Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG,Petitioners,vs.HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2Respondents.3D E C I S I O NCORONA,J.:In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5dated October 24, 2002.FACTS OF THE CASEThis case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6The main issue in this case is relatively simple:who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7his nephews and nieces,8his illegitimate child,9and thede factoadopted child10(ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.The alleged heirs of Josefa DelgadoThe deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, hisPartida de Casamiento14stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado"(the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father.16Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa DelgadoSometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita"or unmarried woman.The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;184. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.The alleged heirs of Guillermo RustiaGuillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect asampun-ampunan.During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child,19the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption22of theirampun-ampunanGuillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction."23The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustiavda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGSOn May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgadovda. deDanao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustiavda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26(2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) theampun-ampunanGuillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgadovda. deDanao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia werenevermarried but had merely lived together as husband and wife.On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgadovda. dede la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgadovda. deDanao, who had died on May 18, 1987.On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgadovda. dede la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.27The dispositive portion of the decision read:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.SO ORDERED.28On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time.29They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30which was dismissed bythe Court of Appeals.31However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33read:As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.xxx xxx xxxThe respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.xxx xxx xxxIn this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.xxx xxx xxxA review of the trial courts decision is needed.xxx xxx xxxWHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court herebyAFFIRMSthe Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for theAPPROVALof the private respondents Record on Appeal and theCONTINUANCEof the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.SO ORDERED.Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34partially set aside the trial courts decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,35the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:With the further modification, our assailed decision isRECONSIDEREDandVACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. A new one is herebyRENDEREDdeclaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrators qualification and posting of the bond.The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 isREMANDEDto the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.Hence, this recourse.The issues for our resolution are:1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;3. who should be issued letters of administration.The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa DelgadoA presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 3.Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:xxx xxx xxx(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;xxx xxx xxxIn this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgadovda. deDanao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita"or unmarried woman.39We are not persuaded.First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which areprima facieevidence of the facts stated therein.44No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.Second, Elisavda. deAnson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.Third, the baptismal certificate45was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein,46such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety.Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa DelgadoTo determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them.48On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad ConcepcionsPartida de Casamiento49identifyingLuis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado"(the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51were her natural children.52Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeedab intestato(from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit thatsuccession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are herbrothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her deathon September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is thesoleheir to the estate:SECTION 1.Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds.x x x (emphasis supplied)The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo RustiaIntervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia onlyafterthe death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother)61by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.62On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but amere groundby which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66In this case, intervenor Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.67Did intervenors report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.The same misfortune befalls theampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from themab intestato. We quote:Adoption is a juridical act, a proceedinginrem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.68Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and theampun-ampunanGuillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69nieces and nephews.70Entitlement To Letters Of AdministrationAn administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:Sec. 6.When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed.71The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases wherejustice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates,72a situation which obtains here.It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgadovda. dede la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is herebyDENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMEDwith the following modifications:1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is herebyANNULLED.2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustiavda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall bepercapita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall beper stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustiavda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgadovda. dede la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.No pronouncement as to costs.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010MAY D. AONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI,Petitioners,vs.INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as Special Administrator,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPEREZ,J.:On appeal1is the Decision2dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576. In the said decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the Orders3of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and their siblings4to intervene in the estate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.5The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July 2, 2004 and January 26, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is hereby issued enjoining respondents [petitioners], their agents and anyone acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the assailed Orders. No costs.6The antecedents are:Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966.7He died without issue.8On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration9with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latters estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently pending before the intestate court.10On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation11before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis.12The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmotherIsabelwas, at the time of Rodolfos death, the legal spouse of the latter.13For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.14As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter.15To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following documents:a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;16b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;17andc.) Their respective proof of births.18It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful representatives.The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its Special Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo.In its Comment to the Manifestation,19the respondent called attention to the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946.20As it turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John Desantis.21The document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as "married."22The respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry, constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.23According to the respondent, Isabels previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.24On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement proceedings.25The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her behalf.26The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.27It ventured on the possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family from the social condemnation of having a child out of wedlock.28The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate court in its order dated 26 January 2006.29Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court.30In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the intestate court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvias birth certificate.31The appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that Sylvias birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts therein statedwhich includes the civil status of her parents.32Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriagethe Isabel-Rodolfo unionis a nullity for being bigamous.33From that premise, Isabel cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.Hence, the instant appeal.34The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari.35In nullifying the intestate courts order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of whether the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion.36Rather, it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining to Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo.37Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion exists, it would have found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or capriciously in issuing its assailed orders.38Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court is belied by the fact that the said orders may be supported by the two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo.39Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in addressing the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to inherit from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that there was none.40A proper evaluation of the evidence at hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had a previous marriage with John Desantis.41To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed between Isabel and John Desantis.42The conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in turn, only lend credibility to the position that no such marriage ever took place.Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be able to prove a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.43In assessing the probative value of such entries, the Court of Appeals should have taken note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples who, in order to "save face" and "not to embarrass their families," concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate.44Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is bigamous.We are not impressed.First ArgumentThe first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether the intestate court gravely abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.45Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.46Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a casethe mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the courts jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when it examined the evidence proving Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines whether the petitioners and their siblings have successfully established Isabels interest in Rodolfos estatewhich, as already mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.Second ArgumentThe second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfos estate.Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.47Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.48Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.49In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.50In clear and categorical language, Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.Pursuant to existing laws,51the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested.52In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvias birth certificate as untruthful statements made only in order to "save face."53They urge this Court to take note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue that the document on which they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabels prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.WHEREFORE,the instant appeal isDENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.Costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985ALICE REYES VAN DORN,petitioner,vs.HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTONrespondents.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:\In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.1Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings.2Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevadadivorceof the parties.The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.3As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:xxx xxx xxxYou are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.xxx xxx xxx4There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner,as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,5only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.6In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under whichdivorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by theFederal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109,et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.Without costs.[G.R. No. 138322.October 2, 2001]GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO,respondent.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision[1]and the March 24, 1999 Order[2]of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF.The assailed Decision disposed as follows:WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.[3]The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.The FactsRederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4]They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.On May 18, 1989,[5]a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.[6]Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7]In theirapplicationfor a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[8]Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[9]On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10]in the courta quo,on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994.She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriageandits subsequent dissolution.[11]He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12]thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.[13]Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.[14]The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[15]The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.[16]After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.Ruling of the Trial CourtThe trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines.It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is,respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.Hence, this Petition.[18]IssuesPetitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:1The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondentipso factoterminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.2The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent3The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.4The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.5The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australiaipso factocapacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.The Courts RulingThe Petition is partly meritorious.First Issue:Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha SamsonPetitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.CitingAdong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20]petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (thelex loci celebrationis).In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21]A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22]and 17[23]of the Civil Code.[24]In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26[25]of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[26]A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.[27]A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made.Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.decreesthat aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.[28]Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[29]Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.Divorce as a Question of FactPetitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.These articles read as follows:ART. 11.Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:x x xx x xx x x(5)If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;x x xx x xx x xART. 13.In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required toART. 13.In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.x x x.ART. 52.The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act of an Australian family court.Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.Respondent is getting ahead of himself.Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.[30]A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.[31]The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33]by the officer having legal custody of the document.If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[34]The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.[35]However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36]The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification.[37]Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.[39]Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40]Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries.By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and thevinculum juristhat had tied him to Philippine personal laws.Burden of Proving Australian LawRespondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment.He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.We are not persuaded.The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.[41]In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.[42]Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[43]Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.[44]The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.Second Issue:Respondents Legal Capacity to RemarryPetitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.Hence, she concludes that their marriage was voidab initio.Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.Respondents contention is untenable.In its strict legal sense,divorcemeans the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.But divorces are of different types.The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce ora vinculo matrimoniiand (2) limited divorce ora mensa et thoro.The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[45]There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce.It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.[46]Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again.The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:1.A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted.It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorceipso factorestored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49]of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.Significance of the Certificate of Legal CapacityPetitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license.According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.We clarify.To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned.The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court.A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner.A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint;[51](b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52](c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53](d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54]and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55](2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56](b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57](c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58](d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;[59]and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.We agree with petitioners contention that the courta quoerred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner.Failing in that, then the courta quomay declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, weREMANDthe case to the courta quofor the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed.No costs.SO ORDERED.Melo, (Chairman), Vitug,andSandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,concur.SECOND DIVISIONREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,P e t i t i o n e r ,-versus-CRASUS L. IYOY,R e s p o n d e n t.G.R. No. 152577Present:PUNO,Chairman,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR.,TINGA, andCHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.Promulgated:September 21, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:In this Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1]affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,[2]declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint[3]for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4]with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount ofP90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely theP90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5]the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7](2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;[8]and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus.[9]Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10]and, later on, a Motion,[11]to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders[12]and Commissions[13]issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14]considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and voidab initio, on the basis of the following findingsThe ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and voidab initio.[15]Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to witDefendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriageArticle 26 of the Family Code provides:Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and i