civil law - property registration (lex 2014)

Copyright 2014 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia First Release 2014 1

Presidential Decree No. 1529 - Property Registration Decree

Sec. 3 -Status of Other Pre-existing Land Registration System

Under the Torrens system of land registration, the State is required to maintain aregister of landholdings that guarantees indefeasible title to those included in theregister. The system has been instituted to combat the problems of uncertainty,complexity and cost associated with old title systems that depended upon proof of anunbroken chain of title back to a good root of title. The State issues an officialcertificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of theproperty described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted orwhat the law warrants or reserves.

Sps. Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi vs. Lilia V. Domingo, G.R. Nos. 195825 &195871, February 27, 2013

One of the guiding tenets underlying the Torrens system is the curtain principle, inthat one does not need to go behind the certificate of title because it contains all theinformation about the title of its holder. This principle dispenses with the need ofproving ownership by long complicated documents kept by the registered owner,which may be necessary under a private conveyancing system, and assures that all thenecessary information regarding ownership is on the certificate of title. Consequently,the avowed objective of the Torrens system is to obviate possible conflicts of title bygiving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and, as arule, to dispense with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of the registeredowner, the system gives him complete peace of mind that he would be secured in hisownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the coveredland.


The Philippines adopted the Torrens system through Act No. 496, also known asthe Land Registration Act, which was approved on November 6, 1902 and took effecton February 1, 1903. In this jurisdiction, therefore, "a person dealing in registeredland has the right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with theneed of inquiring further, except when the party has actual knowledge of facts andcircumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry".

Sps. Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi vs. Lilia V. Domingo, G.R. Nos. 195825 &


195871, February 27, 2013

Sec. 6 - General Functions

General Principles

The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Presidential Decree No.1529) is to finally settle title to real property in order to preempt any question on thelegality of the title except claims that were noted on the certificate itself at the timeof registration or those that arose subsequent thereto. Consequently, once the title isregistered under the said law, owners can rest secure on their ownership andpossession.

SM Prime Holdings, Inc. vs. Angela V. Madayag, G.R. No. 164687, February 12, 2009

Renato Tichangco, et al. vs. Alfredo Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. 150629, June 30, 2004

In its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious resolution ofcases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between thegeneral jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter's limited jurisdiction when actingmerely as a land registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear anddecide even controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving substantialissues. 22 When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to haveall the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. 23 It may,therefore, hear and determine all questions that arise from a petition for registration.


Under Section 6, P.D. 1529, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall exercisesupervision and control over all Registers of Deeds. It is well understood that"supervision and control" includes the authority to act directly whenever a specificfunction is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate. 27 As the public officerhaving supervision and control over Registers of Deeds, the Commissioner of LandRegistration therefore also has the authority to file the action himself.

Eagle Realty Corp. vs. Republic of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 151424, July 4, 2008

Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax declarations


and realty tax payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, theyare a good indication of possession in the concept of owner. These documentsconstitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property, for noone in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or atleast constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property fortaxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title tothe property. It also announces his adverse claim against the state and all other partieswho may be in conflict with his interest. More importantly, it signifies an unfeignedintention to contribute to government revenues an act that strengthens one's bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Zenaida Guinto-Aldana, et al., G.R. No. 175578, August 11,2010

Sec. 14 - Who may Apply

Paragraph 1

Paragraph 2

Paragraph 4

Paragraph 1

In accordance with the aforesaid laws, any person, by himself or through hispredecessor-in-interest, who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notoriouspossession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domainunder a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, may file in theproper trial court an application for registration of title to land, whether personally orthrough his duly authorized representative.

Peregrina Mistica vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 165141, September 11, 2009

The Property Registration Decree involves original registration through ordinaryregistration proceedings. Under Section 14 (1) of said law, the requisites for the filingof an application for registration of title are: that the property in question is alienableand disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or throughtheir predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious


possession and occupation; and that such possession is under a bona fide claim ofownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Joyce Y. Lim vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. Nos. 158630 & 162047, September 4, 2009

Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14 (1) of the PropertyRegistration Decree vary, however, with respect to their operation since the latteroperates when there exists a title which only needs confirmation, while the formerworks under the presumption that the land applied for still belongs to the State

Joyce Y. Lim vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. Nos. 158630 & 162047, September 4, 2009

The afore-quoted provision lays down the following requisites for registration oftitle thereunder: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land ofthe public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through theirpredecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim ofownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Neptuna G. Javier, G.R. No. 179905, August 19, 2009

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires theproperty sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time theapplication for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application ismade, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation ordisposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilizethe property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of thelength of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property hasalready been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there isalready an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative overthe property.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Iglesia Ni Cristo, G.R. No. 180067, June 30, 2009

Republic of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "thosewho by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been inopen, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation ofalienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired


ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length andquality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 anddoes not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposableduring the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to securejudicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienableand disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of thePublic Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act isfurther confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic (Malabanan), G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009

Republic of the Phil. vs. Iglesia Ni Cristo, G.R. No. 180067, June 30, 2009

Thus, there are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration oftitle under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529: (1) that the property in question is alienable anddisposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicant by himself or through hispredecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim ofownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The right to file the application forregistration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to 12 June 1945or earlier, by reason of the claimant's open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Ruby Lee Tsai, G.R. No. 168184, June 22, 2009

As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 yearsor more is not sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January1977, it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by theapplicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12 June 1945or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14 (1) of PD 1529.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Ruby Lee Tsai, G.R. No. 168184, June 22, 2009

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusionof Section 14 (1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both lawscommonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable anddisposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since


June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the impression that oneor the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act hassomehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the natureof the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property RegistrationDecree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather thanestablishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the PublicLand Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarilyestablished the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous,exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable landsof the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for theconfirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificateof title.

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009

(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "thosewho by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been inopen, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation ofalienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquiredownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length andquality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945and does not require that the lands should have been alienable anddisposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor isentitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soonas it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframeimposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the PublicLand Act is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the PropertyRegistration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode


of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domainlands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration thatthese are alienable or disposable. There must also be an expressgovernment manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or nolonger retained for public service or the development of national wealth,under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property hasbecome patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition ofproperty of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. Theperson acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescriptionunder the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof underSection 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial propertymay be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Underordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of apatrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years,in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitiveprescription, a person's uninterrupted adverse possession ofpatrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless ofgood faith or just title, ripens into ownership.


Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14 (1) andSection 14 (2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates registration on thebasis of possession, while Section 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis ofprescription. Registration under Section 14 (1) is extended under the aegis of theProperty Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section14 (2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.

In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period underSection 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and thethirty-year period available through Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decreein relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of athirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter concerns athirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48 (b) ofthe Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years ofpossession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under


Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinaryprescription under the Civil Code.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should notapply as well to Section 14 (1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code,it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to otherstatutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not boundto adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequentlegislation. Section 14 (2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registrationallowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists withrespect to Section 14 (1).

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009

Based on the aforesaid provisions, the three requisites for the filing of anapplication for registration of title under the first category are: (1) that theproperty in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2)that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest havebeen in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and(3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June1945 or earlier. In effect, the period of possession open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious must at least be 30 years computed from 12 June 1945 to the effectivityof Presidential Decree No. 1529 on 11 June 1978.

Section 14 (1) of the aforesaid law requires that the property sought to beregistered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application forregistration of title is filed.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Gregoria L. Diloy, G.R. No. 174633, August 26, 2008

Section 14, paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states the requirementsnecessary for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title to be issued. In accordancewith said provision, persons who by themselves or through theirpredecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domainunder a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, may file in theproper trial court an application for registration of title to land, whether personally orthrough their duly authorized representatives.

Fernanda Arbias vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 173808, September 17, 2008


It is doctrinally settled that a person who seeks confirmation of an imperfect orincomplete title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and hispredecessors-in-interest shoulders the burden of proving by clear and convincingevidence compliance with the requirements of Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth ActNo. 141, as amended. Accordingly, applicants for confirmation and registration ofimperfect title must prove: (a) that the land forms part of the alienable lands of thepublic domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, andnotorious possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the publicdomain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 12 June 1945.

The date "12 June 1945" under the aforequoted provision is a reiteration of Section4 of P.D. No. 1073, which, in turn, amended Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.The reckoning date under the Public Land Act, as amended, for the acquisition ofownership of public lands is likewise 12 June 1945 or earlier, and evidence ofpossession from that date or earlier is essential for a grant of an application forjudicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Imperial Credit Corp., G.R. No. 173088, June 25, 2008

Vernon T. Reyes vs. Republic, G.R. No. 141924, January 23, 2007

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of titlemust prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable landsof the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim ofownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. These requisites involve questions of factwhich are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of thecourt a quo are generally binding on this Court except for certain recognizedexceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrivedat conflicting findings.

Charles L. Ong vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 175746, March 12, 2008

As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30years or more is not sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of P.D. 1073 onJanuary 25, 1977, it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the pieceof land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started onJune 12, 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14 (1) ofP.D. 1529.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Hanover Worlwide Trading Corp., G.R. No. 172102, July 2,


2010

In a judicial confirmation of title under original registration proceedings, applicantsmay obtain the registration of title to land upon a showing that they or theirpredecessors-in-interest have been in (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notoriouspossession and occupation of (2) agricultural lands of the public domain, (3) under abona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, (4) for at least 30 years immediatelypreceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when preventedby war or force majeure. The burden of proof in land registration cases rests onapplicants who must show clear, positive and convincing evidence that their allegedpossession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by law.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Martin T. Ng, G.R. No. 182449, March 6, 2013

Paragraph 2

[w]ith the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basisfor original registration became Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescriptionunder the provisions of existing laws" to apply for original registration. Again, thethirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entireregime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true withrespect to Section 14 (1).


Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles onprescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil lawconcept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section14 (2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14 (1).


When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides thatpersons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under theprovisions of existing laws", it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basisfor the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specificallyallows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial propertybelonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whetherSection 14 (2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial


property of the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009

Paragraph (2) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529 is inapplicable because the propertysought to be registered has not been clearly shown to be a private land. For a piece ofland to be qualified for registration under paragraph (2) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529,the applicant must conclusively prove that the land is private and not part of the publicdomain. Otherwise, if the land is part of the disposable zone of the public domain, asin the instant case, the applicant must prove that he has complied with the conditionsunder paragraph (1) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529. This is premised on the basicdoctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownershipare presumed to belong to the State.


Republic of the Phil. vs. Efren M. Carrasco, G.R. No. 143491, December 6, 2006

Of course, it is possible that a piece of land may be segregated from the mass ofpublic land and, therefore, converted into a private land under the laws ofprescription. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith andwith just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other realrights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possessionthereof for thirty (30) years without need of title or of good faith. With suchconversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands"under Section 14 (2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquiredownership through prescription. However, as already explained above, respondentfailed to present sufficient evidence to prove its uninterrupted adverse possession ofthe property for thirty years. Neither has it been established that respondent'spredecessor-in-interest possessed the property for the length of time required forprescription to set in.


Bienvenido Gesmundo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119870, December 23, 1999

Paragraph 4

Said provision contemplates registration of lands acquired through modes otherthan those specifically enumerated under Section 14, P.D. No. 1529. Respondentacquired an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, thus, its application


for registration must comply with the requisites under paragraph (1) and not paragraph(4) of Section 14.


Sec. 21 - Requirement of Additional Facts and Papers; Ocular Inspection

In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty todetermine whether the issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a valid andexisting certificate of title. An application for registration of an already titled landconstitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, which is not allowed by law. But theRTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the surveyplan in order to determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms partof already titled property. The court may now verify this allegation based on therespondent's survey plan vis--vis the certificates of title of the petitioner and itspredecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves to establish the trueidentity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portionthereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibilitythat it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.

Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court may require the filing ofadditional papers to aid in its determination of the propriety of the application, basedon Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529:

SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocularinspection. The court may require facts to be stated in the application inaddition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and mayrequire the filing of any additional papers.

The court may also directly require the DENR and the Land Registration Authorityto submit a report on whether the subject property has already been registered andcovered by certificates of title, . . .



Sec. 23 - Notice of Initial Hearing, Publication, etc.

Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, explicitlyprovides that before the court can act on the application for land registration, thepublic shall be given notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of publication,mailing, and posting.

Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corp. vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 147359, March28, 2008

Sec. 32 - Review of Decree of Registration; Innocent Purchaser for Value

D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. vs. Ricaredo Panes, et al., G.R. No. 167232, July 31,2009

Modesta Luna vs. Juliana P. Luna, et al., G.R. No. 177624, July 13, 2009

Settled is the rule that no valid TCT can issue from a void TCT, unless an innocentpurchaser for value had intervened. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buysthe property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to or interestin the property, for which a full and fair price is paid by the buyer at the time of thepurchase or before receipt of any notice of the claims or interest of some other personin the property. The protection given to innocent purchasers for value is necessary touphold a certificate of title's efficacy and conclusiveness, which the Torrens systemensures.

Rabaja Ranch Dev't. Corp. vs. AFP Retirement And Separation Benefits System, G.R.No. 177181, July 7, 2009

Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a decree ofregistration may be reopened when a person is deprived of land or an interest thereinby such adjudication or confirmation obtained by actual fraud. On the other hand, anaction for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible butseeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered inother persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have abetter right. In both instances, the land of which a person was deprived should be thesame land which was fraudulently or erroneously registered in another person's name,


which is not the case herein, if the Court considers the allegations in petitioners'Complaints.

Heirs of Tomas Dolleton, et al. vs. Fil-Estate Management, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 170750,April 7, 2009

The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where fraudattended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud.As such, a title issued based on void documents may be annulled. Moreover,elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the State and itssubdivisions.


As the petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith, they cannot lean onthe indefeasibility of their TCT in view of the doctrine that the defense ofindefeasibility of a torrens title does not extend to transferees who take the certificateof title in bad faith. The Court cannot ascribe good faith to those who have not shownany diligence in protecting their rights.

Sps. Esmeraldo and Arsenia Vallido vs. Sps. Elmer and Juliet Pono, et al., G.R. No.200173, April 15, 2013

Indeed, a decree of registration or patent and the certificate of title issued pursuantthereto may be attacked on the ground of falsification or fraud within one year fromthe date of their issuance. Such an attack must be direct and not by a collateralproceeding. The rationale is this:

. . . [The] public should be able to rely on a registered title. TheTorrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be themost effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protecttheir indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established andrecognized.

Sps. Raymundo and Perla De Guzman vs. Praxides J. Agbagala, G.R. No. 163566,February 19, 2008

Miguel Ingusan vs. Heirs of Aureliano I. Reyes, G.R. No. 142938, August 28, 2007

An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceedingis to nullify the title and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title wasdecreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside suchjudgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or


collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment isnevertheless made as an incident thereof.


Heirs of Enrique Diaz vs. Elinor Virata, G.R. No. 162037, August 7, 2006

Undoubtedly, our land registration statute extends its protection to an innocentpurchaser for value, defined as "one who buys the property of another, without noticethat some other person has a right or interest in such property and pays the full pricefor the same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims orinterest of some other person in the property." An "innocent purchaser for value"includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

PNB vs. Ciriaco Jumamoy, et al., G.R. No. 169901, August 3, 2011

PNB is not an innocent purchaser for value. As we have already declared:

A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence beforeentering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or conditionof a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard andindispensable part of its operations.

There was no showing at all that it [PNB] conducted an investigation; that itobserved due diligence and prudence by checking for flaws in the title; that it verifiedthe identity of the true owner and possessor of the land; and, that it visited subjectpremises to determine its actual condition before accepting the same as collateral.

PNB vs. Ciriaco Jumamoy, et al., G.R. No. 169901, August 3, 2011

The petitioners were shown to have been deficient in their vigilance as buyers ofthe property. It was not enough for them to show that the property was unfenced andvacant; otherwise, it would be too easy for any registered owner to lose her property,including its possession, through illegal occupation. Nor was it safe for them to simplyrely on the face of Sy's TCT No. 186142 in view of the fact that they were aware thather TCT was derived from a duplicate owner's copy reissued by virtue of the loss ofthe original duplicate owner's copy. That circumstance should have already alertedthem to the need to inquire beyond the face of Sy's TCT No. 186142. There wereother circumstances, like the almost simultaneous transactions affecting the propertywithin a short span of time, as well as the gross undervaluation of the property in thedeeds of sale, ostensibly at the behest of Sy to minimize her liabilities for the capital


gains tax, that also excited suspicion, and required them to be extra-cautious indealing with Sy on the property.


Sec. 34 - Rules of Procedure

Norma S. Factor, et al. vs. Antonio V. Martel, Jr., G.R. No. 161037, February 4, 2008

Sec. 35 - Cadastral Survey Preparatory to Filing of Petition

Sec. 35 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, provide forthe publication of the application for registration and the schedule of the initialhearing. This is so since judicial cadastral proceedings, like ordinary administrativeregistration, are in rem, and are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure,and evidence. Due publication is required to give notice to all interested parties of theclaim and identity of the property that will be surveyed. And any additional territory orchange in the area of the claim cannot be included by amendment of the plan orapplication without new publication, otherwise the cadastral court does not acquirejurisdiction over the additional or amended claim. But where the identity and area ofthe claimed property are not the subjects of amendment but other collateral matters, anew publication is not needed.

Heirs of the Late Jose de Luzuriaga, et al. vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. Nos. 168848 &169019, June 30, 2009

Sec. 39 - Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title

The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of thejudgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is


imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a preconditionto the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on theland court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner toissue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is totransmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the LandRegistration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree ofregistration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligationsare ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and thus generallybeyond discretion of amendment or review.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Lourdes Abiera Nillas, G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007

Sec. 44 - Statutory Liens Affecting Title

Guaranteed Homes, Inc. vs. Heirs of Maria P. Valdez, et al., G.R. No. 171531, January30, 2009

Sec. 47 - Registered Land Not Subject to Prescription

Article 1126 54 of the Civil Code in connection with Section 46 of Act No. 496(The Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 (TheProperty Registration Decree), clearly supports this rule. Prescription is unavailing notonly against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.Possession is a mere consequence of ownership where land has been registered underthe Torrens system, the efficacy and integrity of which must be protected. Prescriptionis rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose objective is to suppress fraudulent andstale claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties ortheir representatives when the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or thedefective memory or death or removal of witnesses.

D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. vs. Ricaredo Panes, et al., G.R. No. 167232, July 31,2009

Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that "no title to registered land in derogation


of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adversepossession". Since petitioners are the registered owners of the lot in question, theadverse possession by the respondents cannot result to the forfeiture of theirownership. The trial court's declaration that petitioners are the owners of the subjectproperty only affirms petitioners' ownership which requires no specific and positiveact of execution which a sheriff may perform for enforcement unlike the other aspectsof the decision ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and to pay rentals.

Mary M. Bausa, et al. vs. Heirs of Juan Dino, et al., G.R. No. 167281, August 28, 2008

Under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation ofthe title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adversepossession. Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of landregistration proceedings. Barring any mistake or use of fraud in the procurement ofthe title, owners may rest secure on their ownership and possession once their title isregistered under the protective mantle of the Torrens system.

Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, theregistered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registeredproperty by reason of laches.

Xerxes A. Abadiano vs. Sps. Jesus and Lolita Martir, G.R. No. 156310, July 31, 2008

Sec. 48 - Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack

Rarely will the court allow another person to attack the validity and indefeasibilityof a Torrens certificate, unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon adirect action filed in court proceeded in accordance with law.

Zenaida Acosta, et al. vs. Trinidad Salazar, et al., G.R. No. 161034, June 30, 2009

Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree categorically provides that acertificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Dinah C. Castillo vs. Antonio M. Escutin, et al., G.R. No. 171056, March 13, 2009

An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action


is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title wasdecreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside suchjudgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, it is indirect or collateralwhen, in an action or proceeding to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgmentis nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

Gregorio Araneta University Foundation vs. RTC of Kalookan City, Branch 120, et al.,G.R. No. 139672, March 4, 2009

Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. vs. Ma Elvira Castillo, G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000

Such proscription has long been enshrined in Philippine jurisprudence. The judicialaction required to challenge the validity of title is a direct attack, not a collateralattack.

The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set asidesuch proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is indirect orcollateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the proceeding isnevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such action to attack a certificate of titlemay be an original action or a counterclaim, in which a certificate of title is assailed asvoid.

Elvira T. Arangote vs. Sps. Martin and Lourdes Maglunob, et al., G.R. No. 178906,February 18, 2009

Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 prohibits a collateral attack on a Torrens title. ThisCourt has held that a petition which, in effect, questioned the validity of a deed of salefor registered land constitutes a collateral attack on a certificate of title.

Sps. Protacio & Dominga Vicente vs. Delia Soledad Avera, et al., G.R. No. 169970,January 20, 2009

Title to a registered land cannot be collaterally attacked. A separate action isnecessary to raise the issue of ownership.

Sps. Jonel & Sarah Padilla vs. Isauro A. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 169956, January 19,2009

It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter beimpugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in a directproceeding permitted by law. . . .

The action of the petitioners against the respondents, based on the material


allegations of the complaint, is one for recovery of possession of the subjectproperty and damages. However, such action is not a direct, but a collateralattack of TCT No. 236044. (Emphasis supplied) DAaIHT

Sps. Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas vs. Sps. Victor and Elena Alinas, G.R. No. 158040,April 14, 2008

Sps. Aurora and Elpidio de Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No.158002, February 28, 2005

Indeed, a decree of registration or patent and the certificate of title issued pursuantthereto may be attacked on the ground of falsification or fraud within one year fromthe date of their issuance. Such an attack must be direct and not by a collateralproceeding. The rationale is this:

The public should be able to rely on a registered title. The Torrens System wasadopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure toguarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claimof ownership is established and recognized.


Miguel Ingusan vs. Heirs of Aureliano I. Reyes, G.R. No. 142938, August 28, 2007

An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceedingis to nullify the title and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title wasdecreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside suchjudgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect orcollateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment isnevertheless made as an incident thereof.


Heirs of Enrique Diaz vs. Elinor Virata, G.R. No. 162037, August 7, 2006

A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief andas an incident to the present action, an attack is made against the judgment grantingthe title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against ajudgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, setaside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seekrecovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of.


Asuncion Urieta Vda. de Aguilar vs. Sps. Raul and Ederlina Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402,July 5, 2010

An action is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title,thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attackis direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin itsenforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an actionto obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as anincident thereof.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando, Pampanga vs. Eduardo Soriano, Jr., etal., G.R. Nos. 153829 & 160909, August 17, 2011

In order for [petitioner] to properly assail the validity of the respondents' TCT, hemust himself bring an action for that purpose. Instead of bringing that direct action, hemounted his attack as a merely defensive allegation herein. Such manner of attackagainst the TCT was a collateral one, which was disallowed by Section 48 ofPresidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree).

Numeriano P. Abobon vs. Felicitas Abata Abobon, et al., G.R. No. 155830, August 15,2012

Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states that "a certificate of title shall not besubject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in adirect proceeding in accordance with law." An attack on the validity of the title isconsidered to be a collateral attack when, in an action to obtain a different relief andas an incident of the said action, an attack is made against the judgment granting thetitle.

Cagatao v. Almonte, G.R. No. 174004, October 9, 2013

A Torrens title is irrevocable and its validity can only be challenged in a directproceeding. The purpose of adopting a Torrens System in our jurisdiction is toguarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claimof ownership is established and recognized. This is to avoid any possible conflicts oftitle that may arise by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrenstitle and dispense with the need of inquiring further as to the ownership of theproperty. Hence, a Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon thewhole world unless it is nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction in a directproceeding for cancellation of title.



Time and again, the Court has repeatedly ruled that a person dealing with aregistered land has the right to rely on the face of the Torrens title and need notinquire further, unless the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts andcircumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such an inquiry.The indefeasibility of a Torrens title as evidence of lawful ownership of the propertyprotects buyers in good faith who rely on what appears on the face of the saidcertificate of title. Moreover, a potential buyer is charged with notice of only theburdens and claims annotated on the title.


There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked,but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked isthe certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is thatdocument issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the titlereferred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by thatdocument. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as aconcept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidenceof such ownership although both are interchangeably used.

Bagayas v. Bagayas, G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013, citingLacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011

It is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether [the certificate of] title wasprocured by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly institutedfor the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year afterthe date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, andnot by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot bechanged, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. Thecertificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor ofthe person whose name appears therein.

Bagayas v. Bagayas, G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013, citing Borbajov. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., G.R. No. 152440, January 31, 2005

The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be themost effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect theirindefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a personpurchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, heshould not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all.This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted,


public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have tobe attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof ofownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even morenumerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not evenviolent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system,should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditionslaid down by the law are satisfied.

Cagatao v. Almonte, G.R. No. 174004, October 9, 2013, citing Tenio-Obsequio v. Courtof Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1994

Sec. 51 - Conveyance and Other Dealings by Registered Owner

Thus, bereft of registration, any sale or transaction involving registered landoperates only as a contract between the parties and shall not affect or bind theregistered property.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Mabelle Ravelo, et al., G.R. No. 165114, August 6, 2008

Under the aforesaid provisions, the act of registration is the operative act to conveyor affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. Constructive notice is alsocreated upon registration of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment,order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land.

Sps. Protacio and Dominga Vicente vs. Delia Soledad Avera, et al., G.R. No. 169970,January 20, 2009

Armed Forces and Police Mutual Benefit Ass'n., Inc. vs. Ines Bolos Santiago, G.R. No.147559, June 27, 2008

Sec. 52 - Constructive Notice Upon Registration

Registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world. Every conveyance,mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affectingregistered land shall be, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of


Deeds of the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, constructivenotice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.


Sec. 53 - Presentation of Owner's Duplicate Upon Entry of New Certificate

Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, theregistration of the property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest inhim or her the title to the property. A certificate of title merely confirms or recordstitle already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not beused as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Goodfaith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be anexercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstandingthe long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding uponthe whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent,the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.

Sps. Ramon and Emma Reyes vs. Irene Montemayor, et al., G.R. No. 166516,September 3, 2009

From the time that petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was supposedly deprived ofownership of the subject lot through an alleged fraudulent sale, the same had alreadybeen sold thrice. Moreover, since the subject property was already covered by aTorrens title at the time that respondents bought the same, the law does not requirethem to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. The lot has, thus, passed torespondents, who are presumed innocent purchasers for value, in the absence of anyallegation to the contrary.

Padilla Mercado, et al. vs. Sps. Aguedo and Lourdes Espina, G.R. No. 173987,February 25, 2013

Sec. 69 - Attachments


Section 69 of P.D. No. 1529 refers to an attachment that arose after the issuance ofa certificate of title; while Section 71 of the same law pertains to the registration ofthe order of a court of an attachment that was continued, reduced, dissolved orotherwise affected by a judgment of the court. Undoubtedly, the foregoing provisionsfind no application in the present case since petitioner insists that its interest wasannotated prior to the reconstitution of the disputed certificates of title

Philippine Cotton Corporation vs. Naraindas Gagoomal, G.R. No. 130389, February 11,2008

Sec. 70 - Adverse Claim

Jimmy T. Go vs. Ildefonso M. Villanueva, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 154623, March 13, 2009

. . . a notice of adverse claim remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day periodprovided by Section 70 of PD 1529.

Sps. Jesus Ching and Lee Poe Tin vs. Sps. Adolfo and Arsenia Enrile, G.R. No.156076, September 17, 2008

Alfredo Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 102377, July 5, 1996

Sec. 71 - Surrender of Certificate in Involuntary Dealings

In this case, since respondent refuses to surrender the owner's duplicate certificateso that the attachment lien may be annotated, a court order is necessary in order tocompel the respondent to surrender her title. As a rule, the functions of the Register ofDeeds are generally regarded as ministerial and said officer has no power to pass uponthe legality of an order issued by a court of justice.

Armed Forces and Police Mutual Benefit Ass'n., Inc. vs. Ines Bolos Santiago, G.R. No.147559, June 27, 2008

Register of Deeds, Pasig, Rizal vs. Heirs of Hi Caiji, et al., G.R. No. L-7261, May 11,1956


Sec. 75 - Application for New Certificate Upon Expiration of RedemptionPeriod

In Padilla, Jr. v. Philippine Producers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,we categorically declared that in implementing the involuntary transfer of title of realproperty levied and sold on execution, it is not enough for the executing party to file amotion with the court which rendered judgment. The proper course of action is to filea petition in court, rather than merely move, for the issuance of new titles. In soruling, we cited Sections 75 and 107 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 59 whichprovide:

xxx

The above law provides for due process to a registered landowner and prevents thefraudulent or mistaken conveyance of land, the value of which may exceed thejudgment obligation. Thus, while there are good reasons justifying an executionpending appeal, the trial court erred in ordering the cancellation of CCTs and orderingthe issuance of new titles by mere motion. The proper course of action was to file apetition in court.

Estanislao Padilla, Jr. vs. Philippine Producers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,G.R. No. 141256, July 15, 2005

Sec. 76 - Notice of Lis Pendens

Lis pendens literally means "a pending suit", while a notice of lis pendens,inscribed in the certificate of title, is an announcement to the whole world that thecovered property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires interest inthe property does so at his own risk and subject to the results of the litigation. This isembodied in Section 76 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 which provides that noaction to recover possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to removeclouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or other proceedings of any kind incourt directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the


buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse anyjudgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as against persons other than theparties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution of such actionor proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of theinstitution thereof, together with a reference to the number of the certificate of title,and an adequate description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof,shall have been filed and registered. The notice that this provision speaks of thenotice of lis pendens is not a lien or encumbrance on the property, but simply anotice to prospective buyers or to those dealing with the property that it is underlitigation.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Mabelle Ravelo, et al., G.R. No. 165114, August 6, 2008

People of the Philippines vs. Regional Trial Court of Manila, G.R. No. 81541, October 4,1989

Sec. 77 - Cancellation of Lis Pendens

Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, a notice of lis pendensshall be deemed cancelled only upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk ofcourt in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposalthereof if there was a final judgment in favor of the defendant or the action wasdisposed of terminating finally all rights of the plaintiff over the property in litigation.

Isabelita Cunanan, et al. vs. Jumping Jap Trading Corp., G.R. No. 173834, April 24,2009

Section 77 of P.D. No. 1529 provides the appropriate measure to have a notice oflis pendens cancelled out from the title, that is by presenting to the Register of Deeds,after finality of the judgment rendered in the main action, a certificate executed by theclerk of court before which the main action was pending to the effect that the case hasalready been finally decided by the court, stating the manner of the disposal thereof.

J. Casim Construction Supplies, Inc. vs. Registrar of Deeds of Las Pias, G.R. No.168655, July 2, 2010


Sec. 100 - Register of Deeds as Party in Interest

Indisputably, the government is charged with the duty to preserve the integrity ofthe Torrens System and protect the Assurance Fund. The plaintiff instituted thecomplaint precisely to perform this duty. The Complaint seeks the cancellation oferroneously issued titles to protect the Assurance Fund from being made liable by theprivate respondents for damages in case they fail to recover the property. The publicofficer specifically tasked to perform this duty is the Register of Deeds who, underSection 100 of P.D. No. 1529, is authorized to file an action to annul a certificate oftitle erroneously or unlawfully issued, thus:

xxx xxx xxx


Sec. 101 - Losses Not Recoverable

Section 101 of P.D. No. 1529 clearly provides that the Assurance Fund shall not beliable for any loss, damage or deprivation of any right or interest in land which mayhave been caused by a breach of trust, whether express, implied or constructive. Evenassuming arguendo that they are entitled to claim against the Assurance Fund, therespondents' claim has already prescribed since any action for compensation againstthe Assurance Fund must be brought within a period of six (6) years from the time theright to bring such action first occurred, which in this case was in 1967.


Sec. 103 - Certificates of Title Pursuant to Patents

Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 25 mandates the registration ofpatents, and registration is the operative act to convey the land to the patentee, . . .


Rabaja Ranch Dev't. Corp. vs. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System, G.R.No. 177181, July 7, 2009

Rogelio Pasio, et al. vs. Teofilo Eduardo F. Monterroyo, et al., G.R. No. 159494, July31, 2008

Under the law, a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involvingpublic land is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued toprivate lands in the ordinary or cadastral registration proceeding. The effect of theregistration of a patent and the issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is tovest in him an incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if ownership hadbeen determined by final decree of the court, and the title so issued is absolutelyconclusive and indisputable, and is not subject to collateral attack.

Felix Ting Ho, Jr., et al. vs. Vicente Teng Gui, G.R. No. 130115, July 16, 2008

Sec. 107 - Surrender of Withheld Duplicate Certificates

In Padilla, Jr. v. Philippine Producers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,we categorically declared that in implementing the involuntary transfer of title of realproperty levied and sold on execution, it is not enough for the executing party to file amotion with the court which rendered judgment. The proper course of action is to filea petition in court, rather than merely move, for the issuance of new titles. In soruling, we cited Sections 75 and 107 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provide:

xxx

The above law provides for due process to a registered landowner and prevents thefraudulent or mistaken conveyance of land, the value of which may exceed thejudgment obligation. Thus, while there are good reasons justifying an executionpending appeal, the trial court erred in ordering the cancellation of CCTs and orderingthe issuance of new titles by mere motion. The proper course of action was to file apetition in court.

Estanislao Padilla, Jr. vs. Philippine Producers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,G.R. No. 141256, July 15, 2005


Sec. 108 - Amendment and Alteration of Certificates

Jose Sy Bang, et al. vs. Rosauro Sy, et al., G.R. No. 179955, April 24, 2009

The above provision requires that all interested parties must be duly notified of thepetitioner's application for amendment or alteration of the certificate of title. Reliefunder the said legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among theparties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party ininterest.

Albert Chua, et al. vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc., G.R. Nos. 165863 & 165875, April 10, 2013

In fact, based on settled jurisprudence, Section 108 of PD 1529 is limited only toseven instances or situations, namely: (a) when registered interests of any description,whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b)when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon thecertificate; (c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificateor any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (d) when the name of anyperson on the certificate has been changed; (e) when the registered owner has beenmarried, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right orinterest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation, whichowned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within threeyears after its dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable ground for the amendmentor alteration of title.

Bagayas v. Bagayas, G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013

The prevailing rule is that proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 are summaryin nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clericalbut certainly not controversial issues. Relief under said legal provision can only begranted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no adverse claim orserious objection on the part of any party in interest. This is now the controllingprecedent, and the Court should no longer digress from such ruling.

Bagayas v. Bagayas, G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013, citingPhilippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 163530, March 9, 2011


Sec. 109 - Notice and Replacement of Lost Duplicate Certificate

[T]he Court must clarify that a title is different from a certificate of title. Title isgenerally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It isthat which is the foundation of ownership of property, real or personal. Title,therefore, may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusivepossession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, onthe other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title,which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate ofTitle, issued subsequent to the original registration.

Dinah C. Castillo vs. Antonio M. Escutin, et al., G.R. No. 171056, March 13, 2009

To deny them the remedy under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 would leave them norecourse because the submission of the owner's duplicate of the title to the LBP is acondition to the payment of just compensation.

Heirs of Leticia Lopez-Cuevas vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 170539, July 9, 2008

Faustina Camitan, et al. vs. Fidelity Investment Corp., G.R. No. 163684, April 16, 2008

Sec. 110 - Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Original of Torrens Title

In Republic v. Tuastumban, the Court enumerated what needs to be shown beforethe issuance of an order for reconstitution: (a) that the certificate of title had been lostor destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and properto warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that thepetitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest therein; (d) that thecertificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed; and (e) that thedescription, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as thosecontained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.


Heirs of Quilo v. DBP-Dagupan Branch, G.R. No. 184369, October 23, 2013, citingRepublic v. Tuastumban, G.R. No. 173210, April 24, 2009

Based on the foregoing, reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title maybe done judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid down in RepublicAct No. 26; or administratively, in accordance with the provisions of Republic ActNo. 6732.

Enriquita Angat, et al. vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 175788, June 30, 2009

The requirements prescribed by Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 are mandatoryand compliance with such requirements is jurisdictional. Notice of hearing of thepetition for reconstitution of title must be served on the actual possessors of theproperty. Notice thereof by publication is insufficient. Jurisprudence is to the effectsettled that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of theland involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition.Compliance with the actual notice requirement is necessary for the trial court toacquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution. If no notice of the date ofhearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in theproperty involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution isnull and void.

Heirs of Quilo v. DBP-Dagupan Branch, G.R. No. 184369, October 23, 2013

It is judicially settled that a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over a petitionfor the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title, if the original is in factnot lost but is in the possession of an alleged buyer. Corollarily, such reconstitutedcertificate is itself void once the existence of the original is unquestionablydemonstrated. Nonetheless, the nullity of the reconstituted certificate does not by itselfsettle the issue of ownership or title over the property; much less does it vest such titleupon the holder of the original certificate. The issue of ownership must be litigated inappropriate proceedings. It cannot be determined in an action for the issuance of anew owner's duplicate certificate of title or in proceedings to annul such newly issuedduplicate.

Rosalia N. Espino vs. Sps. Celebi and Sharon Bulut, G.R. No. 183811, May 30, 2011,citing Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 56 Phil. 217 (1998)


Sec. 117 - Procedure

It is clear that the afore-quoted procedure applies only when the instrument isalready presented for registration and: (1) the Register of Deeds is in doubt withregard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of anydeed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration; or (2) where anyparty in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds withreference to any such instrument; and (3) when the registration is denied. None ofthese situations is present in this case.

St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc., et al. vs. Office of the Registry of Deeds of MakatiCity, et al., G.R. Nos. 174290 & 176116, January 20, 2009

Bon-Mar Realty and Sport Corp. vs. Sps. Nicanor and Esther De Guzman, et al., G.R.Nos. 182136-37, August 29, 2008

civil law - property registration (lex 2014)

Documents

torrens certificate

indefeasible title

officialcertificate

old title systems

good root of title

land registration systemunder

timeof registration

asthe land registration