1.G.R. No. L-35989 October 28, 1977FERMIN JALOVER,petitioner,vs. PORFERIO YTORIAGA et al.FACTS:Private respondents PorferioYtoriaga and Consolacion Lopez filed against Ana Hedriana and petitioner FerminJalover a complaint alleging that they are owners of a Lot containing an area 8,153 sqm; By virtue of the effects of the current of the river, there was an increase on its southwestern portion of around 900 square meters; In January, 1958, the defendants had the land increase surveyed, placed concrete monuments thereon and took possession, without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff The plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the owners of the increased portion of the land, and that the defendants be ordered to vacate the premises.Issues having been joined, the case was set for trial. However, it was postponed many times to a period of more than 6 years.When the case was called for trial, Presiding Judge Ramon Blanco dismissed the case, for failure of private respondents to appear in court.2 years later,private respondents' lawyer, filed MR alleging that respondents did not fail to prosecute because, during the times that the case was set for hearing, at least 1of the respondents was always present, and the record would show that the transfers of hearing were all made at the instance of petitioner or his counsel; and, moreover, private respondents had already finished presenting their evidence. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that the order of dismissal was an adjudication on the merits and had long become final. Respondent Judge VenicioEscolin, who succeeded Judge Blanco, issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order of dismissal had become final long ago and was beyond the court's power to amend or change.Private respondents filed a Petition for Relief claiming that the order of dismissal was void because of lack of due process and for having been obtained thru fraud, for the petitioner had misrepresented to the court the status of the case by making Judge Blanco - who was not the Presiding Judge when private respondents presented their evidence and rested their case in 1963 - believe that trial had not even begun.Petitioner opposed the petition for relief contending that private respondents were served a copy of the order of dismissal on February 5, 1970, and, therefore, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for relief should have been filed within 60 days from February 5, 1970, and within 6 months from January 26, 1970, when the order was issued; hence, the filing of the petition was beyond the reglementary period.The petition for relief was given due course, respondent Judge issued an order setting aside the orders dated January 26, 1970 and June 23, 1972, and setting the continuation of the trial for September 15, 1972. Petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the order however it was denied.Hence, the present recourse by petitioner.ISSUE: W/N respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the orders dated January 26, 1970 and June 23, 1972, because the said orders have long become final and executory, hence, may no longer be disturbed.HELD: It is settled that when a party is represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the counsel, and notice upon the party himself is not considered notice in law unless service upon the party is ordered by the court.1Non-appearance of private respondents and their counsel at the said hearing could not mean failure to prosecute on their part, may only be construed as a waiver on private respondents' part of the right to cross-examine the witnesses whom petitioner might present and to object to the admissibility of petitioner's evidence..Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court is not the appropriate remedy. A petition for relief is available only if the judgment or order complained of has already become final and executory;6but here, as earlier noted, the order of January 26, 1970 never attained finality for the reason that notice thereof was not served upon private respondents' counsel of record. The petition for relief may nevertheless be considered as a second motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial based on fraud and lack of procedural due process.Under the circumstances of the case, the issuance of the orders now complained of cannot be said to have been characterized with abuse of discretion.ACCORDINGLY the instant petition is denied. 2.LIGAYA MINA et.alvs. ANTONIA PACSON et.alFACTS:In the complaint filed in the CFI of Nueva Ecija, it is alleged that plaintiffs are illegitimate children of the deceased Joaquin Mina begotten by him with PilarLazo during the period from 1933 to 1958 while Joaquin Mina was lawfully married to Antonia Pacson; That the plaintiff Pablo Mina is a recognized illegitimate child of the deceased Joaquin Mina; That Joaquin Mina died intestate leaving no ascendants or descendants, except his widow Antonia Pacson; That he left various parcels of land enumerated in the complaint but that on April 9, 1950 the defendants connived and secured from Joaquin Mina, who was ill and did not know what he was doing, the execution of the two deeds of sale without consideration, fictitiously and fraudulently, transferring his propertiesto the spouses Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina; Plaintiffs pray that they be declared recognized illegitimate children of the deceased Joaquin Mina, entitled to share in the properties left by him and the deeds of sale be declared fictitious, fraudulent and therefore, null and voidThe defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground ofres judicata, alleging that a similar action had previously been presented as in the same court, and by the same parties.However, it was denied. Also, MR is likewise denied. Hence this petition..tISSUE:W/N the order dismissing the previous Civil Case No. 3015 bars the present civil action No. 3296 of the CFI of Nueva Ecija.HELD:There is no complete identity between the parties in the first case and those in the case at bar.In the previous case Antonia Pacson was not included as party-defendlant. The previous order of dismissal does not bar the present complaint, not only because she was not made a party but also because the issue of filiation.In view of this fact, the present action should be considered barred in respect to the action for the annulment of the deeds of sale and as regards the defendants spouses Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina; but as to the case for the declaration of the plaintiffs as illegitimate children and heirs of the deceased Joaquin Mina this latter case is not barred by the previous action.WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is hereby modified in the sense that the action for the recognition of the filiation of the plaintiffs should be allowed to continue against the defendant Antonia Pacson; but the dismissal of the action for the annulment of the deeds of sale is affirmed. Without costs.3.AGUSTIN O. CASEASvs.CONCEPCION SANCHEZ VDA. DE ROSALES et al. FACTS:On 1952, Rodolfo Araas and Agustin O. Caseas filed with the CFI of Agusan, a complaint for specific performance and enforcement of their alleged right under a certain deed of sale, and damages against the spouses Jose A. Rosales and Concepcion Sanchez. The principal relief prayed in the complaint was for an order directing the defendants-spouses to "execute a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of the assignee, plaintiff Agustin O. Caseas.After the defendants-spouses had filed their answer to the above complaint, but before trial, the counsel for the plaintiffs gave notice to the trial court that plaintiff Rodolfo Araas and defendant Jose A. Rosales had both died.The lower court directed the surviving plaintiff, Agustin O. Caseas, to amend the complaint to effect the necessary substitution of parties thereon. However, he failed to comply with the order.For such failure, the lower court issued an order of dismissal. As no appeal was taken from the above order of dismissal, the same, in due time, became final.On 1960, Agustin O. Caseas, the same plaintiff filed with the same CFI of Agusananother complaint against the widow and heirs of the late Jose A. Rosales "to quiet, and for reconveyance of, title to real property, with damages." The suit referred itself to the very same property and asserted exactly the same allegations as those made in the former complaint. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, namely:res judicata, prescription, lack of cause of action, failure to include indispensable parties, and that the contract subject of the complaint was voidab initio. The lower court issued the order under appeal dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata, lack of cause of action and prescription. . Of the above grounds, though, the lower court relied alone on the defendants' plea ofres judicata, lack of cause of action and prescription. ISSUE: W/N the present case is barred by prior judgment and prescription.HELD:We find for the appellant.SEC. 17.Death of Party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. Similar in the case ofBarrameda vs. Barbara, 90 Phil. 718, inasmuch as there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff-appellant to amend his complaint, his failure to comply with such an order did not justify the dismissal of his complaint. Grounded as it was upon a void order, the dismissal was itself void. It clearly may not be asserted to bar the subsequent prosecution of the same or identical claim.Insofar as the issue of prescription is concerned, this Court is of the view that it should defer resolution on it until after Civil Case No. 780 shall have been tried on the merits, considering that one of the defenses set up by the appellant against the said issue is the existence of a trust relationship over the property in dispute.In view of all the foregoing, the order dated January 20, 1961 dismissing Civil Case No. 780 is hereby set aside and the said case is ordered remanded to the court of origin fortrial on the merits. 4. RPB vs. Moline5. SUSANA ABAY DE ARROYO,vs.FRANCISCO ABAY et al.FACTS:Susana Abay de Arroyo filed in CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for the probate of the will of her deceased first-degree cousin CandelariaBenguanOn 28 May, the Court ordered that the petition be published once a week for three consecutive weeks inCivismo, a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Occidental, setting the date of hearing thereof for the 23rd day of June 1956. On the date and time set for the hearing of the petition attorney Rolando Medalla, representing some of the heirs referred to as opponents, moved for the postponement of the hearing to give him time and opportunity to file a written objection to the petition. Whereupon, the hearing was postponed.The opponents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that a petition for the probate of the same last will and testament had been dismissed by the same Court in a previous special proceedings No. 3628 and constitutes a bar to the present proceedings Court dismissed the petition and further denied the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified the appeal to SC for only questions of law are raised. .1wph1.tISSUE:W/N the petition for the probate of a will is barred by a previous special proceedings, which was dismissed for failure of the petitioner and his counsel to appear on the date set for the hearing thereof. .HELD:The SC upheld the contention of the appellant's that the dismissal of the petition for probate in the previous special proceedings is not an adjudication on the merits.The probate of a will may be the concern of one person or several persons as usually is the case. The fault of one such person may be imputed to him alone who must suffer the consequences of his act. Such fault cannot be imputed to other persons. Hence, the failure of Felix Abay and his counsel to appear on the date and time set for the hearing of the petition for the probate of a will cannot prejudice the right of Susana Abay de Arroyo, the petitioner, in a subsequent petition filed for the probate of the same will and last testament. So the provisions of the Rules cited and invoked by the opponents-appellees cannot be made to apply to proceedings for the probate of wills, because the probate of a will for transmission of property rights to them should not be prejudiced by the act or fault of another and because it is the policy of the State to have such last wills and testaments submitted to Court for their probate or legalization. The order of dismissal appealed from is set aside and the petition for probate of a will emanded to the CFI of Negros Occidental for further proceedings.Rule 18 (Pre-trial)1.FILOIL MARKETING CORPORATION (now Petrophil Corporation) vs. DY PAC & CO., INC.,FACTS:Filoil commenced an action for collection of sum of money with interest against Dy Pac on the ground that the latter fails to pay, notwithstanding repeated demands, the amount due to it for petroleum products bought on credit. At the hearing set, neither Dy Pac nor its counsel appeared. Filoil was allowed by the City Court of Manila to proceed ex parte. The said court rendered a decision on the same date ordering Dy Pac to pay Filoil. Dy Pac appealed to CFI Manila which immediately set the case for pre-trial. It ruled that:[]plaintiff and defendant, who are hereby ordered to prepare a stipulation of facts based on their exhibits already marked and submit the same to the court the parties are warned that if they cannot submit the stipulation of facts, the Court will dismiss the appeal.CFI Manila dismissed the case for failure of the parties to submit the required stipulation of facts and ordered the immediate return of the records to the City Court for execution. ISSUE: W/N the case can be dismissed on the ground that the parties failed to submit a stipulation of facts. HELD:No. There is no law which compulsorily requires litigants to stipulate at pre-trial on the facts and issues that may possibly crop up in a particular case, upon pain dismissal of such case. The process of securing admissions whether of facts or evidence is essentially voluntary, since stipulations of facts, like contracts, bind the parties thereto who are not allowed to controvert statements made therein. Courts cannot compel the parties to enter into an agreement upon the facts. Where the parties are unable to arrive at a stipulation of facts and do not reach an amicable settlement of their controversy, the court must close the proceedings and go forward the trial of the case. The CFI Manila committed serious error in dismissing Dy Pacs appeal from the City Courts decision solely on the ground that the parties failed to comply with the order. 2. Rodolfo Paredes, Tito Alago, AgripinoBaybay vs. Ernesto Verano and CosmeHinunangan (2006)FACTS:In Civil Case 2767, a compromise was entered into regarding the complaint for the establishment of a right of way. Hinunangan granted a 2m-wide right of way in favour of Paredes, Alago and Baybayin consideration of P6,000.00. A complaint for specific performance with damages was filed by Hinunangan on the ground that Petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of the compromise agreement. Petitioners denied the allegation contending that respondents were not actual residents of the barangay and that the lot covering the passage of right of way was sold by Hinunangan to Paredes. Petitioners filed a MTD on the ground of lack of cause of action. The trial court denied the MTD. Pre-trial was set on April but was reset on June. However, it did not push through either because none of the parties appeared. On Nov, the RTC was informed of a proposed settlement. The case was reset to January 2004. On January, private respondents and their counsel were present. Petitioners were also present but not their counsel. RTC allowed respondents to present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendants counsel to appear. ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of counsel for petitioners at the pre-trial, with all petitioners themselves present, is a ground to declare them in defaultHELD: No. Absence of counsel at pre-trial does not ipso facto authorise the judge to declare them in default. Sec. 4, Rule 18 imposes duty on litigating parties and their respective counsel to appear at pre-trial. Sec. 5 penalizes the failure to appear of either plaintiff or defendant but not of their counsel. A judgment of default against one who failed to attend at pre-trial or even to file an answer implies a waiver only of their right to be heard and to present evidence to support their allegation but not all their other rights. Rule 19 (Intervention)1. G.R. No. 94005. April 6, 1993.LUISA LYON NUAL, herein represented by ALBERT NUAL, and ANITA NUAL HORMIGOS, petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and EMMA LYON DE LEON in her behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors HELEN SABARRE and KENNY SABARRE, EDUARDO GUZMAN, MERCEDEZ LYON TAUPAN, WILFREDO GUZMAN, MALLY LYON ENCARNACION and DORA LYON DELAS PEAS, respondents.FACTS:This case originated from a Civil Casefiled by Emma Lyon de Leon in her behalf and as guardian of the respondentsagainst petitioners for partition and accounting of a parcel of land located in Isabela, Basilan City. Subject parcel of land was formerly owned deceased parents of the respondents.Private respondents claimed that said parcel of land has been in possession of petitioner Luisa Nual since 1946 and that she made no accounting of the income derived therefrom, despite demands made by private respondents for the partition and delivery of their shares.TheCFI rendered judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the partition of the property but dismissing private respondents' complaint for accounting. The order of partition was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and an order for the issuance of the writ of execution was issued by the court.Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary injunction. She contends that not being a party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a judgment in the said case.Trial court dismissed the motion filed by Mary Lyon Martin and directed the partition of the property among the original party plaintiffs and defendants. The Commissioners manifested to the trial court that the name of Mary Lyon Martin also appears in the TCT that can be construed that she is one of the heirs.On January 9, 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the property.Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. CA rendered its decision dismissing petitioners' appeal.Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for review.ISSUE: W/Nthe trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition of the property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in Civil Case for partition and accounting of the property and that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and executory.HELD:No.In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority.The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.The petition is GRANTED. The order of the lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

2. Union Bank vs ConcepcionEYCO Group of Companies filedwith the SECaPetition for Suspension of Payment. EYCO describe the corporations as havinga combined assetsthat are more than enough to pay off all debts, but nonetheless unable to pay them as they fall due.Joining EYCO as co-petitioners were EulogioYutingco and two other individuals holding controlling interests in the composite corporations.SEC Hearing Paneldirected the suspension of all actions, claims and proceedings against EYCO.Union Bank, one of the private banks which had granted credit facilities to EYCO filed a complaint for a sum of money against 4 members of the EYCO Group and spouses Yutingcowith application for preliminary attachment.

RTC issued the desired writ of preliminary attachment and the levy on attachment was annotated on the titlesUnion Bank, without awaiting for the SECs ruling on its motion to dismiss, filed with the CA a petition forcertiorarito nullify the SEC suspension orderand its creation of the ManCom.

Also, Union Bank alleged that the jurisdiction over the basic petition for declaration of suspension of payment pertains to the RTC under Act No. 1956, as amended, or theInsolvency Law.CA rendered judgment declaring Union Bank guilty of forum shopping and accordingly dismissed its petition forcertiorari.

SC in its decision affirmed ruling of CA, and declare the SEC possessed jurisdiction over EYCOs petition for suspension of payments filed pursuant to Section 5(d) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A.

SECen bancissued an order for the liquidation and dissolution of the EYCO Group and remanded to the hearing panel for that purposeAnotherSEC en bancorder is the appointment of respondentConcepcionto actas EYCO Liquidator.

Three days later,Concepcionsubmitted before the SECaLiquidation Planfor the EYCO Group.After due proceedings, the SEC approved, Liquidation Plan submitted by Concepcion.However, his motion to intervene, has been denied by the RTC on the ground of lack of standing to intervene.

The order, in addition, granted Union Banks earlier motion to declare EYCO in default, and set a date for theex-partereception of Union Banks evidence.Concepcionthen moved for reconsideration of his motion to intervene.Questioned, too, was the default aspect of the order,arguing that the collection proceedings were suspended until further Orders from this Court. RTC denied his motion.After Union Bank presented evidenceMakatiRTC renderedpartial judgmentorderingEYCOto paythe bankP400 million plus interests and attorneys fees.Viaa petition forcertiorariand prohibition before the CA,Concepcionchallenged the RTCs partial judgment.

The appellate court reversed the Makati RTCs impugned issuances and allowingConcepcionto intervene.Hence this petition by the Union Bank.

ISSUE: 1. W/N SEC has jurisdiction over the case2. W/N Concepcion has the right to intervene in the case.HELD:1. Yes.

Transfer effected by R.A 8799 to RTC of the SECs Jurisdiction did not divest the SEC of its jurisdiction over SEC Case No. 09-97-5764.

Given that it had already issued, as early asSeptember 19, 1998,the suspension order after it found the petition for suspension filed onSeptember 16, 1998to be sufficient in form and substance. EYCOs petition for suspension for payment wasstill pending with the SEC as ofJune 30, 2000. Accordingly, the SECs jurisdiction still subsistsuntil [the suspension of payment case and its incidents are] finally disposed.

2. Yes.

Intervention is a procedure by which a third person, not originally party to the suit, but claiming an interest in the subject matter, comes into the case, in order to protect his right or interpose his claim.Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of or the whole controversy among the persons involved.

Just like the CA, the Court has no doubt about the respondent, as the duly-appointed liquidator of EYCOs remaining assets, having a legal interest in the matter litigated in Civil Case No. 97-2184. WHEREFORE, petition isDENIEDand decision of CAisAFFIRMED.

3. VIRRA MALL TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC., vs, VIRRA MALL GREENHILLS ASSOCIATION, INC.G.R. No. 182902FACTS:Ortigas& Company, Limited Partnership is the owner of the Greenhills Shopping Center. Ortigas and Virra Realty Development Corporation entered into a Contract of Lease. Thereafter, Virra Realty organized respondent Virra Mall Greenhills Association, an association of all the tenants and leasehold right holders, who managed and operated Virra Mall. In the First Contract of Lease, VMGA assumed and was subrogated to all the rights, obligations and liabilities of Virra Realty. VMGA, through its president, William Uy requested from Ortigas the renewal of the First Contract of Lease.VGMA secured two insurance policies to protect Virra Mall against damage by fire and other causes. Virra Mall was gutted by fire, requiring substantial repair and restoration. VMGA thus filed an insurance claim .Thereafter, the proceeds of the insurance were released to VMGA.On 3 September 2001, Ortigas entered into a Contract of Lease (Second Contract of Lease) with Uy .On 11 September 2001, the latter assigned and transferred to petitioner Virra Mall Tenants Association all his rights and interests over the property.Ortigas filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages and Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against several defendants, including herein respondents. It accused them of fraud, misappropriation and conversion of substantial portions of the insurance proceeds for their own personal use unrelated to the repair and restoration of Virra Mall. VMTA filed a Complaint-in-Intervention. It claimed that as the assignee or transferee of the rights and obligations of Uy in the Second Contract of Lease, and upon the order of Ortigas, it had engaged the services of various contractors. Thus, VMTA sought the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred in relation thereto. RTC Br. 67 admitted the Complaint-in-Intervention.he CA reversed the ruling of RTC Br. 67 and dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention on the following grounds: (a) VMTA failed to state a cause of action; (b) VMTA has no legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (c) the Complaint-in-Intervention would cause a delay in the trial of the action, make the issues more complicated, prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, stretch the issues.Issue: Whether or not VTMA may be allowed to intervene in the caseRuling:We rule in favor of VMTA. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:Who may intervene. ..In Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight,[footnoteRef:2][21] this Court explained intervention in this wise: [2: ]

Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigationor in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest, permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which is limited by considering whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.Applying the foregoing points to the case at bar, VMTA may be allowed to intervene, and the ruling of RTC Br. 67 allowing intervention was wrongly reversed by the CA because such a ruling does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.It is clear from the foregoing allegations that VMTAs purported right is rooted in its claim that it is the real beneficiary of the insurance proceeds, on the grounds that it had (a) facilitated the repair and restoration of the insured infrastructure upon the orders of Ortigas, and (b) advanced the costs thereof. Corollarily, respondents have a duty to reimburse it for its expenses since the insurance proceeds had already been issued in favor of respondent VMGA, even if the latter was not rightfully entitled thereto. Finally, the imputed act or omission on the part of respondents that supposedly violated the right of VMTA was respondent VMGAs refusal, despite demand, to release the insurance proceeds it received to reimburse the former for the expenses it had incurred in relation to the restoration and repair of Virra Mall. Clearly, then, VMTA was able to establish its cause of action.

MODES of DISCOVERY1. LOURDES CAMUS DE LOPEZ et al.vs.HON. CIRILO G. MACEREN et al.FACTS:Petitioner instituted the present case for the purpose of annulling the order of the respondent judge prohibiting her in taking her deposition in the Civil Case no. 1035.Petitioner maintains that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in forbidding the taking of said deposition, she being entitled to it as a matter of right, without leave of court, after the filing of the answer of the defendantsDeposition pending action, when may be taken. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. Under the other hand, respondents invoke, in their favor, section 16 of the same rule, reading:Orders for the protection of parties and deponents. After notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make an order that the deposition shall not be taken, or that it may be taken at some designated place other than that stated in the notice, or that it may be taken only on written interrogatories, or that certain matters shall not be inquired into, or that the scope of the examination shall be limited to certain matters, or that the examination shall be held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court, or that secret processes, developments or research need not be disclosed, or that the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or the court may make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to "order that the deposition shall not be taken" and, this grant connotes the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is well-settled, however, that the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited; that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained. It is not claimed that the order complained of sought to avert any of the evils which said section 16 was meant to prevent or arrest. Moreover, petitioner was permitted to institute and maintain Civil Case No. 1035 asa pauper.As such, she can ill afford to meet the expenses to make, with her witnesses, the trip or trips from Manila to Davao, and to stay in said province for the time necessary for the hearing of the case, which might not take place on the first date set therefor. Hence, the order in question tended, in effect, to deprive her, not only of her right, under section 1 of Rule 18, to take the deposition in question, but also, of the opportunity to prove her claim and, consequently, of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. Upon the other hand, the records indicate that the defendants in Civil case No. 1035 who are the widow of Salvador Lopez, Sr. and their legitimate children must be well-off financially, for the estate of the deceased Salvador Lopez, Sr., which has already been partitioned among them, appears to be worth approximately half a million pesos. The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were taken, the court could not observe the behaviour of the deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. In other words, the order of respondent Judge cannot be sustained without nullifying the right to take depositions, and, therefore, without, in effect repealing section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which, clearly, was not intended by the framers of section 16 of the same rule.It is, consequently, clear that a grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent Judge in issuing the aforesaid order of January 11, 1954, for which reason the same should be, as it is hereby annulled and set aside, with cost against the respondents, except the Hon. Cirilo C. Maceren.So ordered.

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