our citizens.

Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee waivefurther interest in the toxic materials and that the letter be authorized

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection ?[No response.]The CHAIRMAN. I would ask for the vote of the committee. Those in

favor of the motion, please ndicate by raising your right hand.



187

[Show of handsdenator Towxn. enator Baker by roxy.

The CHAIRMAN. Other members phave’ indicated that they &&urwith this vote and it is therefore the unanimous decision of ‘the com-

mittee. The letter will be signed. Do you have a pen, Senator ?I would like to conclude the hearing this morning by noting that

the committee’s investigation into the 11 grams of shellfish toxin mayhave reminded someof H. G. Welles’ comment on the American novel-ist Henry James. He described him as a hippopotamus rolling a pea.However, a more discerning look into the CIA vault of poisons openedthis week brings to light a series of problems which go far beyondthis single case.

Like other examples discovered in previous executive sessions, anawhich continue to emerge from the ongoing investigation of the com-

mittee, the case of the shellfish toxin illustrates how elusive the chainof command can be in the intelligence community. It underscoresdramatically the necessity for tighter internal controls for betterrecordkeepmg, for greater understanding of code words, compsrt-mentation and the whole range of secrecy requirements. Above all. it,emphasizes the necessity for improved mechanisms of accountability,all the way from the White House to the outer branches of the intelh-gence establishment.

The dilemmas which have surfaced in this week of hearings repre-sent in miniature those which will confront us throughout these pro-ceedings. Their resolution will surely test the ingenuity of those en-gaged in this undertaking. Our successwill require diligent research,persistent investigation, a series of intensive hearings and the mostcareful study and reflection. This is our mandate and this is ourpurpose.

The hearings will now stand adjourned subject to the call of theChair.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the callof the Chair.1



HEARINGS EXHIBITS ’

A schmen D

Uirector of Contra1 Intellig enc e

1 Under criterir determined by the Com mittee, in conwltation with the White HOUIO, the DepartmentDsftnw and the Central Int@rpnq Apmm y, tirttrfn materirlr have been deleted from thora ~OCU-

*r*- _a-* .a --.% I L



190

8 . Sal

10.r,ionell:II:rnms~

typhinurlum (food poluoninK) -

9. Cictltmne lla typhitnuriutu (chlorine resistant)

(Load poisoning) - 3 gram6

10. Vnrioln Virus (smallpox) -

To.~ins :

1. Staphylococcal Enterotoxin10 grams

2. Clostridium botulinum Typo

poisoning) - 5 grams

3. Pnrnlytic Sbe llf ish Poison

;io graam

(food poison inbr) -

A (lethal food

4. BunI;nrus C andidis Venom (Kroit) (let&w1 snake

venom) - 2 grams

5. blicrocystis aoruginosn*toxin (intestinal flu) -25 mg

6. Toxiferfnc (paralytic effect) - 100 mg

Th is 6toc;cpile cnpsb ility plus some research effort in

delivery systems is funded at Si’5,000, per annum.

4. In the event the decision is mnde by the Department

of Defense to dispose of existing stocks of bacteriolog icalwe i! pons , it is possib le that the CIA’s stockpile, eveu

though in R&D quan tities and unlisted, \~I11 be destroyed.

5. If the Director wishes to continue this spe cialcapo% ilit)‘, it is recommended that if the nbove DOD decision

is made, the existing ogeacp stockpile nt SO Division, Ft.Detrick be trnnsforred to the Iluntingd on Rrscarcb Center,

Secton-Dickinson ,Coapanp, Baltimore, L:nrylnnd. Arrangements

‘have been mnde for this continrq?ncy rind assurance s have been

eiven by the pote ntial contractor to store rind ntointain thecgcncy’s stockpile nt n cost no greater tlmn $75,000 per

annum.

Thomas II. Rnramessines

Deputy Director YOr Pla ns



191

TSD: ajc (16 February 1970)

Distribution:Orig - Adtfressce

1 n- (YJ'S D1 - C/'~SD/CtJ



Material Class

LETVAL AGENTS :

Saxitoxin

(shellfish

toxin)

Cobra venom

French com-pound

Aconitum

Ferax ex-tract

AconitineNitrate

F-270

Colchicine

Strychnine

Lethal

Lethal

Lethal

Lethal

Lethal

Lethal

Lethal

Lethal

EXHIBIT 2

IN VEN T OR Y OF LETHAL AJID INCAPACITATING AGENTS

FOUXD AT X CIA BUILDING fexcernted

Quantity

11.405 gr.'

a mg.

1.83 gr.

2 gr.

.5 OZ.

1 cc

8 gr.

5 gr.

fram CIA Invent&l

Characteristics

Highly lethal nervetoxin. Attacks cardio-

vascular, respiratory,

nervous, and muscle sys-tems. Death in seconds.

Lethal nerve toxin; at-

tacks nervous system.

Highly lethal

Lethal in overdose

Lethal

Lethal in oveidose;

death via muscularparalysis and respira-tory failure.

Lethal; attacks neuro-

muscular system.

Dose

7 w.

less than.1 ng.

20-40 ml.

7 mg.

*IO.927 PT. of the total were trasferrcd from Ft . Detrick to 3 CIA Puildinp sometime in

FeBma+v 1970: the remBinder (annroximatelv .S er.a. CU. Buildinr in f_hp

had orevioustv been delivered ts thellli#i-lWn’C-

- --.x-_



r:qEs- rorzr (Con’ c.) _ _

Material Class Quantity Characteristics

L=‘HAL AGENTS :I

Civ snide L-

pi l ls Le’.hSl 10 pilis Lethal. alocks8 Dills Cxygen Absorption

le piiis (asphyxiation)

3~106 ITAC~O-missle cart- Incapacitateridges (con- dogs for 4-6 t,ourSteining dog Lethal Lethal in mant-enquilizer) Incap. 38

Illczp.Let‘nal 10 oval

capsules Dog incapacitantLethal in mm

4 .oistols-2 dart launchers-1 .22 Cal: withdart firing attach-ment-1 .-icrcr.is?le

rangerange

??r.C?

Dog incapacitant

Le:hei in zan

Dose

1 pill

1eZ.s than 1 mg.

lOG-3oa .mg

(dog)

(;y; z;Ses lethala



' INVENTORY (can't.,

Gterial CIZSS

;NCAPACITA;!TS:

az Incap.Letna1

Carbachol Incap.

ZA 3167 I-GZp.

Lethal

9 3442 Incap.

SALlJOiiELLA Ir.eap.2! s. enter-i- Lethal

ditis

b) abortus Incap.Lethal

TACRIN IllCZip.

HALOTHANE Incap.

Quaztit Characteristics

1c Ibs.

1 kg. Causes flushing, colic, .25 rnfdiarrhea, salivation,

na'dsea

200 mg.

6 gr.

5c mg

46 I?$.

123 gr.

Similar to Bz onsetof effects longer andeffects last longer.

similar to BZ effectslast shorter time

Intestinal inflsmmsrionand dysentery micmgrms

Causes abortion in animals

Causes nausea and xmiting

Dose-

19 bottles e125 cc each Anesthetic with less odor

than etheror chloroform



Xaterial Class

Mephenesin Incap.

2-4 pyrolo Incap.

Hyoscine

: .

PI-246

Incap.

Incep.

DesmethoxyResperpine Incap.

S-241 Incap.

Ovabin Incap.

S-341 Incap.

. - .

Quantity

4 oz.

10 gr.

15 gr.

100 tablets1 mg/tablet

1 gr. BZ-like action

11 gr.

1 gr-.

Characteristics

Muscle relaxant

Causes temporaryamnesia

Blocks autonmic

nervous system reactions

Dose- -

Produces paralysis

scn

Lowers blood pressureOverdose causes severe .25-.5 memental depression

Cardiac stimulant .3-.5 mgeven more potent thanDigitoxin--fasteronset, shorter durationIV only

B&like only more effective



.

IMVENTORY (can't.)

Mat,erial Class Quantity Characteristics Dose

Ii<C.4PACITAI<TS :

9z HCl incap.Lethal

COGENTIN: .

Incap.

ERGOTRATEHALCATE

Incap.

COLCHICINE Incap.Lethal

DIGITOXIN Incap.

CINCHORINE Incap.

DEHYDROACETICACID Incap.

20 gr.

26 tablets@ 2mg. each

10 gr.

a gr.

5 gr.

2 gr.

1 gr.

Same as BZ--aatersoluble form

wide range of debilitaUive,.5-.6 mgphysiological effects +‘

Oxytoxic . Used inObstetrics to promoteuterine contractions

Incapacitant. Overdoes 1 mg.leads to death via para-lysis and respiratory lethafailre

ii1 dose-7 mg

Heart stimulant. Overdose 1.2-1can result in death

.5 mg

Antimalarial. Overdoseleads to severe cardiac Iconvulsions, nausea, and

yfomiting

Impairs k idney functionand causes vomitingand convulsions



.

IXVENTORY (can’t.) r .” . - _

Material Class Quantity Characteristics

s 390 Incap. 1 gr. BZ-like

Phencyclidine Inczp. 10 gr. Causes disorienta-HCL Lethal tion. High dosage

leads to convulsionsand death. .

Tetrol Incap. 50 mg narcotic

Dose

KLreurokinin Incap. 50 ml Produces severe aain



198

! ,f

viai 1 .ltiL ,)”



199

10 FcLruary 1970

PARA LYTIC SllELL.FISlI POISON -

IKJRKIIK I;UWD ItiVESTIGATlOllS

Safe D172C3, Iloom 202

tlorthrnfit Si~cllflsh SonLtntLon Center, U.S.Y .II.S., KnrrnC onsctt, R. I.,

product OS follows:

* : :

Dntch VILo O.hYO I:,

Ilrcch VIII o:Lso g

GJECII lx 0.554 c

Doccl~ X t XI 1.236 g "

0.(17&l a

0.557 I:

0.670 c---5.927 6

190 mg of liquid matrrlol fumishrd by I4orldng Punds (probtrbly Edccwood

product) . See No.ccbook CDG40D, pngc 145.

TOXIFERIN lll’C1l.LO11IUE’ 7- . ._ , .)

200.3 "8

_-.



200



201

DOD



202

Office <d IT& I: \\‘l,it: !Tc ~,. -c i’rc:.:. :;< rxc.l:,r)

(!;c,y ::i:.~;:;.n,‘, ?‘I,; iJ. ).

-__---..__.._-- _ ____..___..___..____ _..__ __..__.,________..._.._ - __..-_----.._ --



203



204



205



206



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WIS,,IN GTON . UC 1050s

Novcmbcr 25, 1969

,..*

National Security Decisio n Mcmorandurn 35

TO : The Vice Picsidcnt

The Sccrctary of State

The Sccrctary of Dcfcn sc

The Director, Central Intcllig cncc Agency

The Dircclor, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

The Director, Office of Emcrgcncy Prcparcdn css

The Director, Office of Sc icnc c and Technology

SUDJECT: United States Policy on Chem ical Warfare I’rogram

and Dactc riological/D iological Rcscarch Program

Fallowing consideration by the National Security Coun cil, the Prcsidc nt

has decided Ihat:

1. The term Chemical and Biolo gical Warfare (CUW) will no longer

be used. The rcfcrcncc hcnccforth should bc Lo the t\xo catcgo rics

scparatcly -- The Chem ical Warfare Program and The Riolo gical

Research Program.

2. With rcspcct to Chemical Warfare:

a. The objcctivc of the U. S. program will bc to dctcr Lhc useof chem ical weapons by other nations and to provide a

retaliatory capability if dctcrrcncc fails.

. b. The renunciation of the first use of lethal chem ical weapons

is reaffirmed.

C. Th is renunciation is hcrcby applied to incapacita ting

chemical weapons as well.

d. Th is renunciation dots not apply Lo tllc USC of riot controlagents or hcrbicid cs.

their use will be issued .



208

6. The Sccrctary of Dcfc nsc’, in cooperation with Chc

Director of UIC OKIicc of Sc icnc c and T~chnol~)gy, sha llcontinue to dcvclop and improve controls and safety

nleasurcs in all Chem ical Warfare progranls.

h. ; The Urtder Sccretsrics Com miLtcc sha ll corltlrrct on ann11a1

rcvicw of United States Chem ical Warfare programs and

public informalion policy, and will make recommcndationa

! to the Prcsidcnt.

3. With rcspcc t to Bsc tcriologic al/Biolog ical programs:

a. The Ullitcd StaLcs will rcno uncc 111~ use of lethal methods

of bacteriolog ical/biological warfare.

b. The United Slates will similarly rcnouncc Lhc use of all

other mc lllods of bacL criological/bio logical warfare (for

exsmplc, incapac itating agents).

d. The Sccrclary of Dcfcnsc will subunit rccollll llcntlatiol15

about Lhc dispos al of csistin g stocks of bacLc riological/

biological weapons.

e. The United States shall associate itself will1 Lhc

principles and 013jc clivcs of the DrafL Convcntian

l’rohibiLin!; Lhc USC of Uiologicsl hdctl~ocls of \Vdrlarc

prcscnLl:~l by Lhc UniLctl liingdon l at lhr: EighLucn-Nation

Disarmalrlcnt Confcrcncc in Gcncvn, on 26 August 1961.

I~c~col~~r,lcntlation as Lo assoc iation will3 spe cific pro-

visions of tllc Draft Con vcnlion should bc prcparcd by

lhc Sccrctnry of Stntc and Lhc Director of Chc Arnls

ConLrol and LIisnrmalncnt Agency, in coordi.nstion with

other inlcrcstc d agcn cics, for Lhc Prcsitlcnt’s considcralion.



209

f. The Sccrctnry of Dcfcnsc , in colljun clion will1 lhc

Director of the Office of Science and Technology, slla ll

continue Lo dcvclop controls and safety n lcasurcs in all

bacteriological/biological programs.

6. The Under Sccrctarics Com miltcc shall conduct an

annual rcvicw of United SLolcs Dactcriologicnl/Diological

, Research I~rograms and public information policy, ant1

’ will xnalcc recommendations to the President.

cc: Cha~rnlan, Joint Chiefs of Staff



SUDJECT: Unilcrl Slalcs Policy on Toxins

1.

2.

3.

4.



211

EXHIBIT 9

Protocol for the Prohibition of the lJse in Warof Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Xases,and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare



212

Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-ment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacterio-logical (BiologicaI) and Tosin Weapons andon Their Destruction



213

Article I

Eucli State Pnrtr to this Conveutlon undertakes never in any circ~~mstances

to dewlop, produce. stnckpile or otherwise acquire or retain :

(1) Jilcrnbial or other biological ngeuts. or tosins n-hnterer their nri$n ormethod of productinu, of tyi)es nntl in quantities that hare no justitic:ltiuu for.proI~h~lnctlc. protective or other penccful purposes;

(2) Wrnpnns. equipment nr me*us nf delivery desirrwtl 10 use l c.h :k3’!\t$ nr

tOxille for hostile puriw3es or in armed cnutlict.

Article II

Esc11 State l’artr to this (‘onvrhtinu untlrrt:lkcs to drstwr, IBM n aitwrt rnpeaceful purposes, ns snnu ns possible but. not later than nine months afterthe entry iuto fnrce of the Couvrutiou. *I1 agents, toxins. \v~~npn~~.~. uiisiu+ntand menus n1 drlivctT speciikrl In arricle I of the Convention. rrbich ;tre in its~~ousession or under its jurisdictlnn or control. In itnpleuuwtiug rhe pm izion<of this nrticle all necessary aafetr precautions shall be observed to prntect pop-ulntinus and the environment.

Article III

Each Stnte PartI to this Conkeritinu undert:~kes not to transfer to nnyrecipient whntsnerer, direetlr or indirectly. nnd not in any way to assist,encourage, or induce nuI State, group of States or iriterunti~lnnl or=tinizntinns tomanufacture or ntherwise acquire unI of the ngruts, ttrsiur. WV;II .~ 1:~. I ,u;:~.v-r:i

or means of delivery specified iu article I of the Cnurentivn.

Article IV

E;IcL State PartI to this Couventinn rluill. in nccnrduuce with its cou~titurinunlproce;isea, take nuy necessnry mensurrs to prohilrit and prerrut thr ~lrvrl~~~~u~t~u:,productiou. stockpiling, ncquisltion or retention of the n,srutr.. tnsiu-. trrq~nu~.equipuieiit aud menus nf delivery specified lti article I of thr L’;uwnti,ul. n’i!l :;;:the trrritor) of such State, under it* jurktliction or undvr it3 ~~ntnfl :trzy\:.!wr..

Articlr V

The State I’nrties to this Coureutlnri undert;lkr to onn%lr ~w~r :lu~~flwr ,~f:tl *conperate 111solrinfi any Iwnhletus whivti may nrixe in rt*l:kri~q tn tlir tll~.w.ti~of . or iu the oirplt~ntif~u n f the prwisiws,of. the Cc~urenti~~n. C~~u*tllt:lrillu ,nn~lcn~qwmtion [llll3~liltlt to this article nui.v nlsn bv unciwrnkru tlirl8uzll :tl~i~rrq~rl:lteinter~uitiounl ixrwedurrs withiu the frutucw~~rk of Ibe Ctritvtl \;:ltil*ti. :,I.*1 .:,

acrordauce with its Charter.hrticle VI 1

(1) Aug Stnte Party to this Convention which tiutls that any nther %ate Party

is actlug in breach of c~bliputions deriving from the prorisinns a, f tl iv c’ourwti0nmnp lodge a compiulnt with the Security Cnuucil of the Suited Satilius. Such acomplaint should include all i~osslble eridetwe confirming it2 rnlitlit .v, as n-e11ns a request fnr its rotwidcration by the Security Council.

(2) Encb State Pnrtp to this Conwution undertaken to conper:ite in txrrrinzout nny Inrextlgatlnu which the Security Couriril map initiate, in nccorthruce with

the provisions of the Chnrter of the Culted Satinns, on the basis nf the CON-

.



214

plaint rb &red by the Coun cil. The Security Coun cil sha ll inform the Stnte:

Parties to the Conrention of the results of the inrestigation.

Article YII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support nssist-

ante. in accordance with the United Sations Charter. to’ un.v Party to the Con-

vention which so requests, if the Securitr Cou ncil decid es thnt such Part1 has

been espwed to danger as n result of violation of the Convention.

Article VIII

Sofhing in this Conrenrion sha ll be interpreted ns in any war limiting or

detracting from the 0bli;‘ntion s assum ed bS an!- State under the Protocol for the

Prohit,ition of the Ts e in Wnr of Asphyxiaring. Poison ous or Other Gases. and

of I%ncteriolo$cnl JIethwls @If \Varfnre, signed ilt Geneva on J\tne 17.13-22.

1 Article IS

Each State Part? to this Convention nffirms the recognized objectike of

effectire prohibition of chem ical meapon s and, to this end, undertakes to continue

negotiations in good faith with a Tiers to renching earls agreement on effectire

measnres for the prohibition of their development. production and stockpiling

and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and

means of delivery spe cifically designed for the production or use of chem ical

ngrnts for weapons purposes.

Article S

(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertnhe to fncilitate, and hare

the right to pnrticipnte in. the fullest pos sible exchange of equipment. mnteri~ls

and scie ntific and techno logical informntion for the use of bncteriolo gicnl (bio-

logical) agents and toxins for peace ful purposes. Parties to the Conrention in

a lwsition to do so sb: lll nlsa) conperate in contributing individually or together

with other States or international orpanizntions to the further derelopment 2nd

npplicntion of scie ntific discoreries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for

preventiun of di.ie:ise. or for other peaceful prn-pcses.

(2) Th is Conrentiou .shD ll be implemented in n manner designed to avoid

hnmpering the econo mic or technn lngicnl derrlopment of States Parties to the

Convention or internntionnl cnoprration in the tirtti of peareful t,ncteriotogical

(hioll~gicnl) uctivitirs. includin g the international exchange of bncterinlog ic2.l

(t~i~~lnci~::il) ;r:rnts nnd toxins :lntl equipment for the process ing. iise or produc-

tion of t~ncteriotogic31 (Iriologicnl) agents and toxins for peace ful purposes in

accordance nith the provisirlns of the Convention.

Article SI

.iny Stutr Party muy propose ame ndm ents to this Convrution. hmendm entssha ll enter into force for ench State Pnrtr wcepting the nmendm ents npon

their accrp tnnce by :1 nx~joritr of the Staten Partirs to the Conren tion and

thewnfter for each renniinin g State Party on the date of ncxeptiince by it.

Article XII

Fire Fe:rrs after the entr.r into force of this Conrention, or earlier if it is

requested by a majority of Parties to the Conrcntion by subm itting n proposal



215

to this effect to the Depositnv Goternments, a conferenw of Stntes I’nrtic s to

the Conwntion sha ll be held at Geuera, Switzerland, to revier thp oFration of

the Conreotion. with a view to assurin g that the purposes of the prwtnble rindthe provisions of the Convention. including the provisions concernin; nesotinti8x~.s

on chem icnl nmpons, are being realized. Such rerieK shall tnlw into account

any new scie ntit ic and tech nolo gical derelopnrcr~t* relevant to the Convention.

Article XIII

(1) Th is Convention shxll be of unlim ited duration

(3) Each State Parts to this Coureutiou shall in esrrci;iny its nnrinnal

sorereignty hare the right to withdnrw from the Convention if it decid es thnt

extraordinary erents, related to the sub ject matter of the C’nnrrntion. haw

jeopnrdized the supreme interests of its cotink:;‘. It shall ~B~VP uotice of inch

withdrawal to all other States Parties to rhe Convention and r~ thr C‘1:itr.d

Satious Security Counc il three mouths: in ndwnce. Sllrb norice A;~il inc!u dtl

a statemen t of tte estraordin3ry errnt.i it regrds as harinq jeuI* lrc!izc ~l ii,.

supreme interests.

Article SIJ

(1) Th is Convention sha ll be open to a11 Stnt cs for sipnatu rc. .\ny State

which does not sign the Convention before its entry intn force in accordaucc

With pnragmph (3) of this .\rticle was a cced e to it at any time.

(2) This Convention shall be suhjcc t to ratification bF Signatory Stares.Instruments of ratification and instmnwnts of uccewion shxll be drywitetl

with the Gorernmrnts of the rnited States of .\merica. tllr Iwnir.>fl Iiic;!?~ ::-

of Great Britain and Sot-them Ireland and the Union of Sot-ict S~w inli-t

Rep ublics , which are hereby- designa ted the Depositarr Gorernments.

(3) Th is Convention sh all enter into force after the depob5t o f instrume nts

of ratification bx Went?-tn-o Governnwnts. inclMirg the Gow-nnwnt.~ dcaiz-

nated AS Depo sitaries of the Convrntiwl.

(4) For States whose instnun ents of ratification nr :xty&.<ainn arc ~lrlw-it~tl

subse quent to the entry into force of thic Conrcntitw, it sha ll cntcr inr,) Il0x

on the date of the depo sit of their instr~unen ts of mtiticati~ ~n hr :Iccr+io :l.

(5) The peposit:lry Gnremment~ sh all pronlprly infilrm 311 -i,zn:lrnr?- :Inc:

acce ding States of the date of r:ich si&ll;ltu re, the d:liP of rlepkt of e:~rlr ir:srrl!-

merit of ratification or of xcressia)n ~lntl the date of f!:~ clltry intd) f~~rcc ni thi-

Conrention. and of the receipt of other noricrs.

Article 3\ 1

Th is Conrmtion. the English. Russian, Fwncb. Spanish ant\ ChinPe tests

of which nre equ:lily authentic. shall be drpo~itetl in the nrcbiwa of the DE-

positary Goremments. Duly certif lctl cop ies of the Conrcnti(tn sim ll be trans-

mitted bp the Depositary Governments to the Govemmentp of the signatory and

acceding States.



216

EXHIBIT 11

Dr. Wi I I iam T. Br!avc~

Dep~rtmcnt Of ~h,~~l l l , lC~l~O~J~

Cornell UnivcrsiLy Hcdical College

1300 York Avenue

New York, New York

Mr. Wi I I iam Beck

Northwest She1 I fish Laboratory

Gig Harbor, WashingLon

Dr. Wi I l iam H. Beers

The Rockefeller Univcrsi ty

New York, New York 10021

Dr. Merlin 5. ~crgdoll

Food Research Ins1 i tute

University of Wisconsin

Madison, Wisconsin 53706

.,*

Shellfish Poison

Botulinum Toxin

.

Staph EnL B

Slaph EnL A

Dr. Alan W. Bcrnheimcr

New York University School of Medicine

Department of Microbiology

550 First Avenue

New York, New York

Staple Ent B

Botulinurn Toxin

Dr. Martin E. Bernstein

Indiana University Medical Center

1100 West Michigan Stree t

Indianapolis, Indiana 46207

Or. John A. Bevan

Oepar tment of Pharmacol’ogy

School of Medicine

University of California

Los Angeles, California

Or. B. Beys

Faculty of Medicine & PharmacologySchool of Public IleaiCh

University of Brussels

Brussels I, Belgium

She1 Irish Poison

\

BoLul inum Toxin

SLaph Ent B



217

br. Morclccai P. Blaustc.in

Dcpartmcnt of Physioloqy t Biophysics

Washington Utlivnrsity School of ficdicinc660 5. Eucl id Avenue

St . Louis, Missouri 63110

Dr. Peter Bonvcnturc

Radioisotope Laboratory

Cincinnati Gcncral Hospital

Cincinnati, Ohio

L t . JJIIICS C. BondDepartment of Pharmacology

Georgetown University Medical School

Washington, D.C. 20007

Dr. Hcrbcrt L. Borison

Dcpar tmcn t of Pharmaco I ogy

Dartmouth Medical School

Hanover, New Hampshire

Dr. Daniel Boroff

Albert Einstein. institute

York & TJ~ OI - Roads

Phi Iadelphia, Pennsylvania 19120

Dr. Thomas Bratkowski

Section of Neurobiology & Behavior

Langmui r Laboratory

Cornell University

Ithaca, New York 14850

Or. Oavid K. Brooks

Baylor University Colfege of Medicine

Texas Medical Center

Hous ton, Texas 77025

Dr. Clarence A. Bromrficld

Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

Prof. S. 0. Burton

Institu te of Marine Science

University of Alaska

College, Alaska *

Botu I i num Tox i n

Staph Ent B

Botul inutn Toxin

Staph Ent B

She1 Ifish Poison

Botul inure Toxin

Botul inm Toxin

Shellfish Poison

Botulinum Toxin

Shellfish Poison



218

Mr . Thomas Our I on

Depor ~m cn t ol Ilc~ I th, EdUCJl i cm arid WC I fare

Food & Drug Administration

1521 W. Pica Boulcv~rd

Los Angeles, California 90015

Dr. Frank C. Carpenter

University of Alabama Mcdic~I C\:nter

Medical Collcgc and School of Dentistry

Bi rmi ngham, Alabama 35233

Dr. C. Jclleff Carr

Chief. Scientific Analysis Branch

Life Sciences Division

Office or the Chief of Research and Development


Dr. Ezra Casnwl,

Food & Drug Administration

U.S. Public Health Service

Washington, D.C.

Dr. Stephen 5. Chen

Department of Physiology

The University of Wisconsin


Dr. Michael Chcrington

Division of Neurology

University of Colorado Medical Center

4200 East Ninth AvenueDenver, Colorado 80220

Dr. Wi Ilium Chcsbro


Universi cy of New Hampshire

Durham , New Hampshire 03824

Dr. Scott V. Cobert

Bacteriology DepartmentAlbany Medical College

Albany, New York

She I I fish Poison

.*

.v

Botul inum Toxin

Botulinum Toxin

Staph Ent B

tlotu I i num Tox in

Botulinum Toxin

Staph Ent A

Botu 1 i num Toxin



219

James E. Corrig,ul

35 Dutlcr street

Division of Natural Sciences

St . Francis College

Brooklyn, New York

Ethe I Cosmos

Institute for llusclc .Disoases, Inc.

Division of Cell Biology

New York, New York lOO2l

Dr. Frederick Coulston

lnsti tutc of Experimental Pathology

and Toxicology

Albany Medical Collcgc

Albany, New York 12208

Dr. Scott Covert


Albany Mcdica) Co\ lcgc


Dr. John T . Cronin

Professor of Chemistry

Division of Mathem atics &

Physical Science

Southwestern State Col lege

Weatherford, Oklahoma

Dr. William J. Crowlcy

Department of Ncurolog; Jr’

University of Virginia Schoolof Medicine

Charlottesville, Virginia 22901

Dr. Don Das Gupta

Food Research lnsti lute

University of Wisconsin


SheIICish Poison

.,.’

Botu I i num Tox i n

Botul inum Toxin

Botul inum Toxin

She I I f i sh Poison

Botul inum Toxin

Botulinum Toxin



220

Dr. G ;1 r y 0 :7 v i 5

Nat ion.11 11,st i L,ILC or fIV,l I Jl IICJ Ill1

Divisioll 0r Spccisl f4cnldI Ilc~llh

RCSC,)l’Ch, I R

Laboratory of Ncur-opl~~r~~~ircology

$~inl Elizabcths Hospital

WAW Bui Itling

Washinglon, D.C. 20032

Cal. lrvih Davis

USAF Schoo I of Aer-ospacu llctl i c i nc

Chief, Bioscicnccs Division

Brooks Air Force Base, Texas 78235

Or. C. B. Denny

Assistant Chief, BacLcriolngy

National Canners Associalion, Washington

Research Laboratory,

I I33 20th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

Marjorie L. Dewy

ChieF ToxicologisL

Diablo Laboratories

Berkeley Rescarth CenLcr

Berkeley, California

Dr. N. Dickie

Dcpdrtn~cnt of National Hc~lLh & Welfare

Food & Drug Directorate

Tunncy’s PasLurc

Ottawa, Ontdrio, Canada

Dr. V. R. Dowcll

NaLional Cor~rt~~ut~icdble Discdsc Center

Atlanta, Georgia

. .

.I

Botul inm Toxin

Staph Ent 0

She I I F i 5 h Po i son

Botu I i nun\ Tox in

BOLU I i num Tox i 11



221

Dr. Jmes L. Duncan

Departmcnl or Microbiology

Northwestern Universi Ly

Chicago, Illinois GO611

Dr. Ralph V. Oykus

Scripps Institution of OceanographyUniversity of California, San Diego

P.O. Box 109

La Jolla, California 92037

Dr. Gary Oykstra

Dcpartwnt of tic,~l~h, Education & Welfare

Food & Drug Atlm i n i s trat ion

1560 East Jcffcrson AVCWCZ

Detroit, Michigan 48207

Dr. Arthur Eberstein

Neti York Univcrsi ly Medical Center

Institu te of Physical Medicine &

Rehabi Ii tat icm

400 East 34th Street

New York, New York

Prof. Roger Eckcrt

Departmcnl of Zoology

Syracuse University

Syracuse, NGW York

Dr. Seymour Ehrcnpres i s

Department of Pharmacology

Ccdrgetown Medical School

Washington, D.C.

Dr. Richard Ehrlich

II T Research Institule *

IO West 3511~ Street

Chicago, Illinois

StJ(lh Ellt u

Shci Irish Poison

She I I r i Sll Poison

Shellfish Poison

Bolulinulll loxin

SLapI ‘Ent D



222

Central I11sri1ul.r: fur NuIri Lion

and FIJIJ~ Rcsct~rch T.N .O.UI trcchlscwcg 48

Zeist, The Ncthcrlands

Dr. Martin H. Evans

Instilulc of Animal Physiology

Babraham

Cambridge, England

Mr. Oouglas A. Err~ld

Dep~rtmcnl of Zoology


Berkeley, California 94720

Pro f. Maurice 0. Fcinslcin

Down SLJL~ Mcdicel Ccntct

State Universily of NCM York


450 Clarkson Avenue

Brooklyn, New York II203

Dr. William A Fclsing, Jr.

Chief, Field Operation Section

She1 lfish SanilaLion Branch

Department of Health, Education & Welfare

Washington, D.C.

Dr. John A. Findlay

Deparlmcnt of ChcmirlryUnivers i ty of New Brunswick

Freder iclon, New Brunswick, Canada

Dr. Robert 8. Forncy

Department of Toxicology

Indiana University Medical Center

Indianapolis, Indiana

Prof. Frcdcr ick A Fuhrman

Ffcischmann Laboralorics of the

Hcdical Sciences ‘.

Stanford University School of Medicine

Palo Al to, California 94304

. .

,r

Shcl I fish Poison

Dotul inure ‘Toxin

ShclIfish Poisun

Shellfish Poison

Shellfish Poison

Shellfish Poison



223


School of Veterinary Medicine

Davis, California

Dr. Joseph F. Ccnnsro, Jr.

The J. Hi I Iis Hi I ICI’ ~lealth Center

University of Florida

Gainesville, Florida

Elmer George, Jr. j Director

Laboratory Dui Iding

State Food Laboralory

Department of Agriculture G Markets

1220 Washing ton Avcnclc?


Dr. Julia Cerwing

University of Oritish Columbia

Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

Or. Richard J. Gilbert

Food Hygiene Laboratory

Central Public Health Laboratory

Colindalo Avenue

London NW 9, England

Pro f. A. Ciovanardi

lnstituto Di Igicnc Della

Universi ta Di Mi lane

University of Milan, Ita ly

Dr. N. Grccr

II T Research Institute

IO West 35th Street

Chicago, I I I inois

A. E. Greenberg

Chief, Sani Cation G Radialion Laboratory

2151 Bcrkcley wry

Berkeley, California

SLJIJh En1 D

.v. .

L.

Botu I i ~~UII, Tox i n

Slaph Ent Q

Botulinu~~~ Toxin

Shellfish Poison

She1 I fish Poison



224

of CoIu~~lbia U~~ivcrsily

Departnrcnt of Neurology

Laboratory OF NcuophysioIogy


Dr. S. Hqiwra

Scripps institution of Oceanography

P. 0. Box tog

La Jolla, California 92037

Dr. Ii. E . Hall

Robert A. Ta ft Sanitary Engineering Center

U. 5. Public llcalth Service

4676 Columbia Park\l,ly

Cincinnati, Ohio 45226

Dr. D. L. tiamwcrwn

The Brooklyn CcnLcr

Long Island University

Brooklyn, New York IIZO I

Dr. Wi I I iam K. Harrel I

Chief, Microbiological Reagents Unit

Communicable Discasc Center

Atlanta, Georgia 30333

Dr. Koroku HashimoLo

h.?parLn!cnt Of PharmCOlOgy

Faculty of Medicine

Univcrsi ty of Tohoku

Senda i , Japan

Dr. Ervin J. Hawrylcwicz

I IT Research lnsti tute

IO West 35th SLrec.1

Chicago, Illinois 60616

Dr. JJIIICS L. H~yncs

Litton Syslcms, Inc.

Applied Science Division

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55413

Shellfish Prrisort

,.

She1 If ish Puison

Staph Ent B

Slaph En1 B

Staph Ent B

Sllellfish Poison

Botul inum Toxin

Botul inure Toxin



225

Dr. Richa~‘d llcnclc!r~W

Deparlmm ~t nf Chc:mislry

Stcrl iny Clwnrislry LaboratoryYale University

225 Prospect Strccl

New Haven, Connecticut 06520

Or. Edward J. llcrbsl

Spalding Li fc Scicnccs Bldg.

Department of Diochcmistry

University of New Iiampsllirn

Durham, New Hampshire 03824

Dr. T . Hcrskovic

Section of Castrocntcrology

‘Yale’Universi ty School O F Mcdlcino

New Haven, Connecticut 06510

Dr. John Heuser

Laboratory of Neuropathology t,

Neuroanatomical Sciences

.NationaI Institute of Neurological

Diseases & StrokeBethesda, Maryland 20014

Dr. Ccrlil Hille

The Rockcfc I ler Inst i Lute


Dr. Carl R. Honiy


University of Rochester Medical CenterRochester, New York

Prof. A. 8. Hope

The Flinders University of South Australia

School of Biological Sciences

Bedford Park, South Australia 5042

John Y . Humber

National Canners Aszociation

Washington, D. C. 20036

. .

.I

,*

Sllel Ifish Poison

Staph En1 tl

00 t u 1 i num Tox i n

Shcl Ifish Poison

Botul inure Toxin

Shellfish Poison

Staph Ent A



226

staph En1 II

. .. .

,.

Dr. Bernard Jandorf

CRDL

Edgewood Arsenal, MaI-yland

Shcl If ish Poison

Dr. Jam es M. Jay

Department of Biology

Wayne State University

Detroit, Michigan 48202

Sla~Jh En1 I)

Staph EnL A

Dr. Dana Id J. Jcndcn

Ocpar tmen 1 or Pharmaco I ogy

Univcrsi ty of California Ccnlcr ror

the Health Scrviccs

Los Angeles, California 90024

00 I u I i num Tox i n

Dr. Wayne I. Jensen

U.S . Dept. of Interior Fish & Wi IdlifeService

P.O. Box 459

Bear River Rcsc;lrch StoLion

Brigham City, Utah

Botul inw Toxin

Or . Francois Jobin

Laboratoire de rechcrches cl iniques

et Service d’tlrmato logic

Hospital du Saint-Sacrcment

Quebec, Canada

Shellfish Poison

Dr. Howard M. Juhnsotl

Milk & Food SaniLal,ion Rcscarch Branch

Division of Microbiology

Deportment of lical th, Education C Welfare

IO90 Tuscu I um Avenue

Staph Ent 8

Cincinnati, Ohio 45226

Mr. W. G. Jowctl

TT CP , Sub-group E

Defence Standards LJbOrJtOrieS

P.O. Box 50

Ascot Vale, 3032 -

ViCtOrid, AUStrJliJ

Shellfish Poison



227

Dr. C. Y . Koo

Dcpar lmcn L of Pl~,~rmi~co I ogy

$.latc Univcrlity of Nctr York

Brooklyn, New York

Dr. Toshikaru Kawabala

DcpartmenL of Food Control

National Inslilulc of HealLh

284 Kamiosaki-Cho,jamaru

Shinagawa-Ku, Tok yo, Japan

LCDR John C. Kccscy

Naval Medical Research Institu te

National Naval HcdicaI CenLer

Bethesda, Maryland 20014

Dr. T . H. Kent

WalLer Heed Inst i I.uLc

Walter Reed Medical Center

WashinyLon, D.C.

Maurice E. KingI IT Research Insti-tutc

IO West 35th Street

Chicago, Illinois

Dr. C. P. Kraalz


The Jcffcrson Medical Col leyc

of Philadelphia

1025 Walnut Stree t

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Dr. Richard E. Krcig , Jr.

USAF School of Acrospacc Medicine

Brooks Air Force BJSC, Texas 78235

Dr. K. Krnjcvic

McGill UniversiLy


Montrea l, Quebec, Canada

.*

Shellfish Poison

Sl~cllfish Poison



228

A. Lachansc

Dep~rtncnt OC Ilrdustry & Commo~cc

Division ol Fislwrics

Part iamccr{ Bui Iding

Quebec Ci ly, CJIIJ~J

SlicI1Fisl1 Poison

Prof. Harbans LJI


University Of Kansas

School of Phartllacy

Lawrence, Kansas

Staph En1 I3

Dr. Car 1 lamann

Deputy Chief & Scicnlific Advisor

Life Sciences Division

Off ice of the Chief of Rcsearch

Uolul ihunl Toxin

and Ocvc 1 opmcn tArm y Rcscarch Of r i ce

Washinyton, D.C. 203lD

Dr. R. V.Lechowich

Department of Food Science

Michigan State Univcrsi Ly

East Lansing, Michigan 488i3

Botul inure Toxin

Dr. then-Yuan Ler Uotu I i I~U III Toxon

National Taiw an University

Oepartwtnc of PharnwcoIoyy

Cot legc of Medicine

Taipei, .Taiwan

or. J. s. Lee

Oepartmcnl of Food Science & Technoloyy

Oregon State Univcrsi ty

Shel lfisli Poison

Corvall is, Oregon 9733 I



229

Dr. Knilli II. Lewis

Director. Office of Foods G Nulrition

Food and Drug Adltli 11 i s t ra t i on

Room 6001 - FOB 8 Bldg.

200 C Scrccl, S.W.


Dr. Marlin Lipkin

Departlwznt of Mcdicinc

Cornell Universily Medical College

First Avcnuc & Twenty-Sixth Street


Mr’; A lfred R. Locbl ich I I I

Scripps Ins1 i lut ion of Oceanography

Department of M.~rinc Biology

University 0r California

LaJolIa, California

Dr. Ger trudc D. MdengLryn-OaviesDepartment of Pharmacology

Ceorgctown Univcrsi ty


Dr. Dean F. tlartin

Department of Chemistry

University of South Florida

Tampa Campus

Tampa, ,Florida 33620

Dotul inure Toxi11

Sl\ellFisl~ Puison

Dr. Richard L. flasI,lnd

Department of Neurology

College of Physicians & Surgeons of

Columbia University

New York, New York IO032

Dr. Wi II iam 0. McClure

Oepa rtment pf Chemistry L Chcnlical Engineering

Biochemistry Division

University of IllinoisUrbana, Illinois 61801



230

ocpar Llllc!rrL nf r.111 owolocJy

Univcrsi1.y of C,lIifr)r’nia

Rivcrsidc, Calilornia 92502

Dr. Robert MCI SJJC

Depar tmcn t ol Pharr~~~cology

State University of New York at Buffalo

122 Capcn Hall

Buffalo, New Yor’k

Prof. A. I. McNuI lcnState University of New York st Buffalo

Center for Thcoreticai Biology

4248 R idgc Lea Raad

Amherst, New York 14226

Mr. John T . Mcocllam

food & Drug Adlninislralion

Public Health Service

850 Th i rd Avcnuc

Brooklyn, New York II232

Dr. ErncsL A. Ilcycr

DepartmcIIt 0f Bactcrialogy

University of Oregon Medical School

3181 S.W. Sam Jackson Park Road

Portland, Oregon

Dr. Paul Iliddwgh

Batter iology OcporIwcrrt

College or Agricullure andBiological Sciences

South Dakota State Univrrsi ly

8rookinys, South Oakota 570OG

Or . RobcrL Mi llcr

Department OF ZOO lOgy

The University,

Glasgow, England W.2

Dr. Lloyd Moss

Stanford Research lnst i tuLe

Menlo Park, California

Uolu I i IIU III Tux i II

Botul inure Toxin

Bu LU I i nut11 Tox i I~

Sllcl I f i 5.11 I’ui son

Ootul inw Toxin

Staph Ent U

Slicl Ifish Poison

Botul inure Toxin



Dr. Tosllil~ N,11.,1lr.,shi

Duke Univcr:, i Ly McdicaI C~nlcI

Dcpartlllcnt of Physiology GPharmacology.

Durham, North Carol ina

Dr. K. V. Natarcljan

Douglas Marine 51atiun

Institu te of Marine Science

P.O . 00x 349

Douglas, Alaska 99824

Prof. C. L. Oaklcy

Department of Bacteriology

University ol Leeds

School of tlcdicinc

Leeds 2, Enyl~nd

Dr. Torstcin Oftcbro

The Veterinary Collcgc or Norway

Institute for Food Hygiene

Oslo 4, Norway

231

Slrc I I I i 511 Poison

Sllcl I fish Poison

tjotul inure Toxin

Dr. A. C. Baird-Parke1

Unilevar Research Laboratory

Colworlh House

Shornbrook, BedFord, England’

staph Cnt l3

Dr. Rodney L. Parsons

Department of Physiology & Biophysics

The University or Vcrmonl

College of Medicine

Burlington, Vermont 05401

Bolul inull Toxin

Prof. Anne L. Pales

Department OF Biological Sciences

The Florida SLJCC University

Tallahassee, Florida

Eotul inull Toxin

Dr. Charles S. PctlyMaryland Medical-Legal Foundation, Inc.

700 Fleet Strcot

Baltimore, Maryland

Bolul inum Toxin



232

Dr. JCJIWI J. Puwr~

Food Scicnccs Lol~or~rlory

Univcrsi ly UC Gcurq ia

Athens, Gcoryia 30601

or. Venkatray G. Probhu

Department of Physiology & Phorolaco~ogy

Chicago Col lcqc of Ostcopalhy

I122 EJst 531-d strCC!1

Chicago, Illinois 60615

Dr. Bcn.jamin tl. PringlcNortheast Shcl Irish Poison Laboratories

Naragansett, Rhode island

Dr. John Van Prohaska

Dcpar tmc n t of Surgery

950 East 59lh SLrceL

Chicago, Illinois

Dr. M. Purko

National Dairy Products Carp,

Fundamental Research Laboratory

Research G Dcvclopmcnt Division

Glenview, I I linois

Dotul inw Toxin

She I I r i sli Poison

5tilph En1 B

Shcl Ifish Poison

Prof. Loyd Y . Quinn

Department of Bsclerioloyy

Iowa State Univcrsily of

Science & Technology

Ames, tow.3 500l0

DoLul inum Toxin

Dr. James J. Rahal

I71 Harrison Avenue

Boston, Massachusetts 02111

Dr. K. R. Rao

Department of Ophth~l~w logy

Univcrsi ty Hospi la1

The Univcrsi ty oU Iowa

Iowa CiLy, IOWJ 52240

Botul inw) Toxin

E. J. Ratajak

Charles Pfizer Medical Research

Laborator its

Groton, Connecticut

Staph Ent B



233

0 r . S~IIIIII~ II. R,,y

Marine Labr)r,ll~~r)

TCXJS A t 1.1 Uni vcr5i ly

Galveston, Texas 77SSO

Dr. C. 8. Read

Sanitary Engineering Ccnlcr

U.S. Public Hcallh Scrvicc

4676 Columbia Parkway

Cincinnati, Ohio

C”Stk’O dCi fkJt

Escuala Nacibnal dc Sanidad

Ciudad Univcrsitaria

Madrid, Spain

Or. Hor‘lcc Rccs

Duyway Proving Crllund

Dugway, Utah 84022

Dr. Edward Roicl;

Rockefcl ler Univcrsi ty

66th Street & York Road

New York, New York

Or. J. F. Reilly

Division of Pharmcology

Bureau of Scientific Rcscarch

Food 6 Drug Administration

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Nack R i chords

Department of Sea & Shore Fisheries

State of Main

Fisheries Rcsearch.SIat.ion

West Eoothbay Harbor, Maine 04574

Dr. Hans Ricmnn

Department of Pub1 ic Hcallh

School of Veterinary Mcdicinc

Agricultural Experinrnt StationUniversity of California

Davis, Califqrnia

SheI I fish Poison

Shellfish Poison

Shellfish Poison

Do Lu I i nulls Ta x i n



234

Dr. Willis Ricsr:~l

II T Rese.-1.~11 Ins1 ilulc

IO WO<l 35th SlrccLChicago, I I I inois

Dr. J. Murdoclr P.ilchic

Professor OF Phdrr~~~cology

Albert Einstein Cullagc ! of Medicine

New York, New York I0461

Or. Johrl W. Rittcr

18534 55~1~ Avcnuc. N.E.

Seattle, Washinyton 98155

Dr. Martin Rizack

The Rockcfci ler UIIivcrsi ty


Or . Joseph 0. Robinson

Oepartnrnt of Phar~~lacology

State University nf New YorkUpstate Medical Center

766 I rvi ng AVWUC

Syracuse, New York 13210

Or. ‘Jancs R. Rooncy

Agricultural Expcr imcn t Station

University of Kentucky

Lexington, Kentucky 40.506

Or. Robert E. Rose

Mi I I ipore CorporaL ion

Bedford, Massachusetts 01730

Or. Findlay E. Russell

University of Southern Cal i fornia

Laboratory of Ncuroloyical Research

Los AnrJe les Counly Iiospi La I

Box 323. 1200 North SlaLc Stree t

Los Ange les, California 90033

80 tu I i nuw Tax i II

Uotul inw Toxin

Shcl Iris11 Poison

Botul inuw Toxin

Staph EIlL II

Shcl I fish Poison



235

Dr. Walter W. S~trllcl

D~pJr~llMmt of Puhl ic llca1 111

University uf C‘~IifornioDavis, California

Dr. Bernard P. Salnfsky

Department of Pharmacology -

Cot legc of Hcdirinc

University of I.Ilinois at lllc

Medical Cunt0r

Chicago, Illinois

Dr. J. P. Schmidt

Box 438

School of Aerospace Medicine

Brooks Air Force GJSC

San Antonio, Tc x~ s 78235

Staph En1 B

Maj . Dan i c I Shu~lhan

Department of Expcrimcntal Pathology

Waiter Reed Arm y lnstitutc of Research

Walter Reed Arm y llcdical CcnLer

Washington, D.C. 2OOL2

Slaph Ent D

Dr. Hichacl Shcfl

Pennsylvania Hospital

Ayer Cl inicdl Laboratory

Eighth & Spruce Slrccls

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Dr. C. M. Shul I

Charles Pfizer 1; Company, Inc,

Eastern Point R0ad

Croton, Connecticut

Dr. Lance Simpsun

New York St~tc Psychiatric Institute

722 West 168th Slrect

New York, New York I0032

Dr. John M. Slack

Dcpsrtment of Microbiology

West Virginia UrIiversity Medical Center

Morgantown, West Virginia

Ootul inure Toxin

Stxlph EnL !3

L?OLU I i num Tux i II

Dotul inum Toxin



236

DoLul irium Tuxin

PIlar-lllXcJltrcJyNew York Mcd i cnl Cal Ic !)c

New York, New York ID029

.b’ .’

. .

Prof. Thomas Smy lh! Jr.

Departrncnl of EnLow o~~gy

The Pennsylvania State University

I7 Frear LaboraLory

I University Park, Pennsylvania 16802

Oolul inurlt Toxin

Dr. Arporna Sri bhi bhadh

University of Washington

College of Fishcries

Seattle, Washinglon

Shel Ifish Poison

Dr. Richard A. Stcinh~rdt

Department of Zoology

Sllc I I f i sh Poison

Umiversity of California

Berkeley, California 94720

Of-. A. Ii. Stock

ClepartmenL of Microbioloyy

School of Medicine

Univers i ty of Pi t Lsburgh

Pittsburgh,’ Pennsylvania

Karunobu Sugawara

Pharmaceutical Institute

Tohoku University School of Medicine

K i tayobancho

Senda 1, Japan

She1 Ifish Poison

Dr. Ii. Suqiysma

Food Research Ins t i tutc

Univers i ly of Wiscons,in


Sl~pcI EnL 8

Botul inure Toxin

Or. Ceorgc 6. Sumyk

I IT Research lnsti tutc

10 West 35th Stree t

Chicago, Illinois

SLaph Ent 0



237

Dr. Alan D. Tcnn;l111

Bacteriological L~7boratoric:s

Laboratory 111 Ily!~ iclw

Ottaw a 3, Ontario, Canada

Dr. Frcdcrick P. Thurbc ry

Depa,rtmont of Zoology

University of New Hampshire

Durham, New Hampshi rc 03824

Dr. John C. Tom I inson

Henry Ford Hasp i ta I

Section on Cardiovascular Research

2799 West Grand Boulevard

Detro it, Michigan 48202

Dr. 8. T. Tozar

Microbiological Rcscarch Establishm ent

Porton Down, Sal isbury

Wi I tshire, England

Hr. Warren TseOepar tment of Physiology

The University ol Wisconsin


Mr. Claude Turgcon

Departmen oC Industry & Comm erce

Par1 iament 8ui Idings

Quebec City, Canada

Dr. Richard Tyler

Peter Bent Br i gham Hosp i ta I

Neurology Division

Departmept of Medicine

Boston, Massachusetts

Dr. Dennis W. Watson


1060 Mayo Memorial Building

University of Minnesota

Minneapolis, Ninncsota 55455

She I I F i 511 Pui son

_..,

:

*v

Shcl Ifisll Poison

00 t u I i 11um Tox i n

BOI.U I i nu~u To x i 11

She1 Irish Poison

Bo LU I i nuw To x i n

Staph En1 A



238

Dr. tlorwr W. WJ lkt-r-

Iowa SLJLC Univwsi ly or Scicncc &

Tcclrno I ogyDepartmcnL of DJiry t Food Industry

Ames, Iowa 50010

Dr. Ucan D. Wall

Midwest Rcsc~rch lnsli Lulc

Kansas Ci Ly, Missouri 64110

Prof. E. 0. Wcinber~)

OeparLment of Microbiology

Indiana University

Bloomington, Indiana 47401

Dr. Henry Wi 11s

Albany Mc~dical Col Icq c


Dr. John F. Winn

Chief, Biological Rcagcnts Section

Conm unicaI~lc Dise.lsc Center

Atlanta, Georgia 30333

Dr. Ben Wilson

Vandcrbi It University

School of Ilcdicinc

- Department of Biochemistry

Nashvi I le, Tennessee .i’./ 1: I’. i

Dr. A. J. Wood

BiochcmisLry 6 DJcLuriology Dcpartmcnts

University ol’ VicLorio

Victoria, British Columbia

Dr. Maryy Woodburn

Foods G Nut r i t i on Dcpar Lmcn t

Oregon Stale Univcrsi Ly

School of Hotw Econowi cs

Corvallis, Oregon 97331

Dr. RobclrL D. Y~LC S

Department or AnaLomy

University OF Texas Medical Branch

Ca I ves ton, Texas 77550

_.

.,

.V

Shellfish Poison

Staph Ent 0

SLJP~ Ent B

slap11 EnL B

BoLul i ~num Tox i II

Shellfisll Poison

Shcl I fish Poison

SLJII~ Ent B

Staph Ent A

Botu I i num Toxi n



239

Dr * Sultlllcr- Lacks

Ayer Cl i nical hboratory

Penn tlrtsp i ta I

8th & Spruce SKI-ccts

Phi ladelphia, Pennsylvania



240

JUSE lY68 - JCSE 1969

I

a-*---.- ._._...----“- .-. I

(.:.\i“ ‘~.:,

L, ; , , : , . ‘ ! : . : * : , YVVII - :

L:. .i.:,:“. .-- ,... 12L.



241

[DELETED]

VI . (S) C!,\‘fE E STS’l‘t:;l- ‘l ’t:!;‘ l ’-- ---.--.-- _’



242



243

[DELETED]



244

EXHMT 13

17 Teb nmr y 19’70

Pnrnlytic Slrellflmh

TuxJn (XIII)

Sl~sllCish Toxin A

(lb-l~ried)

sll.211ftrh Toxin A

(Clam)

Dotulimum Toxin (A)(Non-l’urlf Lad)

I~ntultwnu Toxin (D)

3cnl’h Entaro toxin (ll)

(PIIRA)

Pnralyclc Shsllfioh

Toxin (Clam)

Spmcial Oprrotlonr Dlvi~loa

Toxin 1nvontory

Qunn tity Starone Area Recmnndotlon

0.2 ,p"rn. Safe nm 223A11612 ll*t~lIl

0.01 gra m. Snfa Rm 223Al1612 ‘: Rotah

0.01 gr am . Slife Ra 223h/,l012 ” rrtorn

ZG5 grama ‘* Deep Prm rr Ibn 223/1412 DllpOOe

150 ml Refer Rm 223Af1412 Dirpnso

2.5 p?slru Deep ma 4za Ilm 223fwi 11ot*in

20.0 gram . Pm 223A11412 Iletala

2,057 raga Safe 172C3/1bUI

Rmtaln ,

,’



245

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGT0N.D.C. LO505

f.6 September 1975

church committee: hearings-- volume 1

Documents