FALL 2006

BERKELEY REVIEW OF

Latin American StudiesU N I V E R S I T Y O F C A L I F O R N I A , B E R K E L E Y

How will Latin America generate equalopportunities for its citizens? How willLatin America face up to and overcome

the historical rifts generated by the humanrights violations that are the legacy of militarydictatorships, guerrilla fighting and civil wars?And how should Latin America integrate itselfinto the multilateral institutions that govern aglobalized world?

These were the central themes of the speechgiven by Ricardo Lagos, president of Chile from2000 to 2006, to a UC Berkeley audience that

greeted him with loud cheers and a standingovation. In an atmosphere that can only bedescribed as electric, Professor Beatriz Manzexpressed the sentiments of many in her openingremarks, when she offered her heartfelt thanksto President Lagos for his commitment todemocracy and his personal courage in helpingto bring down the Pinochet dictatorship inChile. Her sentiments were echoed byChancellor Robert J. Birgeneau who presentedLagos with the Berkeley Medal, the university’shighest award.

continued on page 13continued on page 13

Expanding the Possibleby Kirsten Sehnbruch

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Expanding the Possible 1

Who Enjoys the Fruits of Trade? 3

Defining New Fronteirs 8

Afta Thoughts on NAFTA 17

Plan Colombia: Coca Moves to the Right 22

State Terrorism in Argentina: Images and Memories 25

The Screams Behind the Photographs 27

Divided Mexico 32

Civil Government? 38

Not a Game for Angels 41

Portrait of Gaddy Tauber 44

The Writing on the Wall 48

A New Spin on Rio’s Favelas 50

Environmental Entrepreneurs 53

Democracy and development were themes

that ran through much of our fall 2006 program

at the Center for Latin American Studies

(CLAS). We were very pleased to host Ricardo

Lagos, president of Chile (2000–06) who taught

a month-long special seminar on “Democracy

and Development in Latin America” and gave a

number of lectures on campus, two of which are

reported on in this issue. President Lagos made

an exceptional contribution as a scholar, a

professor and one of the key political leaders in

Latin America. Students, faculty and staff

members are still engaged in discussions on

issues that he raised during his time in Berkeley.

Professor Brad DeLong, a UC Berkeley

economist, reflects on “Afta Thoughts on

Nafta,” perspectives and critiques 12 years after

the passage of the North American Free Trade

Agreement. The presentation was part of the

Bay Area Latin America Forum, an ongoing

series organized by CLAS.

We were also very pleased to host Ambassador

Héctor Timerman, Consul General of Argentina

in New York, who spoke about his personal

experiences under military dictatorship in

Argentina and, in particular, the case of his

legendary father, Jacobo Timerman.

In this issue, we welcome Colombian journalist

Daniel Coronell as a visiting senior scholar at

CLAS for 2006–07, a visit made by possible by

the Open Society Institute and the Scholar

Rescue Fund.

Finally, this issue features a special section on

the Mexican election, a theme that ran through

our fall program, and an extraordinary article

on organs trafficking by Professor Nancy

Scheper-Hughes, based on research from her

forthcoming book.

We are looking forward to the fifth meeting of

the U.S.–Mexico Future’s Forum, a joint project

with ITAM in Mexico City, early next year.

— Harley Shaiken

Letter from the Chair

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ChairHarley Shaiken

Vice ChairSara Lamson

Managing EditorJean Spencer

Assistant EditorSusie Seefelt Lesieutre

Design and LayoutGreg Louden

ContributingWriters

Stephanie BeasleyAnna Browne Ribeiro

Daniel CoronellJ. Bradford DeLong

Denise DresserRafael Fernández de

CastroMark Alan Healey

Pedro PetersonNancy Scheper-Hughes

Kirsten SehnbruchWendy Muse Sinek

Jean SpencerHéctor Timerman

PhotographyAP Wide World

David GarcíaMichele Gibbs

Higinio GonzálezRosa GonzálezPablo Lasansky

David R. Léon LaraAdriana LestidoDionicia Ramos

Nancy Scheper-HughesKyle SimourdScott Squire

Jacqueline Sullivan

The Berkeley Reviewof Latin American

Studies is publishedthree times a year bythe Center for Latin

American Studies,University of California,2334 Bowditch Street,

Berkeley, CA94720-2312.

Cover: PresidentRicardo Lagos on the

Berkeley campus.

If globalization is producing, as Joseph

Stiglitz has described, “rich countries of

poor people,” then what is to be done? On

October 2, 2006, Ricardo Lagos, president of

Chile from 2000 to 2006 addressed this question

with David Bonior, member of the U.S. House

of Representatives from 1977 to 2003. Both

spent a large part of their political careers

addressing issues of international trade. While the

two men demonstrated a great deal of mutual

respect for one another and were in agreement

at many points throughout the evening, each

also brought a unique perspective to the issue of

fostering both trade and development in the

Western Hemisphere. Their interaction created

an engaging and lively conversation for the

overflowing crowd at the UC Berkeley Alumni

House.

As moderator, Professor Harley Shaiken

suggested they begin by commenting on what

they believe governments can do to ensure that

gains from trade are more equally distributed,

benefiting ordinary people as well as a nation’s

overall GDP. Lagos immediately noted that a

crucial issue with respect to greater equity lies in

who is able to participate in defining the “rules

of the game.” In other words, it matters which

international players decide what protective

tariffs are permitted for a given industry,

what constitutes a violation of the rules and

what the consequences should be. At present,

economically powerful countries have greater

influence in setting the rules and resulting

agreements tend to be weighted toward their

interests.

For example, while larger countries have an

incentive to protect their own internal markets,

smaller countries such as Chile rely on their

ability to export. Therefore, small countries with

a comparative advantage in a given industry

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Valparaíso, Chile’sbusiest seaport.

Who Enjoys the Fruits of Trade?By Wendy Muse Sinek

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need not only reduced trade barriers but also

the opportunity to export freely without being

charged with anti-dumping sanctions by larger

countries. Similarly, when trade barriers are

lowered, capital flows to areas in which the

greatest profit can be made without regard to

national boundaries, yet labor — working

people — cannot cross these boundaries in the

same way. For this reason, Lagos argued that

labor legislation should be an integral part of

free trade agreements to ensure that countries

do not have an incentive to compete over ever-

worsening labor standards. International trade

should lead to greater development worldwide,

but for this to become a reality, smaller countries

need a stronger voice in establishing the rules of

the game.

Bonior expanded on this point, arguing that

there has been a worldwide “race to the bottom”

in terms of labor standards. He posed a revealing

contrast: In the 1950s, General Motors was the

world’s largest corporation, paying factory

workers at least $5 an hour so that they could

afford to buy the cars they produced, fostering

d l d d f h kimproved living standards for the working

class. At present, Wal-Mart is the world’s largest

corporation, yet workers receive only $8.50 an

hour, ensuring that they cannot afford to shop

anywhere but Wal-Mart. Bonior related a wealth

of statistics on deteriorating labor standards in

the United States, many of which are available

online at www.americanrightsatwork.org. The

most striking, however, may be the fact that

within the United States, every 23 minutes

someone is fired or discriminated against for

supporting a union in his or her workplace.

Clearly, the reversal of fortunes for the working

class is a concern for the United States as well as

developing countries.

In Bonior’s view, the results of the North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are a

prime illustration of this dynamic. Since NAFTA

lacks both labor and environmental standards,

social decisions are outside the parameters of the

agreement and resolved only by the unregulated

market. Globalization managed in this way has

created a vast income gap in both the United

States and Mexico, allowing the wealthiest

The Fruits of Tradecontinued from previous page

President Lagos withthe team that

negotiated theU.S.–Chile free

trade agreement.

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individuals to become disconnected from the

fate of society as a whole. Giving poorer

countries greater influence in establishing the

rules of the game, as Lagos suggested, would

be a step in the right direction. To facilitate

this, Bonior proposed establishing a deeper

integration (along the lines of the European

Union) to provide an arena through which all

nations in the Western Hemisphere could voice

their concerns and create a common agenda for

overall economic development.

In response, Lagos countered that existing

social and economic asymmetries between the

United States and most Latin American countries

would be the main obstacle in creating such a

confederation. Currently, there is little solidarity

within the region as a whole, so there is scant

motivation to create a unifying organization.

Moreover, building solidarity would require

greater concessions on the part of economically

powerful actors in the region. For example, when

Chile and Bolivia were negotiating a recent trade

agreement, Chile agreed to eliminate protections

on Bolivian goods immediately but allowed

Bolivia to gradually reduce their tariffs, thus

recognizing the economic asymmetries that exist

between the two nations. Lagos claimed that the

United States would need to take similar steps

with respect to Latin America and asked Bonior

if he thought the United States would be willing

to do so.

For his part, Bonior agreed that developing

countries in the region would likely require

additional trade concessions. However, he

stressed that the most important way to create

hemispheric solidarity would be to incorporate

labor standards within trade agreements.

Currently, most Latin American countries are

signatories to United Nations treaties that

give workers the right to form independent

unions, yet this right is unevenly enforced.

fBringing workers’ rights to the forefront of

trade agreements would ensure that laborers

across the hemisphere are treated fairly, thus

creating greater regional solidarity.

With this issue in mind, Bonior recalled that

when he was following the negotiations toward a

bilateral free trade agreement with Chile, the

American A.F.L.-C.I.O. had discussed labor

rights with unionized Chilean workers, and both

David Bonior andRicardo Lagos inconversation.

Photo by David R

.Léon Lara.

L a g o s a t B e r k e l e y

sides favored incorporating labor protections

into the trade agreement. However, when

Bonior brought the idea to a key U.S. trade

negotiator, it was dismissed. Bonior asked Lagos

for his view on which party was behind this

outcome: Was it the United States or Chile that

was opposed to tying labor rights to the trade

agreement?

Lagos responded that his impression was

that labor rights were important to both sides,

balanced with the desire for each country to

retain sovereignty over labor legislation.

Moreover, legislation in this area does not

change through executive decree; it is crafted

through the time-consuming process of

congressional approval. Reaching a final trade

agreement would have been nearly impossible if

it had been contingent on labor legislation

changes within Chile. While much progress

has been made over the past 15 years, Lagos

admitted that Chile could do more in terms of

strengthening labor rights, especially in the

area of collective bargaining protections.

At this point in the conversation, Shaiken

noted that both Lagos and Bonior appeared to

agree that discussions of globalization tend to be

conducted too narrowly. Strong contingencies

exist in both countries that support bringing the

market and government together for progressive

results, but the parameters of the debate are so

constrained that to simply raise the question

of reframing the debate is often seen as

protectionist and is dismissed out of hand. As a

result, the search for alternatives is considerably

restricted. With this in mind, Shaiken asked

both Lagos and Bonior to comment on what

alternatives they consider most important from

the point of view of their respective nations.

Lagos responded first, stating that trade

negotiations need to acknowledge the inequalities

that exist between developed and developing

countries. For example, intellectual property

rights are one of the most important issues

within trade agreements at present. However,

agreements tend to preference the rights of

countries that hold patents on intellectual

property while doing little to build technical

capacity within developing countries. Doing so

is possible, Lagos noted, citing a bilateral trade

agreement with the European Union that gives

Chilean universities the right to participate in

research and development projects established

by the EU. He argued that similar alternatives

that address social discrepancies should be

further explored.

Extending this idea, Shaiken asked Bonior to

comment on how willing the United States

might be to participate in a search for equalizing

alternatives such as the one Lagos described

and to incorporate them into future trade

agreements. Bonior appeared optimistic in this

regard. He stressed that the U.S. Congress is

now more reluctant to support unfettered free

market trade agreements because citizens feel

the negative effects of current agreements

such as NAFTA in their daily lives. It is at least

equally important for nations to protect the

rights of their workers within trade agreements

as it is to protect intellectual and other

The Fruits of Tradecontinued from previous page

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Chilean imports inBolivia.

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property rights for the goods those workers

create. Since workers’ rights are often left out

of the equation, ordinary people experience

growing inequities, and they are beginning

to pressure their representatives to ensure

that future agreements contain basic social

protections. Bonior closed his comments by

stating that if representatives are not responsive,

people will likely take their grievances to the

streets, engaging in demonstrations against

globalization until the process of reaching trade

agreements is democratized.

In his closing remarks, Lagos reflected on the

broader context of the discussion, in which some

international actors have had more influence

upon the world than others. In different historical

cycles, powerful states — Egypt, Greece, Rome,

the British Empire and, at present, the United

States — have arisen, spent their time on the

world stage and, inevitably, receded. The issue

for powerful states, then, is this: When one is in

the position to set the “rules of the global game,”

will the stage be set such that, when one’s power

and influence is lost, the arrangement remains

satisfactory and fair? Trade discussions, and the

agreements that result from them, are just part

f h h b d l h hof the answer to this broader question. Although

it is difficult to achieve — and in fact would be a

historical first — Lagos urged the United States

to take advantage of its position in the world to

reduce inequalities and create more equitable

ytrade agreements. In this way, not only

nations, but ordinary people within them can

begin to realize greater economic gains from

international trade.

The discussion “Trade, Development and theAmericas” was held at UC Berkeley on October2, 2006. Ricardo Lagos was the president of Chilefrom 2000 to 2006 and a visiting professor atCLAS in fall 2006. David Bonior is currentlyProfessor of Urban, Labor and MetropolitanAffairs at Wayne State University. Previously, hewas a member of the U.S. Congress from 1977 to2003 and House Democratic whip from1991–2002. The discussion was moderated byCLAS Chair Harley Shaiken.

Wendy Muse Sinek is a Ph.D. candidate in theTravers Department of Political Science at UCBerkeley.

L a g o s a t B e r k e l e y

Ricardo Lagos,David Bonior andHarley Shaiken onthe Berkeleycampus.

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H istory will certainly rememberRicardo Lagos as one of Chile’sgreatest presidents. Few presidents, in

the Americas or elsewhere, can point to a similarlist of achievements following six years inoffice, even without having had to operateunder constitutional constraints similar to thosethat often tied the hands of President Lagos.

The people who received the president witha standing ovation at UC Berkeley were well-disposed to admire him. As they repeatedlyrose to their feet to applaud and cheer, I wasreminded of another such reception that Iwitnessed not long ago.

Once a year, Chile’s business leaders meet atan annual congress, the ENADE. At its 2000meeting, a recently elected President Lagos wasgreeted with open skepticism and a degree ofhostility by the business community whichfeared a socialist president would lead Chile’seconomy further into the doldrums. At the 2005ENADE conference, however, I observed the

same audience receive President Lagos with astanding ovation. Business leaders, who in Chileare notoriously right-wing, openly expressedtheir admiration and respect for this left-wing

ypresident and his government, which theyconsider to have been very successful overall.Any criticisms of his government werereserved and centered on relatively minorissues; sometimes they even appeareddownright contrived.

The respect and approval Lagos had generatedffrom such an unlikely source was indicative of

opinions nationwide: During his six years inoffice, Chile’s most important public opinion

ypoll accorded him approval ratings that rarelydipped below 60 percent and sometimes evenexceeded 70 percent. Equally significant, hisdisapproval ratings generally hovered between10 and 15 percent.

Such polls reflect the extent to whichfPresident Lagos managed to reconcile some of

the historic divisions that have characterized

Defining New Frontiers By Kirsten Sehnbruch

Ricardo Lagos andHarley Shaiken

chat with a studenton the Berkeley

campus.

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Chilean politics since at least 1973, a featachieved in large part through the sheer forceof his personal moral convictions.

So what did his government do? Why was heso popular? Unfortunately, a brief article suchas this one can only hope to present a fewsummary answers.

In the economic sphere, the recovery ofgrowth, the expansion of free trade and theinstitution of a structural fiscal surplus set asidefor the reduction of the national debt and futuresocial investment are the hallmarks of the Lagosadministration.

Having taken over Chile’s government at a timewhen the economy had taken a dip, rkk esulting in asharp increase of poor quality employment andunemployment, Lagos managed to turn thisscenario around. With the help of historically highcopper prices, the strong growth rates thatChileans had become accustomed to wererecovered. It is a measure of his government’sforesight and long-term planning that hisadministration instituted the above-mentionedbudget rule, largely intended to protect Chilefrom future economic fluctuations.

However, what President Lagos willundoubtedly be remembered for most, interms of Chile’s economic development, is hisgovernment’s successful negotiation of a series

of free trade agreements, which include treatieswith the United States, the European Union andSouth Korea, as well as with several neighboringcountries in Latin America and, most recently,China. Such agreements have not only integratedChile further into the global economy, they havealso demonstrated the country’s commitment tointernational institutional treaties and democracy.

Chile’s free trade agreements with the UnitedStates and the European Union in particular

fsymbolize the country’s democratic “coming ofage” process. As recently as 1999, segments of theChilean military, which violently opposed thearrest of General Pinochet in London, murmuredthat they were prepared to intervene should thedemocratic government fail to protect their

yinterests. Such rumblings were permanentlyysilenced by these free trade agreements, simply

because the Chilean business community,which had supported the former dictator andthe military, now has too much to lose if theseagreements are suspended.

Despite the economic and symbolic importanceof Chile’s free trade agreement with the UnitedStates, President Lagos nevertheless stood upfor his principles in the midst of its negotiationprocess when his government voted againstthe Bush administration’s decision to invadeIraq in the United Nations Security Council,

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President Lagosand then-DefenseMinister MichelleBachelet at amilitary parade in2004.

defying warnings that such a stance couldjjeopardize the treaty. Few political leaders inhis position would have run such a risk for amatter of principle.

During his stay at UC Berkeley, Lagosemphasized that such a strategy is a necessaryone for smaller countries. “We need clear rules,”he repeatedly stressed. Unlike large and powerfulcountries, small nations do not have the politicalclout to dictate the rules of global engagementas they go along but have to rely on theenforcement and application of establishedrules. “As a small country, I could not jeopardizethis principle,” Lagos explained.

The economic policies of the Lagos administrationwere closely coupled with equally importantsocial policies. “Growth with Equity” (Crecer conIgualdad) had been Lagos’ campaign slogan, andhis government certainly attempted to makegood on this promise.

Extensive health care reforms, social programsto further reduce poverty, 12 years of compulsoryeducation, the institution of longer school days,programs to improve the quality of education,significant increases of the minimum wage andthe institution of an unemployment insurancesystem are only some of the policies that markedthe social agenda of the Lagos government.

Critics, however, tend to argue that thesereforms do not go far enough. My own book TheChilean Labour Market (Palgrave, 2006), forexample, contends that these reforms do notchange the fundamental structures of Chile’ssocial policy institutions, which will make itdifficult to achieve greater equity. In particular, Ihave criticized the Concertación, Chile’s rulingcoalition, for a lack of focus on employmentpolicy as the crucial link between economic andsocial policies.

Nevertheless, the reforms initiated by theLagos government represent an important stepin the right direction. It must be acknowledgedthat Chile’s government has expended moreeffort and resources on its social political agendathan any other Latin American country duringrecent decades, even while its political systemconstrained the government’s ability toundertake more fundamental reforms. In thearea of social policy reform, Lagos picked his

b l l h hbattles wisely, thus perhaps generating greaterycapacity for future change than is widely

assumed at present.It is important to remember that President

Lagos, like his Concertación predecessors, couldnever count on a majority in the Chilean senate.As a result of the undemocratic constitutionallimitations with which the Pinochet dictatorship

ghad saddled Chile’s renascent democracy, amongthem nine unelected senators, political powerwas skewed towards the opposition.Furthermore, this constitution required atwo-thirds majority in the senate to changeimportant legislation, such as the institution andstructure of the pension system.

One of the most important measures thatLagos successfully negotiated, therefore, wasthe reform of this constitution. Similarly, hisgovernment brought Chile’s military statutes inline with the standards of a modern democracy.Future Chilean presidents, for example, will beable to fire the heads of their armed forces, aprerogative that General Pinochet’s constitutionhad denied Chile’s democratically electedleaders.

The importance of these reforms cannot beoveremphasized. Not only will they allow futurepresidents to pass fundamental legislation moreeasily, but they also constitute a crucial step in theprocess of strengthening and deepening Chile’sdemocracy as well as its institutional capacities.

However, President Lagos’ greatest domesticachievement was the deepening of the processof national reconciliation initiated by his

fpredecessors, which will bring some measure ofhope for justice to the victims of the Pinochetdictatorship.

The prosecution of General Pinochet by judgesJuan Guzmán (for human rights violations) andSergio Muñoz (for corruption) was unthinkableonly a few years ago. It is now a reality. The samegoes for countless other officials of the Pinochetdictatorship and their henchmen. PresidentLagos was always careful to assert that he wouldnot interfere in the procedures of the judiciary,which should work independently of politics,but there can be no doubt that his personal andmoral stature did a lot towards ensuring thatjustice is slowly but surely being done in Chile.

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The same can be said for the Valech report,compiled specifically at the behest of the president,which details the human rights violationsperpetrated under General Pinochet’s regime.The report lists the anonymous testimonies ofapproximately 29,000 people who were torturedand who have subsequently received basic life-long pensions and other benefits as a smallmeasure of compensation. Although the reportwas compiled with very limited resources and canbe criticized for its methodology, it constitutes ahistorical document of immense significance,principally because it made information on theextent of human rights violations in this sadchapter of Chile’s recent history available toeveryone.

At the same time, however, the Lagosadministration also pursued an active dialoguewith Chile’s military to unravel the truth aboutthese human rights violations. This dialogue hasfurther resulted in reforms which have redefinedthe role of the military in Chile today andwill allow it to regain its historical status as aprofessional and apolitical actor. Such measuresrepresent an important step in bringing about aprocess of national reconciliation, the prerequisitefor healing the wounds of the past.

In his Berkeley speech, President Lagos saidthat his government defined new frontiers forChile, making possible what was previously

thought of as impossible. This is true of a wholenumber of matters, which range from the mostpractical (such as the construction of pavedroads through remote rural areas) to the morepolitical (such as the constitutional reforms). AsLagos pointed out in his talk, he enjoyed greaterfreedoms to do things than his predecessors,presidents Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei, buthe has also left his successor, Michelle Bachelet,with an even greater range of freedoms, whichwill allow her government to function moreeffectively and to pursue the social agendathat the Lagos administration was unable tocomplete.

Handing over the Chilean presidency to awoman can perhaps be considered as one of themost important expressions of the new frontiersLagos defined in Chile. During his period inoffice, he appointed women to key posts in hiscabinet, including those of Foreign Affairs andDefense. Since cabinet posts in Chile are the bestpositions for achieving public recognition and

fpopularity, Lagos must receive a large share ofthe credit for the fact that the two presidentialcandidates who emerged from the Concertaciónin 2005, Soledad Alvear and Michelle Bachelet,were women.

His successor, President Bachelet, is not only awoman but also a socialist with a militant past,which is itself an expression of the acceptance

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President Lagosvisits the HumanRights Memorialconstruction site.

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that socialism has regained in Chile. She isdivorced and an agnostic (as was RicardoLagos himself), but she is also the singlemother of three children. Such a combinationof characteristics must be viewed as anexpression of the sociocultural frontiers thatChile is exploring and to which the person andpolicies of Ricardo Lagos made an immeasurablecontribution.

By demonstrating not only that a socialist cansuccessfully run the economy but also combineeconomic growth with a comprehensive agendaof social policies, President Lagos introduced“The Third Way” to Latin America.

While some may lament the loss of traditionalsocialist agendas, the approval ratings thatPresident Lagos generated within Chile, togetherwith the recognition he has received beyond hiscountry’s borders, suggests that many morewelcome the fact that socialism has beenreformed to constitute a realistic, practical and

responsible long-term alternative to failedneoliberal reforms.

There can be no doubt that Ricardo Lagos’approach has smoothed the way for otherleft-wing leaders to be elected in a region thatsorely needs to overcome levels of povertyand inequality which are high enough to fuelunrest and may even destabilize the hard-woninroads democracy has made on the continent.

Perhaps history will consider this to bePresident Lagos’ most important contributionto defining new frontiers.

Kirsten Sehnbruch is a senior visiting scholar andlecturer at CLAS.

Defining New Frontierscontinued from previous page

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President Lagosgreets well-wishers

on the day he leftoffice.

President Lagos began his speech by summarizingthe progress Latin America has made over thelast decades. First, he highlighted the fact thatdemocratic institutions, especially electoralprocesses, have consistently improved acrossLatin America. Today virtually all governmentsin the region have been elected democratically.While it is true that some governments didnot finish their terms in office, even in thesecases the rule of law was upheld and legitimateconstitutional means were applied to appointinterim or successor governments. Lagosemphasized that, despite many persistentimperfections, there is more democracy in LatinAmerica today than there was only a couple ofdecades ago, a fact that constitutes real andundeniable progress.

Second, Lagos pointed out the growinginfluence of a cadre of well-trained andtechnically competent professionals who run theeconomies of most Latin American countriestoday. This has led to the de-politicization ofeconomic policy-making in the region, which hepredicted will have positive consequences for thecontinent’s development as a whole.

Third, the overall level of economic developmentin the region has improved to the point that,with only two exceptions, Latin Americancountries no longer qualify for foreign aid.Most are now considered to be middle-incomecountries, facing problems of a different naturefrom those of the past.

yWhile this overall scenario is undoubtedlyyencouraging, the region still battles many

unresolved problems. President Lagos spelledout three major challenges facing Latin America:The first such challenge is how individualcountries can build societies that provide their

ycitizens with equal opportunities so that theycan achieve greater equity.

While growth and investment are essentialingredients in this process, they alone are notenough. Lagos pointed out that one of the mainreasons why unrest periodically resurfaces inLatin America is because large segments of thepopulation perceive that growth is passing themby. “There’s no point in having a 5 percent or 6percent growth rate, if the school system, thehealth care system and the general infrastructureremain the same,” he emphasized.

Expanding the Possiblecontinued from page 1

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The UC Berkeleyaudience wavesflags as PresidentLagos enters theroom.

Photo by Scott Squire.

Given the inadequate trickle-down effect inthe region, it is the job of governments tocomplement economic growth with effectivepublic policies, if necessary discriminating in favorof the most vulnerable. The role of democracy,which treats individuals as equal citizens andnot as unequal consumers, is a crucial one indetermining which public goods should beavailable to everyone. While no one today canreasonably question the reality of marketeconomies, the debate continues as to how andto what extent governments should provide suchpublic goods. In the end, only democracy canprovide the answer to this question.

Since its transition to democracy in 1990,Chile has dealt with these challenges byconsistently diverting the additional incomegenerated by economic growth into socialpolicies. The Chilean poverty rate was cut inhalf through policies designed to generatecapabilities for the poor and extensive reformsin the areas of social security, health care andeducation. These policies have benefited thepopulation at large, but especially lower-incomehouseholds.

The second challenge that Latin America facesis the equally important issue of how to dealwith a past blemished by human rights violations.Civil wars, guerrilla activities and dictatorshipshave left brutal marks on the region’s history.Lagos argued that “Tomorrow exists only afteryou settle the account with the past.”

yIt was in an effort to deal with Chile’s historythat, as president, Lagos set up a human rightscommission which investigated past violationswith stunning thoroughness and detail. Thecommission produced a final report, knownas the Informe Valech, which recorded thetestimonies of 35,000 people, of whom 29,000were recognized as having suffered torture, in acountry with a population of 10.5 million at thetime of the dictatorship.

Lagos dwelt on the courage needed toundertake such a confrontation with the past

yand the difficulties involved in the process. Everycountry has to find its own way to face theseissues, but each must find a way. The presidenthighlighted the importance of moral and ethicalvalues as essential ingredients in any suchprocess if Latin America’s democracies are to

L a g o s a t B e r k e l e y

14

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tt S

quir

e.

President Lagosand Chancellor

Birgeneau.

Expanding the Possiblecontinued from previous page

15

achieve not only legitimacy but also the rule oflaw. He emphatically stated that no one shouldbe above the law.

The third challenge that President Lagosdiscussed is how to integrate the region intoa globalized world. To have an impact onglobal affairs, Latin America needs to speakwith one voice.

Speaking from the Chilean perspective,

Lagos explained that for small and developing

countries without significant political clout, the

rules defining global interactions are especially

important if their rights are to be respected by

their larger and more powerful neighbors. This

logic applies not only to trade in a globalized

world — an area that Chile has pioneered with

bilateral free trade agreements — but also to a

host of other matters that need to be resolved at

the global, multilateral level. He pointed out that

problems such as global warming, damage to the

ozone layer and human rights violations are the

kinds of issues that can only be resolved at the

multilateral level.“The question of human rights, for example,

is not a question of a particular country,” heemphasized. “Whenever a human right isviolated, some other human being has the rightand the duty to denounce this, no matter wherethey live. Frontiers with regard to human rightsviolations cannot exist anymore.”

While Lagos highlighted the importance ofthe United Nations Charter, which was signed in1945 to create a multilateral institution in whichsolutions for lasting peace and economicdevelopment could be devised, he also questionedwhether current institutional structures, inparticular the veto power of the five permanentmembers of the UN Security Council, reflect thepower structures of the past more than those ofthe present.

Latin Americans must learn from the experienceof European countries, which have been able tointegrate as well as develop mechanisms fordiscussing world affairs. Using the experience ofChile and Mexico, which were able to define acommon position with regard to the UNSecurity Council’s decision on Iraq, Lagosillustrated that it is indeed possible for LatinAmerican nations to act in concert and thusinfluence other countries in the world. Suchconcerted action is essential for a continent thatrelies on the application of international law.

Following his talk, President Lagos answered a

series of questions, some of which were receivedvia the internet prior to the event. One questionsent from New Zealand asked whether thepresident saw a conflict between an expandedMercosur and a potential Free Trade Agreementof the Americas. In his response, President Lagosstated that he did not view these differenttrade associations as conflicting, but that twoimportant considerations should be borne inmind with regard to their design. The first is thatcountries with different levels of economicdevelopment should make accommodations forthese discrepancies in their negotiations. Heused the example of Chile’s free trade agreement(FTA) with Bolivia to illustrate this point. SinceChile is the more developed of the two countrieswith the greater proportion of their total trade, itagreed to drop most of its own tariffs to zeroimmediately while allowing Bolivia to reduce itstariffs gradually.

The second point President Lagos made wasthat FTA negotiations must bear in mind that

L a g o s a t B e r k e l e y

Photo by Scott Squire.

President Lagoswearing theBerkeley Medal.

tariffs make up a significant proportion of thetotal fiscal income for some countries. This isparticularly true of smaller, less developednations. For example, in some Caribbeancountries the elimination of tariffs could wipeout up to 40 percent of fiscal revenues. Alongsimilar lines, such negotiations must also makeallowances for the exclusion of certain sectors,such as intellectual property or governmentprocurement, from the FTAs.

President Lagos emphasized the need to learnfrom the successful integration of theEuropean Union, which throughout its historyhas accompanied the integration of newmembers with significant fiscal transfers fromricher countries to poorer ones, especially duringits most recent inclusion of less developedEastern European countries.

The event concluded with a questionregarding the environment. President Lagosemphatically spoke about the need to generateappropriate policies on the environmental

challenges facing developed and less developedcountries alike. Dealing with these challengesrequires not only the establishment of appropriateenvironmental standards but also the institutionof an international body that would be able to

fenforce such standards and sanction violators ifnecessary. Lagos also emphasized that theworld’s most developed countries, the G-8, musttake a lead on this matter, since they are withoutdoubt the principal culprits and contributors tothe environmental degradation that we nowconfront. An optimistic note rang through hisresponse, though, as he repeatedly stated that, inhis view, “mankind is capable of sustainabledevelopment.”

President Ricardo Lagos spoke on “Challenges forLatin America” on September18, 2006.

Kirsten Sehnbruch is a senior visiting scholar andlecturer at CLAS.

16

L a g o s a t B e r k e l e y

Phot

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Dio

nici

a R

amos

.

President Lagosteaching during his

stay at Berkeley.

Expanding the Possiblecontinued from previous page

17

The Mexican Revolution of the early 20th

century created a Mexico where peasants

had nearly inalienable control over their

land; where large-scale industry was heavily

regulated; and where the country was ruled by a

single, corrupt, patronage-based party — the

Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). By the

late 1980s, it was clear that this was not a very

successful politico-economic framework

with which to support Mexican economic

development. Urban and industrial productivity

remained far below world standards with

little sign of catch-up or convergence. Rural

agriculture remained backward. Successful

development fueled by the transfer of labor

from the countryside to the cities had come

to an end in the late-1970s with the general

slowdown of growth in the industrial core, even

though oil-rich Mexico benefited enormously

from the OPEC-driven tripling of world oil

prices in that decade.

After stealing the presidency of Mexico from

the true choice of the voters — Cuauhtémoc

Cárdenas — Carlos Salinas de Gortari decided

at the start of the 1990s to pursue policies of

“neoliberal reform.” He worked to open up the

economy to trade; encourage rather than punish

foreign investment; dismantle regulations and

special privileges; and generally to rely on the

market in the hope that any market failures that

emerged to slow development would be less

destructive and dangerous than the government

failures — stagnation, corruption, entrenched

interests — that many agreed were blocking

Mexican prosperity.

So, in the early 1990s, Salinas de Gortari

sought and won a free trade agreement with

the United States and Canada: NAFTA — the

Afta Thoughts on NAFTABy J. Bradford DeLong

Photo by AP W

ide World.

Anti-NAFTAprotestors at a1993 rally.

18

North American Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA

guaranteed Mexican producers tariff- and

quota-free access to the U.S. market, the largest

consumer market in the world. Once the United

States was committed to allowing quota- and

tariff-free imports from Mexico, the future

twists and turns of U.S. politics would be

unlikely to disrupt U.S.–Mexican trade.

Industrialists could build their factories in

Mexico to serve the American market without

fearing the consequences of a political retreat

from free trade by the United States.

More importantly, perhaps, NAFTA committed

Mexico to following the rules of the international

capitalist game in its domestic economic policies.

Overregulation, nationalization, confiscation —

all the ways that governments can take wealth,

especially wealth invested by foreigners, and

redistribute it — were to be ruled out, or at least

made more difficult, as a result of NAFTA.

The hope was that this two-fold binding of

national governments — the U.S. government

committing not to let a wave of protectionism

affect imports from Mexico and the Mexican

government committing not to let a wave of

populism affect the wealth that foreign investors

would place in Mexico — would set off a giant

investment and export-industrialization boom

in Mexico and so perhaps cut a generation

off the time it would take for full Mexican

economic development.

Indeed, six years ago I was ready to conclude

that NAFTA had been a major success. It looked

as if NAFTA had been the most, or at least a very

promising, road for Mexico. Given that the

United States has both a neighborly duty and a

selfish interest to do whatever it can to raise

the chances for Mexico to become democratic

and prosperous, it appeared that the pushing-

forward of NAFTA by the George H.W. Bush

and Bill Clinton administrations had been one

of the lamentably few good calls by the U.S.

government in its management of relations with

Mexico.

Six years ago I would have said that NAFTA

was a success because I would have looked at

Mexico’s exports and seen that they had

boomed. Indeed, they have continued to boom.

fMexico’s exports have gone from 10 percent of

GDP in 1990 to 17 percent in 1999 to 28 per-

cent today. In 2007, Mexico’s real exports —

overwhelmingly to the United States — will be

fully five times as great as they were at the

beginning of the 1990s. Here, in the rapid

development of export industries and the

dramatic rise in export volumes, it is clear that

NAFTA has made a big difference.

Without the dual guarantees of free imports

into the United States and respect for foreigners’

property in Mexico, fewer investments

would have been made in Mexico in capacity

to satisfy American demand. And to those of

us advocating NAFTA in the early 1990s, such

an expansion of exports as we have in fact

seen would have been confidently predicted to

generate enormous dividends for Mexico as a

whole. Increasing trade between the United

States and Mexico moves both countries toward

a greater degree of specialization and a finer

division of labor. Mexico and the United States

can both raise productivity in important sectors

like autos, where labor-intensive portions are

increasingly accomplished in Mexico, and

textiles, where high-tech spinning and weaving

is increasingly done in the United States, while

Mexico carries out lower-tech cutting and

sewing.

Such efficiency gains from increasing the extent

of the market and promoting specialization

should have produced rapid growth in Mexican

productivity. Likewise, greater efficiency should

have been reinforced by a boom in capital

formation, which should have accompanied the

guarantee that no future wave of protectionism

in the United States would close factories in

Mexico. This is the gospel of free trade and the

division of labor that we economists have

preached since Adam Smith. And we have

powerful evidence around the world and across

the past three centuries that this gospel is a

true one.

The key words here are “should have.”

Afta Thoughts on NAFTAcontinued from previous page

Today’s roughly 100 million Mexicans have

real incomes, at purchasing power parity, of

roughly $10,000 per year, a quarter of the

current U.S. level. They are investing perhaps a

fifth of GDP in gross fixed capital formation —

a healthy amount — and have greatly expanded

their integration into the world economy,

especially that of North America, since NAFTA.

Real GDP has grown at an average rate of 3.6

percent per year since the coming of NAFTA.

But this rate of growth, when coupled with

Mexico’s 2.2 percent per year rate of population

increase, means that Mexicans’ mean market

income from production in Mexico is barely 15

percent above that of pre-NAFTA days. That

means that the gap between their mean income

and that of the United States has widened. And

there is worse news: Because of rising inequality

the gap between mean and median incomes has

risen. The overwhelming majority of Mexicans

are no more productive in a domestic market

income sense than their counterparts of 15 years

ago, although some segments of the population

have benefited. Exporters (but not necessarily

workers in export industries) have gotten rich.

The north of Mexico has done relatively well.

And Mexican families with members in the

United States are living better because of a

greatly increased flow of remittances.

Intellectually, this is a great puzzle for us

economists. We believe in market forces. We

believe in the benefits of trade, specialization

and the international division of labor. We see

the enormous increase in Mexican exports to

the United States over the past decade. We see

great strengths in the Mexican economy:

macroeconomic stability, balanced budgets

and low inflation, low country risk, a flexible

labor force, a strengthened and solvent banking

system, successfully reformed poverty-reduction

programs, high earnings from oil and so on.

Yet success at what neoliberal policymakers

like me thought would be the key links for

Mexican development has had disappointing

results. Success at creating a stable, property-

respecting domestic environment has not

delivered the rapid increases in productivity and

working-class wages that neoliberals like me

would have confidently predicted when NAFTA

was ratified. Had we been told back in 1995 that

Mexican exports would multiply fivefold in the

next 12 years we would have had no doubts that

19

Photo by Jacqueline Sullivan.

Brad DeLong speaksat UC Berkeley.

20

NAFTA was going to be, and would be perceived

as, an extraordinary success. We would have

been convinced that Salinas de Gortari was right

to focus his energies on free trade and

NAFTA rather than on, say, education and

infrastructure.

To be sure, economic deficiencies still abound

in Mexico. According to the Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD), these include a very low average

number of years of schooling, with young

workers having almost no more formal

education than their older counterparts; little

on-the-job training; heavy bureaucratic burdens

on firms; corrupt judges and police; high crime

rates; and a large, low-productivity informal

xsector that narrows the tax base and raises tax

rates on the rest of the economy. But these

deficiencies should not be enough to neutralize

Mexico’s powerful geographic advantages and

the potent benefits of neoliberal policies, should

they?

Apparently they are. The demographic burden

of a rapidly growing labor force appears to be

greatly increased when that labor force is not

very literate, especially when crime, official

corruption and inadequate infrastructure also

take their toll. Reinforcing these deficiencies is

fan important additional factor: the rise of

China. The extraordinary expansion of exports

from China over the past decade has meant

that it has been the worst time since the 1930s

to follow a strategy of export-led industrialization

(unless, of course, you are China). Mexico has

succeeded at exporting to the United States. But

because of the rising economic weight of China,

it has not succeeded in exporting at prices that

generate enough surplus to boost Mexican

development.

In addition, there is a great deal of anecdotal

evidence that attempts by businesses to locate

production for the U.S. market in Mexico are

running into labor shortages. It is not that

labor in Mexico is scarce, and it is not at all

expensive. But labor with the skills needed to

operate machines that could otherwise be

located in Kuala Lumpur or Lisbon or, indeed,

Cleveland, does seem to be hard to find. The

logic of comparative advantage and the division

of labor requires that the productive resources to

divide the labor be present. The low level — and

near stagnation over time — of education in

Mexico may be a critical deficiency.

And there is the problem of Iowa, a gigantic

gand heavily subsidized corn and pork producing

machine. The way NAFTA has worked out, the

biggest single change in cross-border shipments

whas been that Iowa’s agricultural produce is now

sold in Mexico City. The impact on standards

of living for Mexico’s near-subsistence, rural

Afta Thoughts on NAFTAcontinued from previous page

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Wid

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.

Corn flows from anIowa combine.

farmers is frightening to contemplate. Imports

from Iowa have been an extraordinary boon to

Mexico’s urban poor and urban working class.

But have they been a good thing for the country

as a whole?

We neoliberals point out that NAFTA did

not cause poor infrastructure, high crime and

official corruption. We thus implicitly suggest

that Mexicans would be far worse off today

without NAFTA and its effects weighing in on

the positive side of the scale. We neoliberals

point out that we could not have predicted the

rapid rise of China: from the perspective of

1991, China’s future looked likely to be riddled

with political turmoil, repression and perhaps

economic stagnation as the Communist Party

feared too-rapid change, rather than the greatest

economic miracle we have ever seen.

That neoliberal story may be true, but,

then again, it may not. Having witnessed

Mexico’s slow growth over the past 15 years,

we can no longer repeat the old mantra that

the neoliberal road of NAFTA and associated

reforms is clearly and obviously the right one.

Would some other, alternative, non-neoliberal

development strategy have been better for

Mexico in the late 1990s and early 2000s? Would

it have been better to have urged President

Carlos Salinas de Gortari to focus his efforts on

investments in education and infrastructure and

on trying to clean up corruption rather than on

free trade? Perhaps.

The stakes are high. Our current systems of

politics and economics, around the world,

are legitimized not because they are just or

optimal but because they deliver a modicum

of peace coupled with rapid economic growth

and increases in living standards. Mexico’s

development problems are not large when

compared to those of many other countries. We

as a species ought to be able to help Mexico to

do much better than it has in the years since

1990.

J. Bradford DeLong is Professor of Economics atUC Berkeley, Chair of the Political Economy ofIndustrial Societies major and a research associateat the National Bureau of Economic Research. Hespoke on October 16, 2006.

21

Photo by AP W

ide World.

A Mexican farmer inhis cornfield.

22

Six years and $10.6 billion later, PlanColombia has not eradicated coca; however,large areas of cultivation have moved from theguerrilla-controlled zones to paramilitary zones.

In 2000, the United States and Colombiaundertook a huge campaign to strengthenColombian institutions and fight drug trafficking.Plan Colombia, as the initiative was called, wasoriginally presented as the beginning of thereconstruction of a country hit hard by decades ofviolence caused in large part by drug traffickers.

The first goal of Plan Colombia was to supportthe peace process with the RevolutionaryArmed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas, acommunist group created in 1964 that clearlydominated coca growing areas at the time. Thereactivation of the Colombian economy andsome institutional reforms to strengthen localjjustice were also part of the plan’s objectives.

However, it was one specific goal of the planthat allowed the Colombian government, ledby then-President Andrés Pastrana, to gainbipartisan support in the U.S. Congress. Thepromise was to reduce cocaine trafficking to theUnited States by 50 percent over five years. Thegoal was ambitious and the parameters for itsevaluation were clear: by 2006 the total area ofcoca cultivation in Colombia would be reducedby half and the price of cocaine on U.S. streetswould double.

Results and ExplanationsThis attractive equation — crops cut by half,

prices doubled — became the backbone of PlanColombia. In an effort to achieve this goal, $10.6billion — $3 billion more than initially planned— have been spent. Analysis shows that theresults are poor.

The areas of coca cultivation in Colombia areslightly larger today than before Plan Colombiawas instituted. In 1999, an estimated 122,500hectares were planted with coca. In 2005, thisnumber reached 144,000.

Several explanations have been offered toexplain this lack of progress. Colombian officials

h h h d h ddargue that they have done their part. In additionto contributing 60 percent of the total funds forPlan Colombia, the Colombian governmenthas conducted massive spraying in the areasindicated by the United States. They also insistthat American monies have not been received ina timely fashion, hindering Colombia’s efforts toextend fumigation and eradicate illegal crops.

The White House Office of National DrugControl Policy (ONDCP) has defined the resultsas “mixed.” According to the U.S. government,the growth in coca production could beexplained by the expansion of the sampling area

ywhere images are taken of the crops. Theyacknowledge that thousands of hectares havebeen conscientiously sprayed but point out thatcoca has reappeared in new areas or in areas thatwere not previously evaluated.

Aside from the expansion of cultivated areas,the other major indicator of Plan Colombia’sprogress is even more discouraging. The figuresgiven by the State Department and the ONDCP

findicate that the “retail” price of one gram ofcocaine was $135.51 in 1999 and $106.54 in 2003.

Instead of a dramatic increase in price, aspredicted in Plan Colombia, cocaine is cheaperthan ever on U.S. streets.

With results like these, there are good reasonsto think that the plan, six years and $10.6 billionlater, has not changed the coca market inColombia. Nonetheless, a detailed analysisdoes indicate that while, broadly speaking, thenumbers are the same, coca has shifted withinthe territory and has changed hands.

MovementIn 1999, just months before the implementation

of Plan Colombia, the Drug EnforcementAdministration (DEA) presented a map of illicitcultivation in Colombia. This map showed theexistence of two enormous coca growing areas inthe southern region of the country. The first wasin the department of Putumayo, near the borderwith Ecuador. The second ranged across thedepartments of Caquetá and Meta.

Plan Colombia:Coca Moves to the RightBy Daniel Coronell

23

It was also clear that there were othermedium-sized areas on the border withVenezuela: the first in Norte de Santander andthe second in the department of Arauca. Inaddition, the map showed a smaller coca-growingarea in the north of Colombia on the borderbetween the departments of Bolivar andSantander.

The map revealed another worrisome reality.The demilitarized zone, created by the Pastranagovernment in order to advance peace talks withthe FARC, was the epicenter of the two largestcoca-growing areas in the country.

Since the 1980s, the FARC had been financingits activities with the gramaje which they defineas a “revolutionary tax” on illicit growers. All theanalysts indicated that the financial and militarystrengthening of the FARC since that time hadits origins in the millions of dollars earned fromillicit crops, but in 1999 few had imagined howlarge the coca plantations had become in theareas controlled by the guerillas.

The peace process, which had been progressivelylosing support because of abuses by the guerrillasin the demilitarized zone, broke down in 2002.President Pastrana broke off talks after theFARC hijacked a commercial airliner and forcedit to land on a road in order to kidnap a senator

who was among the passengers.President Pastrana’s popularity reached its

lowest point in 2002, just before the presidentialelections. Álvaro Uribe, whose campaign focusedon the need for a military confrontation withthe guerillas, became the favorite to succeedhim. Meanwhile, U.S. priorities had changed.Following the September 11 attacks, the war ondrugs gave way to the war on terror.

Given the need to conserve American supportfor Plan Colombia, President Pastrana sought tohave the FARC declared a terrorist group by theUnited States and the European Union. Soonafter, military operations against the guerrillasand aerial spraying of illicit crops in their areasof influence multiplied.

Álvaro Uribe won the presidency and intensifiedthese operations. Within a few months, however,he announced his intention to initiate a newpeace process, this time with the right-wingparamilitaries and not the left-wing guerrillas.

These right-wing paramilitary death squads,who were responsible for massacring peasants,assassinating left-wing leaders and murderingordinary citizens, claimed to have formed as areaction to abuses by the guerrillas in variousregions in Colombia. There is a measure of truthto this claim. However, it is also true that many

Anti-narcotics policeguard the eradicationof a coca field in southern Colombia.

Photo by AP W

ide World.

were private armies serving the drug traffickers.When the possibility of a peace process with

the Colombian government opened up, somedrug lords not previously tied to paramilitaryactivity began to associate themselves with theseright-wing militias. According to a Colombianpolice report, some drug lords bought militiasfor sums ranging from $10 million to $50 millionin order to gain political status, avoid extraditionto the United States, dialogue with the governmentand disguise their drug-trafficking activities.

The New MapThe first thing the paramilitaries obtained in

their negotiations with the government was aguarantee that they would not be extradited tothe U.S., a deal Colombian drug traffickers hadbeen seeking for 23 years. They had never beenafraid of the weak Colombian justice system, butthey were afraid of U.S. prisons and the longsentences imposed by American judges.

With the slogan, “Better a grave inColombia than a prison in the U.S.,” a groupof drug traffickers led by Pablo Escobar hadunleashed a bloody campaign of attacks in the

d h k h l f1980s and 1990s that took the lives of morethan 3,000 people. Presidential candidates,government ministers, judges, policemen andjournalists died during the terrorist offensivecarried out by the so-called extraditables.

yToday, 24 paramilitary leaders are sought byU.S. courts on charges of drug trafficking. Thus,the “no extradition” promise accelerated thepeace process with the paramilitary squads. In

y2004 and 2005, 30,000 self-declared paramilitarymembers were demobilized.

In April 2006, the United States government,through the ONDCP, revealed the modest results

kof Plan Colombia. Subsequently, the New YorkTimes published an article that included a map,created using information from both the U.S.government and the United Nations, showinghow coca cultivation had changed.

Despite the spraying, the size of the areaunder illicit cultivation had not changed sincePlan Colombia was implemented. Instead, cocacultivation had moved from areas under

fguerrilla influence in the southern region ofthe country to areas under paramilitary control.

Today, coca is grown closer to Caribbean andPacific ports and to various urban centers. Theemergence and growth of these new cultivationzones occurred during the same years as themajor paramilitary demobilization.

The map suggests that, without exception, thenew areas of major cultivation are in zoneswhere the paramilitaries have strong influence.

The facts appear to support those who arguedthat continued spraying would not eradicatecoca but simply move it to unsprayed areas. In

yColombia, coca cultivation has moved, not onlygeographically, but also from one politicalextreme to the other: from left to right.

Colombian journalist Daniel Coronell is currentlyka senior visiting scholar at CLAS. He gave a talk

entitled “Plan Colombia: Auditing the Books” onOctober 23, 2006.

24

Daniel Coronellspeaks at Berkeley.

Coca Moves to the Rightcontinued from previous page

Phot

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uelin

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n.

This fall, the walls of CLAS havebeen covered with hauntingimages of political violence:

death squads, dumped bodies andthe sometimes terrified, sometimesindifferent faces of passers-by. On the30th anniversary of the military coupin Argentina that made terror, murderand disappearance official state policy,this photographic exhibit has been atimely reminder of the horrors that ablind embrace of national securitydoctrine brought to many countries.The exhibit’s powerful sequence ofimages, some well-known and manymore previously unseen, are theproduct of extensive research andcareful selection by photojournalistsAlejandro Reynoso and PabloCerolini. Curated by Ernesto Semánand brought to Berkeley with the helpof the Argentine government, theexhibit was inaugurated on August 30,2006, with a speech by AmbassadorHéctor Timerman, a long-standing humanrights activist who is now the consul general ofArgentina in New York.

As the son of Jacobo Timerman, one of thebest-known victims of the military regime, theambassador could offer an intimate perspectiveon where state terror came from and how itaffected Argentine society. Drawing on his ownmemories of the period, AmbassadorTimerman told of the shattering experienceof having his father taken away and of thenumbing series of meetings with maliciouslyindifferent bureaucrats as he tried to find outwhere his father was being held. He told ofcountless encounters with the lawless servantsof the law, with their doublespeak, their casualbrutality and their manipulative promises. Herecounted the sobering moment when he sawhis father again, wasting away from torture andmistreatment and the difficulty of holdingtogether a family when the possibility of even

seeing his father again could be arbitrarily takenaway at any time.

Ultimately, of course, Jacobo Timerman wasreleased, thanks to the persistence of his familyand the lobbying efforts of many internationalgroups. He left the country to write PrisonerWithout a Name, Cell Without a Number, arrsearing exposé of the dictatorship that provedkey in further isolating the military regime andstrengthening international support forhuman rights.

Ambassador Timerman dwelt at length onthe important role the United States played inthis process, from high-ranking officials ofthe Carter administration like Pat Derian, tothe heroic efforts of diplomats like “Tex”Harris, who worked to document and stopthe disappearances, tortures and murders thatwere taking place. This U.S. support was crucialto weakening the dictatorship and keeping thehuman rights movement alive as well as laying

25

State Terrorism in Argentina:Images and MemoriesBy Mark Alan Healey

Photo by Pablo Lasansky.

The army violentlyquashes a demonstration,1982.

26

the groundwork for Argentines to return todemocracy and bring military leaders to justice.But as Ambassador Timerman also noted, theUnited States had encouraged the coup in thefirst place and, after Reagan took office, reversedcourse and embraced the worst violators ofhuman rights.

The struggle for human rights was key torestoring democracy in Argentina, but politicalinstability and military reaction led the first twodemocratic presidents, Alfonsín and Menem, tolimit the prosecution of human rights violatorsin the name of securing democracy. Since theArgentine Supreme Court voided amnestiesgiven to human rights violators, the Kirchneradministration has made a priority of bringingthe perpetrators of state terror to trial. Whilesome have worried about the instabilitythese trials might bring, AmbassadorTimerman emphasized that the only path tolasting stability requires justice for the victimsand memory of the crimes. Underscoring theimportance of a robust defense of human rightsand a full reckoning with the past, his speechand the exhibit it inaugurated clearly showed

how “Never Again” has become a foundationalprinciple of Argentine democracy.

“En Negro y Blanco: Images of State Terrorism inArgentina (1976–1983)” is on display at CLASuntil January 3, 2007. The photos on pages 25–31are part of the exhibit.

Mark Alan Healey is Assistant Professor of Historyat UC Berkeley.

State Terrorism in Argentinacontinued from previous page

Phot

o co

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and

Am

eri,

p A

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Jacobo Timerman isplaced under house

arrest, 1978.

Photo by David R

.Léon Lara.

Right: AmbassadorTimerman points

to the photo of hisfather.

27

When I viewed the exhibit “En Negro y

Blanco: Images of State Terrorism in

Argentina (1976–1983),” when I

actually saw the photographs hanging on the

walls, I was amazed at how the state-sponsored

terror that engulfed my country for more than

seven years, the violence that preceded it and the

hopes that came afterward could be described

in just 40 photos. It would take several books

to express in words what is chronicled in

these images. Along with the aesthetic and

professional value of the display, it is this

ability to communicate history that does credit to

the photographers who researched and selected

the material.

Although every picture brings back memories

of people I knew or scenes where I was present,

there is one photograph that saddens me the

most: the burial of my childhood friend,

Eduardo Beckerman, who was killed by the

secret police when he was 19 years old. He was

the first of my friends to die.

One of the distinctive features of state terrorism

is how easily and efficiently it spreads terror

throughout a nation. By using the armed forces

to pressure specific so-called dangerous groups

(whether they are called communists, terrorists,

bourgeoisie or Jews does not matter), terror is

used to discipline an entire social body. The

nightmare of Argentina is as vividly noticeable

in the actions perpetrated by the death squads as

in the images of ordinary people going on with

their daily lives in the middle of that ordeal.

The most accurate complement to these

images has left no visual record; it lies in the

testimony of survivors, the conscience of the

continued on page 30

The Screams Behind thePhotographsBy Ambassador Héctor Timerman

A mother and herchild protest at the1982 March forLife.

Photo by Adriana Lestido.

28

The banality of evil:Argentine junta leaders at the World Cup, 1978.

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The reality of evil:A young man dragged off by the police, 1982.

Photo by David G

arcía.

perpetrators and the memory of relatives.

Torture is the weapon of state terrorism whose

effects go far beyond the tortured body out into

the entire society and whose lasting memories

are as hard to forget as these pictures.

I, personally, remember what my family went

through during those years. In 1971, my father,

Jacobo Timerman, founded the newspaper La

Opinión. By the mid-1970s it had become the

most respected liberal paper in Argentina.

When the most brutal dictatorship in

Argentina’s history came to power in 1976, my

father’s battles with the regime became a part of

our family life, and I was proud, though scared,

of his willingness to publish the names of the

victims of the junta’s repression.

In the early morning of April 15, 1977, the

army broke into our home and kidnapped my

father. That night was the beginning of a new,

surreal existence for my family.

We went 40 days without knowing whether my

father was alive or dead. Finally, the telephone

rang. My father was on the line. He told us he

was now officially recognized as a government

prisoner and that we could visit him. If thinking

about someone being tortured is painful, it

is not as terrible as seeing the results of that

torture. My mother and I waited for two hours

in the Central Police Department. We were

allowed only three minutes with my father.

He was a man destroyed, both physically and

mentally. Saying goodbye as if for the last time,

he told us he would never be set free and to

reorganize our lives on that basis. My mother

sobbed uncontrollably as she saw what had

become of him. She stroked him as if he were a

child and kept asking, “What did they do to you?

What did they do? Why are you so ill?”

For the next two months we were allowed

to see him for a few minutes every day and,

slowly, he told us about the long sessions of

torture when the interrogators pressed him

for information on his Zionist background and

his relationships with other prominent Jewish

figures. Among the torturers were people who

were very knowledgeable about Israel and

Judaism.

yFor the relatives of the tortured, it was very

yhard to go on living a normal life. Our reality

was a kind of hell. When the media reported on

the struggle against terrorism or the international

kcampaign against Argentina, when people took

to the streets to celebrate sports triumphs or

entered a restaurant, laughing and kissing, it

was impossible not to feel confusion, anger and

emotional isolation. Watching normal people

doing normal things we felt a bottomless sense

of solitude and loneliness.

A few weeks after that first visit, a police officer

approached us as we were waiting in line to enter

the prison. He told us that my father had been

transferred to an unknown location. He had

vanished from police headquarters, again

becoming a desaparecido.

yFor 30 days we lived in terror, our anxiety

sharpened by the knowledge of the mistreatment

he had suffered during the first kidnapping.

Then a call came from the police. I would be

allowed to visit my father for three minutes

every Friday. Each week it was a different police

station, generally far from the center of Buenos

Aires. I was allowed to speak; my father was not.

One of those Fridays, my little brother Javier

broke down in tears and demanded to see our

father. I was not authorized to bring him along.

wFinally, I decided to take a chance. When we saw

my father, pale and skeletal and handcuffed as

always, Javier took out his report card and said,

“Look Papa, I got the best grades in my class.”

My father wept. With the little flexibility allowed

by the handcuffs, he signed Javier’s report card.

In the midst of all the horror, doing something

so banal seemed like a huge victory.

In April 1978, due to health problems and

world pressure, my father was released from a

military prison and placed under house arrest.

The apartment became the realm of the two

dozen police officers who guarded my father 24

hours a day.

wThat September, just before the Jewish New

Year, the American ambassador called me for

one of our regular meetings. This time, I was the

subject of his concern. He asked me, for my own

safety, to leave the country. The armed forces

30

The Screams Behind the Photographscontinued from page 27

were furious about my contacts with human

rights organizations and especially with the

American Jewish community. Since I didn’t have

a valid passport, I went illegally to Saõ Paulo

where I contacted the Jewish Agency. Once

through the Brazilian checkpoint I felt beyond

the reach of the regime’s henchmen for the first

time in more than three years.

It would be another 15 months before we

were all reunited in Tel Aviv. Bowing to intense

international pressure, the Argentine junta

finally expelled my father in September 1979.

In 1981, my father wrote Prisoner Without a

Name, Cell Without a Number. Its publication inrr

the United States unveiled for millions abroad

what was happening in Argentina, and it became

a powerful tool for the international community

to build pressure against the dictatorship. There,

he wrote:

Of all the dramatic situations I have

witnessed in clandestine prisons, nothing

can compare to those family groups who

were tortured often together, sometimes

separately but in view of one another, or in

different cells while one was aware of the

other being tortured. The entire world of

affection, built up over the years with

utmost difficulty, collapses with a kick in

the father’s genitals, a smack on the

mother’s face, an obscene insult to the

sister, or the sexual violation of a daughter.

Suddenly an entire culture based on familial

love, devotion, and the capacity for mutual

sacrifice collapses. Nothing is possible in

such a universe, and that is precisely what

the torturers know.

Today, his book stands as a reminder of what

a country gives up when it consents to torture,

what is condoned by a society whose people

agree to compromise their freedoms in the

name of a superior national interest. His work

represents the memories of those years and the

intangible terror that the images exhibited at

CLAS so clearly reveal.

Ambassador Héctor Timerman is Consul Generalof Argentina in New York. He spoke at CLAS onAugust 30, 2006.

31

The funeral ofEduardoBeckerman, 1974.

Photo courtesy of Archivo C

rónica.

32

Mexico today is a house divided againstitself. A place where, months after thepresidential election, a daily battle is

still taking place between those who supportedAndrés Manuel López Obrador and those whosupported Felipe Calderón. And even thoughCalderón has been declared the official winner,confrontations persist among Mexicans whothink the election was absolutely clean andMexicans who talk of monumental fraud;among people who insist that the country’sinstitutions are perfect and people who insistthey must be completely overhauled. Theseare the mental maps of two entrenchedarmies; the inflexible views of two differenttribes; the confrontational stances of a countrythat continues to be at war with itself. Acountry inhabited by the millions who hateLópez Obrador and the millions who would beready to give their life for him. A country whererecent polls show that half the populationsupports Felipe Calderón and that a third willnever accept him as president. There they are,two different Mexico’s: fighting, marching,denouncing each other, unconditional supportersof the causes they espouse so passionately.

The 2006 election and the post-electoralconflict it produced have revealed a splitelectorate. In its ranks, many continue toendorse market-led reform while others arecalling for a return to state intervention. Manysupport the economic model of the past 20 yearswhile others, who voted for AMLO, reject it.Many believe in the guiding principles of theMexican Revolution, and others think they needto take into account a globalized world. There isno clear consensus in Mexico today with respectto the path the country should follow. Theelectorate is genuinely at odds, and the closeelection underscored that fact. Thirty-fivepercent of voters chose change while 35 percentchose continuity. Felipe Calderón did not manageto impose his vision nor did Andrés ManuelLópez Obrador manage to broaden his own baseof support. The National Action Party (PAN)appealed to constituencies which had benefitedunder the Fox government, and the Party of the

Democratic Revolution (PRD) appealed tothose who felt disappointed by it. But neithercandidate nor his party received overwhelmingsupport, and that fact in itself is quite revealing.In a polarized election, each party held onto its piece of the country, its portion of theelectorate. While northern Mexico sees itselfrepresented by Felipe Calderón, parts ofsouthern and central Mexico believe he is anillegitimate president.

This is the bitter political reality that Calderónwill have to deal with by calling for negotiation,by advocating consensus, by understandingthat he did not receive a broad mandate andthat he needs to build one. In order to governsuccessfully, Calderón will have to construct abroad, multifaceted political coalition, withenough room for the ideas of even his worstadversary. It must be a roof capable of providingeconomic and political shelter for all Mexicans,especially for those who did not vote for him.

A Contentious ElectionDuring the campaign, both Felipe Calderón

and Andrés Manuel López Obrador spoke totheir hard-core bases of support in the hope ofgetting them out to the polls. Each candidateaddressed his particular part of the countrywithout trying to reach out to those whodidn’t form part of it. They both gambled onpolarization and, as a result, were not able togarner the votes of centrist voters. In an electiondefined by polarized leaders, partisan voters andcentrist citizens, there was no overwhelmingwinner. Calderón and López Obrador reachedelection day constrained by the limits of thepolitical model they chose to run with.

Calderón did everything he was told to do inorder to win. He set up a “war room,” hiredforeign campaign consultants, ran focus groupsand devised a highly negative, yet effective,campaign. Throughout the race, he behaved asthe more professional politician: disciplined,prepared, hard-hitting. He was advised toconduct a campaign of contrasts, and he sethimself to that task. He focused on why he wasnot Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who he

Divided MexicoBy Denise Dresser

U . S . – M e x i c o F u t u r e s F o r u m

33

portrayed as an irresponsible populist. Hepromised to brandish a “strong hand” in order toestablish the rule of law and offered continuityto those who would benefit from it. Calderónpositioned himself as the candidate of stability,common sense and comfortable, gradualchange.

Calderón’s campaign slogan: “López Obrador:A danger for Mexico,” undoubtedly turned theelection in his favor because fear transcendedclass divisions. It became a kind of universalcorrosive that cut through different groups anddifferent regions. Many voters — including thepoor — remembered the years of instability anddidn’t want to relive them. Many rememberedthe times of crisis and didn’t want to resurrectthem. Fairly or not, Calderón’s message had theresonance and impact it sought. However, hisstrategy was not enough to win the election bymore than half a percentage point, according toofficial results. Calderón won by sowing fear ofhis adversary instead of addressing the causesthat explain AMLO’s existence.

Paradoxically, something similar happened toAndrés Manuel López Obrador. The plan for thenation that he put forward during his campaignwas just as exclusionary, just as monochromatic.It seemed as though the country he wanted to

govern only had room for the poor. He behavedas a polarizing candidate who never once saidwhat he would do for the middle class or how hewould foster its growth. He constantly offered torelieve poverty but did not put forth proposalson how to create wealth. He behaved as a socialleader not as a professional politician in atight race whose outcome would be defined bycentrist, independent voters. As a result, LópezObrador never understood the need to movetoward the center of the political spectrum andlead a modern left from there. He nevergrasped that this renewal of the left is what ledpoliticians such as Tony Blair, Ricardo Lagos andFelipe González to power.

López Obrador couldn’t, or didn’t want to, actthis way. He insisted on making history whenhe should have been practicing politics. Heinsisted on talking about his Alternative Planfor the Nation but did not articulate credibleand viable proposals to achieve it. He insistedon addressing only those at the bottom,alienating those at the top and ignoring thosein the middle of the class spectrum. He thoughtit would be enough to offer what he did: fightcorruption, penalize the privileged, eliminateinfluence-peddling, help out those who hadbeen left behind. López Obrador believed he

Andrés ManuelLópez Obradorspeaks at acampaign rally.

Photo by AP W

ide World.

U . S . – M e x i c o F u t u r e s F o r u m

34

could win given the justice of his cause andtherefore never focused on the practical publicpolicies needed to achieve it. He never thoughtthat he needed to convince; he assumed it wasenough to exist.

AMLO in His LabyrinthThe undeniable fact that the Mexican left

must contend with — independently of whathappened on election day — is that AndrésManuel López Obrador had a lead for overthree years that he ended up squandering.AMLO’s world view convinced some segmentsof the electorate but alienated others, mainlystake-holders in the system who felt they hadsomething to lose. The fear campaign provokeda national epidemic because López Obradorhad not vaccinated himself against it. On thecontrary, he fed the closing of the ranks againsthim by espousing the incessant rhetoric ofclass division. He also stoked the animosity ofmoderate voters through a series of campaignmistakes: not attending the first presidential

debate; referring to President Vicente Fox as a“chachalaca” (chattering bird); and refusing tocarry out a media campaign when he was getting

wslaughtered by the media. He did not knowhow to counter-attack with a modern electoralcampaign in a tight race, and this weakenedhim. And it’s true that Vicente Fox campaignedin favor of Felipe Calderón, as did most of thebusiness class. And the Federal ElectoralInstitute undoubtedly made mistakes onelection day and in the weeks prior to it. ButLópez Obrador’s own failings contributed tothe outcome he now shuns.

Given his behavior since July 2nd, many inMexico have come to believe that López

yObrador has simply gone mad. His fieryspeeches, his increasingly anti-institutionalstance, his decision to create a “parallelgovernment” and name himself the president

fof it, all seem to suggest a man who has gone offthe deep end, dragging the country behind him.Yet there is method to the apparent madness.López Obrador has chosen the path of unabated

Divided Mexicocontinued from previous page

U . S . – M e x i c o F u t u r e s F o r u m

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Felipe Calderón holdsup a newspaper

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35

confrontation because he wants to bring thegovernment of incoming president FelipeCalderón down, or at least make it very difficultfor him to govern. López Obrador doesn’t wantto be the Al Gore of Mexico; he’d much rather beits John Brown.

The slash and burn approach López Obradorhas taken since the election suggests that he hasrenounced his presidential ambitions and isnot positioning himself for the next race in2012. Quite the contrary: All of his decisionsunderscore that instead of governing Mexico hewants to make sure nobody else can. From thisperspective, his increasing radicalism makessense. The takeover of Mexico’s main avenue andthe massive sit-in there. The parallels LópezObrador constantly draws between the currentsituation and the tension that preceded theRevolution of 1910. The call for a NationalDemocratic Convention that will draw up a newconstitution. The refusal to accept the FederalElectoral Tribunal’s ruling against him. The callsfor peaceful, civil resistance accompanied by theveiled threats of ensuing violence. The speech inwhich he yelled, “To hell with your institutions.”

All this points to a man who doesn’t want to

work within the existing institutional framework

but instead burn it down. He doesn’t want to

win elections but become the combative, critical,

radical conscience of a country that is changing,

but not fast enough for his taste. He doesn’t want

to ever reach the National Palace but to confront

its occupants from the public square. And,

unmoored by the constraints of conventional

politics, he can do what he knows how to do

best: fight, denounce, mobilize. Become a

permanent thorn in the political system’s

side. Go down in history not as just another

president, but as a revolutionary icon like the

ones he so admires.The problem is that López Obrador is calling

for the destruction of a political system in whichthe left just achieved its largest gains ever. He isshunning the very institutions that his partyhelped build and are an integral part of. LópezObrador’s maximalist, scorched-earth stanceruns counter to the kind of modern, tolerant,institutionalized left that Mexican democracyneeds. A left that seeks to do more than block,sabotage and bring down the government, butrather works to make it increasingly accountable.A left willing to renounce the easy immediacy

of confrontation for the difficult, long-termcommitment of changing Mexico law by law,institution by institution. A left willing tofight for a better cause than Felipe Calderón’spolitical demise. Because the kind of deeptransformations that will benefit the poor and

ystrengthen Mexican democracy will not occur byymerely fueling legitimate grievances but by

addressing them. And Mexico will not end upin a better place if hatred of a flawed politicalsystem precludes the possibility of reforming it.

What Next?Unfortunately many members of the country’s

political and economic establishment do notknow exactly how to deal with López Obrador.

U . S . – M e x i c o F u t u r e s F o r u mPhoto by A

P Wide W

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Supporters ofAndrés ManuelLópez Obrador fillthe Zócalo todemand a recount.

36

They think that it’s enough to simply despisehim. They think that by presenting the electionas a done deal, they have weakened the positionof AMLO enough so that he will self-destruct.But what many members of the political classand the business elite fail to comprehend isthat López Obrador is a symptom of the deepproblems that Mexico needs to address. Incitinghatred towards a man who is perceived as beingclose to the dispossessed won’t eliminate theirlegitimate grievances. And that’s the real dangerfor Mexico in the aftermath of the election: thatin their efforts to disavow López Obrador,Mexico’s ruling elites disregard the conditionsthat produced him.

López Obrador is a product of Mexico’sfailed efforts to modernize using half-heartedneoliberal reforms for the past 20 years. Mexicofollowed the path mapped out by the“Washington Consensus” but did it badly, withbotched privatizations that transferred publicmonopolies into private hands, with economicreforms that benefited a handful of businessmenbut few consumers and with poor results: an

economy that doesn’t grow enough, a businesselite that doesn’t compete enough, an economicmodel that concentrates wealth and doesn’tredistribute enough of it. As a result, 50 millionMexicans live on less than $4 a day. For toomany, the continuity offered by the National

yAction Party’s Felipe Calderón means merelymore of the same.

Therefore, it’s no wonder that LópezObrador continues to receive the support hedoes among 25–30 percent of the population.He is a providential politician created by adysfunctional economic system. He existsbecause of everything that Mexico’s businessand political classes should have done a long

ytime ago: create real opportunities for ordinarypeople by reforming Mexico’s crony capitalism.

wThey didn’t do so, and the privileges for the fewat the expense of the many explain why LópezObrador’s message resonates. It’s as if he held upa mirror and forced the country to look at thereflection of the inequalities many refuse toacknowledge.

And that divide is what Mexico’s elites shouldyfear the most. More than hating the man, they

should hate the conditions that created him.There are too many Mexicans for whom thestatus quo simply doesn’t work. There are toomany people who seek a profound transformationof a country that historically has excluded them

for forced them to cross the border in search ofthe social mobility they can’t aspire to at home.The election was a wake-up call, and those whoignore it do so at their own peril.

So, the question now becomes how to constructpost-electoral consensus in a polarized Mexico.For healing to occur, those who abhor López

tObrador need to understand the factors thatexplain the persistence of his political movement.

fLópez Obrador’s rootedness is symptomatic ofharsh realities some Mexicans simply do notwant to face. The country of privileges thatLópez Obrador has denounced is real. Itexists. It is evident in every contract assignedin a discretionary manner; in every corruptpolitician and the impunity he takes advantage

yof; in the “Chapultepec Accord” promoted bybillionaire Carlos Slim, that doesn’t even contain

Denise Dresser atUC Berkeley.

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the word “competition” among its proposals tomodernize the Mexican economy. LópezObrador doesn’t have the best solutions for theseproblems, but he should be commended forshowing that they exist.

Meanwhile, Calderón deserves recognitionfor his emphasis on policies that have worked:fiscal responsibility, trade liberalization,macroeconomic stability. Calderón seems tounderstand the unavoidable challenge ofglobalization and how to contend with it. Heseems to grasp the issues that explain Mexico’sconnection with the world: everything thatfosters competitiveness in an internationalenvironment where countries pay the price ofignoring it; everything that Mexico needs to do ifit wants to change the parameters of its politicaleconomy. He has focused on the challengesMexico faces if it wants to tread down thepath that countries such as Ireland, SouthKorea, Chile and Spain are on today.Successful countries that have made the dualdecision to grow and share, compete andeducate, create wealth and distribute it moreequitably. These are hard decisions that Mexicomust make in order to become a more moderneconomy, a more representative democracy, amore equal place.

Given this reality, in which both contenders ina bitter feud are partially right, it becomes anobligation for those whose heart is tied toMexico to remind them of the common groundthey can traverse together. Mexican citizens mustremind López Obrador, and those who supporthim unconditionally, that it is not enough tofight for a just cause: the PRD must do so withthe proper tools and without destroying thecountry’s institutions. And Mexicans must alsoremind Felipe Calderón, and those who defendhim so anxiously, that continuity alone is notenough; a more equitable country must be builtupon what has been gained. In the aftermathof a divisive election, both sides have theresponsibility to focus on the many things thatcan bring Mexicans together instead of tearingthem apart.

Denise Dresser is Professor of Political Scienceat the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo deMéxico and writes a political column for the

yMexican newspaper Reforma and the weeklyProceso. She spoke on “Where is MexicoHeaded?” on September 5, 2006.

U . S . – M e x i c o F u t u r e s F o r u mPhoto by A

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Andrés ManuelLópez Obrador issworn in as Mexico’s“legitimate president”on November 20.

38

Despite having an officially-electedpresident, Mexico continues to besubmerged in a post-election conflict

that has revealed serious deficiencies in Mexicandemocracy. The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE)was not the supreme, impartial and infallibleelectoral machine that the rest of the worldassumed it to be. We also now know that, despitethe exorbitant costs of the Mexican electoralprocess, an equitable electoral system is notyet in place. Access to the media, especially totelevision, continues to be unbalanced, to say theleast. The private financing of campaigns showsevidence of irregularities, which means thatMexico has the worst of both worlds: campaignswhich are very costly for taxpayers and yetare influenced, perhaps decisively, by privatecontributions. Thirdly, an attempt has noteven been made to regulate the influence ofthe outgoing president on the electoral process.Why wouldn’t Vicente Fox get involved in theelectoral process if, for the last 70 years, his

predecessors have done so to the point wherethey chose their own successors?

Beyond the institutional and proceduralchanges that are urgently needed for Mexicandemocracy to flourish, there is something elsethat has been practically ignored and has aprofound effect on the situation: Mexicans donot have a political culture of plurality andtolerance. There is neither a political languagenor the forms and practices needed to fosterit. Why would there be if the PRI imposed a“perfect dictatorship” for several decades? Whywould there be if the existence of social fissuresand racial, cultural and sexual discriminationhas been denied?

The lack of an adequate and correct politicallanguage has shown up time and again in thepost-electoral conflict. For example, mere weeksafter the elections, when the Electoral Tribunalwas still deliberating over the results of the vote,President Fox insisted on calling FelipeCalderón the “president-elect.” This only added

U . S . – M e x i c o F u t u r e s F o r u m

Civil Government?By Rafael Fernández de Castro

Mexican legislatorsbrawl in the

Congress buildingjust days before the

inauguration ofFelipe Calderón.

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fuel to the fire. The same opinion was voiced byacademics, university professors and even myown students: “Since Calderón is going to winanyway, we might as well call him the ‘president-elect.’” Given this, all chances for dialogue werewiped out, and there was no further talk ofconciliation with Andrés Manuel LópezObrador’s team.

During the past two months, the crisis oflegitimacy that surrounded Felipe Calderón hasdissipated, but the environment in Mexico is stilltense. Calderón, for his part, initiated his foreignpolicy with three important trips abroad: toCentral America, Canada and the United States.With these visits, he has begun his official dutiesas president-elect. However, López Obrador hasset out an action plan as the “legitimate”president and in clear opposition to the man heconsiders a “false” president. In fact, he declaredhimself president and “took office” onNovember 20th in Mexico City’s central squarebefore a large group of his followers.

Moreover, ungovernability and the conflictin Oaxaca have turned into catalysts for socialdiscontent in Mexico. The lack of a solution tothe situation is, to all intents and purposes, atime bomb for the incumbent governmentand, as is often the case, the politicians seem

fdetermined to politicize the problem instead ofseeking a solution to the conflict. The recentattacks on IFE offices and on a bank aredeplorable and should be a wake-up call forpoliticians to assume the responsibility fororganizing a dialogue as soon as possible.

Without a political culture that makes a pointof using language that includes rather thanoffends and the experience of using politicaldebate rather than force, the discussions tend tobecome personal and the conflicts more serious.

yTwenty years ago, near the beginning of mypostgraduate studies in the United States, I hadthe opportunity to do an internship in the heartof American democracy, the Capitol. I foundmyself taken aback at a hearing on the CentralAmerican conflict. The Republican witness wasadvising invasion; the Democratic speaker, onthe other hand, said that intervention by theNicaraguan “Contra” forces was so serious as tolegitimate the participation of Cuba and the

yformer Soviet Union in the region. To mysurprise, the speakers battled it out in a heateddebate, but, at the end, came down from the

fpodium and shook hands with each other as ifnothing had happened. The same situation, inMexico, would have ended in blows, not ahandshake.

U . S . – M e x i c o F u t u r e s F o r u m

Federal police guardOaxaca’s centralplaza.

Photo by Michele G

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Paradoxically, political tolerance in the UnitedStates has been decreasing while in Mexico it hasbeen increasing, although the goal is still a longway off. Over the past decade, and especiallyunder the government of George W. Bush, theUnited States has seen the disappearance of apolicy that was known by the slogan, “politicsends at the water’s edge.” That is, when dealingwith foreign policy outside U.S. territory one didnot brandish the party line but rather supportedthe national interest. This is no longer thecase. In the era of Al Qaeda terrorism, theBush administration calls those who criticize thegovernment “traitors” and labels opponents oftheir policies as “soft on terrorism.”

Nonetheless, despite this closing of ranks,Americans continue to preserve some culturalpractices that we would do well to emulate.For example, in the eighties a practice knownas political correctness arose that was fosteredby liberals as a legacy of the civil rightsmovement. This tendency seeks to eradicate thediscriminatory connotations that are implicit in

daily language. For example, one should not usethe terms “colored people” or “Negro,” butrather, “African American.” One should also notrefer to undocumented immigrants as “illegals”but rather as “undocumented” persons, since

fbeing illegal has pejorative connotations. Ofcourse, this tendency quickly became excessivein the United States. Today, there are no longerany fat or obese people, only people who are

yoverweight, and there are no more midgets, onlypersons of short stature.

Mexico should borrow the positive elementsof political correctness. We demand that ourpoliticians watch their language and practices tofacilitate a respectful, inclusive, open and maturedialogue about our differences.

yRafael Fernández de Castro is Head of the Facultyfof International Studies at ITAM and Director of

the Spanish edition of Foreign Affairs. He co-chairsthe U.S.–Mexico Futures Forum.

Civil Government?continued from previous page

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Stopping to watchthe presidential

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In the aftermath of the contested presidentialelection, Mexico faces a crisis of legitimacythat will test the capacity of its institutions.

So argued Manuel Camacho Solís in hisBerkeley talk. Speaking just a few weeks after theElectoral Tribunal formally declared FelipeCalderón of the National Action Party (PAN)president-elect, Camacho Solís — who served asthe primary political strategist for the Party ofthe Democratic Revolution (PRD) candidate,Andrés Manuel López Obrador — repeatedlyemphasized the need to move forward to solvethe crisis rather than to rehash who was at fault.

Given that Mexico is so closely divided —the election was decided by .5 percent of theelectorate with both the PAN and the PRDreceiving roughly 35 percent of the vote —the ruling party must take into account theconcerns of the people represented by LópezObrador. Camacho Solís presented two alternatefutures for Mexico. In the first, the institutionsof government fail to cope with the conflict,resulting in a descent into “confrontation,

instability, institutional paralysis, lack ofeconomic growth, anarchy…” In the second,more hopeful, scenario the political crisisprompts real reform. This reform, according toCamacho Solís, would need to occur in fourareas: democracy, economic growth, socialjustice and honesty in government.

DemocracyCamacho Solís presented several concrete

ideas as to how Mexican democracy should bereformed. To start with, he argued that theprocess by which people are appointed to theElectoral Tribunal must be changed if that bodyis to have legitimacy. Under the current system,two parties are able to join forces to create a

fmajority and successfully nominate members ofthe Tribunal without the participation of thethird party. In this case, the PAN and theInstitutional Revolution Party (PRI) were ableto push through their nominees, and the PRDhad no representatives on the Tribunal.Camacho Solís insisted that in a close election

The wrestler“Little Ray ofHope” raises hisfist in support ofAMLO.

U . S . – M e x i c o F u t u r e s F o r u m

Not a Game for AngelsBy Jean Spencer

Photo by AP W

ide World.

42

a Tribunal created without the input of thecountry’s second largest party cannot hope to beseen as legitimate.

Election funding is another issue that must beaddressed. This year’s election was awash inmoney of dubious provenance which, accordingto Camacho Solís, mostly benefited the PAN.More money was spent per capita than in theUnited States, and this in a country with aneconomy only 5 percent the size of that ofthe U.S. Camacho Solís suggested that usingpublic funds for the elections in imitation ofthe European model was a way to avoid thecorruption that big money brings.

Media concentration was repeatedly criticizedby Camacho Solís as incompatible with truedemocracy. In Mexico, two companiesmonopolize television, and both depend on thegovernment for lucrative contracts, giving theincumbent a huge advantage. Camacho Solísasserted that his candidate was not seen on TVand couldn’t get air time to respond to attacksagainst him. He excoriated the current systemsaying, “Soviet-type television in a country thatpresumes to be democratic does not help tolegitimize politics.”

A move from a strictly presidential to a semi-parliamentary system of government was alsosuggested by the speaker. In a three-partycountry as evenly divided as Mexico, it is almosta given that the president’s party will be unableto form a majority in congress. The president isthen “obliged by the structure of the institutionsto use illegal means to maintain control of thecountry.” Among the “illegal means” decried byCamacho Solís are the use of budget funds tocontrol the media and the giving of concessionsto various groups to get crucial support onimportant votes. A semi-parliamentary systemwould mitigate these evils by facilitating thecreation of coalitions which would be able toform a majority in congress.

Economic GrowthIf Mexico is to extricate itself from its current

crisis, economic development is key. Theeconomy has stagnated for the last 25 years,and even now, when international economic

conditions are in Mexico’s favor, jobs remainscarce. If Mexico isn’t soaring when oil is at threetimes its average historic price, interest rates arelow and remittances totaling $20 billion arepouring in, what can be done? Camacho Solíscontended that growth could be achieved byincreasing competition, reducing monopoliesand improving the quality of government. Healso pointed to the lack of available credit as aproblem hindering development and stressedthat the government should invest in education,science and technology in order to take part inthe knowledge economy.

Social JusticeLópez Obrador rose to prominence because

he articulated the needs of the poor and themarginalized. Camacho Solís urged the PAN notto let their narrow electoral victory blindthem to the needs of the people that the PRDcandidate represented. He advocated a systembased on the Chilean model where soundmacroeconomic policies are balanced withsocial investment in areas such as health andeducation. While acknowledging that Mexicocannot afford a social welfare system like that ofthe EU, he insisted that there must be a “floor”or minimum level of welfare that is ensured by“some kind of scheme of social justice.” He didnot elaborate on what that scheme would entail.

Honesty in GovernmentRampant corruption impedes the development

of democracy in Mexico. There are norestrictions on conflict of interest or influencepeddling, and members of congress openly workfor private interests instead of the public good,he maintained. Government needs to “recovera sense of austerity and honorability andethics” before it will be viewed as legitimate byits citizens.

While acknowledging that the current crisis isthe worst he has experienced in many years ingovernment, Camacho Solís maintained thatreform in these four key areas would beenough to convince the public that theinstitutions of government can still function.The campaign and the post-electoral crisis have

Not a Game for Angelscontinued from previous page

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43

had a polarizing effect on Mexico. However,Camacho Solís pointed to an MIT study whichfound that voters were less influenced by theirmembership in a particular social class than bythe political history of their state as evidencethat the country is not as divided as politicalspeechmakers would have it. These divisionscould become deeply entrenched, he warned, ifthe crisis is not solved, or if the government usesrepression to contain dissent.

During the question and answer session,Camacho Solís underlined his support for apeaceful resolution to the crisis wherein reformwould be enacted through the institutions ofgovernment. The PRD is currently dividedbetween those who believe that institutionalreform is possible and those who believe thesystem is too corrupt to be reformed. If thePAN does not respond to calls for reform or ifit stoops to repression, then moderates likehimself will be discredited, and those who favormore radical means will gain the upper hand, hecautioned.

Camacho Solís was also asked pointedquestions about his years as a PRI operative andhis role in the widely disputed 1988 presidentialelection. In response, he portrayed himself as a

man who has pushed for the opening ofMexican politics from the inside, workingwithin the existing system to create institutions,like the Electoral Tribunal, that allowed forever-increasing levels of democracy. Whenasked point-blank how progressives could trustformer priístas or “chameleon politicians,”Camacho Solís responded, “Politics is not agame for angels; it is a game for human beings…If you want only pure symbols, you will becompletely ineffective.”

One can only hope that the human beingsinvolved in Mexico’s current political crisiswill find a way out of the labyrinth they havecreated.

Manuel Camacho Solís is the primary strategistfor former presidential candidate Andrés ManuelLópez Obrador. He has been the mayor of MexicoCity, a congressman and president of the PRI. Hespoke at CLAS on October 18th.

Jean Spencer is the Outreach and PublicationsCoordinator at CLAS.

U . S . – M e x i c o F u t u r e s F o r u m

Manuel CamachoSolís speaks withstudents after hisBerkeley talk.

Photo by David R

.Léon Lara.

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“Ihaven’t much to complain about.”Gadalya “Gaddy” Tauber did indeedlook more fit and relaxed than he had

during my first encounter with him at theHenrique Dias military police brigs in 2005.Then, he was still recovering from the shock ofhis conviction the previous year on charges oforganized crime, racketeering, human traffickingand commerce in human organs and hissubsequent imprisonment in Recife, Brazil.

On this visit, in July of 2006, I was accompaniedby Brazilian journalist Julio Ludimir who, likeme, was investigating the international organstrafficking ring that had operated out of Recifeduring 2002–03. Truly global in its scope, themultimillion dollar scheme originated in Israeland was active in several sites in Eastern Europe,Turkey, Brazil, South Africa and the UnitedStates. Ludimir and I were both fascinated by

Tauber, the hyper-intelligent, complex and wilyTauber, the hyper-intelligent, complex and wily70-year-old former officer in the Israeli DefenseForce (IDF) who was widely rumored in Brazilto be a spy, a drug trafficker, an arms dealer and

ya member of Mosad, Israel’s ultra-elite militaryforce.

As we settled into a corner of the prison yard,Gaddy made a confession: “Last time I told youthat I never killed a man. That was untrue. Thistime I will tell you the truth, all of it.” This wasGaddy as Scheherazade, luring visitors back foranother installment in a story that seemed tohave no end. At the start of every prison visithe would correct a detail from the previousmeeting, and he would end with a promise:“Next time I’ll tell you about ‘the boss’ of theorgans trafficking ring.” Or: “Next Sunday comeagain when Terezinha, my wife, is here [for a bi-monthly conjugal visit from Bom Pastor, thewomen’s prison].”

y“I should have died 70 years ago,” Gaddybegan. When he was three years old, his parentsfled the Nazi invasion of Poland; they went toRussia, sending Gaddy to live with a Catholicpeasant in the Ukraine who hid the little boy andseveral other Jewish children in his cellar.

Although Tauber was not mistreated, neitherwas he protected. When the German policearrived, the boy was handed over, but he wasdescribed as an orphan. “Luckily,” he said, “I wasvery fair and had Aryan features. I was broughtto a camp for war-displaced children somewhere

yin the Ukraine where we were to be adopted byGerman families.” Nonetheless, Gaddy, who wasfive years old at the time, says he remembershunger, sickness and many deaths in the camp.He eventually managed to escape and, after thewar, was reunited with his parents.

In 1947 the family relocated to Israel whereTauber finished school and did his requiredmilitary service. As a young man he showedproficiency in science and math but was neverencouraged to continue his studies. He became aprofessional soldier, “the only job for which Iwas well suited.”

Portrait of Gaddy Tauber:Organs Trafficker, Holocaust SurvivorBy Nancy Scheper-Hughes

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After retiring from the military, Tauber begantraveling the world, selling his skills in police andsecurity training. He met Captain Ivan Bonifacioda Silva, a retired Brazilian military policeofficer, in 1997 at a SWAT training class inMiami. They got along well, and da Silva invitedTauber to Brazil where they set up a consultingfirm specializing in security training. They alsotried to break into the legal weapons trade —selling arms to the military and police inPernambuco — and were awarded an $8.5million contract by the governor, MiguelArrais. But that deal collapsed when Arrais andhis party lost the next election.

During this time Gaddy fell in love with Braziland with Terezinha Medeiros, an attractive andsophisticated lawyer in her fifties. When thearms deal fell through, Gaddy had no way ofmaking a living in Brazil and was forced toreturn to Israel. There, in 1999, he wasapproached by Ilan Perry, a businessman with abackground in medical insurance who wasinvolved in setting up a global transplantscheme. Perry offered Tauber a way to return toRecife as a local agent for his “company.” AllTauber had to do was to find someone in Recifewho could recruit people willing to travelabroad and sell a kidney to Israeli transplantpatients. “I refused outright,” Gaddy said. “I hadno idea that such things were possible, and Ifound it distasteful.”

Three years later, in 2002, Tauber wasapproached again, this time by the wife of an oldfriend. Her description of the pressing need ofJewish transplant patients who were dying ondialysis machines while waiting for transplantscaused Tauber to change his mind. Now he wasprepared “to do something to save the world’sJews, even if it meant finding kidneys for them inthe slums of Brazil.”

This time Gaddy returned to Brazil on amission. Once again he teamed up with da Silva,and in no time at all, a new criminal networkhad formed. It was a pyramid structure with IlanPerry at the top, and everyone got a cut. Gaddy,who was in charge of financial operations inRecife, made $10,000 on each successfultransplant. Captain da Silva, who recruiteddonors though local “kidney hunters,” received$5,000 for every kidney procured. SilvioBourdoux, a military police doctor and colonelwho handled medical screening and bloodmatching, was paid $500 for every donor

d d l ’ f lscreened. Captain da Silva’s wife was alsoinvolved; she traveled with the donors to SouthAfrica where they were taken to a safe house toawait their operation. A parallel structureexisted in both Durban and Johannesburg.

Gaddy received the money needed to organizethe trips directly from Perry and deposited itunder the name of his Brazilian wife, Terezinha,who served as the “accountant” for the scheme.Together, Gaddy and his team rounded up morethan 50 donors to send to South Africa where 38of them were relieved of a “spare” kidney.

The meninos (or “boys” as the kidney sellerswere called) were easy prey. As soon as the firsttwo or three returned safely from Durban andbegan flashing wads of hundred dollar bills, theword was out, and the kidney hunters didn’t

—have to do anything but take down names —more than a hundred of them. The meninos hadspent their lives in Recife’s rundown, working-class neighborhoods, in concrete slab houseswhose roof tiles shook every few minutes asplanes roared overhead. They wanted to travel,too, to see the world and to come back, theirpockets bulging. It was a buyers’ market, and the

yprice for a “fresh” kidney fell almost immediatelyfrom $10,000 to $6,000 and then down to$3,000. Even so, there was no lack of enthusiasmamong the unemployed and indebted.

When several transplants were derailedbecause the donors did not pass the Durbanteam’s medical screening, Perry urged Tauberto set up a transplant center in Recife. Flying

yIsraeli patients to Brazil, where a steady supplyof kidney donors was close at hand, would bemore convenient and less expensive than flyingboth patients and donors to South Africa.

It was a risky business, but da Silva assuredGaddy they could get away with it. Brazilianlaws against organ selling were weak, and da

ySilva’s connections to the police and judiciarywere strong. All they needed was a “five starhospital” and a competent surgical staff. Bothwere located. But just a few weeks before thefirst “transplant tours” were to arrive in Recife,federal police arrested 11 members of the organstrafficking ring. Several of the principal figureswere convicted and given jail sentences rangingfrom one to 11 years, with Gaddy and da Silvareceiving the stiffest penalties.

On our next visit, Gaddy’s jailers did notbring him out as usual but invited us to pass theday with the prisoner in his cell. The visit

46

would be private and only cursorily supervisedby a military guard who might pass by to checkon us from time to time.

I balked, remembering the warning given meby the undercover agent who had nabbedGaddy, Federal Police Chief Karla Gomes MatosMaia. “Don’t be fooled by Tauber,” she had said.“He is a trickster, a liar and a dangeroussociopath. He will play with you, charm you,even amuse you, but he is totally capable ofkilling you.” While awaiting trial, Tauber hadsent “feelers” from his prison cell at the statepenitentiary, Aníbal Bruno, into the slums ofRecife looking for a hit man to knock off Gomesand the judge, Amanda Torres de Lucena. Whenan informant told police about Gaddy’s searchfor a pistoleiro, the prisoner was removed toHenrique Dias, a higher security prison atmilitary headquarters.

Ludimir, a tough investigative reporter, didnot hesitate for a second, and when he eagerlyentered Gaddy’s locked cell, I followed suit.Energized by having his visitors entirely tohimself, Gaddy launched into the story of hisarrest and the abuses he had endured. Above all,he was furious about his portrayal in the localmedia as a “monster, an Israeli Mengele” and theanti-Semitic slurs he suffered from police.“Everyone hates Jews; even Brazilians are anti-

Semites,” Gaddy said bitterly. He seemed startledwhen I asked him why, then, had he participatedin a scheme that had done such great damage toIsrael.

He evaded my question, instead seeking toportray himself not only as a victim of theHolocaust and the savior of sick Jews but also asthe patron saint of the impoverished kidneysellers. He challenged me to consider the povertyof the meninos, their willingness, indeed theireagerness to sell, and their right to dispose oftheir bodies as they saw fit. No one was forcingthem to do anything, he charged. In fact, theywere begging to be part of the group. “I wassaving lives in both countries, in Israel and inBrazil,” he argued. It was a defense I had heardmany times before from body brokers in thePhilippines, Turkey and Moldova. But it wasonly in Brazil where many of the sellers agreedwith their brokers.

As Gaddy prepared lunch for us on a littlecamp stove — homemade soup made fromskinny chicken wings, wilted celery, onions,cilantro and a single, dirt-encrusted carrot — hespoke heatedly about his rescue of my own fieldassistant, Geremias (“Gere”) Belarmino, one ofthe kidney sellers. Out of a job and unable to payhis rent, Gere was facing homelessness. He wasabout to take his wife and three small children tolive in a cardboard shanty when Gaddy offeredhim the “opportunity” to travel to Durban.

“I tried to protect the boy at first; I told him hewas too smart to sell himself this way; I felt likea father toward him, and so I turned him away,”Gaddy claimed. Geremias was insistent, and heoffered to do anything at all for the “company,”including cleaning Gaddy’s apartment, shininghis shoes, translating and interpretingPortuguese, whatever was needed. Gaddyrelented, and Geremias got to sell his kidney.When he returned, Gere agreed to work forTauber as a part-time interpreter, and he hopedto be included as an official guide and translatorfor the new Recife transplant tour scheme.

Gaddy’s version of the story coincided withwhat Geremias himself had told me. And Irecalled the transcript of Gere’s deposition toJudge Torres de Lucena: “What father, seeing abullet headed straight for his children’s heads,

Gaddy andGeremias.

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wouldn’t throw his own body in front of the gunto defend them?” When the judge countered thatGeremias’ children were not facing a deaththreat, Gere responded: “No, you are right. Butthey were facing something even worse, a lifethreat. And to save them, your honor, I wouldhave sold not only a kidney, but an eye, a liver, oreven my heart, and I would have died happy tosee them safely housed.” Geremias had come toTauber’s defense during his trial, saying thatGaddy was the only person to help him whenevery social agency in Recife had turned himdown in his time of dire need. “GaddyTauber may have been a crook who was takingadvantage of the desperation of the poor, buteven so, we all gained something out of it as well.I don’t regret anything.”

Despite the open, foul-smelling toilet located afew feet from the camp stove, despite the dirtyvegetables and the grey-looking chickenwings, the savory aroma coming from thecooking pot made my empty stomach rumble.As he carefully spooned soup into two littleplastic containers, one for me and one for Julio,but none for himself, I protested: “Oh please,Gaddy, you first.”

Tauber demurred, grinning like a Cheshirecat: “I’ll eat later, after you leave.” Pouring a littlewhiskey into his coffee mug [how did he ever getthat, I wondered?], he lit another cigarette.

“Oye, Julio,” I said, “I think this is a test.” ButJulio had already dug in and was slurpingloudly. Hunger, as they say, is the best sauce, andwe both ate greedily, even taking seconds.

As we ate, Gaddy asked me how I had come toBrazil. Since he had revealed his secrets to me, Itold him briefly about my years living in a ruralshantytown as a Peace Corps volunteer in themid-1960s and my return in the 1980s as ananthropologist studying mother love and childdeath. Gaddy listened intently, and he askedintelligent questions. When I described the waysome infants, lacking what shantytown motherscalled “a knack for life” were let go, not onlyallowed to die but helped to die, Gaddy noddedhis head knowingly.

“Do you know what they were?” Gaddy asked.“No, what?”“Those babies were little Musselmen.”I was taken aback. A few years after the

publication of Death without Weeping, I hadggthought of that same analogy while re-readingPrimo Levi’s description of the living dead, the

Musselmen, the sub-population of camp victimswhose exhaustion was so great, whose despairwas so palpable that they looked and behavedlike walking mummies. These men and womenwere avoided and stigmatized as havingsuccumbed, as having “given up” all hope andwith it, their humanity. Thus, were they also“given up on” by those around them.

“Yes, those angel-babies were littleMusselman.”

yBefore we left his cell, for what was to be mykfinal visit to the prison on this trip, Gaddy took

my hand and kissed it and, without giving it asecond thought, I reciprocated. I asked if therewas anything he needed that I could provide.He had only one request: “Whatever you do,promise not to turn me into a monster.”

“I promise; and you take care of yourself,” Isaid.

“I survived Hitler, I survived Stalin. I cancertainly survive this.”

fNancy Scheper-Hughes is Professor ofAnthropology at UC Berkeley.This article is basedon a chapter, “Schindler’s Other List,” in herforthcoming book cParts Unknown:The Global Trafficin Organs (University of California Press).

Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Gaddyin his cell.

Photo by Nancy Scheper-H

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“D“Disjunctive democracy” and its

spatial manifestations form

the overarching themes in

anthropologist Teresa Caldeira’s work. In her

talk, Professor Caldeira outlined three separate

“narratives” that describe ways in which

urban space — particularly public space — is

produced, organized and contested in São Paulo.

The first narrative is one of self-segregation by

elites (and increasingly, the middle class), who

live, shop and work in fortified enclaves with

walls that separate them from the rest of the city.

The next two narratives both come from São

Paulo’s hip-hop movement and re-appropriate

the walls built by the elites as a vehicle for self-

expression and contestation. Graffiti adorns

the city’s walls with sophisticated artwork,

while pichação tags São Paulo’s buildings with

elaborate calligraphy.

The first narrative described by Caldeira is one

that she developed at length in her seminal book

City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship

in São Paulo. The city’s elites have increasingly

segregated themselves by building enclosed

residential and commercial spaces, protected

by walls, armed guards, and state-of-the-art

security systems. The author argues that these

fortified areas reproduce the inequality and

violence that precipitated them. In fact, inequality

is a distinct value used to market such enclaves

to an ever more frightened population.

The segregation of the elites has occurred

alongside two other phenomena, the

democratization of Brazil and a sharp increase

in the incidence of urban violence. As traditional

forms of social organization, such as labor

unions, have decreased in their importance,

other vehicles for fighting social inequalities

have emerged, such as NGOs and cultural and

artistic movements. Professor Caldeira’s more

recent research deals with São Paulo’s hip-hop

movement and the ways in which young, mostly

black males have asserted their identities as

peripheral members of society. In São Paulo,

hip-hop is an agglomeration of different cultural

expressions such as rap, break dancing, graffiti

and pichação.

Rap groups such as Racionais MC’s offer a

devastating class-based critique of Brazilian

society. In the song “Fim de Semana no Parque““ ””

(“Weekend in the Park”), for example, a poor

black boy can only dream of the life inside the

walls where upper class children enjoy their

heated swimming pools and go-karts. Caldeira

notes, however, that rappers such as Racionais

MC’s Mano Brown do not try to negotiate social

inclusion, but rather locate their identities in the

periferia (periphery), in a realm wholly distinct

from that of the denizens of elite neighborhoods

and gated condominiums.

In contrast, graffiti and pichação do venture

outside the periferia and usurp the ultimate

symbols of segregation and exclusion: São Paulo’s

walls. In Caldeira’s words, they appropriate

“whatever surface that is turned outwards as

public.” Graffiti art, with its colorfully surrealist

designs, has turned large portions of walls and

buildings into murals. The complexity and

beauty of the designs have even attracted the

attention of the municipal government, which,

under control of the Workers Party (PT), began

to sponsor graffiti artists as a way to revitalize

certain public spaces. Graffiti has been further

mainstreamed and commoditized by corporate

sponsorships, as in the example of BankBoston,

fwhich created a glossy coffee table book of

fgraffiti art for its VIP clients as an example of

its socially responsible practices.

Pichação, on the other hand, has remained a

clandestine movement. Its practitioners,

known as pichadores, have developed their

cultural expression as an urban sport akin

to skateboarding. Those who practice this

“sport,” mostly young males, are often related to

other groups such as organized soccer fan gangs.

They outdo each other with ever more difficult

feats, placing their pichações on the highest parts

of tall buildings. They use their signatures as a

way of asserting their “brand” upon the city.

yCaldeira described their elaborate, vertically

The Writing on the WallBy Pedro Peterson

49

oriented markings as reflections of the city’s

tall skyline. Like skateboarders, pichadores

read the city’s architecture in their own ways

and appropriate public and private spaces for

their own uses.

Professor Caldeira finished her talk with a

gender analysis of these three narratives

that contest public spaces in São Paulo.

One prominent feature of the city’s enclave

architecture is the use of walls for placing

advertisements which often depicting women

in highly sexualized contexts. Likewise, the hip-

hop contestation of the walls tends to be

male-dominated and — particularly with rap

lyrics — tends to either ignore or antagonize

women. Thus, Caldeira argued, while these

narratives contest class inequalities, they

frequently reinforce gender inequalities.

Fittingly, Caldeira’s discussion of the competing

interpretations of public space in São Paulo came

on the day after Brazil’s presidential elections.

Corruption scandals aside, the transparency and

efficiency of the electoral process was celebrated

by national and foreign media as a further step

in solidifying democracy in Brazil. As Caldeira

showed, however, the deep social cleavages in

Brazilian society have profound effects on the

production of urban space in cities like São

Paulo, where elites continue to undermine the

public nature of the city at the same time that

peripheral voices such as those in the hip-hop

movement open new spaces of participation in

public life.

Teresa Caldeira is Professor of Anthropology atUC Irvine. She gave a talk entitled “A ContestedPublic: Walls, Graffiti, and Pichações in São Paulo”on October 2, 2006.

Pedro Peterson is a graduate student in City andRegional Planning and International and AreaStudies.

Photo courtesy of Teresa Caldeira.

São Paulo graffiti.

I f you reside in one of Rio de Janeiro’s

hillside shantytowns there is no need to look

for violence, it will find you. The question

most residents have to ponder is from which

direction the bullet will come.

Movies and television have tended to

sensationalize life in the favelas where the

poverty-stricken, predominately black population

is threatened by both drug traffickers and Rio’s

corrupt police force. Fernando Meirelles

brought international attention to Brazil’s

shantytowns in “City of God.” Now they serve as

the backdrop to American crime shows when

domestic street violence no longer seems exotic

enough. First-time directors Jeff Zimbalist and

Matt Mochary change the formula, however, in

the documentary, “Favela Rising.” Instead of

promoting their own assumptions about their

subjects — the members of AfroReggae — they

abdicate control, allowing the group to shoot

many of the documentary’s scenes.

Unlike showier big-budget offerings, “Favela

fRising” is technically simple. With no feats of

cinematography to dazzle the audience, it relies

on scenes of every day life that only a local would

notice — chats on the corner, a woman washing

her child with a bucket of water — to grab the

viewer’s attention. Already it has garnered a

“Best New Documentary Filmmaker” award at

the 2005 TriBeCa Film Festival and was named

film of the year by the International

Documentary Association. It screened to a full

audience at UC Berkeley’s Pacific Film Archive.

In interviews, Zimbalist has said that when he

was looking for ideas for a documentary, he

hoped to find a story not commonly seen on the

big screen: a community working together to

overcome its issues without outside interference.

Co-director Mochary had that in mind when he

stumbled upon the story of Grupo Cultural50

A New Spin on Rio’s FavelasBy Stephanie Beasley

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AfroReggae, an organization formed in 1993 by

José Junior and Anderson Sá in Vigário Geral,

then one of the most dangerous favelas in Rio.

Originally, AfroReggae served as the staff of

AfroReggae News, a newspaper aimed at young

people interested in reggae, soul and hip-hop.

As its members increased, AfroReggae began

performing as a musical group throughout the

favela and expanded its services to include

dance and theater workshops and a literacy

program for neighborhood children. “Favela

Rising” follows Sá, a former accessory to drug

trafficking and now the band’s front man, as he

tirelessly strives to draw young people away

from the lure of guns and fast money while

trying to keep his own head above water.

_______________

Many of Sá’s early memories are of the

violence that he witnessed as a child growing up

in Vigário Geral. In one of several scenes where

he is alone, facing the camera, he talks about

seeing a man gunned down in the street at the

age of 10. When his mother tried to shield his

eyes with her hand, he peeked through so that he

could watch the man’s brain splatter against the

pavement. “I just calmly watched,” he recalls. “I

was thinking ‘I’m not afraid of dying.’” Despite

this proclamation, he admits that murder and

gunfire became less appealing when they hit

closer to home.

In 1993, one of Vigário Geral’s local drug

lords ambushed a police patrol car, killing

four officers. Enraged by the assault, the

police retaliated by massacring 21 Vigário

Geral residents at random. Sá’s brother was

among the victims, none of whom had any

involvement with drug trafficking. It was then

that Sá began to think about how he could

prevent such atrocities from recurring.

_______________

Police brutality within the favelas is not

unusual. “They Come in Shooting,” a 2005

Amnesty International report documenting

nearly a year’s worth of data and interviews

with favela residents, highlights several

incidents of police violence in Rio’s marginalized

communities, including a mass killing of

29 people in the Baixada Fluminense district in

March 2005. Amnesty International believes

that this kind of police terrorism stems from low

salaries and insufficient training. The Rio police

often serve as watchdogs for the upper classes

but are as excluded from the city’s wealth as

those they patrol. Many officers take second jobs

to make ends meet.

The drug lords risk their lives for a much

higher paycheck. The film places the salary for

drug trafficking at $650 a day, compared to the

$13 a day that the average black Brazilian earns.

It is easy to see how the lifestyle would appeal

to many young boys in the neighborhood

who look at the drug traffickers’ nice clothes,

fast motorcycles and beautiful girlfriends and

fantasize about being in their place. Sá

A young boy playsthe guitar in “FavelaRising.”

Photo courtesy of Jeff Zim

balist.

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understands the mentality but nevertheless tries

to dissuade youngsters by pointing out how

short-term the benefits are. Most drug traffickers

don’t live long enough to truly enjoy these perks.

Surprisingly, Vigário Geral’s drug lords don’t see

AfroReggae’s anti-trafficking message as a

threat. The group is well-respected and thus

shielded from many of the favela’s dangers.

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AfroReggae’s efforts to transform its

community have drawn praise both nationally

and internationally. Before the group’s emergence

in 1993, there were 150 drug lords in Vigário

Geral. As of 2004, that number had dwindled

to less than 25. By spreading its message

through concert performances — usually

packed by thousands of screaming fans — the

movement has grown to include several favelas

and boasts a membership of 2,000 participants.

AfroReggae has also received a grant from the

Ford Foundation and a music contract with

Universal Records which provide resources to

reach even larger numbers of Brazilian youth.

On the film’s Web site, Zimbalist expresses the

hope that AfroReggae’s story will “inspire

action.” At its UC Berkeley screening the film

inspired hoots of laughter, empathetic tears and

raucous cheers. Whether “Favela Rising” lit a fire

for change in the audience remains to be seen,

but it definitely created a spark. No one dashed

away after the film’s conclusion; audience

members milled around the front of the theater

discussing the issues and characters. Instead of

the disbelief that films about the favelas usually

evoke — that so much violence could exist in a

community — what was incredible for most of

the audience was that such a unique story of

unity and redemption could be true. With this

in mind, one can only hope that just as “Favela

Rising” has moved audiences, it will also prompt

the movie industry to transform how favelas are

represented in films.

The Center for Latin American Studies screened“Favela Rising” at the Pacific Film Archive onSeptember 11.

Stephanie Beasley is a double-degree graduatestudent in the School of Journalism and LatinAmerican Studies at UC Berkeley.

New Spin on Favelascontinued from previous page

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Anderson Sá (right) during an

AfroReggae showin “Favela Rising.”

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Doug Tompkins, creator of ParquePumalín, explains his involvement inenvironmentalism rather simply. His

transformation from clothing magnate toenvironmental philanthropist had its roots inthe realization that he had spent much of his life“producing things people really didn’t need” andcontributing to an unsustainable consumeristmodel. In the late 80s and early 90s, Doug andhis wife, Kristine McDivitt Tompkins, sold theirshares in Esprit and Patagonia and used themoney to fund their environmental activism.

Parque Pumalín, their largest and best-knownproject, is a privately endowed public park insouthern Chile. During the 1990s, the Tompkinsamassed over 700,000 acres of private land inorder to conserve and protect some of Chile’smost beautiful landscapes. Today, this land —which bisects the country and is roughly thesize of Yosemite National Park — is open tothe public.

Tompkins chose to focus his energies on theSouthern Cone because of his long-standingconnection to the region. As a young man,Tompkins traveled to Chile to ski. Over theyears, he returned to Patagonia, repeatedlyreestablishing his relationship with thelandscape and developing lasting friendshipswith people in this region.

“Seven Projects in the Southern Cone” — afilm based on his environmental endeavors —tells the story of the vision he shares with hiswife, a vision of environmental conservation,rehabilitation and economically sustainable,locally-based agro-ecology. “Seven Projects”focuses on their work, beginning with theTompkins’ home, Reñihue Farm, which theyhave restored from an abandoned, dilapidatedand overgrown plot into a sustainable andproductive landscape that is preparing for whatTompkins likes to call the “post-petroleum era.”The remaining six projects range from farms tonational parks. All were designed to encourage amove away from high-power urban lifestylesand toward low-energy agricultural ones,foregrounding local materials and culture,ecological recovery and sustainability.

Tompkins’ model is not without its critics. Theharshest among them accuse him of being animperialist and a colonizer. He has also had run-ins with national governments. Recently, hehas been in the Chilean news for opposing agovernment-funded construction plan thatthreatens to cut across Parque Pumalín. InArgentina, his efforts to build a similar preserveare under fire from the government which hasbegun to consider large-scale foreign ownershipof Argentine territory a national security risk.

It remains to be seen whether Doug Tompkinsis able to translate his vision of entrepreneurialenvironmentalism across cultural and geographicspace to become an enduring force in the globalenvironmental movement. However, therecan be no question as to the beauty of thelandscapes he has worked to preserve, as thefollowing photos will attest.

Doug Tompkins, American entrepreneur andphilanthropist, is the president of the Foundationfor Deep Ecology in San Francisco and presidentof the Conservation Land Trust in Puerto Montt,Chile. His presentation, “Toward Eco-localism,”was held at UC Berkeley, on October 13, 2006

Anna Browne Ribeiro is a graduate student in theDepartment of Anthropology.

Environmental EntrepreneursBy Anna Browne Ribeiro

Photo by David R

.Léon Lara.

Doug Tompkinsat UC Berkeley.

Overleaf:Scenes fromParque Pumalín.

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Photo courtesy of the Foundation for Deep Ecology.

Center for Latin American StudiesUniversity of California, Berkeley2334 Bowditch StreetBerkeley, CA 94720-2312clas@berkeley.eduTel: 510-642-2088Fax: 510-642-3260

clas.berkeley.edu

Parque Pumalín, Chile.

Please visit our Web site for analyses of all CLAS events.

Photo courtesy of the Foundation for Deep Ecology.