cicero and philosophic inventio

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Cicero and Philosophic InventioAuthor(s): Donovan J. OchsSource: Rhetoric Society Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 217-227Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3885290

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217

Cicero and Philosophic Inventio

Donovan J. Ochs

Tantalizing and provocative questions about classical systems of topicalinventioncontinueto receive well-deservedscholarlyattention.Recently, Corbett,exploredhow thetopicscan informtheteachingof writingandTrimpi2 nalyzed hepossible connections between the topics and literary theory. Whetheror not thetopics divide themselves into "material" nd "formal" eceived differing answersfrom Conley3and Grimaldi.4Moreover, nvestigations o discover how the traditionof topics shifted and changedacross time has been addressedby Stump,5Cogan,6and Leff.7

The intellectual richness of such studies stems from many sources.Aristotle,forexample,authorsa topical systemfor dialectic andanother,somewhat

similar somewhat dissimilar, for the art of rhetoric. Cicero, in his early workoffered a topical system based on "personsand actions" for rhetorical practice.Later,in his Topica something resembling Aristotle's dialectical method appearsand then, even more problematic, in his later treatises a topical system unitingrhetoric and philosophy emerges, but in a truncated, ragmented orm. As Buckleynoted:

This identificationof rhetoricandphilosophyin a single universal method is a

consequenceof the Ciceronianunderstandingf the interdependence f res andverbmn,an

understandingmediatedand ustified througha historyof humanculture.8

Preciselywhat the natureof this "singleuniversalmethod"was becomes thefocal pointof thisessay. I contendthat Cicerodeveloped andused a topical system

for philosophicdiscourse,a system thatwas integrallyjoined to his topical system

EdwardP. J. Corbett,"TheTopoi Revisited," n Rhetoric and Praxis: The Contributionof Classical Rhetoric to Practical

Reasoning, ed., Jean Dietz Moss, (Washington,D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 43-58.

2Wesley Trimpi,Muses of One Mind: The LiteraryAnalysisof Experience and Its Continuity Princeton,New Jersey:

Princeton University Press, 1983), 245-321.

3ThomasM. Conley, "Logical Hylomorphismand Aristotle'sKoinoi Topoi,"Central States Speech Journal 29 (1978):

92-98.

William Grimaldi,"TheAristotelianTopics,"Traditio 14 (1958): 1-16.

Eleonore Stump, Boethius'sDe topiciis differentiis: TranslatedwithNotes and Essays on the Text, (Ithaca:Cornell

University Press, 1978).

MarcCogan, "RudolphusAgricola and the Semantic Revolutionsof the Ilistoryof Invention,"Rhetorica2 (1984): 163-

194.

Michael C. Leff, "TheTopics of Argumentative nventionin Latin Rhetorical Theoryfrom Cicero to Boethius,"

Rhetorica 1 (1983): 23-44.

Michael J. Buckley, S.J., "PhilosophicMethod in Cicero,"Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1970): 143-154.



218 Donovan.Ochs

for rhetoricalnvention.Most mportant,owever,his ntegratedystemappearsobe thenecessaryandsufficientcondition or stylisticeloquence.To developthepremises or my argument propose, irst,to reconstruct is integratedmethodfromtwo passages,de Orat.3.28.109-119.and de Part. 18.61-67.Then,I willofferan llustrationf theprocedureromhisessay,deAmicitia.

Duringhis lifetimeCicerohadnumerousnterconnectionsithphilosophersandphilosophies.Cicero knew the Epicureanystemfrom his friendshipwithPhaedrus, eno,andAtticus.FromPosidonius' e learnedStoicphilosophy,romStaseas hePeripateticubric.2 hiloandAntiochusutored iminthedoctrines ftheAcademy. n hisownphilosophicreatises,Cicerodidnotproposeanyneworstartlingonceptions f logic,physics,or ethics.InsteadCiceroofferedhisreadersawiderangeof philosophic pinions rom he several chools.AcceptingheNewAcademy's eaching hatphilosophywasa contestbetweenopinionsandrejectingthe Epicureanisavowal f rhetoric,3iceromoved ojoinrhetoric ndphilosophy.To bestserve the state,a Stoictenet,he believedone mustacquirewisdomfromstudy,specially hestudyof philosophy.Eloquence,hemasteryof therhetoricalart, ame rom hestudyof Academic ndPeripateticeachings.4

InthethirdcenturyHermagoraslaimed hatpoliticalquestionswere thepropergroundandsubjectmatter or rhetoric.He instituted hestasissystemforlocatingproofs n a judicial onfrontation.hortlyhereaftertudentsntheseveralschoolsof rhetoricwere aught systemof inventionalopicsmoreorlessarrangedunder he stasisheadingsof conjectureansit), definition quidsid) andquality(quale sit). Designed to enable an orator to develop materialsfor forensic,deliberative,or epideicticdiscourse hese rhetoricalopicsformedthe core ofrhetoricalnvention orcenturies.

The question aturallyriseswhether nanalogous ystemwas availableorconstructing hilosophic iscourse.foneneeded oaddress nabstractopic,e.g.,the natureof death,theoriginof law, the moralresponsibilitiesf parents, tc.,some inventionalsystem would be needed. Cicero's inventionalsystem forphilosophicdiscourse shows a definite influenceof the Hermagorean tasis

classificationbutseems alsoto derive, n part, rom heSkeptic'seachings.Thatis, probability otcertaintys theobjectiveof the set of questions.Most mportant,theStoicteachings f dutyandobligation reapparentlyairedwiththeEpicureandogmaonconsolation.

See BensonMates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley:UniversityPress, 1953). Also EdwynBevan,Stoics and Sceptics (New York:Barnes andNoble, 1913), 129. And also Hans FriedrichAugustvon Arnim,ed., Stoicorwn VeterwnFragmenta,3 vols.(Leipzig:B.G. Teubner,1903-1924). Standard ccountsare accessiblein EdwardVernonArnold,RomanStoicism(London:Routledge andKegan Paul, 1958) and EduardZeller,TheStoics,Epicureans,andSceptics,trans.Oswald J. Reichel (NewYork:Russell andRussell, 1962).

2

Thebestcollection of materialabout the Peripatetics n Fritz RobertWehrle,ed.,Die Schule des Aristotles(Basel:B.SchwabeandCo., 1944-1959).

3HermannKarlUsener, ed., Epicurea (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner,1887). See also, CyrilBailey, TheGreekAtomistsand

Epicurus(Oxford:TheClarendonPress, 1928) andNormanWentworthDeWitt,Epicurusand His Philosophy(Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress, 1954).

4Cicero'sspeculationwritings orm somethingof a unifiedwhole. TheAcademicaandTopicaaddressproblemsof logic; de

NaturaDeorwn,de Divinatione,and de Fato present he current iews of physicsandcosmology espousedin the schools ofphilosophy.Political theoryserves as the focus for thede RePublicaand de Legibus.Threetreatises,de FinibusBonorumetMalorus, TusculanaeDisputationes, and de OfficiiscontainCicero'spositionon practicalethics. See also, GeorgeKennedy, The Artof Rhetoric in theRomanWorld:300 B.C. - AD. 300 (Princeton,New Jersey:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1973), 264-268.



CiceroandPhilosophicnventio 219

At first glance the placementof Cicero's description of the system seemsvexing. Within his discussion of style in Book III, Crassus explains thecomponents of the ornatestyle and extolls the use of declamationson theses as auseful exercise.' Since amplification is the signal distinction of the orator(amplificatiopotestplurimum,eaqueuna laus oratoris estpropriamaxime,17.105)mastering the challenge of declaiming theses,2unlimited questions, becomesabsolutely essential to eloquence. Indeed, referringto the relegation of theses tophilosophy and hypotheses to rhetoric Crassus introduces his (Cicero's)philosophic nventionalsystemin thesewords:

...the actbeing hatweorators rebound opossess heintelligence,apacity ndskilltospeakbothproandcontra nthetopicsof virtue,duty,equityandgood,moralworthandutility,honor nddisgrace,eward ndpunishment,nd ikematters. ut now we havebeenousted romourownestateand eftinoccupationf a triflingittleproperty,ndthat ontested, ndwewhoare hedefenders f otherpeoplehavebeenunable o holdandsafeguardurown possessions;o let usputourpridenourpocketandborrowwhatweneed rom hosewhohave respassednourheritage.3.17.107-108)

In the de Part. Cicero places his discussion of the philosophic inventionalsystem immediately afterhis discussion of the technical partsof the oration andoffers the system as the logical beginningof his treatmentof inventio.Noteworthyis the fact that in eight years (from de Orat. in 55 B.C. to de Part. in 46 B.C.)Cicero no longer considered theses the propertyof philosophy, felt no need to"borrow," and simply encompassed theses and hypothesis into his unifiedconceptionof oratorical nvention.

To display both the emphases and the extent of Cicero's philosophicinventional system, at the risk of inelegance, I offer the schema in an outlineformat.While doingso makes the system appearmechanical he outlinepermitsoneto compress the two discussions, overlaying the parts both treat in common,inserting the partscontained in only one of the discussions, and adding probableheadings fromhis otherphilosophictreatiseswhen only allusions or references are

madein thetexts.

The Inventional Schema

I. All speculative inquiry (consultatio) can be divided into two classificationswhich have as their object either the study and understanding (cognitio reiscientiaque) of an arguable question or a principle of behavior (agendiconsilium).An arguablequestionis an abstractproposition(propositio, thesis)characterizedby no referenceto specificpersonsor times (notatumnullis nequepersonis neque temporibus).

I have relied on thetext and translations f HarrisRackham n his Cicero: De OratoreandDe Partitione Oratoria

(Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress, 1960). In later segmentsI acknowledgeindebtedness o Walter

Miller's,Cicero: De Officiis(London:WilliamHeinemannLtd., 1938 and JohnEdwardKing's,Cicero: Tusculan

Disputations (Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversity Press, 1950).

2Two standardworks areof importancehere. In Stanley F. Bonner, RomanDeclamation in the Late Republicand Early

Empire (Liverpool:Eaton Press Ltd., 1949) one can read an excellentdiscussion of the relationships heses andhypotheses

hadto Roman law. Also, Alain Michel, Rhetoriqueet PhilosophiechezCiceron:Essai sur lesfondementsphilosophiques

de l'artde persuader(Paris:PressesUniversitairesDe France, 1960). Michel, too, arguesthat Cicero's isting is new and

Stoic in origin (p. 215). Michel'sexplication of the natureof the thesis, however does not extend to the second category of

manipulatingemotions in consolatorydiscourse.



CiceroandPhilosophicnventio 221

1. Does the proposed action contain elements that should be followedpersistentlyor avoided (adpersequendumutdeclinandun)?To reachthisdetermination ne shouldconsidermoralobligations(de officiis).ia. Is the contemplatedaction morallyrightor wrong (authonestumne

an turpe)n termsof prudence,ustice,fortitide,andtemperance?b. If one must choose between two morally right actions, which is

morein accordwithwisdom(sapientia)?c. Is or is not the contemplated action expedient, i.e. conducive to

comfort and happiness in life (ad vitae commoditatemjucunditatemqne)?

d. If one must choose between two expedient actions, one must askwhether the advantages are external or internal and, if internal,which is more likely to enhance one's social esteem (homineshomini ribuunt)?

e. In cases where the morally right conflicts with the expedient onemust ask whetherthe conflict is apparentor real, and, if real, whichis in thebest interestsof the state andhumansociety (quimrultan

utilitatemeipublicaeatquesocietati)?2. Does theproposedor completedaction involve the producing,calming,

or extinguishingof an emotion(aut in animorurn liquqpermotioneautgigendaaut sedanda ollendave ractantur)?2a. Is deathanevil, a blessing,or a release from humanmisery?b. Is painsomething o endureor escape?c. Is sorrowcapableof beingcontrolledby theimagination?d. Aredelight,desire,distress,andfear either naturalor necessary?e. To what extentcan a virtuous ife producehappiness?

II. Propositions developed for producing pleasure (delectationem sectatur),anticipating he futureor, arguinga past act (in provisions posteri temporisaut

inpraeteritidisceptationeversatur)deal with specificpersons, times, andplaces(causa, hypothesis): (Here, one can readily supply the usual apparatusofrhetorical nventionusedin theepideictic,deliberative,and udicialgenres).

Discussion

The expanded schema of Cicero's philosophic inventional system raisesnumerousquestions. Fromwhat sourceor sources might the procedureoriginate?To what uses might such a classification system be put? What relationshipsexistbetween Cicero'sconcept of philosophic "discussions"and rhetorical discourseinlegislative and legal settings?Moreover,what sortof discourse might the schemaproduce?

The fact that Cicero was an eclectic, choosing whatever philosophicalposition seemed to fit his needs or the exigencies of a situation, requiresno proof.

HereI am supplyingthe main headingsCicero uses in his de Off. to extendthe cursorymention of moralobligationsin

Cicero's two presentationsof the schema.Michel alludes to the extensionby claiming, "Thestudyof officiwumn its

relationto the virtues is indeed the subjectof De officiis. It is the studyof values, not in and of themselves, but in so faras

they relateto usage, to life's circumstances" p. 216).

HereI am expandingCicero'sbriefaccount by extrapolating hekey questionshe raises in his Tusc.Disp. The extension

seems justified since consolation is the controllingfeatureof the division.



222 Donovan.Ochs

His eclecticism s sufficientlydocumented.Nonetheless,he inventional chemareflects the teachingsof variousschools of philosophy.Thathe was able tosynthesize ndblenddisparatendcompeting ystems s something f a testamentnot only to his eclectic bent but more so to his quest to make knowledge--philosophyn a broad ense--serveheneedsof theorator-statesman.

Rather hana haphazard titching ogetherof partsof systems, Cicero'schoicesof whatpiecesof whatsystems ousesuggestshe wasmakinga coherent,functional,practical,and teachable schema for practitioners f rhetoric.Forexample,n the aboveoutlineone can read hetracings f the OldAcademyn A.1,2,3. The collection of questions s reminiscentof Socrates'admonitions oPhaedrus ndof Aristotle's isplayof the "preferable"n his Rhetorica.Here,byconsciouschoiceCicerorejects he atomisticdogmaof the Epicureans ndalsorejects heepistomologicenetsof the Stoics. While an oratormightconceivablywant oexplore uchquestions s, "whats theshapeof the earth?" r "whats thesize of the sun?"--and icerodid so onoccasion,de Inv. 1.6.8,de Orat2.15.66--amorepressingneed arisesfor a reasonedpositionon suchquestionsas "Doesjusticederive romnature rcustom?", Whydoexpertsdisagree?"r "Can irtuechange nto vice in a person?"Forone whose life andlivelihooddependedonpraising ndblaming,prosecutingnddefending, xhorting nddissuading ctualpersonsandpolicies,suchphilosophic nquiresas thesecouldonly broadenanorator's utlookandperspective.As Bonner ays,

Experiencef oratoricalleadingtself,whethernactualpractice rinschoolexercises,musthaverevealedhat requentlyehindhespecific ase with ts limited elation operson, ime,andplace, aya wider ssueof equity hedecisionuponwhichcalled or thebalance,hesenseofjustice, he moral alues nculcatedyaphilosophicalraining.,

Indeed, the illustrations and examples Cicero provides in his twodescriptionsof philosophical inquiryseem ideally designedto help an oratorattainBonner's concept of "balance."For instance, in the section on definition Cicero

offers illustrativequestions,suitedforphilosophical nquiry,such as "Isrightin theinterestof the majority?""How many classifications of desirable hings are there?""What are the defining characteristicsof an avaricious person?" These are notspeculativequestionson cosmologicalor metaphysical ssues. Nor do these samplequestions suggest anything approaching contemporary concerns for suchepistomological topics as objectivecriteria or truthstatementsand the like. On thecontrary, he first sectionof the schemeis best understoodas a procedure,derivingmost probably from an admixture of Academic and Peripatetic teaching, forfocusing the mind away from a specific question of law or fact and towardfundamental,arguable ssues in moralphilosophy. Reaching a certain conclusionon any of these issues was neither possible nor intended. At best, a probable,reasoned position could result but the discussion remains always open, neverclosed as when a vote is taken or a verdict reached. Cicero himself attests to theopen, on-going dimensionof these inquiries nvolvingmoralphilosophy:

Bonner, p. 6.



Cicero andPhilosophicInvenfio 223

We, however,whose guide is probabilityandwho areunableto advance further hanthepoint at which the likelihood of truthhas presented tself arepreparedboth to refutewithout obstinacy and be refutedwithout anger.1

Section B of the schema deserves special attention.Whereas the generalpattern n Section A can be seen as a descendantof Hermagoras' nventionaltripletof conjecture, definition, and quality applied to a procedure for deliberating ongeneral questions of moral philosophy, no such easy description for Section Bpresents itself. A few clues however, suggest what Cicero was including in thisdivision.

In both treatises, when introducing his compressed discussion of thematerial in Section B, Cicero, in one case (de Part. 19.67), uses the phrase estpraecipiendigenus quod ad rationemofficiipertinet(thisclassification of advice isdirectedtowardthe basis of moralobligation),and in the other instance (de Orat.3.30.118) thephraseaut in officiidisceptationeversantur [thesequestions]revolvearounddeliberationsof moralobligation).The almostparalleluse of officium,duty,is sufficient evidence to conclude that Cicero is here alluding to the teachings or

publicationsof the Stoics, Panaetiusand Posidonius. In the arenaof moralpracticalbehavior the Skeptics andEpicureanshadlittle to offer. Moreover,while a gap oftwo years exists between publicationof the de Part. in 46 B.C. and his de Off. in44 B.C. one can surelyassume thatCicero was familiarwith the Stoic doctrinesonmoral choice in practicalaffairs.

Yet anotherclue exists in the examples Cicero uses to clarify the scope ofsection B in the inventional schema. In the two examples that appearin de Part.20.67. Cicero offers the questions, "what s the appropriateway to show respectfor parents?" utquemadmodumolindi sintparentes) and"howcan languagecalmstates emotional arousal?" (ut in consolandis maeroribus, etc.). Here oneencountersa differentsort of generalquestionthanthose in Section A. Cicero shiftsdramaticallyawayfrom the intellectualandcognitive to thepracticalandprudentialtype of inquiry.Whereasthe queriesin Section A were of the type, "Whatmightorshoulda wise person conclude, believe, think,or tentativelyhold?"these examplesindicatea type of inquiry,"What hould a wise persondo?"Developing a discourseon a practical questiondoes not requirea dialectic apparatusof definition, genus-species, or the machinery of Cicero's Topica. Rather, once an inquiry aboutchoosing between two courses of actionarises, one of necessity needs recourse tosome philosophical or religious dogma, set of standards,or system of practicalethical behavior against which one can test a proposed action. Not surprisinglyCicero embraces Stoic moralityand its principlesof conduct in the de Off. andinthat treatise one encounterssuch rules as, "Promisesare not binding when life orhealth is at stake," "Itis the duty of a youth to show deference to elders," anddozens of others.

If, however, one raises an inquiry about proper conduct and locates the

relevantethical rule,is not the inquiryconcluded?By no means.Since therule itselfwas derived froma systemof philosophicassumptionsandreachedby a system ofprobable consequences, a discussion on a general question of behavior remainsopen-ended and always subject to furtherexploration,revision, interpretation,orchallenge.Perhapsa short llustrationwouldclarifythe claim.

The Stoicsbelieved thattakingan activerole in publicservice enabledone toattainhappiness and, therefore,was a moral obligation. If a person, for example,

Tusc. Disp. 2.2.5.



224 Donovan .Ochs

raised a generalquestion,"Shouldonejoin a politicalparty?" ndapplied the Stoicrule, an affirmative answer would result, albeit with qualifications. If the samequestionwere appliedto theEpicurean"ethic," negativewould result.

Quite apart from their ethical dogma, Cicero's inclusion and prominent

featuringof the generalquestionsaboutconductevinces mostclearlyone of thekeylinkages Cicero saw between wisdom and eloquence. Section A of the schemayields a cognitive type of knowledge; Section B enables an orator not only toconsider alternatephilosophical positions but, most important,alternatemoralactions. An orator much more so than a speculative philosopher contends withactualnot abstract ontroversiesand needs a methodfordeliberatinguponpracticalcourses of actions, before arguing for or against a specific action in a specificinstance. In simpler terms, Cicero'sapproach o practical nquiryis the source ofthe values underlying an orator'sarguments. n de Off. 1.28.101, for example, onecan read an exposition of the moral tenet that"Temperance ictatesone to subjectappetite o reason."Most of Cicero'scourtroomattackon Verres,for instance,restson Verres' ailureto follow the moralprescription.

Section B.2 in the schema suggests a third distinctive type of philosophic

inquiry. Much less well developed than the othertwo, this categorydoes not yieldeasily to analysis or description. More than likely, Cicero is here addressingsomethingakin to a systemforproducingconsolatorydiscourse.Comfortat a timeof personal loss or grief requiresany speaker o locate resources farremovedfromthose appropriateo courts and assemblies. Inventionalapparatusor the epideicticgenre, dealing as they typicallydo with an individual'sbirth, amily education,andaccomplishments, eflect societal values and tend not to address heemotionalstatesof those sufferinga loss or experiencinggrief.Ciceroaddressedseveraltreatises tothe topic of consolation--the Consolatio, the Hortensius, and the TusculanDisputations. Of these only the latter s extantbut it does offer a view of Cicero'sideas concerning the contributionphilosophy can offer in situations of personal,emotion-ladenloss. The connection between consolation and moralvirtue is alsoaddressed n de Part 22.77 and Rackam ranslateshe passage in this way:

Similarly temperance s directedboth to one's own affairs andthose of thecommunity andis manifestedin two ways in respect of profitable hings--in not seeking those which onehas not got and in refraining romusing those whichare in one'spower.In respect ofunprofitable hings temperance s similarlytwo fold: That which withstandscoming evilsis namedfortitude,andthatwhichsteadfastlyendurespresentevil, patience.

Whatone has in this third ypeof inquiryseems to be a rudimentary ndill-developed psychology. Thatis, when a religious belief in a god and an afterlife isnot available--and such was the case for Cicero and most of his contemporaries--one must take refuge in that branch of moral philosophy which treats of theemotions andtheir control.A speaker, orexample,can offerconsolation to anotherwho is experiencing emotional pain by offering philosophic insights designed to

enableone to reinterpret rre-perceive he cause of thegrief.The deathof a belovedspouse, as a case in point, creates grief. The grief can be ameliorated, Cicerosuggests, by exploringwhetherdeathmightbe a blessing or anescape fromhumanmisery. The procedure involves changing the perception of the disconcertingsituation by counter-posing the unwanted emotional state against the virtue oftemperance nd its practicaldirectives.

Here again, as was true with the other two types of inquiry, the resultantdiscussion remains open-ended and capable of being developed from multipleperspectives. Consider the possibilities in developing answers to a contemnporaryculturalquestion, "shoulda young male be permitted o cry?"One easily canprojectmentally the turns such an inquiry might take as one varies the situations and



Cicero ndPhilosophicnventio 22

contexts. Still, some aspect of temperancewould serve as the underlying virtueregardless of the direction of the discussion. To console, in the final analysis,requires a transference away from the emotionally arousing context to atranscendentevel of meaning,a level providedby this third ypeof general nquiry.Cicero'sTusculanDisputationsprovidesa readerwith Cicero'sown attempt o use

philosophy as a defensive armoragainst the vicissitudes and misfortunes of life.Two centuries later Marcus Aurelius, following the Stoic doctrine of livingaccordingto nature,composed his Meditations. In this work of Aurelius one canread the uses to which philosophy was put in the living out of one's life andovercomingthe inevitabledistress hatcomes from living a human ife.

To see how these three types of inquiry contribute to the production ofdiscoursewe turnnow to an illustration.

Cicero's de Amicita

Given the general and generalizable natureof the questions used in theschema one ought not be overly surprisedto discover that Cicero's essay "On

Friendship"'reflects a good many of the probes. Cicero's "answers"are suppliedunderthe abbreviatedheadingsof the schemato indicateboth how Ciceroused theinventionalprocedureand, by implication, o suggesthow othersmight.

A. To secure understanding

1. Viaconjecturea. what exists?

[Cicero asserts that "friendshipcan exist only among good men."(18)]

b. originof concept?[Friendship originates in nature; (19), (27), (32) does not springfrom weakness, poverty, want (29) nor from a need for defense oraid (46); "cultivatedby those least in need of another'shelp and bythose most generousandmost given to actsof kindness."(51)]

c. cause andpurpose?[Friendshippermits ntimatediscussion, allows one to share oy andbear adversity; riendshipstrengthens he spirit;(20-23), friendshipderives fromvirtue(28, 50, 83, 100)]

d. change?[Since changes in social status, responsibilities, age, etc. happen,maintaininga friendshipthroughoutone's life is almost impossible

(33)]e. certainresultspossible?

["But f you should take the bond of good will out of the universe,

no house or city could stand,nor would even the tillage of the fieldsabide" 23)]f. particular esultsproduced?

["Nothinggives more pleasurethanthe returnof good will and theinterchangeof zealousservice."(50)]["Nature,oving nothingsolitary, always strivesfor some sortofsupport,and man'sbest support s a very clear friend" 88)]

I am indebtedto the text andtranslation f William ArmisteadFalconer,Cicero: De Amicitia (London:William

HeinemannLtd., 1953).



226 Donovan.Ochs

2. Via definitiona. generallyheld view?

["Mostwant a friend to be such as they cannot be themselves andrequire romfriendswhattheythemselvesdo not bestow" (82)]

[Unanimousagreement hat withoutfriendship ife is not lifeat all (86)]

b. specialfeatures[Friendship s "aninclinationof the soul joined with a feeling oflove rather hanthecalculationof profit" 27)]

c. conceptdivided?[No apt illustration]

d. same ordifferent?[Friendshipdiffers from neighborliness 20)]

e. distinguishedvia class?[Friendship s "an accord in all things, things, human and divine,conjoinedwith mutualgood will and affection" 20)]

3. Via consequences(single concept)a. effects to be desiredoravoided?

[Knowingthatfriendshipsarerareamongthose in public office andthatmaterialgain is a threat o other'smisfortunes,one shouldlookfor loyalty in a friend(62-64)][Friendshipenables people to subdue theirpassions, to take delightin whatis fairto requestonly honorable hingsfromeach other, andcontributes o honor, fame,andtranquility f mind(83)]

b. equitableorinequitable ffects?["Afriendmust neither akepleasure n bringingcharges againstyounor believe themwhen madeby others" 65)]

c. honorableor dishonorable ffects?

[No aptillustration]4. Via consequences(comparison rchoice)

a. same or different?[No apt illustration]

b. which is preferable?[Should one prefer new friends to old? Cicero answers that oldfriends tend to be moredelightfulbut thatone ought not scorn newfriends(67-71)]

B. Guidelines for behavior to follow or avoid)a. rightor wrongin termsof cardinalvirtues?

[Friendsmustavoidhypocrisyandsuspicion (66)]

["Askof friendsonly whatis honorable;do for friendsonly what ishonorableand withouteven waitingto be asked" 44)]b. morein accordwithwisdom?

["Render o each friendas muchaid as you can and as much as theotherhas thecapacityto bear" 73)]["Love a friend after you have appraisedhim rather than appraiseafter beginning o love"(85)]

c. conduciveto comfort andhappiness?[When breaking a friendshipdo so slowly unless an unbearablewrong has been committed,thenbreak he relationshipquickly (76-78)]



CiceroandPhilosophicInventio 227

d. likely to enhanceone'ssocialesteem?["If a friend asks a dishonorable favor involving his life orreputation, omply so long as utterdisgracedoes not follow" (61)]

e. best interestsof stateandhumansociety?["Let not a sort of ungoverned goodwill hinder your friend'sadvantage n importantmatters"75)][How truthful should one be? Cicero answers, "let advice be freefrom harshness,reprooffree from insult"(89)]

Observations

From this distilled excursus through the de Amicitia one can clearly see that

the inventionalschema is anythingbutmechanistic.Some problemsareaddresseddirectly, some obliquely, some quite fully, and some not at all. Also, while theconjecturalprobesprecedethepractical n the schema, andto a great extent in thetreatise,a good bit of interminglingandinterfacingoccurs. Were this sequence of

probesmerelya recipeor formula,onewould

expect eachto be

dealt within

order.Happily,such is not the case.Nor do the "responses"o the probesresultin certain conclusions and iron-

clad behavioral directives. Instead,one can read the qualifications and tentativeconclusions resultingfrom the separate nquiries.That is, a reader s not compelled,as in mathematics, or example, to accede to Cicero'sreasoned conclusions, strongand forceful though they be. We have here a schema designed to assist one inworking throughan abstract ognitive andpractical nquiry,what is friendshipandhow oughtone treata friend?We do nothave a systemguaranteeing alid or certainor finalized conclusions. Thus, someoneelse could as easily use the sameprobestoreason throughthe question and reach different, new, contrary,or contradictorypositions.

Of what value is theschema?Considerable.Reflectinguponandresponding

to the probes in the schema can yield a coherent, reasoned position replete withepistomological, ethical, and psychological materials.Without such materialsanorator might be eloquent in a rhetorical situation, but never wise. With suchmaterials, wisdom may not be guaranteed, but is highly probable. With theresourcesof the integrated nventionalsystem an orator,Cicero implies, can attainthe "highest distinction of eloquence" (summa laus eloquentiac, 3.26.104).

Whenthe two systemsof invention,one for philosophicaldiscourse and theother for rhetoricalreasoning are combined and used in the inventional phase ofexpression, a speakeris protectedagainst undue narrowness.In a given specificcase one ought consider the larger view, the moral dimension. At present, forexample, many are arguingwhether ury awardsin tort cases are excessive. Wereone only to concentrateon a single accident, suit, andmonetary award,one wouldassuredlyfail to understand he broader,generalissues and moralobligations that

contextualize the case. One can claim that dialectic must precede rhetoric, butwithoutsome inventionalsystemor guideline for actuallydoing practicaldialecticone is left only withtheadmonitionandlittleelse.

Cicero's invention system for philosophic inquiry admittedly is notcompletebut it does offer worthwhile nsightsfor reasoning throughquestionsof ageneral nature and locating moral values that, in turn, can inform and infuserhetoricalargument.

DonovanJ. OchsDepartment f RhetoricUniversityof Iowa

cicero and philosophic inventio

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