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ALAMEDA1225 Fallon Street1225 Fallon Street

CivilOakland, CA 94612

LeiRoi Bowie, et al. v. Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc., et al.

Lawrence A. Organ (SBN 175503); Navruz Avloni (SBN 279556)California Civil Rights Law Group332 San Anselmo Avenue, San Anselmo, CA 94960

(415) 453-4740 (415) 785-7352Plaintiffs Bowie, Ross, Martin, and Roberson

Five (5)

09/04/2020Navruz Avloni

SUMMONS(CITACION JUDICIAL)

, Deputy (Adjunto)

Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California SUM-100 [Rev. July 1, 2009]

SUMMONS Code of Civil Procedure §§ 412.20, 465 www.courts.ca.gov

[SEAL]

SUM-100

(For proof of service of this summons, use Proof of Service of Summons (form POS-010).)(Para prueba de entrega de esta citatión use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-010).)

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The name, address, and telephone number of plaintiff's attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is: (El nombre, la dirección y el número de teléfono del abogado del demandante, o del demandante que no tiene abogado, es):

DATE:(Fecha)

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: (AVISO AL DEMANDADO):

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FOR COURT USE ONLY (SOLO PARA USO DE LA CORTE)

NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served1.2.

as an individual defendant.as the person sued under the fictitious name of (specify):

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under:

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CCP 416.10 (corporation)CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation)CCP 416.40 (association or partnership)

CCP 416.60 (minor)CCP 416.70 (conservatee)CCP 416.90 (authorized person)

by personal delivery on (date)other (specify):

on behalf of (specify):

Page 1 of 1

NOTICE! You have been sued. The court may decide against you without your being heard unless you respond within 30 days. Read the information below. You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), your county law library, or the courthouse nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form. If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warning from the court. There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney referral service. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for free legal services from a nonprofit legal services program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services Web site (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), or by contacting your local court or county bar association. NOTE: The court has a statutory lien for waived fees and costs on any settlement or arbitration award of $10,000 or more in a civil case. The court's lien must be paid before the court will dismiss the case. ¡AVISO! Lo han demandado. Si no responde dentro de 30 días, la corte puede decidir en su contra sin escuchar su versión. Lea la información a continuación. Tiene 30 DÍAS DE CALENDARIO después de que le entreguen esta citación y papeles legales para presentar una respuesta por escrito en estacorte y hacer que se entregue una copia al demandante. Una carta o una llamada telefónica no lo protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estaren formato legal correcto si desea que procesen su caso en la corte. Es posible que haya un formulario que usted pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de la corte y más información en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.sucorte.ca.gov), en labiblioteca de leyes de su condado o en la corte que le quede más cerca. Si no puede pagar la cuota de presentación, pida al secretario de la corte quele dé un formulario de exención de pago de cuotas. Si no presenta su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso por incumplimiento y la corte le podráquitar su sueldo, dinero y bienes sin más advertencia. Hay otros requisitos legales. Es recomendable que llame a un abogado inmediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede llamar a un servicio deremisión a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado, es posible que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener servicios legales gratuitos de unprograma de servicios legales sin fines de lucro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de lucro en el sitio web de California Legal Services, (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, (www.sucorte.ca.gov) o poniéndose en contacto con la corte o elcolegio de abogados locales. AVISO: Por ley, la corte tiene derecho a reclamar las cuotas y los costos exentos por imponer un gravamen sobrecualquier recuperación de $10,000 ó más de valor recibida mediante un acuerdo o una concesión de arbitraje en un caso de derecho civil. Tiene que pagar el gravamen de la corte antes de que la corte pueda desechar el caso.

Clerk, by (Secretario)

Alameda County Superior Court, Civil1225 Fallon StreetOakland, CA 94612

Navruz Avloni, CA Civil Rights Law Group, 332 San Anselmo Ave, San Anselmo, CA 94960, 415-453-4740

Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. f/k/a Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc.; Mitsubishi Electric USHoldings, Inc. and DOES 1-10, inclusive

LeiRoi Bowie, Craig Martin, Gabriel Ross, and Lavell Roberson

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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LAWRENCE A. ORGAN (SBN 175503) NAVRUZ AVLONI (SBN 279556)

CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS LAW GROUP 332 San Anselmo Avenue

San Anselmo, California 94960 Tel.: (415) 453-4740

Fax.: (415) 785-7352 Email: [email protected]

[email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, LEIROI BOWIE, GABRIEL ROSS,

CRAIG MARTIN, LAVELL ROBERSON

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

LEIROI BOWIE, CRAIG MARTIN,

GABRIEL ROSS, LAVELL ROBERSON

Plaintiff,

v.

MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC US, INC. f/k/a MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC & ELECTRONICS

USA, INC.; MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC US HOLDINGS, INC.; and DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants.

_____________________________________

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Case No.

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES &

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1. Race Harassment (FEHA);2. Race Discrimination (FEHA);

3. Retaliation (FEHA);4. Failure to Prevent Harassment,

Discrimination and Retaliation (FEHA);5. Leave Interference/Retaliation (CFRA).

REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED


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INTRODUCTION

“How do you get a Black guy out of the tree? Cut the rope.”

-Mitsubishi Field Superintendent Kurt Bladecki

1. Throughout their employment at Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics US, Inc. and

Mitsubishi Electric US Holdings, Inc., Plaintiffs LeiRoi Bowie, Lavell Roberson, Gabriel Ross

and Craig Martin were subjected to racist comments by their supervisors, such as the one above.

Their supervisors referred to them as “undesirables,” “lazy,” and “dumb ass n***ers.”

2. Plaintiffs were subjected to visual images of the N-word, “KKK,” swastikas,

black monkeys, Satanic stars, and a noose that was left on a barricade next to Plaintiff Bowie’s

assigned elevator.

3. In addition to the hateful rhetoric and images, Plaintiffs were segregated and

given menial cleaning tasks, such as sweeping, and told to pass tools to white coworkers with

significantly less experience.

4. Plaintiffs, hard-working highly skilled mechanics in their 40s and 50s, most of

whom spent years in the trade and were just trying to work and provide for their families.

Instead, they were robbed of respect and deprived of dignity because of their color and race.

5. Years of abusive behavior and painful experiences took a harsh tool on Plaintiffs.

They exhibit signs of depression, anxiety, trauma, and PTSD. One Plaintiff ended up suffering a

stroke. Another spent last year in therapy trying to salvage his family after the emotional trauma

created by the job site threatened to break it apart. Plaintiffs also lost hundreds of thousands of

dollars because of the company’s discriminatory practices.

6. Plaintiffs are also here seeking injunctive relief, including training and

monitoring, to ensure they and other employees at Mitsubishi are protected against similar

conduct in the future.

PARTIES

7. Plaintiff LeiRoi Bowie is a 42-year-old African American man. He began his

employment with Defendants on approximately May 23, 2016 as a Probationary Helper and is

currently employed as an Elevator Mechanic. Plaintiff Bowie worked for Defendants at the


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following construction sites over the last four years, including but not limited to: the Apple

Campus in Cupertino; the Exchange, Transbay Block 8 and Soma Hotel in San Francisco; the

Hillsdale Mall in San Mateo; and 1100 Broadway and 385 14th Street buildings in Oakland,

California. Plaintiff is, and at all times relevant herein was, a resident of Oakland, California.

8. Plaintiff Craig Martin is a 50-year old African American man. He began his

employment with Defendants on approximately September 20, 2016 and continues to be

employed by Defendants to date as an Elevator Mechanic. Plaintiff Martin worked for

Defendants on the following construction sites over the last four years, including but not limited

to: the Apple Campus in Cupertino; the Townsend in San Francisco; the Gilead in Foster City;

the Hillsdale Mall in San Mateo; the Google building in Redwood City; the Apple building in

Sunnyvale; and 11 Broadway and 40 Harrison Street Buildings in Oakland, California.

9. Plaintiff Gabriel Ross is a 46-year old African American man. He began his

employment with Defendants on approximately January 11, 2018 as a Temporary Mechanic and

is currently employed as an Elevator Mechanic. Plaintiff Ross worked for Defendants at the

following construction sites over the last two and a half years, including but not limited to: the

Transbay Block 8 and 75 Howard in San Francisco; the Hillsdale Mall in San Mateo; the Gilead

in Foster City; and the Modera, 385 14th Street and 40 Harrison Street buildings in Oakland,

California.

10. Plaintiff Lavell Roberson is a 55-year old African American man. He began his

employment with Defendants on approximately January 17, 2017 as an Elevator Constructor and

is currently employed as a Temporary Mechanic. Plaintiff Roberson worked for Defendants at

the following construction sites over the last three and a half years, including but not limited to:

Scotts Boulevard in Santa Clara; the Exchange Building in San Francisco; the Gilead in Foster

City; the Hillsdale Mall in San Mateo; the Apple Building in Cupertino; and 385 14th Street in

Oakland, California.

11. Based on information and belief, Defendant Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. f/k/a

Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics US, Inc. (hereinafter “Mitsubishi”) is a private California

corporation, with headquarters in Cypress, California. It is the principal United States subsidiary


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of the parent company Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, based in Tokyo, Japan, and has more

than 50 locations throughout Northern America. Mitsubishi markets and supports consumers,

commercial and industrial electronic products including semiconductors, heating and air

conditioning systems, elevators and escalators, car vision systems and solar/photovoltaic power

modules. It consists of five distinct divisions, which include the Elevator and Escalator Division.

The company touts itself as a, “major name in elevators and escalators since the 1930s.”

Mitsubishi’s vertical transportation system includes hydraulic, high speed traction and Diamond

Trac machine-room-less elevators. During all relevant times, Mitsubishi employed Plaintiffs and

assigned them to construction sites in Alameda, San Francisco, San Mateo and Santa Clara

Counties.

12. Based on information and belief, Defendant Mitsubishi Electric US Holdings, Inc.

(“Mitsubishi Holdings”) is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware with

its principal place of business in Cypress, California. It is the umbrella organization for six US

affiliates of Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, including, Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA,

Inc. Mitsubishi Holdings, through its subsidiaries, provides the wholesale distribution of

electronic parts and electronic communications equipment for residential, commercial, and

industrial applications. Mitsubishi Holdings serves customers in the United States. Plaintiffs are

informed and believe and on that basis allege that Defendants Mitsubishi and Mitsubishi Electric

Holdings are alter egos and/or integrated enterprises such that the actions of one entity can be

and are attributable to the other entity. Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants Mitsubishi and

Mitsubishi Holdings were and are joint employers of Plaintiffs.

13. In addition to the Defendants named above, Plaintiffs sue fictitiously named

Defendants DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 474, because

their names, capacities, status, or facts showing them to be liable are not presently known.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that each of the fictitiously named

Defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and such

Defendants caused Plaintiffs’ damages as herein alleged. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint to


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show their true names and capacities, together with appropriate charging language, when such

information has been ascertained.

14. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times herein

mentioned each of the employees and/or Defendants were acting as the partner, agent, servant,

and employee of each of the remaining Defendants, and in so doing the things alleged herein was

acting within the course and scope of such agency and with the knowledge of the remaining

Defendants.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

15. Jurisdiction is proper because during all relevant times Defendants Mitsubishi and

Mitsubishi Holdings were doing business in the State of California, and their primary place of

business was based in Cypress, California. The subject matter of this suit is properly within the

jurisdiction of this Court, as the amount in controversy exceeds the amount for limited

jurisdiction cases.

16. Venue is proper in Alameda County as Plaintiffs at all relevant times worked for

Defendants at construction sites including in Alameda County, California. Venue is also proper

in Alameda County as many of the discriminatory and harassing actions alleged herein occurred

in Alameda County, California. Additionally, during all relevant times, Defendants’ Elevator and

Escalator Division’s Northern California branch office was located in Alameda County, 7303

Edgewater Drive, Suite E, in Oakland, California 94621. During all relevant times, Plaintiffs

worked in Defendants’ Elevator and Escalator Division.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

A. PLAINTIFF BOWIE

17. On or about November 1, 2019, Plaintiff Bowie timely filed a charge of

harassment and discrimination based on race and color, retaliation and failure to prevent

harassment, discrimination and retaliation against Defendant Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. with

the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), and received a Right to Sue notice

that same day.


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18. On or about August 19, 2020, Plaintiff Bowie timely amended his charge with the

DFEH to include Defendant Mitsubishi Electric US Holdings, Inc., as well as conduct that

occurred since his November 1, 2019 charge. He received a Right to Sue notice that same day.

B. PLAINTIFF ROBERSON

19. On or about November 1, 2019, Plaintiff Roberson timely filed a charge of

harassment and discrimination based on race and color, and failure to prevent harassment and

discrimination against Defendant Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. with the DFEH, and received a

Right to Sue notice that same day.

20. On or about August 19, 2020, Plaintiff Roberson timely amended his charge with

the DFEH to include Defendant Mitsubishi Electric US Holdings, Inc., to include a claim for

retaliation, as well as conduct that occurred since his November 1, 2019 charge. He received a

Right to Sue notice that same day.

C. PLAINTIFF ROSS

21. On or about January 9, 2020, Plaintiff Ross timely filed a charge of harassment

and discrimination based on race and color, retaliation and failure to prevent harassment,

discrimination and retaliation against Defendant Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. with the

Department of Fair Employment and Housing, and received a Right to Sue notice that same day.

22. On or about August 19, 2020, Plaintiff Ross timely amended his charge with the

DFEH to include Defendant Mitsubishi Electric US Holdings, Inc., as well as conduct that

occurred since his January 9, 2020 charge. He received a Right to Sue notice that same day.

D. PLAINTIFF MARTIN

23. On or around January 14, 2020, Plaintiff Martin timely filed a charge of

harassment and discrimination based on race and color, and failure to prevent harassment and

discrimination against Defendant Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. with the Department of Fair

Employment and Housing, and received a Right to Sue notice that same day.

24. On or about August 19, 2020, Plaintiff Martin timely amended his charge with the

DFEH to include Defendant Mitsubishi Electric US Holdings, Inc., to include a claim for


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retaliation, a claim for CFRA interference and retaliation, as well as conduct that occurred since

his January 14, 2020 charge. He received a Right to Sue notice that same day.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

25. Plaintiffs reallege and hereby incorporate by reference the foregoing paragraphs,

as though fully set forth herein.

26. Plaintiffs worked for Defendants and were assigned to construction sites where

they spent anywhere from three weeks to a year, depending on the size of the project. Plaintiffs

job duties included transforming empty, hollow hoistways to working elevators.

27. As part of the job, Plaintiffs encountered potential hazards on a daily basis, such

as heights, high-voltage electricity and moving mechanical parts. To perform their work

adequately, they required physical strength and stamina, as well as clear, critical and quick

thinking.

28. Plaintiffs have all completed a 4-year apprenticeship program and significant

schooling, and most have received additional certifications.

A. RACIST IMAGES ARE LEFT IN THE GENERAL WORK AREA TO

THREATEN AND HARASS BLACK WORKERS, INCLUDING PLAINTIFFS.

29. Throughout their employment at Mitsubishi, Plaintiffs Bowie, Ross, Martin and

Roberson were subjected to racist images and objects at their assigned construction sites. These

images and/or objects were found in the general work area, bathrooms, on Plaintiff’s property

and in their workspace. Because work sites consist of majority non-Black employees, Plaintiffs

believed these images were directed at them because of their color and race.

30. Plaintiffs Bowie, Ross, Martin and Roberson regularly observed racist images in

the general area of the worksite that ranged from swastikas to “KKK” to the N-word. Some of

these images were captured by Plaintiffs Ross and Bowie.

31. For example, in 2018, Plaintiff Ross observed a black monkey drawn on his

construction site. (See Exhibit 1.)

32. On October 16, 2019, Plaintiff Ross found an image of a hanging man located at

the entrance of an elevator at the 385 14th Street construction site. (Exhibit 2.)


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33. On January 2020, Plaintiff Ross found “KKK” written in the hallway of the 385

14th Street construction site. (Exhibit 3.)

34. On July 21, 2020, Plaintiff Bowie observed a hangman image with N-word slots

at his construction site. (Exhibit 4.)

35. Between 2017 and 2019, Mechanic in Charge (“MIC”) Jermaine Florence had a

large confederate flag sticker posted on his toolbox. The sticker remained on the worksite for

years and was observed by Plaintiffs.

36. Plaintiff Martin observed MIC Florence drawing confederate flags on elevators,

tables, and the hoist way. He complained to Supervisor Gary Butner about racist images in the

bathrooms and the elevator hoist way, including “dumb ass n*****” and the N-word. Butner

responded by saying that he did not see the images and had no idea what he was talking about.

Butner did not investigate Plaintiff Martin’s compliant. Helper James (last name unknown at this

time) told Plaintiff Bowie that he overheard Butner tell another employee, “I just got this brand

new swastika poster with wings on it.”

37. While in some cases not all Plaintiffs were subjected to the same above racist

conduct or were present to observe it, they learned of it shortly thereafter therefore contributing

to the hostile work environment they had to endure at Mitsubishi.

38. Plaintiff Martin complained to Human Resources Director Heather Greene at least

three to four times about the hostile work environment. Ms. Greene failed to investigate the

complaints or address them. The hostile work environment continued.

39. Based on information and belief, Black employees, including Plaintiffs, had

complained to Human Resources as far back as 2016 about racial harassment and discrimination

in the workplace, but the conduct continued.

40. While Defendants may have disciplined First-Year Apprentice Matthew Phillips

with respect to the noose and ultimately Superintendent Kurt Bladecki for engaging in years of

harassing behavior and discriminatory practices targeted at Black employees, Defendants

permitted said conduct to continue for years, as well as after said employees were disciplined.

Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to end the ongoing harassment, and to take adequate


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remedial measures to prevent the continuing nature of the acts. In this way, Defendants engaged

in and ratified the malicious and oppressive acts of racial harassment and discrimination directed

at Plaintiffs.

B. RACIST IMAGES ARE LEFT IN THE BATHROOMS TO THREATEN AND

HARASS BLACK WORKERS, INCLUDING PLAINTIFFS.

41. Plaintiffs Bowie, Ross, Martin and Roberson regularly observed racist images in

the bathrooms of their construction sites that ranged from swastikas to “KKK” to the N-word.

Some of these images were captured by Plaintiffs Ross and Roberson.

42. For example, on November 9, 2019, Plaintiff Ross found an image of a swastika

drawn inside the bathroom of the 385 14th Street construction site. (Exhibit 5.)

43. On July 2, 2020, Plaintiff Roberson observed “Dumb ass N***ers” written in a

bathroom of a construction site he was assigned to. (Exhibit 6.)

44. In July 2020, Plaintiff Ross observed an image of an individual bent over and

BLM written with an arrow pointing to the buttocks of that individual in the bathroom of the 75

Howard Street construction site. (Exhibit 7.)

45. While in some cases not all Plaintiffs observed the same bathroom images, they

learned of them through each other and other Black employees, which further contributed to the

hostile work environment they had to endure throughout their employment.

46. Defendants permitted said conduct to continue for years and based on information

and belief continue to do nothing about it to date. Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to

end the ongoing harassment, and to take adequate remedial measures to prevent the continuing

nature of the acts. In this way, Defendants engaged in and ratified the malicious and oppressive

acts of racial harassment and discrimination directed at Plaintiffs.

C. SATANIC STARS AND “KKK” ARE WRITTEN ON PLAINTIFF ROSS’S

TOOLBOX.

47. On April 13, 2018, Plaintiff Ross found Satanic stars and “KKK” written on his

toolbox. (Exhibit 8.)


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48. Plaintiffs Bowie, Martin and Roberson either directly observed these images or

heard about them immediately after they were discovered by Plaintiff Ross.

49. Apprentice Kevin Wright, Jr. admitted to drawing the Satanic Star and “KKK” on

Plaintiff Ross’ toolbox in April 2018.

50. Plaintiff Ross notified Human Resources Director Heather Greene about the Satan

star and the KKK drawn on his toolbox by apprentice Kevin Wright, Jr. yet she failed to prevent

future harassing and retaliatory conduct by him. Instead, Mr. Wright was temporarily moved to

another site for a short duration, only to be reassigned back to the same site as Plaintiff Ross

even though Plaintiff made it clear he did not wish to ever work again with Mr. Wright on the

same site.

51. Plaintiff Ross was never notified by Human Resources about the outcome of the

investigation. Based on Plaintiffs’ observations, Mr. Wright did not suffer any consequences for

his racist behavior. Mr. Wright’s employment at Mitsubishi continued uninterrupted, and he was

promoted shortly thereafter to a Mechanic in Charge position. Hence, Defendants ratified Mr.

Wright’s racist conduct.

52. After Mr. Wright’s conduct was brought to Human Resources’ attention, he began

retaliating against Plaintiff Ross by threatening him, and calling him a “rat mother f***er.”

53. Plaintiff Ross also requested that Superintendent Kurt Bladecki not assign him to

the same site as Mr. Wright because of the racist drawing on his toolbox and retaliatory conduct,

but his request was ignored. At the very next site (Hillsdale Mall in San Mateo), Plaintiff Ross

was scheduled to work on the same site as Mr. Wright. Plaintiff Ross complained to

Superintendent Bladecki but was told, “just do your f***ing job.” He then placed Plaintiff Ross

on the “broom” performing menial tasks, while Wright, who has significantly less experience

than Plaintiff Ross, performed elevator work. Plaintiff Ross then reached out to Human

Resources Director Greene, and Mr. Wright was finally moved to a different site.

D. A NOOSE IS PLACED ON A BARRICADE NEXT TO PLAINTIFF BOWIE’S

ASSIGNED ELEVATOR.


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54. On June 26, 2019, Plaintiff Bowie arrived to work to find a noose on a barricate

right next to his assigned elevator. (Exhibit 9.)

55. Plaintiffs Ross, Martin and Roberson either directly observed the noose or heard

about it immediately after it was discovered by Plaintiff Bowie.

56. Prior to his first day on this construction site, Plaintiff Bowie specifically

requested that Superintendent Bladecki not assign him to the same job site as MIC Florence. Mr.

Bowie made this request because MIC Florence had previously engaged in racist conduct and

directed such conduct at Plaintiff Bowie. MIC Florence had even inflicted physical harm on Mr.

Bowie previously when he let a hot and heavy metal rod fall and hit his face. Superintendent

Bladecki ignored Plaintiff Bowie’s request.

57. While First-Year Apprentice Matthew Phillips admitted to placing the noose at

Plaintiff Bowie’s work area, there is evidence to suggest that MIC Florence was also involved in

the incident. At least one witness notified Plaintiff Bowie that MIC Florence was responsible for

the noose, and another witness corroborates that MIC Florence participated in placing the noose

on the barricade next to Plaintiff Bowie’s elevator.

58. There was no job-related reason for the noose to be left in that area of the job site.

59. Plaintiff Bowie went to report the noose. MIC Florence instructed Plaintiff Bowie

to keep his name out of his mouth. MIC Florence continues to work as a mechanic in charge,

supervising a crew of approximately 20 employees.

E. SUPERVISORS REFER TO BLACK EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING PLAINTIFFS,

AS “UNDESIRABLES.”

60. “Undesirables” was a term Superintendents Kurt Bladecki and Russell Crowman,

as well as Adjuster Brian Falvey openly used to refer to Plaintiffs. Superintendents Bladecki and

Crowman laughed when doing so, and would make comments such as, “weed out the

undesirables,” referring to Plaintiffs, and Black employees in general.

61. In addition to referring to Plaintiffs as “undesirables,” supervisors talked to

Plaintiffs in a belittling, demeaning and degrading manner.


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62. Superintendent Bladecki often asked Plaintiff Roberson, “why don’t you just

quit,” even though Roberson had no write ups, and arrived on time and ready to work.

63. Superintendent Bladecki regularly told Plaintiff Roberson, “shut the fuck up” and

“fuck you.” To Plaintiff’s knowledge, Mr. Bladecki did not direct such language towards White

employees.

64. When Plaintiff Roberson asked Superintendent Bladecki not talk to like that and

told him he would go to the Union Hall, Superintendent Bladecki responded with, “do whatever

the F**k you want.” Superintendent Bladecki then retaliated against Plaintiff Roberson by

writing him up for not wearing gloves during non-working hours.

65. Plaintiffs Bowie, Ross and Martin either heard the above comments directed at

Roberson or were told about them by Roberson shortly after the incidents occurred.

66. Plaintiff Martin also heard Superintendent Bladecki refer to Black employees as

“lazy” and make comments such as, “fire the rest of their asses.”

67. While in some cases not all Plaintiffs were subjected to the same racist conduct or

were present to observe it, they learned of it shortly thereafter therefore contributing to the


68. Plaintiff Martin complained to Human Resources in 2018 about being labeled as

“undesirable” and assigned demeaning work. But no investigation was conducted,

Superintendent Bladecki was not disciplined, and the conduct continued.

69. Plaintiff Roberson complained to Ms. Greene about the following disrespectful

conduct directed at Black employees, including referring to them as “undesirables;” the

discriminatory job assignments and overtime opportunities; and the tools that were stolen from

his locker by the subject harasser MIC Florence. However, the conduct continued.

70. Based on information and belief, Human Resources Director Greene received

similar complaints over the years, but failed to take steps to stop the harassment directed at

Plaintiffs.

71. Defendants permitted said conduct to continue for years. Defendants failed to take

reasonable steps to end the ongoing harassment, and to take adequate remedial measures to


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prevent the continuing nature of the acts. In this way, Defendants engaged in and ratified the

malicious and oppressive acts of racial harassment and discrimination directed at Plaintiffs.

Based on information and belief, Defendants allege that Superintendent Kurt Bladecki was

ultimately disciplined for said conduct. However, Defendants were aware of his and others’

similar conduct for years prior to any discipline being taken, as well as that the conduct

continued thereafter. Therefore, their failure to act promptly and to take adequate and appropriate

remedial action constituted malicious and oppressive conduct.

F. SUPERVISORS USE RACIAL SLURS AND COMMENTS IN THE PRESENCE

OF PLAINTIFFS.

72. Superintendent Bladecki regularly directed racist comments, including the N-

word, at Plaintiffs.

73. When Plaintiff Robinson started working at Mitsubishi, an employee told him that

Superintendent Bladecki used the N-word openly even though employees have complained.

Plaintiff Roberson was told by another employee that Superintendent Bladecki continued to use

the N-word at work even if he didn’t do it the presence of Black employees.

74. Throughout his employment at Mitsubishi, Plaintiff Roberson heard employees

use the N-word in the workplace.

75. Superintendent Bladecki also regularly made racist comments in the workplace.

For example, he asked Plaintiff Roberson: “ How do you get a Black guy out of the tree? Cut the

rope.”

76. Superintendent Bladecki made racist comments to Plaintiff Martin too, such as

“Who let you in this trade, we don’t let Black guys in this trade.” In reference to Plaintiff

Roberson and another Black employee, Superintendent Bladecki told Plaintiff Martin, “these are

some of the dumbest Black people I’ve met in my life.” He also referred to Plaintiff Roberson as

a “dumb ass n***er” in Plaintiff Martin’s presence.

77. Superintendent Bladecki and Adjuster Brian Falvey encouraged such behavior in

the workplace. For example, Plaintiff Martin observed Falvey and Bladecki laughing at MIC


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Florence’s confederate flag gear – such as tee shirt and hat, while other employees looked on

confused or offended.

78. Plaintiff Martin also observed Falvey and Bladecki smiling and laughing as MIC

Florence called a Black employee a “dumb ass.” MIC Florence would regularly make racist

comments in the presence of Adjuster Falvey, who found them entertaining and took no steps to

stop them even though the Black employees around took offence.

79. For example, MIC Florence told Plaintiff Martin, “Man, if maybe you didn’t stay

in the ghetto you wouldn’t be so dumb,” trying to get Adjuster Falvey to laugh.

80. MIC Florence would also make jokes in front of Adjuster Falvey about Black

guys not being able to pronounce words, and Falvey would laugh.

81. MIC Florence also told Plaintiff Martin, in front of Adjuster Falvey, “where did

you learn to do elevators, in the hood?” Or when in front of the food truck, MIC Florence would

make comments to Plaintiff Martin such as, “go get that chicken, you like that chicken man.”

Adjuster Falvey would just smile or laugh.

82. In fact, Adjuster Falvey himself would engage in the conduct by directing

comments at Plaintiff Martin, such as, “You hanging out in the hood man, with your Black

folks? Where you hanging out man?” or “Man, you’re Black, why are you wearing a black

mask?”

83. Plaintiff Martin heard Florence call Black men, “dumb ass nicca” and “dumb ass

n****r.” In Plaintiff Martin’s presence, MIC Florence made offensive comments like, “you

Black people like to use your cocoa butter” and “make sure you put cocoa butter on that, I know

you have some.”

84. In front of Plaintiffs, MIC Florence commented about an area where Black

employees were congregated saying, “So f***ing Black, if I was a white man, I wouldn’t be able

to see.”

85. MIC Florence would openly say in front of Plaintiffs and other Black employees,

“I can’t get that close to Blacks, I’m white.”


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86. Superintendent Bladecki notified Plaintiff Martin that “Jermaine [Florence] talks

a lot of trash about Black people, he doesn’t like Black people.”

87. Black employees also heard MIC Florence use derogatory and offensive terms for

Black employees such as the N-word, “KKK” and “monkey,” and making comments such as,

“I’m not Black, my daddy worked for a living!” Plaintiffs either heard these comments and/or

learned of them when notified by their Black colleagues.

88. Plaintiffs observed MIC Florence wear a tee shirt and hat with a confederate flag.

His toolbox also had a confederate flag sticker. (Exhibit 10.) For several years, Florence had

“RIGGIN” written on his toolbox. In 2019, he asked employees to read it backwards, showing

the true purpose of having the word written on his tool box. Some Plaintiffs were present and

others learned about it shortly thereafter. All found it offensive.

89. Plaintiff Ross sent Ms. Greene a photograph of “RIGGIN” written on Mr.

Florence’s toolbox. The sign had been there for many years and she was aware of it, yet failed to

discipline Mr. Florence for his conduct. MIC Florence’s hostile workplace behavior continued

unabated.

90. While in some cases not all Plaintiffs were subjected to the same racist language

or were present to observe it, they learned of it shortly thereafter therefore contributing to the



reasonable steps to end the ongoing harassment, and to take adequate remedial measures to

prevent the continuing nature of the acts. In this way, Defendants engaged in and ratified the

malicious and oppressive acts of racial harassment and discrimination directed at Plaintiffs.

G. SUPERVISORS AT MITSUBISHI ADVANCE BLATANTLY

DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES BASED ON RACE WITH RESPECT TO JOB

DUTIES, PROMOTIONS AND OVERTIME OPPORTUNITIES.

92. During various times in their employment, Plaintiffs were segregated with other

Black employees and instructed to perform menial cleaning tasks. (Exhibits 11-12.)


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93. On or around October 31, 2018 and November 15, 2018, Plaintiff Ross sent

Human Resources Director Greene photographs showing Black employees segregated and

performing menial tasks. (See Exhibits 11-12.) However, the practice continued.

94. Plaintiffs, who are mechanics, continued to be assigned to demeaning cleaning

duties and instructed to pass tools to less qualified non-Black employees performing actual

mechanic work.

95. Plaintiffs were also not provided with the same professional development

opportunities and training available to non-Black employees with less experience.

96. Plaintiffs complained to supervisors and Human Resources about performing

menial tasks while white apprentices were given meaningful opportunities to learn elevator

work. Their complaints were ignored.

97. For example, Plaintiff Ross notified Human Resources, shortly after he joined the

company, about the menial tasks assigned to Black employees by supervisors. He even sent Ms.

Greene an email with photographs in which Black employees were segregated and in which he is

sweeping the floor even though he was a mechanic. Yet, Ms. Greene failed to take any steps to

stop the discriminatory practices at Mitsubishi.

98. Plaintiff Bowie complained to Superintendents Bladecki and Crowman, as well as

Adjuster Falvey about not having the opportunity to do electrical work on the elevators, a task

that was dominated by White employees. For example, Plaintiff Bowie explained he needed to

know the whole job (including the back end) to be a good mechanic. Falvey made excuses like,

“we have a tight schedule, don’t have time.” Yet he made time to train others with less

experience. Or, Falvey would say, “don’t get over your head, it’s too much for you.” Plaintiff

Bowie pointed out that there were “new hires, who just got into the trade and you’re teaching

them the back end, why can’t I learn the back end?” His requests and complaints were ignored.

99. When Plaintiff Roberson showed interest in a superintendent job, Superintendent

Bladecki told him to “shut that down.” Plaintiff Roberson attempted to apply for the job but was

notified that Superintendent Bladecki was blocking the opportunity.


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100. During their employment, Plaintiffs were also deprived of the same overtime

opportunities as non-Black employees.

101. Plaintiffs complained to their supervisors about being denied the same overtime

opportunities as White employees. Their complaints were ignored.

102. Plaintiffs were also sent home early on occasions while White apprentices spent

the day performing overtime work.

103. Supervisors Gary Butner, David Adams, Jim Bohag, Kurt Bladecki and Brian

Falvey, as well as Human Resources received complaints from Plaintiffs and other Black

employees about discriminatory practices. Nothing changed.


reasonable steps to end the ongoing harassing and discriminatory practices, and to take adequate

remedial measures to prevent the continuing nature of the acts. In this way, Defendants engaged

in and ratified the malicious and oppressive acts of racial harassment and discrimination directed

at Plaintiffs.

H. DEFENDANTS’ VIOLATIONS OF THE FEHA CAUSED PLAINTIFFS TO

SUFFER HARM.

105. The racial harassment and discrimination directed at Plaintiffs and Mitsubishi’s

failure to end it had a lasting effect on Plaintiffs’ emotional well-being.

106. Plaintiff Ross, a pastor who has been in good mental health prior to his

employment at Mitsubishi, has nightmares about his coworkers coming to his home and killing

him, has developed anxiety, depression and PTSD, and has sought treatment as a result.

107. Plaintiff Martin suffered a stroke in December 2018, which was caused in large

part by the stress he was under at work due to the harassment. He has struggled with emotional

distress as a result of his experience at Mitsubishi.

108. Plaintiff Bowie no longer feels safe in the workplace. His life was threatened with

the noose. Understandably, he is more guarded now, and has developed significant trust issues.

He has struggled with emotional distress as a result of his experience at Mitsubishi.


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109. Plaintiff Roberson, after all he has witnessed at Mitsubishi, dreads going to work.

He feels insecure and has developed low self-esteem as a result of the treatment he has been

subjected to. He finds himself in a “state of withdrawal” as a result of his experience and has

become “hermit-like.” He continues to struggle with emotional distress as a result of his

experience at Mitsubishi.

110. Plaintiffs Bowie, Ross, Martin and Roberson have also incurred lost wages as a

result of being sent home early, and missing opportunities for overtime and advancement.

111. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful acts, Plaintiffs are entitled to damages as set

forth herein.

112. Plaintiffs have hired private counsel to prosecute their claims. Pursuant to

California Government Code section 12965(b), and Civil Code sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(h),

Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs associated with the prosecution of these

claims.

113. Defendants’ acts were malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent with intent to vex,

injure, annoy, humiliate and embarrass Plaintiffs, and in conscious disregard of the rights or

safety of Plaintiffs and other employees. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Defendants’

managing agents, officers or directors ratified the wrongful conduct of their employees and

managers by knowing of the conduct and failing to take immediate remedial action and by

retaining the errant employees. In addition, for years management was aware of racially

harassing conduct including but not limited to racist graffiti in the workplace but failed to stop it

from continuing and failed to take adequate remedial action to ensure that the conduct stopped.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Race Harassment)

Cal. Govt. Code §12940, et seq.



115. Plaintiffs, who are Black and of African American descent, at all times were

employees covered by the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Government


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Code §§ 12940(a) and (j) which prohibit an employer from discriminating against and harassing

an employee on the basis of race and or color.

116. Defendants Mitsubishi and Mitsubishi Holdings were at all times employers

and/or joint employers as defined under the FEHA.

117. California Government Code section 12923(b) states that, “[a] single incident of

harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work

environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work

performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”

118. FEHA also explains that, “harassment creates a hostile, offensive, oppressive, or

intimidating work environment and deprives victims of their statutory right to work in a place

free of discrimination when the harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or

intrudes upon its victim, so as to disrupt the victim's emotional tranquility in the workplace,

affect the victim's ability to perform the job as usual, or otherwise interfere with and undermine

the victim's personal sense of well-being.” Gov. Code, § 12923(a). Defendants have failed to

fulfill their statutory duties as outlined in the FEHA.

119. Plaintiffs were subjected to severe and/or pervasive harassing conduct that created

a working environment that was hostile, intimidating, offensive, oppressive or abusive. Such

conduct included but was not limited to racial epithets and comments, racial images and objects,

belittling and demeaning language directed at Black employees, as well as assignment of

belittling and demeaning work and work assignments that treated Black employees less

favorably than non-Black employees.

120. Plaintiffs were offended, humiliated and distressed by said conduct, and it

disrupted Plaintiff’s emotional tranquility in the workplace.

121. The harassing conduct to which Plaintiffs were subjected to was so severe and/or

pervasive that a reasonable African American individual in Plaintiffs’ circumstances would have

considered the work environment to be hostile, intimidating, offensive, oppressive and abusive.

122. The racist conduct has remained similar, ongoing, and frequent throughout the

time the Plaintiffs have worked for Defendants. Because Defendants permitted said conduct to


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continue for years and failed to take reasonable steps to end the ongoing harassing conduct, and

to take adequate remedial measures to prevent the continuing nature of the acts, the ongoing and

consistent conduct never reached a degree of permanence. Accordingly, the continuing violation

doctrine applies here, and allows Plaintiffs to bring this action based on conduct that spans years

of time.

123. Defendants are strictly liable for the above described conduct that violates the

FEHA because company supervisors engaged in said conduct and because Defendants ratified

the conduct by failing to take adequate steps to end the harassment and prevent it from

continuing.

124. Here, the above mentioned Superintendents, Adjuster Falvey and Mechanic in

Charge Florence all had the ability to direct Plaintiffs’ daily work, assign tasks to them, train

them and discipline them.

125. Defendants are also liable for said conduct because once on notice, they failed to

take prompt, remedial and effective action to stop the harassers from continuing their harassment

and from deterring others from engaging in similar conduct. The remedial actions must be

designed, in part, to deter future harassment by the same offender or others. “[R]emedies should

be ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment.’ . . . ‘Employers should impose sufficient

penalties to assure a workplace free from [] harassment. . . . In evaluating the adequacy of the

remedy, the court may also take into account the remedy's ability to persuade potential harassers

to refrain from unlawful conduct.” Ellison v. Brady (9th Cir. 1991) 924 F.2d 872, 882. Here,

Defendants failed to engage in the required remedial action.

126. Defendants’ violations of the FEHA caused Plaintiffs to suffer harm as set forth

above.

127. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful acts, Plaintiffs are entitled to damages as set

forth herein.

128. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief requiring Defendants to develop additional

training for managers, supervisors, and other union workers to ensure that they are aware of the

laws regarding harassment and prohibitions against race harassment in particular including but


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not limited to use of the N-word, KKK, hangman’s nooses and other racist conduct. Plaintiffs

also seek monitoring for a period not less than three years wherein the conduct of Defendants’

employees are reviewed and assessed to ensure that the training is being effective.


California Government Code section 12965(b), Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney’s fees

and costs and expert witness fees associated with the prosecution of these claims.






retaining the errant employees. In addition, for years, management was aware of racially

harassing conduct including but not limited to racist graffiti in the workplace but failed to stop it

from continuing and failed to take adequate remedial action to ensure that the conduct stopped.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Race Discrimination)




132. Plaintiffs at all times were employees covered by the FEHA, California

Government Code section 12940(a), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against an

employee on the basis of color and race.

133. Defendants Mitsubishi and Mitsubishi Electric US Holdings, Inc. were at all times

employers as defined under the FEHA.

134. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs by ignoring the harassing conduct and

permitting it to continue, discriminating against Black employees with respect to assignments

and genuine promotion opportunities. Plaintiffs consistently asked for overtime opportunities and

non-menial assignments and electrical tasks which were provided to White employees. Their

requests for the most part fell on deaf ears.


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135. Additionally, White employees who arrived from out-of-state were provided with

housing accommodations and other benefits. Said benefits were not offered to Black employees.

Neither Plaintiffs Martin nor Roberson were provided with housing benefits when they arrived

from out-of-state, even though Plaintiff Roberson was specifically promised by Superintendent

Bladecki that he would receive such benefits. After Superintendent Bladecki met Plaintiff

Roberson in person on the first day, he revoked his promise to said benefits.

136. Superintendent Bladecki discriminated against Plaintiffs by disciplining them and

terminating and/or attempting to terminate them when he could.

137. For example, Bladecki attempted on at least three occasions to terminate Plaintiff

Roberson. While HR intervened to stop the terminations, it permitted Superintendent Bladecki to

continue his discriminatory conduct.

138. Superintendent Bladecki also discriminated against Plaintiff Martin by trying to

use Plaintiff Martin’s stroke as an opportunity to terminate his employment.

139. Because Defendants permitted said conduct to continue for years and failed to

take reasonable steps to end the ongoing discriminatory conduct, they failed to take adequate

remedial measures to prevent the continuing nature of the acts, and the ongoing and consistent

conduct never reached a degree of permanence. Accordingly, the continuing violation doctrine

applies here, and allows Plaintiffs to bring discriminatory conduct that spans years in this

lawsuit.

140. Defendants are strictly liable for the above described conduct because company

supervisors engaged in said conduct.

141. Here, the above mentioned Superintendents, Adjuster Falvey and Mechanic in

Charge Florence all had the ability to direct Plaintiffs’ daily work, assign tasks to them, train

them and discipline them.

142. Defendants are also liable for said conduct because once on notice, they failed to

take prompt, remedial and effective action to stop the harassers from continuing their harassment

and from deterring others from engaging in similar conduct. The remedial actions must be

designed, in part, to deter future harassment by the same offender or others. “[R]emedies should


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be ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment.’ . . . ‘Employers should impose sufficient

penalties to assure a workplace free from [] harassment. . . . In evaluating the adequacy of the

remedy, the court may also take into account the remedy's ability to persuade potential harassers

to refrain from unlawful conduct.” Ellison v. Brady (9th Cir. 1991) 924 F.2d 872, 882.

143. Defendants’ practice was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs’ harm.


above.

145. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful acts, Plaintiffs are entitled to damages and

injunctive relief as set forth herein.



and costs associated with the prosecution of these claims.






retaining the errant employees.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Retaliation)

Cal. Govt. Code §12940(h)



149. Plaintiffs complained of harassment and discrimination that violated the FEHA.

150. Defendants took no action to ensure that Plaintiffs Bowie, Ross, Roberson and

Martin were not retaliated against or threatened for having complained.

151. After their complaints, the harassment intensified, and Superintendent Bladecki

attempted to terminate Plaintiffs Ross, Roberson and Martin in response to their complaints

regarding harassment and/or discrimination in the workplace.


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152. For example, Plaintiff Roberson was retaliated against after he protested

Superintendent Bladecki’s refusal to award him housing accommodations, which White

employees receive. In response to his complaints, Superintendent Bladecki sent him to the

“broom” – where Roberson, an experienced mechanic, was tasked with cleaning and sweeping

floors while White apprentices, lower in the ladder and new to the trade, were given

opportunities to work on elevators.

153. Superintendent Bladecki decreased Plaintiff Roberson’s pay rate by

approximately $10 per hour shortly after he complained to Human Resources about the racial

harassment. And attempted on at least three occasions to terminate Plaintiff Roberson shortly

after Roberson complained about the hostile work environment and/or discriminatory conduct.

154. Plaintiff Ross was also retaliated against by Superintendent Bladecki after he

wrote a letter to upper management related to discriminatory treatment on the job site, such as

insufficient tools or plans on site for Black employees. Superintendent Bladecki asked him,

“Why did you do that,” and Ross said, “We didn’t have no tools.” Bladecki threatened Plaintiff

Ross by stating, “you know what, I’m going to put you at the end of the broom, and fire you.” As

soon as Superintendent Bladecki had an opportunity, he placed Plaintiff Ross “on the end of the

broom,” assigning him to menial tasks such as sweeping, and then attempted to fire him.

155. As for Plaintiff Martin, Superintendent Bladecki fired Martin in response to his

complaints to Human Resources about the harassing and discriminatory conduct directed at him

and other Black employees. Bladecki fired Martin when he had his first opportunity – a few days

after Plaintiff Martin suffered a stroke as a result of the stress caused by the hostile work

environment.

156. As for Plaintiff Bowie, he was transferred to a different site after complaining of a

noose, rather than all individuals involved in the incident being reprimanded and removed from

the construction site.

157. Defendants failed to take appropriate action to protect Plaintiffs and the harassing

conduct continued even after Plaintiffs complained about the harassing conduct to supervisors,

managers and human resources.


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158. Because Defendants permitted said conduct to continue for years and failed to

take reasonable steps to end the ongoing retaliatory conduct, they failed to take adequate

remedial measures to prevent the continuing nature of the acts, the ongoing and consistent

conduct never reached a degree of permanence. Accordingly, the continuing violation doctrine

applies here, and allows Plaintiffs to bring retaliatory conduct that spans years in this lawsuit.

159. As a result of Defendants action or inaction, Plaintiffs were subject to retaliation

and additional harassment.

160. Plaintiffs’ complaints were a motivating reason for the retaliatory actions of

Defendants.


above.

162. As a result of Defendants unlawful acts, Plaintiffs are entitled to damages and










retaining the errant employees and by engaging in the malicious, oppressive or fraudulent

conduct themselves.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation)





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166. Government Code section 12940(j)(1) states that all employers “shall take all

reasonable steps to prevent harassment from occurring.” Cal. Govt. Code § 12940(j)(1).

Government Code section 12940(k) makes it an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an

employer…to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination….” Cal. Govt.

Code § 12940(k).

167. Defendants Mitsubishi and Mitsubishi Holdings failed to take all reasonable steps

necessary to prevent the harassment, discrimination and retaliation described above.

168. Resources Director Heather Greene and Construction Director Matthew

Jaskiewicz received numerous complaints over a span of approximately half a decade about

Bladecki, Falvey and Florence’s harassing, discriminatory and retaliatory conduct yet failed to

stop it.

169. Given their position of power, Superintendent Bladecki and Adjuster Falvey also

had an obligation to stop the hostile work environment, including the harassing conduct of MIC

Florence, yet instead encouraged and proliferated it.

170. Defendants also knew or should have known that during all relevant times racially

offensive images and messages were written in the worksites, specifically areas used by their

Black employees, yet failed to investigate and stop the conduct from continuing and take

adequate remedial action to ensure that the conduct did not continue.

171. Defendants also failed to enact an anti-discrimination policy and/or failed to

distribute it appropriately, and failed to effectively train its employees on racial harassment or

discrimination, and retaliation. For the policies Defendants had in place, they failed to

effectively enforce those policies to ensure that harassment stopped and that potential harassment

was dissuaded.

172. As a result of Defendants’ violations of the FEHA, Plaintiffs suffered harm as set

forth above.

173. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful acts, Plaintiffs are entitled to damages and



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174. Plaintiffs have hired private counsel to prosecute his claims. Pursuant to








retaining the errant employees and that managing agents, officers or directors failed to stop the

harassing conduct from continuing once they were on notice of it.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (CFRA Leave Interference and Retaliation)

Cal. Govt. Code §12945.2, et seq. (as to Plaintiff Martin only)



177. The California Family Rights Act (hereinafter “CFRA”) requires employers to

provide twelve (12) weeks of leave for any employee who has been employed by the company

for over a year and has worked over 1250 hours for the employer over the previous year for

medical leave.

178. Defendants are employers as defined by the CFRA. Defendants have over 50

employees within a 75-mile radius of Plaintiff’s work sites. At the time of Plaintiff Martin’s

medical leave, he had been employed by Defendants for over one year, and had worked for

Defendants for over 1250 hours during the previous year.

179. In violation of the CFRA, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff. Plaintiff was

fired a few days after suffering a stroke and needing a couple of days off to receive medical

attention at the hospital. Plaintiff Martin was terminated from employment with Defendants in

substantial part because of his need for CFRA leave.


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180. Plaintiff Martin informed his supervisor that he was in the hospital and had

suffered a stroke. In response, a few days after Mr. Martin returned home from the hospital,

Superintendent Bladecki delivered to his home a termination notice and his last check.

181. Plaintiff Martin complained to Human Resources about said conduct. Nothing

was done. It was only after Plaintiff Martin raised the termination to the union, was he able to

eventually return.

182. By issuing Plaintiff Martin the termination notice, Defendants not only interfered

with his right to use CFRA leave, but also retaliated against him for using such leave.

183. As a result of Defendants’ violations of the CFRA, Plaintiff Martin suffered harm

as set forth above.

184. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful acts, Plaintiff Martin is entitled to damages as

set forth herein.

185. Plaintiffs have hired private counsel to prosecute his claims. Pursuant to








retaining the errant employees and that managing agents, officers or directors failed to stop the

harassing conduct from continuing once they were on notice of it.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request judgment against Defendants as follows:

1. General damages according to proof, however, no less than the jurisdictional limit

of this court;

2. Special damages in amounts according to proof, together with prejudgment

interest;


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3. Exemplary and punitive damages in amounts according to proof;

4. Attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Government Code section 12965 and any

other applicable statute;

5. Interest as provided by law;

6. Costs of suit incurred herein;

7. Injunctive relief to require Defendants to better train its staff on race harassment,

discrimination and retaliation, as well as, to conduct more thorough investigations and to take

effective remedial action to address the racist conduct and graffiti present at sites where their

employees work; and

8. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: September 1, 2020 CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS LAW GROUP

____________________________

LAWRENCE A. ORGAN NAVRUZ AVLONI

Attorneys for Plaintiffs LEIROI BOWIE, et al.


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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

PLAINTIFFS hereby demand a jury trial on all issues.

Dated: September 1, 2020 CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS LAW GROUP

____________________________

LAWRENCE A. ORGAN NAVRUZ AVLONI

Attorneys for Plaintiff LEIROI BOWIE, et al.

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 2

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Exhibit 12

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