1

Civil  Procedure  Outline  (Short),  Sachs  Fall  2011    Goal  of  FRCP:  just,  speedy,  inexpensive  determination  of  every  action    To  get  into  fed  court  need  SMJ  +  PJ  +  venue  To  determine  if  PJ  or  venue  proper,  first  figure  out  if  consented  w/  forum  selection  clause  or  waived  objection  12(h)    SUBJECT  MATTER  JURISDICTION  –  Ability  of  court  to  hear  particular  type  of  case.  Cannot  be  waived.  Constitution  (Article  III)  +  Statute  (§1331,  1332).    Fed  courts  have  limited  SMJ.    Note  states  have  very,  very  broad  SMJ.    

1. Diversity  Jurisdiction:  The  power  of  federal  courts  to  adjudicate  disputes  between  citizens  of  different  states  if  more  than  $75,000  at  stake.    

a. Citizen  of  a  different  state  (Article  III).    Need  complete  diversity:  all  Ps  from  different  states  as  all  Ds  [Strawbridge]  

b. Amount-­‐in-­‐controversy  statutory  requirement  exceeds  $75,000  exclusive  of  interest  or  costs  (§1332).    Legal  certainty;  reasonable  to  conclude  that  P’s  injuries  would  support  recovery  of  that  amount  [Difenthal,  flight  attendant  treated  passengers  “brusquely”,  no  legal  certainty  that  facts  supported  damage  claim  of  $10k]  • P  can  aggregate  claims  against  single  D  • P  cannot  aggregate  claims  against  multiple  Ds  • Co-­‐Ps  cannot  aggregate  claims.  • Exceptions:  supplemental  jurisdiction  &  common  undivided  interest,  joint  claim  that  is  “indivisible”    

How  to  define  citizenship?  *calculate  as  of  date  action  initiated  a. Individual  –  domicile  (only  1)  =  present  +  intent  to  remain  indefinitely  b. Partnership  –  citizen  of  state  where  all  partners  domiciled  c. Corporations  –  state  of  incorporation  +  principal  place  of  business,  where  high  level  officers  direct,  

control  and  coordinate  corporation’s  activities,  nerve  center  [f  Corp.,  Breyer,  usually  the  headquarters  unless  it  is  a  mail  drop  box  or  bare  office;  must  be  single  location,  test  not  perfect  and  can  create  anomalous  results]  

d. Alien  =  domicile    

2. Federal  Question  Jurisdiction  §1331,  the  power  of  federal  courts  to  adjudicate  disputes  arising  under  the  Constitution,  laws  or  treaties  of  the  US  Constitution  defines  outer  bounds  of  jurisdiction  Congress  may  confer  upon  courts.    §1331  interpreted  more  narrowly  in  that  requires  at  least  an  essential  federal  ingredient  [Merrell  Dow,  Grable].    

a. Cause  of  action  under  which  P  sues  is  created  by  federal  law  i. Mottley  (1908)  –  P’s  original  claim  must  arise  under  a  federal  law.    P  enforcing  federal  right.    

Court  doesn’t  have  jurisdiction  just  because  federal  claim-­‐related  defense  is  anticipated.    Only  look  to  P’s  original  complaint  (no  counterclaims)  [P’s  claim  under  state  contract  law  not  federal  law;  RR  would  need  to  bring  federal  law  as  part  of  defense]  

1. Well-­‐pleaded  complaint  rule  –  fed  claim  must  appear  on  the  face  of  the  complaint  2. Holmes’s  creation  test  –  Suit  “arises  under  the  law  that  creates  the  cause  of  action.”    

Can  claim  proceed  without  reference  to  federal  law?    If  yes,  then  doesn’t  belong  in  fed  ct.  *works  for  most  cases  

3. Rationale:  easy  to  determine  jurisdiction  from  onset  b. Cause  of  action  includes  essential  federal  ingredient  

i. Grable  (2005)  –  Claim  that  doesn’t  follow  creation  test  can  be  tried  in  fed  ct.  if  there  is  (1)  essential  federal  element  embedded  in  otherwise  nonfederal  claim  (2)  federal  ingredient  must  actually  be  disputed  (3)  federal  ingredient  must  be  substantial  (4)  court  should  consider  careful  balance  b/t  state  and  fed  courts  

2

1. Serious  federal  interest  in  adjudicating  claim  2. Potential  for  disrupting  balance  b/t  state  and  fed  cts.  (federalism)  3. Impact  on  fed  dockets  4. *Goes  beyond  Holmes  but  faithful  to  Mottley  (looks  to  what  P  must  prove)  [resolution  

involves  implication  of  notice  statute  in  fed.  tax  law].        

3. Removal  –  §1441  if  P  brings  case  in  state  court,  D  can  remove  case  to  fed  ct.  so  long  as  fed  ct.  has  “original  jurisdiction”  (this  means  SMJ  must  have  existed).    Fairness  to  D.    

a. Federal  claims  –  regular  FQ  analysis  b. Non-­‐federal  claims  (state  claims)  –  need  supplemental  jurisdiction  (same  case/controversy  w/  common  

nucleus  of  operative  fact,  §1367(b)  exceptions    

• File  notice  of  removal  w/  clerk  w/in  30  days  of  service  or  30  days  after  becomes  removable  (amended  pleadings),  §1446  

• Must  move  to  fed  district  ct.  “for  district  where  action  pending”  *Venue  §1391  does  not  apply  to  removed  cases  

• All  original  Ds  must  join  in  notice  of  removal  • Exception:  §1441(b)  Forum  defendant  exception:  bars  removal  of  diversity  case  if  D  resides  in  state  

where  suit  brought.    D  doesn’t  need  to  be  protected  b/c  at  home.    Does  NOT  bar  removal  of  fed  Q  case  

• §1441(c)  motion  to  remand  must  be  w/in  30  days  of  else  waive  objections  (other  than  SMJ)    PERSONAL  JURISDICTION  –  Ability  of  court  to  exercise  authority  over  D  (require  D  to  appear  before  it  and  to  render  judgment  that  will  be  binding  on  D).    Can  be  waived.  Constitution  (DP,  notice  and  opportunity  to  be  heard  and  FF&C,  full  faith  and  credit  will  be  given  in  each  state)  +  State  statute  (long-­‐arm  statute)  +  4(k)  (notice  of  lawsuit)    *This  answer  assumes  the  state  long-­‐arm  statute  extends  to  the  limits  of  DP  with  regard  to  the  claim(s)  at  issue.    Also  assume  contacts  mentioned  are  D’s  only  contacts  w/in  forum  state.    

1. Basis  for  Personal  Jurisdiction  –  cannot  sue  people  wherever  you  feel  like  it;  need  DP  a. Domicile  b. Presence,  service  of  process  while  physically  and  voluntarily  present  in  forum  state  [Burnham  (Scalia)  

transient  presence,  father  visiting  kids  in  CA  when  served,  4-­‐4  split,  Brennan:  need  to  do  Shoe]  Note  this  is  only  for  individuals,  service  ok  but  cannot  obtain  PJ  by  serving  officer  of  corporation  (but  not  partnership)  who  happens  to  be  in  forum  state  

c. Consent:  express  (contract)  or  implied  (Hess,  PA  citizen  injured  MA  citizen  in  MA;  voluntary  act  of  driving  in  MA  implied  consent]  

d. Waiver:  failure  to  waive  w/in  specified  time  12(h)  e. Minimum  contacts:  D  must  have  sufficient  contacts  in  state  such  that  D  has  purposefully  availed  himself  

of  privilege  of  conducting  activities  in  state  and  thus  should  reasonably  anticipate  “being  haled  into  court.”    Further,  exercising  PJ  over  D  does  not  offend  traditional  notions  of  fair  play  and  justice  [Shoe,  no  offices  or  contracts  or  sale  in  WA  but  shoe  salesmen  were  continuous  and  systematic  contacts,  received  benefits/protections  of  WA  laws]  

 • D’Arcy  (1851)  –  Need  service  of  process  in  forum  state  or  voluntary  appearance  in  forum  state.  • Pennoyer  (1878)  –  Need  service  of  process  in  forum  state  or  voluntary  appearance  or  property  in  state  and  

property  attached  before  litigation  begins  (quasi  in  rem).    DP  req.  actual  notice.  • International  Shoe  (1945)  –  Need  minimum  contacts.    D  submits  to  litigation  in  forum  state  if  claim  arises  

out  of  voluntary  activities  in  forum  state.    This  is  fair  to  D  and  ok  under  DP  [no  offices  or  contracts  or  sale  in  WA  but  shoe  salesmen  were  continuous  and  systematic  contacts,  received  benefits/protections  of  WA  laws]  

 

3

Did  claim  arise  out  of  D’s  contacts  with  forum  state?    YES  –  specific  jurisdiction  (fewer  contacts  req.)  NO  –  general  jurisdiction  (many  contacts  req.)    

2. General  Personal  Jurisdiction:  If  D  has  continuous  or  systematic  contracts  with  forum  state  such  that  the  continuity  of  purposeful  contacts  w/in  forum  state  is  sufficiently  great,  can  have  PJ  even  if  claim  does  not  arise  out  of  those  contacts.    Not  unfair  or  inconvenient  to  D.    Use  for  any  claim  P  has  against  D.  

 What  continuous  and  systematic  contacts  suffice?  a. Individual  =  domicile  b. Corporation  =    (1)  place  of  incorporation  (2)  principle  place  of  business  (3)  corporate  office  w/  significant  

business  or  continued  physical  presence  [Reyes,  Hong  Kong  company  w/  office  in  CA  that  conduced  significant  business]  (4)  essentially  at  home,  rely  on  “carved  out”  test  ex.  Starbucks  in  NY,  do  everything  in  state  as  they  would  do  if  were  own  business,  buying/selling  in  state  not  enough,  need  physical  presence  [Goodyear  (2011),  Ginsburg,  no  PJ  b/c  Goodyear  not  at  home  in  NC,  attenuated  connections  to  state,  no  offices,  do  not  ship  products  or  solicit  sales]  

i. Registered  to  do  business  in  state?  ii. Physical  presence  in  state?  iii. Any  advertising  in  state  iv. Solicit  business  in  state?  v. Any  employees  in  state?  vi. Volume  of  in-­‐state  business,  relation  to  whole?  vii. If  “carve  out”  forum  market,  does  it  look  like  a  local  business?  

 • Not  necessarily  regular  contacts  [Robbins,  50  transactions  w/  MD  not  enough]  • Temporary  principle  place  of  business  ok  [Perkins,  Philippine  mining  company  temporarily  

conducting  business  in  Ohio]  • Not  necessarily  purchases  in  forum  occurring  at  regular  intervals  [Goodyear,  no  offices,  does  not  

ship  products  or  solicit  sales  in  NC;  P  should  have  argued  single  enterprise  theory]    

3. Specific  Personal  Jurisdiction:  D  has  min  contacts  with  state  (can  be  single  act  b/c  of  “quality  and  nature”  [McGee].    Claim  must  arise  out  of  D’s  min  contacts.    Exercise  of  jurisdiction  must  be  otherwise  consistent  w/  traditional  notions  of  fair  play  and  substantial  justice.    Use  for  only  claims  arising  out  of  D’s  in-­‐state  contacts.  

 Step  1:  Minimum  contacts  with  forum  state.    Contact  exists  when  D  has  purposefully  availed  himself  of  privilege  and  benefits  of  conducting  activities  in  forum  state.  

1. Purposeful  availment  –  did  D  purposefully  avail  itself  of  benefits  and  protection  of  forum’s  laws?  [Hanson]  D  purposefully  avails  self  of  opportunity  to  conduct  activities  in  forum  state  and  could  “reasonably  anticipate  being  haled  into  court  there.”    Lawsuit  cannot  be  a  surprise.    Distinguish  foreseeability  w/  purposeful  availment.  [Nicastro,  Kennedy;  if  foreseeability  sole  criterion,  then  small  farmer  in  FL  who  sells  crops  to  large  distributor  could  be  subject  to  PJ  in  Alaska]  

a. Worldwide  Volkswagen,  must  be  foreseeable  that  D  could  get  sued  in  forum,  not  that  product  could  get  there  [could  foresee  buyers  taking  cars  to  OK  (product)  but  no  PJ  b/c  had  not  purposefully  availed  of  conducting  activities  in  OK,  solicit  no  business,  sell  no  cars  there]  

b. McGee,  PJ  over  D  whose  contacts  w/  state  consist  of  only  single  act  (insurance  contract),  provided  act  is  what  gave  rise  to  claim  for  which  jurisdiction  being  sought,  and  was  deliberately  directed  toward  state  [insurance  company  (1)  solicited  business  and  (2)  CA  had  interest]  

c. Burger  King,  reaffirms  2  prongs  of  Shoe  (1)  contacts:  MI  citizen  opened  BK  franchise  in  MI,  had  purposeful  contact  with  BK  headquarters  in  FL,  (2)  fairness:  burden  on  D  to  show  forum  so  gravely  inconvenient,  PJ  in  FL  ok  

4

d. Calder,  if  D  acts  outside  state  that  knows  will  cause  harmful  effects  w/in  state,  subject  to  min  contacts  w/in  state  [FL  publication  published  story  about  CA  entertainer,  knew  she  lived  in  CA,  knew  would  cause  harmful  effects  in  state,  PJ]  

2. Initiate  –  Did  D  initiate  contact  w/  forum  state  3. Stream  of  commerce  –  if  D  puts  products  in  stream  of  commerce,  is  he  purposefully  availing  himself  

to  whichever  state  products  end  up?  Asahi  does  not  resolve  this  (4-­‐4  split)  a. Brennan:  good  enough,  D  benefits  from  sales  in  other  states  regardless  of  how  products  

get  there,  reasonable  anticipation  REJECTED  b. O’Conner:  not  enough,  also  D  must  also  clearly  seek  market  there  (intent  to  serve  state)  

 4. Stream  of  commerce+  Target  state  (advertising,  marketing,  serving  business  in  forum  state)  

[Nicastro  (2011),  machinist’s  fingers  severed,  no  PJ  over  foreign  D  although  product  in  “stream  of  commerce”  b/c  D  did  not  purposefully  avail  himself  of  NJ  /  did  not  directly  target  NJ]  (4-­‐2-­‐3  split)  

• Kennedy:  Stream  of  commerce  +  target  specific  state.    No  PJ  b/c  need  conduct  purposefully  directed  (emphasis)  at  (targeted)  at  forum  state  (not  natl  market).    Not  enough  might  have  foreseen  goods  might  reach  forum.    D  did  not  target  NJ,  no  offices  there,  no  direct  sales  there,  no  ads.  *notes  there  may  be  exceptions  for  intentional  torts  

• Breyer:  Stream  of  commerce  +  isolated  sale  +  something  more  or  regular  flow  of  merchandise.    No  PJ  b/c  had  isolated  sale  but  not  something  more  i.e.  no  intention,  explicit  desire  to  sell  in  NJ  (advertising,  state-­‐related  design,  advice).    No  regular  flow  of  merchandise  (only  4  machines).    Suggests  that  size  of  company  might  make  a  difference  [Appalachian  potter  v.  large  corporate  D]  

• Ginsburg:  Contact  made/sold.    Yes  PJ  b/c  D  targeted  /  purposefully  availed  themselves  of  US  natl  market  (attendance  at  conventions,  derived  substantial  revenue).    Fairness  and  justice  req.  large  companies  to  defend  at  place  where  products  cause  injury.    DP,  not  state  sovereignty,  at  issue  in  determining  PJ.    Natl  contacts  are  increasingly  common,  PJ  ok.  

5. If  internet  involved:  a. Zippo  test  –  translate  virtual  contacts  into  contracts  framework,  sliding  scale  (dated)  (1)  

Passive,  merely  allow  to  post  information  (no  PJ)  (2)  some  interactivity  (no  PJ)  (3)  active,  interactive  elements  that  allow  owners  to  “engage…  with  forum  residents  over  the  internet”  i.e.  advertising  (yes  PJ)  BUY/SELL  

i. Provides  little  guidance,  no  limit  to  jurisdiction  (active  websites  subject  to  PJ  everywhere)  

b. Calder  effects  test  –  intentional  targeting  of  wrongful  conduct  toward  forum  resident  supports  PJ  [PJ  over  FL  publisher  for  publishing  defamation  article  expressly  aimed  at  celebrity  in  CA,  knew  “brunt  of  the  injury  would  be  felt”  by  P  in  CA]  

i. (1)  where  is  server  based?  (2)  who  is  it  marketed  towards?  (3)  where  does  it  draw  its  sources?  (4)  ties  to  forum  state  

 D  argue  –  PJ  min  contacts  analysis  qualitative,  not  quantitative,  and  “quality”  of  these  sporadic  (too  isolated  or  casual)  contacts  will  probably  be  too  low  to  establish  PJ  

 Step  2:  Claim  arises  out  of  these  contacts  Step  3:  Fair  and  reasonable,  does  not  offend  “traditional  notions  of  fair  play  and  substantial  justice.”    Consider  (1)  burden/inconvenience  on  D  (2)  forum  state’s  interest  (3)  P’s  interest  in  obtaining  relief  (4)  efficient  resolution  of  controversies  (witnesses,  evidence  etc.)  (5)  shared  interest  in  substantive  policy  (fundamental  social  policies  ex.  interest  in  family  harmony).  [Burger  King]  

a. McGee  (1957),  increased  transportation/communication  has  reduced  inconvenience  of  D  defending  action  in  another  state]  

b. Note  when  min  contacts  in  forum  state,  hard  to  prove  unreasonable  to  subject  D  to  PJ  in  forum  state.    D  needs  to  make  “compelling  case”  that  other  considerations  make  exercise  of  PJ  unreasonable.  

 

5

2. Challenging  PJ  a. Direct  attack:  challenges  to  PJ  in  ct.  where  lawsuit  filed  

i. Special  appearance  –  D  appears  in  court  where  original  action  brought  w/  purpose  of  questioning  PJ.    D  waives  objection  if  raises  any  issues  other  than  PJ.  

ii. 12(b)(2)  –  D  may  appear  before  answering  merits  of  complaint  and  object  to  PJ;  may  raise  other  issues  w/o  waiving  objection  to  PJ  (more  liberal)  

1. Either  approach:  objection  must  be  made  immediately  or  else  lost  b. Collateral  attack:  challenges  to  PJ  in  enforcing  court  (risky,  only  makes  sense  when  D  has  no  defense)  

i. D  fails  to  appear  in  court  where  P  filed  initial  suit;  default  judgment  against  D.    P  take  judgment  state  where  D  lives  or  has  assets  and  asks  court  to  enforce  judgment  under  Full  Faith  &  Credit  clause;  “judgment  on  the  judgment.”    D  appears  in  enforcing  court  and  contents  that  original  court’s  judgment  was  invalid  for  lack  of  PJ  and  should  not  be  enforced.  

 3. In  Rem  and  Quasi  in  Rem  Jurisdiction  –  jurisdiction  over  property  w/in  state  if  property  seized  through  

attachment  a. In  rem  –  over  property,  as  against  all  possible  claimants  known  and  unknown.    PJ  over  property,  not  

necessarily  all  claimants  ex.  clear  title  to  real  property,  probate  proceeding  to  settle  estate  b. Quasi  in  rem  (type  I)  –  about  who  owns  property  ex.  disputes  over  property  title  c. Quasi  in  rem  (type  II)  –  know  who  owns  it,  about  some  other  claim.    Purpose  not  to  resolve  conflicting  

claims  over  property.  Need  attachment  (property  as  hostage)  i. Pennoyer  (1878)  –  court  has  authority  to  exercise  in  rem  /  quasi  in  rem  jurisdiction  if  asset  at  

issue  is  w/in  state  and  asset  attached  at  outset  of  case  ii. Harris  (1905)  –  quasi  in  rem  attachment  of  intangible  asset,  expansion  beyond  traditional  roots  

which  involved  physical  control  of  asset  [X  owed  Y  who  owed  Z,  attachment  of  X’s  debt  to  Z  appropriate  through  service  in  MD]  

iii. Shaffer  (1977)  –  quasi  in  rem  of  property  merely  “elliptical  way”  of  asserting  PJ  over  Ds.    Seizing  property  at  outset  not  enough  [Pennoyer],  need  min  contacts  under  Shoe  [derivative  suit  w/  attachment  of  DE  common  stock;  corporate  officers  had  no  contacts,  ties  or  relations  to  DE;  dissent:  officers  voluntarily  associated  themselves  w/  DE  and  purposefully  availed  of  benefits  of  DE  law]  

 4. Service  of  Process  –  Establishes  PJ  over  D  and  notifies  D  of  case  gives  opportunity  for  D  to  appear  and  defend,  

Rule  4.    Can  be  waived.    *Need  service  of  process  for  PJ  but  can  service  without  PJ.    Analyze  separately!!  

 a. Need  “notice  reasonably  calculated  under  the  circumstances”  [Mullane]  b. Need  to  serve  all  Ds  c. Must  take  reasonable  steps  in  attempt  to  provide  notice,  if  practicable  to  do  so.    If  aware  D  did  no  get  

service,  may  need  to  try  other  steps.  [Flowers,  house  taken,  maybe  constructive  service  but  no  actual  notice]  • Summons  and  complaint  • W/in  120  days  after  complaint  filed  • By  non-­‐party,  18+  

 d. 4(e)  Serving  individual  –  (1)  state  law  (2)  personal  service  (3)  leave  at  house  w/  person  of  suitable  age  

and  discretion  who  also  lives  there  (4)  authorized  agent.    Exceptions:  minor/incompetent  person,  state  law  only.  

e. 4(h)  Serving  corporation,  partnership  –  (1)  state  law  (2)  personal  service  to  officer,  managing  or  general  agent,  or  other  authorized  agent  

f. Waiver  of  service  –  less  expensive,  gives  D  60  days  to  respond.    If  D  does  not  return  waiver  then  must  pay  all  costs  of  formal  service,  including  attorneys’  fees  

 

6

 VENUE  –  §1391,  geographic  limitation  that  ensures  court  is  convenient  and  has  connection  to  one  or  more  of  the  litigants.    Not  constitutionally  constructed.    Purpose  is  preventing  case  from  proceeding  in  ct.  that  has  nothing  to  do  w/  case  but  might  have  SMJ  and/or  PJ,  judicial  efficiency,  limit  forum-­‐shopping.    Can  be  waived.    Can  also  consent  before  case  filed  (forum  selection  clause).  *Several  venues  might  be  proper.    

1. 1391(a)  –  Jurisdiction  based  on  diversity  alone,  case  may  brought  in  judicial  district  where:  a. Any  D  resides,  if  all  Ds  reside  in  same  state  (residence  ≠  domicile)  b. Substantial  part  of  events/omissions  giving  rise  to  claim  occurred,  or  substantial  part  of  property  that  is  

subject  to  action  is  situated,  or  c. Fallback  provision  –  if  no  proper  venue  (only),  where  any  D  subject  to  PJ  at  time  action  commenced  

 2. 1391(b)  –  Jurisdiction  NOT  based  on  diversity  alone,  case  may  be  brought  in  judicial  district  where:  

a. Any  D  resides,  if  all  Ds  reside  in  same  state  ex.  both  Ds  live  in  TX;  N.D.  TX  and  E.D.  TX.  then  can  sue  both  in  N.D.  or  E.D.  

b. Substantial  part  of  events/omissions  giving  rise  to  claim  occurred,  or  substantial  part  of  property  that  is  subject  to  action  is  situated,  or  

c. Fallback  provision  –  if  no  proper  venue  (only),  where  any  D  may  be  found    

3. 1391(c)  definition  of  resident  a. Individual  =  domicile  b. Partnership  =  same  as  corporations  c. Corporations  =  any  judicial  district  where  subject  to  PJ  were  that  district  a  separate  state  d. Alien  =  any  state  

 Substantial  part  

• Narrow  =  “a  point  of  dispute  b/t  parties”  • Broad  =  any  event  that  was  part  of  sequence  of  events  that  gave  rise  to  case  [Uffner,  1st  Cir.,  yacht  sank  

off  cost  of  PR,  contract  signed  in  GA,  venue  ok  in  PR  b/c  boat  sinking  was  part  of  sequence]    

4. Challenges  to  venue    Determine  whether  venue  proper.    If  YES,  then  §1404.    If  NO,  then  §1406.    Courts  can  transfer/dismiss  without  SMJ/PJ.  

  Case  filed  in  the  wrong  venue   Case  filed  in  the  correct  venue  Motions  to  transfer   §1406   §1404  Motions  to  dismiss   §1406  and  12(b)(3)   Forum  non  conveniens  (common  

law)    *Choice  of  law:  law  of  transferring  state  applies  unless  venue  improper,  in  which  case  receiving  court  applies  own  laws    

c. §1406  transfer/dismissal:  If  wrongly  filed,  can  dismiss  12(b)(3)  or  transfer  in  interest  of  justice  to  any  other  district  where  case  could  have  been  commenced  or  initiated  (need  SMJ/PJ  and  venue  without  waiver!!)    

d. §1404  transfer:  If  correctly  filed,  for  convenience  and  in  interest  of  justice,  can  transfer  to  any  other  district  where  case  could  have  been  commenced  or  initiated.    Balance  private  and  public  interest  factors.    Typically  honor  P’s  choice  of  forum  unless  other  factors  clearly  favor  transfer.  [MacMunn,  case  transferred  to  MA  b/c  majority  of  witnesses,  medical  records  and  MA  interest  favored  MA]  

 

7

e. Forum  non  conveniens:  If  correctly  filed,  can  dismiss  for  inconvenience  but  only  when  alternative  forum  exists  and  D  waives  SOL  defense.    Permissible  even  when  law  of  foreign  forum  would  likely  give  P  less  desirable  remedy  than  P  could  get  in  fed  ct.  [Piper  Aircraft,  crash  in  Scotland  but  decedents  sued  in  US  b/c  law  more  favorable,  dismissed].    More  reluctant  to  grant  than  §1404  transfer  b/c  hard  on  Ps  (SOL).    Balance  private  and  public  interest  factors.  

 Private  interest  factors:  (1)  D’s  choice  of  forum  (2)  P’s  choice  of  forum  *typically  given  substantial  weight  (3)  whether  claim  arose  elsewhere  (4)  convenience  of  parties  (5)  convenience  of  witnesses  (6)  ease  of  access  to  sources  of  proof    Public  interest  factors:  (1)  transferee’s  familiarity  w/  governing  laws  (2)  relative  congestion  of  courts  (3)  local  interest  in  deciding  local  controversies  at  home  

 PLEADING    

1. Complaint    *each  new  complaint  starts  cycle  anew  –  if  amendment  allowed,  opposing  party  has  same  right  to  respond  to  amended  pleading  as  original  pleading  (14  days)    

a. 8(a)  includes  jurisdictional  statement  (refers  to  SMJ),  relief  sought,  short  and  plain  statement  of  claim  b. 8(b)  can  state  alternate/inconsistent/contradictory  claims  c. 9(b)  heightened  pleading  for  fraud/mistake,  state  w/  particularity  d. 11  –  reasonable  inquiry  under  the  circumstances;  all  papers  signed  by  attorney;  sanctions  for  frivolous  

arguments,  harassment,  or  lack  of  factual  investigation  

2. Pleading  standard  Liberal  pleading  approach  (adopted  as  part  of  shift  from  code  pleading/common  law  pleading  to  notice  pleading,  consistent  with  liberal  threshold  in  determining  12(b)(6))  

a. Purpose  –  to  set  forth  claim  and  give  fair  notice  b. Form  11  –  On  date  at  place,  D  negligently  drove  motor  vehicle  against  P.    P  injured.  c. Conley  (1957)  –  cannot  dismiss  unless  appears  beyond  doubt  that  P  could  prove  no  set  of  facts  in  

support  of  claim  which  would  entitle  him  to  relief  d. Smith  (2005)  –  application  of  Conley,  P  does  not  need  to  allege  facts  corresponding  to  each  element;  

court  can  infer  from  facts  that  elements  are  satisfied,  even  if  not  explicit  in  complaint  e. Leatherman  (1993)  –  rejected  heightened  pleading  standards  that  are  not  explicitly  required  by  FRCP  

[heightened  pleading  not  req.  for  civil  rights  cases  alleging  municipal  liability  under  fed  statute,  suggests  discovery/MSJ  should  be  used  to  weed  out  unmeritorious  claims]    

Twombly/Iqbal  –  shift  to  fact  pleading;  to  survive  12(b)(6)  must  cross  line  from  conceivable  to  plausible  f. Twombly  (2007)  –  rejects  Conley,  req.  fact  pleading;  need  factual  allegations  that  plausibly  (not  

conceivably)  state  claim  for  relief,  no  legal  conclusions,  “requires  more  than  labels  and  conclusions,  and  a  formalistic  recitation  of  the  elements  of  a  cause  of  action  will  not  do.    Factual  allegations  must  be  enough  to  raise  a  right  to  relief  above  the  speculative  level,  on  the  assumption  that  all  allegations  in  the  complaint  are  true”  [class  action  alleging  baby  bell’s  parallel  conduct  inferred  agreement  violating  Sherman  Act,  could  be  consistent  with  common  business  strategies,  complaint  dismissed]  

i. Note  similarity  to  11(b)(3)  req.  facts  have  evidentiary  support  or  will  after  discovery  ≠  8(b)  ii. Confusion  re:  Rule  8,  Leatherman  heightened  pleading  

g. Iqbal  (2009)  –  applies  Twombly  to  all  civil  actions  [Muslim  detained/beaten  in  prison;  alleges  detention  policies  were  racial  discrimination;  pleaded  conclusions  that  Ashcroft  and  Mueller  knew  and  willfully/maliciously  condoned  policy,  facts  did  not  “plausibly”  lead  to  this  conclusion;  dismissed]  

h. Pros:  helps  control  cost  of  discovery,  return  to  practical  

8

i. Cons:  difficult  to  make  non-­‐conclusory  plausible  allegations  before  discovery,  relies  on  judicial  expertise,  judgment  close  to  deciding  facts  that  jury  would  decide  

j. Takeaways:  • Subtract  out  conclusory  (conclusions  of  law,  court  will  ignore)  *innovation  • Assume  well-­‐pleaded  facts  (non-­‐conclusory)  as  true  • Draw  all  plausible  (reasonable)  inferences  for  P  *ct  will  use  own  experience/common  sense  to  

determine  plausibility,  allows  great  discretion  • Once  draw  reasonable  inferences,  are  all  elements  either  (a)  pleaded  or  (b)  inferred?  

 3. Answer  –  allows  parties  to  focus  on  what  is  actually  in  dispute  

a. 21  days  after  complaint  or  14  days  after  pre-­‐answer  motion  denied  b. Assert  unwaived  defenses  c. Admit/deny/lack  knowledge  or  info  sufficient  to  form  a  belief  (failure  to  deny  =  admission)  d. Raise  affirmative  defenses  8(c);  same  pleading  req.  as  complaint;  do  not  waive  if  not  raised  in  timely  

manner  b/c  can  typically  amend  to  include  more  ADs  as  long  as  no  unfair  surprise  [Ingraham]  e. Assert  counter/crossclaim  

 4. Pre-­‐Answer  Motions  12  

a. MTD  12(b);  (1)  lack  of  SMJ  (2)  lack  of  PJ  (3)  improper  venue  (4)  insufficient  process  (5)  insufficient  service  of  process  (6)  failure  to  state  a  claim  upon  which  relief  can  be  granted  (7)  failure  to  join  party  under  19  

i. 12(b)6)  tests  legal  validity  of  P’s  allegations  (not  factual  disputes);  rely  on  complaint,  answer,  and  reply  (if  any);  take  well-­‐pleaded  facts  as  true  

1. Failure  to  plead  enough  facts  to  meet  Twombly/Iqbal  2. Even  if  all  facts  are  true,  no  law  permitting  recovery  3. P  pleads  herself  out  of  court  (fatal  fact,  establishes  affirmative  defense)  

b. Motion  for  judgment  on  pleadings  12(c)  *same  standard  as  12(b)(6)  i. (1)  D  has  AD  in  answer  that  is  un-­‐rebuttable  (2)  D’s  only  AD  destroyed  by  some  element  of  the  

pleading  c. 12(d)  –  12(b)(6)  or  12(c)  +  evidence  outside  pleadings  =  MSJ,  apply  standard  no  genuine  issue  of  

material  fact  d. Motion  for  more  definite  statement  12(e)  –  so  vague  or  ambiguous,  D  must  request  defects  complained  

of  and  details  desired  [Matos,  need  not  be  literary  gem]  e. Motion  to  strike  12(f)  –  insufficient  defense  or  any  redundant,  immaterial,  impertinent,  or  scandalous  

matter;  needs  to  prejudice  D  i. P’s  version  of  12(6)(b);  P  has  same  opportunity  to  challenge  legal  sufficiency  of  D’s  

answer/affirmative  defenses  [Reis  Robatics]  f. Omnibus  motion  rule  12(g)  –  if  party  files  pre-­‐answer  motion,  cannot  make  another  12  motion  based  on  

defenses  or  objections  that  were  available  when  filed  pre-­‐answer  motion  g. Waiver  trap  12(h)  –  if  do  not  object  to  12(b)(2)-­‐(5)  defenses,  then  waive  

i. *Must  consolidate  all  12(b)(2)-­‐(5)  defenses  into  one  motion  or  if  no  motion,  answer  (lack  of  PJ,  improper  venue,  insufficient  process,  insufficient  service  of  process)  

ii. *Can  assert  other  3  defenses  later  in  litig.  (until  trial  for  6,  7)  iii. If  any  4  defenses  omitted,  they  are  waived  

 12(b)  motion  to  dismiss   Can  raise  1-­‐7  Answer   Can  raise  1,  6,  7  and  2-­‐5  [unless  waived  from  

earlier  motion]  12(c)  motion  for  judgment  on  pleadings  

Can  raise  1,  6,  7  and  2-­‐5  [2nd  time  only]  

Trial   1,  6,  7  and  2-­‐5  [2nd  time  only]    

9

5. Amending  Pleadings  15  a. Amendments  before  trial  15(a)  

i. Amendments  as  matter  of  right  15(a)(1)  1. May  amend  original  pleadings  only  once  w/o  leave  of  court  w/in  21  days  after  service  

or  2. If  original  pleading  one  to  which  responsive  pleading  (answer)  required,  party  may  

amend  original  pleading  w/in  21  days  after  service  of  responsive  pleading  or  within  21  days  after  MTD,  motion  for  more  definite  statement,  motion  to  strike,  whichever  earlier    

ii. Amendments  by  leave  of  court  15(a)(2)  –  discretionary,  “freely  give  leave  when  justice  so  requires”;  factors:  

1. (1)  bad  faith  (2)  reasons  for  amending  (3)  undue  delay  (4)  number  of  prior  amendments  (5)  futility  of  amendment  (6)  preparation  prejudice  to  other  party  [Beeck,  counterfeit  waterslide,  D  filed  for  leave  to  amend  complaint,  court  granted  for  factors]  

2. Types  of  prejudice:  (1)  preparation  (2)  merits  (3)  futility  3. Rationale:  narrow  issues  for  discovery,  discovery  hasn’t  happened  yet  so  this  doesn’t  

waste  $  b. Amendments  during/after  trial  15(b)  –  discretionary,  factors  (1)  stage  of  litigation  (2)  reason  for  

amending  (3)  visibility  of  amended  claim/defense  (4)  reason  for  not  included  in  original  pleading  c. Amendments  after  SOL  run  15(c)  –  if  claim  in  amendment  after  relevant  SOL  has  run,  amendment  time-­‐

barred  unless  claim  in  amendment  relates  back  to  date  of  original  complaint  i. Amendment  to  claims,  relate  back  =  new  claim  arises  out  of  same  conduct,  transaction  or  

occurrence  set  out  in  original  pleading.    Original  complaint  needs  to  give  D  notice  of  claims  now  being  asserted  [Moore,  P  wanted  to  amend  complaint  w/  new  claim  of  negligence;  denied  b/c  no  references  in  original  complaint  focused  on  acts  before  surgery  and  new  claim  focuses  on  acts  during/after  surgery]  

ii. Amendment  to  parties,  claim  arises  out  of  same  conduct/transaction/occurrence  set  out  in  original  pleading,  party  received  notice  w/in  20  days  or  knew/should  have  known,  usually  for  misnomers  but  circuit  split  on  John  Does  

 6. Default  Judgment  55,  P  fails  to  respond  to  pleading  w/in  time  designated  for  response.    P  in  default  and  subject  

to  entry  of  default  judgment.    a. P  moves  for  entry  of  default,  clerk  files  entry  of  default.    Default  =  failure  to  appear,  plead  w/in  set  of  

time.    D  admits  to  facts  in  complaint  b. P  moves  for  default  judgment.    Court  still  needs  to  determine  whether  jurisdiction,  service  properly  

made,  facts  in  complaint  state  claim  of  action  and  that  relief  est.  by  evidentiary  hearing,  accounting  or  other  investigation  [Lacey,  illegal  downloads,  default  judgment  b/c  complaint  stated  claim  of  action  and  did  not  need  evidentiary  hearing  for  req.  of  min.  statutory  damages]  

c. Note,  disfavored  by  court;  discretionary;  fear  unfair  to  D      

JOINDER,  policy  rationale:  judicial  economy,  efficiency  *Assume  court  has  SMJ  over  case  and  PJ  over  defendants,  parties  may  join…    Capacity  to  sue  –  action  must  be  prosecuted  by  real  party  in  interest  (person  harmed),  17    Analyze  all  new  state  claims  under  either:  (1)  diversity  –  complete  diversity  +  $75k  or  (2)  supplemental  jurisdiction  –  same  case/controversy  (nucleus  of  operative  fact)  +  exceptions  +  discretion    

1. Joinder  of  Claims  18  –  Bringing  several  legal  claims  against  same  party  together,  liberal  approach  for  judicial  economy,  efficiency,  settlement  and  issue  preclusion.    Needs  to  satisfy  SMJ  requirements  (DJ  or  FQ,  if  no  then  supplemental  jurisdiction?)  

10

a. 18(a)  Party  asserting  claim,  counterclaim,  crossclaim,  or  third-­‐party  claim  may  join,  as  independent  or  alternative  claims,  as  many  claims  as  it  has  against  opposing  party  

b. 18(b)  This  is  ok  even  if  claims  arise  out  of  completely  unrelated  events  (contingent  claims)    

2. Joinder  of  Parties  20  –  Bringing  legal  claims  against  several  parties  together  a. 20(a)(1)  for  P  and  20(a)(2)  for  D  –  P  (or  D)  can  sue  together  (not  required  to  and  can  sue  for  different  

relief)  if:  i. Assert  claims  that  arise  out  of  same  transaction/occurrence  and  ii. Claims  involve  any  common  questions  of  law  or  fact  to  all  Ps  (or  Ds)  

b. 42(b)  court  may  order  separate  trials  to  prevent  delay/prejudice  c. 21  –  Misjoinder  not  grounds  for  dismissing  but  can  sever  claims  or  add/drop  parties  [Holbein,  denied  

motion  to  sever  b/c  claims  against  Ds  arose  from  same  transactions/occurrences  and  involved  same  questions  of  law/fact,  P  injured  by  same  general  policy,  important  to  weigh  burden  on  D  v.  judicial  economy]    

3. Counterclaims  13  –  vs.  opposing  party;  encourages  efficient  resolution  of  all  issues  related  to  same  transaction/occurrence  *invoke  §1367  if  claim  won’t  stand  alone  

a. 13(a)  compulsory  counterclaims  –  arises  out  of  same  transaction/occurrence  that  is  subject  matter  of  opposing  party’s  claim  and  does  not  require  adding  another  party  over  whom  court  cannot  acquire  jurisdiction  and  when  action  commenced  compulsive  counterclaim  was  not  subject  matter  of  another  pending  action  

i. Use  it  or  lose  it  (waive);  claim  preclusion  ii. Logical  relationship  test  for  determining  same  transaction/occurrence  *narrower  than  t/o  test  

1. Are  issue  of  fact/law  raised  in  claim/counterclaim  largely  the  same?  2. Would  issue  preclusion  bar  subsequent  on  party’s  counterclaim,  absent  compulsive  

counterclaim  rule?  3. Same  evidence,  witnesses  to  support/refute  claim  and  counterclaim?  4. Logical  relationship  b/t  claim  and  counterclaim?  5. *Focus  on  underlying  events  giving  rise  to  litig.  

b. 13(b)  permissive  counterclaims  –  whatever  party  wants,  everything  else  *need  independent  basis  for  jurisdiction  (SMJ  or  DJ)  

c. If  counter/crossclaim  then  other  party  MUST  assert  compulsory  counterclaims      *Can  13(a)  crossclaim  or  implead  (14)  and  then  add  additional  claims  18(a).    If  additional  claims  are  state  claims,  need  supplemental  jurisdiction  i.e.  additional  claims  need  to  be  part  of  same  case/controversy  under  Article  III  (Gibbs  standard,  same  case/controversy,  common  nucleus  of  operative  fact).  

   

4. Crossclaims  13  –  vs.  party  on  your  side  *invoke  §1367  if  claim  won’t  stand  alone  a. 13(g)  may  assert  crossclaims  against  co-­‐party  arising  from  same  transaction/occurrence  that  is  subject  

matter  of  original  action  or  counterclaim  or  claim  relates  to  any  property  that  is  subject  matter  of  original  action    

5. Impleader  14  –  D  can  assert  claim  against  non-­‐party  who  may  be  liable  to  D  (contribution  for  some  damages,  indemnification  for  all  damages)  *invoke  SJ  if  claim  won’t  stand  alone  

a. Can  implead  non-­‐party  who  is/may  be  liable  for  all  of  part  of  the  claim  b. 14  days  after  answer,  or  else  motion  c. P  cannot  implead  alternative  target  for  P  or  seek  damages  that  D  may  have  suffered  from  underlying  

issue  d. 4  factors:  (1)  timeliness  of  motion  (2)  potential  for  complication  of  issues  at  trial  (3)  probability  of  trial  

delay  (4)  whether  P  may  be  prejudiced  by  addition  of  parties  [Erkins,  Case  sought  to  implead  Fitzpatrick,  ok  b/c  claim  arose  out  of  “all  or  part  of  claim”  and  satisfied  4  factors]  

11

e. Third  party  P  =  party  asserting  impleader  claim;  third  party  D  =  party  brought  in;  third  party  complaint  =  impleader  complaint  

f. Original  P  options:  i. 14(a)  may  assert  claims  against  third  party  D  that  arise  out  of  same  transaction/occurrence.    

Then  third  party  D  can  respond  w/  defenses,  counterclaim  or  crossclaims  g. Third  party  P  options:  

i. Join  other  claims  against  third  party  D  h. Third  party  D  options:  

i. May/must  assert  counterclaims  against  third  party  P  ii. May  assert  claims  against  original  P  arising  out  of  same  transaction/occurrence  iii. May  assert  defenses  to  original  P’s  claim  iv. May  implead  new  parties  v. Must  assert  defenses  under  Rule  12  

i. Third  parties  need  PJ  and  SMJ!!    Third  party  doesn’t  need  proper  venue    

*Impleader  (14)  claims  are  contingent  on  original  claims  against  D.    If  original  claim  is  wiped  out  then  impleader  claim  gone  too.    6. Required  Joinder  19  *joint  tortfeasors  never  required  

a. Step  1:  Is  absentee  required  (indispensible)  party?  i. Court  cannot  accord  complete  relief  among  existing  parties  w/  person’s  absence,  or  ii. Absentee  claims  interest  relating  to  subject  of  action  w/  conditions  that  might:  

• Impair/impede  person’s  ability  to  protect  that  interest  or  • Create  double  obligations  

b. Step  2:  Is  joinder  feasible?  i. If  feasible,  must  join  ii. Infeasible  if:  

1. Absentee  not  subject  to  PJ  where  suit  brought  2. Joinder  of  absentee  will  destroy  complete  diversity  (negates  SMJ)  3. Joinder  of  absentee  makes  venue  improper  (if  absentee  from  different  state  than  D)  

c. Step  3:  If  not  feasible,  decide  whether  to  continue  or  dismiss,  12(b)(7)?  Factors  in  19(b):  i. Risk  of  prejudice  to  absentee  or  other  parties  if  case  goes  forward  ii. Ways  to  lessen  such  prejudice  by  fashioning  judgment  iii. Whether  judgment  rendered  in  person’s  absence  will  be  adequate  iv. Whether  P  will  have  adequate  remedy  if  action  is  dismissed  for  nonjoiner  (most  weight,  should  

not  dismiss  unless  alternative  forum)  v. *Court  can  also  limit  scope  of  judgment  in  order  to  prevent  dismissal  but  satisfy  4  factors  

[Torrington,  MTD  for  failure  to  join,  employer  was  required  party,  not  feasible  to  join  (would  destroy  DJ),  should  be  dismissed  b/c  failed  to  satisfy  4  requirements]  

 7. Intervention  24  –  party  “stranger  to  suit”  but  resolution  of  case  likely  has  significant  practical  effect  on  non-­‐party  

[Ford  Motor,  railroad  tracks  critical  to  operation].    Broader  than  20.    Need  PJ!  *can  intervene  as  P  or  D,  can  block  settlement  

a. Timely  motion  to  intervene,  factors  (1)  stage  of  lawsuit  (2)  purpose  of  intervention  (3)  when  you  knew  (4)  prejudice  to  original  parties  

b. 24(a)  intervenors  of  right  (court  must  let  intervene)  i. Fed  statute  or  ii. Applicant  has  interest  in  transaction  or  property  +  disposition  will  impair  his  interest  –  no  

existing  party  can  adequately  represent  interest  c. 24(b)  permissive  intervenors  (court  may  let  intervene)  

i. Fed  statute  ii. Claim/defense  that  shares  w/  main  action  a  common  question  of  law/fact  (broad  standard)  iii. Only  if  participation  will  not  unduly  delay  or  prejudice  adjudication  of  original  parties’  rights  

12

iv. *Ct  can  grant  limited  purpose  intervention  for  limited  purposes,  ex.  contesting  scope  of  protective  order  and  confidentiality  agreements  

 8. Interpleader  22,  §1335  –  protect  persons  in  possession  of  property  or  money  (stakeholders)  the  ownership  of  

which  may  be  claimed  by  more  than  one  party;  allows  stakeholder  to  force  adverse  claimants  to  property  to  litigate  ownership  in  single  proceeding  *usually  insurance  cases  

a. Action  brought  by  stakeholder  (P)  naming  contending  claimants  to  property  as  Ds.    Ds  then  file  crossclaims  against  each  other  to  figure  out  who  gets  property.  

b. Ds  will  then  file  crossclaims  13(g)  c. Situation  where  stakeholder  is  facing  double  litigation  and  potentially  paying  twice.    Explicitly  authorizes  

injunctions  against  other  actions  [Pimentel,  Merrill  Lynch  filed  interpleader  action  under  §1335  to  figure  out  who  entitled  to  Philippine  assets;  Republic  and  Commissioner  could  not  be  joined  b/c  sovereign  immunity,  court  dismisses  after  weighing  4  factors]  

 Issue   Federal  interpleader  statute  

(§1335)  *more  expansive  Rule  interpleader  (22)  

Subject  matter  jurisdiction     (Traditional  DJ)  Diversity   Minimum  diversity,  determined  by  

claimants  (at  least  2  claimants  diverse)  (§1335)  

Complete  diversity,  stakeholder  on  one  side  and  claimants  on  other  (§1332)  

Amount   $500+  in  controversy  (§1335)   $75,000+  (§1332)  Personal  jurisdiction   Nationwide  service  of  process  

(nationwide  PJ,  don’t  need  min  contacts)  (§2361)  

Traditional  PJ  (need  PJ  over  all  claimants);  service  under  4  

Venue   Judicial  district  where  one  or  more  claimants  resides  (§1397)  

Judicial  district  where  any  claimant  resides  (if  all  from  one  state);  district  where  property  is,  district  where  any  other  claimant  found  if  no  other  basis  for  venue  (§1391)  

How  to  invoke   P  posts  a  bond  w/  court  to  cover  value  of  controverted  property  

P  deposits  controverted  property  w/  court  

   

9. Supplemental  Jurisdiction  §1367  –  related  state  law  claims  in  fed  ct;  needs  to  be  within  Article  III  and  statutory  authority  (§1367)  

a. Gibbs  (1966)  –  Article  III  grants  jurisdiction  over  cases  ≠  claims;  fed  ct  can  exercise  jurisdiction  over  state  claims  when  state/fed  claims  derive  from  same  common  nucleus  of  operative  fact;  need  federal  hook  

i. Should  fed  ct  still  hear?  Factors:  (1)  judicial  economy,  convenience,  fairness  (2)  novel,  important  state  question  (3)  state  issues  predominate  (4)  federal  claim  drops  out  early  (5)  likelihood  of  jury  confusion  

b. Kroger  –  fed  cts  should  not  hear  claims  by  Ps  against  3rd  party  Ds  in  diversity  cases  if  inconsistent  w/  Strawbridge,  §1367(b)    

c. §1367(a)  if  district  ct  has  original  jurisdiction,  then  has  supplemental  jurisdiction  over  related  claims  that  are  part  of  same  case  or  controversy  under  Article  III  (Gibbs  standard,  common  nucleus  of  operative  fact)  

d. 1367(b)  narrows,  in  diversity  cases  only  ct  will  not  have  supplemental  jurisdiction  in  diversity  actions  where  state-­‐based  claims  are  made  by  original  P  against  persons  made  parties  under  14,  19,  20,  24;  or  state-­‐based  claims  by  parties  joined  under  19,  24  where  break  complete  diversity  

e. 1367(c)  Gibbs  discretionary  factors,  can  decline  if:  i. Claim  raises  novel/complex  issues  of  state  law  ii. Claim  substantially  predominates  over  other  claims  

13

iii. District  court  has  dismissed  all  claims  over  which  has  original  jurisdiction  (and  only  state  claim  remains)  

iv. Other  compelling  reasons  (exceptional  circumstances)                  First,  does  court  have  original  jurisdiction.  Then,  is  there  independent  SMJ  over  second  claim  (DJ/FQ)?    No,  then:  

           CLASS  ACTIONS  –  One  or  more  class  members  litigate  actions  on  behalf  of  class  of  persons  w/  similar  interests.    Reduces  cost  of  litigation  and  makes  lawsuit  financially  viable  (not  negative  value  suit).  *Can  have  class  of  Ds.    

1. Requirements,  23(a)  a. Hansbury  (1940)  –  DP  concerns,  class  action  binding  on  all  members.    Need  (1)  shared  interest  (2)  

adequate  representation  and  (3)  procedures  [binding  judgment  in  Burke  deprived  Ps  of  DP]  b. Implicit  requirements:  

14

i. Sufficiency  of  class  definition  (ct  doesn’t  have  to  speculate)    ii. Whether  proposed  reps  satisfy  definition  

c. Explicit  requirements  i. Numerosity  –  so  numerous  that  joinder  impracticable  ii. Commonality  –  common  questions  of  law/fact,  does  not  req.  all  or  even  most  questions  in  

common  iii. Typicality  –  claims/defenses  of  rep.  parties  are  typical  of  claims/defenses  of  class  iv. Adequacy  of  representative  –  rep.  parties  will  adequately  and  fairly  protect  interests  of  class  

 2. Types  of  Class  Actions  23(b)  

a. 23(b)(1)  prejudice  class  action;  cannot  opt-­‐out  and  may  provide  individual  notice;  prosecuting  separate  actions  would  create  risk  of:  

i. Incompatible  standards  of  conduct  on  D  ii. Impair/impeding  ability  to  protect  interest  of  P,  limited  fund  (has  to  really  be  limited)  

b. 23(b)(2)  injunctive/declaratory  relief,  cannot  opt-­‐out  and  may  provide  individual  notice  i. Injunctive  relief  primary  relief  sought  (money  damages  incidental)  ii. Cohesiveness,  preexisting  or  continuing  legal  relationship  or  significant  common  traits  ex.  

race/gender    c. 23(b)(3)  damages/catch-­‐all,  can  opt-­‐out  initially  and  at  settlement  and  must  provide  individual  notice  

i. Common  questions  of  law  or  fact  and  class  action  superior  to  other  methods  for  fairly/efficiency  adjudicating  controversy  ex.  mass  tort  

ii. Predominance:  most  or  all  common  questions  predominant  ((stricter  than  23(a));  (1)  requires  same  proof  (2)  bound  by  mutual  interest  (3)  resolution  of  common  interests  would  significantly  advance  litigation  (4)  one  or  more  common  issues  constitute  significant  parts  of  each  class  members’  individual  case  (5)  common  questions  central  to  all  members’  claims  (6)  same  theory  of  liability  asserted  by  or  against  all  Ds  

iii. Superiority:  class  is  superior  method  for  resolving  dispute  (1)  class  members’  interest  in  individually  controlling  prosecution/defense  of  separate  actions  (2)  extent  and  nature  of  any  litig.  concerning  controversy  already  begun  by  or  against  class  members  (3)  desirability  of  undesirability  of  concentrating  litig.  of  claims  in  particular  forum  (4)  likely  difficulties  of  managing  class  action    

Class   Definition   Policy  Objective   Practical  Application  26(b)(1),  prejudice  class  action  

-­‐mass  version  of  19  -­‐cannot  opt-­‐out  -­‐may  provide  individual  notice  

Avoid  inconsistent  decisions  or  impair/impede  interests  of  class  members  

Limited  fund  cases,  if  suits  brought  individually  first  P  takes  everything.  Class  action  protects  against  this.  

26(b)(2),  injunctive/declaratory  relief  

-­‐no  $  damages  (or  incidental)  -­‐cannot  opt-­‐out  -­‐may  provide  individual  notice  

Protect  rights  where  large  numbers  of  persons  are  affected,  need  cohesiveness,  preexisting  or  continuing  legal  relationship  or  significant  common  traits  

Civil  rights  cases,  ex.  race/gender  

26(b)(3),  damages,  catch/all  

-­‐$  damages  -­‐must  present  common  questions  of  law  or  fact  (predominance  of  common  questions)  -­‐must  be  superior  to  other  available  methods  -­‐must  provide  individual  notice  (P  bears  cost)  

Judicial  efficiency,  allows  relief  where  individual  P  could  not  economically  pursue  action  (negative  value  suits),  only  effective  method  of  deterring  D’s  behavior  

Where  nobody  would  sue  individually  (minimal  damages)  but  makes  sense  as  class.  [Synfuel  Tech]  

15

-­‐can  opt-­‐out  initially  and  at  settlement    

 3. Other  Procedures  

a. Judgment  binding  on  all  class  members!  b. Need  PJ  and  SMJ  over  class  reps  but  not  members  (including  class  reps  for  sub-­‐classes)  c. Cannot  notice  voluntary  dismissal  d. 23(c)  certification;  putative  before  certified  (interlocutory  appeal  of  this)  e. Court  plays  more  active  role,  discovery  aimed  at  class  reps.  not  absent  members  f. 23(e)  settlement,  high-­‐stakes  and  frequent!!:  need  (1)  notice  to  all  types  of  classes  (2)  fairness  hearing  

(3)  statement  identifying  other  agreements.    Allows  class  member  objections.    Court  should  only  consider  if  “fair,  reasonable  and  adequate.”  

i. (1)  Strength  of  P’s  case  (2)  risk,  expense,  complexity  and  likely  duration  of  further  litig.  (3)  risk  of  maintaining  class  action  status  throughout  trial  (4)  amount  offered  in  settlement  (5)  extent  of  discovery  and  stage  of  proceedings  (6)  experience  of  counsel  (7)  presence  of  govt  participation  (8)  rx  of  class  members  to  proposed  settlement  [Synfuel  Tech.,  class  action  claiming  charged  default  5-­‐lb  rate,  coupon  settlement  not  fair  b/c  payment  structure  disadvantages  customers  charged  multiple  times,  assumes  will  want  to  do  business  again  with  D,  changes  in  company  practices  will  benefit  future  customer  but  not  class  members]  

g. 23(f)  can  appeal  class  cert  order  (interlocutory)  w/in  14  days  after  entered  h. 23(g)  class  counsel  i. 23(h)  attorneys’  fees  

 4. CAFA  2005  

a. Goal:  get  class  actions  into  federal  court  unless  there  are  paramount  state  interests;  passed  after  decades  of  business  lobbying  

b. Requirements:  • Minimum  diversity  (any  P  from  different  state  as  any  D)  • $5  million  amount-­‐in-­‐controversy  (can  aggregate  claims)  • Need  at  least  100  class  members  (mass  action)  • 1  D  removal  (ordinarily  all  Ds  need  to  agree  to  remove)  • No  more  forum  D  rule  for  removal  (ordinarily  NY  D  sued  in  NY  cannot  remove  b/c  no  local  

prejudice)  c. Exceptions:  

• Home  state:  if  2/3+  class  members  or  “primary  defendants”  are  citizens  of  forum  state,  then  state  court  

• Discretionary  jurisdiction:  fed  courts  can  decline  if  1/3+  but  less  than  2/3  members  and  “primary  defendants”  are  citizens  of  forum  state  

   DISCOVERY  –  Gathering  facts  and  evidence  to  help  flesh  out  generally  pleaded  claims  and  defenses.    Major  driver  of  litigation  costs.    Party  directed.    Premised  on  idea  that  parties  should  not  be  subject  to  surprises  at  trial.    

1. Scope  of  Discovery  26(b),  broad  presumptive  access  to  info  constrained  (ideally)  by  common  sense  of  counsel  and  discretionary  limits  imposed  by  judge  when  not  negotiated  by  parties  *broad  

a. Discoverable  matter  (everything)  b. That  is  not  privileged,  exception:  if  privilege  is  controversy  c. That  is  relevant  to  any  party’s  claims  or  defenses  (pleadings  central  to  scope  of  discovery,  no  bright-­‐line  

test  for  relevance)  d. That  is  reasonably  calculated  to  lead  to  discovery  of  admissible  evidence  if  not  itself  admissible  ex.  

remedial  measures,  hearsay    

2. Process  of  Discovery  

16

 Court  has  power  to  manage  discovery,  but  generally  done  by  parties  through:  

• Required  initial  disclosures,  26(b)  • Duty  to  supplement,  26  • Doc  production  requests,  34  • Rules  to  enforce  discovery  orders,  37  

 P  files  motion  to  compel  production  (or  sanctions)    D  has  several  options.    Note  there  are  no  silent  objections  in  discovery!    

1. Properly  requested?    Does  it  comply  w/  all  rules,  discovery  order,  any  protective  orders?  2. Within  scope  of  discovery?  26(a)  3. Object  on  grounds  of  undue  burden  or  expense  

• E-­‐discovery  need  not  provide  if  undue  burden  or  cost  [McPeek,  searching  DOJ  tapes]  • 26(b)(2)(c)  3-­‐part  test  for  objections:  (1)  unreasonably  cumulative  or  duplicative  (2)  ample  

opportunity  to  obtain  info  by  discovery  (3)  burden  or  expense  >  benefit    

4. Counter  w/  protective  order  26(c)  • Certification  that  movant  has  in  good  faith  conferred  or  attempted  to  confer  w/  other  

affected  parties  • Can  protect  from  annoyance,  embarrassment,  oppression,  or  undue  burden  or  expense  

 5. Object  based  on  privilege  26(b)(5)  

• Ex.  attorney-­‐client  privilege;  communication  made  b/t  persons  in  confidence  for  purpose  of  obtaining  or  providing  legal  assistance  for  the  client;  protects  content  of  discussions  not  facts  (i.e.  identity  of  witnesses  or  existence  of  documents);  note  some  states  apply  control  group  test  

• Need  to  expressly  state  claim  and  describe  nature  of  documents,  privilege  log  • Exception:  if  privilege  is  controversy  

 6. Object  based  on  work-­‐product  doctrine  [Hickman,  protects  compilation  and  selection  of  work  

product,  attorneys’  added  value,  intangible  things  ex.  interviews  also  protected  but  not  in  rule]  *does  not  need  to  be  generated  by  attorney  

• 26(b)(3)  May  not  discover  (1)  documents  and  tangible  things  (2)  prepared  in  anticipation  of  litigation  or  for  trial  (doesn’t  include  general  business  records,  3  approaches)  (3)  by  or  for  another  party  or  its  representatives  

• Rebut  by  showing  good  cause  i.e.  substantial  need  for  materials,  cannot  obtain  equivalent  of  work  produced  by  other  means  and  inability  to  discover  will  create  undue  hardship  (i.e.  witness  died,  evidence  gone)  

• Still  must  protect  against  disclosures  of  mental  impressions,  conclusions,  opinions  or  legal  theories  of  party’s  attorney,  also  previous  statements  (absolute  immunity,  will  be  protected  even  if  substantial  need)  

• Note  testifying  experts  (“hired  guns”),  req.  disclosure  of  identify  and  expected  testimony  v.  non-­‐testifying  experts,  protected  from  discovery,  role  is  to  help  attorney  understand  difficult  facts;  unbiased  expert?  

• Policy  rationale:  (1)  efficiency,  don’t  want  lawyer  to  fear  discovery  and  writing  things  down  before  trial  (2)  accuracy,  if  lawyer  can’t  prepare  for  trial,  outcomes  suffer  (3)  entrepreneurial  spirit,  why  pay  attorney  if  can’t  perform  to  best  of  ability?  (4)  don’t  want  other  lawyers  riding  on  coattails  (5)  don’t  want  lawyers  ending  up  as  witnesses  for  own  cases  

 3. Methods  of  Discovery  

17

 Filing    service    26(f)  meet  &  confer    [14  days]  26(a)(1)  required  disclosures  +  26(f)  discovery  plan    [7  days]  16(b)  scheduling  conference  and  order  

 • Scheduling  order  due:  (1)  90  days  after  appearance  of  D  or  (2)  120  days  after  complaint  served  on  D  • Scheduling  order  due:  21  days  after  26(f)  meet  and  confer  

 a. Informal  Investigation,  11  –  make  reasonable  inquiry  before  filing  complaint  

 b. Meet  and  Confer,  26(f)  –  discuss  discovery  plan,  time  limits,  case  management  schedule,  claim/defenses,  

settlement    

c. Required  Disclosures  26(a),  cheap  starting  point  +  discovery  plan  26(f)  i. Initial  disclosures,  must  provide  with  info  that  is  reasonable  available  to  party:  

• Name,  address,  telephone  of  all  individuals  likely  to  have  discovery  info,  along  w/  subject  of  info  that  disclosing  party  may  use  to  support  its  claims  or  defenses  

• Copy  (or  description)  of  all  documents  that  disclosing  party  has  in  its  possession  • Computation  of  each  category  of  damages  by  disclosing  party  • Any  insurance  agreements  

ii. Don’t  need  to  make  prior  to  judgment  or  dispositive  motions  if  “no  useful  purpose”  in  making  disclosures  [Flores,  no  reason  to  delay  disclosure  of  insurance  agreement]  

iii. Prior  discovery  disclosures  must  be  supplemented  if  found  to  be  materially  incomplete/incorrect,  or  if  additional/corrective  info  has  been  made  

iv. Expert  testimony  –  need  to  disclose  expert  disclosures  at  least  90  days  before  trial  v. Trial  evidence  –  need  to  provide  evidence  of  what  will  present  at  trial  at  least  30  days  before  

trial  vi. Why?  (1)  prevent  surprise  and  (2)  enable  objections  vii. 26(g)  sign  disclosures  and  discovery  requests  to  ensure  complete,  correct,  and  not  unduly  

burdensome    

d. Scheduling  Conference  and  Order  16(b)  judge  present,  someone  to  authorize  stipulations  or  potential  settlement,  modify  only  for  good  cause  w/  judge’s  consent  (managerial  judging)    

e. Interrogatories,  33,  cheap,  identify/locate  evidence  i. Questions  to  other  parties,  limited  to  25  Qs  ii. Request  in  writing  iii. If  corporation,  info  available  to  the  party  iv. Answer  under  oath  in  30  days  /  object  in  writing;  can  produce  business  records  instead  

(advantage:  shifts  cost;  disadvantage:  P  could  find  something  else)  v. Can  object  to  pure  questions  of  law;  cannot  object  to  info  about  party’s  application  of  law  to  

fact    

f. Depositions,  30  (oral,  follow-­‐up,  spontaneous  or  candid  evidence  from  witnesses)  &  31  (written,  simple  Qs  that  require  no  follow-­‐up,  cheaper)  *for  party  OR  non-­‐party  (subpoena)  

i. Oral  or  written  questions  under  oath  to  any  person  or  organization  ii. Written  notice  to  all  parties,  compel  w/  subpoena  for  non-­‐party  deponents  (for  PJ)  

1. Service  by  non-­‐party  18+,  delivery  to  person,  w/in  district  of  issuing  court  or  outside  district  but  w/in  100  miles  or  state  statute  or  court  authorization  

2. Move  to  quash  or  modify  subpoena,  45  • Required:  (1)  fails  to  allow  reasonable  time  to  comply  (2)  non-­‐party  to  travel  100+  

miles  (unless  maybe  still  w/in  state,  then  ok)  (3)  disclosure  of  privileged  info  (4)  undue  burden  

• Discretionary:  (1)  un-­‐retained  opinion  

18

• Instead  of  quashing/modifying  court  may  order  if  substantial  need  and  ensures  subpoenaed  person  will  be  reasonably  compensated  

• If  fail  to  comply  can  be  held  in  contempt  iii. If  corporation,  info  known  or  reasonably  available  iv. Verbal  answer  /  object  on  record  but  need  to  answer  even  if  not  admissible.    Do  not  answer  if  

privileged  or  protected,  otherwise  waive  privilege  v. Use  to  prepare  for  trial,  impeach,  use  at  trial  under  certain  circumstances  

 g. Document  Production  Request,  34(a)(1),  collect  identified  written  documents  *can  get  from  non-­‐party  

w/  subpoena  duces  tecum  i. Documents  and  tangible  things  w/in  party’s  possession,  custody,  or  control  ii. Request  in  writing  w/  reasonably  particularity  iii. Format  =  as  requested  or  as  usually  kept  iv. Permit  /  object  in  writing  

 h. Request  to  Enter  onto  Land,  34(a)(2),  inspect,  measure,  survey,  photograph,  test,  or  sample  property  

 i. Mental  and  Physical  Examinations,  35,  determine  mental/physical  conditions  in  controversy  

i. Mental  physical  condition  in  controversy  ii. Need  court  order  b/c  of  privacy;  motion  on  good  cause  and  notice  to  all  parties  iii. If  examinee  requests  report  and  deposes  examiner,  then  privilege  is  waived  

 j. Requests  for  Admissions,  36,  narrowing  issues  for  trial,  authenticating  documents  

i. Request  admission  re:  truth  of  matters  relating  to  (1)  facts,  application  of  law  to  fact,  or  opinions  about  either,  and  (2)  genuineness  (authenticity)  of  any  described  documents  

ii. Request  in  writing  iii. After  reasonable  inquiry  need  to  answer  fairly  responding  to  substance  of  matter,  can  

admit/deny/lack  knowledge  or  object;  failure  to  respond  =  admit  iv. Conclusive!!  (unlike  interrogatories)  

 4. Tools  for  Controlling  Discovery  

 a. 26(g)  Sanctions  (less  common)  

i. Only  triggered  by  motion  ii. Related  to  attorney  signing  discovery  docs.    If  making  request,  signing  that  not  undue  burden.    

If  answering,  warrant  disclosures  complete/correct  and  proportionate  to  case  iii. Only  mentioned  sanction  includes  making  violator  pay  opposing  party’s  reasonable  expenses  

b. 37  Sanctions  (more  common)  *need  order  compelling  discovery,  willful  violation  of  that  order  &  prejudice  to  other  party,  umbrella  sanctions  

i. Triggered  by  motion  or  court  sua  sponte  ii. Sanctions  that  are  “just”  in  the  circumstances  iii. Include  holding  in  contempt,  orders  deeming  specific  facts  to  be  established  for  purposes  of  

actions,  precludes  violator  from  introducing  certain  evidence,  striking  or  dismissing  certain  claims  or  defenses,  entering  default  judgment  [Chadasama,  discovery  battle,  D  filed  objections,  12(b)(6),  protective  order  and  withheld  info]  

   JURY  TRIAL  &  ALTERNATIVES    

Dispositive  motion?  

12(b)(6)  MTD  

12(c)  motion  for  directed  verdict  

56  MSJ   50(a)  JMOL  after  P’s  case  

50(a)  JMOL  after  P  &  D’s  case  

50(b)  renewed  JMOL  

19

What  record?  

Law  +  well-­‐pleaded  allegations  in  complaint  

Law  +  well-­‐pleaded  facts  in  complaint,  answer  and  reply  (if  any)  

Law  +  undisputed  facts  from  discovery  

Law  +  all  facts  from  P’s  case  

Law  +  full  trial  record  

Law  +  full  trial  record  

Who  can  file?  

Only  D   P  and  D   P  and  D   Only  D   P  and  D   P  and  D  

   

1. Voluntary  Dismissal  41  a. P  can  notice  dismissal,  41(a)(1),  usually  without  prejudice  unless  second  voluntary  dismissal,  then  with  

prejudice  and  operates  as  adjudication  on  merits  (claim  precluded)  i. Before  opposing  party  serves  answer  or  MSJ  or  ii. Stipulation  by  all  parties  iii. [In  re  Kitchen  &  Bath  Fixtures  Antitrust  Litig.,  putative  class  noticed  voluntary  dismissal,  Ds  

objected  as  untimely,  court  found  timely  b/c  D  had  not  filed  answer  or  MTD  and  MTD  ≠  MSJ  under  12(d)]  

b. P  can  move  for  voluntary  dismissal,  41(a)(2),  without  prejudice  i. Court  decides  w/  discretion  ii. Aims  to  avoid  plain  legal  prejudice  when  D  has  spent  significant  time,  effort  and  expense  iii. Courts  factor:  (1)  stage  of  litigation  (2)  numbers  of  papers  filed  (3)  number  of  pretrial  

conferences  (4)  prior  hearings  adverse  to  P’s  position  (5)  number  of  hearings  (6)  if  parties  have  undertaken  substantial  discovery  

 2. Summary  Judgment  56,  last  gate-­‐keeping  function  before  trial,  whether  claim  could  go  to  jury?    Use  when  

material  facts  not  in  dispute,  all  that  remains  is  to  apply  the  law.    Notice  pleading  vague,  12(b)(6)  don’t  weed  out  meritlesjurs  claims.  

a. Challenge  party’s  ability  to  prove  allegations  before  lawsuit;  determine  whether  there  is  a  genuine  dispute  of  material  fact  (i.e.  fact  related  to  the  issue)  and  if  not,  whether  moving  party  is  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law  on  undisputed  facts  

b. Standard  =  genuine  dispute  of  material  fact;  whether  any  reasonable-­‐fact  finder  could  decide  an  issue  as  matter  of  fact  for  non-­‐moving  party  

c. 30  days  after  close  of  discovery;  judge  can  grant  in  whole/part  d. How  lawyers  make  MSJ:  

i. Defendants  –  attack  one  of  P’s  key  essential  elements  w/o  which  he  wouldn’t  have  a  case  (disproof  of  1  element,  absence  of  proof)  [Slaven,  prisoner  committed  suicide,  D  showed  P  had  no  proof  to  show  duty;  DuPlantis,  P  slipped  on  board,  D  showed  P  had  no  proof  re:  ownership  of  board]  

ii. Plaintiffs  –  must  show  all  undisputed  facts  supporting  each  and  every  essential  element  of  claim  (proof  of  the  elements  –  P,  must  present  undisputed  facts  supporting  each  and  every  element  of  claim  

iii. Set  out  specific  facts  by  citing  to  materials  in  record  and  support  w/  affidavit  (personal  knowledge);  can  also  support  w/  depos,  answers  to  interrogatories,  admissions  

iv. *Opposing  party  must  respond  w/  countervailing  evidence  in  order  to  avoid  entry  of  judgment  against  him;  can’t  just  reiterate  allegations  in  complaint  –  need  proof!  

e. How  does  court  decide?  i. What  substantive  law  applicable?  ii. Which  facts  are  material?  iii. What  evidence  about  material  fact  is  in  record?  iv. Has  non-­‐movant  successfully  rebutted?  v. What  is  proper  disposition?  

f. How  courts  review?  

20

i. Review  record  as  whole  ii. Do  not  determine  credibility  of  witnesses  or  weigh  the  evidence  iii. Draw  reasonable  inferences  in  favor  of  non-­‐moving  party  

g. Three  options  for  what  courts  can  find:  i. The  jury  could  not  find  for  P  –  no  genuine  issues  of  material  fact,  SJ  granted  ii. The  jury  could  either  find  for  P  or  D  –  genuine  issue  of  material  fact  (evidence  is  contradictory),  

goes  to  jury,  SJ  denied  iii. The  jury  must  find  for  D  –  no  genuine  issue  of  material  fact,  SJ  granted  

h. Policy  rationales:  i. Pro:  Req.  Ps  to  reveal  factual  basis  for  conclusory  allegations  before  trial,  thereby  having  time  

and  $  for  court.    Weeds  out  cases  that  are  factually  frivolous  even  after  discovery  ii. Con:  P’s  DP  right  to  day  in  court  under  7A  

 3. JMOL  i.e.  directed  verdict  50(a)  

a. If  party  has  been  fully  heard  on  issue  during  jury  trial,  other  party  can  file  motion  for  JMOL  at  any  time  before  case  submitted  to  jury;  can  file  on  partial  issue  

a. Standard  =  reasonable  jury  would  not  have  legally  sufficient  evidentiary  basis  to  find  for  the  party  on  that  issue  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  *same  as  MSJ  (test  verdict  for  sufficiency)  (1) Note,  some  states  apply  scintilla  approach  =  consider  only  non-­‐moving  party’s  evidence  even  if  non-­‐

moving  party  has  offered  mere  scintilla  of  evidence  in  support  of  position  (stricter,  harder  to  win  JMOL)  

b. Judge  considers  jury  (RPP)  would  conclude  evidence  sufficient  to  support  verdict  (1)  without  weighing  credibility  of  witnesses  or  (2)  otherwise  considering  weight  of  evidence  [Chamberlain,  brakeman  killed,  JMOL  granted  b/c  evidence  so  overwhelmingly  on  RR’s  side  as  to  “leave  little  room  to  doubt  what  fact  is”]  

c. Burden  of  production  –  P  must  produce  enough  evidence  that  jury  (RPP)  could  find  elements  must  prove  are  met  

d. Burden  of  persuasion,  preponderance  of  evidence  –  P  must  provide  enough  evidence  that  jury  (RPP)  would  find  for  P  

 4. Renewed  JMOL  i.e.  JNOV  50(b)  *same  standard  as  JMOL  

a. After  trial,  party  can  file  motion  for  renewed  JMOL  no  later  than  28  days  after  entry  of  judgment  b. Cannot  renew  unless  made  50(a)  motion  that  raised  same  issue  [Trievedi,  D  failed  to  preserve  50(b)  

motion  for  hostile  work  environment  claim  b/c  did  not  file  50(a)  motion]  c. May  include  alternative  or  join  request  for  new  trial  (59)  d. Courts  typically  deny  50(a)  motions  over  50(b)  motions  

i. If  appeal  and  remand  for  retrial  w/  50(a)  expensive,  time-­‐consuming  retrial  vs.  50(b)  judge  will  only  need  to  enter  judgment  based  on  jury’s  original  verdict  

 5. Jury  Trial  

a. 7A  –  suits  at  common  law,  value  in  controversy  >  $20,  right  to  trial  by  jury  shall  be  preserved.    Historical  test  preserves  right  to  jury  as  existed  in  England  1791.    Doesn’t  bind  to  exact  procedures.    Look  to  origins  of  claim  and  remedy  requested  (greater  emphasis)  and  case  will  be  tried  in  appropriate  ct.  

i. Equity  =  injunction,  declaratory  relied,  accounting  –  JUDGE    ii. Law  =  $  damages,  return  of  property  –  JURY  

b. FRCP  1938  merged  law  and  equity  c. Determine  jury  issue  by  issue.    If  issue  of  fact  underlies  law  and  equity,  get  jury.    Try  jury  issues  first.  d. Dairy  Queen  –  jury  goes  first!!    If  issue  w/  overlapping  facts  involves  legal  and  equitable  claims,  trial  

should  be  structured  so  that  jury  determines  issues  common  to  both  claims.    Judge  will  then  follow  jury’s  findings  on  those  issues  if  they  are  also  relevant  to  equitable  claims  in  action.    Note  expansion  of  right  to  jury  trial  

21

e. 38  –  right  of  jury  in  7A  preserved  to  the  parties  inviolate;  either  party  can  demand  w/  written  demand  no  later  than  14  days  after  last  pleading  served;  if  do  not  demand  in  time  then  waive;  can  undo  waiver  w/  parties  consent  or  motion  (consistency  w/  liberal  amendment  philosophy  of  15(a)?)  

f. 39  –  judge  can  empanel  advisory  jury  to  help  decide  facts,  non-­‐binding  g. 42(b)  –  bifurcate  trial,  can  consolidate/separate  trials  for  convenience  if  common  question  or  law  or  fact  h. Why  jury  v.  bench?  (1)  prejudice?  (2)  who  will  relate?  (3)  complexity  (4)  time/cost  i. Can  juries  handle  complex  cases?  

 6. New  Trial,  59,  usually  filed  simultaneously  or  as  alternative  to  50(b)  

a. Motion  or  court  on  its  own,  w/in  28  days  after  entry  of  judgment;  can  be  granted/denied  or  conditionally  granted/denied  (appeal)  

i. After  jury  trial:  heretofore  been  granted  ii. After  non-­‐jury  trial:  heretofore  been  granted;  can  reopen  record  and  make  new  decision  

b. Against  weight  of  evidence  i. Standard  =  sufficiency  of  evidence  to  support  jury  verdict,  clearly  erroneous,  miscarriage  of  

justice  (more  than  testing  verdict  for  sufficiency,  actually  weighing  evidence)  ii. Court  can  weigh  evidence  and  assess  credibility.    Also  consider  (1)  length/complexity  of  trial  (2)  

importance  of  credibility  determinations  (3)  party’s  comparative  fact  finding  c. Excessive/inadequate  verdicts,  remittitur  59(e)  for  excessive  verdicts  that  shock  the  judicial  conscience.    

Like  settlement,  cannot  appeal  if  accept.  (1)  min  recovery  (2)  max  recovery  (3)  amount  court  deems  reasonable.    Additur  not  ok  in  fed  cts.  

d. Process  error  –  (1)  improper  argument  to  jury  (2)  witness  misconduct  (3)  jury  misconduct  (4)  really  serious  jury  instructional  errors  (5)  evidentiary  errors  

i. Note  61  harmless  errors  that  do  not  affect  parties’  substantial  rights  are  not  grounds  for  granting  new  trial,  setting  aside  verdict,  vacating/modifying  judgment  

e. New  evidence  f.  50(c)  trial  court  needs  to  conditionally  rule  on  motion  for  new  trial,  in  case  JMOL  vacated  or  reversed  

 7. Relief  from  Judgment,  60  

a. 60(a)  clerical  mistake,  can  fix  anytime  but  not  during  appeal  b. 60(b)  court  has  broad  discretion  but  movant  needs  to  show  did  not  contribute  to  default  by  knowing  or  

inexcusable  action.    1  yr  for  1,  2,  3  and  any  (reasonable)  time  for  4,  5,  6  (1) Mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  or  excusable  neglect  –  generally  used  for  default  judgments  (2) Newly  discovered  evidence  (3) Fraud  (of  the  court)  *note  can  be  more  than  1  yr  if  court  says  so  (4) Void  judgment  –  almost  always  default  judgment,  no  notice  or  PJ  (5) Satisfied,  released  or  no  longer  equitable  –  already  paid  or  complied  w/  injunction  (6) Any  other  reason  –  need  extraordinary  circumstances  

 REMEDIES  &  POST-­‐JUDGMENT  PROCEDURES    

1. Remedies  a. 69  –  judgment  enforced  by  writ  of  execution;  look  to  fed  law  on  point  then  go  to  state  law  b. 64  –  person/property  seizures;  any  remedy  available  under  state  law  (anomaly)  and  these:  

i. Arrest  –  no  longer  used,  replaced  w/  service  of  process  ii. Attachment  –  seizing  of  general  property  ($)  to  secure  judgment  ex.  fleeing  to  Switzerland  iii. Garnishment  –  creditor  asks  court  to  order  third  party  to  turn  over  debtor’s  property/wages  to  

creditor;  used  to  collect  on  judgment  that  D  refuses  to  pay  iv. Replevin  –  repossession  of  personal  property  wrongfully  taken/detained  by  D;  P  gives  security  

for  and  holds  property  until  court  decides  who  owns  it  [Fuentes,  replevin  procedures  must  include  notice  and  opportunity  for  hearing  before  your  stuff  taken  to  prevent  unfair/mistaken  deprivations  of  property]  

v. Sequestration  –  specific  property  removed  pending  outcome  

22

c. Injunctions  65  i. TRO  –  no  notice,  temporary,  need  affidavit,  immediate  or  irreparable  injury,  need  to  give  

security  ii. Preliminary  injunction  –  need  notice,  need  to  give  security  

1. Purpose  to  preserve  relative  positions  of  parties  until  trial  on  merits.    Factors  for  granting:  (1)  likelihood  of  P’s  success  on  merits  (2)  whether  P  will  be  irreparably  harmed  if  injunction  not  issued  (3)  balance  of  equities,  who  burden  more?  (4)  public  interest,  affect  third  parties?  [Camenisch]  

2. Bound  if  parties,  agents  &  employees,  active  concert  and  participation  and  received  actual  notice  [Zenith,  Hazletine  not  bound  b/c  not  party  thus  no  PJ  or  notice,  could  have  argued  alter  egos,  directing  litigation]  

d. Declaratory  judgment  57,  §2201  i. Mechanism  for  party  who  is  likely  to  be  sued  to  bring  suit  itself  to  determine  rights  and  

liabilities;  legally  binding  but  does  not  order  any  action  by  party  or  award  remedies.    Does  not  actually  resolve  case  and  preserves  jury  trial  rights  

ii. Only  for  actual  controversies    

2. Appeals  FRAP  3,  4,  §1291,  §1292  a. Notice  appeal  w/in  30  days  after  judgment.    Time  doesn’t  start  until  judgment  entered  on  50(b),  59,  60  b. Can  affirm  w/o  appealing.    Need  to  cross-­‐appeal  to  attack  issues.  c. Requirements  [MacArthur]:  

i. Prejudicial  –  need  to  be  aggrieved  by  judgment.    61,  can’t  be  harmless  error  ii. Preserved  below  –  need  to  preserve  claim  by  timely  objection  in  trial  court;  judicial  economy.    

Exception:  plain  error  doctrine  iii. Presented  above  –  need  to  identify  and  present  issue  in  brief;  gives  notice  

d. Finality  principle  §1291  COA  has  SMJ  jurisdiction  over  all  final  decisions  =  all  claims  resolved  on  merits  such  that  there  is  nothing  left  to  do  but  execute  judgment  [Rectricel  Foam,  discovery  and  case  management  orders  not  final]    

i. Rationale:  congestion,  duplication,  delay,  expense  ii. Exceptions:  

1. Interlocutory  appeals  54  –  applies  to  trial  court  decisions  that  would  have  been  appealable  on  own,  but  for  liberal  joinder  permitted  by  FRCP.    Direct  entry  of  judgment  as  to  one  or  more,  but  fewer  than  all,  claims  or  parties  if  no  just  cause  for  delay  ex.  MSJ.    Need  sufficient  separateness,  cannot  separate  remedies  and  liabilities  

2. Collateral  order  doctrine,  interlocutory  orders  that  are  incidental  to  merits  and  cannot  be  effectively  preserved  for  review  on  appeal  from  final  judgment  (1)  separability,  unrelated  to  merits  (2)  finality,  completely  resolved  below  (3)  urgency,  effectively  unreviewable  on  appeal  (4)  importance  

3. Interlocutory  injunction  §1292  allows  interlocutory  appeal  of  certain  orders  that  may  have  immediate  and  irreparable  consequences  

a. §1292(a)  injunctions  b. §1292(b)  discretionary  review  of  certified  questions;  involve  

controlling  question  of  law  as  to  which  there  is  substantial  ground  for  difference  or  opinion  and  immediate  appeal  from  order  may  materially  advance  ultimate  termination  of  litigation  

4. Writ  of  mandamus  –  extreme,  district  court’s  ruling  undisputedly  wrong  5. 23(f)  interlocutory  appeal  of  class  cert  orders  

e. Staying  judgment  62  –  automatic  stay  14  days,  then  put  up  bond  f. Appellate  standards  of  review  

i. De  novo  –  no  deference,  questions  of  law  1. Reviewing  JMOL  and  RJMOL  CoA  applies  reasonable  jury  standard  –  whether  

reasonable  jury  could  have  reached  same  verdict  THEN  reviews  what  judge  did  as  question  of  law,  reviewed  de  novo  

23

ii. Clear  error  –  some  deference,  findings  of  fact  at  bench  trial  iii. Abuse  of  discretion  –  less  deference,  discretionary  orders  ex.  42  bifurcate,  managing  discovery  

 3. Claim  Preclusion  (res  judicata)  –  precludes  re-­‐litigation  of  claims  that  were  claims  that  were  litigated  and  claims  

that  could  have  been  litigated  based  on  same  transaction  (majority  rule)  or  same  evidence  (minority  rule).    Rational  is  efficiency,  unfair  to  try  twice,  inconsistent  verdicts,  repose,  public’s  confidence  in  jury  system.    *Like  13(a)  for  Ps  (P  waives  any  claims  not  asserted  in  first  action,  if  arise  out  of  same  transaction).  3  requirements:    *Courts  will  apply  broadly  in  order  to  encourage  joinder  and  discourage  multiple  litigation.    But  courts  will  interpret  narrowly  if  concerned  about  harshness  of  preclusion  and  burden  on  P.    

a. Claim  in  lawsuit  #1  resulted  in  valid,  final  judgment  on  the  merits,  full  opportunity  to  have  case  heard  i. Valid  =  need  jurisdiction  (SMJ,  PJ  and  venue)  ii. Final  judgment  =  resolve  case  such  that  there  is  nothing  left  to  do,  12(b),  50,  56  all  count  iii. On  the  merits  =  not  a  dismissal  for  jurisdictional  problems,  venue,  or  joinder  of  indispensible  

party  b. Claim  in  lawsuit  #1  and  #2  are  the  same  (i.e.  transactional)  

i. Transactional  test  –  same  set  of  underlying  facts,  same  common  nucleus  of  operative  fact  (broad)  *note  same  test  as  supplemental  jurisdiction  [River  Park,  P  filed  lawsuit  #1  in  fed  court,  lost  and  filed  lawsuit  #2  in  state  court,  lawsuit  #2  precluded  b/c  although  different  claim,  same  facts  that  city  conspired  to  delay  permitting  process]  

1. Pros:  efficiency,  fewer  suits,  $  2. Cons:  unfair  to  Ps,  not  precise,  throw  in  everything  for  fear  it  will  get  precluded  

ii. Same  evidence  test  –  compare  evidence  (narrow)  c. Claim  in  lawsuit  #1  and  #2  are  between  the  same  parties  =  same  claimant  and  same  respondent  

i. Ex.  A  sues  B,  B  counterclaims,  B  cannot  sue  again  on  counterclaim  b/c  precluded  [Taylor,  filed  lawsuit  seeking  docs  from  FAA;  Herrick  had  already  filed  lawsuit  unsuccessfully  seeking  docs;  Taylor  not  precluded  b/c  fit  into  no  exceptions  and  court  rejects  virtual  representation]  

ii. Exceptions:  (1)  consent  (2)  substantial  legal  relationship  ex.  property  owners  (3)  guaranteed  adequate  rep  ex.  class  actions,  fiduciaries  (4)  new  P  had  control  of  old  case  (5)  old  P  had  control  of  new  case  (6)  special  proceedings  

d. Exceptions  to  claim  preclusion:  (1)  consent,  waivable  (2)  court  in  lawsuit  #1  reserved  it  (3)  couldn’t  make  before  b/c  of  joinder  or  jurisdiction  (4)  statute  (5)  continuing  or  recurring  harm  (6)  other  extraordinary  reasons    

Note  MSJ  good  way  to  cut  off  case  at  beginning  of  issue/claim  preclusion.    Cannot  use  MTD  b/c  will  use  evidence  outside  pleadings,  12(d)  

 4. Issue  Preclusion  (collateral  estoppel)  –  precludes  re-­‐litigation  of  identical  issues  that  were  actually  litigated  and  

determined  by  a  valid  and  final  judgment,  and  the  determination  is  essential  to  the  judgment,  the  determination  is  conclusive  in  a  subsequent  action  between  the  parties,  whether  on  the  same  or  a  different  claim.    Rational  is  efficiency,  unfair  to  try  twice,  inconsistent  verdicts,  repose,  public’s  confidence  in  jury  system.    *Identify  lawsuit  #1  (first  to  reach  judgment);  determine  whether  issue  in  lawsuit  #1  arises  again  in  lawsuit  #2,  circumstances/quality  of  litigation  in  #2  to  decide  if  preclusive  effect    

a. Lawsuit  #1  resulted  in  final  judgment  on  merits,  valid  ex.  MSJ  not  final    b. Lawsuit  #1  and  #2  have  identical  issues  [Panniel,  foot  injury  same  issue]  c. Issue  in  lawsuit  #1  was  actually  litigated  and  decided  

i. Can  infer  from  what  was  actually  decided  what  fact-­‐finder  necessarily  must  have  found  to  answer  fact  question  or  reach  general  verdict  

d. Issue  in  lawsuit  #1  was  essential  to  judgment  [Cambria,  Jeffrey  sued  Cambria  for  negligence  to  recover  personal  injuries  in  lawsuit  #1.    Both  negligence  but  Jeffrey  contributory  negligent.    Then,  Cambria  sued  

24

Jeffrey  for  negligence  to  recover  for  car  damages  in  lawsuit  #2.    No  issue  preclusion  b/c  Jeffrey’s  contributory  negligence  essential  to  #1,  not  Jeffrey’s  negligence.]  

i. Note:  See  if  party  in  lawsuit  #2  could  appeal  verdict  in  lawsuit  #1.  If  nothing  to  appeal,  issue  not  decided.  

ii. Note  circuit  split  on  what  happens  if  #1  found  Jeffrey  negligent  and  Cambria  not  negligent.    Can  either  say  neither  strictly  necessary  to  judgment,  or  both  necessary.  

e. Lawsuit  #1  and  #2  have  the  same  party/privity  f. Panniel  –  cannot  apply  issue  preclusion  mechanically,  even  when  all  req.  elements  courts  can  still  use  

discretion,  exceptions:  i. (1)  no  appeal  in  lawsuit  #1  (2)  question  of  law  really  different  (3)  change  in  proceedings  in  #1  vs.  

#2  (4)  change  in  burden  ex.  criminal  case  (5)  hurts  third  parties  who  cannot  foresee  new  action  and  have  no  opportunity/incentive  to  #1  

 Ask:  did  the  party  being  estopped  (from  the  issue)  litigate  the  issue  in  previous  case?    If  no,  then  cannot  invoke  issue  preclusion  b/c  they  have  not  had  their  day  in  court.    

g. Non-­‐mutual  defensive  issue  preclusion  (new  D  against  old  P)  –  used  by  new  D  in  lawsuit  #2  seeking  to  defend  claim  against  old  (same)  P  from  lawsuit  #1  with  issue(s)  that  were  previously  litigated  against  D  in  lawsuit  #1.  

i. Blonder-­‐Tongue  Labs  (1971)  –  if  sued  before  and  lost,  can  be  estopped  1. [Lawsuit  #1  U.  Illinois  v.  X,  jury  found  patent  invalid;  Lawsuit  #2  U.  Illinois  v.  Y,  

collateral  estoppel  on  issue  of  patent  validity]  ii. Claimant  is  only  person  who  can  get  estopped  and  he  choses  forum;  will  want  to  add  all  Ds  

together  (incentive  to  join)  iii. Policy  rationales:  save  $,  time,  “aura  of  the  gaming  table”  

 h. Non-­‐mutual  offensive  issue  preclusion  (new  P  against  old  D)  –  used  by  old  (same)  D  in  lawsuit  #2  

seeking  to  help  establish  claim  against  new  P  from  lawsuit  #2  with  issue(s)  that  were  previously  litigated  against  D  in  lawsuit  #1  *discretionary  

i. Parklane  Hoisery  Co.  v  Shore  (1979)  –  if  sued  before  and  won,  may  be  estopped  but  court  should  apply  broad  discretion  and  not  apply  when:  (1)  P  easily  could  have  joined  earlier  action  or  (2)  unfair  to  D    

1. [Lawsuit  #1  SEC  v.  Parklane,  jury  found  proxy  statement  false  and  misleading;  Lawsuit  #2  Shore  v.  Parklane,  collateral  estoppel  on  issue  of  proxy  statement  b/c  class  action  could  not  have  joined  SEC  action,  and  D  had  full  incentive  to  fight  SEC  action]  

ii. Respondent  is  only  person  who  can  get  estopped  and  he  does  not  choose  forum  iii. Same  policy  rationales,  but  disadvantages:  

1. Wait  and  see  –  incentive  to  see  if  others  win  and  then  use  against  D  later  2. Foreseeability  –  could  D  fairly  foresee  other  cases?  3. Change  in  procedure  –  respondent  has  no  idea  where  might  get  dragged  into  court  4. Inconsistent  verdicts  –  if  inconsistent  prior  verdicts  then  cannot  use;  RR  hypo,  first  25  

Ps  lose  but  P26  wins,  subsequent  Ps  also  win  (incentives  settlement)    

5. Arbitration:  Form  of  ADR  to  resolve  disputes  outside  of  court.    Results  in  legally  binding  decision  by  voluntarily  chosen  private  decision  maker.    Governed  under  9  USC  §1-­‐11.    Policy  rationale:  quick  and  dirty  way  to  settle  disputes,  moral  informal,  designed  to  save  time  and  $    Embryone  –  arbitration  does  not  waive  substantial  rights,  just  moves  them  to  a  different  forum    

a. §2  –  written  agreement  to  settle  by  arbitration  is  valid,  irrevocable  and  enforceable,  applies  to  controversy  hereafter  arising  or  existing  controversy  

b. §3  –  party  can  apply  to  stay  district  court  action  until  arbitration  completed  [Embryone,  discretionary,  can  dismiss  if  all  issues  before  court  are  subject  to  arbitration]    

25

c. §4  –  if  party  fails,  neglects  or  refuses  to  arbitrate,  then  can  file  motion  to  compel  arbitration  with  district  court;  need  to  produce  evidence  re:  making  of  agreement  and  failure  to  comply  

d. §9  –  arbitration  award  must  be  submitted  to  court  and  court  must  grant  order  e. §10  –  court  can  vacate  award  procured  by  corruption,  fraud  or  undue  means,  but  not  for  getting  law  

wrong  f. §11  –  court  can  modify/correct  award  upon  application  of  parties  

   STATE  LAW  IN  FEDERAL  COURT  –  federalism  Q  

1. RDA  §1652  –  The  laws  of  the  several  states,  except  where  the  Constitution  or  treaties  of  the  US  or  acts  of  Congress  otherwise  require  or  provide,  shall  be  regarded  as  rules  of  decision  in  civil  actions  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  in  cases  where  they  apply  

a. If  fed  statute,  constitutional  provision,  or  treaty  applies,  it  will  provide  governing  law  b. Otherwise,  fed  courts  should  apply  relevant  state  law  

2. Swift  (Story,  1842)  –  RDA  requires  fed  courts  in  diversity  cases  to  apply  relevant  state  statutes  (passed  by  leg)  to  case,  but  not  bound  to  follow  common  law  rulings  of  judges  (in  other  states,  treatises)  *narrow  reading  of  RDA  

a. Old  view:  (1)  legislatures  make  laws  (2)  courts  interpret  and  apply  law    (3)  states  have  statutes,  local  usages,  +  common  law  (4)  both  fed/state  courts  look  at  same  sources,  common  law  as  general  body  of  principles  carried  over  from  English  law  

b. Problems:  i. Creates  forum-­‐shopping  ii. “Schizophrenia  of  administrative  justice  within  a  single  state”  inconsistent  judicial  rulings  in  

same  state  on  same  legal  issue  [Black  &  White  Taxicab,  B&W  reincorporated  in  KY  for  diversity,  agreement  illegal  under  KY  common  law  but  ok  under  fed  common  law,  different  result  in  fed  ct  v.  state  ct]  

5. Erie  (Brandeis,  1938)  –  federal  court  in  diversity  must  apply  state  substantive  law,  whether  law  is  made  by  statute  or  common  law  [trespassing  man  hit  by  RR,  apply  PA  law  (no  duty)  or  fed  law  (duty)]  

a. New  view:  (1)  no  such  thing  as  general  common  law  (2)  courts  make  law  too  (authorized  by  Congress)  (3)  state  courts  make  state  law  (4)  fed  courts  make  fed  law  in  limited  areas  

b. Foundations  of  Erie:  i. Policy,  twin  aims  of  Erie:  (1)  discourage  forum-­‐shopping  (2)  avoid  inequitable  administration  of  

justice,  vertical  uniformity  ii. Statutory:  RDA,  fed  courts  apply  state  law  iii. Constitution:  Congress  cannot  write  normal  contract/property/tort  law  of  states,  reserved  to  

states  under  10A  c. Klaxon  (1941)  –  federal  court  in  diversity  must  apply  state  substantive  law  that  would  be  applied  by  

state  courts  in  state  where  fed  court  sits,  choice-­‐of-­‐law  i. Doesn’t  really  prevent  forum  shopping  b/c  state  choice  of  law  has  various  applications;  tends  to  

favor  local  litigants  d. Standard  Oil  (1947)  –  sometimes  fed  interests  req.  application  of  fed  law  (ex.  water  pollution,  military,  

one  state  suing  another  state);  where  Congress  has  not  acted  affirmatively  to  regulate  essential  federal  matter,  fed  judiciary  has  power  to  address  it  by  creating  “federal  common  law"  

i. Has  Congress  enacted  fed  rule?  1. Yes,  apply  fed  common  law  (natl  uniformity)  2. No,  wait  for  Congress  (natl  uniformity)  [military  payment  case,  do  not  create  fed  

common  law,  defer  to  Congress  b/c  would  upset  balance  of  branches]  3. No,  incorporate  state  law  by  reference  (natl  uniformity  not  a  concern)    

6. When  there  is  fed  practice  but  no  fed  rule,  Hanna  I  “relatively  unguided”-­‐  a. Guaranty  Trust  (1945)  –  apply  outcome  determinative  test  –  if  outcome  different  depending  on  which  

law  applies,  then  apply  state  law,  retrospective,  refusal  to  label  procedural  v.  substantive  [apply  fed  laches  b/c  state  SOL  would  bar  P’s  case]  

i. Stresses  uniformity,  same  result  in  state/fed  court  that  are  block  apart  

26

ii. Problem:  retrospectively,  after  violate  rule,  will  always  affect  outcome,  will  always  lead  to  substitution  of  state  procedure  for  fed  procedure  

b. Byrd  (1958)  –  rules  of  form  and  mode  (procedure)  v.  state  created  rights  and  obligations  (substantive)  i. If  state  created  rights  and  obligations…  generally  defer  to  state  rule  (for  uniformity)  ii. Sometimes  countervailing  federal  interests  (i.e.  essential  characteristic  of  fed  judicial  system)  

might  be  sufficiently  strong  to  outweigh  Guaranty  Trust’s  emphasis  on  uniformity,  then  apply  fed  law.    Unclear  what  is  countervailing  fed  interest,  ex.  Constitutional  right  to  jury  

c. Hanna  –  modified  outcome  determinative  test,  prospective,  apply  twin  aims  of  Erie  +  Byrd  sensitivity  to  other  policies  

7. When  there  is  FRCP  (i.e.  REA  involved),  Hanna  II-­‐  a. REA  §2072  

i. A)  Ct.  has  power  to  proscribe  rules  of  practice  and  procedure  ii. B)  Limits:  cannot  abridge,  enlarge  or  modify  any  substantive  right  

b. Hanna  (1965)  [service  under  FRCP  4  (leave  at  house)  or  MGL  (in  hand,  1  yr),  apply  FRCP]  i. Does  Congress  have  power  to  regulate  this  question  (i.e.  enact  FRCP?  Yes,  Congress  has  power  

under  Article  III  to  mandate  procedure  in  fed  courts  that  is  “rationally  capable  of  classification  as  procedural”  i.e.  arguably  procedural  (broad)  

1. Procedural  =  enforces  rights/duties  recognized  by  substantive  law  and  for  justly  administering  remedy  and  redress  for  disregard  or  infraction  of  them  

2. Concurrence  (Harlan):  arguably  procedural  no  good,  instead  look  to  real  effects  on  ground.    If  affects  primary  conduct,  then  substantive.    If  not,  procedural.  

ii. Has  Congress  delegated  power  to  Court  in  REA?  Yes,  §2072(a)  iii. Is  the  Rule  valid?  Yes,  if  actually  procedural,  §2072(a)  practice  +  procedure  

1. Rebuttal:  §2072(b)  abridges,  enlarges  or  modifies  substantive  right  *unlikely,  need  to  show  Congress/S.  Ct.  were  wrong  

iv. Apply  Rule  if  valid  (supremacy  clause)  8. When  there  is  fed  statute  (i.e.  REA  not  involved)  

a. Fed  law  governs  unless  1)  unconstitutional  b/t  violates  constitutional  right  b)  fed  law  not  “arguably  procedural”    

9. WTF  should  I  do  with  this:    Substantive  =  rights/duties,  remedy  Procedural  =  enforces  rights/duties  recognized  by  substantive  law  and  for  justly  administering  remedy  and  redress  for  disregard  or  infraction  of  them    

 a. Is  the  origin  of  the  claim  state  law  (diversity)?  b. Can  Congress  regulate  this  question  i.e.  is  it  arguably  procedural?  

i. No,  then  substantive  and  apply  state  law  [Erie]  *note  element  of  claim  is  always  substantive    

c. Yes,  If  Congress  has  passed  statute  specific  to  question,  use  fed  statute    

d. Yes,  if  fed  practice  but  no  fed  rule  on  point,  Then  Hanna  I  “relatively  unguided”  i. *Enough  for  most  cases  Twin  aims  of  Erie,  use  fed  rule  if:  

1. Applying  fed  rule  will  not  result  in  equitable  admin  of  justice  (substantial  difference  in  litigation)  

2. Applying  fed  rule  will  not  encourage  forum  shopping  3. Note  this  is  basically  modified  outcome  determinative  test  –  outcome  significantly  

different  if  fed  rule  used,  strongly  favors  using  state  law,  apply  retrospectively  [Guaranty  Trust,  Walker]  v.  prospectively  [Hanna]  

ii. *When  fed  rule  involves  essential  characteristic  of  fed  court  system,  Byrd  balancing  approach  1. State  rule  “bound  up  with”  underlying  state  right,  strongly  supports  using  state  rule  

27

2. Fed  countervailing  interest,  if  applying  state  law  would  alter/disrupt  essential  characteristic  of  fed  judicial  system,  then  use  fed  rule.    Balance  state/fed  interest.    Can  be  sufficiently  strong  to  outweigh  Guaranty  Trust’s  emphasis  on  uniformity.    Ex.  constitutional  right  to  jury    

e. Yes,  if  federal  directive  on  point  (FRCP  or  other  fed  law),  Then  Hanna  II  *apply  fed  directive  if  valid,  no  FRCP  ever  invalidated  

i. Is  there  a  direct  conflict/collision  b/t  state  and  fed  rule?  1. No,  Hanna  I  2. Yes,  Hanna  II  3. Can  avoid  direct  conflict  by  interpreting  fed  rule  narrowly  

a. Walker  (1980)  [no  conflict  b/t  FRCP  3  and  OK  SOL  b/c  commencing  means  different  things,  then  apply  Hanna  I  analysis]  

b. Shady  Grove  Ginsburg:  [no  conflict  b/t  FRCP  23  and  NY  state  law  b/c  just  about  remedy,  apply  Hanna  I  analysis,  would  lead  to  forum  shopping/ineq.  admin  so  apply  state  rule]  

 ii. Has  Congress  delegated  power  to  Court  in  REA?  Yes,  §2072(a)  iii. Is  the  Rule  valid?  Yes,  if  actually  procedural,  §2072(a)  practice  +  procedure;  (b)  cannot  abridge,  

enlarge  or  modify  substantive  right  1. Shady  Grove  Scalia:  Actually  procedural  if  really  regulates  procedure  and  thus  cannot  

affect  substantive  rights,  do  not  care  about  purpose  of  state  rule  [turning  10,000  $500  claims  into  $5M  claim  does  not  affect  remedies,  FRCP  23  really  regulates  procedure  of  class  actions  and  thus  cannot  affect  substantive  rights  [FRCP  3  actually  procedural,  valid,  apply  Rule]  

2. Shady  Grove  Stevens:  test  is  not  arguably  procedural,  test  does  intrude  into  state  policy.    Is  state  rule  substantive?    If  not,  is  it  intertwined  w/  substance  so  as  to  define  the  scope  of  the  right?    In  grey  area,  then  apply  state  rule.  But  this  is  totally  unclear  as  to  what  =  substantive  [FRCP  3  not  substantive  or  intertwined  with  substance,  valid,  apply  Rule]  

a. Ex.  SOL,  burden  of  proof,  appellate  standards  of  review  all  bound  up  w/  substantive  right  

b. Question:  did  state  have  substantive  reason,  extrinsic  policy  reason  iv. Apply  Rule  (supremacy  clause)  

 Comparative  Civ  Pro  (German  Advantage)    Convergence:  managerial  judging  more  compatible  with  theory  of  German  procedure  than  our  own.    We  would  need  to  take  one  step  further  to  achieve  convergence:  from  judicial  control  to  judicial  conduct  of  the  fact-­‐gathering  process    We  could  inflate  pre-­‐trial  process  w/  managerial  judging  ex.  experts,  bifurcate  trial.    But  we  are  locked  in  constitutionally  to  jury  system.       American   German  Judicial  control  of  sequence  

More  adversarial  –  parties  responsible  for  gathering/sifting  evidence  

More  inquisitorial  –  judges  responsible  for  gathering/sifting  evidence  Can  figure  out  issue  at  beginning  and  quickly  end  trial,  efficiency  (time  and  $)  

Witnesses   Parties  select  and  examine,  each  party  bears  costs,  discovery  enormously  $$  

Judge  selects  and  examines,  parties  can  suggest/nominate,  losing  party  pays  

Experts   Hired  guns,  general  jury  distrust  of  experts,  highly  compensated  

Judges  select  from  state  list,  prior  experience  as  expert,  “judges’  aides”  

28

Judicial  incentives   Drawn  from  attorneys,  either  elected  or  appointed,  has  drawbacks  but  we  value  democracy  

Professional  civil  service  bureaucracy,  own  career  path,  prized  career,  compensated  better,  specialized  courts,  mentors  

Trial   7A  jury,  promotes  system  of  concentrated  trial  

No  jury,  no  distinction  b/t  trial  and  pretrial  

Appellate  review   Various  standards,  facts  found  by  judge  reviewed  for  clear  error,  jury  such  that  it  is  not  crazy  

All  facts  found  by  judge  are  reviewed  de  novo  

 Settle  disputes,  find  truth,  promote  justice,  make  fair  decisions,  protect  public’s  confidence  in  the  system.    Party  autonomy.    (1)  notice  pleading  (2)  jurisdiction  (3)  discovery  (3)  jury  selection  (4)  12(b)(6)  +  50,  56  (5)  ADR.    No  way  to  really  avoid  unfairness  /  injustice  to  some  interest.