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94TH CONQBEES

>SENATE

REPORT

2d Session h-0. 94-755

INTELLlGENCE CTIVITIESAND THERIGHTSOFAMERICANS

BOOK II

FINAL REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES SENATE

TOGETHER WITH

ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE

VIEWS

APRIL 26 (legislative day, APRIL 14), 1976

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

68-786 0 WASHINGTON : 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Wash ington, DC. 20402 - Price $3.60



SEN ATE SELE CT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Ohdrman

JOHN 0. TOWER, Texas, Vfce Chairman

PHILIP A. HAR T, Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.. Tennessee

WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona

WAUTER D. HUDDLESTON. Kentudty CHARLES McC. MAT HIAS , JB.. MarylandROBERT MORQAN, North Carolina RICHARD 8. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania

GAR Y HAR T, Colorado

WILLIAM G. MILLER, Btofl DErector

FB~DEBICK A. 0. SCHWAB& Jr., Chtef Counsel

COBTIS R. SMOTHER S, CouneeZ to the YinoritlAUDBPY HA TBY, CZerk of the Committee

ml



LETTER OF TR~~SSJIITTAL

On behalf of the Senate Select (‘ommitter to Stutly GovernmentalOperations with Respect to Intelligence A1c+i\.itirs, ant1 piirsiii tnt tothe mantlate Of Senate Resolution 21, I am transmitting herewith tothe Senate the volume of the Committee’s Final Report. which presentsthe results of the Committee’s investigation into Fctleral tlomcsticintelligence activities.

The Committee’s fintlings anal conclusions concerning :I~IISCS in intel-ligence activity and \ycaknesses in the system of accom~tabilit~ andcontrol are amply docnmcntrtl. I brlicw they lnakt~ a compelling casefor substantial reform. The l~rconlmclldatio~~s section of this vo1111mrsets forth in detail the Committee’s l~rOposals for reforms nectssayto protect the right of Americans. The facts revealed by the (‘ornmlt-tee’s inquiry into the dcrelopmcnt of tlomestic intelligence activity areoutlined in the balance of the volume.

I n-Onlcl add one principal comment on the results of the Commit-&e’s inquiry: The root cause Of the excesses \vhich onr record amplytleiiioiistrates has been failure to apply the wisdom of the constitn-tional system of checks ant1 balances to intelligence activities. 0111c~sperienw as a nation has tniyht. 11s that we must, place our trust. inl:~ws, ant1 not solely in nien. The founding f:dliers foresaw exc(?ss asthe inevitable cOnsequence Of granting any part Of ~government uli-chcckcd p~wr. This has been tlcnlonstr:~trtl in the mtelligcncc fieldwhere. too often, constitutioii:~l principles were. subortlinwted to :Lprag-matic course of periiii tting tlesirctl cwtls to dictate and justify in1proper111ca11s.

Onr ~rcomnirntlntioiis arc tlesipnctl to l)lace intelligence activitiesxith iii the coiistitiitional scliemc for controlling r p\-cImllcllt po\wl’.

The members of this (‘oinniittw liavc WI,\-et1 wtli utmost t liliprnceant1 tlctlication. We Ilaw hat1 1% Full (‘onlniittcr nwcting.3. scores ofother sessions at which Senators pwsitle(l at tlcl)ositions for the tak-ing of testimony, ant1 over 40 s~~b~ornniitter meetings tlevotetl totlrafting the t1v-o vol~~rlirs of 0111’ inal report. I thank each ant1 every0110 of lll;v c0llc:lglles for their hart1 work illl(1 for their tlctermina-tion that the job be clonr fully ant1 fairly.

,Jolln Tower’s se].\-ice as I’ice (‘l l:~ iAlil~ l n-as essential to 0111’ flcc-ti~wicss from start to finish. This inquiry c~oultl ha\-c been tlistixctetlby partisan aiyuinei~t~ over allocating the blairic~ for iiitell ipncc cs-

CCSSCS. nsteatl. we hare unanimously conclutlrtl tl li tt intelligcww prob-lems ill’c f:ll* IllOl’C flllldilIll~~llt~l. Then are not tllc 1)1’0clll(*t of :lll;vsingle aclniinistr:ltion. part\-. or man.

.\t the outset, of this part’iwlnr vo1~11nc special iii~wtioii is ills0 tlllcto Senator Walter F. J[ontlalc for his chairinnnship of the subcwm-rnittcc chaiyd with tlrafting the final report On tloiiiestic intclligenccactivity. T)iii*ing 0111’hearings. Senator SIontlale hclpctl to bring intofocus the threats posctl to the rights of A~inc~ricaii citizens. Tic illltl his

( II I)



Iv

domestic subcommittee colleagues-Senator Howard Raker, as rank-ing Minority member, and Senators Philip Hart,, Robert Morgan andRichard Schweiker-deserve great credit for the complete and com-pelling draft which they presented to t,he Full Committee.

The staff of the Committee has worked long, hard and well. With-out their work over t.he past year-and during many long nights andweekends-the Committee could not have come close to coping withits massive job. I commend and thank them all. The staff memberswhose work was particularly associated with this volume and its sup-plementary detailed reports are listed in Appendix C.

FRASK CHURCH,

Chairman.



In .Janunr~ lD’i5. the Senate resol\-etl to establish a C’onlnlittee to:

contlwt an inr-cstigation mid study o$ ~overilnlental Opera-

tions with respect to intelligence activltlrs ant1 the extent, ifany, to which illegal, iniproper~ or unethical activities wereengaged in by any agency of the Federal Gorernmcnt.l

This C’onlmittee, n-as organized shortly thereafter anti has conducted

a year-long inr-estigation mto the iiitelllgencc activities of the VnitedStates Governnient. the first substantial inquiry into the intelligenceconmimity since World War TI.

The inquiry arosc out of allegations of substantial wrongdoing byintelligence agencies on behalf of the administrations which the?served. A deeper concern unclerlyi,n,p the investigation was whether this(+overnii~ent’s intelligence activities were go~ernecl and controlledconsistently Cth the fundaiiiental principles of ,Iiiierican constitu-tional go\-ernliieiit-that power niust be checked and balanced andthat the preservation of liberty requires the restraint, of laws, and

not simply the gootl intentions of nicn.Our investigation has confiriiwtl that l)roperly controlled and lawful

iiitellipcnce is vital to the nation’s interest. ,I strong ant1 effectiveintelligence system serves. for example. to monitor potential militarythreats from the Soviet I-nion ant1 its allies, to verify compliance withinternational agreements such as SALT. ant1 to combat espionage andinternational terrorism. These, ant1 nlany other necessary and properfunctions are, perfomietl by detlicntctl and hard working employees ofthe intelligence coirininnity.

Tlw Conlnlittee’s investigation has. however. also confinned subst’an-

tial wrongdoing. And it has demonstrated that intelligence activitieshnvc not. gcne~~allv been governed and controlletl in accord with thnfuntlan~ental p&ciples of our constitutional systerii of go\-ernment.

The task faced by this Committee was to propose eflectlre measuresto prevent intelligence excesses.and at the same ime to propose soundgGde.lines anal oversight proceclnres with which to govern and co.ntrollegitimate activities.

Having conrlnded its investigation, the Comiiittee issues ts reports 2for the purposes of:

providing a fair factual basis for informed Congressionaland public debate on critical issues affecting the role of go\--eminental intelligence actiritirs in a free society; and

* Senate Resolution 21. January 27. 19775, Sec. 1. The full text of S. Res. 21 isprinted at Appendix A.

aTlir Committee’s final rfport is divided into two main volumes. The I~lanceof this volume covers domestic activities of int~llieeucc nwncies and their activi-ties owrseas to the extent that they af fect the r&titutiokl rights of Americans.Thr other rolnme cowrs all other activities of Vnitecl States foreign and militaryintelligence agencies.

The Committee has previously issued the reports and hearing records set forth

in Appendix R.



VI

recommending such legislative and executive action as, in thejudgment of the Committee, is appropriate to prevent re-currence of past abusesand to insure adequate coordination,control and oversight of the nation’s intelligence resources,capabilities, and activit,ies.

In elaboration of the broad mandate set forth at the outset of thisReport, the Senate charged the Committee with investigating fourteenspecific. “matters or questions” and with reporting the “full facts” onthem. The fourteen enumerated matters and questions concern: (i)what kind of activities have been-and should be-undertaken byintelligence agencies (ii). whether those activities conform to law

and the Constitution; and (iii) how intelligence agencies have been-and should be-coordinated. controlled and overseen.3

In addition to in\-estipatiltp the “full facts” with respect to suchmatters, the Committee was instructed to determine :

Whether any of the existing laws of the. United States areinadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforce-ment, to safeguard the rights of ,4merican citizens, to im-prove executive and legislative control of intelligence anclrelated activities and to resolve uncertainties as to the au-

thority of United States intelligence and related agencies.[Id., Sec. 2 (12) ]

B. TH E MAJOR QUESTIOXS

Our investigation addressed the structure, history, activities andpolicies of America’s most important intelligence agencies. The Com-mittee looked beyond the operation of individual agencies to examinecommon themes and patterns inherent in intelligence operations. Inthe course of its investigation, the Committee has sought to answer

three broad questions :First, whether domestic intelligence activities have been

consistent with law and with the ‘individual liberties guar-anteed to dmerican citizens by the Constitution.

Second, whether America’s foreign intelligence activitieshare served the national interest in a manner consistent withthe nation’s ideals and with national purposes.

’ S. Res. 21, Ser. 2. Examples of the “matters or questions” include:“The conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence operations against

United States citizens” by the FBI or other agencies. [Sec. 2 (2) I ;“The violation or suspected violation of law” by intelligence agencies [Sec.2(10)1;

Allegations of CIA “domestic” activi ty, and the relationship between CIAresponsibility to protect sources and methods and the prohibition of its exer-cising law enforcement powers or internal securit.v functions [Sec. 2(l), (6)l ;

“The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan” [Sec. 2(7) (9)l ;

“The extent and necessity’ of “covert intelligence activities abroad [Sec.2(14)1;

Whether there is excessive duplication or inadequate coordination amongintelligence agencies [Sec. 2 (4) (13) ] and

The “nature and extent” of executive oversight [Sec. 2(i’) (9) ] and the “need

for improved, strengthened or consolidated’Congressional oversight [Sec.

Z(7) (9) (11)l.



VII

Third, whether the institutional procedures for directingand controlling intelligence agencies have adcqnately emured

their compliance with policy and law, and I\-llether those pro-cedures have been based upon the system of checks and bal-

ances among the branches ofConstitution:

government required by 0111

The Comn1itte.e fully subscribes to the premise that intelligenceagencies perform a necessary and proper function. The Preamble tothe Constitution states that our government was created. in part, to“insure domestic tranquility [and] proTide for the common defense.”,\ccnrate and timely intelllpence can and does help meet those goals.

The Committee is also mindful, however, of the danger which in-telligence collection, and intel ligence operations, may pose for a so-

ciety pronnded in democratic principles. The Preamble to our Con-stitution also declares that our government was created to “secure theblessings of liberty-” and to “establish justice”. If domestic intell i-gence agencies ignore those principles, they may threaten the very\-alues t.hat form the foundation of our society. Similarly, if the gov-ernment conducts foreign intelligence opcratlons overseas which areinconsistent with 0~11' national ideals, our reputation, goals: and in-fluence abroad may be undercut.

1. SELECTIOS OF AGESCIES, PROGRAJIS ASD CASE S TO EJIPIL~SIZE

Secessarily, the Committee had to be selective. To investigate every-thing relevant to intelligence-and even everything relevant to thefmndamental issues on which we llad decided to fouls-would take for-ever. Our job was to discover-anal suggest solutions for-the majorproblems “at the earliest practical date”.*

-4ccordingly. the Committee hat1 to choose the particr1lar Goveni-mental entities ~ipon which we wo~ild concentrate and then further

llad to choose particular cases to investigate in depth.Many agencies, departments or bureans of the Federal Gorernmenthave an intelligence function. Of these, the Committee spent the over-\\helming preponderance of its energies on fire :

The Federal I3nrean of Investigation ; The Central Intelli-gence Agency; The Kational Security ,Igency ; The nationalintelligence components of the Defense Department (otherthan KS*\) ; and The Sational Security Council ant1 its com-ponent parts.”

The agencies upon which the Committee concentrated are thosewhose powers are so great and whose practices were so extensive thatthey miist be iindcMoot1 in order fairly to jntlge whether the intelli-gence s;!-stem of the Thitetl States neetls reforni ant1 change.

ITavmg selected the agencies to en11)liasize. the Committee also had tosclecat I,cl~res(~iit:\ti\-r programs ant1 policies on which to concentrate.Tlierc were many more possible issues and allegations to investigate

’ S. Res. 21 ; SW. 5.

G Sulwtnntinl wnrk was also dnnp nn intelligrnw activities of the Internal Rrre-

nue Srrvicr and the Statr I)elmrtment.



VIII

than could be covered fully and fairly. The principles which guided ourchoices were :

(1) More is learned by investigating tens of programs and

incidents in depth rather than hundreds superficially. Ourgoal was to understand causesand. where appropriate, to sug-gest solutions.

(2) Cases most likely to produce penrrnl lessons shouldreceive the most attention.

(3) Programs were examined from each administrationbeginning with Franklin Roosevelt?. This assured nnder-standing of the historical context within which intelligenceactivities have developed. Fundamental issuesconcerning theconduct and character of the nation deserve nonpartisan

treatment. It has become clear from our inquiry. moreover,that intelligence excesses, at home and abroad, have beenfound in every administration. They are not the product ofany single party, administration. or man.

2. LIMITATIOXS ASD STRESGTH S

(a) The Focus on Problem Anm

The intelligence community has had broad responsibilitv for activi-ties beyond those which we investigated as nossibly “illcpal. improper,or unethical”. Our reports primarily address problenl areas and thecommand and control question gencrallv. However, the intelligencecommunity performs vital tasks outside the areas on which our inves-tigation concentrated. This point must be kept in mind in fairness tothe agencies, and to their employees who have devoted their careers tothe naGon’s service. Moreover, one of many reasons for checkins intel-ligence excesses s to restore the confidence, good name, and effective-ness of intelligence agencies so that they may better serve the nationin the future.6

(6) Caution on Questions of Individual “Gu.ilt” 01’ “Innocence”

A Senate Committee is not a prosecutor, a grand jury or a court. Itis far better suited to determine how things Tvent.wrong and what. canbe done to prevent their going wrong again, than to resolve disputedquestions of individual ‘(guilt” or “innocence”. For the resolution ofthose questions we properly rely on the courts.

Of course, to understand the past in order to better propose guid-ance for the future, the Committee had to investigate the facts under-lying charges of wrongdoing. Facts involve people. Therefore, theCommittee has necessarily had to determine what particular individ-uals appear to have done and, on occasion, to make judgments on their

responsibility. We. hare, however. recognized our limitations and at-tempted to be cautious in reaching those judgments; the reader shouldbe similarly cautious in evaluating our judgments.

The Committee’s hope is that this report will provoke a nationaldebate not on “Who did it ?!‘, but on “How did it happen and what canbe done to keep it, from happening again?”

‘Indeed, it is likely that in snme cases the high priority giren to activities thatappear qurstionahle has reduced the attention Siren to other rital matters. Thns,the FRI. for example, has placed more emphasis on domestic dissent than on nrgx-

nized crime and, according to some, let its efforts against fnreign spies sufferbecause of the amount of time spent checking up on American protest groups.



Ix

(c) Ability to See the FUZZ Xcopc of the Probkm

This Committee examined a verv broad range of issues and com-piled a hughe factual record i whi‘ch covers:

(i) the origins and development, of intelligence programsover seven administrations;

(ii) intelligence activities both at home and abroad; and(iii) the programs and practices of the several most im-

portant intelligence agencies.

Thus, for the first time, based upon the Committee’s investigation, itis possible to examine the patterns of intelligence activity and not’merely isolated incidents.

The issues for the country to rcsolre arc best posed by looking, as

we hare done. at the aggregate, rnthw than at particular incidentsin isolation. Keithcr the dangers, nor the causes. nor the possiblesolutions can be fairly evalnatcd without considering both the broadpatterns of intelligence activity TThich emerge from examining par-ticular cases over the past several decades. and the cumulative effectof activit,ies of different agencies. For example, individual cases orprograms of governmental sur\-eillnnce may constitute interferencewith constitutionally protected rights of privacy and dissent. Butonly by examining the cumulatiw impact of man); such programscan the danger of “Big Brother Government” be rrallstically assessed.

Only by understanding the ful l breatltb of governn~entnl effortsagainst dissenters can one weigh tl lc extent to which those efforts ma,ychill lawful assembly and free expression.

II. TIIE PURPOSE OF THE COJZJII’I~E’S FISOIXGS .\ND RECOJIMESDATIONS

The central goal of tlic Committee is to ninkc inforiiwd Iwolll-

mendations-based upon a detai led ant1 balanced factual investiga-tion-about :

(1) which intelligence activities ought to be permitted, and

which should be rcstrictcd or prohibited; and(2) n-hat controls and organizational structure are neededto keep intell igence operations both cffcctire and consistentwith this country’s most basic 1~1aes and fundamental in-terests.

‘Some 800 witnesses were rsnmined, appr0simatel.v 250 under oath in

esecutire sessions, 50 in pnl,lic sessions, and the hnlance in inten-iews. Tlv?

nggregate number of trnnscript pages is nlmost 30.000. Approsiniatelg 310.000

document pages were obtained from the rnrious intelligence agencies (still morewere prelimina rily reviewed at the agenc ies). as del l xs from the Wh ite House,

nresidential lil,rnrirs. and other sources.Over the course of its investign tion the C’omm itter has hnd genenlly good

cooperation in obtaining information from the intelligence agencies nnd the Ad-

mi&trw tion. Of course, there were problem s, particulnr1.v 3t the outset+om-

Irliance took too long; bure nucm tic rules snc h ns the “third agency rule” (which

required agen cies other than t.hr custo dian of the docum ent to review it if the7

were mentioned) were frustrating. Rnt our experience sugg ests thnt those proh-

lems can IW worked out.

The most important less on to be derived from our experience is thnt effectiveoversight is impo ssible without regular acce ss to the underlying working doru-

merits of the intelligence ?ommunit;r. Top level l)riefings do not adrquntrly de-

scribe the renlitirs. Fl,r that the documents nre n necessary supplement and at

times the only source.



X

The first step for this Committ,ee, its successor oversight Committeesand the Congress as a whole is to devise the legal framework withinwhich intelligence agencies can! in the future, be guided, checke.d and

operate both properly and efficiently. A basic law-a charter of pow-ers, duties, and limitation-does not presently exist for some of themost important intelligence activities (e.g.? FBI’s domestic intelli-gence or NSA) or, where it does exist, as w-lt,h CT,\, it is vague, con-flicting and incomplete.

The absence of laws and the lack of clarity in those that exist hashad the effect, if not the intention, of keeping vit,al issues of nationalimportance away from public debate.

This Committee’s job was to pose the issues that have been ignoredfor decades. The technique for doing so was to investigate and then

to propose basic laws and other rules as to what can and cannot bedone, and on the appropriate command and control structure for in-telligence activities.

There are many other questions, such as the efficiency, cost andquality of intelligence, which are also of vital national importance.We have also examined these matters and consider them in this re-port. But, the main emphasis of our investigation was on whatshould be done and not on how it should be done. We seek in our rec-ommendations to lay the underlying legal foundation, and the con-trol and oversight structure for the intelligence community. If these

are sound, then we have faith that the other questions will be an-swered correctly in the future. But if the foundation is unsound orremains unfinished--or if intelligence agencies continue to operateunder a structure in which executive power is not effectively checkedand examined-then we will have neither quality intell igence nor asociety which is free at home and respected abroad.



CONTENTS

Letter of Transmittal_-- _____.__ -___- ______ - __._____ -_-.- .____ -----Preface____-------------------------------------------------------

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY_- _______. -------_- _____ -A. Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Power

to Impair Citizens’ Rights- ____ -_-_----- ________ - ______B. TheQuestions__------------------.--------..-----------

C. Summary of the Main Problems- _ __________________ -- - -.1. The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intelli-gence Act ivity ____ --- ______ - ____ -___-_- ______.

2. Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long--3. Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper

Means-----~--------..---~----~--~--~~-~--.--a. Covert Action- _______ -_-_- _________ - ___.-

(1) The FBI’s COINTELPRO-_-------.(2) Martin Luther King, Jr _____ - -- _. _ _

b. Illegalor Improper Means___-----------.--(1) Mail Opening ____ -- _.____.___ - -_._-(2) NSA Monitoring- _ ____ _ _ _ - _ - - - _. - _ _(3) Electronic Surveillance__-_-----.-.~.

(4) Political Abuse..----.. __ _ - _ ___-. . - _-(5) Surreptitious Entries- - - - -__ - _ - _. _. _(6) Informants-_--- ._._ ---_-----~.-.-_

4. IgnoringtheLaw.- ____ ---_-----_- ____._-.__.-.--5. Deficiencies in Accountability and Control-- - _ - _ _. . _6. The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Ac-

tivity-----_____----~---------~~-------~~---.-a. General Efforts to Discredit ____ -__. -_- -_._.b. Media Manipulation ________ -_---_--- _____c. Distorting Data to Influence Government

Policy and Public Perceptions-__---_.---.d. “Chilline” First Amendment Rights_- _. _ - . - _

e. Prevent&g the Free Exchange OF Ideas- __ _ _ _7. Cost and Value ____ -_--- __._____________..__-----II . THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE, 1936 to 1976:

A. Summary_-_____-_-__________--~_-_-___-~---~~-..------1. The Lesson: History Repeats I tself ____.___ _____-_-2. The Pattern: Broadening Through Time ______ ______3. Three Periods of Growth for Domestic Intelligence-..

B. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure:1936-1945---____--_-_______-----------------------------

1. Background: The Stone Standard----- ___ __ - _- __ __ -2. Main Developments of the 1936-1945 Period----- __ _3. Domestic Intelligence Authority: Vague and Conflict-

ing Executive Orders _______________ ----- __.____

a. The Original Roosevelt Orders- _ _ _ ___-__- _.b. Orders in 1938-39: The Vagueness of “Sub-

versive Activities” and “Potential” Crimes-c. Orders 194943: The Confusion Continues- - -

4. The Role of Congress-- ___________ --_------- _____a. Executive Avoidance of Congress- _ ___ - ____ _b. Congress Declines to Confront the Issue- - - - -

(XI)

Page. . .111

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II . THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE-ContinuedB. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure-

1936-1945 Continued5. Scope of Domestic Intelligence--- __.____________ -_

a. Beyond Criminal Investigations- _ - _ - __- ___ _b. “Infiltration” Investigations---------------c. Partisan Use- ___ __ - ____ _ - - __ _________ ____d. Centralized Authority: FBI and Military

Intelligence _____ --------------: _______.6. Control by the Attorney General: Compliance and

Resistance____.-------------------------------7. Intrusive Techniques : Questionable Authorization - - -

a. Wiretaps: A Strained Statutory Interpreta-tion~__--------------------------------

b. Bugging, Mail Opening, and SurreptitiousEntry___------------------------------

C. Domestic Intelligence in the Cold War Era: 1946-1963--_-

1. Main Developments of the 1946-1963 Period__ _ _ - __.2. Domestic Intelligence Authority- __- _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - ___. _a. Anti-Communist Consensus - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _b. The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Pro-

gram_---------------------------------(1) Origins of the Program---- __ _. _ -_ _ _(2) Breadth of Investigations----- _ - _ _ _ _(3) FBI Control of Loyalty-Security In-

vestigations _____ - _- ___ ______ ____c. Executive Directives: Lack of Guidance and

Controls-----------------------------------3. Scope of Domestic Intelligence- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ -

a. “Subversive Activities”-_ _ _ __ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _(1) The Number of Investigations- _ - _ _ _(2) Vague and Sweeping Standards- _ _ _ _(3) COMINFIL---or--~~~m~~~~--~~-(4) Exaggeration

fluence-------------------------b. “Racial Matters” and “Hate Groups”- _ _ _ __c. FBI Political Intelligence for the White

House__-------------------------------d. IRS Investigation of Political Organizations- _

4. Accountability and Control-_ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _a. Emergency Detention Act- _ _ _____ _- __ _ ____b. Withholding Information- _ _ _- __ _- __ __ _ __ _-

c. CIA Domestic Activity-- - _ _ _ __ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __(1) Vague Controls on CIA- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -(2) Drug Testing and Cover Programs--

5. Intrusive Techniques----_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - __ __ _ __ __ __ - _ _ _a. Communication Interception: CIA and NSA-b. FBI Covert Techniques_-_-- __ _ _ _ _ __ - _ _ _ _ __

(1) Electronic Surveillance--- _ __ __ _ __ _ _(2) “Black Bag” Jobs- _ __-___________-(3) Mail Opening---- ____ --___-__- ____

c. Use of FBI Wiretaps-- __- _________ -__ __ ___6. Domestic Covert Action __________________ -__ - -___

a. COINTELPRO: Communist Party---------

b. Early Expansion of COINTELPRO--- _ - - _ _ _D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976- -________-_-1. Main Points During the 1964-1976 Period------ __ _ -2. Scope of Domestic Intelligence_ _ _ __ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _

a. Domestic Protest and Dissent: FBI_-- _ ____ -(1) Racial Intelligence- - - __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -(2) “New Left” Intelligence _ _ - - _____ _.

b. FBI Informants _____ -___-_-___-___-___--_(1) Infi ltration of the Klan _ _ _ _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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XIII

II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE-Continued

D. Intelligence and Dom estic Dissen t: 1964-1976-Continued

2. Scope of Dom estic Intelligence-Con tinued

b. FBI Informants-Con tinued

(2) “Listening Posts” in the Black Com-munity----- __._____._.__ ~_----

(3) Infiltr atio n of the “New Left” -- - - - _ _

c. Army Surveillance of Civilian Po liticalActivity--_-------_-_-_- __.____ -_----__

d. Federal Encouragement of Local Po liceInte llig en ce _.___ -~---------------_- ____

e. The Justic e Department’s Interdivision In-formation Unit (IDIU)--__- ______ ~---~_.

f. COhlINFIL Investig ations : Overbreadth- __ _

3. Do me stic Intellig enc e Authority- _. _. . . _ __ _ _ - - - __ _

a. FBI Intelligence-~-----~---------~---~~~~~b. Army Intelligence_._------------~--~.~.~~~

c. FBI Interage ncy Agreem ents-~-~------._..~4. Do me stic Covert Action-------------------~~

a. COINTELPRO---- ______ ____._.._. ---_..(1) Kla n and “White Hate”- - _ ______ __

(2) “Black Nationalist” COINTELPRO.

(3) “New Left” COINTELPRO _...___

b. FBI Target Lists--- ______ ______ _____ ----_.

(1) “Rabble Rouse r/Agitator” Index._ _ _

(2) “Key Ac tivis t” Program-------___.(3) “Key Black Extremist” Program- _. .

(4) Security Index ______ ______ ~_------

c. Internal Revenue Service Programs_ - - - - _. . _(1) Misuse by FBI and CIA-----------

(2) The Spe cial Service Staff: IRS Tar-

geting of Ideolo gica l Groups- _ - - - _5. Foreign Intelligence and Dom estic Dissen t _ - _ - _ _ _ _

a. Origins of CIA Involvement in “Internal Se-

curity Functions”--- ______ _____ ---- ____

b. CIA Intelligence About Domestic Polit ical

Groups________--_-___________________(1)

(2)

CIA Response to FBI Requests- _ _ - _

Operation CHAOS- _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _

c. CIA Security Operations Within the UnitedStates : Protec ting ‘Sou rces” and “Methods”-

d. NSA Monitoring ____--_________ ____ -_-_--

6. Intrusive Techn iques- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _a. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance- _ _ _ _ - - - -

(1) Executive Branch Re strictions on

Electronic Surveillance: 1965-68-. -(2) Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968_

(3) Supreme Court Restrictions on Na-

tional Security E lectronic Surveil-

lance: 1972_-___-________------~

b. CIA Mail Opening-- ______ __ -_----- ______ _

c. Expa nsion of NSA Monitoring- _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ _ _d. FBI Cutbacks_.____--__--________ ________

(1) T20tong Subcom mittee Tnvestiga-

(2) Director Hoover’s Res trictions-- _ _ _ _

7. Acc oun tability and Control-- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

a. The Huston Plan: A Domestic IntelligenceNetwork--_-------_-___________________

(1) Intellig enc e Comm unity Pressu res- - _

(2) Th e Interagency Com mittee Report--

(3) Implementation___-------- ______ __

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xiv

II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE-Continued

D. Intellieence and Dom estic Dissen t: 1964-1976Continued77 Accou ntability and Cantrol-Continued

b. Po litical Intelligence--_- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ - -

(1) Name Check Requests_ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ - -

(2) Demo cratic National Convention, At-lan tic City, 1964.----_- ______ ----

(3) By-Product of Foreign Intellig enc e

Coverage__-----------~~-~------

(4) The Surveillance of Joseph Kraft(19s9)----------------~--~~-~~~

(5) Th e “17” Wiretaps - _ _ _ _ _- - - _. . . . .

c. The Justic e Department’s Internal Security122ivision____._____---------------------- ~~~

(1) Th e “new” Internal Secu rity Divisio n- 123

(2) The Sullivan-Mardian Relationsh ip. _ 124d. Th e FB I’s Secre t “Adm inistrative Index”_-_-- 125

127. Rec onsid eration of FBI Authority-. . . ._._ ._._. ~. .a. Develonme nts in 1972%1974- - _ -. - _ __ _. _. -. 128

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b. Rece nt Do me stic Intellig enc e Authority- - - - - 131

III. FINDINGS___------~-------------~~------~--~~-..-~--.------ 137

A. Major Findin g: Vio latin g and Ignoring the Law-.-----..-_-- 137

- Subfinding s: - _ -

(a) Violating Statutory Law and Cons titutionalRights______-__-___----------.-------.--

(b) IgnoringIllegalIssues--------_-__-- _______ __(c) Con tinuing Leg al Activities-_-----_-_-~------

(d) Tighten ing Security for Illegal Activities- _ _ _ _ _

(e) Conce aling Illegal Activities __._____ __ _ __ _. _ __(f) W eakness of Internal Inspection ._____ - ______.

(g) We akness of Oversight by Senio r Ad min istration

Officials-___---------~..~---~~------~-----

B. Major Finding: The Overbreadth of Dom estic IntelligenceActivity--_~-------_-~~-- ____ ------_-_-- _______ I__._

Subfindings:

(a) Broad Scope of Investigations ________________

(b) Imp recise Standa rds for Investigations - - - - - _ _ _

(c) Ove rinclusive Targeting-_---_--~------------

(d) “Vacuu m Cleaner” Approa ch - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _(e) Exce ssivelv Long Investigations---------_-_-..

C. Major Finding: Excessive Use of Intrusive Techniques_-__--

- Subfinding s :

(a) Insufficient Legal Standards and Procedures - _ _fb) Excessive Collection Counled with Violent and,

Illegal Ac tivities of Informants and Difficulty

of Limiting Surveillance- -__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _

(c) Imprecise Labels Lead to Abusive Use of

Tech nique s--_- ____._ ----- _____.___ ______D. Major Finding: Using Covert Action to Disrupt and Dis-

credit Do me stic Groups__-. _ - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Subfindings :

(a) Targ eting Law-Abiding Citizens--- _ __ __ __. __ _(b) Interference With First Ame ndme nt Rights----

(c) Dange rous Covert Ta ctic s- - _- __ _ __ __ __. __ __ _

(d) Ac tion s Ag ains t Dr. Martin Luther King , Jr---E. Major Finding: Po litical Abuse of Intelligence Information- _

- Subfin

(adings :I) Po litical Intelligence for the White House- __-

(b) Dissem ination of Incidental Po litical or Personal

Information_--- _____ -----_- __._________-(c) Volunteering Information to the White House

and Targeting Critics and Po litical Figures--

(d) Influencing Soc ial Policy and Po litical Action- -

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III. FINDINGS-Continued:F. Major Finding: Inadeouate Controls on Dissemination and

retention--~_-------- ____ -__--__-__-__- _____ ---___--.Subfindings :

(a) Volunteering Irrelevant Information and re-

sponding Unquestioningly to Requests- _ _ - _ -(b) Excessive Dissemination- _ _ _ _ ___ _ __ _ _. _ __ _ _.(c) Federal Employee Security Program- - _ _ _ _ _ - - _(d) FBI Retention of Sensitive, Derogatory, and

Illegally Obtained Information-- ______._.__G. Major Finding: Deficiencies in Control and Accountability- _

Subfindings :(a) Presidential Failure to Limit and Control

Intelligence Activities._- ___ - _ _ _ ___ __ ______(b) Attorneys General Failure to Limit and Con-

trol FBI Intelligence Activities.-------__-~~(c) Encouraging Political Intelligence _ _ - - _ - _ _ - - _

(d) Executive Failures to Inquire___--__----__---(e) Congressional Failure to Oversee IntelligenceActivity and Exert Legislative Control-- _ - - _

(f) Intelligence Agencies Act with InsufficientAuthorization------- ________ --__----__--_

(g) Termination of Abusive Operations- _ __ _______IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ________________

A. Conclusions---_---------------------------------------B. Principles Applied in Framing Recommendations and the

Scope of Recommendations ______ -_ -_ ____ _____ __ __ _- ___C. Recommendations __-__ _ __ __ - _ _ __ _-_ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ -

1. Intelligence Agencies Are Subject to the Rule of Law(Recommendations l-3) _____ --__--_-__-- _______

2. United States Foreign and Military Agencies ShouldBe Precluded From Domestic Security Activities(Recommendations 4-27) ___ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

a. Central Intelligence Agency (Recommenda-tions 4-13)___-___-__--___~----~~-~--~--

b. National Security Agency (Recommendations14-19)______-_--__-_------------~----~~

c. Military Service and Defense DepartmentInvestigative Agencies (Recommendations20-26)___-_-_____-_-~~-~--~------~-----

3. Non-Intelligence Agencies Should Be Barred FromDomestic Security Activi ty (Recommendations

27-37)___--_-_--_---~~~~.~-~----~~----~---~-~a. Internal Revenue Service (Recommendations27-35)___________-__-------------------

b. Post Off ice (U.S. Postal Service) (Recommen-dations 36-37)---.-__--__-__--~---------

4. Federal Domestic Security Activities Should BeLimited and Controlled to Prevent Abuses WithoutHampering Criminal Investigations or Investiga-tions of Foreign Espionage (Recommendations38-69)---~-----~~--~..~.~~.-------~~--~~~~-~.~

a. Centralize Supervision, Investigative Re-sponsibility, and the Use of Covert Tech-niques (Recommendations 38-39) _ _ _. _ _ . _

b. Prohibitions (Recommendations 40-41) - . - ---c. Authorized Scope of Domestic Security In-

vestigations (Recommendations 42-49). _ _.d. Authorized Investigative Techniques (Rec-

ommendations 50-63).~.~.-~--------~-~~e. XInintennnce and Dissemination of Informa-

tion (Recommendations 64-68)------.----f . Attorney General Oversight of the FBI,

Including Termination of Investigations andCovert Techniques (Recommendation 69)--

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XVIVI

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS-ContinuedV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS-ContinuedC. Recommendations-Continued. Recommendations-Continued

5. The Responsibility and Authority of the Attorneyhe Responsibility and Authority of the AttorneyGeneral for Oversinht for Federal Domestic Securitveneral for Oversinht for Federal Domestic SecuritvActivities must be clarified and General Counsel andInspectors General of Intelligence AgenciesStrengthened (Recommendations 70-86) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

a. Attorney General Responsibility and Rela-ship With Other Intelligence Agencies(Recommendations 79-74) _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - -

b. General Counsel and Inspectors General ofIntelligence Agencies (Recommendations-- ^a.‘~S-trl~_-----__--_-_____________________

c. Off ice of Professional Responsibility (Recom-

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.11.

12.

13.

mendation 82) ________ I_______ ~------- _ _d. Director of the FBI and Assistant Directors

of the FBI (Recommendations 83-85) _ _ _ _

Administrative Rulemaking and Increased DisclosureShould Be Required (Recommendations86-89)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_--~-~-~~~~~~~~~~~

a. Administrative Rulemaking (Recommenda-tions86-88)____________________________

b. Disclosure (Recommendations 89-90) _ _ _ _ _ _ _Civil Remedies Should Be Expanded (Recommenda-

tion 91)_-_-______-_-_____----~----------------Criminal Penalties Should Be Enacted (Recom-

mendation 92) ______ _________ __________________The Smith Act and the Voorhis Act Should Either Be

Repealed or Amended (Recommendation 93) - - - _ _

The Espionage Statute Should Be Modernized(Recommendation 94) __________ _________ ____ ___Broaden Access to Intelligence Agency Files Should

Be Provided to GAO, as an Investigative Arm ofthe Congress (Recommendation 95) _______ __ _____

Congressional Oversight Should Be Intensified(Recommendation 96)___-----------------------

Definitions ______ -----_- _____________ -___-_---___n . . . ^.Appendix A: Senate Eesolutlon ~I---------_-_----------------- ____ --Appendix B: Previously Issued Hearings and Reports of Senate Select

Committee~~~~~~~~~--~------------~~---------------Appendix C: Staf f Acknowledgments------ _______ - _____ --__-_---_-___Additional Views:

339339343

355357

Philip A. Hart_-____--~----~~--------------~--------------~---RobertMorgan__-_-_-_-_-_---~---~------~-~----~-~---~-----~-Introduction to Separate Views of Senators John G. Tower, Howard

359363

H. Baker, Jr., and Barry Goldwater- - _ _. _ ___ ___. __ __ __ _ __ __ _ _ - 367John G. Tower---___----_------~---------~-----~---~-------~-~ 369Howard H. Baker, Jr__--_----~~.-----_------- _____ -_----__---- 373Barry Goldwater_______________________________------.-.------ 389Charles McC. Mathias, Jr _________ ---__--_-_-_-----_----------- 395

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