civilo sakaru plānošanas komitejas darbības pārskatu

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

DRAFT -- CCPC COMPENDIUM from 7 November 2005

1. PURPOSE .

2. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

2.1. NATO’s Political Goals and Basic Tasks2.2. Decision Making in NATO2.3. NATO’s Strategic Concept2.4. CEP Structure2.5. CCPC Functions

3. ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST

3.1. Risks and Threats to Civil Communications3.2. Critical Infrastructure3.3. Information Society3.4. Support For Crisis Response Operations (CROs) to be done3.5. Weapons of Mass Destruction3.6. CCPC-NC3O Relation to be done

4. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

4.1. Effect of Glob. and Lib. of Electronic COMS4.2. Definitions .4.3. Technology

4.3.1. Liberalization and Globalization4.3.2. Cellular Systems 4.3.3. Satellites . 4.3.4. certs / internet4.3.5. broadcasting

5. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ORGANISATION

6. NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR CEP

7. GUIDANCE FOR THE CONT. AVAILABILITY OF CIVIL ELEC. COMS

7.1. General7.2. Need for Coordination7.3. Coordination in Emergency, Crisis and War7.4. Measures to be Considered7.5. Staffing and Management7.6. Network and Services Planning7.7. Electronic Coms Installations and Equipment7.8. Support Services7.9. Maintenance and Operations

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 1


7.10. Network Management7.11. Preferential Access7.12. Restoration of International Transmission7.13. Electronic Coms with Non-Alliance Nations7.14. National Emergency Tel. Networks7.15. Electronic Coms for Essential Users7.16. Functions Supported by Electronic Coms7.17. International Standards

8. POSTAL SERVICES

8.1. Introduction8.2. Scope of Postal Services8.3. Provision of Postal Services

9. TRAINING AND EXERCISE

9.1. Training9.2. Exercises9.3. Objective9.4. Exercise Planning

10. DETAILED INFORMATION ON CCPC CRISIS MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND POSTAL MATTERS

10.1. Introduction10.2. Co-ordination10.3. Article 5 and non-article 5 crisis arrangements10.4. Peacetime arrangements10.5. CCPC responsibilities in time of crisis10.6. Use of civil experts10.7. Nominations of experts10.8. Electronic Communications Liaison Officers (ECLO)10.9. Postal Services Liaison Officers (PSLO)10.10. The Tampere Convention .

11. ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

12. LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS to be done

13. CCPC TOR’s to be done

1. PURPOSE



1.1. The purpose of this Compendium is to assist NATO HQ bodies, member nations, and EAPC nations coordinate and harmonize the continued availability of communications during peacetime, crisis, and emergencies by providing designated industrial experts and civil emergency planners at national and international levels with appropriate documentation and guidance for the planning and implementation of measures and arrangements needed for such circumstances.

2. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 2.1. NATO’s Political Goals and Basic Tasks

2.1.1. The North Atlantic Alliance embodies the transatlantic partnership between the European members of NATO and the United States and Canada, designed to bring about peace and stability throughout Europe. The objectives of the Partnership between the European and North American members of the Alliance are primarily political, underpinned by a shared defence planning and military co-operation and by co-operation and consultation in the economic, scientific, environmental and other relevant fields. Through the years of the Cold War, however, NATO focused above all on the development and maintenance of collective defence and on overcoming the fundamental political issues dividing Europe. Today its focus has expanded to include promoting stability throughout Europe as well as outside traditional NATO boundaries through co-operation and by developing the means for collective crisis management and for operations in response to crisis situations.

2.1.2. NATO is an Alliance based on political and military co-operation among independent member nations, established in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. As stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, Alliance members are committed to safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

2.1.3. Article 4 of the Treaty provides for consultations among the Allies whenever any of them believes that their territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened. NATO member states are committed to the defence of one another by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This stipulates that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all. Other missions, such as peace support operations, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief, are referred to as non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CROs).

2.2. Decision Making in NATO

2.2.1. NATO decisions are made on the basis of consensus, after discussion and consultation among the member nations. As a multinational, inter-governmental association of free and independent states, NATO has no supranational authority or policy-making function independent of its members. Decisions taken by NATO are therefore decisions taken by all its member countries. In the same manner, NATO can only implement a course of action if all the member countries are in agreement.

2.3. NATO’s Strategic Concept



2.3.1. The Strategic Concept adopted at the 1991 Rome Summit meeting combined a broad approach to security based on dialogue and co-operation with the maintenance of NATO’s collective defence capability. The Strategic Concept was notable for setting out the road map by which NATO would evolve in the future. There were three key areas of new emphasis:

a broad approach to security, in which co-operation and dialogue would play a prominent part;

military capabilities, which would be reduced but restructured for crisis management missions, as well as for collective defence; and

the European Allies, who would assume a greater responsibility for their own security.

2.3.2. The Concept provided for reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and introduced major changes in NATO’s integrated military forces, including: substantial reductions in their size and readiness; improvements in their mobility, flexibility and adaptability to different contingencies; increased use of multinational formation; the creation of a multinational Rapid Reaction Corps; and the adaptation of defence planning arrangements and procedures.

2.3.3. NATO’s military command structure was streamlined and the Alliance’s defence planning arrangements were adapted in order to take into account future requirements for crisis management and crisis response.

2.3.4. The direction set by the Strategic Concept was intensified by subsequent decisions. Partnership for Peace (PfP) created permanent mechanisms for close military co-operation. The concept of Combined Joint Task forces (CJTF) was introduced at the 1994 Brussels summit, designed to make NATO’s joint military assets available for wider operations by NATO nations. The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) has been undergoing development within NATO since 1996.

2.3.5. Following the Washington Summit of 1999, a new Strategic Concept was adopted, recognizing the changed strategic environment which faces NATO, and was published as Military Committee (MC) Document 400/2, MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy. The approach of this updated document is very direct in establishing the relationship between the Strategic Concept’s guidance and the missions of the Alliance military forces in supporting the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks as agreed in Washington. 2.4. CEP Structure

2.4.1 The aim of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO is to coordinate national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources in collective support of Alliance strategic objectives. Civil Emergency Planning is a national responsibility and civil assets remain under national control at all times.

2.4.2 However, at the NATO level, national intentions and capabilities are harmonized to ensure that jointly developed plans and procedures will work and that necessary assets are available. These assets include ships, aircraft, trains, medical facilities, communications, disaster response capabilities and other civil resources.



2.4.3 The main roles of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO reflect the fundamental security tasks of the Alliance and consist of civil support for the military under Article 5 and non-Article 5 crisis response operations, support for national authorities in civil emergencies and the protection of civilian populations.

2.4.4 Beneath these very broad headings, Civil Emergency Planning has a role to play in managing the availability of civil assets and facilities and the maintenance of normal life during emergency situations such as war, crises and disasters. Increasingly, this work is carried out in close cooperation with Partner countries, who now play an active part in Civil Emergency Planning in NATO.

2.4.5 Following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, renewed efforts have been made to assist member nations in protecting civilian populations against the consequences of attacks from chemical, biological and nuclear agents.

2.4.6 All of this is brought together by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC), which reports directly to the North Atlantic Council. The SCEPC meets at least twice a year in plenary session and eight times a year in Permanent session. The secretary General is Chairman of plenary sessions, but in practice these are chaired by the Assistant Secretary General for Security Investment, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning while Permanent sessions are chaired by the Director of Civil Emergency Planning.

2.4.7 Country representation at plenary level is drawn from heads of national Civil Emergency Planning organizations in capitals. At Permanent level, members of national delegations at NATO Headquarters normally attend but may be reinforced from capitals. Reflecting the deep involvement of Civil Emergency Planning in PfP activities, SCEPC's twice-yearly Plenary meetings are also held in EAPC format, with attendance open to all Partner nations, and Permanent meetings with Partners are held at least four times a year.

2.4.8 Under the direction of the SCEPC, a number of technical Planning Boards and Committees (PB&Cs) bring together national government and industry experts and military representatives to coordinate planning in several areas of civil activity, namely:

Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport (PBIST) Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS) Civil Aviation Planning Committee (CAPC) Food and Agriculture Planning Committee (FAPC) Industrial Planning Committee (IPC) Civil Communications Planning Committee (CCPC) Civil Protection Committee (CPC) Joint Medical Committee (JMC)

2.4.9 These bodies meet regularly and provide the vital link between NATO policy and the means to carry it out. They are supported in their work by smaller, flexible working groups or specialized technical committees.



2.4.10 Overall direction of Civil Emergency Planning, at NATO and national level, is by Foreign Ministers, who decide priorities. However, the very wide range of Civil Emergency Planning requires careful coordination in capitals of contributions from the many ministries and national agencies involved in Civil Emergency Planning today.

2.4.11 As NATO adapted itself to the requirements of the changed security environment in Europe; it became clear that the role played by Civil Emergency Planning within the Alliance's overall strategic concept would also need to be examined. The principal tasks resulting from this review can be summarized as follows:

Supporting Alliance military operations under Article 5; Supporting non-Article 5 crisis response operations; Supporting national authorities in civil emergencies; Supporting national authorities in the protection of their populations

against the effects of weapons of mass destruction; and Cooperation with Partners in the Civil Emergency Planning field.

These priorities are reflected in the activities of the SCEPC and in the work program of its eight Planning Boards and committees.

2.5. CCPC Functions

2.5.1 The Civil Communications Planning Committee (CCPC) was established by the North Atlantic Council in 1957. It is one of the eight civil Planning Boards and Committees (PB&C).

2.5.2 CCPC is responsible for civil communication matters under NATO civil emergency arrangements. Civil communication planning provides for the maintenance of communication services for political, economic and military purposes; in this context the term "civil communications" is seen as all electronic public and non-public communications networks, services, associated facilities, postal services and any other related services.

2.5.3 CCPC is required to maintain a pool of civil experts prepared, in an evolving crisis and in the planning for military operations, to provide advice on the use of civil electronic communications and postal resources to the Council, the SCEPC (in NATO or EAPC format), NATO military Authorities (NMAs), nations or other appropriate bodies as agreed by the Council/SCEPC. There may also be a need for civil experts to support nations and international organizations in case of large-scale emergencies.

2.5.4 CCPC must keep under review the existing civil communications with a view to determining their suitability to meet the requirements of crisis and war and to make recommendations thereon as appropriate, taking into consideration new and emerging technologies, the role of international organizations in the civil communications fields and national legislation and arrangements.



2.5.5 CCPC must co-ordinate with the appropriate NATO electronic and postal communications bodies any civil communications plans or measure which, in the opinion of the CCPC and/or the above mentioned bodies, may influence military communications plans.

2.5.6 CCPC must review its activities with the aim of ensuring economic use of resources available to the Committee and avoiding duplication of the product of other international organizations.

2.5.7 The CCPC is composed of senior members representing national electronic communications and postal authorities that are responsible in each NATO country for matter pertaining to civil communications. CCPC in Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) format is also represented by senior EAPC members representing their national electronic communications and postal authorities. CCPC and EAPC members can be accompanied by national experts.

2.5.8 CCPC, in which all nations are entitled to participate, will generally meet twice a year, as required.

2.5.9 CCPC must direct its efforts to the fulfillment of a two years work programme approved by the SCEPC and prepare every two years a progress report to the SCEPC on the attainment of the objectives.

2.5.10 CCPC and the Working Groups are supported by a CEP Staff Officer.

3. ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST 3.1. Risks and Threats to Civil Communications

3.1.1 Threats to communication networks can manifest themselves in numerous ways, but two broad categories are accidental and intentional.

3.1.2. Physical threats to communication networks include natural causes, accidents and intentional acts. Natural causes and accidents are by far the most common source of communications outages. Telecommunication cables are regularly damaged by construction activities, but the results of the outages are effectively managed. 3.1.3. Intentional acts are far less common, but could have the potential to be far more costly to repair, could have a greater impact on the network, and could be much more difficult to prevent. The trend towards the physical consolidation/co-location of telecommunication providers means that a single attack could have an even greater impact.

3.1.4. Electromagnetic attacks are designed to disrupt radio signals, or destroy or upset electronic systems and components. For the most part, telecommunications providers are continuing to migrate away from metallic cables and radio-based systems for backbone transmission in favour of electromagnetic resistant fibre optics. However, mobile networks and broadcasting are heavily reliant on radio signals that can be disrupted or jammed.



3.1.5. When using electromagnetic jamming, strong electromagnetic signals are directed towards or from radio-based transmitters overlapping the transmitted radio frequencies that can destroy the information being transmitted. Normally, jamming will not physically destroy the components. In order to jam modern public radio-based telecommunication systems e.g. cellular telephony, information about particular radio frequencies and modulation techniques employed is readily available and jamming is not very difficult. 3.1.6. Numerous studies have been conducted on the vulnerability of telecommunications equipment to electromagnetic pulse (EMP). EMP can occur naturally as a consequence of lightning, and on a more limited basis by radio transmitters, non-solid state thermostats and power connections. It is also a by-product of a nuclear blast and this form of EMP can be extremely damaging to electronics. However, measures can be taken to protect critical systems against the effects of EMP. 3.1.7. High Power Microwaves (HPM) is a relatively new type of radiation weapon that uses modern radar technology to generate a very short and intense pulse similar to EMP. Although not widely documented, there is reason to believe that disruption or damage of electronic equipment without any protection can be accomplished up to a range of a few kilometres. HPM weapons, in contrast to EMP weapons, are relatively inexpensive and can be built from readily available technology. Protection against the effect of HPM may differ from that of EMP.

3.1.8. Cyber attacks are those directed at computer based functions that are used for example to operate the various network management control systems of a communication network. Cyber attackers take advantage of flaws in software used throughout a corporation to carry out a wide variety of actions, typically delivered in the form of viruses, worms, Trojans, back doors and distributed denial of service attacks. Hacker activities can range from simple defacement of Web pages, to theft of proprietary information, and disrupting the smooth operation of critical infrastructure assets. 3.1.9. The range of activities a hacker could conduct once inside a network is disturbing, in that essential systems, such as national emergency services could be significantly affected, law enforcement surveillance could be compromised and phone numbers re-routed. Additionally, the impact of such an attack could be dramatically increased if it were carried out in conjunction with a physical attack, or during a national crisis.

3.1.10. Another significant threat posed to telecommunication networks comes from the insider. The typical insider is a disgruntled employee (or agency support staff) who may have a number of reasons for causing damage to an employer’s network or providing critical information to others who would do harm to the network. The insider is able to carry out his or her actions from within more easily, because they would have fewer security features to bypass and may have an intimate knowledge of the specific systems attacked. The insider might be from foreign origin and could have a different point of view in a crisis.



3.1.11. Telecommunication networks are dimensioned to permit the maximum availability at an economically efficient level. During exceptional circumstance, congestion could arise locally or regionally whenever the number of calls made exceed the capacity of any part of the network or the capability of the receiving party to handle the calls received. 3.1.12. Damage to telecommunications infrastructure, whether intentional or unintentional, man-made or others, can result in diminished capacity to carry traffic. Many networks experience temporary difficulties under events such as “phone-ins” or unusual incidents such as large accidents, where the networks are offered far more calls than the available capacity or where the call receiving ability is much lower.

3.1.13. Good business continuity practices such as building in network redundancy can mitigate the impacts of certain outages, although no amount of planning or preparation can completely eliminate all risks or threats. 3.2. Critical Infrastructure 3.2.1. Today’s society has become highly dependent on information and communication technology. In fact society can no longer function effectively without products and services based on information and communication technology. An emerging issue is that telecommunications infrastructures, until recently perceived to be independent from other sectors, are becoming entangled into network-of-networks, and are recognized having multiple interdependencies. Another issue is that the majority of services and business applications will be run outside the corporations and/or countries borders. Therefore, the dependability of some systems may be put beyond the direct control of who owns or operates them. Interdependencies among industry sectors are such that disturbances in one sector may have a cascading effect and could result in long-term consequences in other sectors.

3.2.2. A very large part of all services or products are dependent on a few amongst these products or services. It therefore can be argued that the more critical ones amongst the critical infrastructures should be given more attention when developing a strategy regarding the continuity of these few more critical infrastructures. This should be based on the determination of interdependencies between infrastructures

3.2.3. In order to associate the communications infrastructure interdependencies with other critical infrastructures it is necessary to identify those assets upon which society depends. Also, a varying degree of integration and interdependencies exists between the different functions and applications performed by critical infrastructures.

3.2.4. The key observations regarding critical infrastructures are:

• Infrastructures, until recently perceived as independent, are now recognized as having multiple interdependencies.

• The consequence of the interactions of critical infrastructures is that critical infrastructures are heavily dependent upon each other. These interactions are in



general characterised by their evolving complexity and increasing exposure to risks.

• Interdependencies between critical infrastructures are not bidirectional equal. This results to identification of a main few critical infrastructures upon which a very large number of services or products are dependent.

• Direct and indirect interdependencies must be taken into account. For example, equipment is directly dependent on energy, but in its turn energy is dependent on fuel supply; hence equipment is indirectly dependent on fuel. This can also lead to an even longer chain of interdependencies.

• Awareness of interdependencies is an important element in training and exercising in Civil Emergency Planning.

3.2.5. It is recommended that civil communications emergency planners should consider and analyze the presence of sectoral interdependencies, develop specific intersectoral joint plans and implement appropriate national measures, including training and exercises. Also, from the NATO point of view it is recommended to ensure that the national point of view is consistent with the overall NATO CEP approach for the protection of critical infrastructures.

3.3. Information Society 3.3.1. The development of information society becomes dependable on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). This is recognized by many national and international parties; United Nations has also put development of information society on its agenda. The society on a global spectrum is already transforming into an information society and this sets new demands on civil emergency planning.

3.3.2. While a number of international organizations have proposed various definitions of Information Society, the one developed by the United Nations is considered quite appropriate here.

3.3.3. The United Nations common declarations are intended to promote equal development worldwide. It is recognized that development of the Information Society is vital to achieve this goal. Quoting the declaration of principles from the UN meeting on the information society in Geneva: “We, the representatives of the peoples of the world, assembled in Geneva from 10-12 December 2003 for the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society, declare our common desire and commitment to build a people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in promoting their sustainable development and improving their quality of life, premised on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.

3.3.4. The information and telecommunications infrastructure is in the process of converging infrastructure and services. This conversion could result in less direct control with dependable systems that are vital in emergency situations. Another issue is that services and applications will be run beyond the direct control of those who own or operate them.



Protective measures rely on a holistic approach and the ability to see that security only can be achieved when security is adopted on cross-sectoral activity. It is therefore necessary to approach the situation from different directions such as; awareness, preparedness, regulatory framework, capacity management and contingency planning. In context of CEP, the instruments to initiate the work are appropriate through regulations and to focus on the possible problems in the individual nations.

CCPC adopt the following strategy:

CCPC should recognize that the development of the Information Society is a major transformation, where information-, service- and network-infrastructures are changing and converging and thereby bringing new risks into account. Therefore CCPC must immediately consider the inclusion of expertise in IP-network topology and services.

Civil emergency planners should be aware of the continuing and very rapid development of the Information Society. They should take account of the risks associated with this development, and consider how to make the necessary adjustments. CCPC must consider the views of the national authorities and participate in the development of a course of action for national authorities to assist in the mitigation of the risks associated with the emerging Information Society.

The CCPC point of view should be incorporated in the overall NATO approach to meet future demands for CEP.

3.4. Support For Crisis Response Operations (CROs) 3.4.1. NATO- CEP doc’s3.4.2. CCPC doc – Support to PKO

3.5. Weapons of Mass Destruction 3.5.1 CCPC developed technical and policy documents to study the civil emergency planning (CEP) consequences of the use of existing and future weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on modern civil electronic communication with conclusions and recommendations.

3.5.2 Those studies include chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons of massive destruction (WMD) on modern civil electronic communications networks with conclusions and recommendations.

3.5.3 Telecommunication networks, facilities and services have always been first targeted in time of conventional wars and conflicts. The need for organized telecommunication networks and services during crisis and for the economic wellbeing of our modern society is recognized by terrorist groups. Terrorists would not hesitate to attack telecommunication critical infrastructures if they have a chance and if we are not enough vigilant to protect them. Other critical infrastructures like the



postal system or public air/land /sea transportation systems may and were used as part of a CBR dissemination method.

3.5.4 A wide range of potentially deadly chemical and biological agents including various insecticides, industrial chemicals and potent toxins such as ricin may be relatively easy to produce or otherwise acquire. CBR agents are not specifically designed to impact the physical electronic communication or postal infrastructures. However, their use would have a direct impact on all employees including the critical one. The use of CBR agents may request quarantine of employees, equipment to be destroyed and building to be evacuated for indefinite period of time.

3.5.5 CBR agents and first response actions are complex. It is recommended to the electronic communication operator to provide a basic training session on CBR to security officers assumed to be the first on scene and to the emergency planner who will design a CBR response plan.

3.5.6 The electromagnetic pulse caused by a high altitude nuclear explosion poses a serious threat to civil communications networks. Even if a high altitude nuclear explosion is not seen as an immediate threat, specific measures should be taken to provide adequate protection to national critical infrastructures as it would be difficult to introduce such measures retrospectively.

3.5.7 Electromagnetic pulse generation techniques and high power electromagnetic technology have matured to the point where portable and mobile weapons have become technically feasible and available. The technology is simple enough to be applied by almost any competent technical person intent on creating damage or disruption.

3.5.8 No single method will afford a quick and easy solution to protect postal or electronic communication assets from the effect of a CBRN weapon.

3.6. CCPC-NC3O Relation

4. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

4.1. Effect of Globalization and Liberalization of Electronic COMS

4.1.1. The electronic communications market is changing rapidly in its technology, in liberalization and globalization. Competition leads to a worldwide market driven electronic communications sector. The emergence of new services and competition broadens customer choice, encourages investment and reduces costs. Services are more powerful and more numerous and diversified. Equipment costs are decreasing and users have access to multi-functional, resilient electronic communications.

4.2. Definitions

New definitions are indispensable in order to take into account the convergence phenomenon by bringing together under one single definition all electronic



communications services and/or networks which are concerned with the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means (i.e. fixed, wireless, cable television, satellite networks). Thus, the transmission and broadcasting of radio and television programmes should be recognised as an electronic communication service and networks used for such transmission and broadcasting should likewise be recognised as electronic communications networks. Furthermore, it should be made clear that the new definition of electronic communications networks also covers fibre networks which enable third parties, using their own switching or routing equipment, to convey signals.The definition of electronic communications networks should also mean that Nations are not permitted to restrict the right of an operator to establish, extend and/or provide a cable network on the ground that such network could also be used for the transmission of radio and television programming.

"Electronic communications network" means transmission systems and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit - and packet - switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, and electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information conveyed;

"Public communications network" means an electronic communications network used wholly or mainly for the provision of public electronic communications services;

"Electronic communications services" means a service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, including telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used for broadcasting but exclude services providing or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services.

"Publicly available electronic communications services" means electronic communications services available to the public;

4.3. Technology

Flexibility and mobility in the use of NATO communications in crisis, emergency and war are ever more required by the Alliance New Strategic Concept. Cellular systems such as GSM or UMTS are, consequently, very important means to meet such requirements. UMTS, for example, will offer an integrated global roaming system able to handle voice, facsimile, data, video, and Internet access in pocketsize equipment and at a bit rate of up to 2 Mbps.

4.3.1. Liberalization and Globalization

The technological evolution also brings about a change in regulatory environment. Whereas in earlier days individual monopolies were the usual way wherein the telecommunication business was constructed, today the differentiation of services,



service providers, infrastructure providers, etc., requires a different regulatory approach.

The circumstances that have brought about these changes are advances in technology which have reduced the cost and increased the funcionality of electronic communications networks and services, and an emerging consensus that competition is the most effective way to provide services. In particular, the development of optical fibre cables and the development of fully digital switching and transmission systems have reduced the cost and increased the funcionality of traditional electronic communications networks, while the development of radio and satellite technology has opened up the possibility of providing competing networks based on alternative technologies.

World-wide liberalization and globalization are changing the electronic communications sector and as a result the need for world-wide co-operation in regulatory measures has been recognised. National authorities should review the provisions for being prepared to cause changes to be made where necessary periodicaly for civil emergency planners.

Advances in technology have reduced cost and broadened the functionality of electronic communications networks and devices. In the long run, monopolies have proved not to be the most efficient way of providing new services to the costumers and the demand for liberalization has grown.

The lessons learned from liberalization of telecommunications are that the introduction of competition tends to produce a world-wide market driven communications sector. It also promotes a faster development and emergence of new innovative services, broadens and customer choice, encourages investment and lowers costs. Electronic communications consumers are benefitting from increased quality, greater efficiency, widespread availability and low prices.

Liberalization, however, raises issues concerning, among others, security and civil emergency planning aspects, which should be considered themes.

Society is heavily dependent upon electronic communications and applications carried over electronic communications links. There is therefore an increasing concern with the integrity and security of networks. These become even more critical when defence and CEP needs are taken into consideration.

Modern technology has opened up new possibilities for the overall availability of electronic communications, with competing vendors offering a wide range of services. CEP planners have an opportunity to take advantage of these developments to acquire multi-functional, resilient communications, given a supportive regulatory regime.

Nations should consider in the context of these developments, further legislation or regulation to meet CEP requirements.

Nations should continue to monitor the electronic communications sector in relation to globalization, liberalization, convergence, interconnection and interoperability.



4.3.2. Cellular Systems

The rapid development of technology applied to the field of electronic communications makes it possible today to communicate almost everywhere in the world.

The development and implementation of cellular radio systems allows subscribers who are on the move to use their personal mobile station to communicate between each other and with users connected with line-based Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN).

With the introduction on the market of the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), it has been possible to provide interoperability of systems between different operators internationally.

Current technology can determine a mobile station within a few hundred meters, depending on mobile base station density. Recent developments in technology however are likely to permit localisation of a caller with increasing precision.

Standardisation of the GSM technology internationally provided roaming between nations. Nations have seen the benefits of extending roaming capabilities between networks nationally as well. While this is currently possible in a number of nations, others are in the process of introducing this capability.

Priority access can be achieved by using specially programmed SIM cards that enable “essential” people to obtain new connection to the overloaded network (without affecting calls in progress); by the use of pre-programmed analogue mobiles or by applying network management techniques.

An additional vulnerability that is exceedingly hard to overcome is that of electronic attack, fraud and abuse. Communications security technologies, increased service reliability and network accessibility are areas in which commercial service providers should continue to focus time and expense to ensure availability for users.

Wireless services, although of great impact in the field of emergency and crisis recovery, do demonstrate a vulnerability to physical damage from man-made and natural disasters.

When available, cellular mobile communications augment emergency management effectiveness:

a). By their immediate accessibility;b). Ease of use in communicating wide-area, nation-wide or world-wide;c). Services offered today are comparable to wireline services including voice, video and data applications;d). Reliability;

The use of commercial wireless communications in different critical situations have provided important communications means in disaster recovery.



The evolution of wireless technology with the use of transportable, rechargeable power supplies has shown how it has been possible to install and enhance mobile base stations quickly offering to both stricken population and emergency recovery teams all the necessary communications assistance.

Recent events indicates a need for implementing priority access arrangements to ensure that the emergency management communications are available in crisis situations. 4.3.3. Satellites

"Satellite earth station network" means a configuration of two or more earth stations which interwork by means of a satellite;

In the Information Society, regulatory and trade barriers in electronic communications, including the satellite sector, constrain the difusion of new global services and applications. Removing these barriers will increase competition, improve the quality and range of services, lower prices to consumers and stimulate further research and development. National Regulatory Authorities, therefore, have a fundamental task to remove barriers to the benefit of their countries.

There is already significant competition and liberalization taking place and rapid strides have been made towards a fully open satellite communications market. Nevertheless, some barriers remain.

Nations shall ensure that any regulatory prohibition or restriction on the offer of space segment capacity to any authorised satellite earth station network operator are abolished, and shall authorise within their territory any space-segment supplier to verify that the satellite earth station network for use in connection with the space segment of the supplier in question is in conformity with the published conditions for access to such person's space segment capacity.

Nations which are party to international conventions setting up international satellite organisations shall, where such conventions are not compatible with the competition rules, take all appropriate steps to eliminate such incompatibilities, as access to spectrum is increasingly used as a competitive tool. 4.3.4. certs / internet

The Internet truly became a crucial infrastructure that supports communications, commercial and financial transactions, and public services to the citizens.

There is a growing dependency of several agents of society as governments, schools, banks and general business in relation to the Internet. In this context, the protection of this infrastructure is becoming as important as other already considered critical, like the water and electricity supply, or telephone communication.

Today, the technical level required to connect a system to the Internet, is far lower that the level required to administer securely that same system.



While connection to the Internet is in most cases easy and cheap, finding a good systems administrator isn't, on most of the cases.

Consequently, many systems aren't properly secured, are a danger to data integrity, and are being used to compromise other remote systems.

The recent increase of identified vulnerabilities and corresponding exploitation, are a cause of large business financial loss, and user's low confidence on services available on the Internet.

CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team), is a common name given to an entity that focus, exclusively, in supplying security services on computers and/or computer networks.

Two fundamental characteristics of a CERT are that it supplies security incident handling, and has a clear authority and constituency.

CERT may include the following aspects:

- Offering technical support to computer users in resolving security incidents, advising on best-practices, analysing artefacts, and coordinating actions with the parties involved.

- Gather and disseminate a set of information about vulnerabilities and recommendations, pertaining to potential security risks and ongoing malicious activities

- Gather from accredited sources information related to security vulnerabilities, and act on the community with the goal of minimizing impact at the National level

- Promote the creation of new CERT/CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Teams) in the Nations, and raise awareness of security issues on computer users.

4.3.5. Broadcasting

Radio and TV broadcasting is a kind of communication directed from the source to the listeners/viewers.Fundamental differences are determined by the frequencies of transmission and power of transmitters.

a. The use of long-wave technology is mostly limited for navigation purposes, it is not too prevalent, and this is why it is not included in the scope of examination. However it can be stated that this technology is very similar to medium-wave technology, so results of analysis of medium-wave technology equipment, and recommendations can be applied to long wave stations as well. The long-wave broadcast stations transmit from 150 Khz to 285 Khz.

b. Medium-wave technology constitutes a separate group for examination. It can be characterized by large size antenna towers, in some cases a fairly long feeder



line between the transmitter and the antenna tower and in the case of older technology transmitters, a rather large transmission building, and an energy supply system that provides large electric power input. Naturally, size of more modern technology transmitter and support equipment is much less.

Naturally, the scope of this examination includes only non-mobile, high power, long distance transmission equipment serving broadcasting purposes.

In the broadcast industry, the medium-wave transmitters are also known as AM commercial broadcast transmitters from 535 Khz to 1705 Khz.

c. Short wave technology is similar to medium-wave technology in many respects. Here the most significant difference is to be found in the antenna systems, because physical dimensions may vary to a great extent (dipole curtains). Buildings that house transmitters, antenna control units and other support equipment are greater compared to those of middle-wave stations. The input power can also be compared to that of middle-wave technology. The short-wave broadcast transmitters operate on different bands inside a range between 2300 Khz to 26100 Khz.

d. The technologies and sites for FM radio and television transmitters in VHF and UHF frequency bands are examined together. This technology can be characterized by substantially lesser dimensions, and a higher level of integration. Usually there are more transmitters at one site, so more programs can be transmitted at the same time. Their electric power requirement is much lower compared to the technologies described above.

e. Satellite transmission technology provides the possibility of direct program broadcasting and distribution as well. The technology can be characterized by a satellite broadcasting up-link station and a satellite down-link receiving station—often on one site. Older equipment is placed in a larger transmission building, and uses larger satellite dishes. More modern equipment is characterized by up-link and down-link equipment installed in containers, and equipped with smaller sized satellite dishes. Their energy supply does not demand a high level of input.

f. Cable broadcasting - Considering cable broadcasting is present in a considerable number of households, its role is addressed in the context of civil emergency planning.

g. Digital Radio: The radio broadcast industry mainly uses analogue systems to carry programmes from their studios to the listeners. Due to the growing number of broadcasters and programme services, the frequency bands allocated to AM and FM radio in many regions of the world are full. The resulting congestion in the radio spectrum has led to a decline in reception quality and is a real constraint to further growth. Digital transmission technology can offer much improved coverage and availability. It is expected to replace analogue transmissions in many areas, but as digital systems are incompatible with current AM and FM broadcasting systems, new receivers will be needed. Ideally, to reach the widest range of listeners, a genuinely universal digital radio system



should be capable of being transmitted via terrestrial, satellite and cable systems. Different technologies using different frequency bands are in development.

One of the five roles for Civil Emergency Planning is the Support for national authorities in civil emergencies. The broadcasting sector can play a vital role in terms of communications in these circumstances, due to its popularity among people and the fact that almost everybody possesses a receiver device of some sort .

In time of emergency, radio broadcasting is a proven means of alerting and the public generally expects to receive warning via their local or national radio stations.

The public requires to be informed reliably and nearly immediately. Most populated areas are within the coverage area of several radio stations which have the potential to simultaneously reach a large number of people at home during the day, in the work place or in vehicles. Every emergency plan to protect the population and/or the national critical infrastructures that include public safety, emergency management, power and gas distribution, transportation, telephone networks, public works, etc. depend on public broadcast.However, there are several other means and ways to realize an emergency warning system too.

4.3.6. All of these technologies have significant benefits for electronic communications providers and users, including civil emergency planners. It is essential, however, that national authorities put processes in place, which allow for the periodic review of the provisions for CEP, being prepared to cause changes to be made where necessary.

5. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ORGANISATION

5.1. The organisation of electronic communications has also undergone changes in most of the member nations of the Alliance. Formerly the whole of electronic communications regulation, infrastructure and service provision was the responsibility of a single government department, usually known as the PTT. Over the years there has been a separation of regulatory aspects in several countries from those of provision of networks and services. Regulatory affairs generally continue to be the responsibility of a government department - referred to in this document as the "National Regulatory Authority".

5.2. The provision of the electronic communication infrastructure and the services provided over the infrastructure may be carried out by separate entities. Any of these organisations can be owned by national governments or by private bodies, dependant upon the extent to which liberalization and privatization has been carried out. This document refers to those collectively responsible for the provision of electronic communications as "Electronic Communications Providers” (c.f. AC/121-WP/193(3rd Revise) of 29 November 1996). Where necessary to differentiate, those responsible for the provision of service without possessing infrastructure are referred to as "Service Providers".



5.3. Due to this dispersal of responsibility and expertise, special consideration needs to be given as to how best to focus the efforts of all the organisations involved on a common CEP strategy.

6. NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR CEP

The purpose of this paragraphs is to outline the impacts and opportunities the development of information society has on Civil Emergency Planning (CEP).

It is useful to focus on four current trends relevant to the Information Society concept, i.e. globalisation, convergence, liberalisation and centralisation.

6.1. GlobalisationAs ICT becomes more accessible, industries have matched that growth and increased their multinational presence. Under normal circumstances, these companies reflect the needs of stockowners, national authorities and customers. Under some abnormal circumstances, the needs of the national authorities in a geographical area might be different. As more networks are being managed by fewer multinational companies, failures can cause serious disruption across several countries. Globalisation introduces challenges to CEP and the multinational community needs to identify the costs and benefits of any capabilities or enhancements. This border-less dependency reflects the need for a well co-ordinated and planned multinational approach to CEP.

6.2. ConvergenceTraditionally, separate networks have been used to provide voice, data and videoservices, each requiring separate access mechanisms. Convergence allows these different kinds of services to be transformed into packets and combined into a single mode of transport. Convergence also provides inter-working between existing networks such as PSTN, ISDN and GSM by means of gateways.In general convergence can be viewed as all IP (Internet Protocol) or packetbased integrated networks with a number of characteristics. Convergence does not only cover network characteristics but also service characteristics, which provide new opportunities to network operators, service providers, communications manufacturers and users.

IP based networks also provide challenges to security and dependability.Convergence will need security mechanisms to protect services from attacks, such as denial of service and viruses, and hence to protect the sensitive information of customers from malicious activities. It must be recognized that the security features of the traditional networks and services might be lost in the converged environment.

Policy makers and regulators need to continue to ensure that appropriate measures are being taken to protect the convergence of networks and services from disruptive shocks such as technical failure, physical or cyber attack or accidental damage. As an example, many telecommunications operators are in the process of transforming of ordinary PSTN to IP based telephone service (often referred to as VoIP). This migration will provide for example, what might be termed ‘nomadic’ access to the IP network. Users are not limited to connect at fixed locations but will have access to



their service from any suitable point in the network. This makes it very difficult to regulate or set demands on the service provider.

There is no practical experience of the availability of such access points in a crisis situation. These access systems also need an external power-supply to function, which could be another potential problem.

The convergence also includes broadcasting and telecommunication services.

6.3. LiberalisationThe liberalization of the electronic communications sector and the lowering of the barriers for entry to the market place, have resulted in a greater number of service providers. These service providers may not necessarily have a culture of security and emergency preparedness due to the added cost in a competitive arena. A good example of this is the transformation to Voice over IP (VoIP) telephones. Because VoIP uses the established IP network infrastructure, the VoIP service provider can provide the service from different locations in the world. Companies providing electronic communications services are being operated according to generally acceptable commercial criteria. In the context of CEP, it is vital to have a communications system that is reliable and available at any time.

6.4 CentralisationThe liberalisation of the free market has accelerated the movement to increased centralisation. Increasing efficiencies through consolidation of organisations, equipment and staff could result in a single event with great global repercussions.

It is important that emergency planners recognise the various impacts which centralisation can have.

Societal, political, economical, technological, and cultural changes, have both the impact on and opportunities for CEP.

6.4. Societal impacts and opportunities

Civil Emergency Planning in the Information Society will be faced with elements of interest not envisioned two decades ago. Information once thought to be relevant only to national authorities has become critical to private individuals and business managers alike, impacting on the daily decisions of millions of people. Interruptions to that flow of data might well harm, not only the day-to-day operations of family life, but financial markets and transactions involving significant amounts of money. Civil emergency planners must now acknowledge the importance of maintaining the flow of information to a broader spectrum of users, which now must include residential communications users as well as business and national authorities. With such a diverse user base, emergency planners may well have to institute a system of priority restoration procedures. Within that community of critical communications systems users, one must consider the increased importance of the media outlets such as radio, television, newspapers, and other publication vehicles.

6.5. Political impacts and opportunities

Privatisation of once governmental and monopoly owned communications sources has greatly increased the base of service providers, which can adversely affect the



situation during a crisis. Emergency planners now must develop multiple paths of communications to retain and assure dependable communication connectivity at all times. Previously, a single provider could once provide a complete picture of the regional or national situation, that now requires multiple providers reporting on multiple services and technology. Traditional wireline carriers are now supplemented by wireless carriers and Internet providers. While the traditional providers may retain some of the former regulatory restraint and reporting requirements, the less traditional have less stringent, or no reporting requirements. Wireless providers, generally less constrained by government oversight, promote mobile communications as a social statement and standard. The wireless phone allows one to call in the case of a personal emergency and the ability to be contacted at anytime, but ignores the facts of cell congestion and lack of adequate signal strength when an emergency strikes. As an example, in the US, the wireless market is advocating total dependency on the mobile phone and the elimination of the residential wireline instrument. During the recent power failures in the US Northeast, many wireless users found themselves without any means of communications because of cell congestion and depleted battery backup for many of the cell towers.

6.6. Economical impacts and opportunities

Economic impacts of the Information Society will have economic impacts on CEP. The wider spectrum of services will require a broader examination by the emergencyplanner. Every added element of protection and control will add to the planning budget. With the increased privatisation of the industry comes the need to balance expense with revenue. Who is to pay for the crisis preparedness efforts? Certainly the cost of protecting one’s stockholders should fall to the corporation, but what about protection of national security aspects of critical industry sectors, (e.g. the financial industry, which depends on the communications network)? The additional protection is for the good of all citizens of that nation; should they not share the costs, rather than only the stockholders of the communications company? While emergency planners should embrace the enhancements brought on by the Information Society, they should also engage with politicians to seek national compensation solutions, to ease the stockholder’s burden of costs.

6.7. Technological impacts and opportunities

Emergency planners, once eavily concerned with cable cuts and switch failures, must now be concerned with latency, software-code, viruses and other network operations. Not only is there more information, provided by more sources, but there are more platforms for providing the communications media. Increased use of the Internet Protocol (IP) demands revisions in oversight and analysis procedures of the emergency planner. Operations centres must consider greater bandwidth capacity. A Network Operations Centre (NOC) must now maintain human resources with specialised IP skills, as well as cutting-edge technology. Positive elements of these changes include the many automatic analysis processes and the effective reach of a single NOC to very large and distant services and networks.

Among the analysis tools available to the civil emergency planner is the recent development of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). CERTs are generally comprised of highly skilled information technology specialists. The teams may be formed at the private sector level within corporations, or at varying levels of the Government oversight sector. Their role is to react to attacks or severe crisis



situations within the internet protocol environment. Increased dependency on IP based services will soon demand attention from teams such as this to assure an acceptable standard of performance within the Information Society

6.8. Cultural and environmental impacts and opportunities

Acknowledging the increased awareness and individual and business needs of the Information Society, the civil emergency planner must now be prepared to assist withinformation gathering during a crisis. The more aware public will now demand timely information on the event, frequent updates and a demonstration by national authorities that they have the situation in hand. Critical sectors, such as civil communications, will need to know the consequences of the event for their sectors. From the electrical sector, communications managers will need to know the availability of commercial power, and if geographical areas are safe to enter to facilitate repairs. Authorities responsible for public evacuation will need to know the availability of telephone services within a geographical area. The public sheltering in the area will need emergency communications facilities. Civil emergency planners should be prepared to work closely with the authorities to provide near-real time information updates to assist the public, emergency workers, and others.

The Information Society will place greater demands, not only on the communications sector, but also on national authorities. The public’s thirst for information grows not only to encompass additional sources and types of data, but also increases as the severity of the crisis rises. During a period of crisis, industry sectors with critical infrastructures will require increased information relevant to the immediate situation.National authorities will need information to maintain public understanding, safety, and the provision of governmental assistance when required. The role of CEP is changing from analysis, mitigation and restoration, to providing information to national authorities.

7. GUIDANCE FOR THE CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF CIVIL ELECTRONIC COMS

7.1. General

7.1.1. It is imperative that NATO Member States regard their national and international electronic communication facilities as part of the overall defence capability of the Alliance, which includes Civil Preparedness.

7.1.2. This Chapter provides guidance to meet the civil electronic communications requirements of the Alliance. Some aspects of the guidance may also be appropriate to satisfy military requirements.

7.2. Need for Coordination

7.2.1. It is important that, in each nation, effective machinery is set up by means of which it is possible to introduce, and monitor the implementation of, appropriate measures in national electronic communication services, in order to achieve continued availability of communications internationally and nationally in emergency, crisis and war. To that end, the chosen national machinery should provide means of



regular consultation, coordination and exchange of information among members of the Alliance.

7.2.2. Electronic communications Providers need to have advance information about defence requirements in order to fit in smoothly in the conduct of business (which is mostly commercial by nature) and to avoid delays and additional costs. This points to the necessity for a continuous process of consultation between Electronic communications Provider and their appropriate National Authorities.

7.2.3. There is a need for bi- and multilateral consultation between the appropriate national authorities and the electronic communications providers to ensure that NATO's CEP requirements are taken into account in the planning, implementation and continued operation of essential international services. No benefit will accrue for the achievement of NATO objectives for civil electronic communications in emergency, crisis and war, if compatible actions to maintain services are not introduced in all Member Nations. It is therefore desirable that Member Nations should exchange information on measures found to be most effective and convenient in enhancing the potential availability of their electronic communication networks and services in emergency, crisis and war. It is the Alliance’s ambition to share all of this information with the Partner Nations.

7.2.4. As the circumstances within individual nations differ so widely, it would not be appropriate for the CCPC to recommend any precise form of mechanism for consultation, coordination and the exchange of information. However, as an essential part of that mechanism, Nations are urged to actively participate in the planning and coordinating of the work carried out by the CCPC. In the event that it does not prove possible to resolve situations in bilateral discussions or to overcome shortcomings from the standpoint of electronic communications in emergency, crisis and war in the course of normal development of international systems, it is of vital importance that such issues are brought to the attention of the CCPC for information and possible coordination.

7.2.5. The results of studies in other international bodies (such as International Telecommunication Union (ITU), European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), Commission of European Post and Telecommunications (CEPT), European Union (EU), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), etc.) may be of importance to NATO as they may influence international electronic communication policies and may provide additional guidance on protective measures. The CCPC should therefore keep under review any relevant studies.

7.3. Coordination in Emergency, Crisis and War

7.3.1. In emergency, crisis and war electronic communication networks and services would have to cope with rapid changes in traffic patterns and with urgent needs to support defence activities. The extent of damage to networks may vary widely from country to country and within individual countries. In these circumstances the essential activities of electronic communication operators in establishing, maintaining and restoring international electronic communications cannot be achieved without proper coordination.

From a stage of crisis, depending on national decisions, the electronic communications provider should make arrangements for transition to their planned wartime organization. These measures should include:



7.3.2. Bringing into service means of exchanging secure electronic communications on international coordination; and imposing security restrictions on usual peacetime channels (PSTN, telegraph and telephone engineering service lines) to prevent the divulgence of sensitive information concerning the location and extent of damage to networks.

7.3.3. Establishing contact with the appropriate national authorities responsible for decision making, when commercial facilities are becoming insufficient to meet all the CEP and defence requirements and priorities must be allocated.

7.3.4. Introducing arrangements for the exchange of incident reports (TELINCREPS) and situation reports (TELSITREPS) between national control centres.

7.3.5. Establishing contact with the appropriate national authorities responsible for decision making, when commercial facilities are becoming insufficient to meet all the CEP and defence requirements and priorities must be allocated.

7.3.6. Means of fallback emergency coordination may be required at a national or if necessary at a subordinate level in the event of catastrophic damage to public networks and when planned emergency coordination is no longer possible. This function could be assigned to the Electronic Communications Liaison Officer (ECLO) in each nation and the ECLO should be the initial point of contact.

7.4. Measures to be Considered

7.4.1. As part of their peacetime operations, Electronic Communication Providers have to respond to a wide variety of events, which affect their capacity to handle traffic and to provide services. Highly evolved and effective network management capabilities are essential for Electronic Communication Providers to control their networks and guarantee a quality of service to their customers including NATO. The manner in which Electronic Communication Providers operate during peacetime should be continued in an emergency, crisis or war situation as much as possible. However, Electronic Communication Providers must plan and prepare during peacetime for unforeseen circumstances which may occur as the crisis escalates. The paragraphs that follow outline several factors which need to be considered.

7.5. Staffing and Management

7.5.1. Account should be taken of the possibility of appropriate available manpower being reduced by general national mobilisation and of the need to ensure through appropriate national action the availability of qualified electronic communication personnel. Appointed personnel must be instructed and trained, e.g. by taking part in exercises or training seminars.

7.5.2. Preparations should be made for:

7.5.3. Establishment of crisis management centres and/or war headquarters, including provision of adequate and secure means of electronic communications and of procedures for dealing with gradual or rapid transition to crisis and war functions.



7.5.4. Strengthening of the organisation and services in areas where increased activities are to be expected.

7.5.5. Reduction of activities deemed to be of lesser importance.

7.5.6. Establishment or strengthening of internal security and augmenting the personnel on duty to safeguard against sabotage, subversion, etc.

7.5.7. Identifying alternative facilities, stocks, production capacity and repair capabilities and making provision, where possible, for their use in times of emergency, crisis and war.

7.5.8. Informing and instructing the public about voluntary or mandatory constraints on their use of electronic communication services according to the actual situation.

7.6. Civil Electronic Communication Network and Services Planning

7.6.1. Civil electronic communication networks and services are critical infrastructures which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of our society. It is necessary that peacetime planning aims at the development of a network structure flexible enough to meet requirements in emergency, crisis and war and to limit the consequences of possible damage to a manageable deterioration in service.

7.6.2 In order to achieve the necessary degree of flexibility, consideration should be given to the following measures, bearing in mind the need for an adequate balance between defence requirements, technical feasibility and financial constraints:

o Geographically separated routes should be established with each NATO and partner country.

o Maximize diversity between cables (submarine, optical fibre, copper), microwave and satellite routes between countries.

o Interconnection of important arteries should be established in such a manner as to bypass vulnerable points and to augment the flexibility of the networks.

7.6.3 In time of crisis, the normal electronic communications traffic will be required to carry additional traffic grow for essential purposes like food, raw materials, shipping, transports, etc. There should be sufficient capacity to accommodate this expected growth with another potential increase for defence traffic. Nations who already have a national or international preference scheme may decide to activate the essential network features they have for priority dial tone, priority call setup and exemption from restrictive management control.



7.6.4. Normal practice for network management centers is routing traffic over as many different routes as possible (with automatic overflow). This should enable vital traffic to be handled in the event of several of the routes breaking down.

A well organized and continuous supervision of individual parts of the electronic communication networks, together with suitable reporting systems and well established common channels are essential for the continued operation of the networks in a crisis and war environment, as well as after a civil emergency.

7.7. Electronic Communication Installation and Equipment

7.7.1. To achieve the necessary degree of survivability, consideration should be given to the following measures, keeping in mind the need for an adequate balance between the Alliance requirements, the technical feasibility and the financial constraints.

7.7.2. To reduce the risk of service being severely affected by the destruction of one or more centres, national and international telecommunication switching and control centres should, when possible, be mutually supported.

7.7.3. Additional measures are required when telecommunication installations are identified as a critical infrastructure to assure a continuity of operation in case of natural or man-made disasters. Those additional measures may include as example; storage depots, workshop, physical protection, contingency plans, standby power generator with adequate fuel supply, etc.

7.7.4. National authorities should decide if a critical infrastructure, vital for its security, should be equipped with an Emission Control (EMCOM) protection system to minimize the risk of radio installation, within telecommunication networks, being used for direction finding, targeting, information gathering and sabotage.

7.8. Support Services

7.8.1. In the peacetime planning of support services full attention must be given to the increased demands that would be made on such services in times of emergency, crisis and war. In order to meet these requirements the following specific measures should be considered:

7.8.2. In the evaluation and procurement of electronic communications equipment, where other factors are equal, preference should be given to the equipment considered to be more resilient under wartime conditions.

7.8.3. Extra stocks of critical items of equipment should be procured and dispersed to suitable locations, where they can be made available for the rapid restoration of services.

7.8.4. Mobile and transportable equipment, including emergency power units, with full documentation, logistic support and trained personnel should be provided or augmented for temporary use following heavy damage.



7.8.5. An effective repair capability should be established, which meets the demands of emergency, crisis and war situations.

7.8.6. In order to enhance the capacity of the support services under crisis and war conditions, preparation should be made to use the alternative facilities, stocks, etc.

7.9. Maintenance and Operations

7.9.1. In time of emergency, crisis and war public electronic communication networks will have to cope with the rapid changes in traffic patterns and with the urgent needs to support Alliance activities. In war, even after heavy damage, conditions may vary within a country so that in some areas, services are totally disrupted while in others, they are capable of functioning normally. Under these circumstances the activities of civil electronic communication administrations lie primarily in ensuring the continued operation of their country's essential national and international electronic communication services in coordination with, where necessary, other administrations.

7.9.2. During normal times, increasing demand for international services has been met by advances in both technology and operational techniques and by the development of larger digital transmission and switching systems, along with common channel signalling, to provide the required capacity. This has resulted in an international electronic communication network that is highly interconnected and interactive.

7.10. Network Management

7.10.1. Within the context of this document, Network Management is defined as the set of activities required to monitor and maintain all network components in order to provide maximum utilisation of network services in all situations. Network management controls provide a means to regulate the flow of traffic in networks and their application should be based on network performance parameters, which indicate that action is required.

7.10.2. The key requirements of network management, within the context of network operations are:

7.10.3. Maximising the number of effectively handled calls by the coordination of all activities related to the utilisation and availability of networks.

7.10.4. A flexible network structure so that maximum advantage can be taken of facilities such as automatic re-routing, automatic route switching and dynamic traffic control.

7.10.5. Remote surveillance and control of switching and transmission systems to be aware of the state of the whole network at all times.

7.10.6. Real-time traffic control to minimise congestion and maximise the number of successful call completions.



7.10.7. Standby transmission network capacity with automatic protection.

7.10.8. Restoration plans and rapidly deployable equipment to replace damaged items or to provide supplementary capacity.

7.10.9. Computer support systems for on-line monitoring and control of network elements, and comprehensive information management and display the cause of the problem.

7.10.10. Pro-actively monitoring and maintaining direct customer network services and network interconnections with other licensed operators including international correspondents.

7.10.11. Network management controls and techniques will provide the network operators with commercial benefits in normal times but will be of critical importance in emergency, crisis and war for the continued operation of electronic communication services. Because of that important role, it should be a requirement on Network Operators that their Network Management Centres (NMCs) should be continuously manned and, preferably, should be housed in protected accommodation located away from vulnerable areas. Communications linking the NMCs to the network nodes should be highly survivable. NMCs should be duplicated or the functions should be capable of being performed on a regional or local level or in International Switching Centres (ISCs).

7.11. International Emergency Preference Scheme

7.11.1. When International Telecommunication Service is restricted due to damage, congestion, and/or other faults the IEPS allows authorised users to have access to the telephone service in public telecommunication service, whereby users can communicate directly and temporarily between themselves in conversational mode.

7.11.2. The primary goal of IEPS is to support crisis management arrangements. IEPS should significantly increase the ability of essential users to initiate and complete their communications (voice and data) via Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) and Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN).

7.11.3. ITU-T Recommendation E.106 was prepared by ITU-T Study Group 2 (1997-2000) and was approved under World Telecommunication Standardisation Conference (WTSC) Resolution NO. 1 procedure on 13 March 2000.

7.11.4. IEPS allows authorised users to have access to the International Telephone Service as described in ITU Recommendation E.106.

7.11.5. IEPS is needed when there is an emergency or a crisis situation, which causes abnormal telecommunication requirements for governmental, military, civil authorities and other essential users of public telecommunications networks such as Public Switched Telephony Network (PSTN). It allows authorised users to have



access to the International Telephone Service while the service is restricted due to damage, congestion, and/or other faults.

7.11.6. Most nations have national preferences schemes to allow this essential internal traffic to flow. Therefore, it is important that to enable NATO/EAPC nations to support NATO during emergencies and crisis they establish interoperability principles necessary to allow international telecommunications of essential users.

7.11.7. A technical evolution in civil telecommunication is developing very fast, there is today a request to implement preference scheme in the Mobile Telephone Services and in the Internet Protocol Telephony (INPTEL) area.

7.12. Restoration of International Transmission

7.12.1. International transmission systems form the interconnections between the ISCs of the public switched electronic communication services and may be routed directly between two countries or transit third countries. Internationally established and coordinated plans and procedures have been agreed by the Electronic communications Providers to be applied in the restoration of any part of the normal transmission systems which have been lost due to failure or planned interruption.

7.12.2. In emergency, crisis and war the continued application of the restoration plans could be made difficult by the cumulative impact of damage to international transmission systems, since many planned restoration links could either be in use or out of action. It would be necessary to resort to "ad hoc" restoration arrangements using the best available surviving facilities. Consultation would be needed between civil electronic communication operators and between them and their national civil and military authorities.

7.12.3. The peacetime priority rules, which primarily take account of commercial considerations, may not be applicable in many situations in emergency, crisis and war. In a situation of heavy or cumulative damage the normal objective of complete restoration would not be achievable and available facilities would have to be allocated as directed by the appropriate national authorities. Nations should pursue the need to identify civil international leased circuits which are considered vital to the total defence of the Alliance and which are thus required to continue in service in emergency, crisis and war.

7.13. Electronic Coms with Non-Alliance Nations

7.13.1. In a crisis every effort must be made to ensure the continued use of international electronic communication services. Particularly, diplomatic and other vital electronic communications between Alliance members and between the Alliance and enemy, potential enemy, neutral governments and partners are essential for effective efforts to avoid crisis, and, where such efforts are unsuccessful, necessary towards the achievement of peace. However in times of emergency, crisis and war it may be necessary to introduce control measures so that appropriate action can be taken with regard to direct and indirect electronic communication routes between the Alliance and enemy, potential enemy, neutral countries and partners according to prevailing circumstances.



7.13.2. In this context, "control" means the regulation of circuits and the traffic carried by them; it does not relate to the contents of the information transferred.

7.13.3. Electronic communications Providers when directed by appropriate national authorities shall apply controls on both public and leased international electronic communications services.

7.13.4. Technical arrangements for control measures to be adopted by the Electronic communications Providers will need to be agreed upon among the NATO nations. These can be an extension of their normal peacetime network management functions previously described.

7.13.5. For international electronic communication services to be effectively controlled, it is important that all NATO nations activate their agreed control measures at the same time and in compliance with appropriate NATO measures.

7.14. National Emergency Electronic Communications Networks

7.14.1. There is a need for a communication facility, called a National Emergency Electronic Communications Network separated from public electronic communication services, for use by National Authorities in emergency, crisis or war. This facility is intended to be used at the administrative level, but should have interconnecting functions to the communication networks at the operational level. The facility can be implemented in several ways: as a physically dedicated communications network, as a functionality within existing public communications networks, or as a combination of those. It will have to support the need for electronic communication networks and services at all administrative levels -being local, regional or national- during an emergency situation, crisis or war.The National Emergency Electronic Communications Network will bring the most benefit if it is capable of supporting all levels of emergency and has a high level of preparedness and availability. The network should be resilient and capable of being deployed in both fixed and mobile locations. The equipment should be robust and simple to use and be fully interoperable with other emergency response service networks. When deciding on the national implementation of such national emergency network the decision making authority should make a thorough analysis of the exact needs for electronic communication networks and services in an emergency situation, crisis or war before deciding on the kind of implementation of a national emergency network.Subject to the adoption of an appropriate international signalling system and the possibility of a resultant good transmission performance, it is considered advantageous to internationally interconnect national emergency networks during peacetime or early in a crisis to enable appropriate vital users to communicate. The national authority should consider the possible need to enhance the national implemented facility to be able to carry the subsequent additional international traffic.



7.14.2.In order to use these interconnected national emergency networks for passing calls under wartime conditions arrangements must exist to ensure seamless continuous electronic communications. This implies diverse routing, multi-gateway distribution of circuits, and, in addition, methods of system hardening could be considered. In view of the possible capacity limitations, specially when the national emergency network is implemented through public telecommunications networks, nations may wish to exercise some control over external calls coming into their national emergency network; semi-automatic operator service with the operator located in the receiving country would meet the requirements and provide additional assistance to the caller in successfully completing his call. Operators employed should be multilingual in addition to the mother tongue.

7.15. Electronic Coms for Essential Users

7.15.1. Civil electronic communication networks and services are part of the total electronic communications resources available to the NATO Alliance to be used in civil emergency, crisis and war. Effective operation of these civil networks and services for the benefit of essential users in emergency, crisis and war must be a mandatory responsibility of civil electronic communication network operators and service providers. National Authorities should ensure that network operators and service providers throughout the NATO Alliance are required to take this responsibility as part of their normal, commercial, peacetime planning.

7.15.2. In order to guide their civil electronic communication network operators and service providers in their planning, Nations should specify those functions whose essential operations in a civil emergency or in crisis and war would rely on civil electronic communications. A list of functions considered of relevance for NATO crisis management purposes, both civil and military, can be found below. The list is not in order of priority: the relative importance of the functions must be decided by Nations on the basis of the actual situation and on national circumstances.

7.15.3. In their planning to meet the emergency, crisis and wartime requirements of these functions for networks and services, civil electronic communication network operators and service providers should pay particular attention to the need for prompt provision of networks and services; and, to the extent practicable, for the restoration of those networks and services as quickly as possible after interruption, if appropriate in accordance with priorities decided by National Authorities.

7.16. Functions Supported by Electronic Coms

7.16.1. Functions (civil and military) reliant on civil electronic communications and of relevance for NATO crisis management:

7.16.2. Military purposes

7.16.3. Civil defence/"home defence" e.g. public warning systems



7.16.4. Diplomatic and other vital governmental purposes

7.16.5. State security purposes including customs and immigration

7.16.6. Emergency services by local authorities, including police, fire services, etc.

7.16.7. Restoration of electronic communication services

7.16.8. Public utilities including energy, water supply etc.

7.16.9. Air and sea rescue

7.16.10. Vital industries sustaining the war effort (armaments, ammunition, electronics, chemicals, food, etc.)

7.16.11. National and international transport, such as:

7.16.12. Airports and air services (in particular the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN) and the Societé Internationale des Télécommunications Aéronautique (SITA) network)

7.16.13. Road services

7.16.14. Seaports and maritime services

7.16.15. Railway systems

7.16.16. Inland waterways

7.16.17. Meteorological services (in particular the meteorological electronic communications network)

7.16.18. Broadcasting and press services (radio, television, press agencies, etc.)

7.17. International Standards

7.17.1. Introduction

A number of electronic communication related standards are published by many international and national bodies. These are increasingly used by electronic communication providers and the others.

Electronic communications networks and information systems are nowadays an essential part of the daily lives of our citizen and are fundamental for the functioning of our societies. The convergence of telecommunications, media (broadcasting) and information technology sectors, and the implications for regulation towards the Information Society have led to a new regulatory framework for electronic communications.



As a result of the development of information and communications technology there is an increasing globalisation in many sectors of our society. These development also has resulted in worldwide electronic communications networks and services across national boundaries.

Electronic communications networks and information systems play a vital role in emergencies, the health services, the public administrations, defence, commerce and other economic activities. Without reliable and available electronic communications networks and information systems the functioning of emergency services and disaster relief operations are severely hampered or even not possible.

Worldwide standardisation is a key issue in the development of telecommunications, broadcasting, information technology and the Information Society. Worldwide bodies:

7.17.2. International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

Under the provisions of the Constitution and Convention (Geneva 1992) the mission of the ITU Telecommunications Standardisation Sector is to fulfil the purposes of the Union relating to telecommunications standardisation by studying technical, operational and tariff questions and adopting Recommendations on them with a view to standardising telecommunications on a worldwide basis. The ITU Radiocommunication Sector carries out similar activities related to the use of radiocommunications. Emergency telecommunications is another area where renewed efforts are required. The most relevant activities of the ITU regarding emergency telecommunications are addressed below.

a. Radiocommunication objectives and requirements for Public Protection and Disaster Relief (PPDR);b. ITU Workshop on Telecommunications for Disaster Relief 2002;c. Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunications Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations;d. ITU Handbook on Disaster Communications;e. ITU Partnership with Inmarsat to Provide Satellite Services for Disaster Management;f. ITU-R Recommendation M. 1637 on Global cross-border circulation of radiocommunications equipment in emergency and disaster relief situations;g. ITU Resolution 645 (WRC-2000/WRC-03) invites ITU-R to conduct studies for development of a Resolution concerning technical and operational bases for global cross-border circulation of radiocommunication equipment in emergency and disaster relief situations (Resolution now suppressed (WRC-03);h. ITU Resolution 644 Rev (WRC-2000) which urges administrations to take all practical steps to facilitate the rapid deployment and effective use of telecommunications resources for disaster mitigation and disaster relief operations by reducing and where possible removing regulatory barriers;i. ITU Resolution 36 (Marrakesh 2002) of the Plenipotentiary Conference urges member states to facilitate use of telecommunications for the safety and security of the personnel in humanitarian organisations;j. ITU Resolution PPDR2.1-1 (WRC-03) on Public Protection and Disaster Relief



telecommunicaitons;k. Description of an International Emergency Preference Scheme (IEPS).

7.17.3. International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)

The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) sets world-wide standards for any subject not covered by a specialist agency. The International Electrotechnical Committee (IEC) sets world-wide standards in electrontechnical area. Both organisations co-operate in a Joint Technical Committee (JTC), which is the central body for IT standards. Applications of technology, however, are being handled within ISO. The members of JTC are national standards organisations.

European bodies:

7.17.4. European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)

ETSI is a non-profit making, independent organisation and is to produce telecommunications standards that will be used for decades to come throughout Europe and world-wide. There are a number of activities on emergency standardisation issues e.g.

a. Public Safety Partnership Project (PSPP) - Project MESA (together with US TIA);b. Requirements for communications of citizens with authorities/organisations in caseof distress (emergency call handling);c. Project MESA: Update Making Progress towards an International PPDR standard;d. Project MESA: Statement of Requirements;e. Project MESA: Emergency Data Exchange;f. Emergency Telecommunications (EMTEL) concept;g. Establishing Trust in the Information Society;h. Securing the Internet;i. Proceedings Emergency Telecommunications Experts;

7.17.5. European Committee for Standardisation (CEN - Comité Européen de Normalisation) and (CENELEC – European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation ).

The mission of the CEN is to promote voluntary technical harmonized standards in conjuction with world-wide bodies and its partners in Europe. Harmonization diminishes trade barriers, promotes and allows interoperability of products, systems and services, and promotes common technical understanding. European Standards are developed on the basis of voluntary agreement and consensus between all the interested parties in Europe. CEN works in partnership with CENELEC (the European Committee for electrotechnical Standardization and co-ordinates with industry-specific bodies and the the ISO. CEN created CEN / ISSS (Information Society Standardization System) as the focus for its ICT (Information and Communications Technology). CEN/ISSS provides a middle way, an open process, backing of the formal standardization



environment with a fast, market-driven approach, to provide a one-stop of consensus products from full standards to best-practice agreements.

7.17.6. Conference of European Posts and Telecommunications Administrations – (CEPT)

CEPT deals exclusively with sovereign / regulatory matters and has established two committees, one on postal matters (CERP), and the other one on electronic communications (ECC). CEPT decided to create ETSI, into which all its telecommunications standardisation activities were transferred.Present relevant activities regarding emergency communications are related to the availability of the radio spectrum for public protection and disaster relief.

Bodies in Canada and the US:

7.17.7. Canadian Radio, Television and Electronic communications Commission (CRTC)

Under the Telecommunications Act, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) is responsible for the supervision and regulation of telecommunications common carriers and service providers that fall under federal jurisdiction. Under the Broadcasting Act the CRTC is responsible for the supervision and regulation of the Canadian broadcasting systems. The Minister of Industry (Industry Canada) is responsible for the administration of the Telecommunications and Radiocommunication Acts, which set out the policy framework and regulatory requirements. Industry Canada facilitates access to the radiofrequency spectrum by issuing authorities for its use. Industry Canada has the lead role for Emergency Telecommunication Planning at the national level.

7.17.8. American National Standards Institute (ANSI)

The American National Standards Institute - ANSI is a private, non-profit organization that administers and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standardization and conformity assessment system in the United States.ANSI promotes the use of U.S. standards internationally, advocates U.S. policy and technical positions in international and regional standards organizations, and encourages the adoption of international standards as national standards where they meet the needs of the user community.

7.17.9. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

NIST is a non-regulatory federal agency within the U.S. Commerce Department's Technology Administration. NIST's mission is to develop and promote measurement, standards, and technology to enhance productivity, facilitate trade, and improve the quality of life.

7.17.10. Federal Communications Commission (FCC)


http://www.ta.doc.gov/

http://www.ta.doc.gov/


FCC is an independent United States government agency, directly responsible to Congress. The FCC was established by the Communications Act of 1934 and is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable. The FCC's jurisdiction covers the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. possessions.Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, a number of federal agencies have initiated efforts to develop preparedness standards, among which are the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), NIST and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Homeland Security together with NIST is setting standards for State and Local Preparedness.

NIST and FCC are the primary governmental bodies involved with telecommunications standards in the USA.

7.17.11. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

The IEEE is a U.S. non-profit, technical professional association of more than 360,000 individual members in approximately 175 countries. The full name is the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., although the organization is most popularly known and referred to by the letters I-E-E-E.

Through its members, the IEEE is a leading authority in technical areas ranging from computer engineering, biomedical technology and telecommunications, to electric power, aerospace and consumer electronics.

The IEEE promotes the engineering process of creating, developing, integrating, sharing, and applying knowledge about electro and information technologies and sciences for the benefit of humanity and the profession.

NATO CIS Standards:

7.17.12. Military Agency for Standardization (MAS)

The Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) was established in London in January 1951 for the purpose of fostering the standardization of operational and administrative practices and war material. In 1971 the MAS moved to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, where, following the 1998-2000 review of the NATO Standardization Process, the MAS was combined with the Office of NATO Standardization (which addressed broader standardisation issues such as identifying overall Alliance standardisation goals and co-ordination between operational and material activities). The Charter of the resultant NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), approved in August 2001, gave the NSA expanded responsibilities for the co-ordination of standardisation activities within NATO.

The NATO Standardisation Agency is a single, integrated body set up by the North Atlantic Council and composed of military and civilian staff. It is responsible to the NATO Standardisation Committee for the coordination of issues between all fields of standardisation. It sets out procedures, planning and execution functions related to standardisation for application throughout the Alliance. It is responsible for the preparation of the work for the NCS (NATO Committee for Standardisation ), NCSREPs and NSSG (NATO Standardisation Staff Group) meetings and the overall



administration of all Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs) and Allied Publications (APs).

7.17.13. international organisations of relevance to CCPC

Report on the recent developments in the international (tele)communications bodies, which could affect NATO Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). CCPC develops such report twice a year. Last two reports cover the period from1 February 2004 - 1 September 2004 and the second period from 1 September – 1 February 2005.This report describes the main activities mostly in these organisations:

- EUROPEAN UNION (EU);

-INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION (ITU);

-CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

ADMINISTRATIONS ( CEPT ) (CEPT);

-ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

(OECD);

-EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS INSTITUTE (ETSI);

-UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION (UPU);

-INTERNET / ICANN /GAC

-GLOBAL DISASTER INFORMATION NETWORK (GDIN);

-EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH (CERN);

-UN WORKING GROUP ON EMERGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS (WGET);

-WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM.

8. POSTAL SERVICES

8.1. Introduction

8.1.1. Postal services unquestionably fulfil an important role in daily life. Many functions of modern society depend on the availability of postal services. With the growing demand for high levels of service in terms of quality, quantity, speediness and reliability, efficient postal operators are indispensable. This also applies in times of emergency, crisis and war, when securing both vital domestic and international mail becomes of special importance.



8.1.2. To maintain essential international postal services, nations should make necessary preparations and take appropriate measures to overcome the possible impact of risks (see Chapter “Risks to Civil Communications”). In practice the risks will vary from country to country and therefore it is essential for each country to analyse and set out the concrete risks for postal services included in this compendium. For the purpose of determining risks, it is recommended that countries use a risk management approach as risk management provides an organisation with a systematic planned response to a range of risks or crisis situations. Each postal organisation should adopt risk management techniques in relation to the security operations necessary to maintain services in an emergency situation. The techniques could include the following:

8.1.3. Identify and list essential and vital areas of operations and means necessary for the continuity of the postal organisation and for the maintenance of public life.

8.1.4. Specify the level of importance of the services and the impact of a reduction of these services.

8.1.5. Identify relevant baseline security measures that are taken to protect the services and means as mentioned in steps 26.1.1 and 26.1.2. in normal times.

8.1.6. Identify and list the type and level of perceived threats in times of crisis and/or war.

8.1.7. Are the baseline security measures taken adequate and capable of improvement in crisis? If appropriate, take into account the availability of specific threat assessments and intelligence likely to be available at the time.

8.1.8. Specify general areas where security improvements are necessary during emergency/crises.

8.1.9. Preparation of these security improvements and testing with the aim of periodical review of crisis management arrangements.

8.1.10. In the event of civil electronic communications being destroyed in a crisis, the maintenance of postal services will be of even greater importance as a back-up service for maintaining vital communications. Similarly postal services will be of increasing importance as a substitute service to the degree that ordinary electronic communication services for all or parts of society have to be restricted or withdrawn for reasons of capacity and/or priority to vital users.

8.1.11. In certain circumstances, such as large-scale man-made or natural peacetime emergency, crisis and war, national and international postal services can be affected by a lack of appropriate means for transportation. This lack will arise from:

8.1.12. Changes in terms of destinations, quantities and qualities of mail to be transported.



8.1.13. Decreasing availability of means of transportation (trucks, boats, trains and aircraft) and/or oil-shortage.

8.1.14. Damage to the infrastructure (roads, airways, ports, airports).

8.1.15. In periods of emergency, crisis and war security provisions on transportation and delivery of mail may be necessary to counteract sabotage. This in turn may cause reduced handling capacity and delay to mail.

8.2. Scope of Postal Services

8.2.1. In order to fulfil the requirement of maintaining the scope of postal services the "business as usual" practice will prevail until conditions necessitate national changes in:

8.2.2. Counter services

8.2.3. Letter business

8.2.4. Parcel business

8.2.5. Courier products.

8.2.6. That means use should be made as long as possible of normal existing postal procedures, facilities and installations. Only if these do not suffice any longer, additional measures have to be taken.

8.2.7. The permissible limitation actions may be graded in terms of type of items and special modes of dispatch.

8.2.8. To guarantee fundamental postal coverage efforts should be made to at least admit the following types of mail:

8.2.9. Of all users:

8.2.10. Ordinary letters up to 50 g (also by airmail)

8.2.11. Ordinary postcards (also by airmail)

8.2.12. Postal money orders (except telegraphic orders)

8.2.13. Giro payment orders (except telegraphic orders) or equivalent

8.2.14. Daily newspapers

8.2.15. Of users with key defence functions (all items must be marked with "priority mail") in addition:

8.2.16. Ordinary and registered letters up to 1000 g and postcards



8.2.17. Insured letters

8.2.18. Parcels up to 5 kg (including insured parcels)

8.2.19. Items with express delivery-containing notifications regarding vital tasks for survival and defence purposes (in same weight limits)

8.2.20. It is recommended that the nationally appointed postal service providers of the above mentioned services, as part of the domestic postal emergency planning, make plans and prepare measures to ensure these services are maintained between member countries during emergency, crisis and war.

8.2.21. The threat of terrorist attacks on civil aircraft and the threat to civil aircraft from explosive devices being carried in cargo/mail will be exacerbated during periods of heightened tension. Similarly the use of ships, trains and road transportation could be threatened during periods of heightened tension. Therefore, to ensure the continued availability of postal services, postal authorities should maintain contingency plans to ensure the possibility of diverting mail to alternative means of transportation. Depending upon the nature of the threat in a situation of crisis or war, priority mail and/or mail to all users may have to undergo security provisions, such as screening of mail.

8.3. Provision of Postal Services

8.3.1. The services offered by, and the operating patterns of the civil postal organisations may have to be adjusted to the changed conditions in times of emergency, crisis and war.

8.3.2. For this purpose, simple operational systems, which have low susceptibility to failure, will have to be introduced. In addition, the services offered to the civilian population may have to be restricted.

8.3.3. Users with key defence functions are to be exempted from any restrictions, which might possibly be imposed on admission. Consignments on which authorities, civil protection organisations and other public institutions appear as the addressees of senders ("priority mail") must be given priority over other consignments if it is not possible to convey all consignments at the same time. The same applies to military mail.

8.3.4. The activation of additional domestic measures will remain a national responsibility, but it will be clear that effectiveness can only be achieved by NATO-wide implementation. Hence, coordination within NATO is required, in particular with regard to international postal services and the security hereof.

8.3.5. Room should be left, however, for bilateral and ad hoc arrangements whenever necessary and possible. It should be obvious that limitations of postal services occurring nationally should be taken into account by all NATO-members when handling the mail. However, provision should at the same time be made for fulfilling the obligations connected with the postal management arrangements for international mail within the Alliance in times of emergency, crisis and war.



9. TRAINING AND EXERCISE

9.1. Training

9.1.1. The efficiency of the Electronic communications and Postal Experts supporting the CECC would be improved in undergoing an appropriate course or training on NATO organisation and methods of working and their role within it. Therefore each nation should be invited to send experts to attend a familiarization course run by the CEPD at NATO Headquarters at NATO expenses.

9.1.2. The aim of such a CEP training session, in general, would be to present the policies and objectives of and procedures by NATO, the perspectives of NATO in the future and their repercussions for CEP, as well as to collect the views of the participants for consideration in (future) civil emergency planning. The CCPC conducts a biannual Training Session in which electronic communications and postal experts are instructed in Crisis Management Arrangements.

9.2. Exercises

9.2.1. The main purpose of NATO Crisis Management Exercises in which NATO Headquarters, nations, military commands and civil emergency organisations participate is to test, develop and evaluate the Alliance's arrangements, preparedness, procedures and plans to face emergency, crisis and war situations. There is a continuing need for major NATO Crisis Management Exercises to ensure that the Alliance crisis management procedures can operate efficiently. Civil electronic communications operators and postal service providers may be called on to participate in these and other NATO exercises.9.2.2. see ccpc doc. on ccpc participation in future crisis management exercises

9.3. Objective

9.3.1. The purpose of participation by National Authorities (NAs), Electronic communications Operators (TOs), and Postal Organisations (POs) in NATO crisis management and other exercises is to achieve the following goals:

9.3.2. To maintain the standard of their support to NATO in emergency, crisis and wartime situations.

9.3.3. To practise procedures which are not in everyday use.

9.3.4. To exercise the management of situations where, in order to make the best use of electronic communications and postal facilities, coordination is required between civil, military authorities and NATO HQ.

9.3.5. To enhance relationships between all National Authorities, Electronic communications Operators and Postal Organisations to improve their ability to support Alliance activities.



9.3.6. The main objective, additional to own national objectives, would be to practice the procedures for continuing electronic communications and postal arrangements in NATO during emergency, crisis and war.

9.4. Exercise Planning

9.4.1. The Exercise Planning Team (EPT) is a group of experts subordinate to the CCPC and created to plan and coordinate, at NATO level, the participation of national Civil Communications (which include Postal) authorities, Electronic communications and Postal Organisations and the Civil Communications Crisis Management Structure in all NATO exercise in which national authorities decide to participate. In their planning, the EPT will take into account experience acquired from previous exercises in order to improve the effectiveness of participation in future exercises.

9.4.2. The EPT should prepare a short instruction called "Guidelines" dealing with matters exclusive to each exercise and referring participants to the relevant parts of permanent documentation. The matters to be covered should include:

9.4.3. The name, date and duration of the exercise

9.4.4. The objectives selected for the exercise

9.4.5. The extent of participation of TOs and POs and their contact points

9.4.6. Communications arrangements

9.4.7. Any features of the exercise requiring special attention by players or DistaffPost-exercise

9.4.8. incident planning

9.4.9. exercise instructions

9.4.10. organisation for the exercise

9.4.11. evaluation of the exercise

9.4.12. players and di-staff

9.4.13. exercise play

9.4.14. relevant ccpc/scepc doc’s and studies¨



10. DETAILED INFORMATION ON CCPC CRISIS MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND POSTAL MATTERS

10.1. Introduction:

When a crisis occurs, no decisions on planning, deployment or employment of military forces are taken without political authorization. Decisions are taken by the governments of each NATO member country collectively and may include political or military measures, as well as measures to deal with civil emergencies, depending on the nature of the crisis.

NATO has different mechanisms in place to deal with crises. The top decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, exchanges intelligence, information and other data, compares different perceptions and approaches, and harmonizes its views.

The Council is supported by a number of specialized committees, including the Policy Co-ordination Group, the Political Committee, the Military Committee and the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee. NATO communication systems, including a "Situation Centre", receive exchange and disseminate political, economic and military intelligence and information around the clock, every single day of the year.

10.2. Co-ordination:

The NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS), NATO’s Operational Planning System and NATO Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements are designed to underpin the Alliance’s crisis management role and response capability in a complementary and synergistic fashion, as part of an overall NATO Crisis Management Process.

In a crisis the SCEPC is the core of the CEP crisis management arrangements and advises the North Atlantic Council on the availability and effective utilisation of civil resources in an emerging crisis and brings to its attention CEP issues which have a bearing on Alliance policy and require policy-level resolution.

10.3. Article 5 and non-article 5 crisis arrangements:

In the case of Article 5 or non-article 5 crisis response operations, the SCEPC Chairman may call a meeting of the SCEPC in accordance with established procedures. A member nation may also request a meeting at any time. The SCEPC Chairman may call upon the CCPC Chairman and members of the CCPC to assess the situation and to advise the SCEPC/Council on behalf of their PB&Cs. The consultation with CCPC Chairman and members could be exercised by means of communications or by physical presence at NATO Headquarters and during Council/SCEPC Meetings.

The CCPC Chairman would also be consulted by the SCEPC Chairman with regard to the expertise (CCPC experts) required for further advice and/or assistance to the Council and/or the SCEPC and for the augmentation of the CEP crisis management



element. CCPC experts could be consulted individually at their workplace or convened at NATO headquarters or elsewhere.

10.4. Peacetime arrangements:

In case of civil emergency or disasters, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC) acts as the focal point for information sharing on disaster assistance requests among EAPC countries. The EADRCC informs the Secretary General and, through him, the EAPC, as well as the SCEPC in EAPC format, and the NATO Military Authorities, of such requests for disaster assistance, and to obtain any necessary political guidance.

The EADRCC can be operational on a 24 hours/7 days basis and should it be necessary can be augmented for the duration of an actual disaster, initially by CEPD Staff, other IS Divisions and/or IMS personnel, CCPC Chairman or members including if appropriate members from EAPC countries and after consultation with CCPC Chairman, civil experts.

10.5. CCPC responsibilities in time of crisis:

10.5.1 Responsibilities in electronic communications

Located in NATO or from their workplace, a) the CCPC Chairman, b) the CCPC and/or EAPC members that have been called to support and c) the CCPC electronic communication experts may be requested to support the NATO Council, the SCEPC and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-Ordination Center (EADRCC) with their expertise in electronic communication, to:

o Provide advice on new technologies, market developments and the availability of assets, and provide commercial assessments on the suitability of assets that may be available;

o Provide advice on the consequences of a crisis, or pending crisis, and its implications on telecommunications networks;

o Provide advice on the economic and legal consequences of decisions taken by civil and military authorities;

o Provide advice on logistics use of telecommunications, operations and availability. Propose solutions to overcome, or resolve civil communication shortfalls.

o Provide civil communication expertise, advice, guidance, assistance and support on national and international legislation and regulation covering civil communications.



o Provide civil communication expertise, advice, guidance, assistance and support on all hazard protection of Civil Communications critical infrastructures and services against cyber and physical threats.

o Establish contact and work in close collaboration with National and NATO Cyber Emergency Response Teams (CERTs).

o Provide civil communication expertise, advice, guidance, assistance and support on Information Society & Broadcast, Warning covering civil communications.

o Provide advice and assistance on how to approach a) national regulators or national/international public providers, b) broadcasters or c) private owners of telecommunications networks, in support to emergency response functions and civil emergency plans.

o Facilitate access to and use of civil communication networks or non-military frequencies by the national and NATO military authorities.

o Provide advice and assistance on the affect of weapon of mass destruction (includes chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats) on the electronic communication sector.

o Participate in military meeting and conferences involving civil communications.

10.5.2 Responsibilities in postal matters

Located in NATO or from their workplace, a) the CCPC Chairman, b) the CCPC and/or EAPC postal members that have been called to support and c) the CCPC postal experts may be requested to support the NATO Council, the SCEPC and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-Ordination Center (EADRCC) with their expertise in postal matters, to:

o Provide advice and assistance on developments in the postal sector and international postal operations;

o Provide advice and assistance on the availability of postal assets, and an assessment of the suitability of those assets;

o Provide advice and assistance on the use and availability of postal resources and operations;

o Provide advice and assistance on consequences of a crisis, or pending crisis, and its implications for the postal sector and any associated economic and commercial effects;



o Provide advice and assistance on possible consequences to the postal sector from impacts to other sectors which the postal sector is dependent on (i.e. transportation);

o Provide advice and assistance on economic and legal consequences of decisions taken by civil and military authorities;

o Provide advice and assistance on issues of concern for International Organizations that will result from a crisis situation;

o Provide advice and assistance on legislation and regulation that affect Posts ability to comply with the requirements of NATO CEP Crisis Management Arrangements;

o Provide advice and assistance on issues of concern regarding critical infrastructures for the post and other interdependent sectors that affect the Post ability to comply with the requirements of NATO CEP Crisis Management arrangements;

o Provide advice and assistance on the affect of weapon of mass destruction (includes chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats) on the postal sector.

o Facilitate the liaison and cooperation with International Organizations and those parts of the Commercial sector that may be involved with the Posts in responding to a crisis situation.

o Gather and analyze information on the situation.

o Participate in meetings and conferences with International Organizations.

o Support the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-Ordination Center (EADRCC).

10.6. Use of civil experts:

In all cases, once the Council or the SCEPC, upon advice of the CCPC chairman, has decided to call up CCPC civil experts, the Director, CEP will send a message through the designated point of contact(s) to the nation(s) who have nominated the expert(s) in question. In principle and in common practice, any use of the civil experts should be made through the national representatives of the appropriate PB&C. The message will specify the reasons for the call up, the name(s) and area of expertise of the expert(s), the financial arrangements, the duration and the actions to be taken. On receipt of such a message, the nation(s) if they agree to provide the expert(s) will alert the expert(s) and initiate appropriate actions.



10.7. Nominations of experts:

Based on the approved areas of telecommunications and postal expertise in document EAPC(CCPC)WP(2004)0003-REV2, Expert Posts have been identified. These expert posts are open to all members and partner nations with the aim to select the best-qualified experts with an emphasis on the experience, knowledge and the ability of a candidate to perform in a professional manner the duties that may be assigned. There are no national quotas when nominating and selecting the candidates for expert posts.

High level or senior civil experts should serve as high quality business/industry advisers. Specialised civil experts should be middle management personnel with wide experience in their particular sector of expertise, whose companies/ministries are prepared to make them available to NATO Headquarters for a limited period of time, for periodic training and, if needed, in a crisis. Civil experts must be willing and able to respond on short notice during a crisis when their advice is needed. Civil experts should in principle be nominated for a minimum of three years.

Every year, CCPC will issue a call for nomination of CCPC experts to invite nations to submit candidates. This document should list the method of operation, specific qualifications and duties for each category of expertise.

A CCPC Expert Selection Team was established to evaluate the applications and qualifications for the candidates nominated and to select the experts. This Team, if required, will also advise CCPC on the type of expertise required in future, and whether additional qualifications should be required for CCPC expert posts. The decisions by the CCPC Experts Selection Team will be subject to final endorsement by the CCPC WG. The CCPC Experts Selection Team will include the CCPC Vice Chairman, CCPC Working Group Chairman, and three other national representatives on a rotational basis (in alphabetical order for an annual term).

After the selection process, the candidate experts will receive, via the national representatives, the results from the Expert Selection Team signed by NATO CEPD.

Detailed information on CCPC experts is kept in a secure file at NATO CEP at the CCPC Staff Officer Office. Experts should be contacted on a regular basis by their national representatives to maintain the relation and to note possible changes that did happen.

10.8. Electronic Communications Liaison Officers (ECLO)

10.8.1. ECLOs are nominated by the National Authorities in accordance with the CEP Crisis Management Arrangements (CMA). They represent the national authority in Civil Electronic Communications and should be well-versed in NATO activities, and must be available in person or via a designated representative, on a 24-hours-a-day, 365-days-a-year basis.

10.8.2. ECLOs serve as national Point of Contact (POC). Requests for assistance from NATO should be directed through the ECLO. The ECLO should establish and



maintain a national network of experts from various professional areas, who will be available when NATO CEP requires assistance on civil electronic communications.

10.9. Postal Services Liaison Officers (PSLO)

10.9.1. PSLOs are nominated by the National Authorities in accordance with the CEP Crisis Management Arrangements (CMA). They represent the National Authority, responsible for the Civil Postal Services, and should be well versed in NATO activities and must be available in person or via a designated representative, on a 24-hours-a-day, 365-days-a-year basis.

10.9.2. PSLOs serve as national Point of Contact (POC). Requests for assistance from NATO should be directed through the PSLO. The PSLO should establish and maintain a national network of experts from various professional areas, who will be available when NATO CEP requires assistance on Civil Postal Services.

10.10. The Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations:

Today's telecommunication industry provides us with a multitude of equipment and services, but national regulatory barriers still hinder the full use of these valuable tools. The Tampere Convention creates an international framework for the provision of telecommunications resources for disaster mitigation and relief between states and between nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The convention:

o Urges nations and NGO entities to co-operate in facilitating the use of telecommunications resources in disaster mitigation and relief.

o Recommends that nations reduce or remove barriers that currently impede the use of telecommunications resources for disaster mitigation and relief operation. Those barriers are the limitation on importation of telecommunication equipment, the trans-border access for telecommunications experts and the use of radio frequency and equipment.

o Safeguards the privileges, immunities, and facilities afforded to persons providing disaster assistance.

o Shall not affect the rights and obligations of States Parties deriving from other international agreements or international law.

The Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunications Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations (Tampere, 18 June 1998), after the number of 30 states parties to the Convention has been reached, entered into force on 8 January 2005.

11. ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS



AC Allied CommitteeAFTN Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network ANSI American National Standards Institute

CAPC Civil Aviation Planning Committee CBR Chemical Biological RadiologicalCBRN Chemical Biological Radiological and NuclearCCPC Civil Communications Planning Committee CDC Center for Desease Control and PreventionCECC Civil Emergency Crisis Cell

CEN European Committee for Standardization/Comité Européen de Normalisation

CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization/Comité Européen de Normalisation Electrotechnique

CEP Civil Emergency Planning CEPD Civil Emergeney Planning Director CEPT Commission of European Post and Telecommunications CERN European Organization for Nuclear ResearchCERT Computer Emergency Response TeamCIS Communications and Information Systems CJTF Combined Joint Task Force CMA Crisis Management Arrangements

CPC Civil Protection Commíttee CRTC Canadian Radio Television and Electronic Communications

Commission

DISTAFF Directing Staff

EADRCC Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre / Crisis Cell EAPC Euro Atlantic Partnership Council ECLO Electronic Communications Liaison OfficerEMCOM Emission ControlEMP Electro-magnetic PulseEMTEL Emergency TelecommunicationsEPT Exercise Planning TeamESDI European Security and Defence Identity ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute EU European Union



FEMA Federal Emergency Management AgencyFAPC Food and Agriculture Planning Committee FCC Federal CommunicationsCommission

GDIN Global Disaster Information NetworkGSM Global System for Mobile Communications

HPM Hight Power Microwaves

ICT Information and Communication Technologies IEC International Electrotechnical CommitteeIEPS International Emergency Preference Scheme IMS International Military Staff IP Internet ProtocolIPC Industrial Planning Committee IS International Staff lSCs International Switching Centres ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network ISO International Organisation for Standardization ISSS Information Society Standadization SystemITU International Telecommunications Union

JMC Joint Medical Committee JTC Joint Technical Committee

MAS Military Agency for Standardization MC Military Committee

NAC North Atlantic Council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO H.Q. NATO Head QuartersNC3 NATO Command Control CommunicationsNCRS NATO Crisis Response SystemNCS NATO Committee for StandardisationNCSREPS NATO Committee for Standardisation RepresentativesNGO Non Governmental OrganizationsNIWS NATO Intelligence and Warning SystemNMCs Network Management Centres NOC Network Operations CenterNSA NATO Standardisation AgencyNSSG NATO Standardisation Staff GroupOECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PfP Partnership for PeacePB&C Planning Boards & Committees PBIST Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport



PBOS Planning Board for Ocean Shipping PKOPOC Point of ContactPos Postal Organisations PPDR Public Protection and Disaster ReliefPSLO/PSO Postal Service Liaison Officer PSPP Public Safety Partnership ProjectPSTN Public Switched Telephone Network SCEPC Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee SITA Societé Internationale des Télécommunications STANAGs Standardization Agreement

TOs Electronic Communications OperatorsTOR Terms of Reference

UN United Nations UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication SystemUPU Universal Postal Union

VOIP Voice Over Internet Protocol

WG Working Group WGET Working Group on Emergency TelecommunicationsWP Working Paper WMD Weapons of Mass DestructionWRC World Radio Conference

12. LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS

13. CCPC TOR’s

The CCPC is responsible for civil communication matters under NATO civil emergency arrangements. Civil communication planning provides for the maintenance of communication services for political, economic and military purposes. Terms of reference of the CCPC is included in the document NACC/PfP(C)D(95)13 from 3 January 1996 “Terms of Reference of the NATO Civil Emergency Planning Boards and Committees (PB&Cs).

In 2003, the CCPC revised the Terms of Reference and came to the conclusion that the term “Civil Communication” as described in the current CCPC TOR does not correctly reflect the developments in the Alliance and the establishment of a new international regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services following the convergence of telecommunications, media (broadcasting) and the information technology sector. As described in EAPC(CCPC)WP(2003)2 from 16 April 2003, CCPC Terms of Reference”, on 12 March 2003, the new definition of “Civil Communications” was approved by the CCPC under the silence



procedure and would be included in the TOR for CCPC when revised. Until then, this definition should be the basis of the activities of the CCPC: the term "civil communications" is seen as all electronic public and non-public communications networks, services, associated facilities, postal services and any other related services.


civilo sakaru plānošanas komitejas darbības pārskatu

Documents