Mile High Dice

Active Threat, Recovery Considerations

after the smoke has cleared

Seminar &Tabletop Exercise

November 8, 2017

JIM GRAYDepartment of Justice | Bureau of Prisons | National Corrections Academy

Director

NANCY DRAGANIDepartment of Homeland Security | FEMA Region VIII

Regional Administrator (A)

FRED EIDSONColorado Federal Executive Board

Executive Director

EPC Donna Vallejos, Chair | GSAFran Santagata, Vice Chair | CDHSEMJackie Mead, Secretary | ONRRSheila Perry, ONRR

STATE OF CO Fran Santagata

EPA Region 8 Danny Nguyen

CEPP Pat Williams

BOP Jim Gray, DirectorWayne Decker

FEMA R-VIII Nancy Dragani, Regional Administrator (A)

DHS IP Jeff O’KonekMartin EnosDorothy Miller

CFEB Fred EidsonJeff Conn

Mile High DICE provides a forum for interagency coordination and improvement of continuity and response plans.

The 2017 theme is Active Threat, which is the emergency coalition’s priority this year. (CFEB/CEPP/CDHSEM/DHS/FEMA)

DICE establishes a learning environment for participants to improve their understanding of an Active Threat incident and examine response/contingency plans to determine their ability to continue their mission essential functions.

Develop a common understanding of:

Active Threat scenarios and vulnerabilities

Actions required following an event/incident

Active Threat resources available from the government

Identify Active Threat gaps or vulnerabilities that could disrupt delivery of mission essential functions

Discuss response and recovery of mission essential functions following an Active Threat event

Discuss and examine the challenges, issues and best practices associated with conducting Reconstitution efforts following an Active Threat event.

An Active Threat is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active threat use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Active threat situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly.

When you become aware of an incident, move away quickly from the immediate path of danger:

Run, Hide, Fight

Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter and Evacuate (ALICE)

Plan, Prepare, Protect

7:30 am Registration8:30 Welcome / Opening Remarks9:30 Navy Yard: A Case Study10:30 BREAK \ Optional - Facilitator Training11:00 Module #1 | One hour Post Incident12:00 LUNCH | On Your Own1:00 Module #2 | 12 to 24 Hours Post Incident2:00 BREAK2:30 Module #3 | 36 Hours and Beyond Post Incident3:30 Hot wash / Wrap Up3:45 Adjourn

Who's in the room? Stage

Table #4

Table #23

Table #22

Table #18

Table #14CO

DOL

Table #10BOR

Table #6

FEMATable #1

Table #24

Table #19Table #15

SSATable #11 DHS IP

Table #7

FEMATable #2

Table #25

Table #20Table #16 Table #12 GIPSA

Table #8

FDA

Table #3

Table #21Table #17

Table #13

ONRRIBC

Table #9

RESTable #5

NARAHUD

Walgreens

CEPP/CONGUSGS/WAPA

CDHSEM

CDHSEM

NOAA

NPSVA

DoD DHA

USCIS

GSABOPNTSB

FPSFEMA ADRNOAA-Ged

Mike B.Bruce B.Jeff O.

Enos M.

EPA Reg 8

EPA NEICHHS CMS

CFEBNNC

TABLE INTRODUCTIONS

Name

Agency

Title

SELECT A FACILITATOR

SELECT A SCRIBE

Want to change tables? Now is the time.

FACILITY

PERSONNELNormal Operations

MISSION COOP -vs- Devolution

COOPActivation

FACILITYPERSONNEL

MISSIONLoss of Facility

PERSONNEL

MISSION

ERS FACILITY

COOP Execution

MISSION MISSION

FACILITY

Devolution Execution

New FACILITY

New PERSONNELDevolution

ofOperations

Loss of Facility & PersonnelPERSONNEL

ReconstitutionTakes Organization back to a state of Normalcy

November 8, 2017

Mile High DICEActive Threat,

Recovery Considerations after the smoke has cleared

Washington Navy Yard: A Case Study

“There was a feeling of powerlessness, “ “I am in command of 60,000 people, and I can do nothing. I’m locked down with my phone.”

- Vice Admiral William Hilarides, 43rd Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)

Reconstitution of Naval Sea Systems Command Following the

September 16, 2013 Mass Shooting

Agenda

• Background• Temporary Relocation • Reconstitution at Transpoint• Reconstitution back to Washington Navy Yard• Lessons Learned/Corrective Actions Taken

Background

• Our Mission • Our Organization• Our Workforce• Our Origin• Our Location• Our Headquarters

Washington Navy Yard

KEYIncidentNAVSEATemp HQTemp Workspaces

Taking Care of Our People

• Navy assigns Casualty Assistants Call Officers to victims families.

• Civilian Employee Assistance Program Critical Incident/Crisis response team activated.

• Coordinated with Navy Office of Civilian Human Resources to support employees through the Federal Employees Compensation act.

Temporary Relocation • Facility was Functional

– Electricity, Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning, Water and Sewer, IT and Phone Service all functioned

• Designated As a FBI Crime Scene– Personnel effects left behind during evacuation

• Government Issued Laptop Computers/Government Cellular Phones• Identification Cards• Car Keys

– Navy Yard closed for two days.• A displaced workforce of 2,800 Personnel

– Command Element relocated to Military Sealift Command– Roughly 10% relocated to “borrowed” Spaces– Others teleworked

RECONSTITUTION

• “The process by which surviving and/or replacement organization personnel resume normal operations.”

(Federal Continuity Directive-1 January 17, 2017)

MissionTo relocate 2,800 employees displaced from Building 197 to the TRANSPOINT building, and return them back to the newly renovated Headquarters to be known as the Humphreys Building by March 2015.

Government Lease Expires April 30 2015Renovations completed by February 01, 2015

Congress authorized $74,000,000 for the project: Expand employee entrance, construct new visitor entrance, enclose two atriums with glass, relocate computer and telephone rooms, install 2,200 new cubicles, new paint, and carpet to change the feel and the appearance of the building. Move in completed by December 20, 2013

Move to TRANSPOINTNovember-December 2013

New Building New Challenges

• People

• Policies

• Logistics

• Facilities

Reconstitution Back To Navy Yard02 February 2015

U.S. NAVY PHOTO BY SCOTT ADAM WEBB

Renovations involved 170 different contractors with 320,000 man-hours,with 0 lost time mishaps.

Old New Building Challenges

• People

• Policies

• Logistics

• Facilities

Summary

• Lessons Learned– Expect the unexpected.– Remain fluid, because being flexible is too rigid.– Take care of your people.

• Corrective Actions Taken– Employee Training– Revision of the Emergency Action Plan– Revision of the COOP Plan

Contact Information

Richard “Bruce” BakerNaval Sea Systems Command

Continuity of Operations PlannerOffice of Emergency Management

(202) 781-1988Richard.b.baker@navy.mil

November 8, 2017

Mile High DICEActive Threat,

Recovery Considerations after the smoke has clearedTabletop Exercise

Exercise DirectorJeff O’Konek

Stakeholder Readiness and Exercise SectionDepartment of Homeland Security – Office of Infrastructure Protection (DHS/IP)

Background- Supports departments and agencies in exercise design, development, and

execution and assists in leading, facilitating, planning, and executing both discussion and operations-based exercises for the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure.

Exercise Structure• This will be a facilitated, discussion-based exercise

• Players will participate in the following three modules: – Module #1: One hour Post Incident– Module #2: 12 to 24 Hours Post Incident– Module #3: 36 Hours and Beyond Post Incident

• This exercise will conclude with a brief Hotwash.

Participant Roles and Responsibilities

Players Respond to situation presented based on current plans, policies, and procedures

Scribes Observe and document player discussions

Facilitator Provide situation updates and moderate discussions

Guidelines – Facilitated Discussion• This is an open, low-stress environment. Varying viewpoints, even

disagreements, are expected.• Respond to the scenario using your knowledge of current plans,

capabilities (i.e., you may use only existing assets) and insights derived from your training.

• This discussion is not precedent setting and may not reflect your organization’s final position on a given issue. This is an opportunity to discuss and present multiple options and possible solutions.

• Assume cooperation and support from other responders and agencies.• Non-attribution is in effect

Guidelines (cont.)

• The exercise is conducted in a no-fault learning environment.

• There is no “hidden agenda” nor are there any trick questions.

• The exercise scenario is plausible, and events occur as they are presented.

• All players receive information at the same time.

• The scenario is not derived from current intelligence.

• Issue identification is not as valuable as suggestions and recommended actions that could improve prevention, detection, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts.

Active Threat TTX Facilitated Discussion

Scenario

A man exits the van with a large caliber rifle and immediately begins firing into the building. After entering the building the man proceeds to the government office and begins firing on the government office occupants.

Law enforcement arrives on the scene within minutes of the first 911 call and as they are cordoning off the area, there is a single shot from inside the building. It’s discovered that the shooter has self-neutralized himself.

It’s 10:30 a.m. on a sunny November day. A small rental van pulls into a parking space four blocks from a six story building that provides office space for several commercial companies and is home to a Federal government office.

Scenario - Continued Five minutes after the initial 911 call, the first ambulance and fire units arrive on the scene and establish a triage area four blocks from the site of the assault but very close to the shooters rental vehicle.

Thirty minutes after the initial 911 call, the shooter’s van explodes, sending debris and shrapnel hundreds of feet in every direction. Numerous law enforcement, fire, and EMS personnel who are staged near the van are killed and wounded in the explosion.

Note: explosive with debris only, not a dirty bomb, no chemical

Module #1: One Hour -12 hours

Post active shooter and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED)

Incident

Module #1: One Hour -12 hours Post Incident• Calls are flooding the local Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP)

regarding the attack. Conflicting reports suggest that there was an additional attack that included an explosion several blocks away from the initial explosion. Further reports are communicating that the explosion came from a black duffle bag while others say from a suicide bomber.

• Mass casualties (casualty count unknown). Casualties include: tourists; government employees; retail employees; law enforcement and first responders (caught in VBIED blast soon after responding to the incident).

Module #1: One Hour -12 hours Post Incident• The local bomb squad has arrived on scene and are sweeping the

area for any additional VBIED, which has delayed the recovery of some of the dead and wounded.

• Questions: Do not focus on 1st responder efforts, focus on how your organization is affected by an incident like this and the actions you, as leaders and managers, are taking in the first couple of hours of an Active Threat event.

Discussion Questions• Facilitator – Participant Handbook Questions, page 13.• Scribe – Record answers for organization use.

• What are your principle findings or concerns from this module?• Are there any major changes to your plan or procedures that

you’re considering?• Do you have any best practices to share with other agencies?• Agency specific challenges to share?

Table Brief-outs

Module #2: 12-24 Hours

Post active shooter and VBIED Incident

Module #2: 12-24 hours Post IncidentIt’s the day after the event.

• 40% of your personnel are still being treated at medical facilities for various injuries or emotional trauma.

• 10% of your personnel lost their lives during the shooting.

• Your agency/office only has 50% of the workforce available to work. However, only half of those personnel have the ability to work from home or alternate work locations.

Module #2: 12-24 hours Post IncidentIt’s the day after the event.

• Underground water pipes and electrical/communication conduit suffer significant blast damage resulting from the IED detonation.

• Power outages continue in several businesses near the incident site. There is significant damage to some buildings near the scene.

Discussion Questions• Facilitator – Participant Handbook Questions, page 15.• Scribe – Record answers for organization use.

• Does your continuity plan encompass an Active Threat?• Are all employees familiar with the organization’s continuity plan

and, in this case, is there periodic Active Threat training?• What are your principle findings or concerns from this module?• Are there any major changes to your plan or procedures that

you’re considering?• Do you have any best practices to share with other agencies?• Agency specific challenges to share?

Table Brief-outs

Module #3: 36 Hours to 30 Days or beyond

Post active shooter and VBIED Incident

Part 1 and Part 2

Module #3: 36 Hours to 30 Days or beyond Incident

It is two weeks after the event. The building is no longer a crime scene, however it is not suitable for occupation due to the damage sustained during the shooting.

Personnel are allowed to go back to retrieve personal items left behind during the shooting.

• It is determined that it will take over a year for the building to be repaired and renovated for reoccupation.

• A significant portion of your personnel have opted to retire, seek other employment, or have taken extended leave due to the shooting.

Part 1

Module #3: 36 Hours to 30 Days or beyond Incident

• You only have approximately 60% of the workforce you did prior to the event.

• Power outages continue in several businesses near the incident site. There is significant damage to some buildings near the scene.

Module #3: 36 Hours to 30 Days or beyond Incident

It is now approximately a year and a half later.

• The building has now been repaired and is ready for reoccupation.

• You are now close to having 100% of the workforce that you did prior to the event.

Part 2

Discussion Questions• Facilitator – Participant Handbook Questions, page 19.• Scribe – Record answers for organization use.

• What are your principle findings or concerns from this module?• Are there any major changes to your plan or procedures that

you’re considering?• Do you have any best practices to share with other agencies that

could help them in their reconstitution planning efforts?• Agency specific challenges to share?

Table Brief-outs

Exercise Hot Wash Discussion

50

Resourceswww.colorado.feb.gov

Additional COOP Resources

http://www.fema.gov/continuity-operations

Business Continuity Planning suitehttps://www.ready.gov/business-continuity-planning-suite

51

Closing Remarks

Please look for, and respond to, the Feedback Survey email

https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/2017_Mile_High_DICE_Participant_Survey

Thank you!