climate change & (in)security1325559/fulltext01.pdf · that securitization of climate change in...
TRANSCRIPT
CLIMATE CHANGE & (IN)SECURITY
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITIZATION
RICKARD SÖDER
Master's Thesis
Spring 2019
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
Supervisor: Nina von Uexkull
ABSTRACT
This study explores different perceptions of security and investigates if recognition of climate
change as a security issue has implications for countries’ armed forces. I use a securitization
framework to understand how discursive positions are created, and by making the framework
more dynamic I investigate how similar security matters are represented in different ways. I argue
that securitization of climate change in national contexts changes the armed forces’ strategies to
bring about security and that their activities are affected by the underlying logics of the discursive
arguments. To investigate the proposed relation, I conduct a comparative case study of Norway
and Sweden, and find that different ideas about the security dimension of climate change have
different implications for the armed forces’ practices and organization.
Key Words: Climate change, Security, Securitization, Armed Forces
For Hannah, Forever Ago
ABBREVIATIONS
EU European Union
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NAC North Atlantic Council
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO CCMS NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NBG Nordic Battle Group
SMHI Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute
UN United Nations
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 1
2. Previous Research ...................................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Climate Change and Changing Circumstances .................................................................................... 4
2.2 Climate Change, National Security and Armed Forces ....................................................................... 5
3. Theoretical Framework .............................................................................................................................. 8
3.1 Independent Variable – Politicization, Threatification & Riskification .............................................. 8
Securitization Framework ...................................................................................................................... 8
Introducing Risk ................................................................................................................................... 10
Combination of the Frameworks – Dynamic Securitization ................................................................ 11
3.2 Dependent Variable – Changing Practices and Structures ................................................................. 15
Consequences of Climate Change ........................................................................................................ 15
Consequences of Securitizing Climate Change .................................................................................... 16
3.3 Causal Mechanisms and Hypotheses ................................................................................................. 18
4. Research Design ....................................................................................................................................... 20
4.1 Structured Focused Comparison ........................................................................................................ 20
4.2 Time Frame and Reference Points ..................................................................................................... 21
4.3 Case Selection .................................................................................................................................... 23
4.4 Operationalization .............................................................................................................................. 25
Independent variable – Securitization of Climate Change .................................................................. 25
Dependent Variable – Changing Practices and Structures ................................................................. 28
4.5 Sources and Material .......................................................................................................................... 30
5. Empirical Findings – Norway .................................................................................................................. 32
5.1 Independent Variable – Securitization of Climate Change ................................................................ 32
5.2 Dependent Variable – Changing Practices and Structures ................................................................. 35
6. Empirical Findings – Sweden .................................................................................................................. 40
6.1 Independent Variable – Securitization of Climate Change ................................................................ 40
6.2 Dependent Variable – Changing Practices and Structures ................................................................. 43
7. Analysis .................................................................................................................................................... 48
7.1 Comparison of Cases .......................................................................................................................... 48
7.2 Extended Analysis and Alternative Explanations .............................................................................. 50
7.3 Limitations and Caveats ..................................................................................................................... 52
8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 55
9. Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................. 56
1
1. Introduction
Climate change is an issue unlike anything else, it is oblivious to political boundaries and
confronts us with multifaceted challenges at various levels. Not only does it change the
environment surrounding us but also the structures and functions societies rest on, the IPCC’s
fifth assessment report states that: “Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes
have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems” (Pachauri, Mayer, and IPCC 2015,
40). The social effects of climate change have sparked debates about its security implications
among researchers and policy makers.
The concept of security has with time come to encompass new actors and domains, and
matters that previously were disregarded in security discourses are now attributed greater
importance. Research shows that 70 percent of all states recognize that climate change threatens
their national security (Holland and Vagg 2013). Yet, few studies have empirically tested what
implications this has for countries’ security agencies, especially for those ultimately responsible
for the protection of a state’s interests; the armed forces. I aim to fill this gap by studying how
recognition of climate change as a security issue affects armed forces’ practices. More
specifically, I focus on how armed forces are affected by securitization of climate change and ask
how do variations of securitization of climate change impact the armed forces’ practices and
structure? With practices, I refer to the actual activities carried out by the armed forces and with
structure, I refer to the organization of the government agency.
I apply an adjusted version of the securitization framework developed by Diez et al. (2016).
They claim that there are two separate variations of securitization resting on different underlying
logics. The Copenhagen School’s securitization notion, built on a threat-logic, is supplemented
by one based on a risk-logic. Together with politicization, these understandings constitute a
comprehensive securitization framework within which risk and threat can intersect (ibid). The
adjusted approach enables broad analyses of different contexts.
Corry (2012) formed the riskification theory to renew and replace the original securitization
framework. Both securitization and riskification assume that virtually all matters, at least in
theory, can be turned into security issues. Security is a socially constructed concept; it is
attributed different meanings depending on the context. The difference lies in the basic
2
understanding of what a threat (or risk) is. Securitization is based on a threat-logic considering
direct causes of harm whereas riskification is based on a risk-logic identifying constitutive causes
of harm. The former encourages short-term reactive measures and the latter endorses long-term
proactive and cautious actions (Trombetta 2008; Corry 2012). Unlike Corry (2012), Diez et al.
(2016) do not consider threat- and risk-logics as separate categories, but as sub-sets of
securitizations. Securitization is the overarching process whereas riskification and threatification
are two variations of that very process. The combination of riskification and threatification
captures a great variety of security problems and framings.
I argue that securitization of climate change in national contexts alter the armed forces
approach to security. A successful securitization process affects security notions which in turn
have implications for the armed forces. Security practices and organizational structures differ
depending on the variation of securitization. Riskification of climate change leads to a wider
security understanding demanding overarching measures and collaborations due to a cross-
sectional and interconnected perception of dangers. In contrast, threatification of climate change
upholds traditional security ideas and promotes a narrow security understanding leaving practices
relatively unchanged. This applies not only to actions explicitly dealing with climate-related
security problems but to general proceedings and planning. I conduct a controlled comparison of
Norway and Sweden, within and across cases, and find that variations of securitization affect
practices and structures of the armed forces.
It is important to study what happens to armed forces when climate change is securitized for
several reasons. First, it is necessary to understand the practical consequences of portrayals of
climate change. Militaries are profoundly affected by climate change, only since 2010, the US
Department of Defense has released 35 products addressing climate-related dangers and many
senior officials at the Defense Department have recognized climate change as a national security
issue (All Things Considered 2017; Werrell and Femia 2018). For instance, climate change is an
existing and escalating threat to US military infrastructure, readiness and operations. Notably, it
is not a distant and eventual danger but its effects are already harming military installations and
thus forcing the armed forces to adapt (Melton 2018; Brzoska 2012b, 2015). But what happens
when understandings of the dangers posed by climate change differ? Studies show that security
dimensions of climate changed are perceived differently in intergovernmental organizations and
states, but none have revealed the varying effects of those discourses (Dellmuth et al. 2018; Oels
3
2012; Floyd 2015). I examine how armed forces respond to alleged strategic challenges of
climate change and by focusing on two cases, I can make deeper analyses of if and how their
practices and structures are adjusted along those lines.
Second, as Thomas (2017) writes, there is a need to “understand the intersection between the
political and the military spheres” (Thomas 2017, 13). Climate change creates security issues and
problems to common public-policy, but many military institutions have historically been hesitant
to engage in political matters (ibid). Moreover, as the US-example indicates, there can be
discrepancies between political positioning and military strategic decisions. Personnel at the US
Department of Defense claim that climate change is a national security issue although the current
administration denies that anthropogenic climate change is real (BBC News 2018). Thus, it is
important to scrutinize the freedom and constraints the armed forces operate within.
This paper is outlined as follows. In the first section, I assess previous research to
demonstrate the research gap and formulate a research question. To answer the question, I
construct a theoretical framework that explains the empirical process of interest. Then follows a
section where I present the research design enabling me to test the hypothesized relations, after
which I bring the pieces together and conduct an empirical analysis of the selected cases. The
thesis concludes with some final remarks together with discussions about limitations, caveats and
potential future implications.
4
2. Previous Research
Climate change has been examined by social scientists for decades. Focus has mainly been on the
consequences of the phenomenon and, more recently, how to adapt to the new circumstances.
Against this background, climate change and the role of national security agencies has been
debated. Researchers have discussed the future role of states and theoretical implications of
climate change, yet, no studies have empirically tested the consequences of changing notions due
to climate change. This section begins with a brief reasoning about how our circumstances
changes. Then follows an overview of previous research on climate change and national security.
Based on these assessments, I identify a research gap and formulate a question guiding the
research process.
2.1 Climate Change and Changing Circumstances
Historical studies show that climate variations affect the environment which in turn has
implications for human-life and social development. The Holocene, the geological era beginning
12 000 years BC and marked by a relatively warm and stable climate, provided the necessary
conditions for civilizations to emerge (Fagan 2004). Variations in climate also coincides with
specific behavior in human history (Parker 2013). However, the current situation is distinctly
different from climate change in the Holocene. The speed and range of alteration is more
dramatic than before, and little suggests this will change any time soon. The Holocene has even
been supplemented by the Anthropocene, a geological era defined by the impact of human
activities on the Earth system (Crutzen 2002). Humans are no longer passive victims affected by
natural forces but are rather the underlying factor driving change. Humans have become
geological actors (Harrington, Lecavalier, and Shearing 2017).
The Anthropocene became popular among earth system scientists in the early 2000s but was
only recently picked up by social scientists trying to understand the social implications of global
environmental change. “The scale and complexity of human-generated shifts has moved us
beyond the limits of existing knowledge. We are entering a new human-made world that we do
not understand” (Harrington, Lecavalier, and Shearing 2017, 494). Regardless of the conceptual
necessity of the Anthropocene, the severity of climate change is unprecedented in human history.
According to analyses by NASA and NOAA, 2018 was the fourth warmest year ever recorded
and the global surface temperature of the last five years collectively beat all previous records.
5
Since 1880, the average global temperature has increased by almost one degree Celsius (NASA
News 2019; World Meteorological Organization 2019).
This presents unique challenges. Scholars have identified and analyzed the security
consequences of environmental change, but now “problems are more severe, increasingly
impactful, and perhaps most importantly, more fully global (though their effects are often local
and contextual) than ever before” (Harrington, Lecavalier, and Shearing 2017, 494). The
extensive changes create environmental insecurities that influence norms and social structures.
Government officials repeatedly label climate change as an existentially threatening matter (Oels
2012). This ought to have implications for how security is understood and practiced.
2.2 Climate Change, National Security and Armed Forces
National security has typically been about the protection of basic functions and values from
external military threats or from internal dismantling of political systems. After World War II,
national security largely became militarized and the concept was used to justify military
investments. The notion that the greatest threats came from rival states grew so strong that
emerging challenges, of types that armed forces were not suited to handle, were ignored (Brown
1986; Deudney 1990; Dalby 2009).
In early research on climate change and security, armed forces were considered incapable of
handling the issues posed by climate change (Deudney 1990). Military equipment like tanks,
airplanes, missiles and guns stood useless before environmental problems. Military institutions
are in fact drivers of environmental degradation through high energy consumption and toxic
waste emissions (Dalby 2009). Thereto, many were critical of the militarization of national
security. Brown (1977) argues for a reassessment of national security and says that the concept in
its very essence is about protecting the state from dangers, not maximizing military strength.
Thus, emerging nonmilitary threats, including environmental degradation, should be considered
alongside military ones. Redistribution of public resources away from military budget to
emerging threats was suggested as a viable way forward (Conca and Dabelko 2018, chap. 4:
Redefining National Security1; Brown 1986). Later studies draw different conclusions about the
utility of discussions about security and climate change. Some maintain that debates on military
1 Excerpt from Lester R. Brown, Redefining National Security, Worldwatch Institute, Worldwatch Paper 14,
October 1977.
6
consequences of climate change could be an effective way of changing climate-related policies
while others claim it is only a deliberate try to strengthen the armed forces’ role (Brzoska 2015;
Floyd 2014).
The formulation of climate change as a national security problem is partly motivated by a
hypothetical link between climate change and violent conflicts. This idea rests on neo-Malthusian
arguments sustaining that climate change prevents access to necessary resources, for instance
freshwater and food, which in turn increases insecurity and competition over those resources.
Homer-Dixon (1999) associated environmental changes with increased violence through water
shortages and migration. Resource scarcity, caused by environmental degradation, could
proposedly trigger conflicts both directly, by increasing competition for resources, and indirectly,
by creating migration flows (Trombetta 2012). Albeit debated and later overproved, similar
arguments influenced policymakers and politicians. Kaplan’s (2000) influential article The
Coming Anarchy was supposedly sent to all US embassies by the Clinton administration, and a
report commissioned by the German government in 2007 stated that climate change is expected
to surge tension on societies, which might trigger violent conflicts (Bretthauer 2017). In the early
2000s, when climate change gained recognition, hypotheses on environmental degradation and
violent conflicts were extended to climate change. Accordingly, it compromised national and
international security (Oels 2012).
Scholars have long tried to disentangle the relation between climate change and armed
conflicts, but empirical studies have generated mixed results because of the phenomenon’s
complexity. Climate change is not one factor or outcome to account for and thus, it is difficult to
make general assessments about correlation and causality. However, recent literature has
challenged previously established neo-Malthusian claims. Although severe weathers might
augment violent conflicts, there are many cases where comparable events have increased
cooperation. Arguments proposing a direct relation between climate change and violence neglect
that problems often are mitigated and controlled by formal and informal institutions. Current
research indicates that climate change seldom causes armed conflicts (Gleditsch 2012; Gleditsch
and Nordås 2014; Salehyan 2008). If anything, climate change works as a threat multiplier, it
exacerbates already existing tensions and instability, and “does not inevitably cause insecurity; it
instead increases the risk of insecurity” (Mobjörk et al. 2016, 3).
7
As shown above, militaries have been deemed unfit to manage the threats posed by climate
change and there is seemingly no direct correlation between climate change and violent conflicts.
Yet, the armed forces remain an important political actor and security provider, and the military
sector has even mobilized action for climate mitigation (Brzoska 2012b; Oels 2012). According
to Åsberg and Wallensteen (1998), discussions on emerging threats and values have outpaced
thinking about actors and security providers. Non-state actors’ influence has increased in recent
times, still, security providers are commonly sorted into two main groups; states and the
international community.
Climate change and related discourses have not altered the armed forces’ central position,
but could it be that it has altered the way they operate? Few studies have empirically tested what
implications climate change has for national security agencies. This study aims to understand
some of those. Based on theories explaining how climate change discourses alter security
understandings, I empirically test how armed forces are affected by climate change and try to
understand how variations of securitization alter their provisions. The research question guiding
the project is: How do variations of securitization of climate change impact the armed forces’
practices and structure? My decision to focus on the armed forces is motivated by their
important role in many societies and is by no intents a try to downplay the relevance of other
actors. An exaggerated focus on national contexts even though climate change is transboundary
can lead to the reinforcement of territorial boundaries. But as Diez et al. (2016) point out, climate
policies must be adopted domestically and thus, “political debates about climate change, while
certainly also taking place on a global elite level, therefore largely take place within national
contexts” (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016, 4).
8
3. Theoretical Framework
In the following section, I outline the paper’s theoretical framework and hypothesize relations
between variables. The theoretical argument is constructed with regards to the research gap and
research question. I begin by separately explaining the independent and the dependent variables
together with basic assumption and logics. For the independent variable – securitization of
climate change – I use a dynamic framework to better understand the complex construction of a
security issue. For the dependent variable – armed forces’ practices and structure – I describe the
anticipated consequences of variations of securitization of climate change for the government
agency. The section concludes with a description of the causal mechanisms explaining the
relation between the variables together with a formulation of three hypotheses. Other important
concepts are defined continuously throughout the text.
3.1 Independent Variable – Politicization, Threatification & Riskification
Securitization Framework
Following the end of the Cold War, research agendas and security notions were reconceptualized.
The Copenhagen School, a body of research developed at the Conflict and Peace Research
Institute of Copenhagen led by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, quickly received recognition in
academic and political debates (Emmers 2019). The school sought to understand what security is
and how issues become security problems. It argues that no objective threats exist and
emphasizes the performative effects of specific discourses. Security is created in a speech act
that, if successful, moves an issue from normal politics to a mode where emergency measures are
accessible (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). The securitization framework enables dynamic
analyses of the of security problems and includes more actors and dimensions than traditional
security studies (Corry 2012; Emmers 2019).
According to the Copenhagen School, security is fundamentally about survival. Security
issues emerge when a matter allegedly constitutes an existential threat to a denoted referent
object. The school widens the traditional security concept by identifying five types of security;
economic, environmental, military, political and societal. The dynamics of these types are
determined by two aspects; securitizing actors and referent objects. The former is an actor, for
instance, a politician or a government, stating that something is existentially threatened. The
9
latter is an object under an existential threat with a valid claim to survival, for instance, states or
economic systems (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998; Emmers 2019). Consequently, the
securitizing actor securitizes the referent object.
To analyze how a matter moves from a political procedure to a security agenda, the
Copenhagen School presents a three-stage spectrum – non-politicized, politicized and securitized
– along which any issue can be located. A matter is non-politicized when it is not a subject for
governing action, it is politicized when it is managed within the normal political system and it is
securitized when emergency actions are justified (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). Politicized
issues become securitized through securitization acts, that is when “a securitizing actor (for
example, government, political elite, military, civil society) articulates an already politicized
issue as an existential threat to a referent object (for example, state, groups, national sovereignty,
ideology, economy)” (Emmers 2019, 175) and due to the existential nature of the threat “asserts
that it has to adopt extraordinary means that go beyond the ordinary norms of the political
domain” (Emmers 2019, 175). Depoliticization is the reverse process; when an issue is longer no
considered posing an existential threat it is resumed by normal political instances (Buzan,
Wæver, and Wilde 1998).
Securitization acts rests on two processes. First, the depiction of a specific issue endangering
the referent objects. This begins when a securitizing actor articulates a problem in security terms
and the issue, irrespective of its form and nature, is said to endanger the referent objects. The first
step is conditioned on power and tends to be dominated by powerful actors, such as states.
Second, the conviction among a relevant audience that the referent object is existentially
threatened by the highlighted threat (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). Thus, “the consensual
establishment of threat needs to be of sufficient salience to produce substantial political effect”
(Emmers 2019, 176). In other words, securitization is a process determined by a political
community rather than individuals and only when the appropriate audience is convinced that a
referent object is endangered can extraordinary measures be imposed. Speech acts are attributed
great significance in the securitization framework and language is central in both the portrayal of
security matters and in the persuasion of the relevant audience of the immediate dangers. Security
articulation gives actors the right to assemble power and take emergency measures (Buzan,
Wæver, and Wilde 1998).
10
Researchers of the Copenhagen School argue that securitization of the environment has not
been successful because no extraordinary measures are identifiable whereas other scholars
demonstrate that it in fact has happened (Floyd 2019; Trombetta 2008; Corry 2012). The
conflicting findings depend on contrasting perceptions of securitization. The Copenhagen School
perceive it as a process of act and response while other strands of literature understand it as an
argumentative process happening in all political deliberations (Lucke, Wellmann, and Diez
2014). Thereto, the former attributes great significance to emergency measures while the latter
does not.
Introducing Risk
The Copenhagen School’s security framework was developed after the Cold War. It was an
effective response to certain representations of threats in that context, but times have changed and
with it, the applicability of the theory. The school’s understanding of security is based on an
antagonistic logic of exception and war, but following the emergence of new types of issues,
other scholars have emphasized the need to contextualize security claims (Corry 2012).
Contemporary threats, like climate change, are complex and uncertain in nature, and global
warming and environmental degradation are oblivious to territorial borders and political
boundaries. In an increasingly interconnected world, catastrophic events in one place have severe
consequences in far distant places (Beck 1999; Dalby 2009). Preventive approaches have become
more and more relevant on the behalf of reactive ones since it is difficult to anticipate the effects
of climate change. Subsequently, scholars and policy makers have picked up risk logics as a
complement (or substitute) for threat logics (Corry 2012; Beck 1999). Since nothing indicates
that the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework is rejective of re-articulation, it would be
ignorant to neglect contextual changes and stubbornly use the framework in its original form
(Trombetta 2008).
Trombetta (2008) investigates the basic accounts on which security rests; survival and
threats. She examines the implications of environmental discourse on security notions and argues
that securitization of the environment alters security understandings and provisions. Climate
change has multi-dimensional and multi-faceted effects that impact various dimensions of
security; events that harm state security will also affect individuals (Dellmuth et al. 2018).
11
Recognition of this arouses alternative security understandings which affect security practices
(Trombetta 2008).
Corry (2012) emphasizes this and contends that risk politics is distinctly different from
securitization. Security based on a threat-logic targets direct causes of harm while security based
on risk-logics relate to the fundamental causes of harm. The former encourages short-term
reactive measures and the latter endorses long-term proactive and cautious dealings. He
formulates an alternative speech act based on risk-logics to complement the Copenhagen
School’s securitization framework (ibid). The phases in a riskification process are similar to the
corresponding steps in the securitization framework and the importance of language is
maintained, but instead of being characterized by existential threats triggering extraordinary
measures, “it posits risks (understood as conditions of possibility for harm) to a referent object
leading to (…) changes aimed at reducing vulnerability and boosting governance-capacity of the
valued referent object itself” (Corry 2012, 248). Unlike politicization and securitization,
riskification encourages sensible creations of safety margins to mitigate potentially destructive
events.
Nonetheless, it is possible to problematize that Corry (2012), like the Copenhagen School,
separates security constructions and political decision-making processes. Neither the riskification
framework nor the original securitization framework acknowledge that security arguments are
used for political purposes in established institutions. Thus, it is useful to adopt an understanding
of securitization as a process in which security issues are created and where practices can be
challenged and transformed (Trombetta 2012). Rather than the product of a single actor’s
urgings, securitization can be considered a communicative action that creates opportunities for
political decisions, “it is better understood as an argumentative process, where the statements of
different actors compete in a certain discursive or political arena.” (Rothe 2012, 243–44).
Securitization is subsequently successful when some arguments win over others and establishes a
‘discourse coalition’ that favors the winning party’s demands.
Combination of the Frameworks – Dynamic Securitization
Diez et al. (2016) follow Corry’s (2012) distinction of threat and risk-logics, but do not consider
them as separate categories. They claim that risk is a variation of security because in the
historical origin of the debate, risk emerged as a position in security policies and debates, and
12
because risk generally is included in security practices. Consequently, they create an analytical
framework that does not distinguish between securitization and riskification, but “between
riskification and threatification, and see both as variations of securitization that form the two
poles of a continuum, on which risk and threat (or security, in traditional terms) can intersect.”
(Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016, 9).
Diez et al. (2016) relabel the Copenhagen School’s securitization understanding as
threatification to mark that it, like riskification, is a sub-set of securitization. Accordingly,
securitization is a process that takes one of two forms; threatification or riskification. The former
is based on a threat-logic that increases the urgency and immediate existentiality of the issues
whereas the latter rests on a risk-logic. Diez et al. (2016) claim that invocations of risk and
danger are related because they both invoke threats to justify policies. Both processes “change the
nature of politics by transforming the rules of the debate and legitimizing policies that would
otherwise not have been considered legitimate“ (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016, 14). The
sub-sets of securitizations are separated by their underlying logics and used as spectrums in a
dynamic model.
The distinction between threatification and riskification is based on three aspects. First, the
level of threat concretization. The type of existential threat involved in threatification is more
concrete than those in riskification. In riskification, the threats rarely emanate from an identified
enemy, for instance, a rivaling state. Instead, they are more difficult to grasp and locate. Second,
the referent objects of risk are less distinct than the referent objects of danger. It is more difficult
to identify a single referent because the wider scope of riskification relates matters to several
referents simultaneously. Third, risk has a vaguer time horizon than threat. Threatification is
imminently threatening to the referent object while riskification refers to issues that are more
distant in time (Lucke, Wellmann, and Diez 2014; Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016).
Figure 1 illustrates how threatification and riskification relate to securitization. These
discourse coalitions are theoretical ideal types, meaning that no arguments are exclusively based
on one or the other. Yet, the framework enables me to assess and classify dominating logics in
different framings. Extraordinary measures can be introduced after either of the sub-sets, but it is
not a necessary condition of securitization. Climate change is politicized if arguments on the
security dimension of climate change are not fully accepted and no discourse coalitions are
formed. If so, climate change or climate-related effects will not be considered in security settings
13
and therefore not be handled by the armed forces.
Figure 1: Sub-sets of securitizations.
Security arguments are used in all political debates to create attention and momentum and
they are sometimes needed to place issues on the political agenda. Diez et al. (2016) argue that
some degree of securitization is required in all political processes but that it only is successful
when certain security arguments overshadow others and discourse coalitions are formed. The
variation of securitization depends on what logic the discourse coalition rests on. Threatification
of climate change in a national context builds on arguments resembling the ‘neo-Malthusian’ idea
of environmental degradation. It emphasizes the possibility of violent conflict or social unrest
caused by degrading resources and competition for those available. For a state, the threat is not
really climate change or the consequential physical effects, instead, it is “the indirect socio-
economic effects on social orders” (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016, 21). Subsequent
measures will primarily be short-term and target the socio-economic effects by immediate
adaption as opposed to long-term mitigation efforts (ibid).
Riskification of climate change in a national context is based on claims assessing the
probability of instability or unrest induced by climate change in areas identified by risk
assessments or scenario planning. Those general probabilities require contingency planning for
events that, although they are unlikely, can have disastrous consequences. Measures will be
designed for adaption with emphasis on transforming the referent object, increasing actors’
general readiness and “the enhancement of resilience to climate change effects in case the risk
turns into reality” (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016, 22). Due to the risk logic’s vaguer time
horizon, those arguments allow the implementation of more general and overarching
Securitization
Threatification Riskification
14
countermeasures, such as resilience building. The actions are intended to ensure capacity to
handle the worst possible scenario (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016).
Characteristics of Security Arguments
Logic of securitization
Threatification
Riskification
Examples of speech acts Territorial danger
Climate change as triggering
and increasing violent conflict
that endangers state security.
Indirect socio-economic
consequences.
Territorial risk
Climate change as long-term
risk for states located in risk
areas.
General probabilities of instability
in risk areas.
Table 1: A typology of climate security discourses.2
I use the securitization framework accustomed by Diez et al. (2016) because it lowers the
Copenhagen School’s strict securitization criteria. The processes in which security is constructed
are more complex than those described by the Copenhagen School. The frameworks used to
study such procedures should therefore be encompassing and flexible enough to match a variety
of arguments and responses.
In line with Trombetta (2008), I argue that environmental and climate change discourses
alter security understandings. Securitization of climate change means that discoursal coalitions on
the security dimension of climate change are established and those coalitions have implications
for security understandings which in turn affect a state’s security practices. Consequently, the
armed forces are affected differently depending on the variation of securitization. The risk-logic
considers the probability of dangers, and to account for worst-possible scenarios the armed forces
must adjust their organization. The authority will focus on comprehensive resilience building to
provide safety for its functions and inhabitants. In contrast, threatification of climate change will
enforce the already prevailing logic of exception and war. Threatification recognizes concrete
threats and encourages protection of instances exposed to indirect socio-economic consequences
of climate change (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016; Lucke, Wellmann, and Diez 2014). If
2 Adjusted version of Lucke, Wellmann, and Diez 2014, 864. Organized along one-dimension, territorial, due to the
focus on national contexts.
15
climate change is not securitized, previous security understandings remain. I explain the expected
changes within the armed forces in detail below.
3.2 Dependent Variable – Changing Practices and Structures
Consequences of Climate Change
Like all government agencies, armed forces are affected by contextual changes and political
decisions. The armed forces command large shares of public resources to protect a state’s
fundamental values and it is reasonable that they either voluntarily or involuntarily adjust to new
settings by altering the organization and prioritizing new tasks.
Brzoska (2015) investigates how armed forces are affected by climate change. Based on
observed changes he formulates six ‘military futures’ that are distinguished by the alleged impact
of climate change on their organization and on how they in turn relate to that perception. Three
aspects are particularly relevant to look at when analyzing how armed forces are affected by
climate change. First, the funding of armed forces. On the one hand, climate mitigation and
adaption are costly. On the other hand, added responsibilities and duties due to climate change
require extra funding. Thus, situations where trade-offs are necessary might arise (Brzoska
2012b, 2015). Second, the primary functions of armies. The organization’s responsibilities and
the personnel’s duties may alter when the environment it operates within changes which partly
depends on the government’s understanding of the implications of climate change. New roles for
the military can be proposed since they hold resources and capabilities that could be deployed to
protect the environment. Third, changing structures in the armed forces. The importance of
certain operational elements may vary with climate change and they become either more or less
significant (Brzoska 2012b, 2015; Trombetta 2012). The last two aspects are particularly relevant
when examining the implications of securitization.
Brzoska (2015) claims that climate change is an important factor in most states’ military
planning, but the practical implications differ significantly. Among his military futures, those
related to disaster relief are most common and those related to the expansion of traditional
military roles are relatively frequent. Unlike Brzoska, I do not investigate how armed forces
directly are affected by climate-related problems, instead, I examine how the framing of climate
change as a security matter influences military priorities and structures. Moreover, I do not
investigate potential futures, rather, I test changes that have already occurred.
16
Consequences of Securitizing Climate Change
As previously explained, Trombetta (2008) analyzes climate security discourses. She investigates
how security practices are affected by the inclusion of environmental or climate issues in the
security nexus (securitization) and argues that securitization of the environment transforms
present practices and provisions. According to Hartman (2010), a national security shift has
already happened in the US. Defense thinking and planning have changed, from conventional
prioritizations to a focus on stability operations and the handling of new security dimensions. In
essence, the US military increased its influences over development assistance and humanitarian
aid (Hartmann 2010). The new approach merged civilian and military elements; an effect
expected to follow riskification of climate change.
Little suggests that appeals to security in environmental deliberations have caused
exceptional measures, neither military measures nor drastic financial actions, climate change is
rather associated with proactive measures and alternative forms of governance (Trombetta 2012).
Riskification of climate change is the securitization of issues that are “uncertain, widespread and
whose impact is difficult to quantify” (Trombetta 2008, 598). It is an appeal to security that likely
generates a balanced security understanding where all hazards are considered and accounted for
(Trombetta 2012). Because riskification does not identify an enemy and since referent objects of
risk are less distinct than that of danger, efforts to counteract potential dangers will be
comprehensive and overarching, and the longer time horizon leaves more time for development
and implementation of necessary measures. National security will be understood as a shared
responsibility for all members of the society which is reflected in active preparation and
participation of military and public instances jointly.
Following riskification, the armed forces will participate in contingency planning to
counteract potential instability caused by climate change. Riskification instigates alteration of the
agency’s general readiness and its contribution to the state’s enhancement of resilience to climate
change effects. A comprehensive and overarching security approach is best achieved in
conjunction with other agencies, within and across state borders. Thus, cooperation across
institutional borders is prioritized. General resilience building is emphasized because there are no
distinct enemies to account for. Moreover, risk assessments and scenario planning guide the
operative part of the armed forces (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016).
17
In contrast, threatification of climate change singles out an external enemy, the referent
object is distinctly defined and there is a shorter time horizon to those threats. Dangers are more
urgent and distinctly defined. Consequently, threatification creates a focus on the indirect socio-
economic effects on social orders caused by climate change, such as conflicts over resources
(ibid). Instead of concerning a broad population, national security will be restricted to a limited
number of security professionals with the armed forces in the front position. Threatification of
climate change encourages negative and reactionary security actions (McDonald, 2008).
If climate change is threatified, the armed forces will conduct short term actions aiming to
counter indirect socio-economic issues. For instance, they might participate in interventions
abroad to prevent negative consequence at home. Conflict prevention and management are
conducted to bring stability to the international context the state is part of. Furthermore,
immediate adaptive measures will be prioritized on behalf of comprehensive long-term actions
(Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016). The armed forces will be preoccupied with traditional
‘command and control’ structures which means that they try to control situations that arise. Tasks
that historically has been in the armed force’s toolbox, like border protection and assertion of
sovereignty, will be highly prioritized and intelligence units will work to better anticipate and
prevent harm (ibid).
Armed Forces Response to Securitization of Climate Change
Logic of securitization
Threatification
Riskification
Expected responses Responsive measures (short-term).
Interventions in vulnerable areas
(national and international).
Command and control.
Contingency planning (long-term).
Collaboration with other
government agencies.
General resilience building.
Table 2: Summary of expected consequences of securitization of climate change.
In sum, the consequences of securitization of climate change for the armed forces depend on
the underlying logics; different activities are justified and brought about by threatification and
riskification. On the one hand, threatification of climate change results in the prioritization of the
armed force’s responsive capacity with an increased emphasis on short-term measures to counter
socio-economic disturbances. The armed forces will be preoccupied with preventing armed
18
conflicts or social unrest occurring in its surroundings. On the other hand, if riskification of
climate change occurs at state-level, armed forces will increasingly deal with precautionary
measures and collective capacity building. Their primary responsibility will be to contribute to
the state’s collective security capacity which requires collaboration with other actors and
agencies. I investigate general practices and not just operations targeting climate-related
consequences because, as shown above, the armed forces’ entire structures and orientations might
change. If climate change is not securitized in the national context, no major changes in the
practices or structure will be discernable.
3.3 Causal Mechanisms and Hypotheses
Like the Copenhagen School, I assume that language is not the representation of an objective
reality but “the linguistic structure which constitutes the perceived reality in the first
place.”(Rothe 2012, 245). The meaning of objects is created when language relates and orders
them by similarities and differences. This does not mean that a material objectivity is dismissed,
only that those facts do not have a meaning until we connect or contrast them to other objects.
The same term can have dissimilar meanings in various contexts since there are no given
relations between terms and objects. Discourses are compositions of notions and classifications
that are being shaped, reshaped and altered in certain practices through which meaning is given to
physical and social realities (Rothe 2012).
Speech acts constitute a key aspect of the theoretical framework and is an important indicator
of the mechanisms causing the relation. Even though concepts can have different meanings, it is
possible to interpret their contextual meaning. Statements about the security dimension of climate
change show that changed practices and structures within the armed forces are affected by the
securitization of climate change. Without such a connection, potential correlations might very
well be a coincidence. If the restructuring of armed forces and their practices is caused by the
securitization of climate change, statements by high-level politicians and security officials within
the armed forces should be observable. If security understandings really change, security
arguments on climate change should trickle-down from leading politicians to senior officials
within the relevant authority.
By tracing statements, I can explore causality. Announcements by politicians and security
officials might show which factors cause the observed effect. Although I do not expect that the
19
occurrence or securitization of climate change fully explain the outcome of the dependent
variable, I assume that it alters security perspectives which has consequences for the armed forces
priorities. Statements relating climate and security are indicators of the causal mechanisms
explaining the relation between the variables. It is especially important to see if such ideas and
narratives travel across agencies and if they trickle-down. I investigate securitization of climate
change at state-level and changing provision at institutional-level. It is far from certain that
military practices alter merely because governing politicians accentuates new problems.
Following the independent and the dependent variable above, I formulate three hypotheses
that are tested in an empirical cross-case comparison of Norway and Sweden. Each hypothesize
the alleged consequences of securitization of climate change.
H1. No securitization of climate change leaves the armed forces’ practices and structure
unchanged.
H2. State-level threatification of climate change leads to prioritization of short-term
responsive measures and command and control structures within the armed forces.
H3. State-level riskification of climate change leads to prioritization of long-term contingency
planning and collaboration with other government agencies within the armed forces.
20
4. Research Design
I conduct a comparative small-n analysis to empirically test the hypothesized relation between
securitization of climate change and the structure and practices of the armed forces. More
specifically, I do a structured focused comparison to systematically compare varying outcomes.
By investigating few cases in detail, I hope to learn something about the mechanisms explaining
the outcome and potentially make inferences about a larger universe of similar cases. (Gerring
2006). I examine the development in two states, Norway and Sweden, selected according to a
most similar principle, or Mill’s method of difference. A comparison of the two is justified by the
fact that they are alike in most aspects except the independent variable. I conduct a theory testing
study within and across cases. The usage of a two-fold approach strengthens the analysis,
allowing me to make better assessments.
The following section is organized into five parts. I begin with a description of structured
focused comparison together with an explanation of why it is an appropriate method for this
study. Then follows a part where I clarify the comparative components of the study. In the third
part, I explain and justify the choice of cases whereas the operationalization of variables is
explained in part four. Lastly, I discuss the type of sources and empirical material used for the
empirical analysis.
4.1 Structured Focused Comparison
Structured focused comparison is a research method resting on rather straightforward logics. As
the name suggests, the method consists of two elements enabling comparison of different cases.
First, it is structured because the researcher constructs a set of general questions that is asked to
the cases. By asking the same questions, it is easier to systematically gather and compare data.
Second, it is focused because it only targets aspects that are relevant for the purpose of the study.
The set of questions should therefore be based on the theoretical framework (George and Bennett
2005).
Few studies can account for all characteristics of historical events and it is therefore
important to focus on the most relevant features. A distinct focus on the central variables together
with a specification of what phenomenon the selected cases are instances of, can make results
generalizable (Gerring 2006). For the purpose of examining practical implications of
securitization of climate change, I have chosen Norway and Sweden as study objects and will
21
examine the dependent variable at two points in each case; before and after securitization of
climate change. This two-fold approach enables me to compare changes over time and determine
temporal order. I expect that securitization of climate change can be observed at state-level
whereas practical implications can be studied within each state’s armed forces. Why I choose
these cases and why I do comparisons within and across states is explained below.
In short, when conducting a structured focused comparison, the researcher asks a set of
consistent questions, based on the study’s purpose and the theoretical framework, to each case.
The set of standardized questions should not be used for purely formal reasons. They must be
based on and reflect theories and the research objective (George and Bennett 2005). If carried out
properly, the method facilitates the research process and helps one to “avoid the all too familiar
and disappointing pitfall of traditional, intensive single cases studies” (George and Bennett 2005,
69–70). Additionally, the method is suitable for the type of variables I study. Neither the
independent or the dependent variable can be organized into an ordinal rule or be statistically
determined (Esaiasson et al. 2012). Asking a set of questions to the cases will therefore provide
the most insightful categorization of the variables.
I do a qualitative comparative analysis because it allows me to make inferences about the
relationship between variations of securitization and armed forces structure and practices.
Previous studies have investigated whether climate change threatens national security and, if so,
in what ways (Bretthauer 2017; Gleditsch 2012). Yet, no studies have scrutinized what
consequences varying interpretations of the dangers posed by climate change have for the
organization and practices of armed forces. This study is theory testing, I compare cases to test
the proposed relation and try to generate new insights on correlation and causality.
4.2 Time Frame and Reference Points
To begin with, I analyze if climate change has been securitized in each case and if so, what logic
the security arguments are based on. Because macro-securitizations – securitization in
international contexts – has implications for discourses in national contexts (Rothe 2012), I have
reason to believe that climate change was securitized in Norway and Sweden during the late-
2000s when security and climate change became topical internationally.3 For instance, several
3 Macro-securitizations as described by Rothe (2012), see operationalization section for a more detailed description.
22
influential reports were published at the time; Stern stressed future economic costs of inaction,
the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) warned for increased vulnerability
and the fourth IPCC assessment report highlighted the likelihood of climate-related conflicts
(Oels 2012; Trombetta 2012; Bretthauer 2017). And at the time, international deliberations were
dominated by fears of violent conflicts and humanitarian disasters which is well illustrated by
two events in 2007: First, the UN Security Council’s first debate on climate change and that
year’s Nobel Peace Prize laureates. Prior to 2007, the UN Security Council had not defined
climate change as a security threat which disqualified it as a relevant topic for deliberations
(Sindico 2007). Second, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC for their
efforts to generate and spread knowledge about anthropogenic climate change (Nobel Media
n.d.).
I then produce two separate analyses of the dependent variable by dividing each single
longitudinal case into two sections – before and after treatment – that follows a discontinuous
change in the independent variable. Later, I compare the two analyses and scrutinize variations
between them. This design is inspired by experimental methods using two groups, one that is
exposed to the relevant treatment and another that is not subjected to it. The latter group is used
for the purpose of controlling for alternative factors explaining the outcome. A ‘true’ experiment
cannot be carried out without control over treatment but some of its methodological
characteristics can be used to strengthen studies comparative parts (George and Bennett 2005;
Esaiasson et al. 2012).
The time scale of the study ranges between 2001 and 2018. It begins around 2001 and the
period following the attacks of September 11, an incident that impacted security perspectives and
practices, but the exact starting date is contextual for each case (Collins 2013). I expect to
observe the independent variable in the mid-to-late 2000s. Even though there are previous
examples of climate change being incorporated into national security domains, it was not until
2007 climate change was uplifted to the domain of high and securitized politics (Sindico 2007;
Oels 2012; Bretthauer 2017). The end year of examination is 2018, the most recent year of which
military activities have been reported.
This design enables to analyzes of each case before and after expected occurrence of the
explanatory variable, with enough time in-between the reference points for consequences to
occur. Using this two-fold design, I can overcome some common flaws of single case studies. I
23
will be able to control for potential changes in other variables that occur simultaneously as the
independent variable and I can control for events with a potential effect on the outcome occurring
in one case but not the other.
4.3 Case Selection
A case study analysis aims to “identify cases that reproduce the relevant causal features of a
larger universe (representativeness) and provide variation along the dimensions of theoretical
interest (causal leverage)” (Gerring 2006, 88). Because of the relatively small sample of cases,
these goals are easiest met through purposive selection. I employ a most-similar technique, that is
the identification of cases that are similar on specified variables other than the independent
variables and possibly the dependent variable, to generate suitable study objects. A most-similar
technique is useful for studies aiming to generate theories or testing hypotheses, two purposes of
this project (Gerring 2006). Based on anticipated values of the independent variables and relevant
control variables, I select Norway and Sweden as cases.
Because of macro-securitization in the late-2000s, I expect securitization of climate change
in both cases. However, since NATO and EU promote different ideas about the threats posed by
climate change, it is likely that the underlying security logics of the dominant arguments on
security and climate change differ in each state (Floyd 2015; Dellmuth et al. 2018). Norway is a
member of NATO and despite Sweden’s collaboration with the organization in peace and
security operations, Sweden is not a NATO-member. In contrast, Sweden is a member of the EU
whereas Norway is not. NATO has had a narrow focus on helping member states’ armed forces
handling (instant) harmful effects of climate change while EU has promoted a non-antagonistic
security approach to climate change including progressive measures to overcome climate-related
issues (Trombetta 2008; Floyd 2015). Hence, it is likely that dissimilar variations of
securitization occurred in Norway and Sweden; threatification in the former and riskification in
the latter. However, the independent variable must be studied in detail before further accounts are
made.
Regarding control variables, it is likely that national security agencies in states more severely
affected by climate change focus more on climate mitigation and adaptation. Climate change
measured as increasing temperatures is severely intense in the North. Air temperatures in the
Arctic increase twice as fast than in the rest of the globe (Osborne, Richter-Menge, and Jeffries
24
2018) and a recent compilation of annual temperatures by SMHI (2019) shows that temperatures
in Sweden increase faster than the global average, much depending on the closeness to the Arctic
(SMHI 2019). Because I study bordering countries, it is reasonable to assume that the intensity of
climate change is equal in both countries. Nevertheless, if measured as expected economic losses
(or benefits) of increased carbon dioxide emissions, Norway and Sweden are not expected to be
heavily affected by increased carbon emissions. Using new climate model projections, Ricke
(2018) estimates that Norway and Sweden will economically do well in comparison with other
countries if carbon dioxide emissions increase.
Moreover, the selected cases are similar in another aspect determining the impact of climate
change; their capacity to manage or reduce the effects. The capacity to manage the consequence
of climate change is decided by economic development and institutional capacity (Bretthauer
2017). According to the Quality of Governance institute at the University of Gothenburg, the
countries get similar values in state fragility index, functioning of government, political
corruption index and governance effectiveness (Teorell et al. 2018). The last metric is an index of
the quality of “public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the
government's commitment to policies” (The World Bank 2019; Teorell et al. 2018). These
numbers indicate similar qualities of governments, authorities and agencies in Norway and
Sweden. They reasonably have similar capacities to handle the consequences of climate change.
The cases are, nonetheless, dissimilar in some significant respects. Importantly, there is a
difference in the countries’ fossil fuel energy consumption, measured as percentage of total
consumption and carbon dioxide emissions per capita. Norway has higher emission levels than
Sweden. In 2015, fossil fuel accounted for 58 percent of the total energy consumption in Norway
while it accounted for 27 percent of Sweden’s total energy consumption. Similarly, in 2014,
Norway emitted 9.3 metric tons carbon dioxide per capita whereas Sweden emitted 4.5 metric
tons per capita (The World Bank 2019; Teorell et al. 2018). However, this is a potential
explanation for the independent variable, not the dependent variable. It might explain variations
of securitization but not if the structure and practices of the armed forces differ.
Lastly, practical reasons influenced the selection of cases. Publicity principles prevail in
Norway and Sweden which means that documents and reports are publicly available. It is
therefore relatively easy to access relevant material. Also, most political strategies and reports are
25
written in the official languages of the states and are rarely translated into other languages. A
potential disadvantage of analyzing Norway and Sweden is that there are limitations in the
generalizability of the two cases, but results should still be generalizable to contexts with similar
political and military settings.
In sum, I have selected cases that are similar in most aspects as a way of isolating for
alternative explanations. According to George and Bennet (2005), it is important that cases are
selected “to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem” (George
and Bennett 2005, 83). The purposive choice is based on expected variations in the independent
variable and the figures presented above indicate similarities between Norway and Sweden in
significant control variables for the period of analysis. Alternative explanations and potential
shortcomings are discussed in the analysis section.
4.4 Operationalization
As part of the structured focused comparison, I have formulated a standardized set of questions
that is applied to each case. The questions are based on the theoretical framework and have
carefully been formulated to reach reliability and validity, but as always, trade-offs are necessary
for various reasons. I describe the independent and the dependent variable separately below, first
presenting the questions and then discussing each of them in the light of advantages and
disadvantages.
Independent variable – Securitization of Climate Change
The questions for the independent variable are listed further below. The Copenhagen School
initially stated that securitization occurs at the mid-range political level (nation state), but in a
recent article Buzan and Wæver revise the spatial dimension of the securitization framework and
argue that securitization at lower-levels can be linked to more “comprehensive security
discourses at the transnational or even global level” (Rothe 2012, 245). Securitization at the
international level– ‘macro-securitizations’ – has implications for securitization in national
contexts. An example of macro-securitization is the ‘the global war on terror’, a transnational
security discourse that sparked terrorism discourses in national contexts. As Rothe (2012) notes,
macro-securitization is highly relevant for climate security discourses since the matter, due to its
transboundary nature, is frequently negotiated and deliberated in overstate settings. Thus,
26
securitization of climate change in an intergovernmental organization, which the examined state
is a member of, likely indicates that securitization of climate change has happened in the
domestic context as well. The first question identifies this indicator.
When operationalizing the independent variable, I focus on characteristics of the securitizing
act. As explained in the theory section, a securitizing act assumes two processes; a securitizing
actor claiming that a matter constitutes an existential threat and the relevant audience’s
acceptance of that claim. Acts of utterance and response are inherent parts of the argumentative
processes behind all political decisions. Before discoursal coalitions are established, narratives
and arguments travel back and forth in competition with other urgings. Securitization is
successful when other arguments are left aside and a discourse coalition is formed (Rothe 2012).
I do not examine the instigation of single securitizing acts but look at units of discursive acts. By
analyzing a variety of speech acts, I can more easily ascertain if climate change was successfully
securitized. Similarly, I examine if dominant arguments about the security dimension of climate
change are accepted by relevant audiences. The second and the third question relate to the steps
in the securitization act, arguments presented by decision-makers and acceptance by the relevant
audience. If the procedures described above did not happen, no securitization occurred.
The last three questions are applied if climate change was securitized. They identify
securitization sub-set by determining whether the security arguments are based on threat-logics or
risk-logics. According to Rothe (2012), climate change is a complex phenomenon we cannot
understand all aspects of, hence, conceptual metaphors and simplifying storylines are created to
enable thinking and discussions about the phenomenon. To determine securitization sub-sets, I
analyze the underlying logics of the conceptual metaphors forming the dominant discursive
arguments in the national context. I ask about the level of threat concretization, if arguments
identify a distinct referent object that is at risk, and which time horizon is attributed to the threats.
A discourse that concretely defines imminent threats to a clearly denoted referent object, suggest
threatification, whereas the opposite with imprecisely defined threats, a vague time horizon and
no delimited reference object, indicate riskification. Threatification of climate change likely
entails focus on the indirect socio-economic consequences of climate change and connections to
violent conflicts that threatens states security. Riskification of climate change likely involves
ideas about potential long-term risks for vulnerable states or regions and a general increase in the
probability of instability.
27
Standardized Questions – Independent Variable
- Has macro-securitization occurred in an intergovernmental organization the state is a
member of?
- Have leading decision-makers and security officials emphasized security dimensions of
climate change?
- Does the population acknowledge climate change as a security issue?
- Are the anticipated dangers of climate change concretely defined?
- Is a delimited referent object identified?
- What is the time horizon of the proposed dangers?
When answering the first and the second question, I merely investigate a selection of influential
actors in climate change and security discourses to achieve better reliability. With the first
question I investigate actors with the capacity to define the state of a given political domain, that
is some of the most influential intergovernmental organizations for each state; namely the EU and
NATO. For the second question, I examine speech acts issued by two types of national actors;
politicians and security officials. In this study it refers to the states’ leading decision-makers and
the highest-ranking officials of the armed forces. Politicians are highly influential and
institutionalized subject positions in climate politics and security officials have recently become
integrated in the climate discourse (Rothe 2012). I investigate few actors despite realizing that a
greater selection of actors would strengthen validity because without distinct delimitations the
study would be more difficult to reproduce. With regards to validity, I select the most influential
actors to guarantee that dominant discourses are studied.
Similar assessments were made for the audience considered in the third question. I
investigate opinions and perceptions of climate change and security among the populations. I
look at opinion polls and news sources to investigate whether the securitizing arguments laid out
by the subject positions were accepted. If the general sense among the population is in line with
the arguments offered by the securitizing actors, I consider them accepted. Reliability is relatively
high since it involves fewer assessments. Validity is inhibited because general opinions cannot be
linked to acceptance of the first move in securitizing acts. Thereto, it is weakened by the decision
to only investigate one dimension of audiences. In a securitizing act, audiences are multi-layered,
28
meaning that audiences at various levels are targeted by speech acts. For instance, Dupont (2019)
look at both internal and external audiences whereas I only investigate internal; the population of
Norway and Sweden. Yet, as I am foremost interested in domestic responses to securitization of
climate change, this approach is enough.
An analysis of the discursive arguments is one of few ways to investigate the underlying
security logics since they rest on subjective assessment and discursive acts. It is vital to consider
the contextual meaning of the arguments, not only looking for specific words but rather what is
meant by the usage of the words. The last question requires assessments by the researcher which
weakens the reliability. However, strong reliability elsewhere for the independent variable makes
the overall reliability of the independent variable acceptable.
Dependent Variable – Changing Practices and Structures
The questions for the dependent variable are listed further below. Different from the Copenhagen
School’s securitization theory, extraordinary measures in the Diez-framework do not necessarily
imply militaristic or undemocratic actions. It simply means that a measure would not have been
legitimate in the absence of a securitization that changed the settings through successful
articulations of danger and risk. Extraordinary measures are also attributed greater urgency
following successful securitizations. Extraordinary measures following threatification, the
process where matters endanger a denoted referent object, intend to counteract the issue posing
the existential danger. At minimum, they attempt to move the matter out of the danger zone.
Extraordinary measures following riskification, the process positing the conditions of possibility
for harm, aim to reinforce societies’ general responsive capacity (overall resilience building).
The first of the standardized questions simply identifies what actions that are prioritized by
the armed forces during the given period. It serves as a starting point for further analyses and
comparisons. The second and the third questions identify what general approach the measures
and actions go under. As explained above, I evaluate the overall structure and practices on two
occasions for each case; before and after the occurrence of the independent variable in the mid to
late 2000s. Roughly, I examine whether completed alignments and actions improve states’
collective resilience or strengthens states responsive capacity. I am primarily interested in overall
structural changes, if restructuring of organization and orientation happened within the armed
forces, and the last question therefore clarifies what the implication of the findings are.
29
Standardized Questions – Dependent Variable
- What practices are prioritized by the armed forces?
- Are the actions primarily short-term responsive?
- Are the actions primarily long-term preparatory?
- Are the armed forces responsible for improving the states’ reactive (response-oriented) or
proactive capacity (contingency planning)?
The first question is forthright and does not require any major assessments, it is merely a
description of completed initiatives and operations during the periods. In contrast, the second and
the third questions involve more estimations which inhibits reliability, but indicators from the
theoretical framework clarify where focus should be. Assessments of whether measures are
responsive (short-term) or preparatory (long-term), if activities in vulnerable regions or the
society in general are prioritized, and if the armed forces embrace command and control or
engage in collaborations with other authorities. Although I do not expect clear-cut answers –
responses that are exclusively one or the other – the indicators improve reliability. To achieve
high validity, I have carefully formulated the questions based on the theory so that I really
measures what I intend to.
The last question aims to determine what defense orientation the strategies and actions
represent. I am interested in general changes in structure and priorities and it is therefore
important to see overall patterns and not only the specifics. Yet again is it necessary to make
assessments. However, as explained below, I study a long sequence of related documents over
time which means that contrasts should be visible to anyone who conducts similar analyzes. It
should be straightforward to identify changing practices when comparing them against each
other. Reliability and validity are correspondingly strong for the dependent variable, the variable
is straightforward and clearly defined.
Standardized Set of Questions
Independent Variable –
Securitization of Climate Change
Dependent Variable – Changing
Practices and Structures
30
1 Has macro-securitization occurred
in an intergovernmental
organization the state is a member
of?
What practices are prioritized by the
armed forces?
2 Have leading decision-makers and
security officials emphasized
security dimensions of climate
change?
Are the actions primarily short-term
responsive?
3 Does the population acknowledge
climate change as a security issue?
Are the actions primarily long-term
preparatory (readiness, contingency
planning)?
4 Are indirect socio-economic effects
of climate change stressed in
dominating arguments?
Are the armed forces responsible
for improving the states reactive
(response-oriented) or proactive
capacity (contingency planning)?
5 Is climate change believed to
increase the general probability of
instability?
Table 3: Structured Focused Comparison.
4.5 Sources and Material
When analyzing the independent variable, I investigate secondary literature and make
assessments of public statements and responses in Norway and Sweden. The former type of
source is especially useful for the macro-securitization indicator of the independent variable.
Thereto, I analyze official statements by high-level politicians, news sources and public opinion
polls to determine if climate change has become securitized, and if so, by which underlying
security-logic. I analyze public statements and official decisions when analyzing elite speech
acts. Both the Norwegian and the Swedish government have digital archives of official
statements, declarations and speeches made by former and current governments which enables
tracking of historical arguments linking climate change and security.
For the dependent variable I employ a content analysis. I primarily analyze annual reports on
the armed forces’ operations and initiatives during the last year. Those provide an honest and
reliable understanding of the authority’s structure and allow for comparison over time. Due to
practical reasons I only examine the main document without attachments. I complement findings
31
in the annual reports with analyses of security strategies and defense planning documents. Such
documents provide useful insights on a state’s security policy and planned action. Brzoska
(2012a) writes that “defense planning documents outline the consequences of security strategies
for armed forces” (Brzoska 2012a, 165) and by analyzing them, one can answer “whether and
how security elites have adopted the claim that climate change is a security issue, and what kind
of measures and activities they are promoting as a consequence” (Brzoska 2012a, 165). Those
documents are publicly available in both Norway and Sweden.
Analyzing authority documents allows me to examine whether incorporation of climate
change in the security nexus leads to actual suggestions for action. The annual reports list
activities carried out during the intended year which enables tracking of activities over time and
assessments of changes. Unlike defense planning documents and security strategies, these reports
declare which activities have been carried out. Measures deriving from important statements
about security threats/risks are often discussed in defense planning documents, sometimes the
documents even entail lists of prioritized actions.
32
5. Empirical Findings – Norway
Using the theoretical framework outlined above, I find that climate change was securitized in
Norway during the late-2000s. The process rested on arguments about indirect socio-economic
threats caused by climate change, thus, climate change was threatified. The armed forces’
practices and structure altered throughout the whole period with interesting alterations after
threatification in the late 2000s. Below, I examine the independent variable and the dependent
variable in line with the research design. To clarify changes among the armed forces, I divide the
section on the dependent variable into two parts; before and after securitization.
5.1 Independent Variable – Securitization of Climate Change
Environmental change has been on NATO’s agenda since the establishment of the Committee on
the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) in 1969, but it took time before it became a
prioritized matter. In 1995, NATO through the CCMS launched a study conducted by German
and American scholars on the environment and security in an international context. The report
focused on potential violent environmental conflicts and the researchers identified complex
relations between environmental and social factors that can provide early warning signals for
potential violent conflicts (Floyd 2015; Trombetta 2008). NATO has throughout been concerned
about state security and the alliance has maintained a relatively narrow focus on helping member
states’ armed forces handling harmful effects of climate change. Nevertheless, it was not until the
late 2000s that initiatives and operations were initiated (Floyd 2015).
Recently, NATO has related climate security to negative consequences of environmental
factors for military readiness and its ability to provide security, although the organization also
engages in civil emergency planning. Since 2009, there is an expert group within NATO looking
at the implications of environmental change on daily operations. NATO is particularly concerned
with energy security due to its potential harm on states and individuals. At a summit of the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) in 2014, Heads of State and Government declared that climate change
and increasing energy needs will severely affect future security, and they specifically linked
climate change to adverse effects for planning and implementation of operations (SDG
Knowledge Hub 2014). Dellmuth et al. (2018) claim that NATO securitized the climate to
safeguard its military force.
33
NATO’ securitization of climate change increases likelihood of securitization in Norway.
This is further strengthened by official statements in the national context on the security
dimension of climate change. In 2008, the then Prime Minister Stoltenberg stressed the severity
and urgency of climate change.
“Melting and flooding. Hurricanes harm people and destroy houses. Droughts
take people and crops. We have known about the climate threat for a long time.
But the scope turned out to be greater than what researchers previously
thought. The consequences more dramatic. And the time limits were shorter
than we thought. We have understood the seriousness. Now it is important not
to be discouraged.” (Stoltenberg 2008).4
As illustrated by the quote, climate change was considered a severe problem by the Stoltenberg
administration. Unlike the previous administration, Stoltenberg’s government brought the matter
to the table by repeatedly emphasizing the climate problem in official speeches and statements. In
2010, he said that: “The greatest challenge of our time are the problems of climate change. It
requires efforts both at home and abroad” (Stoltenberg 2010, 4). Not only did they affirm climate
change as a severe problem, the administration also made prevention of climate change one of
their top priorities. In 2009, Stoltenberg declared that: “A main priority for Norway is the work
against war, poverty and climate change” (Stoltenberg 2009, 17). In all annual New Year’s
speeches by the Prime Minister from 2007 to 2013, climate change was described as one of the
most serious problems of our time (Stoltenberg 2008; Regjeringen.no 2008).
Discourses about the security dimensions of climate change trickled down to senior security
officials within the armed forces. In 2015, climate change was addressed in the Norwegian
Armed Forces’ annual report, suggesting that such arguments were prevalent in the government
agency. In the report, climate change was defined as a threat in traditional terms, it was labeled as
a major threat to stability and security through the pressure it causes on state welfare via resource
shortage and migration (Forsvaret 2016). Thereto, climate politics is officially part of Norway’s
widened security concept (Utenriksdepartementet 2016). In 2010, the Norwegian Commander-in-
Chief, Harald Sunde, stressed the severity of climate change and its adverse effects for societal
security. Accordingly, emerging security problems are asymmetrical and transboundary and can
4 My translation from Norwegian to English.
34
cause ‘complex emergencies’, meaning multifaceted conflicts and humanitarian disasters
characterized by protracted periods of violence, large refugee flows, destruction of societies and
prevention of humanitarian aid. Sunde also linked climate change directly to armed conflicts
(Sunde 2010). Clearly, arguments regarding the security dimension of climate change took root
even among security officials.
To assess whether arguments of the type above were accepted by the Norwegian population,
I examine public opinion surveys and polls. According to the TNS Gallup’s (2016) yearly survey
on the Norwegian population’s beliefs about the climate and related political matters, 31 percent
of the respondents considered climate change as one of the three biggest challenges for Norway
and 60 percent said they were concerned about climate change affecting them directly. The
numbers decreased in 2010 to 2013 when other matters were prioritized, but in 2015, they
increased yet again. Correspondingly, climate change was generally most prioritized in 2009 and
2015 when respondents were asked to rank freely (TNS Gallups 2016). This is in line with what
to expect if securitization was accepted, the numbers peaked after climate change was
emphasized on the high-political security agenda and after the matter was issued by decision-
makers and security officials. In another study, the Norwegian population ranked pollution/the
environment as the second most important issue facing Norway in the next 20 years whereas
climate change was ranked as the fourth most pressing issue (Steentjes et al. 2017). A discourse
coalition on climate change and security took hold in Norway in the late 2000s. Consequently,
climate change was securitized in Norway during the late 2000s, but what sub-set of
securitizations was it?
Understandings of climate change and security within NATO and Norway resemble each
other. In NATO, there is a focus on the direct consequences of climate change with a short
perspective on the changes. The organization mainly work to handle harmful effects of the
phenomenon and apply a traditional security understanding that emphasizes state security. An
expert group looks at already prevalent consequences of climate change and the civil emergency
planning is intended to act quickly if disasters happen (Floyd 2015).
In official speeches, Stoltenberg to a certain extent concretized the danger posed by climate
change, for instance, by emphasizing that it causes instability and conflict in denoted regions
around the world. The Arctic is accentuated as a region that is particularly vulnerable to changes
which could lead to sever consequences for Norwegian security. Various effects on specific
35
dimensions, like energy and agriculture, were pin pointed as potentially stressful for the society
(Stoltenberg 2009, 2010). NATO’s interest in energy security is an example of concretization of
threats related to climate change. Moreover, social unrest in distant regions were believed to
heighten international stress which in turn could harm Norway (Stoltenberg 2008). As shown
above, senior officials within the armed forces stressed indirect socio-economic effects in the
form of violence, large refugee flows and societal destruction. Nonetheless, a distinct referent
object threatend by the consequences of climate change is not possible to discern in the official
statements. The intended referent object changes from individuals, the state and the planet
depending on the context. Regarding the time horizon, threats posed by climate change were
often considered imminent, particularly in the Arctic as environmental degradation and
subsequent political activity frequently were emphasized. Based on these factors and even though
a distinct referent object was not defined, I conclude that climate change was threatified in
Norway.
5.2 Dependent Variable – Changing Practices and Structures
Before Securitization
After several years of a deep structural crisis, the Norwegian government, in 2001, decided to
initiate a modernization of the defense. The intention was to create a flexible defense structure
and it was decided that the organization would be scaled down to increase mobility and
efficiency. Relevant competences were prioritized over maintenance of a large workforce.
International defense alliances, NATO, and multilateral cooperation were accentuated as
important for international as well as national security (Forsvarsdepartement 2001).
Following the 9/11 attacks the modernization strategy was supplemented by another plan
stressing international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as the greatest security threats
to Norway and the international community. Prevention and control of terrorism became topical
and new core objective for the armed forces were formulated. Since the armed forces lacked
capacity for such specialized operations, financial allocations were increased to strengthen the
state’s individual capacity as well as NATO’s overall ability to fight terrorism. Restructuring and
reorganization of the armed forces were expected to increase the military’s anti-terrorism
capacity and their general flexibility. International involvement was advocated and conducted
during the years (Forsvarsdepartement 2002). Since it was no longer viable to merely expect
36
violation of sovereignty by a rivalry state, the government emphasized a growing number of
security dimensions that must be reflected in the armed forces practices, the modernization of the
defense was supposed to account for those. The emergence of novel threats also requires more
effective collaboration between civilians and military instances. If Norway or NATO are exposed
to attacks, they must receive enough support from the civil society. Together with other
authorities, the military had a joint responsibility to protect Norway against state-level terrorism
(ibid).
The modernization of the Norwegian defense continued in 2005-2008 and the previous goals
remained, the armed forces became more flexible and competence oriented. Its units were
educated and equipped to intervene quickly nationally and internationally and adapt to different
circumstances (Forsvarsdepartement 2004). The quote below highlights the core values of the
modernization:
“The units and the sections of the armed forces ought to have high
responsiveness, be available, flexible and deployable, and be able to effectively
operate alone or in conjunction with forces from allied states, at home and
abroad” (Forsvarsdepartement 2004, 14).5
During the extensive modernization of the armed forces, major organizational changes were
made with some units being closed and new ones started. For instance, new specialized task
forces were formed (cyber security), and a NATO-center was established in Stavanger
(Forsvarsdepartementet 2009b, 2009a). The work force in peacetime was reduced and trained to
become more mobile. There was a distinct focus on violent confrontation, but non-conventional
examples of such were emphasized, for instance, terrorism, a transboundary issue that requires
coordinated national and international efforts. Collaborations between civil and military instances
and across institutional borders remained important throughout the period. The restructuring was
successful in the sense that a modern reaction-defense adjusted to the prevailing conditions was
developed (ibid).
5 My translation from Swedish to English.
37
After Securitization
In 2008, the Norwegian parliament adopted a new security strategy (2011-2012) concerning a
continued development of the reaction-oriented defense structure (organization). The ultimate
objective prevailed; to counteract pressure and aggression against Norway and Norwegian
interests. They highlighted the interconnectedness of contemporary issues and stated that peace
and security must be considered in a wide context. Norway’s engagement in international
operations, to promote international law, protecting human rights, and strengthen interstate
cooperation, is an important element of their security policy as it contributes to stability abroad,
and thereby Norway (Forsvarsdepartement 2012). The Northern parts of Norway was stressed as
a key region where presence needed to increase. Moreover, the armed forces’ responsibility to
support the society in crisis situations other than armed confrontations is emphasized, something
that is best accomplished through cross-sectional collaborations. The authority is an integrated
part of the Norwegian society and it is thereby interdependent on the surroundings. The total-
defense concept was also modernized with all the authority’s resources becoming available
during crises if necessary (Forsvarsdepartement 2013).
Overall, the strategy accentuates the importance of a balanced approach for the armed forces,
but the continuous modernization and the reaction-oriented alignment of the subsequent strategies
prevail. Compared to previous years, financial allocations to the Norwegian Armed Forces in
actual term increased in 2009-2012 and those finances were intended to attract, develop and
handle expertise. The capacity of specialized companies, like the intelligence unit and cyber
security unit, improved throughout the years (ibid).
Because of a strained economic situation and geopolitical changes with high military
demands, the government later allocated extra funding to the armed forces to make sure that they
could maintain high readiness and continuously work with further reforms. They prioritized
strengthened individual and collective defense followed by support of international operations
and improvement of the total defense. NATO remained as the fundament of Norwegian security.
The military was also responsible for supporting the police and other contingency authority’s in
case of severe events, for instance, terrorist attacks or natural disasters (Forsvarsdepartement
2016).
“The concept of total-defense means mutual support and collaboration between
the armed forces and the civil society in prevention, contingency planning,
38
crisis and consequence management over the whole spectrum, from peace via
crises to armed conflicts.” (Forsvarsdepartement 2016, 5).6
The quote illustrates the increased emphasis on preventive measures (national and international)
and collaboration across institutional borders.
However, changing circumstances once again brought to light permanent preparedness and
perseverance. In reports at the time, it is repeatedly stated that the military ought to have a
deterrent effect on eventual enemies. Investments in strategic capacity were made, including the
acquisition of new submarines, surveillance airplanes and warplanes. Development of a high-
technological arsenal was initiated (information technology, missile technology, AI weapons and
systems). These investments were enabled by reduction in other units. Because of increased
political tension, it was thereto stressed that military presence in the northern part of Norway
would be strengthened (Forsvarsdepartement 2016).
Because of the 2011 Norway terrorist attacks, the subsequent annual reports focus on anti-
terror measures and responsive measures in times of crises. During this time, previous goals
remained but armed attacks came into focus again. For instance, the armed forces’ goal of crises
management was distinctly focused on terrorist attacks. Likewise, the intelligence units got more
resources and predominantly worked to prevent and counteract terrorist activities. The national
home guard was responsible for the work to link civil and military operations. Because of
political changes in the surroundings, presence in the northern parts of the country was
strengthened with Norwegian forces and the coastguard patrolling and protecting the Russian
border. Their international involvement prevailed (Forsvaret 2012, 2013).
The trend continued in the subsequent years; national operations increased in northern
Norway for the purpose of protecting border agreements. The coast guard was particularly active
there, it is part of the naval armed forces and works with protection of ships and resources in
Norwegian waters, rescue operations, environmental protection and customs. Additionally,
NATO led exercises and international operations were conducted (Forsvaret 2014). The Russian
annexation of Crimea in 2014 caused increased mobilization of Norwegian forces at sea, in the
air, and in the regions bordering Russia. Norway advanced its national capacity and contributed
to the development of NATO’s strategic plans in the Norwegian surroundings. Exercises on
6 My translation from Norwegian to English.
39
collective defense preparedness, regional cooperation, and crises management were conducted.
Furthermore, the armed forces continued developing a competence-oriented defense structure
with a smaller force in times of peace, quick response and a well-functioning total defense were
prioritized (Forsvaret 2015, 2018). In 2015, they participated in the establishment of a new unit
within NATO; the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (Forsvaret 2016).
In sum, the practices and structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces remained somewhat alike
throughout the period of investigation. The work was, and to some extent still is, largely marked
by the extensive reorganization initiated in the early 2000s. Since then, the armed forces have
gradually transformed to a modern reaction-oriented defense where flexibility, fast response and
specialized competences are emphasized. NATO’s collective capacity and a well-functioning
total defense structure were prioritized throughout. In recent years, the armed forces have become
more active in the northern part of Norway.
Summary of Findings for the Dependent Variable
Before Threatification After Threatification
Practices and Structure Primarily responsive measures.
Involvement in international
operations.
Collaboration with other
government agencies.
Primarily responsive measures.
Intervention in vulnerable areas; the
Arctic region and international
operations.
Collaboration with other
government agencies.
Table 4: Summary of findings in Norway.
40
6. Empirical Findings – Sweden
By applying the theoretical framework, I show that climate change was riskified in Sweden
during the late-2000s. Security argument on climate change in Sweden did not recognize specific
threats or specific referent objects endangered by the phenomenon’s consequences. Climate
change was riskified in Sweden and after that, the armed forces practices and structure altered.
Just like with the Norwegian case, I examine the case in line with the research design. To mark
the shift in the perception of climate change, I divide the dependent variable section into two
parts; before and after securitization.
6.1 Independent Variable – Securitization of Climate Change
In the beginning of the 2000s, the EU took a lead in climate policy development and committed
to binding emission reduction targets, supposedly as a response to US decision to not ratify the
Kyoto Protocol (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016; Dupont 2019). Not only did it develop
climate policies, it also emphasized the security dimension of climate change. According to
Dupont (2019), EU’s member states collectively securitized climate change in the late 2000s.
Already in 2003, EU published a security strategy stating that climate change would potentially
create turbulence and migration in the future. In 2006, EU stated that “the effects of climate
change may have major implications for national and world security” (Dupont 2019, 377) and in
2007, the EU stated climate change is an issue that is having a “considerable impact on
international security issues” (Dupont 2019, 377). Clearly, EU was concerned with security
implications at international and national levels.
The collective securitization of climate change in the EU is an indicator of securitization in
Sweden. Macro-securitization influences national discourses, an effect further strengthened by
Sweden’s EU presidency during the peak of climate change deliberation. In 2009, Sweden had
the presidency of the Council of the European Union and the government had two leading
ambitions for their presidency; for EU to continue taking responsibility for the climate threat and
to grow strong after the financial crisis. The government explicitly stated that the two matters
were the most pressing issues for the union at the time (Riksdagsförvaltningen 2010). Prior to the
presidency, the government consulted the Swedish parliament about what to prioritize (ibid).
Acceptance of the climate threat as one of two primary priorities shows that arguments about the
security dimension of climate change were strong in the national context.
41
Moreover, official statements by the then ruling administration show that influential
decision-makers argued for the security dimension of climate change. Securitization speech acts
repeatedly happened (Regeringskansliet 2014a). In Tokyo 2008, then Swedish Prime Minister
Reinfeldt issued the following statement when speaking at a symposium.
“Today, we live in a world of many challenges and opportunities. However, if I
am to focus on one issue that will have an impact – not only on us – but on
future generations – it is climate change. (…) Even if we do not fully
understand the exact consequences climate change will have in different parts
of the world, we do know that in some parts of our world global warming will
result in water shortages, drought and deserts spreading. In other parts it will
lead to more extreme weather conditions, such as storms and flooding.”
(Regeringskansliet 2014b, 43).
This is one of many statements in which the Reinfeldt administration highlight the severity of
climate change. Importantly, he underlined the great variety of potential consequences and how
regions are affected differently. He also maintained that climate change is not something remote,
its consequences are already visible and palpable. Later that year in Beijing, Reinfeldt
emphasized the danger of climate change and exemplified how issues can arise.
“Finally, development is more than freedom from poverty. It is also about
human rights, human health, a clean and healthy environment and social
welfare. It is about quality of life. A good quality of life is the core of
sustainable development. A changing climate leads to the opposite”
(Regeringskansliet 2014b, 25).
The quotes above indicate the type of securitization in Sweden, this is discussed further below.
Arguments on the security dimension of climate change have trickled down from top political
positions to senior officials within the armed forces. Already in 2009, Håkan Syrén, then Swedish
Commander-in-Chief, briefly framed climate change as a threat and Sverker Göransson, another
former Swedish Commander-in-Chief, highlighted potential security consequences of climate
change in 2010 (Syrén 2009; Göransson 2010). In 2013, the director general of the Swedish
Armed Forces, Peter Sandwall, described climate change as one of three factors causing major
42
geopolitical changes. He explicitly stated that the Swedish Armed Forces’ estimate that climate
change will have critical security implications now and in the future (Sandwall 2009).
High-level politicians and security officials have promoted security arguments related to
climate change, but has the population acknowledged the same? According to the Special Euro
Barometer 435 from 2015, the Swedish population considered that climate change was the most
serious challenge facing the world at the time. 37 percent of the respondents in Sweden ranked it
as the most severe problem, before problems like poverty, international terrorism, the economic
situation and armed conflicts. When allowed to select up to four serious problems facing the
world, 76 percent of the Swedish respondents mentioned climate change (TNS Opinion & Social
2015). Numbers from Pew Research Center in 2019 show corresponding tendencies with 69
percent of the Swedish respondents believing that climate change is a major threat to the state
(Poushter and Huang 2019). In the Eurobarometer 372 published in 2011, shortly after the
proposed securitization, 30 percent of the Swedish respondents said that climate change was the
single most serious problem facing the world. That was an increase from previous years and the
general trend among European citizens was that climate change is becoming an increasing
problem (TNS Opinion & Social 2011). This implies that arguments regarding the security
dimension of climate change laid out by decision-makers were commonly accepted by the
Swedish population.
As evident by the security arguments dominating in the national context, securitization of
climate change was successful in Sweden. Nonetheless did securitization in Sweden and the
European Union happen overnight, instead, it was a long process of several events and decision
over the course of many years. But what type of securitization happened? Was climate change
threatified or riskified?
The quotes above illustrate the type of arguments that dominated the national context at the
time of securitization. Climate change was commonly considered to increase the general
probability of instability and few indirect socio-economic threats of climate change was
emphasized. When presenting the agenda of the Sweden’s EU presidency before the EU’s
parliament, Reinfeldt again spoke about climate change as a factor increasing the general
probability of instability.
“We are experiencing more extreme weather conditions, with severe storms
and droughts. And while this is happening, emission levels have not even
43
started to decline (…). There is no more time to lose, if we do not want our
children to suffer even more dramatic consequences of climate change.”
(Regeringskansliet 2014b, 12).
Reinfeldt highlighted the severity of climate change but spoke about dangers in vague terms
regarding threat concretization and time horizon. The administration at the time did not
emphasize distinct threats, instead, it made sweeping descriptions of the consequences of climate
change. Neither did it primarily stress imminent consequences of the phenomenon. In the quote
above, Reinfeldt applied a vague time horizon by speaking about future consequences for ‘our
children’. Furthermore, a distinct referent object of the risks was not defined, climate change did
proposedly not pose a threat to specific referent objects. Its effects are multifaceted, and the
objects affected by them are manifold. Similar patterns are identified in many of his public
statements and speeches, climate change was riskified in Sweden. The results are further
supported by the then dominant understanding within the EU. In 2008, the High Representative
and the European Commission released a report on climate change and international security.
Unlike previous papers and statements, the 2008 report moved away from neo-Malthusian
arguments of resource scarcity. It explains how climate change is a threat multiplier that
exacerbates already existing trends and instabilities (Dupont 2019).
6.2 Dependent Variable – Changing Practices and Structures
Before Securitization
In the early 2000s, the Swedish defense was transformed from an invasion defense to an
intervention defense. A strategic decision by the Swedish government in 2004, caused by external
political changes and changing economic conditions, changed the aims for the armed forces. The
government decided to carry out an extensive reorganization which meant the closure of several
organizational units, relocation of some and the start-up of only a few. Security was largely
perceived as a global matter, international cooperation and operations were increasingly
prioritized to strengthen international peace and security for Sweden, EU, and the rest of the
world. Conflict prevention and conflict management in vulnerable areas were expected to bring
stability in the international order, with peace and development coming hand in hand. Sweden’s
intelligence would be strengthened to keep up with Sweden’s increased international
involvement. The overall defense capacity, combined civilian and military ability, was only given
44
little attention. There was almost an exclusive focus on violent conflicts in the proposition, for
instance, intelligence was conducted to detect and prevent external threats like terrorism. The
transition to an intervention defense and reduced financial allocations meant that the workforce
was reduced (Riksdagsförvaltningen 2004b, 2004a). The 2004 proposition was in force until
2009 when the subsequent security strategy was adopted.
During the first years that followed the decision in 2004, the armed forces primarily worked
with the reorganization. From 2005 to 2007, they primarily sought to guarantee their responsive
capacity and increase international presence (Afghanistan, Liberia, Democratic Republic of
Kongo etc.). The military handled these priorities simultaneously. International cooperation
involved conflict management and prevention, and there was a distinct focus on military capacity
(Försvarsmakten 2006, 2007). In the 2007 annual report, the then Swedish commander in chief
stated that the authority prioritized providing long-term sustainability for the transition work done
in the recent years’ (Försvarsmakten 2008). The armed forces practice during these years were,
according to the annual reports, in line with the 2004 security strategy and overall, most of their
work were centered around social unrest and armed conflicts.
In 2008, major cutbacks were necessary because of reduced financial allocations; fewer
people were recruited, exercises decreased, and less people were sufficiently educated. However,
an important exception was made for the Nordic Battle Group (NBG) as part of Sweden’s
transition to a response-oriented defense. Resources were allocated to strengthen the group and
cooperation with the other countries involved. This speaks to the general focus on armed
conflicts.
After Securitization
The subsequent strategic decision adopted in 2009 encouraged continued development to an
intervention-oriented defense with the biggest difference being that the defense capacity again
would increase. The government considered it important to increase the number of useful and
available units that flexibly can be used in national and international settings, flexibility was
emphasized, and new types of threats were accentuated. Issues were described as interconnected,
transboundary, complex and of varying time horizons and to cope with those, the ability to
integrate civilians and military operations would be strengthened. A comprehensive approach to
45
security began to emerge, involving a cross-sectional perspective hoping to guarantee the
society’s functionality and people’s health (Riksdagsförvaltningen 2009).
“Comprehensiveness and collaboration strengthen security. Security must be
defended by military and non-military means” (Riksdagsförvaltningen 2009,
15).7
The armed forces involvement in social protection and readiness advanced. Moreover, a
declaration of solidarity with the EU member-countries, Norway and Iceland was accepted and
yet again, the government decided to increase international presence and participation in
multilateral cooperation’s led by EU, UN and NATO. Importantly, the government adopted a
wider security perspective that later influenced security policies (ibid).
According to the annual reports, the armed forces developed in line with the strategic
decision in 2009. Sweden’s international presence remained, and the armed forces strengthened
the capacity of their military defense, but to a greater extent than before, the ability to support the
civilian society and other authorities was emphasized. Despite efforts being occasional,
collaborations with other authorities were planned and prepared (Försvarsmakten 2012, 2013,
2014). For instance, the exercises carried out in 2013 were more complex and involved a greater
variety of units (Försvarsmakten 2014). Still, most activities had their point of departure in
defense against territorial violations and armed attacks. In 2014, the military helped the civil
society with fire-extinguishing of extensive wildfires and disaster management became topical
with it (Försvarsmakten 2015).
Again in 2015, the government proposed a security strategy that later was accepted by the
parliament. The proposition account for a worsened security situation in Europe and the
government thus decided to strengthen Sweden’s defense capability. Ultimately, the armed forces
were supposed to be able to face an armed attack by external actors (Regeringskansliet 2015).
Furthermore, the combined capacity of the civilian and military defense was underlined. The
national context was prioritized on the behalf of international operations although Sweden
continued to work with conflict prevention abroad. Sovereignty and protection of Sweden’s
values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law are core features of the 2015 security
strategy. However, to an even greater extent than the previous strategy, this plan takes a holistic
7 My translation from Swedish to English.
46
approach to security. Security policy is accordingly part of the society’s collective resources to
manage challenges to our safety, planning for a new civil defense was initiated (ibid).
Consequently, the civilian defense increasingly became an integral part of the defense
organization through coordinated planning and joint exercises. International collaborations were
further strengthened and new domains, like psychological defense and enhanced cyber security,
were introduced. Sweden moved from an intervention-oriented defense to a modern, national
total-defense demanding a broad commitment anchored in the society. Because of uncertainty
about what the future holds, the armed forces would be prepared to handle a variety of issues
(ibid).
The years following the adoption of the security strategy were marked by the new
orientation. In 2016, Sweden strengthened bilateral cooperation with Finland and the US. Even
domestic collaborations with other authorities and actors were widely strengthened, the armed
forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency jointly developed a concept for the total-
defense to guarantee capacity and readiness (Försvarsmakten 2017). The combined capacity of
the civil and military defenses was increasingly highlighted with less focus on violent
confrontations and more emphasis on interconnected crises. Several times in 2017, the armed
forces conducted operations involving protection of safety-worthy activities, primarily transports
but also stationary objects. Simultaneously, intelligence units developed to be better at handling
cyber-attacks and other cross-sectional threats like manipulation of information. The Swedish
Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency are planning to conduct an
encompassing exercise in 2020 to test the capacity of the total-defense and a particular focus on
maintaining socially important activities (Försvarsmakten 2018). In 2018, disaster management
became topical yet again due to the widespread wildfires. The security idea stressing the society’s
collective resources to manage challenges to our safety is illustrated by the authority’s vison:
“A stronger defense – facing all threats, handling all challenges”
(Försvarsmakten 2019, 4).8
The ultimate objective for the Swedish armed forces has remained unchanged; to safeguard
sovereignty and Swedish values. However, thoughts on what the objective entails and how it is
best achieved has changed over time.
8 My translation from Swedish to English.
47
In sum, two major changes are observable in the analysis above. First, Sweden went from
developing a reaction defense heavily involved in international operations to an encompassing
defense emphasizing the national context. This alteration is explained by changing surroundings
and increased tensions, with the Russian annexation of Crimea as a decisive event. It is difficult
to assess if riskification of climate change the late-2000s in Sweden affected the national focus.
Second, Sweden changed from a downscaled specialized defense to a comprehensive defense
combining various elements – civilian and military – to account for potential security issues. This
might have been influenced by the riskification of climate change that is expected to cause a
holistic security understanding due to ideas of threat-multiplying and interconnectedness.
Riskification of climate change in Sweden happened before the gradual transformation to a total-
defense, meaning that environmental and climate change discourses could have had implications
for the armed forces practices and structure. In the later reports, it is repeatedly stated that
security matters are cross-sectional and erratic which requires a defense that can handle different
types of challenges (Försvarsmakten 2015, 2017, 2018). Focus on armed confrontations remains,
but unlike before, the defense is now expected to be prepared for potential increases in instability.
The changes described are reflected in security strategies and annual assessment reports.
Summary of Findings for the Dependent Variable
Before Riskification After Riskification
Practices and Structure Responsive measures, intervention-
oriented defense.
Involvement in international
operations.
Contingency planning.
Collaboration with other
government agencies.
General resilience building.
National emphasis.
Table 5: Summary of findings in Sweden.
48
7. Analysis
In the empirical findings above, I demonstrate that climate change was securitized in both cases
during the late-2000s. The difference between Norway and Sweden is the type of securitization
that occurred; it was threatified in the former context whereas it was riskified in latter. Thus,
differences in the armed forces’ organizational structure and priorities should be observable after
securitization, both within each case and across them. Observations were made over time, before
and after securitization, to investigate whether this is the case. The analysis produced mixed
results which is discussed in detail below. This section begins with a comparison of the cases and
then follows an extended analysis where I discuss implications of the findings. Later, I discuss
alternative explanations and lastly, I highlight theoretical and methodological shortcomings I
could not circumvent.
7.1 Comparison of Cases
The organizational structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces changed marginally after the
threatification of climate change. The same type of tasks has been prioritized ever since the
extensive reorganization of the authority in the early 2000s. In terms of the big picture, Norway
has continuously developed a reaction-oriented defense structure. The organization is modern and
reactionary in the sense that it can handle various threats in different contexts, it has a short
reaction time with a smaller but highly professional and specialized workforce that makes the
authority more effective. In addition, the authority has maintained a simultaneous notional and
international focus, claiming that international conflict prevention and management contributes to
international stability and thereby prevents national unrest. Also, Norway has throughout
promoted collaboration between civilian and military instances with its total-defense concept that
uninterruptedly been part of their security strategy. This was not an expected consequence of
threatification of climate change.
The changes following the threatification of climate change were minor, yet important. As
expected by the theory, climate-related security issues were brought into the armed forces
agenda, although not in an explicit and direct sense, rather indirect socio-economic consequence
of climate change. The armed forces became increasingly active in the northern parts of the
country. Political activity and potential competition for resources in the Arctic due to the
changing environment are two reasons for prioritizing of the North (Forsvarsdepartement 2016;
49
Forsvaret 2018, 2015). Coastguard patrolling border areas and protecting Norwegian resources
are examples of short-term actions targeting indirect but concrete socio-economic effects of
climate change. Likewise, disaster management, either national or international, can be
considered short-term measures targeting indirect effects of climate change. Changes in Norway
before and after securitization were small but observable. It is not surprising that a major
restructuring of the armed forces’ organization did not happen since a security notion based on
threat-logics likely prevailed also before the threatification of climate change.
In Sweden, however, major changes in the organizational took place after the riskification of
climate change. In the early 2000s, it was decided that the armed forces would be modernized
and restructured. Like Norway, the reorganization focused on reducing the workforces, making it
more flexible and efficient while providing necessary capacity at the right time. Sweden changed
from an invasion-oriented defense to one emphasizing the reactionary capacity. The development
continued until after the riskification of climate change in the national context in the late-2000s
when a gradual transformation of priorities was initiated. Unlike before, the armed forces’
obligation to support the civilian society and other authorities was accentuated. Even though it
was subordinated to other priorities, collaborations with other authorities were established
(Försvarsmakten 2012, 2013, 2014).
The adoption of the most recent security strategy, in 2015, accelerated the initiated changes.
Sweden resumed the total-defense concept, the combined capacity of civilians and military
instances, after many years of rest. The Swedish Armed Forces changed security approach, from
favoring a downscaled specialized defense intended to quickly act on emerging threats to a
comprehensive defense with the purpose of limiting future potential harms. Security policy
accordingly became part of the society’s collective resources to manage challenges to our safety.
In 2017, the Swedish government released a national security strategy that assessed necessary
measures to provide secure settings and make appropriate priorities. The strategy defines national
interests, current threats and risks, and states that Sweden must be prepared for long-term dangers
and challenges (Regeringskansliet 2017). Nevertheless, the idea of comprehensive capacity only
applies to the national context on the behalf of international operations which was not an
expected consequence of riskification.
In the early 2000s, the armed forces in Norway and Sweden had similar organizational
structures and strategic alignments. Prior securitizations, both authorities adapted to changes in
50
the surroundings by developing a flexible and responsive body. One significant difference is that
collaboration between government agencies and cooperation between civilian and military
instances was continuously emphasized in Norway while it was absent in Sweden, but that
changed with securitization. Since climate change was riskified in Sweden, the Swedish Armed
Forces has prioritized the total-defense concept and increased capacity of the national defense.
Following securitizations in the late 2000s, each state’s armed forces have adopted different
approaches. Norway develops a response-oriented defense whereas Sweden has adopted the idea
of security being the society’s collective capacity to reduce harms. The Swedish armed forces are
foremost organized to withstand atrocities and to reduce potential harms in the long-term.
Norway’s counterpart is primarily organized to quickly respond to a variety of dangers and
strives to contribute to NATO’s joint defense capacity and thereby contribute to peace and
stability. They focus more on the international context than the Swedish Armed Forces. However,
they have continuously prioritized collaboration across institutional borders. Both states’ armed
forces engage in similar practices, but since the variations of securitizations they prioritized them
to varying extent. Threatification of climate change was followed by the prioritization of
responsive mechanisms and riskification of climate change was succeeded by emphasis on
contingency planning. Moreover, arguments about the security dimensions of climate change
trickled down from highest political level to senior security officials and importantly, the types of
arguments did not change along the way.
7.2 Extended Analysis and Alternative Explanations
Even though they have many common features, it is shown that the armed forces’ structure and
organization in Norway and Sweden differ in important aspects. The variations of securitization
seem to affect their priorities; riskification induced prioritization of general readiness whereas
threatification led to a focus on responsive capacity. The hypotheses are only partly supported
which indicates that other aspects also have had an effect. Variations of securitizations can only
account for some of the prioritizations by the armed forces, meaning that other factors also have
influenced the armed forces’ practices and structures.
Three important teachings can be made from these empirical findings and the subsequent
analysis. First, variations of securitization cannot be entirely dismissed as theoretical concepts
lacking relevance for the ‘real world’. The type of logic underlying security arguments has
51
implications for the understanding of security issues which in turn affect how they are handled.
Different arguments about the security dimension took hold in the national debate leading to the
establishment of varying discourse coalitions. Although the security dimension of climate change
was stressed in both contexts, there are different perceptions of why it is harmful and whom it
threatens. The varying practices and structures following securitization suggest that framings of
security matters influence allocated means to provide security.
Second, there were synergy between political instances and military spheres in Norway and
Sweden. Political decisions and alignments at highest level affected how the armed forces
behaved. It is not only financial allocations that determine activity, but also the perception of
potential dangers. The analysis of the independent variable shows that claims made by high-level
politicians were picked up by senior officials in the armed forces and that arguments trickled
down from politicians to authorities. It took time, but climate change has even been discussed in
both countries’ military annual reports. This indicates causality between the variables.
Third, there is not one uniform understanding of security and climate change. Framings of
climate change as a security issue, instead of a developmental or political matter, can be based on
different grounds and be made for various reasons. As Scott (2012) writes, it can serve to
enhance and widen policy responses “at various governance levels by facilitating policy makers
and their publics recognizing the common origins of what may otherwise appear as unconnected
phenomena” (Scott 2012, 229). Narratives on impacts and consequences of climate change are
formed to make sense of the by nature interconnected and multifaceted issue. These narratives are
naturally influenced by the context they are created within and varying aspects are highlighted
(Scott 2012; Rothe 2012). Diez et al. (2016) find that national debates on climate and security
evolve in widely varying ways and that they are difficult to influence from outside. Thus, it is not
enough to analyze if climate change and security are brought together, one must also ask in what
way they are connected. The analysis shows that the framing of the security dimension of climate
change differ in Norway and Sweden, two similar contexts.
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge relevant alternative explanations. The most
obvious objection to the results is that other political and social changes have caused the
outcome. The basic function of the armed forces is to protect the state’s values and provide
security and it is therefore reasonable that they constantly adapt to the needs of the time. And
quite rightly, the armed forces’ practices and priorities are affected by the surroundings. Both
52
countries explicitly responded to increased Russian military activity in Georgia and Ukraine, and
Norway responded with an increased focus on terrorism after the 2011 Norway attacks when 77
people were killed and many more injured (“Utöya och Oslo: Terrorattentaten i Norge 2011”
n.d.). However, the research design with the two-fold comparative approach accounts for many of
those changes. The comparison within cases isolate for contextual changes and the comparison
across cases isolate for events in the surroundings.
The Norway attacks altered the armed forces priorities in the short run but did not get far-
reaching consequences. The Russian annexation of Crimea heavily influenced alignments within
the armed forces in Norway and Sweden. In the most recent Swedish strategic decision, it is
explicitly stated that increased military activity in the state’s immediate area caused the priority
of the national context (Regeringskansliet 2015). Factors of this type might explain increased
military activities and certain strategic decision, but it does not explain the varying responses to
the issue. One cannot completely ignore the effect of variations of securitization and changing
security notions; it seems like different events have had different implications for segments of the
armed forces practices’ and structure.
Another concern could be that the armed forces’ practices and structure are influenced by
political alignments, but the research design yet again rejects such explanations. Both countries
were led by governments with different political orientations in the period. Although there is
synergy between political instances and military spheres in Norway and Sweden, such processes
are expectedly moderate. Research shows that military institutions generally are reluctant to
engage in political matters (Thomas 2017). Moreover, the empirical analysis shows that it took
time before climate change was acknowledged in military strategies and reports, reasonably
indicating that armed forces do not immediately embrace political arguments. Thereto, during the
time of securitization, Norway and Sweden had administration of varying political ideologies
(Regjeringen.no 2008).
7.3 Limitations and Caveats
This study comes with limitations I could not account for, both theoretical and methodological
flaws inhibit the general strength of the study with potential implications for the results. Although
I designed the study to isolate for alternative explanations and confounding variables by keeping
factors constant across cases and doing analyses over time, a comparative case study of only two
53
cases is not able to control for all possible confounders and differences between the cases. Below
I revisit decisions made during the research process and critically assess what could and should
have been done differently. I begin by explaining theoretical limitations and then continue with
methodological flaws.
I investigate a phenomenon that is under constant change. The theory presupposes that
concepts are always open to negotiation and I can thus only interpret situations. Still, I believe
that interpretation cannot be written off as completely irrelevant. They can tell us something
about prevalent situations and by contrasting varying contexts it might be possible to make
assessments. Along the same lines, McDonald (2008) claims that securitization is not a
“shorthand for the broader construction of security” (McDonald 2008, 564). Instead, it is a
framework that recognizes a discursive position, a product, but overlooks the historical and social
contexts in which descriptions of security are created. Securitization does not equate security
understandings but can be used as a tool to understand dominant narratives. Consequently, I
cannot make inferences about complete security understandings which I have refrained from
doing. This must also be considered by anyone reading the results of this study. As all theories,
the securitization framework is a simplification of reality, and while a conceptual framework
cannot do everything, it can contribute to the understanding of complex phenomena.
Discourses are formed in historical and social contexts which inevitably makes results
difficult to generalize. However, if generalized to other countries with similar political structures
and a comparably sized armed forces, the findings in this study can be applied to other contexts.
George and Bennet claim that this is often the case in case studies, “Case study researchers rarely
‘overgeneralize’ from their cases; instead, they are frequently careful in providing circumscribed
‘contingent generalization’ that subsequent researchers should not mistakenly overgeneralize.”
(George and Bennett 2005, 84).
There are also some methodological choices that limits the strength of the study. First, the
application of the dynamic securitization framework is not without flaws. I only examine
language when addressing securitization although analyses of speech acts can be supplemented
by practices and policy tools to provide a more truthful picture of the discursive position
(McDonald 2008). Also, I merely investigate responses from a denoted audience, namely the
populations of the country although others have explained the prevalence of multi-levelled
audiences (Dupont 2019). Second, the wide unit of analysis of the study required delimitations.
54
The scale of political and military instances made it necessary to delimit and exclude a variety of
agents and structures. These deliberate choices were necessary for the feasibility of the study but
might skew the results and is therefore important to bear in mind.
Lastly, practical limitations might have influenced the results. I relied on documents,
speeches, reports and articles in the analyses of the independent and the dependent variables.
Those examined were singled out based on availability, they needed to be open and free to access
and had to be published by the political administration or the armed forces. This limits the
material analyzed in the study.
55
8. Conclusion
The security dimension of climate change has been widely investigated and discussed by
researchers and decision-makers. Climate change has been brought into high-level security
domains and is today considered as a national security issue in most countries (Holland and Vagg
2013; Brzoska 2012b). Research shows that understandings about the dangers posed by climate
change differ in states and organizations (Floyd 2015; Trombetta 2012; Dellmuth et al. 2018). In
this paper, I have asked what implications varying representations of dangers have for one of the
most influential security actors, namely the armed forces, and I find that understandings of the
security dimension of climate change in the national context can affect armed forces’ activities
and organization.
This study contributes to existing research in three ways: First, it shows that variations of
securitization are relevant to the ‘real world’. Second, in certain contexts there is interaction
between political and military spheres. Third, there is not one uniform understanding of security
and climate change. Future research needs to further address the practical consequences of
different security notions, for national security agencies and other government agencies.
Moreover, it is necessary to investigate the effects of variations of securitization in contexts that
are vastly different from Norway and Sweden.
Climate change and environmental degradation destabilize what we previously have taken
for granted. Regardless of how the problem is framed, one thing is certain; climate change is not
a distant phenomenon. It is therefore time to act.
56
9. Bibliography
All Things Considered. 2017. “How Natural Disasters Make Major Cities Vulnerable To National
Security Threats.” NPR.Org. September 10, 2017.
https://www.npr.org/2017/09/10/549989643/how-natural-disasters-make-major-cities-vulnerable-
to-national-security-threats.
Åsberg, Carl Johan, and Peter Wallensteen. 1998. “New Threats and New Security: The Post-Cold War
Debate Revisited.” In , 35. Uppsala: Dept. Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-32191.
BBC News. 2018. “Trump Dismisses US Climate Change Report,” November 26, 2018, sec. US &
Canada. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46351940.
Beck, Ulrich. 1999. World Risk Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bretthauer, Judith M. 2017. Climate Change and Resource Conflict: The Role of Scarcity. Routledge
Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge.
Brown, Lester R. 1986. “Redefining National Security.” Challenge 29 (3): 25–32.
Brzoska, Michael. 2012a. “Climate Change as a Driver of Security Policy.” In Climate Change, Human
Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability, edited by Jürgen Scheffran,
Michael Brzoska, Hans Günter Brauch, Peter Michael Link, and Janpeter Schilling, 165–84.
Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer
Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28626-1_8.
———. 2012b. “Climate Change and the Military in China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68 (2): 43–54.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340212438384.
———. 2015. “Climate Change and Military Planning.” International Journal of Climate Change
Strategies and Management 7 (2): 172–90. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCCSM-10-2013-0114.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder,
Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
Cambridge Dictionary. n.d. “THE ARMED FORCES | Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary.”
Accessed May 21, 2019. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/armed-forces.
Collins, Alan, ed. 2013. Contemporary Security Studies. 3. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conca, Ken, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko. 2018. Green Planet Blues: Critical Perspectives on Global
Environmental Politics. Boulder, UNITED STATES: Routledge.
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uu/detail.action?docID=1652865.
57
Corry, Olaf. 2012. “Securitisation and ‘Riskification’: Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate
Change.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40 (2): 235–58.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829811419444.
Crutzen, Paul J. 2002. “Geology of Mankind.” Nature 415 (January): 23. https://doi.org/10.1038/415023a.
Dalby, Simon. 2009. Security and Environmental Change. Cambridge: Polity.
Dellmuth, Lisa M., Maria-Therese Gustafsson, Niklas Bremberg, and Malin Mobjörk. 2018.
“Intergovernmental Organizations and Climate Security: Advancing the Research Agenda.” Wiley
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 9 (1). https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.496.
Deudney, Daniel. 1990. “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security.”
Millennium 19 (3): 461–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298900190031001.
Diez, Thomas, Franziskus von Lucke, and Zehra Wellmann. 2016. The Securitisation of Climate Change:
Actors, Processes and Consequences. London, UNITED KINGDOM: Routledge.
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uu/detail.action?docID=4516506.
Dupont, Claire. 2019. “The EU’s Collective Securitisation of Climate Change.” West European Politics
42 (2): 369–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1510199.
Emmers, Ralf. 2019. “Securitization.” In Contemporary Security Studies, edited by Alan Collins, fifth,
173–87. Oxford University Press.
Esaiasson, Peter, Mikael Gilljam, Henrik Oscarsson, and Lena Wängnerud, eds. 2012. Metodpraktikan:
konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. 4., [rev.] uppl. Stockholm: Norstedts juridik.
Fagan, Brian. 2004. The Long Summer: How Climate Changed Civilization. New York: Basic Books.
Floyd, Rita. 2014. Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security
Policy. Cambridge University Press.
———. 2015. “Global Climate Security Governance: A Case of Institutional and Ideational
Fragmentation.” Conflict, Security & Development 15 (2): 119–46.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2015.1034452.
———. 2019. “Collective Securitisation in the EU: Normative Dimensions.” West European Politics 42
(2): 391–412. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1510200.
Forsvaret. 2012. “Forsvarets Årsrapport 2011.” Forsvaret.
———. 2013. “Forsvarets Årsrapport 2012.” Forsvaret.
———. 2014. “Forsvarets Årsrapport 2013.” Forsvaret.
———. 2015. “Forsvarets Årsrapport 2014.” Forsvaret.
———. 2016. “Forsvarets Årsrapport 2015.” Forsvaret.
———. 2018. “Forsvarets Årsrapport 2017.” Forsvaret.
58
Forsvarsdepartement. 2001. “Omleggingen Av Forsvaret i Perioden 2002–2005.” St.prp. nr. 45. Kongelige
Forsvarsdepartement.
———. 2002. “Gjennomføringsproposisjonen Forsvaret i Perioden 2002–2005.” St.prp.nr.55. Kongelige
Forsvarsdepartement.
———. 2004. “Den Videre Moderniseringen Av Forsvaret i Perioden 2005–2008.” St.prp. nr. 42.
Kongelige Forsvarsdepartement.
———. 2012. “Et Forsvar for Vår Tid.” Prop. 73 S. Kongelige Forsvarsdepartement.
———. 2013. “Evalueringsrapport 2009–2012.” Det Kongelige Forsvarsdepartement.
———. 2016. “Kampkraft Og Bærekraft - Langtidsplan for Forsvarssektoren.” Prop. 151. Det Kongelige
Forsvarsdepartement.
Forsvarsdepartementet. 2009a. “Forsvarsomstillingen 2002–2005.” Redaksjonellartikkel. Regjeringen.no.
May 26, 2009. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dep/fd/rydde/forsvarsomstillingen-
20022005/id476331/.
———. 2009b. “Moderniseringen av Forsvaret 2002–2008.” Redaksjonellartikkel. Regjeringen.no. May
26, 2009. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dep/fd/rydde/moderniseringen-av-forsvaret-2002-
2008/id548644/.
Försvarsmakten. 2006. “Årsredovisning 2005.” Stockholm: Försvarsmakten.
———. 2007. “Årsredovisning 2006.” Stockholm: Försvarsmakten.
———. 2008. “Årsredovisning 2007.” Stockholm: Försvarsmakten.
———. 2012. “Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2011.” Stockholm: Försvarsmakten.
———. 2013. “Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2012.” Stockholm: Försvarsmakten.
———. 2014. “Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2013.” Stockholm: Försvarsmakten.
———. 2015. “Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2014.” Stockholm: Försvarsmakten.
———. 2017. “Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2016.” Stockholm: Försvarsmakten.
———. 2018. “Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2017.” Stockholm: Försvarsmakten.
———. 2019. “Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2018.” Försvarsmakten.
https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/om-myndigheten/dokument/arsredovisningar/.
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences. MIT Press.
Gerring, John. 2006. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uu/detail.action?docID=288451.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter. 2012. “Whither the Weather? Climate Change and Conflict.” Journal of Peace
Research 49 (1): 3–9. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311431288.
59
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, and Ragnhild Nordås. 2014. “Conflicting Messages? The IPCC on Conflict and
Human Security.” Political Geography, Special Issue: Climate Change and Conflict, 43
(November): 82–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.08.007.
Göransson, Sverker. 2010. “Anförande Av Överbefälhavare Sverker Göransson - Folk Och Försvars
Rikskonferens 2010.” https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/om-myndigheten/dokument/obs-tal-och-
debattartiklar/.
Harrington, Cameron, Emma Lecavalier, and Clifford Shearing. 2017. “From Passengers to Crew:
Introductory Reflections.” Crime, Law and Social Change; Dordrecht 68 (5): 493–98.
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.its.uu.se/10.1007/s10611-017-9698-y.
Hartmann, Betsy. 2010. “Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the
Politics of Policy Discourse.” Journal of International Development, Journal of International
Development, 22 (2): 233–46.
Holland, Andrew, and Xander Vagg. 2013. “The Global Security Defense Index on Climate Change::
Preliminary Results National Security Perspectives on Climate Change from Around the World.”
American Security Project. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06007.
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1999. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Kaplan, Robert D. 2000. “The Coming Anarchy.” In Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century,
edited by Patrick O’Meara, Howard D. Mehlinger, Matthew Krain, and Roxana Ma Newman, 34–
60. A Reader. Indiana University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt2005tk7.8.
Lucke, Franziskus von, Zehra Wellmann, and Thomas Diez. 2014. “What’s at Stake in Securitising
Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach.” Geopolitics 19 (4): 857–84.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2014.913028.
McDonald, Matt. 2008. “Securitization and the Construction of Security.” European Journal of
International Relations 14 (4): 563–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066108097553.
Melton, Michelle. 2018. “Climate Change and National Security, Part I: What Is the Threat, When’s It
Coming, and How Bad Will It Be?” Lawfare. November 19, 2018.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/climate-change-and-national-security-part-i-what-threat-whens-it-
coming-and-how-bad-will-it-be.
NASA News. 2019. “2018 Fourth Warmest Year in Continued Warming Trend, According to NASA,
NOAA.” Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet. February 6, 2019.
https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2841/2018-fourth-warmest-year-in-continued-warming-trend-
according-to-nasa-noaa.
60
Nobel Media. n.d. “The Nobel Peace Prize 2007.” NobelPrize.Org. Accessed February 4, 2019.
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2007/summary/.
Oels, Angela. 2012. “From ‘Securitization’ of Climate Change to ’Climatization‘ of the Security Field:
Comparing Three Theoretical Perspectives.” In Climate Change, Human Security and Violent
Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability, edited by Jürgen Scheffran, Michael Brzoska, Hans
Günter Brauch, Peter Michael Link, and Janpeter Schilling, 185–205. Hexagon Series on Human
and Environmental Security and Peace. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28626-1_9.
Osborne, Emily, Jacqueline Richter-Menge, and Martin Jeffries. 2018. “Executive Summary.” Arctic
Program. December 3, 2018. https://arctic.noaa.gov/Report-Card/Report-Card-
2018/ArtMID/7878/ArticleID/772/Executive-Summary.
Pachauri, R. K., Leo Mayer, and IPCC, eds. 2015. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Geneva,
Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Parker, Geoffrey. 2013. Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Poushter, Jacob, and Christine Huang. 2019. “Climate Change Still Seen as Top Global Threat, but
Cyberattacks Rising Concern.” February 10, 2019.
https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/02/10/climate-change-still-seen-as-the-top-global-threat-but-
cyberattacks-a-rising-concern/.
Regeringskansliet. 2014a. “Fredrik Reinfeldt pressmeddelanden, tal och uttalanden 2006-2010.” Text.
Regeringskansliet. October 1, 2014.
https://www.regeringen.se/informationsmaterial/2014/10/fredrik-reinfeldt-pressmeddelanden-tal-
och-uttalanden-2006-2010/.
———. 2014b. “Tal 2006–2010 – Fredrik Reinfeldt,” October, 98.
Regeringskansliet, Regeringen och. 2015. “Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016–2020.”
Text. Regeringskansliet. April 23, 2015. https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-
dokument/proposition/2015/04/prop.-201415109/.
———. 2017. “Sveriges nationella säkerhetsstrategi.” Text. Regeringskansliet. January 8, 2017.
https://www.regeringen.se/artiklar/2017/01/sveriges-nationella-sakerhetsstrategi/.
Regjeringen.no. 2008. “Jens Stoltenbergs andre regjering.” HistoriskRegjering. Regjeringen.no. February
15, 2008. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/om-regjeringa/tidligere-regjeringer-og-historie/sok-i-
regjeringer-siden-1814/historiske-regjeringer/regjeringer/jens-stoltenbergs-andre-
regjering/id449424/.
Ricke, Katharine. 2018. “Country-Level Social Cost of Carbon.” Nature Climate Change 8: 7.
61
Riksdagsförvaltningen. 2004a. “Vårt framtida försvar Proposition 2004/05:5 - Riksdagen.” September 24,
2004. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/proposition/vart-framtida-
forsvar_GS035.
———. 2004b. “Försvarsmaktens grundorganisation Proposition 2004/05:43 - Riksdagen.” October 28,
2004. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/proposition/forsvarsmaktens-
grundorganisation_GS0343.
———. 2009. “Ett användbart försvar Proposition 2008/09:140 - Riksdagen.” March 19, 2009.
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/proposition/ett-anvandbart-
forsvar_GW03140.
———. 2010. “Redogörelse för det svenska ordförandeskapet i Europeiska unionens råd andra halvåret
2009 Skrivelse 2009/10:174 - Riksdagen.” April 9, 2010. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-
lagar/dokument/skrivelse/redogorelse-for-det-svenska-ordforandeskapet-i_GX03174.
Rothe, Delf. 2012. “Security as a Weapon: How Cataclysm Discourses Frame International Climate
Negotiations.” In Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal
Stability, edited by Jürgen Scheffran, Michael Brzoska, Hans Günter Brauch, Peter Michael Link,
and Janpeter Schilling, 243–58. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and
Peace. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28626-
1_12.
Salehyan, Idean. 2008. “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet.” Journal of Peace
Research 45 (3): 315–26.
Sandwall, Peter. 2009. “Kartan Och Verkligheten.” https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/om-
myndigheten/dokument/obs-tal-och-debattartiklar/.
Scott, Shirley V. 2012. “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close Have We
Come and Would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change Policy?”
Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, no. 3 (November).
SDG Knowledge Hub. 2014. “NATO Stresses Climate Change Impacts on Security | News | SDG
Knowledge Hub | IISD.” September 10, 2014. http://sdg.iisd.org/news/nato-stresses-climate-
change-impacts-on-security/.
Sindico, Francesco. 2007. “Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue.” Carbon & Climate Law Review
2007: 29–34.
SMHI. 2019. “Temperaturen i Sverige stiger mer än för jorden som helhet | SMHI.” SMHI Nyhetsarkiv.
March 29, 2019. https://www.smhi.se/nyhetsarkiv/temperaturen-i-sverige-stiger-mer-an-for-
jorden-som-helhet-1.146120?l=null.
62
Steentjes, Katharine, Nicholas Frank Pidgeon, Wouter Poortinga, Adam J. Corner, Anika Arnold, Gisela
Böhm, Claire Mays, et al. 2017. “European Perceptions of Climate Change (EPCC): Topline
Findings of a Survey Conducted in Four European Countries in 2016.” Monograph. 2017.
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/98660/.
Stoltenberg, Jens. 2008. “Statsministerens nyttårstale 2008.” Taleartikkel. Regjeringen.no. January 1,
2008. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumentarkiv/stoltenberg-ii/smk/taler-og-
artikler/2008/nyttarstale-2008/id495221/.
———. 2009. “Kong Harald Vs trontale 2009–2010 og melding om rikets tilstand.” Taleartikkel.
Regjeringen.no. October 9, 2009. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumentarkiv/stoltenberg-
ii/smk/taler-og-artikler/2009/trontale-2009-2010-og-melding-om-rikets-tilstand/id2479769/.
———. 2010. “Kong Harald Vs trontale 2010–2011 og melding om rikets tilstand.” Taleartikkel.
Regjeringen.no. October 2, 2010. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumentarkiv/stoltenberg-
ii/smk/taler-og-artikler/2010/trontale-2010-2011-og-melding-om-rikets-tilstand/id2479772/.
Sunde, Harald. 2010. “Foredrag: «Realiseringen av morgendagens forsvar» ved Forsvarssjef Sunde | Oslo
Militære Samfund.” January 18, 2010. https://www.oslomilsamfund.no/foredrag-realiseringen-av-
morgendagens-forsvar-ved-forsvarssjef-sunde/.
Syrén, Håkan. 2009. “Att Prioritera Är Att Välja (Bort)!” https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/om-
myndigheten/dokument/obs-tal-och-debattartiklar/.
Teorell, J, S Dahlberg, S Holmberg, N Rothstein, N Alvarado, and R Svensson. 2018. “The Quality of
Government Standard Dataset.” Version Jan18. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of
Government Institute. http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.
The World Bank. 2019. “World Development Index.” The World Bank.
Thomas, Michael Durant. 2017. The Securitization of Climate Change: Australian and United States’
Military Responses (2003 - 2013). Vol. 10. The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—
Science. Springer International Publishing.
TNS Gallups. 2016. “TNS Gallups Klimabarometer 2016,” 52.
TNS Opinion & Social. 2011. “Special Eurobarometer 372 - Climate Change.” Special Eurobarometer
372. European Commission.
———. 2015. “Special Eurobarometer 435 - Climate Change.” Special Eurobarometer 435. European
Commission.
Trombetta, Maria Julia. 2008. “Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse.”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21 (4): 585–602.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570802452920.
63
———. 2012. “Climate Change and the Environmental Conflict Discourse.” In Climate Change, Human
Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability, edited by Jürgen Scheffran,
Michael Brzoska, Hans Günter Brauch, Peter Michael Link, and Janpeter Schilling, 151–64.
Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer
Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28626-1_7.
Utenriksdepartementet. 2016. “Sikkerhetspolitikk.” Redaksjonellartikkel. Regjeringen.no. May 31, 2016.
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/utenrikssaker/sikkerhetspolitikk/sikkerhetspolitikk/id86753/.
“Utöya och Oslo: Terrorattentaten i Norge 2011.” n.d. Accessed April 22, 2019.
https://www.krisinformation.se/handelser-och-storningar/2011/handelserna-i-oslo-och-pa-utoya-i-
norge.
Werrell, Caitlin, and Francesco Femia. 2018. “Chronology of U.S. Military Statements and Actions on
Climate Change and Security: 2017-2018.” The Center for Climate & Security (blog). October 2,
2018. https://climateandsecurity.org/2018/10/02/chronology-of-u-s-military-statements-and-
actions-on-climate-change-and-security-2017-2018/.
World Meteorological Organization. 2019. WMO Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018.
WMO. WMO.