Citizen Response and Hurricane Planning:Two Case Examples

Citizen Response and Hurricane Planning:Two case examples

• Residents, and to a certain extent emergency management staff, public officials and the media, tend to respond to their last experience with a hurricane or storm, rather than the current situation;

• Today, I will look at two case examples (1. Hurricanes Allen and Alicia and 2. Hurricanes Rita and Ike) illustrating this problem.

• My remarks will be somewhat subjective and personal based upon more than 4 1/2 decades living on a barrier island in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as someone who experienced this phenomenon, purely as a resident as well as being involved in planning, reacting to and reporting on Gulf storms.

Our first example is the case of Hurricanes Allen in 1980 and Alicia in 1983

Hurricane Allen Evacuation“Fiasco

When Hurricane Allen reached Category 5 status on August 7, near panic set in along the Texas coast;

UTMB at Galveston closed its medical and allied health schools that afternoon at 5pm, discharging all but emergency patients and sending all non-essential personnel home

Early afternoon on Friday, August 8, Aransas County announced a mandatory evacuation. Other nearby counties followed suit. At 4 pm, Galveston County officials called for evacuation of the West End and Bolivar. Several area TV and radio stations stated that a general evacuation was in effect

Hurricane Allen Evacuation“Fiasco”

At 6 pm, the City of Galveston officials called for an evacuation of the entire city

Soon the Houston area was completely gridlocked normal Friday afternoon traffic combining with evacuation traffic from Brazoria and Galveston Counties. At midnight, traffic was still at a stand-still on Loop 610. Many evacuees headed for San Antonio and Austin did not arrive there until Saturday morningOn Friday afternoon, the eye of Hurricane Allen was still 650 miles from the extreme South Texas coast and 750 miles from the Upper-Texas Coast.

Hurricane Allen made landfall on the extreme South Texas coast around 8:30 pm on Sunday, August 10

Subsequent headlines in the local newspaper and quotes from public officials tell the story about the public’s reaction

• County Judge Ray Holbrook: “We had no problems evacuating people from Galveston County, it was getting through Houston that was the problem”

Subsequent headlines in the local newspaper and quotes from public officials tell the story about the public’s reaction

• Those who left: For them Allen was not a vacation”

• “Many evacuees return to burglarized homes”

• “Safe evacuation? Better off staying at home”

• “Now I understand why so many people refuse to leave”

• “Officials fear residents won’t evacuate if another hurricane threatens Texas”

Hurricane Alicia, August, 1983

Hurricane Alicia: Fast Developing Storm, Slow Response

• Developed into a tropical disturbance on August 15, increased to a tropical storm by 11 am on the 16th and a minimal hurricane by 5 pm that day;

• When Alicia intensified into a 100-mph system, evacuation of low-lying areas was suggested by Judge Ray Holbrook.

• However, earlier that morning the County Emergency Manager minimized the risk, stating “we’ve had worse weekend storms”.

Hurricane Alicia: Fast Developing Storm, Slow Response

• In the city of Galveston, confusion reigns over “who is in charge” of emergency response measures

• UTMB, mindful of its financial losses from Allen, is slow to respond as well. The institution does not shift into emergency mode until 4 pm that afternoon. The eye of the hurricane is approximately 65 miles offshore . Winds are gusting to 63-mph as non-essential employees are released and attempt to make their way home.

• Only 10% of the city’s residents choose, or are able, to evacuate. The hospital endures the storm with a full patient load.

• By evening, one reporter noted that residents “had stopped ‘mocking’ the lightly regarded storm”.

Hurricane Alicia Aftermath

• “Officials spar over evacuation”

• “Isle needs a better plan: One thing is certain, Galveston must come up with a better plan for responding to such an emergency”

• “It is not going to happen again” the major vowed. “We are going to have to get it clarified just who has the authority in these situations”.

Second case example: Hurricanes Rita in 2005 and Ike in 2008

Hurricane Rita: A necessary, but disastrous evacuation

• With images of Katrina still fresh in everyone’s minds and a Category 5 Hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico, Rita results in the largest evacuation to that point, involving an estimated 3 million Texas residents;

• Public officials along the immediate coast have well prepared evacuation plans in place, but inland counties “jump the gun” on evacuation and maybe residents in non-evacuation zones join the exodus;

• While the state has a plan in place, it is inadequate for the size of the evacuation. Fuel is in short-supply. There are no contraflow lanes and some possible evacuation routes are blocked by local or state officials in their attempts to control traffic flow;

• With a heat wave in place and general chaos, an estimated 107 persons perish in the exodus, including 23 nursing home residents on a bus that overheats and catches fire

Hurricane Rita, 2005

• Storm veers east of the Houston-Galveston area, bringing only minor damage in its wake.

• Peak wind gusts in Galveston are 57-mph at Pleasure Pier and 64-mph at the North Jetty.

• In Houston, peak wind gusts are 48-mph at Houston Hobby and 53-mph at Intercontinental

• “Coastal communities successfully evacuated massive numbers of residents prior to Hurricane Rita's arrival. The evacuation process, however, was complicated by a number of factors. First, the late change in the hurricane's course meant that many more people than necessary were evacuated. Second, further congestion was created along evacuation routes when inland counties were also put under mandatory evacuation. Third, lack of adequate traffic control in rural areas contributed to the massive traffic problems. Fourth, the vivid warnings issued by the National Weather Service and media outlets, Texas Emergency Management, and FEMA officials motivated residents to evacuate. Finally, Texans were heavily influenced by the very recent experience of Hurricane Katrina.” (Public Health Reports, 2006)

• A small follow up study indicates that 10% of evacuees from Galveston stated that they would not evacuate for the next storm due to their Rita experience (Weather and Forecasting , 2007)

Hurricane Ike, 2008

• Ike reaches peak intensity as a Category 4 on September 4, 2008 in the open Atlantic northeast of the Lesser Antilles;

• Tracks westward over Cuba, where it weakens, but remains a large system with a 600 mile diameter at one point;

• Although expected to re-intensify over the Gulf of Mexico, remains a Category 2 hurricane as it approaches Texas;

• Ike produces a 12-16’ storm surge on the Bolivar Peninsula as the storm moves ashore over the extreme eastern part of Galveston Island at 2:10 am CDT on Friday, September 13;

• Storm Surge in Galveston ranges from 10’ on the western part of the Island to 12-13’ over the more populated areas on the east;

• An estimated 13 people died on the Bolivar Peninsula and 6 persons on Galveston Island (only 2 directly due to storm surge)

Hurricane Ike, 2008

• Despite warnings of a massive surge with the storm, officials in Galveston hesitate to call for evacuation: “(Steve) LeBlanc and Lyda Ann Thomas had a difficult time making the call for evacuation. Based on the problems people had during the Rita evacuation, everyone at city hall knew it would be difficult to make people leave” (Jones & Meyers, 2010)

• City officials finally order mandatory evacuation at 9:30 am on Thursday, after calls from County Judge Jim Yarbrough and state emergency director Jack Colby;

• Mayor Thomas admits this has been “a hard call to make”:

• Approximately 1/3 of the City’s residents choose to ride out the storm on the Island.

Conclusions

• I contend that residents’ last experience with a hurricane “pre-disposes” them to take the actions they do when a system threatens;

• While studies have shown that such factors as family wishes, the means and opportunity to go somewhere, and objective factors (such as Saffir-Simpson category, surge forecasts, evacuation orders, and media reports) do influence decisions, these factors are often cited as reasons to justify a pre-existing inclination to ignore or obey official recommendations.

• So the question becomes, how can emergency planners, public officials, and the media help to influence those whose inclinations are to ignore official advisories and advice?

The Next Storm?

• I find a somewhat paradoxical attitude among Galvestonians regarding their response to the next hurricane threat;

• Most (though not all of those) who stayed for Ike say that they would never do that again;

• However, many who left express great anger at not being allowed to return home quickly after the storm and claim that they could have salvaged much of their belongings if they had. Some of these say they are never leaving again.