civil liberties union v. executive secretary

7/17/2019 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIERTIES UNION, petitioner,vs.T!E E"ECUTIVE SECRET#R$, respondent.

G.R. No. 8381% February 22, 1991

#NTI&GR#FT LE#GUE OF T!E P!ILIPPINES, INC. a'( CRISPIN T. RE$ES, petitioners,vs.P!ILIP ELL# C. )UICO, a* Se+reary o- #rar/a' Re-or0 C#RLOS OMINGUE, a* Se+reary

o- #r/+u4ure LOURES 5UISUMING, a* Se+reary o- E(u+a/o', Cu4ure a'( Sor*FULGENCIO F#CTOR#N, )R., a* Se+reary o- E'7/ro'0e' a'( Naura4 Re*our+e* VICENTEV. )#$ME, a* Se+reary o- F/'a'+e SEFRE$ OROE, a* Se+reary o- )u*/+e FR#NLINN. RILON, a* Se+reary o- Labor a'( E04oy0e' LUIS S#NTOS, a* Se+reary o- Lo+a4Go7er'0e' FIEL V. R#MOS, a* Se+reary o- Na/o'a4 e-e'*e TEOORO F. ENIGNO, a*Pre** Se+reary )U#NITO FERRER, a* Se+reary o- Pub4/+ :or;* a'( !/<=ay* #NTONIO#RRI##L, a* Se+reary o- S+/e'+e a'( Te+<'o4oy )OSE CONCEPCION, a* Se+reary o-Tra(e a'( I'(u*ry )OSE #NTONIO GON#LE, a* Se+reary o- Tour/*0 #LFREO R.#.ENGON, a* Se+reary o- !ea4< REINERIO . RE$ES, a* Se+reary o- Tra'*ora/o' a'(Co00u'/+a/o' GUILLERMO C#R#GUE, a* Co00/**/o'er o- <e u(e a'( SOLIT#MONSO, a* !ea( o- <e Na/o'a4 E+o'o0/+ e7e4o0e' #u<or/y, respondents.

Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 8389. Antonio P. !orone" for petitioners in 838#$.

FERN#N, C.J.: p

These two (! petitions were consolidated per resolution dated Au"ust #, $#%% $ and are bein" resolved &ointl' as both see a declaration ofthe unconstitutionalit' of E)ecutive *rder No. %+ issued b' President Coraon C. A-uino on ul' /, $#%0. The pertinent provisions of theassailed E)ecutive *rder are1

2ec. $. Even if allowed b' law or b' the ordinar' functions of his position, a 3e3ber of the

Cabinet, undersecretar' or assistant secretar' or other appointive officials of the E)ecutive4epart3ent 3a', in addition to his pri3ar' position, hold not 3ore than two positions in the"overn3ent and "overn3ent corporations and receive the correspondin" co3pensationtherefor5 Provided , that this li3itation shall not appl' to ad hoc bodies or co33ittees, or toboards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chair3an.

2ec. . 6f a 3e3ber of the cabinet, undersecretar' or assistant secretar' or other appointiveofficial of the E)ecutive 4epart3ent holds 3ore positions than what is allowed in 2ection $hereof, the' (sic ! 3ust relin-uish the e)cess position in favor of the subordinate official who

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is ne)t in ran, but in no case shall an' official hold 3ore than two positions other than hispri3ar' position.

2ec. 7. 6n order to full' protect the interest of the "overn3ent in "overn3ent8owned orcontrolled corporations, at least one8third ($97! of the 3e3bers of the boards of suchcorporation should either be a secretar', or undersecretar', or assistant secretar'.

Petitioners 3aintain that this E)ecutive *rder which, in effect, allows 3e3bers of the Cabinet, theirundersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other "overn3ent offices or positions in additionto their pri3ar' positions, albeit sub&ect to the li3itation therein i3posed, runs counter to 2ection $7,

Article :66 of the $#%0 Constitution, which provides as follows1

2ec. $7. The President, :ice8President, the Me3bers of the Cabinet, and their deputies orassistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold an' other office ore3plo'3ent durin" their tenure. The' shall not, durin" said tenure, directl' or indirectl'practice an' other profession, participate in an' business, or be financiall' interested in an'contract with, or in an' franchise, or special privile"e "ranted b' the ;overn3ent or an'subdivision, a"enc', or instru3entalit' thereof, includin" "overn3ent8owned or controlled

corporations or their subsidiaries. The' shall strictl' avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

6t is alle"ed that the above8-uoted 2ection $7, Article :66 prohibits public respondents, as 3e3bersof the Cabinet, alon" with the other public officials enu3erated in the list attached to the petitions as

Anne) <C< in ;.R. No.%7%$/ 7 and as Anne) <B< in ;.R. No. %7%#= + fro3 holdin" an' other office or e3plo'3ent durin"their tenure. 6n addition to seein" a declaration of the unconstitutionalit' of E)ecutive *rder No.%+, petitioner Anti8;raft >ea"ue of the Philippines further sees in ;.R. No. %7%$/ the issuance ofthe e)traordinar' writs of prohibition and %anda%us, as well as a te3porar' restrainin" orderdirectin" public respondents therein to cease and desist fro3 holdin", in addition to their pri3ar'positions, dual or 3ultiple positions other than those authoried b' the $#%0 Constitution and fro3receivin" an' salaries, allowances, per die3s and other for3s of privile"es and the lie appurtenant

to their -uestioned positions, and co3pellin" public respondents to return, rei3burse or refund an'and all a3ounts or benefits that the' 3a' have received fro3 such positions.

2pecificall', petitioner Anti8;raft >ea"ue of the Philippines char"es that notwithstandin" theafore-uoted <absolute and self8e)ecutin"< provision of the $#%0 Constitution, then 2ecretar' ofustice 2edfre' *rdo?e, construin" 2ection $7, Article :66 in relation to 2ection 0, par. (!, Article6@8B, rendered on ul' 7, $#%0 *pinion No. 07, series of $#%0, / declarin" that Cabinet 3e3bers,their deputies (undersecretaries! and assistant secretaries 3a' hold other public office, includin"3e3bership in the boards of "overn3ent corporations1 (a! when directl' provided for in theConstitution as in the case of the 2ecretar' of ustice who is 3ade an e&'officio 3e3ber of theudicial and Bar Council under 2ection %, para"raph $, Article :6665 or (b! if allowed b' law5 or (c! ifallowed b' the pri3ar' functions of their respective positions5 and that on the basis of this *pinion,

the President of the Philippines, on ul' /, $#%0 or two (! da's before Con"ress convened on ul'0, $#%01 pro3ul"ated E)ecutive *rder No. %+. =

Petitioner Anti8;raft >ea"ue of the Philippines ob&ects to both 4* *pinion No. 07 and E)ecutive*rder No. %+ as the' alle"edl' <lu3ped to"ether< 2ection $7, Article :66 and the "eneral provisionin another article, 2ection 0, par. (!, Article 68@B. This <strained lina"e< between the two provisions,each addressed to a distinct and separate "roup of public officers one, the President and herofficial fa3il', and the other, public servants in "eneral alle"edl' <abolished the clearl' separate,hi"her, e)clusive, and 3andator' constitutional ran assi"ned to the prohibition a"ainst 3ultiple &obs
















for the President, the :ice8President, the 3e3bers of the Cabinet, and their deputies andsubalterns, who are the leaders of "overn3ent e)pected to lead b' e)a3ple.< 0 Article 6@8B, 2ection0, par. (! % provides1

2ec. 0. . . . . .

(n"ess ot)er*ise a""o*ed + "a* or + t)e pri%ar functions of )is position, no appointiveofficia" s)a"" )o"d an ot)er office or e%p"o%ent in t)e govern%ent or an su+division,agenc or instru%enta"it t)ereof, inc"uding govern%ent'o*ned or contro""ed corporations ort)eir su+sidiaries.

The 2olicitor ;eneral counters that 4epart3ent of ustice 4* *pinion No. 07, series of $#%0, asfurther elucidated and clarified b' 4* *pinion No. $#, series of $#%0 # and 4* *pinion No. $//,series of $#%%, $bein" the first official construction and interpretation b' the 2ecretar' of ustice of2ection $7, Article :66 and par. (! of 2ection 0, Article 68@B of the Constitution, involvin" the sa3esub&ect of appoint3ents or desi"nations of an appointive e)ecutive official to positions other than hispri3ar' position, is <reasonabl' valid and constitutionall' fir3,< and that E)ecutive *rder No. %+,pro3ul"ated pursuant to 4* *pinion No. 07, series of $#%0 is conse-uentl' constitutional. 6t is

worth notin" that 4* *pinion No. $#, series of $#%0 and 4* *pinion No. $//, series of $#%%construed the li3itation i3posed b' E.*. No. %+ as not appl'in" to e&'officio positions or topositions which, althou"h not so desi"nated as e&'officio are allowed b' the pri3ar' functions of thepublic official, but onl' to the holdin" of 3ultiple positions which are not related to or necessaril'included in the position of the public official concerned (disparate positions!.

6n su3, the constitutionalit' of E)ecutive *rder No. %+ is bein" challen"ed b' petitioners on theprincipal sub3ission that it adds e)ceptions to 2ection $7, Article :66 other than those provided in theConstitution. Accordin" to petitioners, b' virtue of the phrase <unless otherwise provided in thisConstitution,< the onl' e)ceptions a"ainst holdin" an' other office or e3plo'3ent in ;overn3ent arethose provided in the Constitution, na3el'1 ($! The :ice8President 3a' be appointed as a Me3berof the Cabinet under 2ection 7, par. (!, Article :66 thereof5 and (! the 2ecretar' of ustice is an e&'officio 3e3ber of the udicial and Bar Council b' virtue of 2ection % ($!, Article :666.

Petitioners further ar"ue that the e)ception to the prohibition in 2ection 0, par. (!, Article 68@B on theCivil 2ervice Co33ission applies to officers and e3plo'ees of the Civil 2ervice in "eneral and thatsaid e)ceptions do not appl' and cannot be e)tended to 2ection $7, Article :66 which appliesspecificall' to the President, :ice8President, Me3bers of the Cabinet and their deputies orassistants.

There is no dispute that the prohibition a"ainst the President, :ice8President, the 3e3bers of theCabinet and their deputies or assistants fro3 holdin" dual or 3ultiple positions in the ;overn3entad3its of certain e)ceptions. The disa"ree3ent between petitioners and public respondents lies onthe constitutional basis of the e)ception. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase <unlessotherwise provided in this Constitution< used in 2ection $7 of Article :66, the e)ception 3ust be

e)pressl' provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the :ice8President bein" allowed to beco3ea Me3ber of the Cabinet under the second para"raph of 2ection 7, Article :66 or the 2ecretar' ofustice bein" desi"nated an e&'officio 3e3ber of the udicial and Bar Council under Article :666,2ec. % ($!. Public respondents, on the other hand, 3aintain that the phrase <unless otherwiseprovided in the Constitution< in 2ection $7, Article :66 3aes reference to 2ection 0, par. (!, Article 68@B insofar as the appointive officials 3entioned therein are concerned.

The threshold -uestion therefore is1 does the prohibition in 2ection $7, Article :66 of the $#%0Constitution insofar as Cabinet 3e3bers, their deputies or assistants are concerned ad3it of the












broad e)ceptions 3ade for appointive officials in "eneral under 2ection 0, par. (!, Article 68@B which,for eas' reference is -uoted anew, thus1 <nless otherwise allowed b' law or b' the pri3ar'functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold an' other office or e3plo'3ent in the;overn3ent or an' subdivision, a"enc' or instru3entalit' thereof, includin" "overn3ent8owned orcontrolled corporation or their subsidiaries.<

De rule in the ne"ative.

A foolproof 'ardstic in constitutional construction is the intention underl'in" the provision underconsideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construin" a Constitution should bear in 3indthe ob&ect sou"ht to be acco3plished b' its adoption, and the evils, if an', sou"ht to be prevented orre3edied. A doubtful provision will be e)a3ined in the li"ht of the histor' of the ti3es, and thecondition and circu3stances under which the Constitution was fra3ed. The ob&ect is to ascertain thereason which induced the fra3ers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and thepurpose sou"ht to be acco3plished thereb', in order to construe the whole as to 3ae the wordsconsonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. $$

The practice of desi"natin" 3e3bers of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as 3e3bers of

the "overnin" bodies or boards of various "overn3ent a"encies and instru3entalities, includin""overn3ent8owned and controlled corporations, beca3e prevalent durin" the ti3e le"islative powersin this countr' were e)ercised b' for3er President erdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his 3artial lawauthorit'. There was a proliferation of newl'8created a"encies, instru3entalities and "overn3ent8owned and controlled corporations created b' presidential decrees and other 3odes of presidentialissuances where Cabinet 3e3bers, their deputies or assistants were desi"nated to head or sit as3e3bers of the board with the correspondin" salaries, e3olu3ents, per die3s, allowances andother per-uisites of office. Most of these instru3entalities have re3ained up to the present ti3e.

This practice of holdin" 3ultiple offices or positions in the "overn3ent soon led to abuses b'unscrupulous public officials who too advanta"e of this sche3e for purposes of self8enrich3ent. 6nfact, the holdin" of 3ultiple offices in "overn3ent was stron"l' denounced on the floor of theBatasan" Pa3bansa. $ This conde3nation ca3e in reaction to the published report of the

Co33ission on Audit, entitled <$#%7 2u33ar' Annual Audit Report on1 ;overn3ent8*wned andControlled Corporations, 2elf8;overnin" Boards and Co33issions< which carried as its i"ure No. +a <Roaster of Me3bership in ;overnin" Boards of ;overn3ent8*wned and Controlled Corporationsas of 4ece3ber 7$, $#%7.<

Particularl' odious and revoltin" to the peopleFs sense of propriet' and 3oralit' in "overn3entservice were the data contained therein that Roberto :. *n"pin was a 3e3ber of the "overnin"boards of twent'8nine (#! "overn3ental a"encies, instru3entalities and corporations5 63elda R.Marcos of twent'8three (7!5 Cesar E.A. :irata of twent'8two (!5 Arturo R. Tanco, r. of fifteen ($/!5esus 2. Gipolito and ;eroni3o H. :elasco, of fourteen each ($+!5 Cesar C. Hala3ea of thirteen($7!5 Ruben B. Ancheta and ose A. Ro?o of twelve ($! each5 Manuel P. Alba, ;ilberto *. Teodoro,and Ed"ardo Tordesillas of eleven ($$! each5 and >ilia Bautista and Teodoro I. Pe?a of ten ($!

each. $7

The blatant betra'al of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with theMarcos re"i3e. 6t was therefore -uite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhel3in" senti3entof the people that the $#%= Constitutional Co33ission, convened as it was after the peoplesuccessfull' unseated for3er President Marcos, should draft into its proposed Constitution theprovisions under consideration which are envisioned to re3ed', if not correct, the evils that flow fro3the holdin" of 3ultiple "overn3ental offices and e3plo'3ent. 6n fact, as eenl' observed b' Mr.ustice 6sa"ani A. Cru durin" the deliberations in these cases, one of the stron"est sellin" points of












the $#%0 Constitution durin" the ca3pai"n for its ratification was the assurance "iven b' itsproponents that the scandalous practice of Cabinet 3e3bers holdin" 3ultiple positions in the"overn3ent and collectin" unconscionabl' e)cessive co3pensation therefro3 would bediscontinued.

But what is indeed si"nificant is the fact that althou"h 2ection 0, Article 68@B alread' contains a

blanet prohibition a"ainst the holdin" of 3ultiple offices or e3plo'3ent in the "overn3entsubsu3in" both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Co33ission should see itfit to for3ulate another provision, 2ec. $7, Article :66, specificall' prohibitin" the President, :ice8President, 3e3bers of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants fro3 holdin" an' other office ore3plo'3ent durin" their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.

Evidentl', fro3 this 3ove as well as in the different phraseolo"ies of the constitutional provisions in-uestion, the intent of the fra3ers of the Constitution was to i3pose a stricter prohibition on thePresident and his official fa3il' in so far as holdin" other offices or e3plo'3ent in the "overn3ent or elsewhere is concerned.

Moreover, such intent is underscored b' a co3parison of 2ection $7, Article :66 with other provisions

of the Constitution on the dis-ualifications of certain public officials or e3plo'ees fro3 holdin" otheroffices or e3plo'3ent. nder 2ection $7, Article :6, <(N!o 2enator or Me3ber of the Gouse ofRepresentatives 3a' hold an' other office or e3plo'3ent in t)e -overn%ent . . .<. nder 2ection/(+!, Article @:6, <(N!o 3e3ber of the ar3ed forces in the active service shall, at an' ti3e, beappointed in an' capacit' to a civilian position in t)e -overn%ent, includin" "overn3ent8owned orcontrolled corporations or an' of their subsidiaries.< Even 2ection 0 (!, Article 6@8B, relied upon b'respondents provides <(!nless otherwise allowed b' law or b' the pri3ar' functions of his position,no appointive official shall hold an' other office or e3plo'3ent in t)e -overn%ent .<

6t is -uite notable that in all these provisions on dis-ualifications to hold other office or e3plo'3ent,the prohibition pertains to an office or e3plo'3ent in t)e govern%ent and "overn3ent8owned orcontrolled corporations or their subsidiaries. 6n striin" contrast is the wordin" of 2ection $7, Article:66 which states that <(T!he President, :ice8President, the Me3bers of the Cabinet, and their

deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold an' other officeor e3plo'3ent durin" their tenure.< 6n the latter provision, the dis-ualification is absolute, not bein"-ualified b' the phrase <in the ;overn3ent.< The prohibition i3posed on the President and hisofficial fa3il' is therefore all8e3bracin" and covers both public and private office or e3plo'3ent.

;oin" further into 2ection $7, Article :66, the second sentence provides1 <The' shall not, durin" saidtenure, directl' or indirectl', practice an' other profession, participate in an' business, or befinanciall' interested in an' contract with, or in an' franchise, or special privile"e "ranted b' the;overn3ent or an' subdivision, a"enc' or instru3entalit' thereof, includin" "overn3ent8owned orcontrolled corporations or their subsidiaries.< These sweepin", all8e3bracin" prohibitions i3posedon the President and his official fa3il', which prohibitions are not si3ilarl' i3posed on other publicofficials or e3plo'ees such as the Me3bers of Con"ress, 3e3bers of the civil service in "eneral

and 3e3bers of the ar3ed forces, are proof of the intent of the $#%0 Constitution to treat thePresident and his official fa3il' as a class b' itself and to i3pose upon said class stricterprohibitions.

2uch intent of the $#%= Constitutional Co33ission to be stricter with the President and his officialfa3il' was also succinctl' articulated b' Co33issioner :icente o after Co33issioner Re"aladoMaa3bon" noted durin" the floor deliberations and debate that there was no s'33etr' between theCivil 2ervice prohibitions, ori"inall' found in the ;eneral Provisions and the anticipated report on theE)ecutive 4epart3ent. Co33issioner o Co33ented, <De actuall' have to be stricter with the



President and the 3e3bers of the Cabinet because the' e)ercise 3ore powers and, therefore, 3orechees and restraints on the3 are called for because there is 3ore possibilit' of abuse in theircase.< $+

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office ore3plo'3ent in the "overn3ent durin" their tenure when such is allowed b' law or b' the pri3ar'

functions of their positions, 3e3bers of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants 3a' do so onl'when e)pressl' authoried b' the Constitution itself. 6n other words, 2ection 0, Article 68@B is 3eantto la' down the "eneral rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and e3plo'ees,while 2ection $7, Article :66 is 3eant to be the e)ception applicable onl' to the President, the :ice8President, Me3bers of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

This bein" the case, the -ualif'in" phrase <unless otherwise provided in this Constitution< in 2ection$7, Article :66 cannot possibl' refer to the broad e)ceptions provided under 2ection 0, Article 68@B ofthe $#%0 Constitution. To construe said -ualif'in" phrase as respondents would have us do, wouldrender nu"ator' and 3eanin"less the 3anifest intent and purpose of the fra3ers of the Constitutionto i3pose a stricter prohibition on the President, :ice8President, Me3bers of the Cabinet, theirdeputies and assistants with respect to holdin" other offices or e3plo'3ent in the "overn3ent

durin" their tenure. RespondentsF interpretation that 2ection $7 of Article :66 ad3its of the e)ceptionsfound in 2ection 0, par. (! of Article 6@8B would obliterate the distinction so carefull' set b' thefra3ers of the Constitution as to when the hi"h8ranin" officials of the E)ecutive Branch fro3 thePresident to Assistant 2ecretar', on the one hand, and the "eneralit' of civil servants fro3 the rani33ediatel' below Assistant 2ecretar' downwards, on the other, 3a' hold an' other office orposition in the "overn3ent durin" their tenure.

Moreover, respondentsF readin" of the provisions in -uestion would render certain parts of theConstitution inoperative. This observation applies particularl' to the :ice8President who, under2ection $7 of Article :66 is allowed to hold other office or e3plo'3ent when so authoried b' theConstitution, but who as an elective public official under 2ec. 0, par. ($! of Article 68@B is absolutel'ineli"ible <for appoint3ent or desi"nation in an' capacit' to an' public office or position durin" histenure.< 2urel', to sa' that the phrase <unless otherwise provided in this Constitution< found in

2ection $7, Article :66 has reference to 2ection 0, par. ($! of Article 68@B would render 3eanin"lessthe specific provisions of the Constitution authoriin" the :ice8President to beco3e a 3e3ber of theCabinet,$/ and to act as President without relin-uishin" the :ice8Presidenc' where the Presidentshall not nave been chosen or fails to -ualif'.$= 2uch absurd conse-uence can be avoided onl' b'interpretin" the two provisions under consideration as one, i.e., 2ection 0, par. ($! of Article 68@Bprovidin" the "eneral rule and the other, i.e., 2ection $7, Article :66 as constitutin" the e)ceptionthereto. 6n the sa3e 3anner 3ust 2ection 0, par. (! of Article 68@B be construed vis'a'vis 2ection$7, Article :66.

6t is a well8established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution isto be separated fro3 all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearin" upon aparticular sub&ect are to be brou"ht into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the "reat

purposes of the instru3ent.$0

2ections bearin" on a particular sub&ect should be considered andinterpreted to"ether as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution $% and one section is not tobe allowed to defeat another, if b' an' reasonable construction, the two can be 3ade to standto"ether. $#

6n other words, the court 3ust har3onie the3, if practicable, and 3ust lean in favor of aconstruction which will render ever' word operative, rather than one which 3a' 3ae the words idleand nu"ator'.




















2ince the evident purpose of the fra3ers of the $#%0 Constitution is to i3pose a stricter prohibitionon the President, :ice8President, 3e3bers of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respectto holdin" 3ultiple offices or e3plo'3ent in the "overn3ent durin" their tenure, the e)ception to thisprohibition 3ust be read with e-ual severit'. *n its face, the lan"ua"e of 2ection $7, Article :66 isprohibitor' so that it 3ust be understood as intended to be a positive and une-uivocal ne"ation ofthe privile"e of holdin" 3ultiple "overn3ent offices or e3plo'3ent. :eril', wherever the lan"ua"e

used in the constitution is prohibitor', it is to be understood as intended to be a positive andune-uivocal ne"ation. $ The phrase <unless otherwise provided in this Constitution< 3ust be "iven aliteral interpretation to refer onl' to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit1the :ice8President bein" appointed as a 3e3ber of the Cabinet under 2ection 7, par. (!, Article :665or actin" as President in those instances provided under 2ection 0, pars. (! and (7!, Article :665 and,the 2ecretar' of ustice bein" e&'officio 3e3ber of the udicial and Bar Council b' virtue of 2ection% ($!, Article :666.

The prohibition a"ainst holdin" dual or 3ultiple offices or e3plo'3ent under 2ection $7, Article :66 of the Constitution 3ust not, however, be construed as appl'in" to posts occupied b' the E)ecutiveofficials specified therein without additional co3pensation in an e&'officio capacit' as provided b'law and as reuired b' the pri3ar' functions of said officialsF office. The reason is that these postsdo no co3prise <an' other office< within the conte3plation of the constitutional prohibition but areproperl' an i3position of additional duties and functions on said officials. 7 To characterie theseposts otherwise would lead to absurd conse-uences, a3on" which are1 The President of thePhilippines cannot chair the National 2ecurit' Council reor"anied under E)ecutive *rder No. $$/(4ece3ber +, $#%=!. Neither can the :ice8President, the E)ecutive 2ecretar', and the 2ecretariesof National 4efense, ustice, >abor and E3plo'3ent and >ocal ;overn3ent sit in this Council,which would then have no reason to e)ist for lac of a chairperson and 3e3bers. The respectiveundersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be prohibited.

The 2ecretar' of >abor and E3plo'3ent cannot chair the Board of Trustees of the NationalManpower and Jouth Council (NMJC! or the Philippine *verseas E3plo'3ent Ad3inistration(P*EA!, both of which are attached to his depart3ent for polic' coordination and "uidance. Neithercan his ndersecretaries and Assistant 2ecretaries chair these a"encies.

The 2ecretaries of inance and Bud"et cannot sit in the Monetar' Board. + Neither can theirrespective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The Central Ban ;overnor would then beassisted b' lower ranin" e3plo'ees in providin" polic' direction in the areas of 3one', banin" andcredit./

6ndeed, the fra3ers of our Constitution could not have intended such absurd conse-uences. AConstitution, viewed as a continuousl' operative charter of "overn3ent, is not to be interpreted asde3andin" the i3possible or the i3practicable5 and unreasonable or absurd conse-uences, ifpossible, should be avoided. =

To reiterate, the prohibition under 2ection $7, Article :66 is not to be interpreted as coverin" positions

held without additional co3pensation in e&'officio capacities as provided b' law and as re-uired b'the pri3ar' functions of the concerned officialFs office. The ter3 e&'officio 3eans <fro3 office5 b'virtue of office.< 6t refers to an <authorit' derived fro3 official character 3erel', not e)pressl'conferred upon the individual character, but rather anne)ed to the official position.< /&'officio liewise denotes an <act done in an official character, or as a conse-uence of office, andwithout an' other appoint3ent or authorit' than that conferred b' the office.< 0 An e&'officio 3e3berof a board is one who is a 3e3ber b' virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrantor appoint3ent. % To illustrate, b' e)press provision of law, the 2ecretar' of Transportation and
























Co33unications is the e&'officio Chair3an of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authorit', # and the>i"ht Rail Transit Authorit'. 7

The Court had occasion to e)plain the 3eanin" of an e&'officio position in Rafae" vs. /%+roiderand Appare" !ontro" and Inspection 0oard,7$ thus1 <An e)a3ination of section of the -uestionedstatute (R.A. 7$70! reveals that for the chair3an and 3e3bers of the Board to -ualif' the' need onl'

be desi"nated b' the respective depart3ent heads. Dith the e)ception of the representative fro3the private sector, the' sit e&'officio. 6n order to be desi"nated the' 3ust alread' be holdin"positions in the offices 3entioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a previousappoint3ent in the Bureau of Custo3s, cannot, under the act, be desi"nated a representative fro3that office. The sa3e is true with respect to the representatives fro3 the other offices. No newappoint3ents are necessar'. This is as it should be, because the representatives sodesi"nated %ere" perfor% duties in t)e 0oard in addition to t)ose a"read perfor%ed under t)eirorigina" appoint%ents.< 7

The ter3 <pri3ar'< used to describe <functions< refers to the order of i3portance and thus 3eanschief or principal function. The ter3 is not restricted to the sin"ular but 3a' refer to the plural. 77 Theadditional duties 3ust not onl' be closel' related to, but 3ust be re-uired b' the officialFs pri3ar'

functions. E)a3ples of desi"nations to positions b' virtue of oneFs pri3ar' functions are the2ecretaries of inance and Bud"et sittin" as 3e3bers of the Monetar' Board, and the 2ecretar' ofTransportation and Co33unications actin" as Chair3an of the Mariti3e 6ndustr' Authorit' 7+ and theCivil Aeronautics Board.

6f the functions re-uired to be perfor3ed are 3erel' incidental, re3otel' related, inconsistent,inco3patible, or otherwise alien to the pri3ar' function of a cabinet official, such additional functionswould fall under the purview of <an' other office< prohibited b' the Constitution. An e)a3ple wouldbe the Press ndersecretar' sittin" as a 3e3ber of the Board of the Philippine A3use3ent and;a3in" Corporation. The sa3e rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet official3ana"e3ent functions and9or 3onetar' co3pensation, such as but not li3ited to chair3anships ordirectorships in "overn3ent8owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Mandatin" additional duties and functions to the President, :ice8President, Cabinet Me3bers, theirdeputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with those alread' prescribed b' their offices orappoint3ents b' virtue of their special nowled"e, e)pertise and sill in their respective e)ecutiveoffices is a practice lon"8reco"nied in 3an' &urisdictions. 6t is a practice &ustified b' the de3ands ofefficienc', polic' direction, continuit' and coordination a3on" the different offices in the E)ecutiveBranch in the dischar"e of its 3ultifarious tass of e)ecutin" and i3ple3entin" laws affectin"national interest and "eneral welfare and deliverin" basic services to the people. 6t is consistent withthe power vested on the President and his alter e"os, the Cabinet 3e3bers, to have control of allthe e)ecutive depart3ents, bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfull'e)ecuted. 7/ Dithout these additional duties and functions bein" assi"ned to the President and hisofficial fa3il' to sit in the "overnin" bodies or boards of "overn3ental a"encies or instru3entalitiesin an e&'officio capacit' as provided b' law and as re-uired b' their pri3ar' functions, the' would be

supervision, thereb' deprived of the 3eans for control and resultin" in an unwield' and confusedbureaucrac'.

6t bears repeatin" thou"h that in order that such additional duties or functions 3a' not trans"ress theprohibition e3bodied in 2ection $7, Article :66 of the $#%0 Constitution, such additional duties orfunctions 3ust be reuired + t)e pri%ar functions of t)e officia" concerned, *)o is to perfor% t)esa%e in an e&'officio capacit as provided + "a*, *it)out receiving an additiona" co%pensationt)erefor .





















The e&'officio position bein" actuall' and in le"al conte3plation part of the principal office, it followsthat the official concerned has no ri"ht to receive additional co3pensation for his services in the saidposition. The reason is that these services are alread' paid for and covered b' the co3pensationattached to his principal office. 6t should be obvious that if, sa', the 2ecretar' of inance attends a3eetin" of the Monetar' Board as an e&'officio3e3ber thereof, he is actuall' and in le"alconte3plation perfor3in" the pri3ar' function of his principal office in definin" polic' in 3onetar'

and banin" 3atters, which co3e under the &urisdiction of his depart3ent. or such attendance,therefore, he is not entitled to collect an' e)tra co3pensation, whether it be in the for3 of a per the3or an honorariu3 or an allowance, or so3e other such euphe3is3. B' whatever na3e it isdesi"nated, such additional co3pensation is prohibited b' the Constitution.

6t is interestin" to note that durin" the floor deliberations on the proposal of Co33issioner ChristianMonsod to add to 2ection 0, par. (!, Article 6@8B, ori"inall' found as 2ection 7 of the ;eneralProvisions, the e)ception <unless re-uired b' the functions of his position,< 7= e)press reference tocertain hi"h8ranin" appointive public officials lie 3e3bers of the Cabinet were3ade. 70 Respondin" to a -uer' of Co33issioner Blas *ple, Co33issioner Monsod pointed out thatthere are instances when althou"h not re-uired b' current law, 3e3bership of certain hi"h8ranin"e)ecutive officials in ot)er offices and corporations is necessar' b' reason of said officialsF pri3ar'functions. The e)a3ple "iven b' Co33issioner Monsod was the Minister of Trade and 6ndustr'. 7%

Dhile this e)chan"e between Co33issioners Monsod and *ple 3a' be used as authorit' for sa'in"that additional functions and duties flowin" fro3 the pri3ar' functions of the official 3a' be i3posedupon hi3 without offendin" the constitutional prohibition under consideration, it cannot, however, betaen as authorit' for sa'in" that this e)ception is b' virtue of 2ection 0, par. (! of Article 68@B. Thiscollo-u' between the two Co33issioners too place in the plenar' session of 2epte3ber 0, $#%=.nder consideration then was 2ection 7 of Co33ittee Resolution No. /7$ which was the proposedarticle on ;eneral Provisions. 7# At that ti3e, the article on the Civil 2ervice Co33ission had beenapproved on third readin" on ul' , $#%=, + while the article on the E)ecutive 4epart3ent,containin" the 3ore specific prohibition in 2ection $7, had also been earlier approved on thirdreadin" on Au"ust =, $#%=. +$ 6t was onl' after the draft Constitution had under"one refor3attin"and <st'lin"< b' the Co33ittee on 2t'le that said 2ection 7 of the ;eneral Provisions beca3e

2ection 0, par. (! of Article 6@8B and reworded <nless otherwise allowed b' law or b' the pri3ar'functions of his position. . . .<

Dhat was clearl' bein" discussed then were "eneral principles which would serve as constitutional"uidelines in the absence of specific constitutional provisions on the 3atter. Dhat was pri3aril' atissue and approved on that occasion was the adoption of the -ualified and deli3ited phrase <pri3ar'functions< as the basis of an e)ception to the "eneral rule coverin" all appointive public officials. Gadthe Constitutional Co33ission intended to dilute the specific prohibition in said 2ection $7 of Article:66, it could have re8worded said 2ection $7 to confor3 to the wider e)ceptions provided in then2ection 7 of the proposed "eneral Provisions, later placed as 2ection 0, par. (! of Article 6@8B on theCivil 2ervice Co33ission.

That this e)ception would in the final anal'sis appl' also to the President and his official fa3il' is b'reason of the le"al principles "overnin" additional functions and duties of public officials rather thanb' virtue of 2ection 0, par. , Article 6@8B At an' rate, we have 3ade it clear that onl' the additionalfunctions and duties <re-uired,< as opposed to <allowed,< b' the pri3ar' functions 3a' beconsidered as not constitutin" <an' other office.<

Dhile it is per3issible in this &urisdiction to consult the debates and proceedin"s of the constitutionalconvention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resultin" Constitution, resort thereto3a' be had onl' when other "uides fail + as said proceedin"s are powerless to var' the ter3s of the



















Constitution when the 3eanin" is clear. #1*p)i#4ebates in the constitutional convention <are of value asshowin" the views of the individual 3e3bers, and as indicatin" the reasons for their votes, but the'"ive us no li"ht as to the views of the lar"e 3a&orit' who did not tal, 3uch less of the 3ass of ourfellow citiens whose votes at the polls "ave that instru3ent the force of funda3ental law. De thin itsafer to construe the constitution fro3 what appears upon its face.< +7 The proper interpretationtherefore depends 3ore on how it was understood b' the people adoptin" it than in the fra3ersFs

understandin" thereof.++

6t bein" clear, as it was in fact one of its best sellin" points, that the $#%0 Constitution sees toprohibit the President, :ice8President, 3e3bers of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants fro3holdin" durin" their tenure 3ultiple offices or e3plo'3ent in the "overn3ent, e)cept in those casesspecified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additionalco3pensation in an e&'officio capacit' as provided b' law and as re-uired b' the pri3ar' functionsof their office, the citation of Cabinet 3e3bers (then called Ministers! as e)a3ples durin" the debateand deliberation on the "eneral rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as3ere personal opinions which cannot override the constitutionFs 3anifest intent and the peopleFunderstandin" thereof.

6n the li"ht of the construction "iven to 2ection $7, Article :66 in relation to 2ection 0, par. (!, Article6@8B of the $#%0 Constitution, E)ecutive *rder No. %+ dated ul' 7, $#%0 is unconstitutional.*stensibl' restrictin" the nu3ber of positions that Cabinet 3e3bers, undersecretaries or assistantsecretaries 3a' hold in addition to their pri3ar' position to not 3ore than two (! positions in the"overn3ent and "overn3ent corporations, E)ecutive *rder No. %+ actuall' allows the3 to hold3ultiple offices or e3plo'3ent in direct contravention of the e)press 3andate of 2ection $7, Article:66 of the $#%0 Constitution prohibitin" the3 fro3 doin" so, unless otherwise provided in the $#%0Constitution itself.

The Court is alerted b' respondents to the i3practical conse-uences that will result fro3 a strictapplication of the prohibition 3andated under 2ection $7, Article :66 on the operations of the;overn3ent, considerin" that Cabinet 3e3bers would be stripped of their offices held in an e&'officio capacit', b' reason of their pri3ar' positions or b' virtue of le"islation. As earlier clarified in

this decision, e&'officio posts held b' the e)ecutive official concerned without additionalco3pensation as provided b' law and as re-uired b' the pri3ar' functions of his office do not fallunder the definition of <an' other office< within the conte3plation of the constitutional prohibition.Dith respect to other offices or e3plo'3ent held b' virtue of le"islation, includin" chair3anships ordirectorships in "overn3ent8owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to sa'that the feared i3practical conse-uences are 3ore apparent than real. Bein" head of an e)ecutivedepart3ent is no 3ean &ob. 6t is 3ore than a full8ti3e &ob, re-uirin" full attention, specialiednowled"e, sills and e)pertise. 6f 3a)i3u3 benefits are to be derived fro3 a depart3ent headFsabilit' and e)pertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without thedistraction of other "overn3ental offices or e3plo'3ent. Ge should be precluded fro3 dissipatin"his efforts, attention and ener"' a3on" too 3an' positions of responsibilit', which 3a' result inhaphaardness and inefficienc'. 2urel' the advanta"es to be derived fro3 this concentration ofattention, nowled"e and e)pertise, particularl' at this sta"e of our national and econo3icdevelop3ent, far outwei"h the benefits, if an', that 3a' be "ained fro3 a depart3ent headspreadin" hi3self too thin and tain" in 3ore than what he can handle.

indin" E)ecutive *rder No. %+ to be constitutionall' infir3, the court hereb' orders respondents2ecretar' of Environ3ent and Natural Resources ul"encio actoran, r., 2ecretar' of >ocal;overn3ent +/ >uis 2antos, 2ecretar' of National 4efense idel :. Ra3os, 2ecretar' of Gealth

Alfredo R.A. Ben"on and 2ecretar' of the Bud"et ;uiller3o Cara"ue to i33ediatel' relin-uish their other offices or e3plo'3ent, as herein defined, in the "overn3ent, includin" "overn3ent8owned or











controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Dith respect to the other na3ed respondents, thepetitions have beco3e 3oot and acade3ic as the' are no lon"er occup'in" the positionsco3plained of.

4urin" their tenure in the -uestioned positions, respondents 3a' be considered de facto officers andas such entitled to e3olu3ents for actual services rendered. += 6t has been held that <in cases where

there is no de 2ure,officer, a de facto officer, who, in "ood faith has had possession of the office andhas dischar"ed the duties pertainin" thereto, is le"all' entitled to the e3olu3ents of the office, and3a' in an appropriate action recover the salar', fees and other co3pensations attached to the office.This doctrine is, undoubtedl', supported on e-uitable "rounds since it see3s un&ust that the publicshould benefit b' the services of an officer de facto and then be freed fro3 all liabilit' to pa' an' onefor such services. +0 An' per die3, allowances or other e3olu3ents received b' the respondents b'virtue of actual services rendered in the -uestioned positions 3a' therefore be retained b' the3.

DGERE*RE, sub&ect to the -ualification above8stated, the petitions are ;RANTE4. E)ecutive*rder No. %+ is hereb' declared null and void and is accordin"l' set aside.

2* *R4ERE4.

arvasa, Me"encio'4errera, -utierre5, Jr., !ru5, Paras, 6e"iciano, -ancaco, Padi""a, 0idin,Media"dea, Rega"ado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.7ar%iento and -rio'Auino, JJ., too no part.

Foo'oe*

$ P. 0$, Ro""o in ;.R. No. %7%$/ and p. %, Ro""o in ;.R. No. %7%#=.

E3phasis supplied.

7 pp. #87, Ro""o.

+ pp. $8$, Ro""o.

/ Anne) <A<, Petition, ;.R. No. %7%$/, pp. $8+, Ro""o.

= Thereb', petitioner alle"es, elicitin" adverse published co33entaries fro3 C*NC*MCo33issioners r. oa-uin ;. Bernas, 2. . and Re"alado E. Maa3bon", Con"ress3anRodolfo Albano of 6sabela, and retired 2upre3e Court ustice eli) I. Antonio, Anne)es <4<,<E< and <<, Petition, ;.R. No. %7%$/, pp. +8=+, Ro""o. C*NC*M :ice8President A3brosioB. Padilla, in a published article cited in the anne)es, also co33ented on E* %+.

0 p. $$, Ro""o in ;.R. No. %7%$/.

% E3phasis supplied.

# Anne) <6<, Co33ent, ;.R. No. %7%#=, pp. =8=0, Ro""o.

$ Anne) <<, I+id., pp. =%80$, Ro""o.




http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/feb1991/gr_83896_1991.html#fnt1

































$$ Ma)well vs. 4ow, $0= .2. /%$, 2up. Ct. ++%, ++ >. Ed. /#0.

$ R.B. No. #/, Monda', March $$, $#%/, Record of the Batasan, :olu3e 6:, pp. %7/8%7=.

$7 pp. $$8$+.

$+ Record of the $#%= Constitutional Co33ission, :ol. $, p. //7.

$/ 2ec. 7, I+id .

$= 2ec. 0, Article :66.

$0 *ld Da'ne Mut. >ife Asso. vs. Mc4onou"h, + .2. %, /$ > Ed 7+/, 0 2 Ct 7=5 Dallacevs. Pa'ne, $#0 Cal /7#, +$ P. %0#.

$% ;rant vs. ;rau3an (K'! 7 2D d 7=+5 Run'on vs. 23ith, 7% K' 07, $ 2D d /$.

$# People vs. Dri"ht, = Col. #.

Tho3as M. Colle', A Treatise on the Constitutional >i3itations, :ol. 6, p.$%, citing Attorne'8;eneral vs. 4etroit and Erin Plan Road Co., Mich. $$+5 People vs.Burns, / Mich. $$+ 5 4istrict Township vs. 4ubu-ue, 0 6owa =.

$ :arne' vs. ustice, %= K' /#=5 = 2.D. +/05 Gunt vs. 2tate, Te). App. 7#=, 7 2.D. 77.

As opposed to the ter3 <allowed< used in 2ection 0, par. (!, Article 6@8B of theConstitution, which is per3issive. <Re-uired< su""ests an i3position, and therefore,obli"ator' in nature.

7 Martin v. 23ith, $+ A.>.R. $075 Ash3ore v. ;reater ;reenville 2ewer 4istrict, $07 A.>.R.+0.

+ E)ecutive *rder No. $=, Ma' #, $#%=, % *.;. $$0.

/ 2ec. , Art. @66, $#%0 Constitution.

= Giraba'ashi vs. nited 2tates, 7 .2. %$, %0 >. Ed. $00+, =7 2. Ct. $70/5 *pp CottonMills, 6nc. vs. Ad3inistrator of Da"e and Gour 4iv., 7$ .2. $=, %/ >. Ed. =+, =$ 2. Ct./+5 ;a"e vs. ordan, 7 Cal d 0#+, $0+ P d, %0 cited in $= A3 ur d, pp. $, +=+.

0 BlacFs >aw 4ictionar', p. /$=5 $/A Dords and Phrases, p. 7#.

% $/A Dords and Phrases, p. 7#.

# 2ec. 0, E.*. 00%.

7 2ec. $, E.*. $.

7$ $ 2CRA 77= ($#=0!.














































7 E3phasis supplied.

77 77A Dords and Phrases, p. $, citing Collector of Revenue vs. >ouisiana Read' Mi) Co.,>a. App., $#0 2. d $+$, $+/.

7+ 2ec. 0, P.4. No. +0+.

7/ 2ection $0, Article :66.

7= The phrase that appears in the Constitution is not <nless reuired b' the pri3ar'functions< but <nless otherwise a""o*ed b' law or b' the pri3ar' functions . . .<

70 Record of the $#%= Constitutional Co33ission, :ol. :, pp. $=/8$==.

7% E3phasis supplied, I+id ., p. $=/.

7# I+id ., :ol. :., pp. %8%$.

+ I+id ., :ol. 66, p, #+.

+$ I+id ., :ol. 666, p. 0$.

+ $= Corpus uris 2ecundu3, . 7$, p. $/.

+7 Co33onwealth vs. Ralph, $$$ Pa. 7=/, 7 Atl .

++ Gousehold inance Corporation vs. 2haffner, 7, 2.D. d 07+. 7/= Mo. %%.

+/ Now 4epart3ent of 6nterior and >ocal ;overn3ents.

+= Castillo vs. Arrieta, ;.R. No. >87$+++, Nove3ber $7, $#0+, =$ 2CRA //.

+0 Patterson vs. Benson, $$ Pac. %$, 7 >.R.A. (N2! #+#.

































civil liberties union v. executive secretary

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