clarke-1995-international journal of urban and regional research
TRANSCRIPT
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Institutional Logics and Local Economic
Development: A Comparative Analysis
of
Eight American Cities
SUSAN
E. CLARKE
Overview
Profound global economic transformations and attendant social changes are prompting
changes in local political arrangements. With the exception of a few large cities, these
political changes are as yet uncharted and the extent to which they signal disjunctures in
local democratic processes remains understudied. Indeed, although a vast political
economy literature documents urban change prior to
1990,
its main themes are now often
less relevant in explaining these local political changes (Ash, 1994).Through the
1980s
urban regime theory appeared well-suited to analysis
of
the impacts of changing economic
and political conditions on local political processes. Yet regime theory is silent on several
critical issues associated with recent political changes, particularly how to read the
diverse local institutional settings in which economic development decisions are made. In
part, these silences stem from unnecessarily narrow renditions of regime theory. To
continue to be useful, these analyses need to incorporate institutional change issues
associated with restructuring processes.
Drawing on new institutionalism approaches, this essay develops a schema for
characterizing the new institutional terrain for economic development policy-making in
American cities. This schema distinguishes among cities in terms of (1) the institutional
orders or logics involved in shaping development patterns and processes and (2) the
complexity of this local institutional setting. It delineates arenas permeated by the logics
of bureaucracy and democracy and those penetrated by the logic of capitalism and
corporate organization. It assesses institutional complexity in terms of the diffusion of
standardized policy elements across organizations. In both instances institutionalization is
conceptualized as a process, rather than a set of specific organizations. This directs the
analytic focus to the conditions under which shifts in institutional logics occur and the
conflicts and struggles associated with the politics of institutional change. Such mapping
of the local institutional terrain is a necessary step towards a more rigorous understanding
of the political transformations underway in a postindustrial, postfordist era.
*
This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation and the Center
for
Public Policy
Research at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Laura Brunell provided invaluable research assistance in
conducting over 100 phone interviews with comm unity activists and in developing data analysis strategies. An
earlier version
of
this paper entitled Comparing Patterns
of
Local Political Change was presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 1992.
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Susan E. Clarke
Urban regime theory and institutional settings
Regime theories emphasize the mediation of structural constraints on local politics by
various political arrangements that allow coalitions to form and govern in local
communities (e.g. Elkin, 1980; 1985; 19 87; Stone, 1989; Stone e t a l . , 1991). This offers
a fruitful means of meshing concerns about structural constraints and contextual
variations. Most theories and notions of regime change centre on coalitions formed
around core business-government interests; broader-based coalitions are possible,
however, and recent comparative work explores the conditions under which different
coalitions emerge and persist (e.g. Stone
e t a l . ,
1991; Turner, 1992; Walton, 1990;
Clavel and Kleniewski, 1990).
There are drawbacks to limiting analysis to the composition of governing coalitions
(Horan, 1991; Elkin, 1987). W hile regime theories anticipate mo re autonomous state and
societal interests in econom ic development decision processes, they a re less clear on how
and when these interests matter (Kantor and Savitch, 1993). Thus, understanding the
dynamics of regime composition may be necessary but it is not sufficient for
understanding how ideas and interests are accommodated in local policy choices.
A
narrow focus on regime composition and the possible relationship between regime
composition and policy choices obscu res the important ways in which the overall structure
of the local institutional terrain affects the ability of groups to influence policy.
The policy effects of regime composition and institutional channels must be
distinguished analytically before we can understand their interactions. The
accommodation of interests in governing coalitions and in institutional arrangements are
two distinct processes; they can influence policy choices in independent but also
potentially overlapping paths. M ost regime studies, how ever, represen t the relationship of
regime composition and policy choice as relatively direct: more progressive policies are
associated with more inclusive governing coalitions (Stone, 1987; Elkin, 1987; Goetz,
1994; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Turner, 1992). But the preferences of som e governing
coalition members could be blunted by an institutional setting that is inimical to
democratic logics. Furthermore, provisions for designated representation in local
economic development institutions may provide channels for influencing policy even in
the absence of regime incorporation of these interests.
A
perspective encompassing both
regimes and institutions would anticipate local policy choices corresponding to interest
representation in these two aren as; to the extent that governing regimes a re inclusive and
democratic logics pervade these institutions, more progressive development policies are
possible. More restricted interest representation or less coherent institutional settings
would result in more eclectic policy agendas. To understand local economic development
policy choices increasingly requires cogn izance of interest representation in institutional
channels as well as in the dynamics of regime composition.
Regimes, interests and institutions
This is an especially important consideration in analyses of contemporary economic
development policy-making in American cities. The profusion of federal community and
economic development programmes since the 1960s has increased the complexity and
fragmentation of local institutional environments. Programmes from the US Department
of Housing and Urban Development, the Economic Development Administration and
other federal agencies prompted the formation of separate line agencies for economic
development and, more indirectly, the initiation of special authorities and quasi-public
developm ent corpo rations in many com munities. Equally importan t, they also introduced
designated interest representation processes as a complement to electoral interest
incorporation in redevelopment policy processes.
In
doing
so,
they shored up the
legitimacy
of
these processes by ensuring broad political representation in programmes
aimed at reorganizing the local employment base and land use patterns. Although these
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Institutional logics and local economic development
515
tended to b e project-specific representation strategies, they offered an a lternative means
of bringing marginalized voices to the table. In particular, designated representation can
overcome the lack of group resources and electoral clout that often precludes
representation in the electoral arena.
Until recently, the character of local regimes appeared to be strongly influenced by
these national programmes and resources (Fainstein and Fainstein,
1983;
Mollenkopf,
1983).
Most efforts to distinguish broad h istorical stages or phases in local redevelopment
politics characterize different periods in terms of regimes dominated by specific
configurations
of
interests and policy orientations (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983; Elkin,
1985).
These variations distinguish regimes over time and across cities; since most
regime theory is based on postwar redevelopment experiences, regime change in the
1960s and 1970s in American cities is often implicitly attributed to federal resources
providing selective incentives for inclusion of minorities and neighbourhood groups.
But as cities rely increasingly on local resources fo r revitalization activities, they are
freed from this federal oversight on whether and how community interests will be
represented in redevelopment efforts. Although regime change is implicitly associated
with resource base changes in most extant models, they offer little guidance for
anticipating either the direction of ch ange in the scope of postfederal regime s o r the menu
of institutional options for accomm odating interests in local economic developm ent policy
decisions. It is unclear, for exam ple, w hether the withdrawal of external public resources
and pressures necessarily means a reversion to the dominance of core business/
government coalitions and a limited public voice. This is a tacit assumption in many
versions of urbzn regime theory but there is no systematic empirical test of this
relationship of resource base change , reg ime inclusiveness a nd local developm ent policy
choices. Some groups may be able to sustain representation even in the absence of
external mandates and resources while others face relative decline or are supplanted by
new interests. The consequent public voice is likely to be shaped by the different
institutional modes available, the bargaining advantages they provide (Kantor and
Savitch,
1993)
and the trade-offs they present to local groups. By influencing the goals
and strategies of state, market and societal interests, these institutional channels may yield
local developmen t choices that do not correspond directly o r obviously to the preferences
of governing regime members.
Inclusiveness and governing coalitions
Are there theoretical grounds for anticipating a
narrower scope of interest representation in the absence of external public resources?
Fainstein and Fainstein
(1983:287)
predict that the weakening ties between national and
local politics will mean greater local diversity and less patterned regularity in local
regimes. But given the political and economic context of Am erican cities, it is reasonable
to assume that most governing reg imes ar e likely to be dominated by core producer
interests controlling economic resources and public officials vested with the political
authority to govern (Stone,
1980).
Without external resources, the systemic bias is
towards narrow governing coalitions (Stone, 1980; Peterson, 198
1 .
However, overt
business resistance to an expanded coalition may not be the primary factor underlying this
trend . More limited coalitions may also emerg e due to the sheer difficulties of m obilizing
and organizing minority and neighbourhood interests and sustaining their participation.
And there is growing evidence that the withdrawal of federa l programm e fu nds has led to
increased conflict between m ayors and council mem bers ove r local developm ent roles and
priorities (Clarke and Gaile,
1992).
In this politicized setting, business interests may be
reluctant and elected leaders may be wary of building coalitions that may include these
broader conflicts and hamper effective action.
Stone
(1989)
argues, how ever, that local governing coalitions seek sufficient scope to
encompass and coordinate the groups necessary for generating enough cooperation to
carry out governance activities. His account of the emergence
of
a bi-racial governing
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coalition in Atlanta underscores the strategic incorporation of groups controlling
resources seen as essential to governance. At one point, neighbourhood groups in Atlanta
were
on
the brink of assuming this strategic importance. Their failure to do
so
in Atlanta
(and in Pittsburgh) stemmed from their inability to achieve an overarching organizational
coherence as well as from cuts in federal neighbourhood programme funds that would
have supported their participation (Jezierski,
1990).
More inclusive representation may also emerge to the extent that economic
restructuring, recessions and demographic changes in cities bring about disarray within
dominant coalitions and political opportunities for expanded representation (Fainstein,
1987;
Skocpol,
1979).
Alliances with key groups such as planners, lawyers, and non-
profit making organizations may be more feasible under these conditions (Fainstein,
1987:328).
Past coalitional efforts of minorities and low income groups have depended
heavily on elite disarray and third-party alliances, albeit often supported with external
resources (Piven and Cloward, 1971
;
Mollenkopf, 1983).
Finally, communities have a history of cultural and social patterns of more or less
inclusive representation practices. Historical links between city governments,
neighbourhoods and local groups may forestall major changes in the scope of interest
representation even in the absence of federal funds. Walton confirms the importance of a
historical tradition of popular action and a network of community-based organizations in
fashioning more autonomous policies in response to restructuring pressures
(1990:251).
More recent policy history, particularly local variations in interest representation in the
Community Development Block Grant programme (Goetz, 1987) and Urban
Development Action Grant projects (Clarke,
1986;
Rich,
1992; 1993),
will also affect
potential shifts.
Interests and institutional channels
The growing importance of public
-
rivate partnerships and the move to off-budget
development organizations in American and European cities underscores the need to
extend any analysis of local development politics beyond governing regimes and electoral
arenas to encompass institutional settings. This shift of development decisions to quasi-
public organizations now renders electoral control much less meaningful than in other
policy areas. The trend toward two political arenas with different political bargaining
approaches, one where representation is determined by competitive processes and one
aimed at non-competitive, exclusive representation, is increasingly important. The latter
arena, crowded with public
-
rivate partnerships and local development corporations,
bypasses electoral competition and limits representation only to those groups with the
resources necessary to ensure sufficient cooperation. Thus the capture of state power
through electoral means may not be sufficient to influence development choices
if
the
institutional logic is corporate-based. From this perspective, the organizational and
institutional attributes of both the local state and capital are important factors in shaping
development policy orientations (Hall, 1987). The issue is not technical capacity per se
but the incentives for coherent and stable choices embedded in the institutional structure,
or the state apparatus itself, and the bargaining advantages this creates for different
interests (Kantor and Savitch, 1993).
Jezierski finds both electoral incorporation and corporatist theories necessary for this
expanded analytic scope. As she points out, incorporation models imply that if interests
can gain local-state power, they will automatically exert some influence within the
public-private partnerships (1990:219). The theoretical implication is that broad-based
electoral coalitions can influence local policy through majority decision rules. The
inclusiveness of interest representation rests on competitive electoral politics; the state is
not viewed as an entity with its own interests or strategic representation needs. By
contrast, corporatist theorists anticipate more inclusive institutional representation
corresponding to state interests, even in the absence of external pressure or resources. In
.
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the meso-corporatist version, state leaders designate organizations which reflect the
concerns of categories of interests, such as neighbourhoods or environmental groups
(Cawson, 1985), for incorporation into institutionalized economic policy-making
processes in order to reduce uncertainty and enhance implementation success (Schmitter,
1979). This echoes Stones argument o n strategic inclusion but centres on the institutional
arena; it emphasizes the ways in which designated representation in institutionalized
decision-making processes can fuse representation and control needs, two important
concerns in carrying out local economic development activities.
Uneven conceptualizations For analytic purposes, governing regimes and institutional
channels are addressed separately. There a re sufficient empirical grounds, howeve r, fo r
assuming that cities varied political responses to econom ic development deman ds can be
traced to the interactions of regime coalitions and institutional setting (Logan and
Swanstom, 1990; King and Pierre, 1990; Stone et al. , 1991; Turn er, 1990; Kantor and
Savitch, 1993; Clavel, 1983; Robinson, 1989). Our ability to make more persuasive
arguments linking regimes, institutions and policy choices, however, is hampered by
uneven conceptualizations of regime dynamics and the institutional setting. While there
are compelling, if not consistent, arguments about the dynamics of regime composition,
as noted above , there is less guidance in understanding local institutional settings . In most
studies, local institutions are treated as indicators of the capacity of the local state or
regime to control financial and bureaucratic resources and of the likely effectiveness of
the local state in reaching development policy goals and managing conflict
e . g .
DiGaetano and Klemanski,
1993; Kantor and Savitch, 1993). For example, many
accounts of the conditions under which cities choose progressive strategies rather than
compliant or corporate-centred strategies stress the importance of regime composition
and local political capacity (W alton, 1990; Go etz, 1990). But local political capacity is
rarely specified in a mean ingful way; more capacity tends to be associated with b etter,
i.e. more progressive decisions, but there is no reason to assume this would be the case
and there are no thresholds to determine when these conditions are met. Political
fragmentation arguments suffer similar flaws, although there is more systematic
evidence of the relationship between the multiple veto points and diverse decision rules
inherent in fragmentation, and the consequent policies exacerbating social and spatial
inequities (Bowman and Pagano, 1988; Weiher, 1991; Lewis, 1994). More precise
characterizations of policy intervention mechanisms can be suceptible to problems of
scale; categorizing policy intervention capacity in terms of centralAoca1 integration, fo r
example, obscures significant variations in local institutional settings within the less
integrated American system
(c f .
Kantor and Savitch, 1993).
In this focus on how institutional features affect the ability of regimes to get things
done, there is less attention to the interaction of interests and institutions in development
policy-making. Yet the institutions and routines of local economic development policy
arenas shape group preferences, available resources and potential interest representation
options. To focus primarily on this shaping proposition, however, results in a more
nuanced but essentially static analysis. Drawing on new institutionalism perspectives
redresses some of these shortcomings: it introduces the argument that local economic
development policy choices are contingent on the institutional logics and the degree of
coherence characterizing local institutional settings.
Restoring the institutional focus to the study
of
local political
change
The new institutionalism
is,
of course, not
so
new. (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Ostrom,
1990; North, 199 0; Zuckin and DiM aggio, 1990; DiM aggio and Pow ell, 1990). Nor is it
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an undifferentiated approach: the views of historical institutionalists and rational choice
institutionalists diverge significantly on questions of coalition formation and the effects of
institutions on goals and preferences (Thelen and Steinmo,
1992).
New institutionalism
approaches differ from earlier institutionalist perspectives in a number of important ways.
In Thelen and Steinmos
(1992)
account, the old institutionalism emphasized detailed
configurative studies of formal institutional structures. Comparative analysis proceeded
through a juxtaposition of these studies, with little theoretical orientation. In contrast,
historical institutionalists (Thelen and Seinmo,
1992)
view institutions in relational terms,
as they structure relations of power among contending groups. Institutions shape both the
strategies and the goals of political actors; they also contribute to political processes in
which a number of plausible and unexpected outcomes are possible. This perspective
centres on the social and political construction of goals, strategies and preferences rather
than a narrower focus on how the institutional context affects strategic calculations and
choices. New ideas and their articulation through institutional channels can change how
interests are perceived and thus affect which coalitions form and which do not
ibid.:9) .
As
Thelen and Steinmo put it, institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never
the sole cause of outcomes
(1992:3).
Restoring an institutional focus to the study of local politics can illuminate the search
for a new institutional fix which Peck and Tickell (1994) contend is characteristic of a
postfordist period.
It
is necessary to avoid reading off institutions from economic
conditions or politics from institutions however, by empirically comparing intermediate
level institutions and the processes involved in shaping place (Shlay, 1993) across cities.
Bringing concepts of intermediate-level institutions into regime analysis retains the focus
on mediation of macrolevel socioeconomic change but provides a means for examining
non-trivial differences in politics and policies across cities facing similar structural
pressures. Differences in the local institutional terrain will influence how restructuring
pressures affect the goals and strategies of different groups, and how and when they are
incorporated in governing coalitions and/or designated for representation in local
economic development institutions.
Institutionalizationprocesses in local economic development policy-making
One of the key distinctions of the new institutionalism is the conceptualization of
institutionalization as a process involving elements such as organizational forms,
structures and rules rather than specific organizations (DiMaggio and Powell,
1991:14).
These elements, rather than concrete organizations, become institutionalized in an
organizational field such as local economic development policy-making
.
Institutionalization therefore denotes the diffusion of standard rules and structures rather
than an adaptive process fitting organizations to particular settings
ibid. 27).
This
improves on nominal classifications of economic development organizations as public or
private sector organizations; here, for example, publicness is reflected in the degree of
democratic control over rules and procedures governing organizational resource
acquisition, rather than legal status (Bozeman, 1987). From this perspective, the conflicts
between different institutional orders or logics and the degree to which a particular logic
is institutionalized become core analytic questions in understanding changes in local
development politics.
Contesting institutional orders
Friedland and Alford
(1991
explain political change in
terms
Of
contradictions and conflicts between different interdependent institutional orders
present in modern society. These institutional orders each have a central logic in which
certain material practices and symbolic systems serve as organizing principles
ibid,
249). Conflicts occur when there is disagreement over which institutional logic should
guide particular activities and to which categories of people it should apply
ibid. :
256) .
The important political conflicts regarding local economic development policies
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Institutional logics and local economic development 5 19
involve contradictions between the institutional logic of capitalism, the state and
democracy. Given that local economic development is a relatively new and unsettled
policy field, local conflicts centre on whether the appropriate institutional logic is the
accumulation and commodification practices of capitalism, the rationalization and
routinization of state bureaucratic organizations, or the decision-making participation and
popular control of democracy (see Friedland and Alfrod, 1991:248). As a new set of
policy responsibilities and roles, local economic development issues compel some typeof
institutional response: either the logic of the market is extended to the state and
democracy or the logic of the state and democracy is extended to local markets. The
former appears most likely although attempts to extend bureaucratic controls and popular
participation to economic development activities are not as infrequent in American cities
as one might think (e.g. Goetz, 1994; Kantor and Savitch, 1993).
But since the burgeoning of local economic development activities in the mid-1970s
(Clarke and Gaile, 1992; Goetz and Clarke, 1993), market symbols and practices he
rhetoric of partnerships, leverage and entrepreneurs re rife. Institutional change in
local economic development appears to entail a shift in the institutional setting from one in
which state bureaucracies manage development with the legitimation of democratic
procedures to one in which market logic is pervasive. If market challenges to the
institutional orders of the state and democracy prevail, either bureaucratic organizations
adopt the practices and symbols of market logic or new quasi-public organizations which
are better able to do
so
become dominant. If these challenges are rebuffed, economic
development policies will be shaped by bureaucratic and democratic practices and
symbols. Although beyond the scope of this paper, a critical task for analysis would be
understanding the conditions under which these contesting institutional orders lead to
institutional transformations. Here, cities are characterized by the dominance of market
or state/democratic institutional orders and the extent to which core practices and symbols
are institutionalized.
The degree
of
institutionalization
The language of the new institutionalism perspective
connotes a vigorous process of contesting institutional orders and a diffusion of key
elements he rules and procedures of different orders. One implication of the
diffusion viewpoint is that greater institutionalization leads to less variety and diversity in
local economic development policy environments. The recent diffusion of
public- rivate partnerships, leverage ratios and entrepreneurial elements across
American cities and beyond (Barnekov, Boyle and Rich, 1989; Mayer, 1994) exemplifies
this process. It is a rich example of how these standard elements make local economic
development processes more similar across cities and thus reduce investor uncertainty
about how local officials will handle these relatively new roles and responsibilities. Not
every local organization becomes a public- rivate partnership but the reliance on the
partnership logic and symbols is pervasive; development organisations unwilling or
unable to refashion their structures and procedures in compatible ways are overridden by
those that do or by new organizations embodying these features.
In DiMaggio and Powells terms, the extent to which such elements are coupled
across organizations is an empirical issue (1991:29). One can therefore characterize the
complexity and diversity of local economic development policy settings in terms of how
pervasive the diffusion of standard rules and structures is relative to more adaptive
features. In cities where the standardized rules and procedures for economic development
policy-making are loosely coupled and not pervasive, institutionalization is relatively low.
There are multiple agencies, differing levels of authority, and numerous informal
linkages and communication networks in play (Roe, 1994). As a consequence, there is
more variety, flexibility and organizational diversity in the local policy environment but
also more potential instability as organizations continually adapt to changing
circumstances. Furthermore, there is more uncertainty and possibly conflict over turf
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issues and the appropriate rules and routines to use in different cases. Given this setting,
policy processes may be slower and policy choices may be less effective but the
opportunities for interest representation may be greater and more diverse. In contrast,
cities where econom ic development policy -making rules and procedu res a re mo re tightly
coupled across organizations are more institutionalized. The policy setting is more
homogenous and stable; organizations ar e run by professionals and interest designation is
driven by organizational compatibility with dominant rules and procedures. The
ascendance of non-profit making organizations in housing and development arenas in
American cities, for example, is partially accounted for by their melding of democratic
and corporate institutional logics. This tight coupling, however, may make the local
institutional structure more vulnerable to external shocks (DiMaggio and Powell,
1991)
such as the loss of federal funds or credit crunches.
Mapping local institutional settings f o r economic development policy-mak ing: eight
cities
The following analysis of local institutional change in economic development policy-
making draws on these two dimensions of institutional change. These features of the
institutional terrain do not necessarily correspond to a particular regime composition;
indeed, tho se responsible for institutional designs are rarely the sam e as those who benefit
(Thelen and Steinmo,
1992).
The schema characterizes cities according to the dominant
institutional logic in local economic development policies and the degree of
institutionalization of this logic. Given the normative and theoretical issues involved, a
systematic comparison of several carefully matched cases is used to unravel these
processes (Yin, 1984; Browning
et
al. 1984; Ragin, 1987). Eight little-studied central
cities are involved: Tulsa and Oklahoma C ity, OK; Dayton and Cleveland,
OH;
Macon
and Columbus, G A ; and Tacoma and Seattle, W A . These pairs were chosen according to
several criteria. First, each pair is located within the same state to minimize comparability
problems arising from interstate differences in state authorized spending, service
responsibilities, legal municipal requirements and state policies and regulations. Second,
each pair was active in federal redevelopment programmes and suffered comparable cuts
in federal aid during the 1980s. Th ird, in varying w ays, each pair of cities has previously
incorporated minority and neighbourhood interests in federal redevelopment projects.
To developers these generally appear as second tier cities. Each city had a
population of over
100,000
in
1976
(making them eligible for most federal development
programmes); their central city populations in 1990 ranged from 512,000 in Seattle to
116,896 in Macon. Overall, each city underwent difficult restructuring processes
stemming either from lack of diversity in the local economic base (Seattle, Tacoma,
Tulsa, Oklahoma City, Macon, Columbus) or from dependency on manufacturing
(Cleveland, Dayton). In terms of changing production functions, they include classic
deindustrializing cities which have been losing both manufacturing jobs and population
since the
1970s
(Cleveland and Dayton) as well as new manufacturing centres with
growth in manufactuirng employment and above average population growth (Macon,
Oklahoma City, Tu lsa) (Negrey and Zickel, 1994).As in most Am erican cities, economic
and political issues are increasingly metropolitan in nature and ar e exacerbated by racial
and class segregation; only Columbus has a consolidated city-county government.
Governmental structures are diverse and surprisingly volatile: with the exception of
Daytons commission form and Tacomas council-city manager structure, each city is
governed through mayor-council structures; however, in response to legal challenges
Tulsa changed from commission to mayor-council in the early
1990s
and Columbus
changed to primarily district based elections in 1993. Finally, each city experienced elite
disarray prompted by economic transformations and corporate reorganizations in the
1980s (Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Tacoma, Cleveland, Dayton) or by reform challenges
which expanded electoral representation in the 1970s (Columbus, Macon, Seattle).
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Institutional logics and local economic development 52
1
StatelDemocracy Logic Market Logic
Highly
Institutionalized
Less
Institutionalized
Seattle
Dayton
Tacoma
Macon
Tulsa
Cleveland
Columbus
Oklahoma City
Figure 1
Variations in local institutional settings
Figure 1 maps the institutional terrain in each city. Based on interviews with local
officials, community activists and site visits from 1991- , city economic development
policy-making proce sses a re charac terized as being regulated by the institutional logic of
either the state/democracy o r the market. Although econom ic development projects may
themselves accommodate a mix of tightly and loosely coupled processes, the degree to
which the institutional terrain is tightly or loosely institutionalized further distinguishes
cities from each other. What is not evident in this figure (but is discussed below) is the
source and direction of institutional transform ation. Since the purpose here is to indicate
how new institutionalism perspectives can inform the study of local political change by
specifying important variations in institutional features, only brief accounts of the
individual cities are provided (see Appendix).
Cities where state/democracy institutional orders persist In four cities Seattle,
Dayton , Tacoma and Macon conomic development policies continue to be regulated
primarily through bureaucratic structures and democratic decision processes. As
DiMaggio and Powell point out, there is no necessary virtue associated with these
institutional logics; rather they indicate curre nt settlements on the app ropriate institutional
logics fo r econom ic development activities (199 1
30).
Both Seattle and Tacom a operate
under narrow state constitutional constraints on local lending of credit to businesses.
Although in other cities such constitutional limitations often spawn a host of quasi-public
organizations that circumv ent these constraints and dominate policy-making the key
actors in both these cities are agencies and organizations which operate according to
bureaucratic and democratic conventions.
In Seattle these rules and procedures ar e tightly coupled across organizations. T hat is,
the standard economic development organizational elements include an emphasis on
standardized decision criteria, citizen participation, fairness, multiple values including
environmental as well as economic goals, non-commodification of environmental and
social values and due process (see Frieden and Sagalyn, 1989). Although the
public rivate Seattle Econo mic Development Comm ission (SED C), which was set up
by the Mayor in the mid-1980s as an advisory body, urged newly-elected Mayor Norm
Rice to set up a separate line agency for economic development in 1989 (i.e . not even
attempting to extend the market logic or rhetoric), Rice initially resisted and moved
economic development responsibilities into
t h e
Office of Long-Range Planning. This
Office is also responsible for implementing local growth managem ent initiatives while the
King County Economic Development Council is the operational agency for state growth
management issues. Shortly before his re-election bid in 1993, Rice established the line
agency, the Office of Economic Development. Repayments from UDAG loans are
channelled through the Office of Budget and Management to cover Community
Development Department staff salaries and operating c osts. Seattle is noted for balancing
public concerns and private corporate interests through extensive public participation in
its redevelopment projects. The Pikes Place Market is a well-known example (Frieden
and Sagalyn, 1989); more recent initiatives to develop a 74 acre open space, the Seattle
Commons, evolved from an initial proposal to create a passive buffer zone into a plan
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including affordable housing, job creation and pedestrian-oriented neighbourhood
development.
Yet the homogeneity stability and professionalism of this highly institutionalized
state logic is challenged most vocally by neighbourhood activists who disparage Seattle
politics as Nice Politics. To these groups, the routinization and rationalization provided
by bureaucratic controls means that uneven development processes and polarized
communities are overlooked. Furthermore, the at-large electoral system weakens
neighbourhood demands even though many candidates run on neighbourhood platforms.
Currently the 13 District Councils established in the city charter channel neighbourhood
demands from Neighbourhood and Community Councils up to the city council. Interest
designation on the SEDC and even Rices electoral climb from the Rainier Valley, one of
the most distressed areas, to the Mayors Office is not seen as sufficient for achieving
neighbourhood-based goals. Although framed in terms of contesting bureaucratic and
democratic logics, Seattles economic development policy-making setting would have to
incorporate market procedures to allow many neighbourhood-based groups to enter into
the financial and real estate activities they seek. There are few local economic
development corporations (LDC) in Seattle, some special public district authorities for
redevelopment areas (again, bureaucratic logic), LISC activities and a state-wide
consortium of community-based development groups. There are more LDCs in the
housing area as well as a strong consortium of non-profit housing developers that works
with local and state agencies. The non-profit consortium model seems to be a
countervailing and necessary organizational form for attempting to refashion bureaucratic
logic in the face of market logic challenges.
Dayton represents a more loosely coupled institutional setting. The combination of a
weak executive and weak legislative branch in its commission form of government
prompted Dayton to delegate public authority for economic development decision-making
outside the formal political structures at a much earlier date than most cities. Two
arrangements exemplify these efforts at the citywide and neighbourhood level: the
establishment
of
neighbourhood-based Priority Boards in 1971 and the formation of the
Dayton Citywide Development Corporation in 1972. As a quasi-public organization, the
Dayton City Development Corporation intervenes in downtown development activities by
providing gap financing and debt financing to private investors.
As
an essential service of
city government, the Priority Boards allow the city to devolve certain service and project
responsibilities to the neighbourhood level.
Given the lack of adequate political authority in the formal structure, the DCDC acts
as a policy instrument for the city, pursuing the citys economic development agenda with
the cooperation of private sector interests. In contrast, the Priority Boards provide a
highly institutionalized, relatively open framework for decision-making and deliberation
but they have been limited to neighbourhood rather than city-wide issues. The citys
development portfolio is, therefore, dominated by the DCDCs downtown revitalization
projects; most neighbourhood projects entail recreational and infrastructure issues. Thus
the territorial dimensions
of
economic development policy-making operate relatively
independently of each other with little institutionalized coordination. Curiously absent is
some sense of a strong state hand in the DCDC and Priority Board arrangements. In
contrast to Cleveland, these are public rather than private sector efforts to structure the
development policy context; they meld corporate logic with some sense of democratic
participation and state regulation. Yet the local state role has been primarily to set up these
frameworks in the mid-l970s, to ensure their legitimacy, to provide their continued
resource base, to participate in their initial rule-making and rule enforcement decisions
but then to step back and leave on-going negotiations to the participants.
The institutionalization of the Priority Board infrastructure channels neighbourhood
participation and representation in city policy processes, giving a formal voice to
neighbourhood interests that wouldnt otherwise occur. The Priority Boards, however,
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are increasingly challenged by a new institutional layer of neighbourhood development
corporations and historical district organizations. Neighbourhood development initiatives
stemm ing fro m the Dayton Comm unity R einvestment A ct Alliance mobilized a younger
generation of African Am erican activists who have responded to the lack of a coherent
agenda by pushing for investment-oriented strategies rather than conventional set-aside
programmes. In addition to this reinvestment gap, the introduction of neighbourhood
development organizations and federal housing programm es has provided an alternative
means of accessing resources. To the extent that new economic development
organizations can mobilize and articulate an alternative economic development vision,
their chances for influencing the policy context are greater than in Cleveland.
The dominant institutional logic in Tacoma and Macon is similar to Seattles but the
state/democracy elements are m ore loosely coupled. Thus their policy settings are more
diverse, but also more unstable as organizations continually adapt to fit changing
circumstances. Tacoma was more active in federal development programmes than
Seattle; Tacomas institutional structure is a series of overlays from past federal
initiatives, including Urban Renewal, Model Cities, CDBG and UDAG. Although
Tacoma was one of the first cities in the country to provide business assistance through
these agencies, the cuts in federal funds allowed some elements of popular control to
undermine this bureaucratic o rder through the district electoral channels.
A progressive coalition on the city council, the election of a new mayor and the
appointment of a new city manager prompted a reorganization of city policy priorities in
the late
1980s.
In
1990
economic development was downsized from a separate agency
(created in
1986)
to a unit in the new Planning an d Development Services Department.
Housing issues cam e to the fore. T he council wanted to earm ark UDA G repayments for
affordable housing rather than channel it to the developm ent agencies as in the past; they
also wanted to enact a new excise tax for the same purposes. In the face of state social
service cuts, the city allocates general funds to non-profit making o rganization s for social
services that were formerly supported by CDBG funds.
The institutional terrain is further fragmented by the Port Authority, the Municipal
Authority and the Urban Policy Committee. The Port Authority is a separate municipal
corporation with elected officials and its own taxing and bond authority. Although it
receives city services, it pays no city taxes. The M unicipal Corporation, a separate public
corporation with five appointed members, approves the development proposals packaged
by the Community Development Department and generally uses its broad financing
powers to get around constitutional limits. Similar to this fragmented state order, the
Urban Policy Committee (UPC) reflects fragmentation in democratic orders. The UPC
was established as a neighbourhood advisory body to the city council during the Model
Cities era in Tacoma. Its 25 members were originally elected and the UPCs
recommendations tended to be adopted by the council. The council now appoints its
members and is attempting to rein in the UPC by narrowing its scope and weakening its
advisory role. There are no LDCs in Tacoma but there are Neighbourhood Business
Districts, county-level CDCs and Economic Development Corporations (EDCs). In its
rehabilitation of the Union Station rail terminal area, the city rejected the idea of setting
up a Public Development Authority because of local concerns about the citys ability to
control PD A fin ances. T he trade-off of gove rnance capacity for financial flexibility led to
the establishment of the Union Station District Development Association, a CDC-like
private, non-profit making organization with no specific financing authority. Although
Tacoma has a limited redevelopment portfolio, this effort to impose democratic control
over organizational resource issues is a characteristic feature.
Macon carries out economic development activities in eight different departments
controlled by five different political bodies.
A
seasoned local poli tic ian, T o m y C .
Olmstead, won a landslide election in 1991 on the promise of bipartisan initiatives to
bring business and government together.
In
1992 the city attempted to overcome this
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fragmentation through the formation of the M acon Economic D evelopment Comm ission,
a public- rivate partnership focussing on industrial recruitment. Macon
2000,
also
formed in
1992,
is a partnership of business, government and community interests to
support educational reform . U p to this point, most of the citys other partnerships were
with state and federal agencies. Although recent mayors have been aggressive about
economic development issues, the city council is more conservative; it recently voted
down a bond issue and has been slow to take up tax-increment financing opportunities.
Neverth eless, in the early
1990s
econom ic develop men t activities accounted for over 3 0 %
of
the community development budget, primarily in support of industrial development
and up from the
10
average of a few years ago. Macons relatively successful
downtown revitalization efforts started over
20
years ago; they centre on historic
preservation initiatives, with a loose coalition of preservationist groups, neighbourhood
groups, and local black and white business leaders defining the development agenda. T he
mayor appoints m embers to the P roject Area C omm ittee to coordinate city development
projects, mostly for infrastructure and housing. Through this group there has been some
targeting to poor minority neighbourhoods as well as the establishment of a strategic
housing plan and a minority business office park. Macons redev elopm ent efforts include
historic preservation projects now encompassing projects to preserve historic
African- Am erican neighbourhoods as well as the downtown hom es of the historic white
elite.
These cities are instances where the institutional order of state/democracy practices
still regulates public economic development initiatives. These efforts are more coherent
(i.e. tightly coupled and institutionalized) in Seattle than in Dayton, Tacom a and Maco n.
Seattles local political capacity is homegrown: federal development activities were less
prevalent in Seattle than in the other two cities so its institutional setting consists of a
higher proportion of o rganizations which a re custom-fitted to the local context. W ithout
reverting to political culture arguments, it can be said that the institutional orders
regulating local economic development policies in Seattle mesh together bureaucratic
public planning and democratic popular control practices. Although this includes a strong
neighbourhood voice, demands a re channelled through bureaucratic and, more indirectly,
at-large electoral links. Thus, although minority groups and neighbourhoods are included
in the governing coalition, the demands for change from groups interested in
neighbourhood economic development cannot be accommodated without an extension of
market logic into public institutions. This would undermine bureaucratic controls; m ost of
the institutional change in Seattle has come from within the political community rather
than in response to external shocks.
In contrast, the institutional settings in Dayton, Tacom a and M acon ar e rooted in past
federal programmes. As the funds supporting those activities decline, the economic
development field in these cities becomes increasingly volatile. Given its weak leadership
structure, Dayton appears to have stalled; city policies are increasingly challenged by a
younger generation of neighbourhood-based African-American activists. In Tacoma and
Macon the city councils have responded to the diminishing ability of local bureaucracies
to regulate public development activities by reasserting legislative prerogatives and
decision powe rs. In Tacom a this means a chang e in policy priorities, while in Macon the
city council seeks to stem local public involvement in econom ic development altogether.
Cities where market institutional orders dominate Since this category reflects the
diffusion of market symbols and practices into local policy arena s, less detail on specific
settings is provided and more emphasis is given to contesting institutional orders.
Cleveland is an especially interesting case: Clevelands institutional transformation is
somewhat incomplete but reflects a shift from a loosely institutionalized public capacity
dominated by state/democratic rules and procedures, iis in Tacoma, to processes
characterized more by market rules and procedures. Clevelands local political capacity
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for economic development policy-making is grounded in its extensive participation in
federal development programmes. The tension between bureaucratic and democratic
controls over development activities continues to be addressed by agencies which
routinely allocate some development funds to individual council members. Given
Clevelands success in securing federal development funds, this largesse still allowed
bureaucratic control of local development initiatives but legitimated these activities
through the councils participation. As the UDAG programme began to bring market
practices and symbols into local policy arenas in the mid-l970s, this logic was diffused
throughout Clevelands economic development structure. The city was extraordinarily
active in the UDAG programme; it became adept at negotiating deals with complex
financial packages that often included revenue streams and profit-sharing. The city staff
underw ent professional training in development finan ce through w orkshops put on by the
National Development Council. Thus Clevelands initial institutional transformation
occu rred through the diffusion of market elem ents and the professionalization of city staff
under federal auspices. As part of this process a public-private, non-profit ma king,
citywide development corporation was established and staffed by the city. In addition, a
network of non-profit making LDCs was established and funded by the city to carry out
housing and economic deve lopment at the neighbourhood level. Some of these operating
expenses come from the council members allocations; city staff review all LDC
proposals but rarely turn on e down.
Although the logic of the market entered Clevelands institutional field through
federal initiatives, the cuts in federal funds accelerated the extension of market logic to an
arena where some bureaucratic and democratic controls persisted. Now, Clevelands
economic development policy-making is being dominated increasingly by Cleveland
Tomorrow, a consortium of top business leaders who have set up an equity pool for
investment in downtown development. The consortium takes an equity position in each
project and has set up a separate foundation to fund neighbourhood economic
development. Although Cleveland Tomorrow consults with the city on development
projects, the initiative as well as the rules and procedu res ar e controlled by m arket logic.
While there is political incorporation of minority and neighbourhood interests in the
governin g coalition, there is less representation in these key development institutions. T he
new institutional context dampens the potential for collective action and internal
deliberation; neighbourhood groups are encouraged to compete and m aximize their rent
seeking behaviour at the expense of other groups. Clevelands portfolio is dominated by
large down town developm ent projects such a s the restoration of the Terminal T ow er rail
centre in historic Public Square, a new baseball stadium and the Rock and Roll Hall of
Fame. Neighbourhood projects primarily involve commercial redevelopment and some
inner city housing.
There is little direct bureaucratic or democratic regulation of public economic
development activities in Tulsa, Oklahoma City and Columbus GA; in these cities, the
institutional setting is dominated by an arra y of off-budget organizations which op erate by
market rules and procedures. The institutionalization is high in that market logic and
standard market elements dominate in Tulsa and Columbu s with no strong bureaucratic or
political presence as in Cleveland. In Tulsa, this is due in part to state constitutional
constraints on local government credit activities, unstable political leadership in recent
years and a level of federal programme activity which is insufficient to generate public
bureaucratic capacity. Throughout the 1980s all federal funds were handled by one line
agency; CDBG funds were used to support a separate Community Development
Depa rtment and to facilitate land packaging for projects carried out by the Tulsa Industrial
Development Authority (TIDA) and the Tulsa Economic Development Corporation
(TEDC). The TIDA has been in place since the 1960s; it is becoming more active as a
special developer and financing source for large-scale projects as federal programme
funds disappear. Although the TE D C was set up as a citywide development organization ,
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it now targets minority business development and job creation in selected
neighbourhoods. Electoral interest representation is becoming more inclusive following a
court suit forcing elections in 1990 along new district lines; the interest representation in
development institutions, however, is minimal. The citys portfolio includes extensive
downtown redevelopment and some minority business development in the historic
African
-
American commercial district of Greenwood. The source of institutional
change in Tulsa appears to be in federal initiatives; the local political capacity is located in
off-budget organizations which are regulated by market practices rather than bureaucratic
and democratic controls.
Columbus GA has a similar institutional setting with off-budget organizations
capitalized by federal programmes. The CDBG was also a prime source of economic
development funds in Columbus; initially these funds were targeted to seven areas but
now they are used for more general economic development activities. CDBG funds were
used to capitalize a revolving loan fund and to set up a local development corporation that
now reviews CDBG and Small Business Administration (SBA) loan proposals. A Local
Development Authority was also capitalized with CDBG funds for capital improvements
and has independent bonding authority. SBA funds support a new Minority Assistance
Corporation providing business loans; both CDBG and SBA funds are currently involved
in the rehabilitation of the Liberty Theater in the historic black business district area.
Another revolving loan fund for new start-ups is administered by a bank consortium
working with the city. With the decline in federal funds, economic development has been
moved out of the Mayors office and back to the Community Development Department;
the city council is again becoming more active on economic development issues.
Redevelopment efforts have been initiated by the business leadership which centre on
downtown revitalization. The rehabilitation of a former Confederate munitions factory
into a hotel and office centre spurred protests from the African-American community
for greater attention to their cultural heritage. In both Tulsa and Columbus the issue is
whether democratic and bureaucratic controls can be extended into an institutional arena
constituted by federal programmes which diffuse market practices.
Oklahoma City reveals very little institutional capacity for economic development in
the public sector and few economic development initiatives. State institutional orders are
also undeveloped: because of state constraints on city fiscal authority and taxing powers,
the city operates through over 30 Public Trusts ff-budget authorities used for service
provisions and capital improvements. These Public Trusts have independent bonding
authority and are isolated
from democratic controls. City economic development
functions are assigned to the Budget and Management Information Office and all UDAG
and CDBG funds are administered through this general government office, there being no
separate economic development staff. There are regular informal meetings between city
officials and local developers but the public development role is nearly non-existent. Most
economic development activities are at the initiative of the Oklahoma City Chamber of
Commerce, which now encompasses the Oklahoma Industrial Authority and the
Oklahoma City Economic Development Foundation. In both Tulsa and Oklahoma City,
the energy crises and recession prompted the exit of some old, monied families. Since the
1 9 8 0 ~ ~he younger business leadership is more likely to act independently of the old
families and the oil and gas lobbies (Morgan et a l . , 19915). These shake-ups in the
business leadership were a catalyst for reorganization of the Chamber of Commerce; the
recent initiatives for public- rivate partnerships emerged from this more coherent
business community.
Conclusion
By drawing on new institutionalism notions of contesting institutional orders and varying
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degrees of institutionalization, the salient features of the institutional terrain in eight
American cities can be mapped. These maps indicate that market-based institutional
orders are not pervasive: state/democratic institutional orders persist in several cities,
bolstered by strong citizen organization networks in Seattle, a decentralized political
structure in Dayton, and contesting elected officials in Tacoma and Macon. In these
cities, both elec toral incorporation and designated representation processes ar e relatively
inclusive; that is, the cumulative representation patterns in the governing coalitions and
economic development institutions shore up democratic logics. The policy effects are
most ev ident in Seattle where the tightly coupled institutional orde r produces a relatively
coherent, public-centred, economic development orientation. In Dayton, Tacoma and
Macon the more loosely coupled institutional setting dilutes the policy preferences of
members of the governing coalition; the policy initiatives are smaller scale and less
coherent.
Looking across cities indicates that the federal government remains a m ajor sou rce of
local institutional transformation. Federal programmes initially promoted state-centred
bureaucratic rules and procedures to manage local economic development, then more
recently diffused market practices and organizational forms throughout local economic
development settings. The vacuum created by federal funding cuts is prompting renewed
efforts at dem ocratic policy control through city councils in some cities but is also leaving
cities vulnerable to organ izational steering by business interests. In co ntrast to analyses of
national institutions, local institutional chang e in Am erican cities appea rs to be relatively
common. Concomitantly, periods of local institutional stability are punctuated more
frequen tly by crises and transformation (Krasne r,
1984).
The consequence is not
so
much
the breakdown of existing institutions and clea r policy d isjunctures but local institutional
overlays and accretions. Furthermore, these interventions are mediated by political
fragmentation at a national and local level. Fragmented national authority dilutes the
content of policy initiatives to be implemented a t the local level (King,
1992).
Similarly,
splintered local government structures preclude wholesale shifts in policy direction by
multiplying the relevant decision arenas, the necessary decision chains and the possible
veto points (Immergut,
1992).
Th e loose coupling of public economic deve lopment organizations evident in most
American communities is overcome, on occasion, by arrangements that limit these
decision points in order to forge consensus and policy stability
(ibid., 1992),
e.g. the
formation of Cleveland Tom orrow and the M acon Econom ic Development Com mission.
Most often, these institutional arrangements shift decision-making outside the electoral
aren a; this makes organ ized political activity by m inority and neighbourhood groups less
viable, and subjects their views and ideas to routines an d decision criteria that limit their
success. Less frequently, as in Seattle, strong political leadership provides consensus
through short-term coalitions that restrict the continued consideration of alternative
choices encouraged by fragmented government structures and majority decision rules
(cf .
Immergut,
1992).
While this schema sets out institutional configurations and policy d ifferences across
cities, it may obscure changes within these cities over time
(c f .
Thelen and Steinmo,
1992).
Indeed, in the course of this study, Tulsa and Columbus changed their governing
structure in response to legal pressures and other cities continued to revamp their
institutional apparatus for economic developm ent.
So
fa r, these changes suggest increased
coherence in the dominant institutional logics rather than shifts in power relations or
policy direction. The thrust of the institutionalist argument, how ever, suggests that these
institutional shifts may reconstitute interests and goals over time in ways that will affect
future policy choices. A further concern is that this admittedly classificatory exercise
slights our understanding of the analytic tip in institutional logics, that moment when
relatively stable logics tip in favour of another institutional order (cf . Roe, 1994).
Parallel to the notion of a linguistic tip, the analtyic tip signifies the build up of negative
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sentiment to existing logics or discourse, such as the state-centred orientation of the
fordist era and the abandonment of that discourse for a new logic. Fo r many cities the new
analytical point of departure is the need for public- rivate cooperation; the trade-offs
involved are minimized in the emphas is on finding a comm on ground . Th e institutionalist
approach suggested here enhances efforts to push beyond these initial classificatory
approaches. A more extended analysis of the sources of institutional change, the
conditions under which different institutional orders come to regulate local economic
development activities and the circumstances contributing to the tip from one logic to
another promises to enrich studies of local political change.
Appendix
Brief descriptions of the eight cities follow:
Columbus,
GA
has a relatively dive rsified but wage and job-p oor local econom y. With the
establishment of Fort Benning during the first world war, the growth and mergers of
several local industries with national firms after the second world war, and the more
recent influx of educational, banking, insurance and medical services, Columbus has
outgrow n its dependency on the textile indu stry. In
1990
the population stoo d at
280,000;
most of
the
economic growth is occurring within the consolidated (since
1971)
metropolitan area but outside the downtown core in increasingly segregated patterns.
Among southern cities, Columbus is distinctive for a recent history of competitive
mayoral elections featuring Republican, biracial, reform challenges to the white hat,
white suit boys of the traditional Democratic machine (Gaddy,
1988).
There is also a
history of intense civil rights activities going back to the late
1940s
and overshadowed by
the assassination of local NAACP leader Dr Thomas H . Drewer, Sr. on the downtown
streets in
1956.
Federal court challenges to Columbus primarily at-large electoral
structure culmina ted in the
1993
transformation to a council of eight districts and tw o at-
large seats. The consolidated City-County Commission includes six at-large and four
single member districts. Although Columbus is now
5 9 %
African- American,
representation on the consolidated Commission and Authorities is minimal.
Macon,
GA
also has a historic dependency on textile manufacturing and military
installations but has a m ore strategic location (84 miles south of Atlanta) at the nexus of
three major interstate highways and three rail lines. Macons population is 116,896. The
local economy is becoming more diversified with employment concentrated in services,
retail trade, government and manufacturing. The M acon-Warner Robbins Air Force base
is a major employer, although just south of Macon city limits, and is part of a growing
aerospace industry in the area . In addition there w ere
17
international firms in the area as
of
1993.
Macon has a weak, mayor-council form of government with three members from
each of five wards; the first post in each ward is elected at-large, the second and third
from within the ward. The at-large members are usually white and constitute a white
voting majority on the council. Several prominent African Am erican businessmen have
been incorporated into the privatist regime that has dominated Macon politics since the
1970s. African-Americans now make up 52% of the population in this residentially
segregated city; Africa n- Am ericans and women have been regularly represented on the
Coun cil since the late 1970s. African- American support in the Democra tic prima ries has
been crucial for any mayoral candidate since the late
1940s.
Local politics invariably
involve Bibb County although the city and county are not consolidated as in Columbus.
Several powerful city- ounty Authorities are key development organizations; they
include a mix of elected and appointed members, with several African- Americans
gaining county office by appointment since the mid-1970s. By the 1990s African-
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Am ericans were in key leadership positions on the County Commission, the School Board
and nearly every Authority.
Cleveland,
OH is in the industrial manufacturing heartland of the United States. The city
suffered severe economic dislocations during the 1970s and 1980s; manufacturing
employm ent fell by 18.3 from 1982- 1987and now constitutes only 23 of the labour
force. It is emerging as a regional finance, service and health facilities centre; hospitals
and medical research centres are now the citys largest employer. Reflecting these
transitions, there has been a turnover in 65 of the co rporate leadership positions in the
last eight years. With a population loss of 12.4 from 1980-1992, Clevelands
population is now 502,539. Ov er three quarters of the city is designated a state enterprise
zone, eligible for generous tax abatements.
Cleveland has a m ayor-council structure with a city council elected by 21 wards. An
electoral coalition including neighbourhood groups put Mayor Michael White, an
African-A merican , and a reform-dominated city council in office in 1989 to carry out a
neighbourhood agenda. 46.8 of the population are African-American and 4.6 are
Hispanic. Despite the prominence of several African
-
American politicians, including
the Mayor and fo rmer City Council President, Cleveland ranks as one of the most racially
segregated cities in the United States.
Dayton, OH describes its location as Am ericas Crossroad s he intersection of two
major interstate highways in Ohios Miami Valley. The city underwent massive
disinvestment and suburban ization of both population and industry in the 1970s. General
Motors historically dominated the local economy but downsized substantially in the
1980s; only 18.6 of the labour force remain in manufacturing jobs. The nearby
Wright- atterson Air Force Base, 32,000 jobs strong, mitigated some of these losses;
the facility generates substantial subcontraacting as well as numerous research parks
oriented to technology transfer. Over 80 of job growth in the area comes from the
expansion of existing businesses. Daytons population now is
183,189.
Th e city m anager-commissioner system originated in Dayton. Daytons city mana ger
works in tandem w ith an at-large, nom inally non-partisan comm ission (five members) and
a weak m ayor form of go vernment. The comb ination of both a weak executive and weak
legislative branch shifts important responsibilities to the bureaucracy; it also prompted
Dayton to delegate public authority for economic development decision-making outside
formal political structures at a much earlier date than most cities. A distinctive Priority
Board structure also devolves some budgeting authority and decision powers to
neighbourhoods. 40.2 of the central city are African- American; other ethnic and
racial minorities represent less than 2 of the population. Dayton rem ains one of the most
racially segregated American cities. African
-
Am ericans have served as comm issioners
since the early 1980s; in the early 1990s an African-American became mayor and two
African Am ericans, including a wom an, were elected comm issioners.
Oklahoma
City,
OK is the state capital and largest city (444,719 in 1990). Over 50 of
the state population resides in the Oklahoma City and Tulsa metropolitan areas in a
northeast outhwest urban corrid or. The local economy is diversifying through federal
government installations such as Tinker Air Force base and increased manufacturing.
Independent real estate interests have not been pa rticularly pow erful; oil and gas lobbies,
more oriented to the national than the local arena, predominate.
Although now over 400 square miles, Oklahom a City is represented by eight elected
district councilors and over
42
appointed boards and commissions. It is a weak
ma yor- council city. Ok lahom a City has the largest Native American population
(5 .5 )
of any American city; these group s, however, a re hampered politically by tribal cleavages
and dispersed, non-urban settlement; they rarely mobilize for electoral politics. Although
the ethnic and racial communities are small relative to other American cities (under 25 ),
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Oklahoma City has the largest share of African- Am ericans (16 % ) in the state as well as
a growing Hispanic
(5 )
and m odest Asian population. Currently tw o of the eight council
representatives are African Am erican.
Tulsa, OK
is an archetypal American community. In both
1980
and 1990, Tulsa emerged as
the
city most representative of the American population: its averages on age distribution,
racial
mix
and housing prices a re the closest to national averages (Lohr, 1992). Both Tulsa
and Oklahoma City went through the mid 1970s boom and bust cycle, then suffered more
hits from the 1982 and 1986 recessions and energy crises and a series of bank, and savings
and loan, failures. Along with Oklahoma City, Tulsa is part of an aerospace triangle
including McD onnell Douglas and Rockwell manufacturing facilities as well a s the American
Airlines (the states largest employer) reservations system. S ince 1985, em ployment growth
has been strong in service industries, transportation, communication, insurance firms and
manufacturing (Curtis, 1991). By 1992, Tulsa was outstripping Oklahoma City
in
growth
rate as well as wage and salary employment growth.
In 1990, Tulsas population reached 37 6,302. T he African- Am erican population is
13 % of the city; the Native Am erican population (4 .7 % ) is scattered across the white and
African Am erican northern neighbourhoods and there is a small Hispanic community
(2. 6% ). Until 1990 Tulsa operated with a partisan comm ission form of go vernment, in
which a mayor and four commissioners elected at-large acted as both legislators and
adm inistrative heads. A lawsuit filed by the N AA CP in 1987 challenging the commission
form for diluting black voting strength provided the lever for various charter revision
proponents to act together. In
1990
the city held elections under a district based, strong
mayor-coun cil format; a 4-year term mayor was elected at-large and nine 2-year term
councillors were elected by districts. Two of the new council were women, including an
African- Am erican woman who joined one other African-American on the council; a
woman became mayor in the early 1990s.
Seattle,
WA
is a city historically dominated by the Boeing Company. The two Boeing Busts
in 1969-1971 and 19 82-19 84 devastated the economy in terms of taxes and
unemployment. Boeing was the largest local employer as well as the source
of
many
subcontracts to other local firms. As Boeing recovered in the mid-1980s it fuelled an
econom ic boom , now also encompassing the Port of Seattle and its Pacific Rim trade and
a high tech industry including MicroSoft and 350 other software companies
(Bowermaster, 1991). Seattles population growth in the 1980s was double the national
rate (18 % vs. 9% ): both downtown and suburban areas grew . By the end of the decade
suburban and county growth p redominated; in 1990 the city population stood at 512,00 0
while the rest of King County had nearly 1.5 million. B oth Seattle and Tacom a are bound
by 1990 state legislation requiring comprehensive land use planning around growth
centres.
Seattle has enjoyed a long history of citizen-based organizational politics, particularly
among w omens group s, environmentalist group s and good governmen t groups. Not only
are there a large numb er of active groups, there ar e also an unusual number of federations
of groups. City elections ar e at-large; they ar e bipartisan but all may ors since 19 70 have
been Democrats (Gordon et al . , 1991). 75% of Seattles population is white; the Asian
(11.8 %), black (10.1 ) and Hispanic ( 3 .6 % ) population is growing steadily, with Asians
increasing most rapidly. The African American comm unity has been relatively stable
since the second world war ibid.). n the 1989 election, council member Norm Rice
becam e the citys first African-A merican may or; he easily won re-election in 1993. By
the early 1990s a majority of the council members were women (at one point all council
mem bers were wom en), including African-American and Asian wom en.
Tacoma, WA copes with a job-poor economic base dependent on outside forces: key
features include the Port of Tacoma (governed by separate commissioners), the extensive
_
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Editor
and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1995
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7/26/2019 Clarke-1995-International Journal of Urban and Regional Research
19/21
Institutional logics and local economic development
53 1
land holdings in military installations at Fort Lewis and national shipbuilding and lumber
corporations. Until the late 1970sTacoma could still be described as a labour town with
over half the workforce unionized; the political tradition is blue collar and Democratic.
Labour lost its edge as locally owned businesses merged with national corporations, the
local smelter finally closed down and the Port Authority operations became subject to
greater scrutiny.
Tacoma runs on the nonpartisan city manager model. Since 1993, elections
of
five
city council members are by district; three other council seats are nominated and elected
at-large. With a population of 176,664,Tacoma is
11
African-American, 6.9 Asian
and 3.8 Hispanic. Both women and African-Americans have held Council seats,
although it is a weak mayor office; in 1989a woman was elected mayor, followed by an
African-American in 1994. There were over
55
active neighbourhood organizations in
the early 1990s; United Neighbourhoods of Tacoma, a federation of these groups, has
been active since 1979.
Susan E.
Clarke University of Colorado at Boulder, C B 330, Boulder CO, USA.
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