cleveland metropolitan school district: developing a...

Cleveland Metropolitan School District:Developing a School Turnaround Strategy

To Help All Students Achieve

Final DraftAugust 2009

This work was commissioned by Dr. Eugene Sanders, CMSD’s Chief Executive Officer, andfunded by The Cleveland Foundation. This School Turnaround Strategy project is part of a

larger planning initiative within CMSD, called the Strategic Development Initiative.

1CMSD Strategic Development Initiative – School Turnaround Strategies

Every student mustthrive.Every opportunity forimprovement must beseized.

SCHOOL TURNAROUND IN CLEVELAND: WHAT IS IT, AND WHY NOW?

Cleveland Metropolitan School District (CMSD) recognizes that school turnaround effortsacross the country are gaining traction and beginning to produce significant results. Doing thiswork at scale, however, has been an ongoing challenge. To support CMSD’s goal to become apremier school district in the United States, CEO Dr. Eugene Sanders noted in his annual 2009State of the Schools Address: “Every school must excel. Every student. Every school. EveryNeighborhood. Every student must thrive. Every opportunity for improvement must beseized.”

With a significant number of under-performing schools in the district, as well as high-performing schools that help large numbers of students excel academically, CMSD embracesthe turnaround challenge as a necessary next step to reaching its goal. Of the 102 schools inCMSD, more than half are rated in Academic Watch or Emergency. Thirty schools are in yearthree or higher of School Improvement, which is considered the first year of Corrective Actionunder the state’s accountability system. Ten schools were identified by CMSD and theCleveland Teachers’ Union (CTU) as “Turnaround Schools” becausethey have five or more years in School ImprovementStatus. And another 17 schools – 15 high schools –willjoin this designation in 2009-10.

This report attempts to define the policy andaccountability environment within which CMSD willdo this work, lay out a research framework of whatis known about the opportunities and challenges ofschool turnaround and provide recommendations forhow CMSD can realize success.

What is School Turnaround? The research on turningaround persistently low-performing high poverty schools increasinglyindicates that dramatic transformational action – not school improvement planning – isrequired to turn a school to a high-performing, high-poverty school in an urgent time frame.School turnaround is not just about moving a low-performing school from the bottom of theachievement categories—it’s about putting it on track to become consistently high-

performing.

Urban districts across the country – includingChicago, Washington, New York – have resortedto bold district-wide initiatives because manyschools were able to make only incremental gainsthrough traditional school improvement methods.These districts are seeing student achievementgains over time. Each has embraced a district-wide high-performance approach. Understandingthe characteristics, culture, expectations,operations and the talented people who makehigh-poverty schools function at high levels iscritical to creating a successful strategy forCMSD.

CMSD Profile• 50,078 students• 102 schools• More than 50% of CMSD schools in

Academic Watch or Emergency• 100% economically disadvantaged• Median household income: $22,127• 84.3 % minority

Turnaround Schools• 10 designated Turnaround schools• 17 more to fall into the category in

2009-10


Cleveland’s work ahead is about setting a course of differentiated strategies,interventions, supports and autonomies that will enable all schools to become and stayhigh performing.

This report lays out the rationale, research and context for moving ahead with turning aroundlow performing schools in Cleveland. Conclusions from this work support the following forconsideration:

Recommendations

1. Turnaround strategy has to be embedded in a district-wide transformationplan that supports every CMSD school to become a high-performing school.

2. Employ a hybrid set of strategies that include closure, transformation,support and new schools that are clustered into zones.

3. Work to build a partnership with the Cleveland Teachers Union toaccomplish reform on behalf of students.

4. Redesign the approach to the district’s human capital pipeline.

5. Use strong curriculum and teaching practices.

6. Plan and conduct an ongoing communication and engagement plan.

7. Organize district office and personnel to support success.

8. Enlist additional external partners in executing the plan.

9. Secure ongoing policy support to identify state and local levers as well asfunding sources that will support the work.


THE CASE FOR CHANGE

The rationale for action is clear. CMSD must not only act to address its low performing schoolsto better serve the students of Cleveland, a number of factors have combined to make thisthe right time to implement significant change.

• CMSD must act as demanded by law. NCLB and Ohio’s school accountability systemrequire CMSD to make changes as a consequence of persistent low performance of itslowest performing schools.

• The Obama Administration’s emphasis on education and real change in what weexpect of students, teachers, schools and educational leaders provides a uniqueopportunity to make changes that are fundamental to moving the district forwardstrongly and well. The support of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Actfunding supports this work in unprecedented ways.

• The economy of the region is dependent upon talent, and CMSD students aredependent upon the local economy. Preparing students to participate in the localeconomy in ways that give them real choices is critical for each student and the futurevitality of the region.

• It is the right thing to do. CMSD must devise a strategy that provides a way forward tohigh performance because the students of Cleveland need the schools to help morefully develop their talents and potential.

THE CLEVELAND CONTEXT FOR TURNAROUNDCleveland’s turnaround schools fit the classic profile of such schools across the country: Eachand every one of them is serving high concentrations of students living in poverty, and eachand every one of them is chronically and acutely low-performing. Table 1 brings this realityinto sharp relief: In the typical CMSD turnaround school, more than nine in 10 students areimpoverished; the school is in a state of academic emergency; and performance has laggedfor at least five years.

Table 1: Partial Profile of CMSD K-8 Turnaround Schools

School

EconomicallyDisadvantaged

Students School DesignationSchool Improvement

StatusAlbert Hart 96 % Academic emergency Improvement Year 6Andrew J.Rickoff

89 % Academic emergency Improvement Year 6

Audubon 91 % Academic emergency Improvement Year 5Buhrer 93 % Academic emergency Improvement Year 5Carl & LouisStokes


Joseph M.Gallagher


Luis MunozMartin


Nathan Hale 91 % Academic emergency Improvement Year 7Patrick Henry 92 % Academic emergency Improvement Year 5Wilbur Wright 94 % Academic watch Improvement Year 5


The strong link between high poverty and low performance in CMSD is evident in schoolsacross the state of Ohio and in every other state in the union.

THE STATE OF OHIO POLICY CONTEXT FOR TURNAROUNDFor more than a decade, the State of Ohio has embraced standards-based reform,implementing high expectations, assessment and accountability measures for students,schools and districts. The advent of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) brought a new and differentlandscape to education policy. Ensuring that every student’s achievement matters and thatthe performance of all schools and districts counts is the foundation of NCLB. Closingachievement gaps while preparing students for success in college and careers by the timethey graduate high school has become the state’s most critical education goal.

Student Achievement ResultsAs a result, Ohio student achievement has grown significantly. Ten years ago, Ohio wasranked in the middle of the pack among states, and now it is ranked in the top six accordingto Quality Counts 2009, an annually published report from Education Week. Nationwide, thedisparity in achievement between white students and students of color and students fromadvantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds is profound—and must be closed. A recent studyfrom McKinsey & Company stated, “These educational gaps impose on the United States theeconomic equivalent of a permanent national recession.”1

At a time when Ohio’s achievement is rising steadily, urban public school districts like CMSDstruggle. Statewide, the performance index score has increased 25 percent – from 72.7 to92.3 -since the measure was introduced in 1999-2000. Cleveland’s performance index is 72.1.While the four-year cohort high school graduation rate for the state of Ohio is 74.7 percent,and districts that are demographically similar to Cleveland average 73.6 percent, inCleveland, the graduation rate is 61.9 percent. 2

CMSD has a great deal of work to do to assist students in being successful with the Ohio Core—a graduation requirement for all students beginning with the class of 2014—and on theplanned college- and career-ready measures that will set a new and higher target for allstudents (see appendix B for more information). Ohio higher education institutions—includingcommunity colleges—have determined that a score of 18 in English language arts and a scoreof 22 on the mathematics exam mean that a student is ready for entry-level courseworkwithout the need for remediation. Yet, this year, CMSD students who took the ACT averaged a16.3 ACT composite score. For Ohio the composite average was 21.7 for all students, but only17.1 for African American students. 3 Disturbingly, according to the ACT, students scoringbelow 20 on ACT (proficiency is 22) cannot solve two- to three-step math problems, such asrate, proportion, tax added and percentage off. Nor can they identify the main idea in aparagraph.

School & District Accountability PoliciesEvery public school and school district is required to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) asdefined by NCLB as well as the state accountability system. Ohio has a timeline for ensuring

1 The Economic Impact of the Achievement Gap in America’s Schools, McKinsey & Company, April 2009, www.mckinsey.com/achievementgap2 Ohio Department of Education 2007-08 State & District Report Cards, www.ode.ohio.gov3 The Foundation is Set: Using the Date You Already Receive to Support a P-16/20 Initiative Presentation, ACT OhioOffice, Gahanna, OH, 200


that all students will meet or exceed Ohio’s proficient level of academic achievement inreading/language arts and mathematics, not later than 2013-14. Determinations of schooldistrict and school building designations are made on the base of multiple measures.Beginning in 2011, the state will also have the authority to take over districts due to lowperformance.

Of the 102 schools in CMSD, more than half are rated in Academic Watch or Emergency, thetwo lowest categories of performance (as measured by the Ohio Department of Education2007-08 School Year Report Card). Seventy schools are designated in School Improvement fortwo years or more. Thirty of these are in year three or higher, which is considered the firstyear of Corrective Action under the state’s accountability system. In addition, there are 10schools identified by CMSD as “Turnaround Schools” because they have five or more years inSchool Improvement Status. And there are another 17 schools – 15 of them high schools – thatwill join this designation in 2009-10.

School & District GovernanceThere are two levels of governance policy that are critical to the CMSD context: Mayoralcontrol of the district and governance options for school buildings.

A number of medium and large urban districts across the country making substantial progresson education reform and student achievement are under mayoral control. Leaders in severalof those districts – such as Chancellor Michelle Rhee of the District of Columbia and DeputyMayor of New York Dennis Walcott – recently appeared on a panel together and agreed thatthe policy set involved in this type of governance provides for tight alignment of vision, policydevelopment and governance between the superintendent, school board and mayor thatsignificantly increased the chances for successful, dramatic reform. They also agreed thatwhile mayoral control is helpful, it is not in and of itself sufficient to the goal. Both panelists,along with Louisiana Commissioner of Education Paul Pastorek, indicated that dramaticreform is accomplished only when the policy and governance structure is used in concert withsignificant political will, a sense of urgency and the conviction to persistently pursue effortsthat are in the primary interest of student learning.4

CMSD is one of a select number of districts in the country that is under mayoral control as aresult of past state intervention (Sub H.B. 269 122nd Ohio General Assembly). 5 As such, it hasopportunity to apply to the state superintendent for waivers from state administrative rulesadopted under Title 33 of the Revised Code. He or she must take action and provide within 30days and approve the request if he/she finds it to be in the best interest of the district’sstudents. Excepted from this are: rules of the State Teachers Retirement System and theSchool Employees Retirement System, rules pertaining to employment terms and conditionsfor teachers and nonteaching employees, and rules pertaining to special education. The state

4 Superintendents Discussion – Eliminating the Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gap in Public Education by Workingto Create an Effective School for Every Child, Nashville Education Summit, Sponsored by Vanderbilt University,Nashville, TN, August 14, 2009.5 In CMSD, the Mayor appoints school board members from a list generated by the Municipal School DistrictNominating Committee. Each of the nine appointed board members must be nominated by the panel, reside in theschool district and hold no elected office. Prior to their appointment, four of the nine individuals must havesignificant expertise in the field of education, finance or business. One of the nine members must reside in themunicipal school district but not the municipal corporation containing the greatest portion of the district’sterritory. The mayor appoints the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) with the concurrence of the school board. TheCEO serves at the pleasure of the board, with the mayor’s concurrence necessary for removal.


superintendent may also authorize the district to apply the state funds it receives for currentexpenses to debt charges on its public obligations.

As part of mayoral control, CMSD is required “to set goals for the district’s educational,financial, and management progress and to establish accountability standards with which tomeasure the district’s progress.” In addition, the CEO must develop, implement and regularlyupdate a plan to measure student academic performance and, with the board’s concurrence,to take “corrective action” within a school where measurements demonstrate students arenot achieving or not improving achievement at an acceptable rate. Such corrective actionmay include reallocation of academic and financial resources, reassignment of staff, redesignof academic program, and deploying of additional assistance to students.

The statute also calls for the CEO to conduct a public awareness campaign that includesinformation about the district’s ombudsman and other resources. In addition, the lawestablishes a Community Oversight Committee with members whose charge is to annuallyprepare a written report for legislative leaders addressing the financial, operational,academic and community issues of the district.

From a school perspective, Ohio provides opportunities for charter school operation, andthose opportunities were recently expanded somewhat in the biennial budget. Conversioncharters – within district models – are supported through the Evidence-Based School FinanceModel, and CMSD is eligible to create such schools if it wishes. This option is one oftenemployed when significant numbers of new schools are slated for opening.

The Role of Teachers & UnionsOhio has a long history of teacher unions and strong representation of membership. InCleveland relationships between the Cleveland Teachers Union and the district havesometimes been strained, but there have been strong points of collaboration. Each hasindicated their support for turning around low-performing schools, and each hasdemonstrated willingness to do so. While there may not be agreement on the details of themechanisms to accomplish the work, there is agreement that it is a high priority.

One of the more challenging issues facing CMSD and CTU as they work together on schoolturnaround is the collective bargaining agreement, which prohibits the assignment of teachersbased upon expertise and fit with the building. Unfortunately, some unintended consequencesof the current contract, along with other factors including district policies and practices,include high teacher absentee rates, particularly in under-performing schools. While this isnot a sought-after outcome of the contract, it is a disturbing consequence, and severelydisruptive to the learning environment.

Recently, legislation was passed moving teacher tenure in Ohio back to year four andinstituting other reforms intended to assure the placement and support of effective teachersin classrooms throughout the state. This new paradigm, along with the ObamaAdministration’s focus on incentive pay and linking student achievement data with individualteachers, provides an opportunity for additional discussion and collaboration between Ohiodistricts and teacher unions.

Funding & Resource Mechanisms for TurnaroundA variety of funding streams provide support for turning around low-performing schools,including Title 1 funds. Those are set to increase substantially on a formula basis due to the


stimulus package. In addition, the Ohio Department of Education’s guidance on the use ofthese dollars supports the purpose. But, this must be meaningfully integrated to accomplishthe goal with an eye toward long term sustainability. In addition, any Workforce InvestmentAct youth funds and other monies provided under the stimulus package could be leveraged aswell.

A focus on turnaround also positions CMSD well for competing for an Innovation Fund grant orto participate in Ohio’s Race to the Top proposal at the invitation of the state. It is not fullyclear yet exactly what funds under the Ohio Evidence Based School Finance Model might beavailable for spending outside of the pre-defined expenses. Detailed information on thestate’s full allocation to each district and interpretation of spending rules is expected byOctober.


BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN POVERTY AND ACHIEVEMENT:READINESS TO LEARN, READINESS TO TEACH, READINESS TO ACT

Our country has a long and largely unsuccessful track record in trying to break this linkbetween high poverty and low academic performance. Why?6

Much is known about how effective schools and these research lessons have formed the basisfor programmatic change for decades. However, it is far less clear how to move an ineffectiveschool from failure to success. The relevant turnaround literature differs from the vast bodyof literature about organizational change in general, which focuses on continuous,incremental improvement over longer time periods. Incremental change is important andarguably the correct strategy for good organizations interested in becoming great ones.According to the literature, however, efforts to turn around organizations that are failing onmultiple metrics require more dramatic change to become successful, and this change isfundamentally different from incremental improvement over time.

States and districts have again attempted to pursue a range of strategies to turn around low-performing schools identified under NCLB. A review of state and local efforts to intervene infailing schools categorized interventions into three types: programmatic, people, andconditions. By far, programmatic interventions are the most common. On the whole, theseefforts can be characterized as more of the same: That is, they have typically involvedramping up the kind of incremental change suggested by the effective schools literature.They involve stepped up efforts to procure more professional development for administratorsand teachers, curricular reform, adoption of new instructional practices, and the like. Lessoften do interventions focus on revamping and redeploying the human resources in thesystem—chiefly principals and teachers—in ways that support a comprehensive turnaroundstrategy. Few past efforts tackled the underlying incentive structures and operating contextsthat form the foundation for change. And rarely, if ever, is there comprehensive change thatincorporates all three types of interventions into an integrated system redesign.

The meager results that have followed suggest that this is a dead-end strategy. Trends on theNational Educational Assessment of Progress are static. Scores of schools have alreadyentered restructuring status under NCLB, and thousands more are projected to join them inthe next few years. The few schools that have managed to exit restructuring status underNCLB are struggling to sustain their momentum, and are in real danger of slipping back down.

The cross-sector literature on turnarounds shows clearly that it takes big changes inoperation to produce big changes in student learning. Developing these capacities tolearn, teach and act requires a fundamental shift in schooling, not another tinkeringaround the edges of reform. The tentative, fragmented strategies that typify schoolimprovement efforts are simply inadequate for turnaround. It is clear from pastexperience that pursuing programmatic changes is necessary, but nowhere nearsufficient. The time for timid action is long past. The time for bold action is now.The BenchmarkImplementing bold action to transform struggling schools requires a clear vision of success.Yet, there are no successful examples of turnaround at scale. A handful of large, urban

6 Though many researchers argue persuasively that the devastating effects of poverty cannot be mitigated byschool policy alone, here we focus on the problems associated with past school-based intervention strategies. Wetouch on some of the ways in which schools can and should partner with other organizations to address thesepoverty deficits throughout the review.


A growing caseliterature of high-performing, high-

poverty schools paints apicture of what

successful turnaround

districts have implemented promising strategies for turnaround. In a later section we describethe approaches of Chicago, Miami-Dade and New York City. Though these efforts offerpromising ideas and preliminary lessons, they are too new to be held up as blueprints forother state and district turnaround efforts. There is, however, a growing case literaturedocumenting the characteristics of high-performing, high-poverty schools that paints a pictureof what successful turnaround looks like.

So what do high-performing, high-poverty schools do that sets them apart? A recent synthesisof decades of research on effective schools, coupled with earlyexperience with school turnarounds in statesand districts across the country, suggests thatthey have several common features.

High-performing, high-poverty schools create teams and systems to provide the necessarysupport for each student in the building. At the center of Figure 2 is a set of convergingarrows that conveys this notion. To create and sustain these student-specific supports,these schools develop three core capacities: readiness to learn, readiness to teach, andreadiness to act.


Figure 2: The HPHP Readiness Model

Source: Mass Insight’s The Turnaround Challenge

Readiness to learn—Since students living in poverty enter school already well behind theirpeers, and that gap only widens over time, it is imperative that schools operate in ways thataddress these deficiencies immediately and consistently. Three school features supportstudents’ readiness to learn:

• Safety, discipline and engagement. A calm and orderly environment is a prerequisite forlearning. Without it, little else can follow. Students living in poverty face extremedifficulties, and the school environment often reflects this. High poverty schools that beatthe odds go the extra mile to support each child through each day and to create anatmosphere that facilitates critical connections between adults and students (see below).

CASE IN POINT: At Granger High School in Washington, a new principal started eachday by spray painting over gang-related graffiti that had damaged school property theprevious night. This simple, daily exercise sent a message that school leadership woulddo whatever was necessary to make the school a safe and welcoming place forstudents and staff alike.

And while they focus relentlessly on achievement in core academic areas, high-povertyhigh-performing schools employ curricula and instructional approaches that reflect abroad-based set of techniques, content, and experiences to engage and inspire eachstudent to learn. Indeed, focusing on learning and student achievement does not meandropping electives and field trips in an effort to get “back to basics.” Rather, schools thatbeat the odds have a solid foundation of instruction in literacy and numeracy and rich


opportunities to engage in arts, physical education, and other subjects that are oftenhastily jettisoned in an effort to raise test scores. Research shows that such robustcurricula, coupled with project-based and other learner-centered instructionaltechniques, are a critical element of success.

CASE IN POINT: A Norfolk, Virginia school posted big gains on state social studiesassessments after incorporating literature, dance, history, and cross-disciplinaryprojects about Mali, the birthplace of many students at the school, throughout theschool year.

• Action against adversity. Schools must counter the deficits students living in povertybring to school every day by offering nutritious meals, medical exams and services, andbehavior-based training that set students and parents up for success. High-performing,high-poverty schools partner with a range of social service and non-profit organizations intheir community to provide training and group facilitation around non-violent conflictresolution and other life skills. Oftentimes these schools employ social workers to workwith students and their families throughout the year. Others ensure that teaching staffhave human services training themselves, so they better understand the lifecircumstances of their students and have the basic skills to address them effectively intheir classrooms.

• Close student–adult relationships. Some researchers who study the success factors ofhigh-performing, high-poverty schools cite the ability of adults to forge close relationshipswith students as the single most powerful lever for exacting change. A high school inLowell, Massachusetts has adopted a range of policies to actively promote theserelationships: students loop with their teachers for at least two years; staff sits withstudents each day to eat lunch together; and the school size is relatively small. As aresult, students are reluctant to disappoint the adults in the building, because, as onestudent remarked, “they are like family.”

Readiness to teach—A readiness to teach means shared staff responsibility for studentachievement through strategies such as personalized instruction based on diagnosticassessment, flexible time on task, and a teaching culture that stresses collaboration andcontinuous improvement. Most of the effective schools literature and related reforms havefocused on this aspect—which is by all accounts necessary, and by most accounts insufficient.Three elements support a school’s readiness to teach:

• Shared responsibility for achievement. The entire community-students, parents,teachers, and often other community members- is intensively and relentlessly focused onraising student achievement. Adults are motivated to change their own behavior to betterassist students in reaching success. Everyone is accountable for success, and schoolleaders balance a no-excuses mentality for success with the need for flexibility in the faceof wrenching circumstances.

CASE IN POINT: When a student told a principal from a high-performing, high-povertyschool that he had not slept because his father had been taken to jail the previousnight, the response was “I’m sorry, study some more and we’ll give you theopportunity to re-take the test.”


• Personalized instruction. High-performing high-poverty schools organize instructionaround a short feedback loop of formative assessment, adapted instruction, furtherformative assessment, and further adapted instruction. The high-performing high-povertyschools employ the data-driven decision making techniques of typical standards-drivenschool reforms but do so with more intensity. They employ short feedback loops offormative assessments, adapted instruction, more formative assessments, another roundof adapted instruction, and so on. The assessments are highly targeted (often no morethan 4-5 items) and given frequently (sometimes weekly); results are analyzed by teamswithin a day or two; and instruction is tailored in multiple ways to address gaps. Smallgroup instruction, individual tutoring, and other strategies that explicitly address specificstudent misconceptions and learning challenges are immediately implemented after groupanalysis of student learning trends and individual cases. Assessment is seen by teachersand students alike as a critical tool for learning, rather than a disconnected chore orstressful high-stakes activity.

• Professional teaching culture. Teachers in high-poverty schools must work together andfunction collaboratively, focusing on formative and ongoing assessments of studentlearning, every week and often every day. Typical practices in high-performing high-poverty schools include professional learning communities, joint planning time, and groupreviews of student work. Leaders provide the time and support to facilitate these tasks,which are seen by everyone as a crucial part of their work, rather than an additionalobligation. And they offer team-based, school-wide professional development that isfocused directly on improving instruction and achievement and embedded in the data-driven analysis and adaptive instruction that forms the core of the work in high-performing high-poverty schools.

CASE IN POINT: A Brighton, Massachusetts, high school exemplifies this approach.School leaders have revolutionized professional development to support thedevelopment of a collaborative teaching culture that is laser-like focused on boostingachievement through frequent assessment and adaptive instruction. Instead ofcentrally mandated professional development offerings, the school relies on a site-based coach to help develop targeted professional development that flows out ofteacher-led inquiry teams who analyze student data in school-wide or curriculum-specific groupings.

Readiness to act—Leaders of high-performing high-poverty schools have the ability to makemission-driven decisions about people, time, money and programs. They are adept at securingadditional resources, leveraging partner relationships, and developing creative responses toconstant unrest. The ability to face the unique challenges of a chronically underperformingschool is essential in facing the turnaround challenge, and a significant distinction inaddressing their unique needs. Three elements support a school’s readiness to act:

• Resource authority—High-performing, high-poverty schools’ resource authority shows upacross the gamut of school operations: the daily schedule, often the annual schoolcalendar, the way teachers collaborate with each other and participate in schooldecisionmaking, the allocation of the school’s budget, and the very nature of instruction.Some have authority over hiring, firing and pay of teachers—the quality of whom isarguably the most influential factor on student achievement. Indeed, leaders in high-performing high-poverty schools routinely cite the ability to recruit excellent staffmembers is the single most important thing that they do. Charter schools that beat the


odds have this authority formally spelled out in their contracts; successful traditionalschools have leaders who insist on doing so within the traditional structure and arerelentless in pursuing creative ways to assemble a staff team that is dedicated to theschool’s mission and to the collaborative, achievement-focused work culture.

• Resource ingenuity—Principals and staff find every mechanism and tap every organizationor group they can to get done what needs to get done.

CASE IN POINT: In the so-called Benwood Initiative, which targeted eight low-performing elementary schools in the Chattanooga area, the mayor offered $5,000bonuses to any classroom teachers whose students’ test scores rose 15% or morehigher than expected. He also arranged for high-performing teachers to get low-interest mortgages.

• Agility in the face of turbulence—Principals and staff must find ways to overcome theconstant turbulence of a high-poverty, low-performing school—and be flexible enough tosolve problems that crop up each day. This agility is essential to tackle the endless streamof circumstances that conspire to disrupt a school’s readiness to teach and readiness tolearn. Responding to rapidly changing and difficult situations requires flexibility andpersuasion, rather than rigidity and adherence to narrow standards of operationalpractice. Research shows that a strong culture of accountability in the face of constantunrest helps establish the expectations among adults and students alike that everyone isworking together to tackle the tough work of reaching proficiency.


SCHOOL-LEVEL TURNAROUND BENCHMARKS

Readiness to Act Readiness to Learn Readiness to Teach

Resource Authority� School has authority to

chose & assign staff, setdaily schedule & annualcalendar, and allocatebudgets to focus onlearning

� School has authority toshape programs &instruction around theneeds of students

� School is free fromdisincentives such as fearof bargaining issues, andfree to offer teachersfinancial & non-financialincentives

Resource Ingenuity� Leaders engage business,

community and socialservice organizations toincrease support andresources

� Leaders are inventive atraising additional financialresources and using state& federal dollars tosupport their aims

Agility in the Face of Turbulence� Leaders continuously

adapt to and triage theneeds and challenges thatarise

� Leaders use flexibilityand persuasion ratherthan rigid standards &control

Action Against Adversity� School partners with

community providers tomonitor and serve studenthealth and human serviceneeds

� School provides explicitguidance for thedevelopment of goodlearning behaviors and lifeskills relevant to students’environment

Close Student-Adult Relationships� School & class size are

small enough to fosteradult-student relationships

� School maximizes contact& continuity ofrelationships throughadvisories, home contactand creative scheduling

Safety, Discipline & Engagement� School has safe, orderly

environment with well-defined but flexibleroutines and clear codes ofbehavior

� School has a well-rounded,engaging curriculum(around core focus on ELAand math, see in Readinessto Teach)

Shared Responsibility forInstruction

� All school adults share astrong commitment tostudent achievement

� Students & teachers areaccountable for studentlearning in rigorous waysthat also take account ofthe uncertainties of poverty

� Support, training andresources are provided inproportion to expectations

Personalization of Instruction� School has a robust

formative assessmentsystem featuring veryfrequent assessment &immediate feedback toteachers & students

� Assessment feedback isutilized extensively both topersonalize instruction andto adapt curriculum &classroom instruction forindividuals & high-needgroups

Professional Teaching Culture� Teaching capacity is highly

adaptive, good at problem-solving and committed tocontinuous learning

� Work practices relating tocurriculum, instruction,reviews of student workand PD are highlycollaborative

Source: Mass Insight Education and Research Institute


Authority overstaffing is often the

most criticalfreedom needed

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR TURNAROUND

Taken together, the high-performing, high-poverty school benchmark analyses, examinationof existing state and district efforts, and the cross-sector research that characterizes thefeatures of successful turnarounds suggest three guiding principles to shape Cleveland’sturnaround strategy. In brief, these reform elements include:

1) Create the conditions for reform. This element of a turnaround strategy is often themissing piece in supporting a school’s readiness to act in the face of turbulence, as well asin providing the necessary foundation to support teaching and learning. It is crucial toestablish the overarching operating conditions and incentive structures necessary to dowhat is best for students and their achievement. Turnarounds need flexible authority overcritical resources—people, time, money and program—and incentives that activelyencourage collaborative efforts to reach shared, clear goals. And the nature of theincentive system involves empowering leaders to act decisively. New incentives should bedeveloped that drive the investment of resources, the engagement of parents and otherschool stakeholders, the creation of specific accountability structures, and the publicpositioning of the turnaround effort among stakeholders in an urgent, yet positive light.

2) Build capacity. Turnaround is a people-intensive effort. Principals (or another turnaroundleader) must have authority to shape their internalstaffs with professionals who have the requisiteexpertise for the turnaround work. The teaching staffmust not only possess the needed expertise but alsothe willingness to change behavior as needed toachieve success. And districts need to integrate andorganize external consultants and service providers inways that support the implementation of turnaroundstrategies in every facet of the organization. Theimperative is clear to build the leadership capacity forturnaround, which is truly rare.

3) Cluster for Support. Autonomy alone will not do it—turnarounds need intensive districtsupport to succeed. Virtually all of the most far-reaching district turnaround effortsunderway today are using some sort of cluster approach. The clustering is often tiedtogether with each district’s portfolio of intervention strategies, involving different formsof school management.

Guiding Principle 1: Create the Conditions for Reform

Changing the operating conditions—particularly those related to resource authority andincentive structures— is the element of turnaround strategy that is most often missing fromcurrent state and district efforts. Yet, it is often precisely those conditions that undercut theprogrammatic or human resource reforms they undertake. It is not surprising, however, thatthese efforts are rare: They are the most likely to challenge the status quo and are the mostlikely to disrupt established bureaucratic routines and workplace expectations.

Resource Authority and AutonomyBoth the effective schools literature and case studies of high-performing, high-poverty schoolssupport the notion that turnarounds must be empowered to make resource decisions in ways


that support students and their achievement. Schools undertaking significant reform appearto have a higher chance of success when the district allows as much freedom as possible fromregulations regarding scheduling, transportation, discipline and curriculum. Case evidence

from outside education offers similar findings.

Increased autonomy to promote change is not a new ideain education; indeed, it is a hallmark of severalapproaches to restructuring under NCLB: converting intoa charter school or turning over management to aneducation management organization (EMO). The pointhere, however, is that districts can provide the kind offlexible operating conditions that can drivetransformative change by carving out specificautonomies, tied to clear performance goals, forturnaround schools in ways that mirror the termsarticulated in charter school and EMO contracts.

There are some case studies that suggest that freedom toact is likely to be needed but may not always benecessary. If turnaround leaders are required to workwithin the existing bureaucracy, however, there shouldbe an exceptionally strong leader at the helm of theschool. Research in the public sector reveals that withoutan extraordinary leader, lack of freedom to act quicklyand decisively can severely hinder an organization’sability to change. (We speak to the capacities andcharacteristics of successful turnaround leaders in thecapacity section.)

Though charter school and several other subfields ofresearch show the positive effects of school-levelautonomies, it is not always wise to devolve resourceauthority to the school building level. For example, if

strong turnaround leaders are in short supply, it does not make sense to concentrate power atthat level. Instead, a single leader at the district level could be granted the authoritiesnecessary to support the turnaround effort (see case study on Miami-Dade’s ImprovementZone). And, in any case, the role of the central office remains crucial. Even if someautonomies are granted to school leaders, it may well make sense to make some centralizeddecisions at the district level (e.g., mandating research-based curriculum). Boston’s pilotschools—originally a mechanism for creating new schools but now part of a statewideinitiative to turn around chronically low-performing schools in the state of Massachusetts—areoffered several operating autonomies but still function under district control, and staffremain part of the city’s collective bargaining agreement.

The authority required to make the decisions necessary for turnaround includes the ability toallocate resources of people, time, money and program in ways that are focused onsupporting student learning.

People—Authority to hire and fire personnel or to alter assignments and working conditionswas identified in multiple cases as the most critical freedom that influences effective

Resource Authority:

Contrasting DistrictApproaches

Miami Dade’s ImprovementZone

Turnaround schools in Miami-Dade were not grantedbuilding-level resourceauthority. Rather, schools inthe Improvement Zone weresubject to more intensive,centralized decisions aboutcurriculum, scheduling, andteacher training, enabled bycollaboration andnegotiations with the localteacher’s union.

Boston’s Pilot Schools

Boston’s pilot schools, nowpart of a statewide effortfocused on turnarounds inMassachusetts, are grantedfive autonomies: budget;staffing; scheduling;


turnaround. Further, there is a strong education research base that points to the primaryinfluence of teacher and leader quality in boosting student achievement. Ensuring that thebest-qualified staff to support the turnaround effort are assigned and empowered to do so isparamount (We discuss this issue in more detail in the capacity section.).

Time—High-performing, high-poverty schools often use time in fundamentally different ways.In elementary schools, students spend more time on core academic subjects. Teachers areempowered to spend regular blocks of time collaborating with their peers to analyze studentperformance data, plan instruction, and participate in focused professional developmentactivities. At the high school level, high-performing, high-poverty schools are quite deliberatein using time in focused ways, often by providing opportunities for bringing students up tograde level if they are behind. Successful secondary schools often have implemented radicalchanges to their weekly and annual calendars in order to support student learning.

Money—Implementing a school turnaround plan often requires control over the school budget.Without the ability to prioritize and invest resources in ways that support the turnaroundeffort, turnaround leaders must be exceedingly entrepreneurial in leveraging externalresources and funding streams.

Program—With support from district and other partners, turnaround leaders should have theauthority to shape instructional and other academic programs in their buildings in ways thataddress the specific needs and interests of the students and complement other programsoperating under the same roof.


Figure 4 depicts this idea of applying the concepts of these outside-the-system approaches tothe operation of turnaround schools within the district’s purview.

Figure 4

Source: Mass Insight’s The Turnaround Challenge

IncentivesThe nature of the incentive system should empower leaders to act decisively— not in theincremental fashion that typify past efforts. States and districts will likely have to create themechanisms to support these incentives, since the implementation of the NCLB restructuringrequirements have shown a clear tendency to choose the path of least resistance. A host ofnew incentives can be created, ranging from the provision of additional funds to schoolswilling to take on bold turnaround strategies to intensive efforts to mobilize parent andcommunity groups in support of turnaround work. In crafting a set of incentives that push allpieces of the system to support change, positioning the turnaround challenge and associatedintervention strategy is an important and ongoing task. Communicating the message thatturnarounds are valued and supported rather than blamed or stigmatized is especiallyimportant, both for internal planning and implementation and for external public relationsand messaging.

Guiding Principle 2: Build Capacity

Key to successful turnaround is marshalling and developing the necessary human andorganizational resources. Capacity building is required across the system for effectiveturnaround. We focus here on principals, teachers, external service providers and communitymembers.


PrincipalsResearch suggests that the turnaround leader – principals or a person at the district level – isoften the determining factor for a turnaround’s success or failure. Most often, a new leader isrequired for a successful turnaround: The business literature shows that 70% of successfulturnarounds included changes in top management.

This cross-industry research also shows that successful businesses that replace top leaders arealmost twice as likely to replace them with someone from outside the organization, ratherthan an insider.

New leaders who are recruited from outside the school offer a fresh perspective on itsstrengths and weaknesses. This cross-sector research on turnaround leaders in schools andother arenas provides guidance on what turnaround leadersneed to know, what they need to be able to do, and how toselect leaders with those characteristics even if they lackspecific turnaround experience.

What turnaround leaders need to know. The research isclear that turnaround leaders must have a handle on thefactors that promote effective schools. These are more orless the general principles that underlie standards-basedreform: adherence to standards and high expectations;curricula aligned to those standards; professional staff whoare skilled in delivering instruction that supports students tomeet those standards; ongoing formative assessment; professional development designed topromote standards-based instruction; strong leadership; strong parent and communitypartnerships; and intensive support for students struggling to meet standards.

What turnaround leaders need to be able to do. Successful turnaround leaders engage acommon set of actions. There are two specific actions that appear to stand out from theothers in both the frequency with which they appear in the literature and their centrality tothe turnaround process: concentrating on achieving a few, tangible wins in year one, andimplementing strategies even when they require deviation from current organizationalpolicies.

• Get quick wins. A striking element of the research on turnarounds is that successfulturnaround leaders use speedy, focused results as a major lever to change theorganization’s culture. Success begets success; specifically, the early and tangiblewins can serve as a catalyst for additional positive change. Through a rapid process oftrial and error in which unsuccessful tactics are dropped and new strategies are tried,successful turnaround leaders figure out what actions will get rapid, large results andthen increase those activities. Examples from the case literature include improving thephysical plant by cleaning up debris and painting walls, ensuring that students haverequired materials and supplies at the beginning of the school year, significantlyreducing discipline referrals by altering class transition schedules, and reducingtruancy by locking superfluous entrances and communicating to parents that theschool day is protected instructional time.

The turnaroundleader is often thedetermining factor

for success orfailure. Most


• Deviate from the norm. A second trait of successful turnaround leaders is an ability todeviate from organizational policies in order to stoke “productive conflict.” Thisaction enables the leader to call for change, create opportunities to do thingsdifferently and communicate that the status quo is not acceptable. Examples includeadjusting teachers’ and paraeducators’ schedules to align with late buses to createopportunity for additional one-on-one instructional time; carving out additional timefor instruction, either by reallocating the school day or creating additional timebeyond the school day; and assigning assistant principals and instructional assistantsworking in the main office to work in classrooms.

Other specific actions in which successful turnaround leaders engage include:

• Analyze performance data and solve problems. Turnaround leaders pay vigorousattention to collecting and personally analyzing organizational performance data,especially in the early stages. Then, they make specific action plans based on whatthose data reveal. Recent case studies in five states—including Ohio—show thatintensive data-driven decisionmaking, combined with the use of benchmarkassessments and additional tutoring for struggling students, helped schools exit NCLBrestructuring status.

• Drive for results. Turnaround leaders require all staff to change, rather than making itoptional. Driving for results also involves making necessary but limited staffreplacements. Successful turnaround leaders tend to focus staff replacement on asmall number of staff members whose continued participation may hinder changeefforts. Another aspect of driving for results is funneling more time and money intosuccessful tactics while halting unsuccessful tactics. While celebrating small successesalong the way, effective leaders act in relentless pursuit of goals, rather than toutingprogress as ultimate success.

• Leverage influence. In successful turnarounds, leaders use influence to win thesupport of both staff and external stakeholders for the changes the organizationneeds. This involves communicating a positive vision for future results, and helpingstaff personally see and feel the problems their “customers” face.

CASE IN POINT: A turnaround principal reported accomplishing this by challengingher teachers to look at their class lists before the school year started and identifythe students they did not think they could teach how to read. The principalreported that she leveled this challenge to help the teachers see the effect theycan have on students and communicate her expectations. At the same time, shecommitted to providing the teachers with the support they would need to succeed.Teachers reported that this simple question was extremely potent and stuck withthem long after the faculty meeting.

Another crucial action: getting key influencers to support change and silencingnaysayers indirectly by showing speedy successes. Such early wins make it harder foropponents to gain traction.

• Measure and report. Multiple principals in successful school turnarounds identifiedsharing data on a regular basis as a key means to identify practices that were workingwell and, alternatively, those that were not working. Rather than regarding the


sharing of data as a means to criticize or punish, teachers reportedly grew to dependupon open discussions about data as a key means to improve their practice. Onespecific tactic is gathering staff in frequent open-air meetings, requiring all to discloseresults and to solve problems. Intensive tutoring for struggling students identifiedthrough deep data analysis of student results seems related to successful turnaroundas well.

How to select turnaround leadersIt is likely that there will be few leaders with established track records in school turnaround.However, the research base on what successful turnaround leaders need to know and be ableto do provides clues as to what districts should look for in potential turnaround leaders:

• A track record of leading significant, speedy change where many barriers to successexisted; changes may be more focused than whole-school change but should have involvedinfluencing other people and introducing new practices inconsistent with current“policy;”changes should have been significant (not just incremental improvements to anexisting activity).

• A track record of using some or most of the actions common to successful turnarounds(described above).

• Both start-up and managerial success competencies, including the very highest level ofteam leadership needed to implement change and the ability to communicate acompelling vision.

• A solid understanding of research about effective schools (also described above) and theability to describe how it applies to children who have not been successful learnerspreviously.

TeachersProfessional teaching staff plays a crucial role in all schools, and their role is no lessprominent in turnaround contexts. The turnaround research touches on several issues relatedto teachers: their role in developing and sustaining a culture shift; the union role inpartnering with the district to support a turnaround effort; and the effects of teacherreplacement, or reconstitution, in turnaround schools.

Culture Shift—One of the most important things that turnaround leaders do is to shatter oldways of thinking and create a collaborative team culture that is focused on meeting the needsof every student in the school building. The teachers must participate fully in this process if itis to work, and it is their responsibility to make the cultural changes come alive in theirclassroom teaching every day in ways that support all students’ achievement. Creating atransparent and widely-shared dialogue about student progress, and what is working and notworking in the classroom to support that progress, is the key to this cultural shift.

The primary methods of changing culture are additional training and improvedcommunication.

CASES IN POINT: Turnaround schools in San Francisco, for example, grouped teachers intocohesive work groups in which they could collaborate around a common vision. Newprincipals in Houston encouraged teachers within grade levels to coordinate lessons and


homework assignments. In Baskin ElementarySchool in Texas, teachers and administratorscredit regular public conversations aboutclassroom practice and student achievementwith changing organizational norms andpractices in their turnaround effort. Theteachers plan together and share ideas as wellas resources. They also visit one another’sclassrooms to ask questions and offer advice.

The case of Broad Acres Elementary school inMontgomery County, Maryland, illustrates thepower of teachers in promoting a fundamentalcultural shift in low-performing schools. Though the main storyline at Broad Acres is abouta union-initiated partnership with district leaders to avert reconstitution, thefundamental change that led to the school’s turnaround was a cultural one. Teachersengaged in common professional development, participated on school leadership teamsand led study groups—all to lead the way to academic achievement. The teachers gotdistrict and school leader support, but it was teacher leadership that broke old ways andcreated a shared sense of responsibility and ownership for the school and its students.

Union Role—Unions are powerful players in turnaround efforts. The case literature shows thatthey can be a barrier or act as a crucial partner. In unionized districts, one of the biggestbarriers to successful school turnaround is often the ability to replace or reassign staff, as thisoften violates collective bargaining agreements. Similarly, turnaround leaders need to beempowered to deviate from organizational practice, and thissometimes bumps up against workplace requirementsnegotiated in such agreements. Districts with collectivebargaining agreements that prohibit replacement ofstaff and/or place restrictions on workplace conditions (e.g.,length of school day) may need to arrange in advance forwaivers or exemptions that would allow principals toreplace some portion of staff in turnaround schools whenneeded.

On the other hand, there are cases in the literature thatshow the promise of a district – union partnership inpromoting successful turnaround. The successfulturnaround work we just described at Broad Acres was borneof a union-district partnership. Likewise, the BenwoodInitiative in Chattanooga, described below, is another case inpoint. Turnaround work in unionized districts will almostalways require negotiating with union leaders, so the question isnot whether to work with them, but how to do so mostproductively.

Reconstitution—Another research area relevant to teachercapacity in turnaround contexts is the limited experience withwholesale reconstitutions. The literature in education andelsewhere is clear that while successful turnaround

Select staffchanges,

rather thanwholesale

reconstitution, is

associated

Reconstitutionin Chicago

As part of asystem-wideeffort to shoreup city highschools in themid-1990s,Chicagoreconstitutedseven of its low-performing highschools. Thebroader effort,includingreconstitution,was aimed atincreasingpersonalattention tostudents andfostering a senseof urgency toimprove studentachievement inthe schools.


almost always requires a new leader, select staff changes—rather than wholesalereconstitution—seem to be associated with success. Indeed, the case study literature supportsa staffing strategy that strategically mixes the enthusiasm and expertise of new staff with theestablished skill and local knowledge of experienced staff in turnarounds.

The limited experience in K–12 education with major reconstitution efforts—in San Francisco,Chicago and New York—has been hampered by a lack of capacity and obstructive conditions.Two common challenges arise: First, districts have struggled to find qualified staff to fill thepositions in the reconstituted schools. In practice, some reconstitution efforts have resultedin many of the same teachers in their original positions after the rehiring process wascompleted. And second, the timetable associated with the process has been too short. Typically, staff isdismissed at the end of one school year, and then interviewing and hiring is conducted overthe summer to reopen the school with new staff the following fall. A few short months is notnearly enough time to conduct this work well. In San Francisco’s district-wide reconstitutioneffort in the 1980s and 90s, researchers documented that when all teachers in a school wererequired to reapply for their jobs, the newly hired teachers were not uniformly moreeffective, and the wholesale replacement may have contributed to low teacher morale andinstability across the district.

CASE IN POINT: The Benwood Initiative that targeted improvements in eight low-performing elementary schools in the Chattanooga, Tennessee area is often touted as anexample of a reconstitution effort that has been successful. Upon closer inspection of thisinitiative, however, it is not likely that the reconstitution itself was the driver of itsimpressive achievement results. First, much like in other districts, the reconstitutionprocess resulted in many teachers returning to their previous positions. Moresignificantly, the reconstitution was part of a broader teacher quality initiative thatincluded pay-for-performance incentives, as well as heavy investments in teacherprofessional development, mentoring and leadership. Relatively few of the teachersreceived the performance bonuses, but analyses show that the effectiveness of theteachers in the turnaround schools (again, mostly the same even after reconstitution)increased alongside the student achievement gains. Notably, the Benwood Initiativeinvolved a true partnership between the district, its union leaders, the mayor and a hostof community organizations.

External Service ProvidersSuccessful turnaround efforts leverage significant capacity outside the system as partners.These external partners include a diverse array of providers, including universities, nonprofitservice providers, and sometimes for-profit school management entities. It is clear from theliterature that successful turnaround at scale will require substantial partnerships to succeed.

CASE IN POINT: Boston school leaders have developed a host of partner relationships tosupport their turnaround and related reform efforts: The local nonprofit Center forCollaborative Education provides coaching, professional development, advocacy andresearch for the Boston Pilot School Network; Northeastern University offers a principalcredential program for new city schools; and Massachusetts General Hospital supports areading specialist certification program, just to name a few. It is not unrelated thatBoston won the Broad Prize for Urban Education in 2007.


EMOs inChesterUpland

The experiencein this smallurban districtoutside ofPhiladelphiaoffers manylessons forengagingexternalmanagementpartners inturnaroundwork. InChester,progress washindered rightout of the gatewhen the callfor proposalsfrom externalgroups did notaccuratelyrepresent whatthe

Universities often play central roles inturnaround and related school reform work.University partners can play a number ofroles.

CASES IN POINT: In Philadelphia, the SchoolReform Commission in 2002 awardedcontracts to Temple University and theUniversity of Pennsylvania to run some ofthe city’s lowest performing schools.Another example is the TalentDevelopment Academy, a partnershipbetween the Johns Hopkins UniversityCenter for Social Organization of Schoolsand 115 high schools serving at-risk youthacross 15 states. Hopkins leaders partnerwith districts to bring the TalentDevelopment Academy model andassociated technical assistance andcoaching to help turn around chronicallylow-performing high schools. And, as wementioned, Northeastern Universityprovides principal training for Boston’spilot schools. The capacities withininstitutions of higher education are many,and can and should be leveraged tosupport turnaround.

Since one of the restructuring options underNCLB is contracting with education management organizations (EMOs)—for-profit groups likeEdison and nonprofits like KIPP—it is worth a closer look at the research on these groupsspecifically. Overall, the research is mixed on the track record to date. The effects onstudent achievement are not well documented, but so far results appear mixed or slightlypositive relative to similar gains in district-run schools. District experience contracting outschool management does show success in the area of improved school management.

CASE IN POINT: In Baltimore, for example, state, district and school leaders all identifiedimprovements to the physical plant as an important contribution by EMOs.

Market analyses in six major urban areas suggest that many of these groups would only engagein turnaround work if significant autonomy was granted around staffing, program, studentchoice and budget. Concerns about restricted authority in restructuring contracts, thedifficulties of altering existing school cultures and the challenging community politics ofschool takeovers appear to be constricting supply. Indeed, without the support of state anddistrict bureaucracies as full partners, these arrangements almost always fail.

CASE IN POINT: This challenge—and a host of others—was at play in the disastrous EMOexperience of Chester Upland, a small urban district outside of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania(see sidebar).


Lowcustomertrust is acommon

element inturnaround

Examining the experience with education contracting, there are several factors that influencethe success or failure of implementing this option. The most important roles required ofsystem-level governance at the district level are selecting an EMO, managing the contractingprocess, engaging the school community, and providing ongoing oversight of the EMO afterthe selection process is complete. Additionally, the EMO selection process must be rigorous(give it time; get community input; follow contracting procedures; conduct thoroughreviews); transparent (both with EMO candidates andbroader community); fair; involve communitymembers (especially during transition); andinclude ongoing oversight and accountability(clarity in expectations and capacity tooversee).

Leaders of EMO-run schools are akin to start-upleaders, and that research is instructive inhelping districts choose the right leaders forthese roles. These managers are successfulwhen they drive for results; solve problems;show confidence; influence others; thinkconceptually; lead a team; and are dedicatedto the organization. A start-up leader with an educationbackground may be the ideal, but this type of leader may not always be available. When thisis the case, the district may want to see evidence that the contracting group will provideintensive education training, a “chief academic officer” for the school, or a team ofexperienced educators working with the leader. After the start-up phase of an EMO-runschool, leadership may need to change because the necessary capacities to sustain progressare different from those of a start-up.

Community SupportThe case literature is littered with stories of failure that stem from a lack of communitysupport for the reform efforts. It is important to think about developing broad communityunderstanding and support for turnaround as a crucial element of a capacity-building plan.During the implementation phase of a turnaround, successful organizations frequently developa turnaround “campaign” to ensure that restructuring takes place in an environment that isreceptive to change. Low customer trust is a common element of failure leading toturnaround efforts across sectors. In schools, students, parents and the broader communityare all “customers” with a stake in school success.

The campaign needs to make it clear why change is necessary and allow staff and communitymembers to see the real consequences of failure. Unsuccessful turnarounds in retrospectoften realized staff did not understand the magnitude of the problem or the severity of thepotential consequences of inaction.

Research shows that key to successful turnaround is engaging parents and surroundingcommunity in a way that encourages them to become part of the changes in the school,rather than critical observers who watch from the sidelines. The resulting support appears toprovide the school with a better chance of success for turning its performance around.

CASE IN POINT: During its restructuring effort, Chicago school leaders engaged thebroader community by developing partnerships with grassroots organizations to help


TurnaroundSchools with New

Autonomies

Sacramento.Historically,Sacramento HighSchool had lowstudentachievement andhad experienced afurther drop in testscores in the yearspreceding itscontroversialconversion in 2002.Facing statesanctions, theschool boardelected to shutdown the schooland reopen it as sixautonomouscharter academiesin the samefacility. Although80 percent of theoriginal student

parents understand why reform would benefit their children. The group also convenedcommunity members at each school, so that the school-specific efforts had a built-inconstituency base. Chicago has also experienced setbacks in their reform efforts as aresult of poor community outreach; city leaders had to delay implementation of itsRenaissance 2010 initiative when community backlash over school closures reached afever pitch.

Guiding Principle 3: Cluster for Support

The idea behind clustering for support is simplythis: Turnarounds need to be grouped for supportand provided with the tools necessary for success.Clustering into “turnaround zones” involvescarving out space within the district bureaucracy.The role of the zone is to establish and oversee aseparate set of operating conditions, performanceexpectations and supports for turnaround schools(Figure 4). The zone empowers schools to makethe changes necessary for turnaround, whileoffering the support needed to succeed.

As we have suggested, in many ways, thisarrangement is not unlike the role a charterschool authorizer plays in ensuring school success.And although very few schools have chosen toconvert to charter schools under NCLBrestructuring, the early experience of newlycreated schools—charters and restructuredschools with special autonomies—formed as astrategy to turn around chronically low-performing schools is instructive in this context.See sidebar for a few case examples of charterconversions and charter-like conversions thatexemplify the kind of autonomies that in-districtturnarounds can be granted.

In the schools that have restructured in this way and have been operating successfully for afew years, a few things seem to stand out as important: a change in mission and culture;district oversight; money; the relationship with the district; and timetable.

Mission and CultureOften, there is major change in the school’s culture and a new mission that gives the schoolcommunity a sense of shared purpose. In such successful conversions, new administratorsguide change at the school based on an educational philosophy, and they focus the students,faculty, and curriculum on clear goals and objectives.

District OversightThere are lessons related to the district support and capacity it takes to create these newlyautonomous schools well. Research shows that districts in particular often struggle toperform the traditional charter school authorizing role well, and early experience with


district turnaround zones highlights the same challenge. Conducting this kind of oversight canbe done internally by the district, but district leaders must be willing to develop the capacityto do so. Alternatively, districts have also outsourced the task: Two major national studies ofcharter authorizing have found that authorizers with a wider geographic scope than a singledistrict, such as statewide authorizers, are capable of high-volume authorizing, which is tiedto higher quality processes.

Research indicates that the district’s most important roles are to choose the right turnaroundleaders, set expectations for school turnarounds within an accelerated timeframe, providesupport and aligned systems to turnaround schools, and allow school turnaround leaders thefreedom to implement necessary changes at the school level. Districts choosing this optionmust decide how much improvement is acceptable in how short of a timeframe and whatactions—such as replacement of the school turnaround leader—will be taken if a school doesnot improve rapidly. A great turnaround leader can effect a turnaround without districtsupport, but a sustained turnaround may be more likely when the district is involved in theturnaround from the start. San Francisco’s experience points up the need for ongoing supportafter initial implementation.

Support can come in any number of forms: project managers assigned to each school thatinterface with the district accountability office; business manager assigned to each school tofree up principal to focus on instruction; and providing systems alignment.

CASE IN POINT: Research on the University of Virginia’s turnaround leader trainingprogram suggests that district support may also include changes to align other districtsystems with a turnaround school’s needs, which may be critical for sustaining andreplicating successful turnarounds within a district. System alignment examples from theVirginia experience include providing financial reports at the school level, facilitating thetransfer of school staff who cannot help complete the turnaround, and ensuring effectiveuse of federal funds that flow through the district to the school.

MoneyMore money may help, but enhanced resources are not necessarily required to support asuccessful turnaround. The authors of the The Turnaround Challenge recommend investingbetween $250,000 and $1,000,000 annually in each turnaround school.

CASE IN POINT: Commentators on San Francisco’s unsuccessful later turnarounds pointedto inadequate funding as one cause of failure. And many promising district approaches tocomprehensive turnaround include additional funding allocated in different ways (e.g.,sending more resources to schools, or increasing teacher salaries).

However, a weightier bulk of documented, successful turnarounds across sectors (including,notably, public turnarounds) suggests that existing resources can support necessary change ifthey are concentrated on the factors that are most in need of change and offer the biggestpossible pay-offs.CASE IN POINT: Ethnographic case studies of school turnarounds in Virginia revealedmultiple examples of principals’ adjusting the allocation of fiscal and human resources attheir schools in order to align resources with new priorities. Indeed, too much money,and too many resulting initiatives to spend the money, can dilute the turnaround leader’sattention.


RelationshipHowever they are structured, newly formed schools must have the right relationship with thedistrict. School providers who have achieved the best success with previously low-performingstudents use very different approaches to instruction, staffing, scheduling of the school dayand year, parent relationships, discipline techniques, budget allocation and the like. Here,again, the importance of autonomy coupled with clear accountability for student performanceis clear. Establishing a proper mechanism for monitoring and evaluating progress to clear andshared expectations for student performance can be technically challenging. Performanceindicators must be explicit part of any such arrangement, and ongoing assessment ofstandardized test results and other indicators should be performed regularly in order to try todistinguish between growing pains of a start-up organization that are to be expected andmore fundamental problems that require remediation.

Part of the relationship involves clearly specified lines of responsibility. In studies of variousstate and district approaches, analysts have categorized the control over various aspects ofschool management and design as either “loose”—delegated to the school level—or “tight”—controlled at the cluster or district level. Districts have assembled turnaround plans withdifferent mixes of loose and tight control, which are partly described in the case examples.

TimetableThe case study literature on school reconstitution makes clear that districts who have closeddown schools in June and reopened them in August have often struggled with chaos and poorresults.

CASE IN POINT: A study of state implementation of the restructuring options under NCLBfound that few states chose the chartering option, in part because the timetable does notalign with their charter application process or hiring and firing decisions. Though startingearly or phasing in grades or schools over time are strategies that can help mitigate thisproblem, more time to plan the restructuring strategy also allows more time for people tobecome frightened of the change. As such, this transitional period needs carefulcommunication and management attention.


Every student mustthrive.Every opportunity forimprovement must beseized.

CMSD CEO Dr. Gene Sanders

School Turnaround Strategies:Recommendations to Cleveland Metropolitan School District

Cleveland Metropolitan School District recognizes the need to turn around its lowestperforming schools. The district has made a good start by identifying and clustering the tenlowest-performing schools into a zone for support and has been working with staff tounderstand the challenges and opportunities for growth within each of these schools. Thiscoming year, an additional 17 schools – most of which are high schools – are expected to fallinto this category as well. CMSD will be faced with 27 schools in need of drastic action.

These schools are persistently failing to meet minimum performance standards (AYP) andthere is not enough evidence to suggest that they can become highly effective schools in areasonable time frame without the district and its leadership making some very difficult butimportant choices. In an effort to assist with the next steps in this work, we have taken intoaccount the state and federal context, emerging best practices and research in schoolturnaround, as well as the conditions within CMSD to offer the recommendations that follow.

While these recommendations will hone in on the specifics required to transformpersistently low-performing schools, they will also suggest a framework for a district-wideapproach for immediate, decisive and scalable action. This approach is being embraced bymany urban school districts across the country that share CMSD’s challenges.

1 A TURNAROUND STRATEGY MUST BE EMBEDDED IN A DISTRICT-WIDE TRANSFORMATIONPLAN THAT SUPPORTS EVERY CMSD SCHOOL TO BECOME A HIGH-PERFORMING SCHOOL.

Each and every district leader that we spoke with, as well as many of those quoted in theliterature stated that the guiding principle for turnaround work is: For every decision, wemust fundamentally reframe expectations as always being what is in the best interest ofstudents. Leaders also relayed that the effort require bold action, courageous leadershipand a high level of persistence. Transforming schools is about achievingexcellence district-wide. In that way, it is part of thedistrict’s overall philosophy and every day work – notjust a strategy focused on a small number of schools.Whether students are bound for the military,apprenticeships, a job and workforce training,community college, or a four-year university, they needa strong educational foundation to get. Students willhave many careers throughout their lifetimes, and willbe called upon to continue learning, innovating andgrowing their skills throughout their adult years. CMSDschools should fully prepare them for that reality.

Goals for student performance should be anchored inabsolute performance, not a relative approach.Measuring incremental gains from last year or benchmarking to otherurban districts is unlikely to strike the right competitive target for Cleveland’s students.

We recommend that the district set absolute performance goals such as:


• All CMSD schools will achieve Continuous Improvement by 2015 and Effective by2020.

• Move at least two additional schools into Excellent rating each of the next 5 years.• Increase the graduation rate to over 90 percent by 2015.• Increase the CMSD average ACT score from 16.3 to college ready levels by 2020. 7

• Increase the number of CMSD students attending postsecondary education by 5percent each year.

Commit to bold, swift, decisive and unified leadership and action at both the systemand school level to reach the goals. The CMSD Team, Board, Mayor’s Office and criticalstakeholder groups need to be unequivocally committed to transforming the educationexperience for Cleveland’s children, and be prepared to expend significant energy andpolitical capital to make it happen. Change is always difficult, but the changes needed totransform the learning experience for students in CMSD must happen at both the systemand school levels simultaneously. This will make adults uncomfortable. It will meanbusiness as usual is over.

For example, Chicago Public Schools set the explicit goal to close 70 city schools andreplace through the development of 100 new, innovative high-performing schools designedto increase student achievement. District leadership in New York and Washington, D.C. setsimilar goals to set the stage for their action. Each leader communicated the goals clearlyand often, with target numbers for action and the reasons behind them.

There is no doubt, however, this work requires fortitude on behalf of district leaders,board members, committed stakeholders and the mayor. While these recommendationsmay be straightforward, they are certainly not easy.

Develop support strategies for schools at every level of achievement – includingContinuous Improvement, Effective and Excellent.There is not a history or evidence of schools turning around quickly on their own once theydrop into Academic Watch/Emergency. Therefore preventing that from happening, as wellas continuing to coach schools forward into higher levels of performance is key.

• Support continued success of schools in Effective and Excellent categories• Provide support, clarify and communicate expectations and intentionally monitor

schools in Continuous Improvement• Determine early in-district intervention strategies for schools in Continuous

Improvement that illustrate a downward trajectory from one year to the next• Identify and intervene in Academic Watch schools to halt their fall• Immediately deal with schools in Academic Emergency through strong and decisive

action.

Each school should not get the same level of intensive support as those chosen forturnaround; but certainly resources are limited. For high achieving schools, providing a listsupport opportunities that schools could take advantage of at their own cost, pairing themwith other schools in order to provide peer-to-peer capacity building, and shining a lighton their good work is meaningful.

7 According to ACT College Readiness Standards, students scoring below 20 on ACT (proficiency is 22) cannot solvetwo- to three-step math problems, such as rate, proportion, tax added and percentage off. Nor can they identifythe main idea in a paragraph.


Align district expectations, structures and decision making to support the work andcommunicate the expectation all parts of the system are needed to reach learninggoals. Map all work to student achievement goals. Communication throughout the districtshould emphasize a “no excuses” approach to reaching them. From district staff toteachers, principals, maintenance workers and bus drivers, the operations of the schoolenterprise should all be aligned to support student achievement. The building contractorshould be concerned about responding in a timely fashion to the principal’s need forpainting over gang tags or broken windows, for example, as more than just a cosmeticissue. This is an illustration to students that their school and they as students are valuedwhen people care enough to make their learning environment safe and clean. The same istrue for processing paperwork or delivering supplies: student learning goes forwardseamlessly and well because all in the system do their jobs well to support the work ofstudents in classrooms.

2 EMPLOY A HYBRID SET OF STRATEGIES THAT INCLUDE CLOSURE, TRANSFORMATION,SUPPORT AND NEW SCHOOLS THAT ARE CLUSTERED INTO ZONES.The scope of the problem in CMSD is significant. With so many schools to attend to –currently 10 with the likelihood of growing to at least 27 in the coming year that need tointervention due to their AYP statues - it is critical that the district take actionimmediately to categorize schools for closure, transformation, or support. In addition,CMSD needs to target the number of new schools it will open over the next 5 years.

We recommend that the district employ a hybrid set of strategies that includes bothclosing a set of schools and opening new ones, as well as carefully choosing andsupporting a number of them for turnaround using the tools of surgical reconstitution anddistrict charter conversion.

Choose to close a set of schools – perhaps 7-10, including some high schools - quickly.Identify those schools that need to close immediately based upon criteria agreed tothrough the School Facilities Utilization model, factoring in both building condition andperformance but also those key components of Readiness to Teach, Learn and Act. Schoolsthat do not have any of the core criteria for success in place are not going to besuccessful in turning around (see Figure 5).

The scale of CMSD’s problems is such that there needs to be sharp and decisive action ona good number of schools, so that those who have some of the critical strengths can besupported in ways that will ensure their success. These school-closing announcementsshould be made swiftly and prior to the end of the calendar year, so that requisite staffingchanges for the following year can be completed in the spring. Students would be assignedto other schools for the 2011 school year, or attend a new school that replaces the oldone.

Carefully choose those schools that are ripe for turnaround based upon the strengthsthey exhibit when assessed with the High-performing High Poverty Readiness toTeach, Learn and Act framework and cluster them into a Turnaround Zone.Use tools developed by Mass Insight to assist in this determination, both from a districtlevel perspective, but also allow the principal and teachers to work through the toolsthemselves to understand their level of readiness for teaching, learning and acting. If


there are some core strengths in 2 of the 3 readiness areas, the school could be ripe forturnaround and worth both the support and investment the district can provide.

These schools should be clustered together for support within a Turnaround Zone. TheTurnaround Office will specifically support the work of these schools and grantautonomies to them based upon their leaders’ capacity to carry out the work. If theleader does not exhibit the characteristics of strong turnaround principals, the districtshould reassign him or her.

Schools with sufficient strength to embrace significant autonomies should be clusteredtogether provided with as much decision making authority as possible, and heldaccountable for results. Clearly identified goals and benchmarks for performance as wellas support to achieve success must be in place. There may also be a cluster of schools thatexhibit some strong conditions for success, but lack core skills and capacity to implementhigh levels of autonomy. These schools should be clustered together within the zone andgiven much more support from central office, and have significantly less authoritydevolved to the school level that the schools that illustrate capacity.

Allow schools entering the Turnaround Zone some element of choice in process andmodel adoption and critical autonomies.If there is confidence that a school has some capacity and will to do what is necessary tobecome high-performing, the school staff and principal should have some measure ofchoice. If the school is determined to be in the Turnaround Zone, allow the staff to voteon whether they want to become a charter or have the school surgically reconstitute theschool and implement an established and successful program model. Surgicalreconstitution retains strong staff within the building, lets weak or ineffective staff moveon, and replicates a strong recognized program model. A set of school programs forschools to choose from should be approved by the district in advance based upon theefficacy of the model, the needs of the district’s portfolio and the ability to takeadvantage of scalable supports. This should be a very limited list of recognized high-performing models that have had demonstrated success in CMSD or other markets.

This allows two things to occur: if a school becomes an in-district charter, then there areautomatically more autonomies that come along with that. A charter managementorganization could be brought in to provide technical assistance and/or run the school onbehalf of the district if needed. If the surgical reconstitution model is adopted but doesnot prove successful over a short period of years, the district could then choose to closethat school or turn it into a district-sponsored charter.

Prepare and publish a Request for Proposal (RFP) for new school development inadvance of announcing the specific schools to be closed. Allow appropriate time forbidding interviewing and selection of models to be replicated within the district as charterschools. The process can take up to six months. Once specific school closureannouncements are made, CMSD can strategically determine which new schools will openwhere, and the Office of New Schools can manage the relationships and the process withpartners. Choose those organizations that bring capacity and experience to the district.Choices need to be made and communicated in the early spring in order to move forwardwell with the recruitment and hiring process.

Choose or develop partners to assist in executing school turnaround and replacement


strategies. CMSD must have – or gain – the capacity to execute the plan for the schoolturnarounds it chooses to pursue. How many schools can the district handle at one time?What is the real need? Through the Turnaround Office, there is foundational strength andstaff are building their skill set with the University of Virginia Leaders Program. However,there are many schools in need, and it will likely demand the support of an organization(s)specializing in school turnaround and human capital such as Mass Insight, New Leaders forNew Schools, and others. CMSD will likely have to “buy” additional capacity in order to beready for the schools that need serious attention in an urgent timeframe.


Figure 5Yellow indicates strategy is inappropriate or proven ineffective for lowest performing schools

Orange indicates appropriate for School Turnaround of existing school with some significant corecapacity for readiness

Peach indicates appropriate for School Turnaround with little or no capacity for readiness; School closesand another school replaces it in that location or another

SCHOOL CATEGORY ACTION Approach ReadyTo Learn

ReadyTo Teach

ReadyTo Act

ContinuousImprovement

SCHOOLSUPPORT

Access to BestPractice Models,Student Supportsand EmbeddedProfessionalDevelopment

Challenge and supportthe School to continuereaching for higher

High/Marginal

High/Marginal

High/Marginal

SurgicalReconstitution

Put “charter like”autonomies in place atthe building level

Replicate a strongmodel program

Marginal/Low

Marginal/Low

Marginal/Low

AcademicWatch/Emergency –where HPHPreadiness indicatorsare strong

SCHOOLTURNAROUND

Convert to Charterwith DistrictSponsorship

With charterautonomies in place

Bring in a partneroperator to buildcapacity

Marginal/Low

Marginal/Low

Marginal/Low

Open New School –with districtdeveloped program

Choose program basedupon replicating onethat works now, or is aspecific need within thecommunity and/orexpanding the portfolioof options CMSD needs

Low Low Low

Open New School –Replicate High-performing Model

Replicate high-performing model withexperienced andeffective organization

Low Low Low

Persistent AcademicEmergency – whereHPHP readinessindicators aremarginal or poor

SCHOOLCLOSURE

Conversion CharterOpen New Charter Replicate Model with

EMO

Low Low Low


3 WORK TO BUILD A PARTNERSHIP WITH THE CLEVELAND TEACHERS UNION TOACCOMPLISH REFORM ON BEHALF OF STUDENTS.CMSD needs to reach out to the Cleveland Teachers Union (CTU) to form an authenticpartnership to accomplish the hard work ahead. Students cannot learn without teachers.While relationships have sometimes been strained, the CTU and CMSD need each other’sbest efforts to make Cleveland schools premier. And, frankly, there is no time to waste.

President Obama is making strong moves on education reform, some of which are causingteacher unions across the country to rethink old ideologies. He is touting the issues ofmerit pay, high school graduation as a patriotic duty, linking student-learning data withteacher data as one measure of effective teaching and learning – and these have thepotential to fundamentally change the conversation across the country.

Against this backdrop, teachers unions in places like Memphis, Chattanooga, and Columbusare working with district leadership on the difficult issues of pay and evaluation practices.In Chicago the union and administration has worked together over a long period to movethe needle on student achievement and education reform.

Cleveland has an opportunity for both CMSD and CTU to show leadership on the set ofcritical priority activities if both parties choose to do so. With the new tenure changesin Ohio statute and a real emphasis on teacher effectiveness, fair evaluation and coachingfrom the Obama Administration the time is right for CMSD and CTU to work together on anew paradigm for Cleveland’s schools.

A number of high leverage actions would provide significant support for turning aroundlow-performing schools in particular:

• Agreement on strategic plan tenets for the district• Willingness to negotiate an umbrella MOU for schools in the Turnaround Zone that

includes critical reasonable changes such as flexibility in days and work time,ability to grant hiring authority to principals, ability to match teachers in thoseschools based upon the best “fit” not exclusively seniority, and other items thatare currently included in the Innovative Schools MOUs.

• Commitment to communicate well and authentically throughout the strategicimplementation of the district strategy

4 REDESIGN THE APPROACH TO THE DISTRICT’S HUMAN CAPITAL PIPELINECMSD’s human resources approach is not built for the challenges of today’s complex anddemanding school environment. In a nutshell – the old rules don’t apply anymore. CMSDmust attract the best, brightest and more accomplished to work in Cleveland’s schools –as well as retain the highest-level talent within the district. Conducting turnaround atscale and make the changes necessary to have every building become high achievingcannot be accomplished without the right people. Given the changes in Ohio tenure law,approach to “apprenticeship” for teachers, and other changes, there has been no bettertime to rethink the profession and how it operates within CMSD. Ideally, this would bedone in concert with CTU. Given the Obama Administration’s interest and support for thiskind of work, and the opportunities for leveraging federal funding, there is a basis for


collaboration and discussion in ways that previously did not exist.

Create an intentional identification, selection, training, evaluation and supportprocess for school leaders that leverages key partners to build capacity in this area.• Establish a relationship with an existing urban leader recruitment and training

organization already operating at the national level (University of Virginia, NewLeaders for New Schools, etc.) to support the work CMSD needs to do. Theseorganizations have track records and have replicated their human resource andtraining operations to provide service in many locations.If the district wishes to create an organization with local partners, we urge CMSD topartner/contract with an existing national organization to establish leadershipdevelopment opportunities immediately for promising leaders within the district, withthe goal of having significant leadership training and support to develop theturnaround leaders and great principals CMSD needs. After the first year, determinewhether the contracted organization is working well, or if the district needs to buildits own organization with regional and/or statewide partners. The external providershould work closely and directly with human resources on implementing a newapproach to talent development. New Leaders for New Schools works directly withcharters and districts in this manner.

• Intentionally identify rising leaders within the district early and offer them long-termcohort training experiences with experienced training organizations.

• Recruit leaders from Ohio and beyond to the training and work opportunities withinCMSD.

Recruit, Assign, Develop, Evaluate, Coach and Retain Effective TeachersBuilding leadership matters greatly in accomplishing turnaround; effective teachingmatters greatly to student learning. Work directly with CTU to build upon the researchand recommendations provided CMSD from the New Teacher Project (see appendix).These include creating a new teacher incentive structure; changing some contractelements to eliminate unintended consequences at the school level; providing new andunique supports for recruiting, evaluating and supporting teachers and more. To assurethe most effective teachers will work in the Turnaround Schools an incentive systemneeds to be in place.

In addition, the district could decide to work directly with a national organization such asThe New Teacher Project or the Boston Residency program to build capacity andfundamentally change the approach to human resources at CMSD.

Work directly with the union to secure needed Readiness Elements, and if possible, to jointly structure critical contract changes/MOU for the Turnaround Zone schools. Suchchanges should include:• Ability to assign teachers to where they are most needed and to be hired by building

principals within the Turnaround Zone• Establish and expect a “whatever it takes” framework of operation• Create a meaningful and fair evaluation method that encourages and rewards success• Build upon the offered “opt out” provision offered by the union as a starting point for

conversations.• These items should be accomplished through negotiation if possible, but selected

portions may have to be done by other means if partners are not willing to commit.


This work should be accomplished with the goal of recruiting the best and brightestteacher candidates from Ohio and beyond and working to retain them over time. The NewTeacher Project (TNTP) has been working in Memphis for six years and this coming year,all human resource functions relating to teachers will be outsourced to them at therequest of the district. Two years ago TNTP recruited more than 6,400 applicants for jobsin the Memphis School District for less than 300 slots.

5 USE STRONG CURRICUM AND TEACHING PRACTICES. High quality curriculum with linkedstrongprofessional development and short-cycle formative assessments that inform instructionalpractice are critical elements of effective turnarounds. Curriculum on its own is notsufficient to accomplish the goal. But when combined with the other strategies discussedin this report and the recommendations outlined here, it is powerful. CMSD is encouragedto use a limited number of curriculum platforms – as well as the scope and sequenceprocess already in place – consistently across schools. This assists highly mobile children ingrounding they’re learning with particularly those with limited or developing teachereffectiveness.

Recognizing the critical role that strong curriculum and instruction plays in teaching andlearning, CMSD implemented a “scope and sequence” project over the past two years. Ledby the chief academic officer, the project included teachers and stakeholders in itsdevelopment, and continues to encourage feedback from teachers district-wide as to itsuse and refinement.

6 PLAN AND CONDUCT AN ONGOING COMMUNICATION AND ENGAGEMENT PLANThe communication planning must be intentional, ongoing and clear. It should includeboth internal and external audiences, so that all are aware of the changes and how theyare moving ahead. CMSD must create the vision of what a better future looks like. Thesesets of messages are the district’s touchstones going forward. Framing the effort up frontand continually reminding the public that the highest measure is “whether it is in this bestinterest of student learning?” is a powerful concept to be against. This could create awellspring of momentum for the work. It will also provide political cover for when thehard decisions come down the line.

Reach the community leaders and citizens through private meetings and public mediawhen establishing a clear vision for the future

• Clearly explain goals and actions• Preview what will be happening and the realistic growing pains that will occur in a way

that illustrates the value propositiono Will go through some difficult change in order to serve children exceptionally

well and give them great schools so they can succeedo link educational transformation to economic vitality for individuals and the City

of Cleveland’s future• Use influential community champions to assist the district in carrying the message• Position CMSD to “own” the message; not let it be co-opted by others in ways that are

counterproductive

Ongoing Communications communication must be targeted to the following audiences:


• CMSD Staff – district office, principals, teachers, support personnel• City Leaders• Students• Parents• Stakeholders• Funders• Business Community• News Media• Others

Engage key influential community leaders as early advocates and keep them briefed behindthe scenes.

Establish an ongoing communication dialogue with Cleveland Teachers Union and explore thepotential for joint public statements on turning around CMSD schools. Conduct engagementactivities at the school level with key stakeholders from the beginning - as schools areidentified for a category of action – even before the specific go forward decisions for thatschool have been determined.

Publicly celebrate successes small and large and hold up successful existing schools as aharbinger of what the future can be for all of CMSD’s students. Secure the assistance of a firmthat specializes in campaigns to assist in creating and implementing the externalcommunication plan.

7 Organize District Office and Personnel to Support SuccessAs stated earlier in this report, all district personnel have a stake in this work and weneed to recognize it.Readiness to Act at the district level needs to be present in demonstrable ways.Turnaround leaders have indicated that to be most effective, key district personnel atlevels below the CEO need to be empowered to make decisions within a specified set ofparameters. This is especially true of those dedicated to School Turnaround. CMSD shouldassess the decision making parameters and structure within the district to assure theproper autonomies set the district and its schools up for success. In addition, the districthas some very strong and capable people within central office leading this work.Consideration should be given to increasing capacity to support schools through strategicaddition of personnel to assist these leaders in supporting the turnaround schools.

CMSD has made a good start toward preparing for turning schools around by bothestablishing the Turnaround Schools as a cluster and creating a dedicated staff person tomanage.

Developing clear lines of authority and responsibility for decision making, incorporatingthe ongoing use of evidence and processes that ensure upper level leaders arecomfortable that the needed due diligence has been done is important. In addition, clearunderstanding of the types of decisions that need to be forwarded up for higher-levelapproval is needed in order to support success. Without this in place bold action couldvery well revert to incremental change or worse.

8 ENLIST ADDITIONAL EXTERNAL PARTNERS IN EXECUTING THE PLAN.


A number of the external experts should be secured in order to maximize CMSD’sopportunity for long-term success. These include:• School turnaround expertise for necessary coaching• Strategy planning and communication support for plan implementation• Ohio School Improvement Process. Right, Ohio provides a team from a regional

educational Service Center to assist the district. CMSD is encouraged to explore apotential waiver of that process in favor of the state paying for hiring an experiencedturnaround firm

9 SECURE ONGOING POLICY SUPPORT TO IDENTIFY STATE AND LOCAL LEVERS AS WELLAS FUNDING SOURCES THAT WILL SUPPORT THE WORK. Cleveland does not have anindividual or a firm devoted policy analysis and development, and government relations.For a district this size, particularly one with Mayoral control, this is an importantcomponent. Particularly because the district in outside of the traditional structure and isunder Mayoral Control it experiences unique opportunities and challenges other districtsdo not.

The person in this role would monitor and manage policy process with Columbus and seekopportunities where exercising waiver authority or other mechanisms could benefit CMSDand manage ongoing legislative relationships.

There are a lot of federal dollars in play right now, and some of them are coming directlyto Cleveland. By aggressively pursuing a turnaround strategy, CMSD positions itself well fornot only the formulaic dollars it will receive via formula, but for the competitive dollarsas well.

However, at the state level there will not be specifically clear until October the exactdollars districts will receive through the new funding model. The new Evidenced-BasedModel rolls out and is implemented; we will know very quickly how much attention shouldbe paid there.

Cleveland Metropolitan School District has a unique opportunity tohelp the children of Northeastern Ohio gain the critical skills theyneed to be successful. It is a very tall order to serve so many childrenwell. CMSD cannot do it alone. But with the partnership and support ofteachers, leaders, community members, state officials and trustedexperts Cleveland can become a district full of high-performingschools and high-performing learners.


Appendix AMETHODOLOGY AND PRIMARY RESOURCES

This report relies on a research-based framework to conceptualize and organize acomprehensive strategy for turning around chronically low-performing schools. Theframework is designed to apply the lessons of research to aid CMSD’s efforts to turn around itslowest-performing schools.

We did not attempt to describe CMSD turnaround efforts to date. We have culled andsynthesized lessons and insights from research and related efforts across the country toinform CMSD in this area, and have prepared a series of recommended actions and approachesfor CMSD’s consideration. This report is intended to facilitate a discussion about best practiceand to gather insights about potential implications for moving CMSD’s work forward.

Our research framework is based on a comprehensive review of the literature related toschool turnarounds. The review taps research on effective schools, school interventionimplementation and effectiveness, organizational change and improvement, and cross-sectorresearch on dramatic organizational improvement in a range of public and private spheres.Appendix A includes a list of sources consulted as part of this review process.

The review benefits from, and relies heavily upon, two recently released, comprehensiveefforts to synthesize a range of literature relevant to turning around the nation’s lowest-performing schools. The Turnaround Challenge, published by Mass Insight in 2007, anchors thereview. The report was developed after two years of national examination of schoolintervention policy and strategies, a thorough review of the literature, and extensive externalvetting by a cadre of the nation’s leading experts in school change and related areas.

Since the publication represents such a thorough review, our strategy was to begin the reviewwith its framework, and then to test it by reviewing articles, case studies and policy reportsthat either had been published since 2007 or that were not highlighted in that publication.After identifying and reviewing this additional literature (see Appendix A) against TheTurnaround Challenge framework, we were convinced that it was an effective organization ofthe literature for guiding a turnaround strategy. Specifically, the case for change, benchmarkand guiding principles sections that make up our framework all take their cue from TheTurnaround Challenge.

We also draw heavily on a second recent synthesis called School Turnarounds: A Review ofthe Cross-Sector Evidence on Dramatic Organizational Improvement. This publication,developed by Public Agenda for the Center on Innovation and Improvement, covered much ofthe same material included in The Turnaround Challenge, but elaborated on the cross-sectorliterature implications pertaining to turnaround leadership capacity issues. Thus, we drawheavily on this review in our discussion of school turnaround leadership capacity issues.8

8 For ease of exposition, we do not cite these or other publications each time they are referenced in the text that

follows.


The research framework draws heavily on the following publications, particularly the MassInsight and Public Agenda reports:

Policy and research reviews:

The Turnaround Challenge: New Research, Recommendations, and a Partnership Frameworkfor States and School Districts. (2007). Mass Insight.

School Turnarounds: A review of cross-sector evidence on dramatic organizationalimprovement. (2007). Public Impact for the Center on Innovation and Improvement.

School Restructuring Options Under No Child Left Behind: What Works When? Reopening as aCharter School. (2005). Public Impact for Learning Points Associates.

School Restructuring Options Under No Child Left Behind: What Works When? Contracting WithExternal Education Management Providers. (2005). Public Impact for Learning PointsAssociates.

School Restructuring Options Under No Child Left Behind: What Works When? Turnaroundswith New Leaders and Staff. (2005). Public Impact for Learning Points Associates.

State and district case analyses:

A Call to Restructure Restructuring: Lessons from the No Child Left Behind Act in Five States.(2008). Center for Education Policy.

It Takes More than a Hero: School Restructuring in Ohio under NCLB. (2008). Center forEducation Policy.

Considering School Turnarounds: Market Research and Analysis in Six Urban Districts. (2007).Mass Insight for NewSchools Venture Fund.

Duke, D.L. Keys to Sustaining Successful School Turnarounds. Darden-Curry Partnership forLeaders in Education.

Rhim, L. M. Restructuring Schools in Baltimore: An Analysis of State and District Efforts.(2004). Education Commission of the States.

Rhim, L. M. School Restructuring in Philadelphia: Management Lessons from 2002 to 2005.(2005). Education Commission of the States.

Rhim, L. M. (2005a). Restructuring Schools in Chester Upland, Pennsylvania: An Analysis ofState Restructuring Efforts. Denver, CO: Education Commission of the States.


APPENDIX B: STANDARDS-BASED REFORM IN OHIO

Ohio’s Standards, Assessments and Student AccountabilityOhio embraces standards based reform, and has worked for many years to implement policiesthat support this approach. No Child Left Behind sets the minimum expectations andconsequences, with Ohio’s plan aligning with that framework to create a single statewideaccountability system that applies to all public school buildings and districts.

Academic Content Standards exist for early learning through grade 12 and lead to college andcareer ready expectations. Ohio Achievement Tests (OAT) are administered annually in grades3-8 and the Ohio Graduation Test (OGT) is administered for the first time in grade 10, with upto 7 opportunities for students to take the exam. Students must pass all five sections of thetest, as well as satisfy other criteria, in order to graduate.9 The OGT is based upon grade 10academic content standards, and does not align well with the skills and knowledge needed forsuccess in college and career.10

With Governor Strickland’s Education Reform Plan (H.B. 1), major changes are underway forassessment. Chief among them, the Ohio Graduation Test will be phased out in favor of asuite of assessments designed to certify that students are ready for postsecondary educationand meaningful careers. The assessments will include:

• A nationally standardized assessment in science, math, and ELA• Series of end of course exams in science, math, ELA, and social studies• Senior project completed individually or in a group.

The Ohio Core legislation enacted in 2007, requires students to this year’s 7th graders to bethe first to meet more rigorous graduation requirements in order to earn a diploma. OhioCore does not increase the state’s minimum 20 credits requirement, but does specify coursesin an effort to prepare more students to become college and career ready. Most notably, eachstudent must take at least four years of math (including Algebra 2 or its equivalent) and 3years of inquiry-based science with laboratory experience to graduate.

School and District AccountabilityEvery public school and local education agency (LEA) is required to make Adequate YearlyProgress (AYP) as defined by NCLB as well as the State Accountability System. Ohio has atimeline for ensuring that all students will meet or exceed Ohio’s proficient level of academicachievement in reading/language arts and mathematics, not later than 2013-2014.Determinations of school district and school building designations are made on the basis ofmultiple measures – the proportion of Ohio report card indicators met, a performance indexscore, adequate yearly progress (AYP) as defined by federal statute, and a measure based onindividual student achievement gains over time. Ohio incorporates the growth calculationonce grades three through eight reading and mathematics assessments have beenimplemented for at least two years. Figure 1 provides an overview of the way in which thecalculations are combined to determine each school building’s and each school district’sdesignation.

9 There is a provision to allow graduation while failing one subject of the test if students meet other academiccriteria.10 Do Graduation Tests Measure Up? A Closer Look at State High School Exit Exams, Achieve 2004, www.achieve.org


All public school buildings and districts are accountable for the performance of studentsubgroups - including major racial/ethnic subgroups, students with disabilities, limited Englishproficient students, and economically disadvantaged students – through the AYPdetermination, provided the subgroup meets the minimum group size requirement. Both TitleI and non-Title I school buildings and districts are part of the single statewide accountabilitysystem.

Beginning in 2011, state statute authorizes the Ohio Department of Education to activateAcademic Distress Commissions to take on the role of the district to determine necessarysupports, interventions and restructuring. State legislation created Academic DistressCommissions that can be activated when a district fails to make AYP and has been given thestate’s lowest accountability designation (“academic emergency”) for four years.

The state-assigned academic distress commissions are five-member teams who continue tooperate until the district has achieved the designation “continuous improvement” for twoyears, or at the discretion of the state department of education. Three members of eachcommission are appointed by the department of education and two by the chair of the districtschool board.

The academic distress commissions can be activated for the first time in 2011 and haveseveral important powers, including authority to appoint school building administrators andreassign administrative personnel, terminate contracts of administrators or administrativepersonnel, contract with a private entity to perform school or district management functions,

Source: The Ohio Model of Differentiated Accountability, Proposal tothe United States Department of Education, Ohio Department of


establish a budget for the district, and approve district expenditures. The law establishingthe academic distress commissions also contains provisions preventing collective bargainingagreements negotiated during the existence of the commission or adopted after passage ofthe law from interfering with the express powers granted the commission.

Finally, as part of NCLB, each state must have a system of supports to assist schools anddistricts in meeting acceptable levels of performance. Ohio’s proposal for a DifferentiatedAccountability Pilot was accepted by the US Department of Education and is in its first year ofimplementation.

The Differentiated Accountability Framework sets in place a series of diagnostic tools todetermine the level of support required for each district (high, medium, low). SchoolImprovement Teams from the regional Education Service Centers (ESC) have been trained andmobilized to support districts in this work, which is aimed at building district and buildinglevel capacity to solve student achievement issues. It is still unclear, however, how successfulthis approach will be for schools in deepest crisis, including Cleveland’s.


APPENDIX C: CASE EXAMPLESCASE EXAMPLESTo reiterate, no one district or state has a comprehensive, successful turnaround strategy.However, there are four leading-edge, comprehensive district efforts that recognize andattempt to promote the guiding principles outlined in this (and The Turnaround Challenge)report: Create conditions for reform; build capacity; and cluster for support. The specifics ofeach district’s approach, which vary considerably but include some critical commonelements, are highlighted in Table 2 and described in the appendix.

The table below provides examples of the ways in which four trail-blazing districts –Philadelphia, Miami-Dade, New York City, and Chicago – are creating the conditions forreform, building capacity, and clustering its turnaround schools. The lower two rows of thetable provide glimpses of turnaround strategies in districts that are more historically anddemographically similar to CMSD. These peer districts do not currently have comprehensiveturnaround strategies in place, and therefore cannot be considered as model turnaroundinitiatives. We draw out some promising practices from these localities to show how districtswith smaller population bases and fewer human and organizational resources are approachingthe problem in promising—if still piecemeal—ways.

Table 2. Select Practices of District Turnaround Efforts by Guiding Principle

Create conditions for reform Build capacity Cluster for supportChicago’sRenaissance2010 Initiative

Charter and Contract schoolscreate employee compensationscales, and employees canchoose whether to join union

All schools offeredprogrammatic and curricularflexibility

Charter and contractschools administered byapproved independentorganizations

Developing neworganization(“ChicagoRise”) tosupport initiative

Each school (mostlynew, somereconstituted) choosesto become a Charter,Contract, orPerformance School

Office of New Schoolswithin districtbureaucracy overseesand provides supportfor Ren-10 schools

Miami-Dade’sSchoolImprovementZone

Union negotiated personnelchanges in Zone schools:

(1) Several principalsreplaced

(2) Teachers allowed to“opt-out”

(3) Educator salaries 20%higher

Required pd hourssignificantly higher forprincipals and teachersin Zone schools

New associatesuperintendentoversees Zone schools

School ImprovementZone University andCommunity AdvisoryBoard provides support

New YorkCity’s ChildrenFirstEmpowermentStrategy

Devolves budgetary authorityand other autonomies toschools in exchange foraccountability for results;central bureaucracy reduced

Union agreed to changes inseniority, length of school day,and principal hiring inexchange for pay raise

An RFP process is beingused to develop amarketplace of externalservice providers whocan act as PartnershipService Organizations

Citywide training isprovided for using apowerful data systemto customize student

Each school chooses tobecome anEmpowerment School,partner with an internaldistrict LearningSupport Organization,or partner with anexternal PartnershipSupport Organization

District sets standards


Union agreed to new peermentoring program forstruggling teachers, and recentextension of this reform offersprincipals tools to removeteachers who do not improve

achievement analysisand adapt instruction

and holds schoolsaccountable formeeting them as wellas retains ultimatecontrol overemployment and otherdecisions

Office of PortfolioDevelopment overseesand supportsEmpowerment schools

Philadelphia’sDiverseProvider Model

Relied on charter conversionsand use of EMOs to changemanagement conditions andincentives

Site-based selection processfor teacher positions if 75% ofteachers approve

Partnered with EMOs,universities and otherpartners to run someturnaround schools

Schools choose tobecome either aPartnership Model(EMO-district sharedresponsibility), aCreative Action andResults schools (districtrun) or convert to acharter school

Office of RestructuringSchools oversees CARschools within district

Baltimore New Schools Initiative schoolsare granted autonomy overgovernance staffing andcurriculum

BenwoodInitiative inChattanooga

Heavy investments inteacher professionaldevelopment,leadership andmentoring

Partnership amongdistrict leaders, mayor,union, and communitygroups

Examining some of the practices of the four exemplar districts in Table 2, it is clear that eachgoes about implementing the three reform elements in strikingly different ways. It is equallyapparent that there is a shared foundation for success. Each of the four entrepreneurialdistricts approaches the work with a similar mindset for transformational reform and has afew core similarities in how they have gone about their work to date:

• Collaborating with the union—Exemplar districts collaborated and negotiated withthe local union to achieve crucial conditions-changing reforms around hiring,evaluation, hours and pay, and work rules. These relationships have often been rocky,but nonetheless there have been big breakthroughs in each of the districts that werethe direct result of union-district collaboration. The superintendent in Miami-Dadesuccessfully negotiated key changes to collective bargaining and other arrangementsto recruit and support excellent staff to Zone schools; the Ren-10 initiative negotiateddifferential pay and union membership rules for its contract and charter schools; New


York City struck a deal with its union to make changes to the seniority system andlengthen the school day in exchange for a pay raise.

• Building capacity—Comprehensive turnaround strategies boost capacity for itsturnaround schools in a variety of ways, typically with the help of external partners.Miami-Dade invested heavily in more professional development for teachers andprincipals; Chicago is actively building a cadre of external service providers to supporta range of initiative efforts, including school management; Philadelphia has engagedmost directly in partnering with education management organizations and othercommunity partners to operate select turnaround schools; New York City

• Investing additional resources—Often schools receive more money, in the form ofincreased teacher salaries, per pupil funding boosts, or other mechanisms. AllPhiladelphia schools in the original Partnership Model and some in the Creative Actionand Results Region received additional per pupil funding; Miami-Dade raised teachersalaries in its turnaround schools; and New York funnels more resources to turnaroundschools and empowers building-level leaders to use those resources to address theparticular needs of each school.


APPENDIX D: CASE STUDIES OF FOUR DISTRICTS

New York City’s Children First Empowerment Strategy

The Big IdeaNew York City Schools leadership—the chancellor and mayor—devised a comprehensive schoolreform strategy grounded in the idea of placing the needs of students ahead of all otherconsiderations, and “fundamentally rejecting incrementalism” as a school improvementstrategy.

How it Works By 2006, the city had designated more than 300 Empowerment Schools, which were offeredautonomy over resource allocation and instructional decisions, as well as increased funding,in exchange for accountability to significantly boost student achievement. The next year, themayor announced more reforms: further central office reductions and more resourcesdirected to schools; principals would become more empowered to shape their teaching staffs(via transforming tenure into an earned privilege rather than a right, and offering support toaddress low-performing teachers); and all schools were offered the option of becoming anEmpowerment School, or a few other governance options, representing different level ofschool-based control.

Curriculum and PracticeA broad set of diagnostic assessments are used four to five times per year to measure andanalyze student achievement, and to provide the foundation for adaptive instruction over thecourse of the school year. A web-based data management system will enable customizedanalysis and collaboration around effective instructional strategies, and intensive citywidetraining is being provided to support the use of the system in practice. NYC EmpowermentSchools-the heart of the Children First Initiative-have greater authority over instructionaldecisions.

Strengths and ChallengesChildren First was launched on a strong political foundation and attracted support due to itsbold and inventive approach. Its very boldness, however, is also a challenge: The risks arebig. The union has opposed much of the plan, but it did recently come to agreement on someissues related to seniority, the length of the school day, and the hiring of principals inexchange for a pay raise. Similarly, middle management within the district bureaucracy wasinitially oppositional, but has shown signs of cooperation after the creation of the Office ofPortfolio Development to help coordinate oversight and district support.

Miami-Dade’s School Improvement Zone

The Big IdeaMiami-Dade initiated a centralized plan to support its turnaround schools in a cohort ofsuperintendent’s schools (under then-superintendent Rudy Crew, who has since left thedistrict). The notion was to implement a rapid set of standardized reforms in the turnaroundschools to create a critical mass and to change the culture of the chronically low-performingschools in the zone.

How it WorksThe district leadership used longitudinal achievement data to identify 39 schools to enter the


zone—about half of which were elementary schools, and a dozen of both middle and highschools. Zone schools are required to adhere to strict, district-imposed guidelines aboutcurriculum, schedules, teacher training and other matters. At the same time, Zone schoolsare supported with higher teacher salaries, longer school days and years, more resources,support for students at key transitions, and intensive teacher professional developmentaround implementing the mandated curriculum. In collaboration with the union, teacherswere offered an “opt-out” of Zone schools, and nearly half of the turnaround schoolprincipals were replaced.

Curriculum and PracticeIn contract to the other exemplar districts, Miami-Dade’s approach to curriculum and practiceis highly centralized. Schools in the turnaround Zone are required to use standardizedcurricula in literacy and other areas and lengthen the school day, year, and class periods.Principals and teachers have far more professional development requirements to complete.And the district implemented supports for students at key transitional points, in particularimplementing Transition Academies for sixth and ninth graders that focus on academicplanning, study habits, career development, and preparation for state tests.

Strengths and Challenges Union collaboration set out a strong partnership for success, and the urgency and speed withwhich changes and improvements were made helped develop support. The downside of thespeediness, however, is a lack of deep community buy-in which, especially given Crew’srecent departure, places the fate of the Zone in peril. Further, since the Zone was set to“sunset” in three years time, it is not clear how the initiative will be sustained or how thesupports provided to Zone schools can or should be extended to all schools in the district.

Chicago’s Renaissance 2010 Initiative (“Ren-10”)

The Big IdeaThe fundamental premise behind the Ren-10 program is to turn around the city’s lowestperforming schools by applying the flexibility-in-exchange-for-accountability notion thatunderlies Chicago’s successful charter schools. The primary goal of the initiative is to shutdown 70 city schools, either for underperformance, under-enrollment, or both—and replacethem with 100 new, innovative schools by 2010.

How it WorksTo build community support, the district’s Office of New Schools issues a formal request forproposal for each new school, and offers a menu of governance options that school leaderscan choose: Charter school, Management school (operated by independent non-profitorganizations), or Performance school (operated under district control). Most Renaissanceschools will be small, enrolling no more than 600 students. Though all neighborhood schoolsare eligible to become Renaissance schools, only some are open to students citywide (that is,most would still enroll students within existing neighborhood boundaries). Proposals arereviewed for quality, and selected proposals then enter a five-year contract that includesincreased autonomy in exchange for meeting clear performance goals. Ren-10 schools arefunded on a per-pupil basis.

Curriculum and PracticeCurriculum and practice vary widely and deliberately across the Ren-10 Charter, Contract,and Performance Schools, as they are designed to foster innovation and create new models.


Thus as a general matter all schools have wide latitude to specify curricula and otherprogrammatic elements in the agreement they enter with the district. Similarly, all threeschool types are able to change the calendar and school day to meet their individual missionsand circumstances, provided they meet district minimums.

Strengths and ChallengesChicago’s Ren-10 reform plan has benefited from the strong political foundation of the mayorand superintendent (now Education Secretary Arne Duncan), as well as substantial interestfrom local partners. It has ongoing challenges associated with community and union support(though they support the choices embedded in the program they are still wary of closuregenerally) and oversight (the district bureaucracy is attempting to shore up its support ofturnarounds without taking back the very autonomies it granted as part of the process).

Philadelphia’s Diverse Provider Model

The Big IdeaThe district’s recent reform efforts to turn around their lowest performing schools wasspurred by state action, when they were placed under a form of state receivership. Under thepurview of the School Reform Commission (or SRC, which replaced the school board after thestate takeover), the district offers a menu of governance options to its turnaround schools,with a heavy emphasis on introducing market forces via charter conversions and externalmanagement organizations to propel reform.

How it WorksThe management across the Partnership, charter, and Creative Action and Results schools isoverlapping and complex. In broad terms, the Partnership schools represent a shared set ofresponsibilities between the district and the partnership organization (education managementorganization, university, or other community partner), while the so-called “CAR” schoolsremain under district control. State takeover revoked the union’s right to strike, and alongwith steady efforts by the SRC, led to additional changes that grant principals greaterauthority over staffing decisions.

Curriculum and PracticeThe restructured schools in the Creative Action and Results Region implemented blockscheduling, reduced class sizes and introduced a core curriculum. More recently, the districthas introduced data-driven instruction with six-week benchmark assessments, increased andmore standardized professional development, and more time dedicated to English/languagearts and mathematics.

Strengths and ChallengesSignificant confusion continues in Philadelphia over the role of education managementorganizations. The shared responsibility of the “thin management” model was not alwaysclearly articulated or understood and management mishaps occur as a result. Ongoing effortsto grow the market of external providers will be needed to ensure the Partnership model cancontinue to grow and succeed. High-profile evaluation results that compared the performanceof CAR schools to externally managed schools have not yielded findings that suggest onemodel is clearly better than the other, but do reveal the importance of creating clearercontracts and maintaining district support for external partners.

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