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Decentralization was an explicit policy goal in the 2000s, but implementa-tion has been patchy (Setnikar-Cankar 2011). A constitutional amendment in2006 paved the way for the creation of fourteen provinces as a new tier ofgovernment. However, the legislative package failed to gain parliamentaryapproval and a consultative referendumheld in 2008 did not generate sufficientturnout (Andreou and Bache 2010). To date, no provinces have been created.In 2011, the law on balanced regional development was amended to trans-

form the regional agencies into self-governing development regions withbroader competences governed by an executive and assembly (Law No. 20/2011, Art. 18). These regional development councils (razvojni svet regije) con-sist of representatives from municipalities, business, and non-governmentalorganizations who elect their president (Andreou and Bache 2010; Law No.20/2011, Art. 11). Executive tasks are handled by regional development agen-cies and are supervised by the central government (Law No. 20/2011, Arts. 11and 20). The law on regional development was amended oncemore in 2012 tobring in municipal mayors as ex officiomembers (Law No. 57/2012, Arts. 8–9).

Spain

Self-rule

INSTITUTIONAL DEPTH AND POLICY SCOPESpain has two tiers of regional governance: fifty provincias (provinces), whichdate from 1833, and seventeen comunidades autónomas (autonomous commu-nities), which came into being with Spain’s transition to democracy in 1978,alongside two ciudades autónomas (autonomous cities, Ceuta and Melilla)(C 1978, Art. 137). Seven comunidades autónomas are single provinces (Astur-ias, Baleares, Cantabria, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, and La Rioja),17 and in thesecases there is a single regional government, the comunidad.18

Self-rule in Slovenia

Institutionaldepth

Policyscope

Fiscalautonomy

Borrowingautonomy

Representation Self-rule

Assembly Executive

Regionalnerazvojneagencije

1999–2010 1 0 0 0 0 0 1

17 Many Spanish provincias and comunidades have co-official spellings in the local language/s.We use both in the dataset and tables, but use English in the profiles.

18 When calculating country scores we do not include the self-rule exercised by theseuniprovincial comunidades in the scores of the provincias.

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/1/2016, SPi

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Comunidades autónomas may establish comarcas (counties), which is a thirdtier of government between municipalities and provincias (Council of Europe:Spain 1997). Comarcas exist in Aragon, Asturias, Cantabria, Castilla y León,and Catalonia (Law No. 3/1986, 6/1987, 1/1991, 10/1993, and 8/1999) butonly in Catalonia do they meet the population criterion for regional govern-ment. In addition, there is one autonomous comarca in Catalonia: Val d’Aran(Aran Valley) (Law No. 16/1990).Under the rule of Francisco Franco from 1950–77 the fifty provincias func-

tioned as deconcentrated outposts of the central government. Two of them,Álava (Araba) and Navarre (Navarra/Nafarroa), enjoyed special fiscal rights(fueros discussed below).The constitution of 1978 guarantees self-government for all nationalities

and regions (C 1978, Art. 143) and lists twenty-two competences that could betransferred to comunidades. These include city and regional planning, healthand hygiene, housing, public works, regional railways and roads, ports andairports, agriculture, forests and fishing, environmental protection, culture,tourism, promotion of sports, social welfare, economic development withinthe objectives set by national economic policy, and regional political institu-tions (C 1978, Art. 148; Council of Europe: Spain 1997; Harty 2002). Comuni-dades can assume residual powers if so stated in their autonomy statute(C 1978, Art. 149.3; Hueghlin and Fenna 2006: 172). The central governmenthas exclusive jurisdiction over foreign policy, defense, justice, labor, civil andcommercial law, social security, public safety, customs and trade, and thecurrency, as well as citizenship and immigration (C 1978, Art.149; Councilof Europe: Spain 1997; Harty 2002; Swenden 2006; Watts 1998, 2008). Thecentral government may also enact framework legislation and transfer ordelegate competences to the comunidades, and it may adopt harmonizationlaws even when jurisdiction lies with the comunidades (C 1978, Art. 150; Maizet al. 2010). The comunidades score 3 on institutional depth and policy scopefrom the year in which they adopt their autonomy statute.The 1978 constitution laid out two routes to regional autonomy (Agranoff

and Gallarín 1997; Harty 2002): the vía rápida (fast track, C 1978, Art. 151) andthe vía lenta (slow track, C 1978, Art. 148.2). The fast track was meant to beused only by the three historic nationalities that passed autonomy statutesduring the Second Republic—the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia—though Andalusia used the avenue as well. The first two had their statutesapproved by the Spanish congress in 1979, while those of Andalusia andGalicia were passed in 1981 (Harty 2002; Law Nos. 3/1979, 4/1979, 1/1981,and 6/1981). The remaining comunidades negotiated a limited transfer ofpowers with the central government, which could be extended later.By 1983 all comunidades had approved statutes and self–governing institu-

tions (Law Nos. 7–8/1981, 3–5/1982, 8–10/1982, 13/1982, and 1–4/1983;


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Morales and Molés 2002; Swenden 2006: 64). Valencia, the Canary Islands,and Navarre demanded and received additional competences early on, whilethe rest obtained new powers through renegotiation of their statutes duringthe 1990s and early 2000s.Exclusive competences were expanded for the ten slow track comunidades—

Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Murcia, Aragon, Castilla-La Mancha, Extrema-dura, Baleares, Madrid, and Castilla y Leon—with a Law adopted in 1992 andcoming into effect in 1994 (Law Nos. 9/1992, 1–4/1994, and 6–11/1994;Morales and Molés 2002). Their competences included gambling, industry,distribution and transport of energy, advertisement, meteorological services,concurrent powers in education, consumer protection, mining, energy, envir-onmental protection, press, radio, and television (Law No. 9/1992, Arts. 2–3and 19). Implementing powers were extended to international trade, manage-ment of the social security system, museums, libraries, weights and measures,pharmaceuticals, labor and industrial and intellectual property (Agranoff andGallarín 1997; Law No. 9/1992, Art. 4).Further decentralization in the second half of the 1990s brought the com-

petences of the slow track comunidades closer to those of the fast track comu-nidades (Beramendi andMáiz 2004; Law Nos. 5/1996, 3/1997, 1/1998, 5/1998,11/1998, and 1-4/1999) and some comunidades also negotiated increasedautonomy during these years (Canary Islands, Law No. 4/1996; Valencia,Law No. 5/1994; Galicia, Law No. 16/1995 and 6/1999). A major reform in2002 devolved responsibility for the provision of health and education to theten slow track comunidades that did not already control these competences(Law No. 7/2001; López-Laborda and Monasterio 2006).The reform of autonomy statutes is an ongoing process. Overhauls were

passed in Catalonia and Valencia in 2006 (Law Nos. 1/2006 and 6/2006),Andalusia, Aragon, Baleares, and Castilla y León in 2007 (Law Nos. 1/2007, 2/2007, 5/2007, and 14/2007), Navarre in 2010 (Law Nos. 1/2001 and 7/2010),Extremadura in 2011 (Law No. 1/2011), Murcia in 2013 (Law No. 7/2013), andCastilla-La Mancha in 2014 (Law No. 2/2014).19

Ceuta and Melilla were part of Spanish Morocco until it gained independ-ence from Spain in 1956, while they remained part of Spain. The cities weregoverned as dependencies under the Franco regime. After the transition todemocracy, the ciudades became autonomous and self-governing within the

19 The new statutes accommodate prior reforms, slightly amend regional law making, or reducethe number of deputies in the regional parliament. Some comunidades also changed theirpreambles, declaring themselves historic nations. See Generalitat de Catalunya. Departament deGovernació i Relacions Institucionals. “Quadre comparatiu de les reformes dels estatutsd’autonomia de Catalunya, Andalusia i Aragó” and “Quadre comparatiu de les reformes delsestatuts d’autonomia de Catalunya, Comunitat Valenciana, Illes Balears, Castella i Lleó, Navarra iExtremadura.” <http://web.gencat.cat/en/generalitat/estatut>


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Spanish constitutional framework. Local assemblies were set up with the firstdirect elections in 1979. The 1978 constitution created an option for Ceutaand Melilla to become comunidades, but this reform never took place. Instead,in 1995, both enclaves negotiated statutes as ciudades autónomas (Law No.1–2/1995), a unique and intermediate status. For example the central govern-ment still directly provides health care. However, their statutes otherwisegrant similar powers as for comunidades. The ciudades score 1 on institutionaldepth and zero on policy scope until 1978; from 1978 the scores on institu-tional depth and policy scope increase to 2Æ until the 1995 reform, when thescores on both dimensions increase to 3.Under the Franco dictatorship the provinciaswere deconcentrated. In 1978 a

Law on local elections reformed the institutions of the provincias with indir-ectly elected assemblies as part of the return to democracy (Law No. 173/1978). The primary functions of provincias are in social services and fairs(Agranoff and Gallarín 1997). They share with municipalities responsibilityfor culture, solid waste treatment, coordinating municipal services, deliveringrural services, technical assistance to municipal councils, and investmentplanning for small municipalities (Council of Europe: Spain 1997).� Provinciasalso coordinate and provide inter-municipal policies (Committee of theRegions 2005; Law No. 7/1985, Art. 31). The provincias score 1 on institutionaldepth and 0 on policy scope until 1978 and 2 and 1, respectively, as of 1978.20

Prior to the democratic transition, Álava and Navarre were allowed to keepunique fiscal arrangements and some limited autonomy in culture and edu-cation. These two provincias score 1 on institutional depth and 1 on policyscope during the dictatorship. After the democratic transition the uniquefiscal arrangements (fueros) for all four historically Basque provincias, Álava,Navarre, Biscay (Bizkaia/Vizcaya), and Gipuzkoa (Guipúzcoa) were reinstated(discussed in more detail under fiscal autonomy).Catalonia has a third layer of intermediate government—comarcas. The

legal framework was created by a 1987 regional Law (Law No. 6/1987) andreformed in 2003 (Law No. 8/2003). Municipalities may join together toestablish comarcas via a popular referendum. The comarcas primarily act inpublic health, environment, economic development, social services, con-sumer protection, tourism, and regional planning (Agranoff and Gallarín1997; Law No. 6/1987, Art. 25). The 2003 reform expanded their competenceswithin the general framework of local government and created a council ofmayors with formal oversight authority in the comarca. It also allowed a

20 Provincial competences are absorbed into the regional government in seven uniprovincialcomunidades (Asturias, Cantabria, Baleares, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, and Navarre). In these casesthe authority of provincias is not scored once the autonomy statute of the comunidad has beenadopted and the provincias cease to function as autonomous institutions.


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comunidad, provincia, or municipality to delegate responsibilities to the comar-cas. The comarcas score 2 on institutional depth and 2 on policy scope.

There is one autonomous comarca in Catalonia. Val d’Aran has specialauthority to protect the Aran language through the public education system(Law No. 16/1990, Art. 20). These differences are too fine-grained to be cap-tured by our measure and Val d’Aran scores the same on institutional depthand policy scope as other comarcas.

FISCAL AUTONOMYThere are two tax regimes for comunidades: a special foral regime for Navarreand the Basque Country and a common regime for the remainingcomunidades.The common tax regime for comunidades was established in 1980 with the

adoption of an organic law on the finances of autonomous communities(called the LOFCA) setting out which taxes could be devolved and whichcould not. Taxes that could be devolved were wealth taxes and taxes on realestate sales, inheritance, property, and gambling (Aja 2001; Law No. 8/1980,Art. 9; Toboso and Scorsone 2010).Subsequent legislation ceded extensive regional control over spending, but

little control over revenue. In 1993, comunidades began to receive 15 percentof the central income tax. In 1997 this was doubled to 30 percent and comu-nidades gained control over property tax and several minor taxes (inheritanceand gifts, real estate, and stamp tax, and both base and rate on gambling)(Almendral 2002). Comunidades also gained authority over the rate of incometax within a band set by central government (Law No. 3/1996; Morales andMolés 2002; Toboso and Scorsone 2010). In 2002 another 3 percent of theincome tax was devolved, along with 40 percent of alcohol, tobacco, andpetrol, 35 percent of the VAT, and 100 percent of electricity (Law No. 7/2001; López-Laborda et al. 2006; López-Laborda and Monasterio 2006;Toboso and Scorsone 2010; Swenden 2006: 134). In 2010, the ceded amountsincreased to 50 percent of the income tax, 50 percent of the VAT, and 58percent of alcohol, tobacco, and petrol (Chapman Osterkatz 2013: 358;Herrero-Alcalde et al. 2012; Law No. 3/2009). Comunidades can introducenew taxes if not already levied by the central government (Law No. 8/1980,Art. 6), but there are few areas where this is possible. The comunidades score 2until 1997 and 3 from 1997 onwards.Until 1978, Ceuta and Melilla were ruled as dependencies. From 1978 until

1996, they were entitled to an additional share of central taxes and an add-itional 50 percent of the fiscal portion of municipal taxes levied by theenclaves.Æ The 1996 reform of the law on the financing of the autonomouscommunities put them on equal fiscal footing with comunidades (Law No.


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3/1996). Ceuta and Mellila score zero until 1978, 2 from 1978 until 1996, and3 from 1996 onwards.Provinciashave limited fiscal autonomy.Æ They are fundedwith small portions

of the income tax, VAT, municipal transfers, and some other minor taxes ofthose living in their territory (Law No. 39/1988, Art. 125). Provincias can levy asurcharge on the business tax within centrally imposed limits and control therate of property tax, a surcharge on the municipal business tax, and a motorvehicle tax. They can also set the rate on buildings, facilities, and urban property(Agranoff and Gallarín 1997; Council of Europe 1997; Law No. 39/1988, Art.124; Pedraja-Chaparro et al. 2006). Provincias score 1 from 1978.The foral regime in Navarre and the Basque Country dates back to Roman

times and during the Franco regime survived only in the provincias of Álavaand Navarre (Law No. 16/1969 and 2948/1976).Æ The constitution of 1978reauthorized the special fiscal arrangements for the provincias of Biscay andGipuzkoa (Aja 2001; C 1978, additional provision one). While in the rest ofSpain, taxes are paid to the center and set amounts are transferred back to thecomunidades, the governments of these four provinces collect income, corpor-ate, inheritance, and wealth taxes and are able to the set the rate and base forthese taxes autonomously (López-Laborda and Monasterio 2006; Toboso andScorsone 2010). Taxes are collected at the provincial level and a portion isremitted to the central and Basque governments after negotiations (Tobosoand Scorsone 2010). In the Basque territories the amount must total 6.24percent of what the central government spends on non-transferred compe-tences. The amount is 1.62 percent in Navarre (Chapman Osterkatz 2013: 94).The modern fiscal regime in the Basque Country (Concierto) was set up in

1981 (Law No. 12/1981) and reformed in 2002 (Law No. 12/2002; López-Laborda et al. 2006). The Basque parliament guarantees harmonizationamong the three provinces with regard to their legislative and executivepowers. To this end, the Basque tax coordination agency (Órgano de Coordina-ción Tributaria de Euskadi) was created in 1989 (Law No. 3/1989) and the threeprovincial councils and the Basque government are represented in thisagency. However, the Basque government cannot compel its provinces toenact or revoke taxes. Fiscal autonomy lies with the Basque provinces andthe comunidad scores zero.Æ Álava scores 3 from 1950–77 and 4 subsequentlyand Biscay and Gipuzkoa score zero until 1977 and 4 subsequently.Navarre’s fiscal regime (Convenio) originated in 1841 and has been renewed

several times, most recently in 1969 and 1990. The arrangements were pro-longed during the democratic transition and through the process of creatingthe comunidades (Law Nos. 839/1978, 2655/1979, 13/1982, Arts. 43 and 45;López-Laborda et al. 2006). The first amendment to the fiscal regime con-cerned the collection and administration of VAT (Law No. 18/1986). The


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1990 Convenio (Law No. 28/1990) was reformed in 2003 (Law No. 25/2003).Navarre scores 3 from 1950–81 and 4 thereafter.Catalan comarcas and the Val d’Aran are funded by the municipalities

and cannot set the base or rate of a tax (Law No. 6/1987, Arts. 43–47 andNo. 16/1990, Art. 25).

BORROWING AUTONOMYAll comunidades may issue debt with prior authorization by the central gov-ernment (Gordo and Cos 2001; European Commission 2012; Toboso andScorsone 2010). Authorization is also necessary for loans raised outside theEuropean Monetary Union (EMU) (Council of Europe 2000). Only access toshort term credit of less than one year is not subject to prior central approval.Furthermore, comunidades may borrow only to finance capital investmentsand the sum on annual repayments and interest may not exceed 25 percent ofthe regional government’s revenue (Gordo and Cos 2001; Law No. 8/1980,Art. 14; Swenden 2006: 134). Comunidadesmay borrow to mitigate temporarycash imbalances if the bond maturity does not exceed one year.Since 2002, comunidades must run balanced budgets or budgets with a

surplus (Law No. 5/2001; Law No. 3/2006; López-Laborda and Monasterio2006) and, as of 2010, they have an obligation to publish budgetary executiondata on a quarterly basis (European Commission 2012). Comunidades score 1on borrowing autonomy from 1980 or from the year in which their autonomystatute was adopted.All provincias may borrow only for investment purposes and under prior

authorization by the ministry of finance or by the government of its comuni-dad (and then only if the comunidad has assumed monitoring competences)(Council of Europe 1997; Law No. 39/1988, Arts. 50–54; Monasterio-Escuderoand Suárez-Pandiello 2002). Prior to the democratic transition, a network ofpublic banks issued credit to provincial and municipal governments on aregular basis.Æ Soon after the transition, central bailouts were required tostabilize local finances. Provincias therefore score 1 from 1950.Until 1978, Ceuta and Melilla were ruled as dependencies but fell under the

same borrowing regime as provincias between 1978 and 1995. They are subjectto the same borrowing rules as comunidades from 1995.Æ Ceuta and Melillascore zero until 1978 and 1 from 1978 onwards.Catalan comarcas and Val d’Aran are funded by their municipalities and

have no borrowing autonomy (Law No. 6/1987, Arts. 43–47 and No. 16/1990,Art. 25).

REPRESENTATIONAt the level of the comunidad, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, andAndalusia hold direct elections on a date set by their assembly (Colino and del


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Pino 2010; Gómez Fortes and Cabeza Perez 2013). The first elections tookplace in Catalonia and the Basque Country in 1980, followed by Galicia in1981 and Andalusia in 1982. Direct elections were introduced in all othercomunidades in 1983 and take place every four years. In all comunidades,executives are elected by and from the assemblies. Comunidades score 2 onassembly and 2 on executive from the first election onwards.Ceuta and Melilla were managed directly from the center during the Franco

regime and have had popularly elected councils since 1979, with executiveselected by the assembly (Law No. 1-2/1995). Ceuta and Melilla score zero onassembly and executive until 1979 and 2 and 2, respectively, from 1979.All provincias have had indirectly elected assemblies (juntas generales or

cortes) selected by the municipalities and an executive (diputación provincialor foral) since 1812 (Law No. 173/1978, Art. 31). The assembly elects theexecutive (Law No. 173/1978, Art. 34) but under the dictatorship of Francothe president of the executive (gobernador civil) was centrally appointed. Pro-vincias score 1 on assembly and zero on executive until 1978 and 1 and 2,respectively, from 1978.The comarcas in Catalonia have indirectly elected councils (Law No. 6/1987,

Art. 20). The assembly of Val d’Aran (Conselh Generau d’Aran) is directly elected(Law No. 16/1990, Art. 11-3). The executive in the comarcas is elected by thecouncil (Law No. 6/1987, Art. 22; Law No. 16/1990, Art. 15). Comarcas score 1on assembly and 2 on executive and Val d’Aran scores 2 and 2, respectively.

Shared rule

There is no shared rule for comarcas and Val d’Aran (Law No. 6/1987 and 16/1990). Provincias do not participate in intergovernmental meetings with theexception of those in the Basque Country, and have no executive, fiscal, orborrowing control.

LAW MAKINGUntil 1977, the Spanish parliament was unicameral. The Cortes Generales(lower house) was set up in 1942 by the Franco regime. Provincial representa-tion consisted of the mayor of the capital city of each provincia and onerepresentative from the municipalities (Law No. 200/1942, Art. 2.e), but pro-vincial weight in the Cortes as a whole was minimal (Law No. 200/1942,Art. 2). Moreover, the parliament lacked authority since Franco could legislateby decree.A law on political reformwas passed in the Cortes in 1976 and put to popular

referendum in early 1977 (Law No. 1/1977). The law re-established the senateas a body of territorial representation, giving the king the right to appoint afifth of the members (Law No. 1/1977, Art. 2). The 1978 constitution


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eliminated royal appointment and introduced representation for the comuni-dades (C 1978, Art. 66), which had not yet been formed. Since then, theprovincias have 208 members and comunidades fifty-eight members in the266-seat chamber (Harty 2002; Watts 2008). The Senado has some reservedpowers over constitutional appointments (C 1978, Arts. 122 and 159), but canbe overridden by a majority in the lower house on normal legislation andmaynot initiate legislation (C 1978, Art. 90).The assembly of each comunidad selects at least one member up to a limit of

one senator per million inhabitants (C 1978, Art. 69.5). In the current Senado,the number of seats ranges from one for La Rioja, Cantabria, and Navarre toeight for Catalonia and nine for Andalusia. While the aggregation rule clearlyfalls between the principle of “one region, one vote” and “one person, onevote,” it appears closer to the latter.� Comunidades’ assemblies designate rep-resentatives in the Senado (L2) but their representatives constitute a minority(zero on L3).All provincial senators are popularly elected: four per provincia on the main-

land, three for the larger islands, and two for the smaller islands (C 1978, Art.69; Hueghlin and Fenna 2006: 211–13). Provincias are the unit of representa-tion (L1) and provincial senators constitute a majority in the Senado (L3).21

Under their special autonomy status, Ceuta and Melilla each had threerepresentatives, one directly elected deputy in the lower house and two dir-ectly elected senators, but they did not have special bilateral arrangements forlaw making (C 1978, Arts. 68.2 and 69.4). Since 1995, they have had twodirectly elected senators. Ceuta and Melilla are units of representation (L1)and together with the provincial senators they constitute a majority in theSenado (L3).

EXECUTIVE CONTROLIntergovernmental meetings were foreseen when decentralization took off inthe early 1980s. A Law on the process of autonomy adopted in 1983 stipulatedthat sectoral committees consisting of representatives from central andregional government would meet at least twice a year (Agranoff and Gallarín1997; Agranoff 2004; Bolleyer 2006a; Law No. 12/1983, Art. 4). The commit-tees convened at the request of the central government or one of the comuni-dades, but meetings were ad hoc and did not result in binding agreements(Beramendi and Máiz 2004: 137). Negotiation between the national govern-ment and the comunidadeswere kick-started from 1987 with intergovernmental

21 Asturias, Cantabria, Islas Baleares, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, and Navarre combine theinstitutions of provincias and comunidades. When calculating country scores we include thecollective shared rule in law making exercised by these uniprovincial comunidades in the scoresof the provincias.


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meetings on health (Consejo Interterritorial del Sistema Nacional de Salud) that canconclude binding agreements (LawNo. 14/1986, final provision 7 and 16/2003,Arts. 69–75).In 1992, the intergovernmental framework was consolidated by a Law

allowing central government ministers to initiate sectoral conferences whichmay result in binding collaboration agreements (Law No. 30/1992, Arts. 5–6).In 1999, the 1992 Law was amended to formalize and institutionalize sectoralconferences by specifying the items to be included in the collaboration agree-ments (Law No. 4/1999). More recently, the autonomy statutes of Andalusia,Aragon, Baleares, Castilla y León, Catalonia, and Extremadura, have furtherenhanced the formalization of intergovernmental meetings (LawNos. 6/2006,1–2/2007, 5/2007, 14/2007, and 1/2011).In addition to the sectoral committees, there is the Conferencia para Asuntos

Relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas (Conference for European Affairs)established in 1988 and the Conferencia de Presidentes (Conference of Presi-dents) established in 2004. In 1994 the Conference on European Affairsadopted an agreement that involved comunidades in preparing a Spanishposition in the Council of Ministers (Hueghlin and Fenna 2006: 242–3). In1997, this agreement was formalized in law (Law No. 2/1997). It sets out ruleson the adoption of decisions that require the support of a majority of comu-nidades (Law No. 2/1997, Annex).In addition, comunidades obtained one representative in the Spanish dele-

gation to the EU who, since 2004, participates as a permanent representativein the Councils of Ministers for employment, social policy, health and con-sumers; agriculture and fishing; environment; and education, youth, andculture.The Conferencia de Presidentes consists of the presidents of the Spanish

government and the seventeen comunidades and Ceuta and Melilla and hasheld meetings on European affairs, health care finance, research, techno-logical development and innovation, fiscal stability and the employmentsituation.22 In 2009 it adopted internal regulations which stipulate that reso-lutions at the annual meeting are adopted by consensus and recommenda-tions are adopted with the support of Spanish president and two-thirds of thepresidents of the comunidades (Law No. 3409/2009). Since 1987 comunidadesscore 2 on executive control.Executive control was extended to Ceuta and Melilla when they adopted

their autonomy statutes in 1995.Æ

22 Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas. Secretaria de Estado de AdministracionesPúblicas. “Conferencia de Presidentes.” <http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/web/areas/politica_autonomica/coop_autonomica/Confer_Presidentes.html>.


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FISCAL CONTROLComunidades can influence national tax policy through their institutionalrepresentation in the Senado, but the Senado can be overridden by a majorityin the lower house (C 1978, Art. 90). In addition, there is considerable atten-tion to fiscal matters in the intergovernmental meetings through the Consejode Política Fiscal y Financiera (Council on Fiscal Policy and Finance), created bythe LOFCA 1980 and used for making recommendations on regional financeformulas, transfers, and revenue sharing (Law No. 8/1980, Art. 3). The councilis composed of representatives of the ministry of finance, the minister ofeconomic planning, and regional finance ministers (Watts 2005). The BasqueCountry and Navarre are members of the Consejo. The Law on the finances ofautonomous communities, LOFCA, establishes an inter-territorial compensa-tion fund (Law No. 8/1980, Art. 16) and reforms of the Law, including thearticles concerning inter-territorial compensation, are subject to debate in theConsejo (Law No. 7/2001, Art. 4). Comunidades score 1 on multilateral fiscalcontrol from the year in which their autonomy statute was adopted. WhenCeuta and Melilla became ciudades autónomas in 1995, they also becamemembers of the Consejo (Law No. 3/1996) and score 1 on multilateral fiscalcontrol.The foral rights of the Basque provinces and Navarre are embedded in the

1978 constitution but the implementation of the special tax regimes is subjectto bilateral agreements (C 1978, Additional provision one). A fixed amount ofthe revenue collected by the Basque Country and Navarre is transferred to thecentral government to cover central government activity in those territories.This fixed amount, or cupo, is settled in advance in bilateral foral economictreaties (Toboso and Scorsone 2010).During the Franco regime, the Basque provinces had no special intergov-

ernmental avenues for negotiation.Æ The fiscal regime for the Basque Country(Concierto) was set up in 1981 and was renegotiated in 2002 but the cupo isnegotiated every five years (Law No. 12/1981, Art. 48 and No. 12/2002, Arts.49–50). The negotiations on the fiscal regime take place in a coordinationcommittee (Comisión coordinadora) composed of four central governmentrepresentatives and four Basque representatives, one from each of the threeBasque provinces and one from the Basque government (Law No. 12/1981,Art. 40). The cupo is decided by a joint committee (Comisión Mixta del ConciertoEconómico) which meets every five years and consists of an equal number ofrepresentatives from the central government and the Basque region (half ofwhom are appointed by the provinces and half by the Basque government(Law No. 12/1981, Art.49; Swenden 2006: 135–6). The 2002 fiscal agreementmade the joint committee responsible for determining the cupo and for nego-tiating amendments to the fiscal agreement. It stipulates that decisions aretaken unanimously (Law No. 12/2002, Arts. 61–62).


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Within the Basque Country a tax coordination agency (Órgano de Coordina-ción Tributaria de Euskadi) is responsible for coordinating the tax regimes of thethree provinces. The agency was set up in 1989 and the board consists of threerepresentatives from the Basque government and one representative fromeach provincial council. Its competences are limited to issuing reports (LawNo. 3/1989, Arts. 16–17). The Basque government and Álava, Biscay, andGipuzkoa score 2 on bilateral fiscal control from 1981 onwards.Navarre’s fiscal regime (Convenio) was in place during the Franco regime and

was extended into the democratic transition (see Fiscal Autonomy Law).A new fiscal regime was concluded in 1990. The 1990 agreement installs anarbitration board (Junta Arbitral) with a president appointed by the Spanishgovernment (after the opinion of the supreme court of Navarre) tasked withresolving regional/central government disputes. Four of its members areappointed by the central government and four by the government of Navarre(Law No. 28/1990, Arts. 45–46). A similar arrangement exists for the BasqueCountry (Law No. 12/2002, Arts. 65–67). The annual cupo of Navarre is nego-tiated every five years by a coordination commission (Comisión Coordinador) oftwelve members, also split between the central government and Navarre (LawNo. 28/1990, Arts. 53 and 61; Swenden 2006: 135–6). Changes to the Convenioneed to be approved by the parliaments of both Spain and Navarre (Law No.13/1982, Art. 45). The latest revision was adopted in 2003 (Law No. 25/2003).Navarre scores 2 on bilateral fiscal control from 1982 onwards.

BORROWING CONTROLCoordination of public debt is discussed in the Consejo de Política Fiscal yFinanciera (see Fiscal control, discussed earlier). The decisions of the councilare adopted by two-thirds of the votes or, when falling short in the first round,an absolute majority in a second round (Council of Europe 2000).23 However,the Consejo originally had only an advisory role (Law No. 8/1980, Art. 3.2;López-Laborda et al. 2006).The control of the Consejo on borrowing increased when, in response to

EMU, a Law was adopted in 2001 (in force since 2002) stipulating that comu-nidades should achieve budgetary stability and that theymust submit recoveryplans subject to approval of the Consejo when they run deficits (EuropeanCommission 2011; Gordo and de Cos 2001; Law No. 5/2001, Arts. 2 and 8).The 2001 Law also applies to the Basque Country and Navarre (Law 5/2001,final disposition one). A reform in 2006 brought comunidades under strictercontrol by requirements to negotiate fiscal restoration plans with the Consejo

23 Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas. “Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera.Reglamento de Régimen Interior del Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera, Art. 10.” <http://www.minhap.gob.es/es-ES/Areas%20Tematicas/Financiacion%20Autonomica>.


Southern Europe

506

Not for

circu

lation

and to provide more information on the regional fiscal situation to the centralgovernment (Law No. 3/2006, Art. 1.3–1.4; López-Laborda et al. 2006).

Since 2012, government debt is subject to a balanced budget law stipulatingthat all tiers of government may incur deficits only when an absolute majorityof the national parliament recognizes a case of natural disaster, economicrecession, or other emergency (Law No. 2/2012, Art. 11). Comunidad debtmay not exceed 13 percent of regional GDP and the Consejo sets annual debttargets for each of the comunidades (Law No. 2/2012, Arts. 13 and 16). The2012 Law was amended in 2013 to include commercial debt and to improvethe monitoring and enforcement of budgetary stability (Law No. 9/2013).Comunidades score 1 from 1980 (or the year in which their autonomy statutewas adopted) until 2002, and 2 since 2002 on multilateral borrowing control.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMSenators representing the assemblies of the comunidades are too few in number(fifty-eightoutof a total of 266members, just under22percent) tobeable to raisethe decisionhurdle so comunidades score 0 onmultilateral constitutional reform.The lack of collective comunidad control over the constitution of the Spanishstate is balanced by the fact that each comunidad has a veto over amendments toits own statute. A revised autonomy statute requires in any case the approval of amajority in the Cortes, in both the congress and senate (C 1978, Art. 81; Colino2009). The procedure within the comunidades differs according to type ofmajor-ity andwhether the revision of the autonomy statute is subject to ratification bya regional referendum, but in all cases the comunidades have veto power (OrteandWilson 2009) and score 4 onbilateral constitutional reform from the year inwhich their autonomy statute was adopted.According to the Spanish constitution, Ceuta and Melilla may become

comunidades when their councils so decide and when the national parliamentapproves it (C 1978, transitional provision five). Both cities became ciudadesautónomas in 1995 and amendments to their autonomy statutes require a two-thirds majority of the regional assembly (Law No. 1/1995, Art. 41 and No. 2/1995, Art. 41) as well as the approval of a majority in the Cortes, in both thecongress and senate (C 1978, Art. 81). Ceuta and Mellila score 0 on bilateralconstitutional reform from 1950 until 1978, and 4 from 1978 onwards.Provincias in Spain played no role in constitutional reform during the dic-

tatorship. Since 1978, constitutional reform requires a three-fifths majority inboth the upper and the lower house on the first vote and—failing agreement—a two-thirds majority in the lower house and absolute majority in the Senadoin a subsequent vote before the proposal can be submitted for ratification in areferendum (C 1978, Art. 167; Harty 2002; Swenden 2006: 77). The directlyelected provincial senators can therefore veto constitutional change and score3 on multilateral constitutional reform from 1978.


Country Profiles

507

Not for

circu

lation

Self-rulein

Spain

Institutional

dep

thPo

licyscope

Fiscal

autonomy

Borrowingau

tonomy

Rep

resentation

Self-rule

Assem

bly

Exec

utive

Prov

incias

1950

–19

771

00

11

03

1978

–20

102

11

11

28

Álava/Araba

1950

–19

771

13

11

07

1978

–20

102

14

11

211

Bizkaia/Vizcaya

1978

–20

102

14

11

211

Gipuz

koa/Guipú

zcoa

1978

–20

102

14

11

211

InCatalun

ya:c

omarcas

1987

–20

102

20

01

27

InCatalun

ya:V

ald’Aran

1991

–20

102

20

02

28

Com

unidad

esau

tóno

mas*

1982

33

21

00

919

83–19

963

32

12

213

1997

–20

103

33

12

214

Com

unidad

esau

tóno

mas**

1983

–19

963

32

12

213

1997

–20

103

33

12

214

And

aluc

ía19

813

32

10

09

Galiza/Galicia

1981

–19

963

32

12

213

1997

–20

103

33

12

214

Navarra/N

afarroa

1950

–19

771

13

11

07

1978

21

31

10

819

79–19

812

13

12

211

1982

–20

103

34

12

215

Catalun

ya/C

ataluñ

a19

793

30

00

06

1980

–19

963

32

12

213

1997

–20

103

33

12

214

Euskad

i/Pa

ísVa

sco

1979

33

00

00

619

80–20

103

30

12

211

Ceu

ta19

56–19

771

00

00

01

1978

22

21

00

719

79–19

942

22

12

211

1995

–19

963

32

12

213

1997

–20

103

33

12

214

Melilla

1956

–19

771

00

00

01

1978

22

21

00

719

79–19

942

22

12

211

1995

–19

963

32

12

213

1997

–20

103

33

12

214

*Arag

on,A

sturias,Can

tabria,Islas

Can

arias,Castilla-LaMan

cha,

LaRioja,

Murcia,

andVa

lencia.

**Castilla

yLeón

,Extremad

ura,

IslasBa

leares,a

ndMad

rid.


Not for

circu

lation

Shared

rule

inSp

ain

Law

mak

ing

Exec

utive

control

Fiscal

control

Borrowing

control

Constitutional

reform

Shared

rule

L1L2

L3L4

L5L6

MB

MB

MB

MB

Prov

incias

1950

–19

770

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

1978

–20

100.5

00.5

00

00

00

00

03

04

Álava/Araba

1950

–19

770

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

1978

–19

800.5

00.5

00

00

00

00

03

04

1981

–20

100.5

00.5

00

00

00

20

03

06

Bizkaia/Vizcaya

1978

–19

800.5

00.5

00

00

00

00

03

04

1981

–20

100.5

00.5

00

00

00

20

03

06

Gipuz

koa/Guipú

zcoa

1978

–19

800.5

00.5

00

00

00

00

03

04

1981

–20

100.5

00.5

00

00

00

20

03

06

InCatalun

ya:c

omarcas

1987

–20

100

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

InCatalun

ya:V

ald’Aran

1991

–20

100

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

Com

unidad

es19

82–19

860

0.5

00

00

00

10

10

04

6.5

autóno

mas*

1987

–20

010

0.5

00

00

20

10

10

04

8.5

2002

–20

100

0.5

00

00

20

10

20

04

9.5

Com

unidad

es19

83–19

860

0.5

00

00

00

10

10

04

6.5

autóno

mas**

1987

–20

010

0.5

00

00

20

10

10

04

8.5

2002

–20

100

0.5

00

00

20

10

20

04

9.5

And

aluc

ía19

810

0.5

00

00

00

10

10

04

6.5

Galiza/Galicia

1981

–19

860

0.5

00

00

00

10

10

04

6.5

1987

–20

010

0.5

00

00

20

10

10

04

8.5

2002

–20

100

0.5

00

00

20

10

20

04

9.5

Navarra/N

afarroa

1950

–19

810

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

1982

–19

860

0.5

00

00

00

12

10

04

8.5

1987

–20

010

0.5

00

00

20

12

10

04

9.5

2002

–20

100

0.5

00

00

20

12

20

04

10.5

(con

tinued)


Not for

circu

lation

Con

tinue

d

Law

mak

ing

Exec

utive

control

Fiscal

control

Borrowing

control

Constitutional

reform

Shared

rule

L1L2

L3L4

L5L6

MB

MB

MB

MB

Catalun

ya/C

ataluñ

a19

80–19

860

0.5

00

00

00

10

10

04

6.5

1987

–20

010

0.5

00

00

20

10

10

04

8.5

2002

–20

100

0.5

00

00

20

10

20

04

9.5

Euskad

i/Pa

ísVa

sco

1980

00.5

00

00

00

10

10

04

6.5

1981

–19

860

0.5

00

00

00

12

10

04

7.5

1987

–20

010

0.5

00

00

20

12

10

04

9.5

2002

–20

100

0.5

00

00

20

12

20

04

10.5

Ceu

ta19

56–19

770

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

1978

–19

940.5

00.5

00

00

00

00

00

45

1995

–20

010.5

00.5

00

02

01

01

00

49

2002

–20

100.5

00.5

00

02

01

02

04

10Melilla

1956

–19

770

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

1978

–19

940.5

00.5

00

00

00

00

00

45

1995

–20

010.5

00.5

00

02

01

01

00

49

2002

–20

100.5

00.5

00

02

01

02

00

410

Nationa

lleg

islature:L

1=region

alrepresen

tatio

n;L2

=reg

iona

lgov

ernm

entrepresen

tatio

n;L3

=majority

region

alrepresen

tatio

n;L4

=exten

sive

authority

;L5=

bilateralreg

iona

lcon

sulta

tion;

L6=v

eto

forindividu

alregion

.Total

shared

rule

iseither

multilateral

(M)or

bilateral(B).


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