Citizen Insecurity in Venezuela:Poverty or Institutions?

Roberto Briceño-LeónWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Universidad Central de Venezuela

In Venezuela there has been an increase in violence and killings that is surprising and is unique

in its speed and the magnitude

19761978

19801982

19841986

19881990

19921994

19961998

20002002

20042006

20082010

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

Fuente: Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia sobre datos oficiales

VenezuelaTotal homicides 1976-2011

For decades Venezuela was a country with low violence and low homicide rate.

How can we explain this change?

Objectives• The thesis that we hold in this presentation is that the increase

in homicides in Venezuela occurs for political reasons.• Not as political violence in the sense of conflict between

groups competing for power, but as the existing political settlement that allows society to regulate conflicts, define social norms and enforce compliance. The political agreement that underlies and supports the rule of law.

• This also means that violence in Venezuela does not originate from social reasons such as poverty or inequality. Or economic reasons such as increasing unemployment and decreasing the country's GDP.

To demonstrate this I will present the following:

• First, I will make some comparisons of the violence, particularly homicides, between Venezuela and its two neighboring Latin American countries, Colombia and Brazil

• Second, I propose an explanation of the reasons that I argue can explain changes in violence in Venezuela in the last 25 years.

• Third, I will offer evidence of why the killings are not associated with social conditions. And I will show that these variations are associated with changes in institutions.

IHomicides in Venezuela,

Colombia and Brazil

In the 1980s, homicide rates increased in other countries, but not in Venezuela

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 19900

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Homicide rates

Hom

icid

es/1

00,0

00 in

habi

tant

s COL

BR

VEN

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20110

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Homicide rates (per 100,000 inhabitants)

Brazil Colombia Venezuela

VEN

COL

BR

However, the situation in the 2000s is radically different:

homicides decreased in Colombia, stabilized in Brazil, and increased in Venezuela

Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime

There are also changes in other areas of citizen securityKidnapping decreased notably in Colombia

and greatly increased in VenezuelaNumber of Reported Kidnappings 2000-2010

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

VenezuelaColombia

2What happened in Venezuela?

Violence and Institutions in Venezuela

• In Venezuela, the explanation lies in the political changes the country. On changes in the rules of social and political life.

• There are three different phases in the institutional and security situation in Venezuela: its crises, recovery and destruction.

In phase 1, after years of stability, an institutional crisis begins

19761978

19801982

19841986

19881990

19921994

19961998

20002002

20042006

20082010

Source: Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia sobre datos oficiales

1989:Caracazo

1992: Coups d’état

Phase I: 1989-1993Institutional Crisis

Venezuela 1976-2011 Homicides

In phase 2, there is an effort by the institutional reconstruction

19761978

19801982

19841986

19881990

19921994

19961998

20002002

20042006

20082010

Fuente: Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia sobre datos oficiales

Political Stability Rafael Caldera

Phase II: 1994 -1998Institutional Recovery

In phase 3 starts the destruction of institutions

19761978

19801982

19841986

19881990

19921994

19961998

20002002

20042006

20082010

Source: Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia sobre datos oficiales

Bolivarian Revolution Hugo Chavez

Phase III: 1999-2011Institutional Destruction

PHASE 1In February 1989, there was a revolt with looting, destruction of

businesses and a strong repression that resulted in more than 500 fatalities in Caracas in one week

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

10

20

30

40

50

60

1989 First increase with the looting and popular re-

volt

InstitutionalCrisis

PHASE 1In February and November of 1992, there were two attempts at coups d’état,

with deaths in the clashes and bombing of the capital. The president was removed from office and in one month, there were three different presidents.

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

10

20

30

40

50

60

1992 Increase in homicides during and after the two coups d’état in February and November of 1992

Institutional Crisis

PHASE 2In 1994, the elected government of R. Caldera began and the political situation was stabilized. For 5 years, homicides were

maintained without change and the rate decreased.

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

10

20

30

40

50

60

1994 to 1998: Stabiliza-tion linked to the efforts to pacify the country and reinforce institutionality.

Institutional Stability

PHASE 3In 1999, a “revolution” began that sought to destroy the institutions of the

past and install a new socialist regime. As its security policy, the government decided that social policies should be made and crime should not be

persecuted.

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

10

20

30

40

50

60

Since 1999: increase in homicides as a result of the institutional destruction and political division in the country

Institutional Destruction

In our view this occurs because of the institutional policy of destruction run by the government

• The government as a revolution wants to destroy the ancien regime

• The government believes that violence is rooted in poverty and therefore social policies alone are enough.

• The government believes that violence is part of the class struggle, that stealing is not wrong if you're hungry, that violence is suitable a political tool.

• The government considers that the police use is a policy of the right wing politics

• This led to a decision to do nothing and not enforcing the law

3Insecurity: Poverty or Institutions?

The thesis of poverty and inequality

• The explanations of insecurity and violence are said to have originated from the increased size of the youth population, poverty, education and illiteracy, inequality, unemployment or lack of resources country.

• Consider what has happened in the relationship of these variables in Venezuela with the killings.

Young population and HomicideThere is no association between the change in homicide rate

and the size of the young population .

1990 1995 2000 2005 20100

10

20

30

40

50

60

Venezuela

% of population between 15-34 Homicide rate

Illiteracy and HomicidesVenezuela was the country that had the best results in education and, in addition, was the LA country that

“reported the best results” in the Millenium Goals, althought it shows the highest increase in homicide

1990 1995 2000 2005 20100

10

20

30

40

50

60 Venezuela

Illiteracy rate (% of total population) Homicide rate

Poverty and HomicidesThere is no assocation between the percentage of the country living in poverty and homicides.

Venezuela reported the greatest decrease in poverty in LA and is the country with the most homicides

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0 Venezuela

% of population living below poverty lineHomicide rate

Unemployment and Homicides Venezuela shows a decrease in unemployment during the analyzed period. Even

though the type of employment created in this period is generally public employment in Venezuela with a decrease in industrial and private agricultural employment.

Homicides increased. There is no association

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

10

20

30

40

50

60 Venezuela

Homicidios Unemployment

Gini Index and Homicides Social inequality measured by the Gini coefficient shows results contrary to what is

expected. In Venezuela, there is an increase in equality while homicides also increased

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

Venezuela

Gini index Homicide rate (in hundredths)

GDP per capita and HomicidesMeasured per capita, the country that had the greatest increase in income

was Venezuela, the country that has the highest homicide rate

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Venezuela

GDP per capita (in tens) Homicides per 1 million inhabitants

The case is different with institutional variables

Country Delay R2 RMSE BIC

Brazil 3 0.773 1.832 2.300

Colombia 2 0.646 4.931 4.226

Venezuela 5 0.752 3.509 3.731

The analysis with ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average) showed association and modest

significance between governance variables and predicting the results of homicides.

Rule of Law and HomicidesIn Venezuela, the fall of rule of law starting in 2001 is strongly associated with the increase in homicides.

1996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920100

10

20

30

40

50

60Venezuela

Rule of Law (percentile rank) Homcide rate

Government Effectiveness and HomicidesThe lack of government effectiveness in Venezuela is negatively related to the increase in

violence.

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

10

20

30

40

50

60

Venezuela

Government Effectiveness (percentile rank) Homcide rate

Regulatory Quality and HomicidesIn Venezuela, the decrease in regulatory quality starting in 1999 is negatively associated with the

increase in homicides.

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

10

20

30

40

50

60Venezuela

Regulatory Quality (percentile rank) Homcide rate

Voice and Accountability and HomicidesFor Venezuela, the results show a negative association as

accountability decreases and homicides increase. In Venezuela, this is something particular since, starting in 2004,

the government prohibited the release of criminality and homicide data and removed the existing data from official

websites.

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

10

20

30

40

50

60

Venezuela

Voice and Accountability (percentile rank)Homcide rate

Political Stability and Homicides In Venezuela, there is a decrease in the value, which is negatively

associated with the increase in homicides

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

10

20

30

40

50

60

Venezuela

Political Stability (percentile rank) Homcide rate

There is an inverse association between incarceration and homicide in the three

countries.

In Brazil, imprisonment for homicides increased and the number of homicides

remained stable

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20110

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

Homicides and Imprisonment

Inmates form Homicide Total Homicidios Brasil

Source: Ministério da Justiça, Departamento Penitenciário Nacional, Sistema Integrado de Informações Penitenciárias--InfoPen

In the state of São Paulo, arrests for homicide increased and the number of

homicides decreased

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20110

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

Homicides and Imprisonment

Inmates for Homicide Total Homcidios Sao Paulo

Source: Ministério da Justiça, Departamento Penitenciário Nacional, Sistema Integrado de Informações Penitenciárias--InfoPen

In Colombia, arrests increased and homicides decreased

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Colombia 1990-2010Rates of homicide and imprisonment

(per 100,000 inhabitants)

Homicide rate Imprisonment rate

Source: Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras, Centro de Estudios Económicos

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 20090

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

Homicides Imprisonments for homicide

Fuente: Archivos del CICPC

In Venezuela, those detained for homicide decreased and homicides increased from

1998 to 2010

Conclusions• The explanation for the increase in homicides and insecurity in

Venezuela is political, because it has its origin in the institutional destruction caused passive policies of doing nothing, not to force compliance with the law, or punish offenders.

• And the active policies of the president and the national government that praise violent methods and violent individuals

• Institutions, understood as the social and political life governed by rules, are the only what can help reduce homicides and increase security.

• Social policies, devoted to reducing poverty and inequality, are valuable in themselves. But they do not reduce crime or increase safety if they are not accompanied by a strengthening of social organization and institutions.

Will this situation of insecurity electoral political consequences?

• It is difficult to know, because it is a reality that is interpreted with a polarized view.

• Our survey of 2011 shows a skewed perception of the problem and who is responsible.

The same reality is seen differently by government supporters and opposition or non-aligned

Aumentado Igual Disminuido0

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ChavistaNo ChavistaDe NingunoNacional

Axis Title

According to you, insecurity has increased, decreased or

the same?

Fuente: LACSO Encuesta de Violencia 2011

The attribution of responsibility to the government or the president is given differently depending on the political position

Mucha Algo Poca Niguna.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

CHAVISTA NO CHAVISTA DE NINGUNO NACIONAL

Fuente: LACSO Encuesta de Violencia 2011

how confident are you that President Chavez will solve the

problem of insecurity?

Conclusion

• At the end there are two groups: the supporters of the government on one side, and opponents and non-aligned on the other.

• If non-aligned blame the president and the government and act accordingly, this can become a relevant political factor in elections.