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Climate governance, justice, andtransnational civil societyBrandon B. Dermana

a Department of Geography, University of Washington, Box 353550, Seattle,WA 98195, USAPublished online: 29 Oct 2013.

To cite this article: Brandon B. Derman (2014) Climate governance, justice, and transnational civil society,Climate Policy, 14:1, 23-41, DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2014.849492

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2014.849492

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B research article

Climate governance, justice, and transnational civilsocietyBRANDON B. DERMAN*

Department of Geography, University of Washington, Box 353550, Seattle, WA 98195, USA

Justice dilemmas associated with climate change and the regulatory responses to it pose challenges for global governance,arguably hampering progress and raising concerns over efficacy and relevance. Scholarly literature suggests that transnationalcivil society groups can help address problems of governance and injustice that cross borders and pit states against each other.Findings of a comparative, qualitative study of climate justice advocacy suggest, however, that civil society groups’ work in theUS and EU is significantly shaped by institutional factors specific to those regimes, limiting advocates’ broader impact. Moreover,political opportunities for the pursuit of climate action, and justice particularly, have diminished in those settings. By contrast, theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides greater opportunities for discussions of justice,although civil society actors are significantly constrained within it. It is argued that greater roles for civil society in the UNFCCCcould prove constructive in the face of current challenges connected with justice issues. Three themes in civil society advocacylinking principles of global justice with current climate policy debates are summarized. Finally, it is suggested that the first iterationof the UNFCCC Periodic Review provides timely opportunities to more fully draw upon civil society’s potential contributionstoward a fair and effective global climate regime.

Policy relevanceThe roles of civil society organizations in climate governance were examined in three policy contexts: the UNFCCC, the US, andthe EU, with special attention to advocacy addressing issues of equity and justice, identified as key challenges for a post-2012global agreement. Findings suggest that (1) civil society roles are significantly constrained in each context, and (2) politicalopportunities for climate advocacy have diminished since 2009 in the US and EU, underlining (3) the continued salience of theUNFCCC as a forum for engagement and the construction of effective and equitable climate policy. Potential exists for increasedcivil society involvement at the UNFCCC to help resolve obstacles based in divergent national priorities. Three areas of justice-focused civil society activity are reviewed for current negotiation topics and the governance structure of the institution. Thecurrent UNFCCC Periodic Review is identified as an opportunity to increase civil society involvement.

Keywords: equity; governance; international comparison; NGOs; political processes; social justice; UNFCCC

1. Introduction

Attempts to address climate change through coordinated action confront formidable challenges

related to justice, responsibility, and equity. Gardiner (2011) enumerates justice issues within dom-

estic, global, international, intergenerational, and ecological domains. Observers of international

negotiations have linked the halting progress and persistent uncertainty of recent years to recurring

conflicts over principles of equity and responsibility as parties work to renew – or replace – the

B *Email: bderman@uw.edu; brandonderman@gmail.com

Vol. 14, No. 1, 23–41, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2014.849492

# 2013 Taylor & Francis

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Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Gupta, 2012; Winkler & Beaumont, 2010). Meanwhile, over the last several years,

‘climate justice’ has defined advocacy positions for new and long-standing civil society networks,

whose globally dispersed constituencies and non-state status correlate with perspectives that differ

in significant ways from those of many negotiating parties (e.g. CJN, 2013; FOEI, n.d.; GJEP, n.d.).

Scholars have long acknowledged the influence of civil society engagement in global climate govern-

ance (e.g. Arts, 1998; Betsill & Corell, 2008; Hjerpe & Linner, 2010; Newell, 2000; Schroeder & Lovell,

2012), and also the influence of national and international regime characteristics on the practice and

efficacy of environmental social movements (e.g. Dryzek, Downes, Hunold, Schlosberg, & Hernes,

2003; Schreurs, 2002; Van Der Heijden, 2006). However, questions surrounding the potential role of

civil society groups within the rapidly changing, multiscalar landscape of climate change politics (Ber-

nauer, 2013), the recently heightened and problematized participation of such groups at Conferences

of the Parties (COPs) (Fisher, 2010), and the relatively novel status of climate justice advocacy per se

(Fisher, 2010; Newell, 2005; Pettit, 2004) suggest the need for further research about the work of advo-

cates seeking to facilitate fair and effective climate policy.

This article summarizes the findings of a qualitative study using interviews and observation to better

understand transnational civil society1 advocacy for climate justice within and between global (United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC), European (EU), and US policy set-

tings. Section 2 contextualizes this in relation to literature on the contributions of and constraints

on civil society in global governance. The literature suggests that although transnationally networked

organizations can provide needed capacity and accountability in response to problems of social and

environmental justice that escape national control, such groups are also highly constrained by

states and increasingly sidelined, while global governance itself often exacerbates inequality. These

findings prompt empirical investigation into the conditions of recent civil society engagement in

climate governance and its justice dimensions. Following a brief discussion of methodology in

Section 3, Section 4 mobilizes interview data to characterize the EU, US, and UNFCCC as political

opportunity structures (e.g. Meyer, 2004) for civil society involvement and the pursuit of climate

justice. Specifically, the work of transnational NGOs advocating climate justice in the EU and US is sig-

nificantly differentiated by conditions particular to each governmental setting, and increasingly con-

strained by economic imperatives in both, following the onset of global financial crisis. Further, despite

limits on civil society and widespread interest in other scales of governance after COP15, for advocate

and government interviewees alike, the UNFCCC remains a uniquely relevant site for the articulation

and pursuit of climate effectiveness as well as justice. Section 5 summarizes recent policy positions

associated with climate justice advocacy in global governance. Three themes are presented, drawing

on observation and documentary evidence: the articulation of relevant rights protections, responsibil-

ity-based approaches to climate finance, and the need for transparency and accountability. Section 6

concludes by suggesting that the policy positions and analyses of transnational civil society groups

warrant more serious consideration in negotiations during the current period of transition. The

ongoing implementation of the Periodic Review process, agreed at COP16 as a mechanism to evaluate

the specification of and progress towards a global goal for GHG emissions reduction (UNFCCC, 2013),

represents an opportunity for such consideration and for implementing more meaningful civil society

involvement.2 Although by no means arguing against political and regulatory initiatives at other scales,

it is asserted that international negotiations and the milieu surrounding them remain important

forums for addressing the global intertwining of climatic, political, and economic processes, as well

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as the dilemmas of justice these entail, and, further, that transnational civil society actors stand to offer

meaningful contributions toward that end. However, the realization of the potential benefits civil

society represents for effective, legitimate, and just global climate governance will likely depend on

institutional priorities and practices regarding the groups themselves and other players in the

climate regime.

2. Civil society and global governance

An extensive literature appearing over the last three decades examines civil society as a prominent

feature of governance and politics (e.g. Cohen & Arato, 1994; Edwards, 2009; Fukuyama, 2001;

Gellner, 1994). This work reflects widespread interest in the emergence of new organizations at a

range of geographic scales, the consequential roles some of those organizations play, and the political

significance of their work. Acknowledging patterns of varied usage, Edwards (2009) delineates three

distinct but related meanings of ‘civil society’, both long-standing and current, in scholarly and politi-

cal discussion. ‘Associational life’ captures the interest of authors like Putnam (2001) in terms of the

frequency and activity of voluntary non-state organizations. ‘The good society’ refers to social life con-

ducted in accordance with positive norms and values and the realization of desirable social goals. The

‘public sphere’ references the field of debate upon which democracy is thought to depend, in which

broadly shared meanings are constructed through evenly accessible structures of communication.

Although the three concepts are interrelated, virtues of the good society are often associated with

rich associational life, to the neglect of the public sphere (Edwards, 2009).

These connotations recur in literature devoted to the analysis of civil society organizations and prac-

tices beyond the scale of the nation-state (e.g. Anheier, Glasius, & Kaldor, 2001; Kaldor, 2003; Kaldor,

Moore, Selchow, & Murray-Leach, 2012; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004). Anheier

et al. (2001) defined ‘global civil society’ as ‘the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, net-

works, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the

confines of national societies, polities, and economies’ (p. 17). In the post-Cold War era, such organiz-

ations have been seen as facilitating democratization and the peaceful resolution of conflicts between

states: ‘helping to constitute and being constituted by a global system of rules, underpinned by over-

lapping intergovernmental, governmental and global authorities’ (Kaldor, 2003, p. 2). Those rules and

authorities may in turn be drawn on by organizations linked through regional or global networks to

confront problems of social and environmental injustice that escape national capacities, jurisdictions,

and politics (e.g. Fraser, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Keck and Sikkink (1998) for instance, chronicle

the work of transnational activist networks who mobilize international pressure to hold states accoun-

table for human rights abuses and other breaches of international law and norms. In the environ-

mental realm, civil society groups have long played a range of consequential roles, from

constructing and maintaining international institutions (Young, 1997) to confronting regulatory

and market initiatives in the name of community, place, and ‘nature’ (Lipschutz & Mayer, 1996).

Reflecting recently on the changing landscape of ‘global civil society’, Kaldor et al. (2012) highlighted

the increasing importance of less formalized transnational social movement organizations.

In the climate governance context, analysts have noted increased numbers of civil society observers

at COPs (Bernauer, 2013; Fisher, 2010), and have identified contributions stemming from their work in

Climate governance, justice, and transnational civil society 25

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official side events (Hjerpe & Linner, 2010; Schroeder & Lovell, 2012). Further, a broader cast of trans-

national social movements are now engaging climate governance at multiple scales, their work orga-

nized around the pursuit of justice (Bond, 2011; Gupta, 2012). Less bound by national interest, the

perspectives offered by such groups may hold potential to constructively address issues in climate gov-

ernance that pit states against each other and divide populations within them.

Other themes in the larger literature, however, underline the fragility of civil society and the benefits

it purportedly offers, particularly in the context of contemporary global governance. For Salamon and

Sokolowski (2004), civil society, while ‘a major social and economic force in countries throughout the

world’ (p. 56) is also ‘not a substitute for government’ (p. 30). Civil society groups acting alone cannot

maintain a truly public sphere in the face of well-resourced private interests, or ensure that the basic

needs that underpin engaged citizenship are met. Rather, these conditions require active and

capable government, and their realization globally is demonstrably uneven (Edwards, 2009). Further-

more, the last several years have witnessed the rise of competing theories that locate the promise of

social good not in civil society, but in markets and ‘creative capital’, despite their history of unequal

outcomes (Edwards, 2009). Finally, critical analyses suggest that states in fact remain the consequential

drivers of governance (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009), and that globalization, rather than ‘leveling the

playing field’, often provides opportunities for the continued pursuit of national and corporate pro-

jects of global political and economic control (Gill, 1995; Sparke, 2005). Global environmental and

climate governance can be seen as structured along such lines (Paterson, 2000; Newell & Paterson,

2010). Reading international negotiations in this light lends support to recent investigations of politi-

cal and regulatory possibilities for effective – and just – climate response at other scales.

Given these more circumspect findings, the documented contributions of transnational networks in

other domains, and the increased engagement of civil society in the justice dilemmas of climate policy

at multiple scales, Section 4 examines the conditions of such advocacy within three governmental set-

tings. Finding that advocates in EU and US federal institutions have encountered increasing constraint

amidst the global financial crises, and that government and justice advocate respondents have argued

for the continued importance of global forums, Section 5 summarizes climate justice positions in the

latter context as they bear on current policy debates. Section 3 briefly describes the methodology and

data underpinning those findings.

3. Methodology and data

Theories of political opportunity structure (POS) recognize that ‘activists’ prospects for advancing par-

ticular claims, mobilizing supporters, and affecting influence are context-dependent’ (Meyer, 2004,

p. 126). Classic conceptualizations (e.g. Kriesi, 1995; Miller, 1994; Tarrow, 1989) define relevant

context to include the openness of formal political processes, the receptivity of dominant coalitions

to non-governing groups, the availability and ideological orientations of potential allies, and govern-

mentally defined economic imperatives. Such conditions vary over time3 and between individual

states (Kriesi, 1995) and supranational institutions (Betsill & Corell, 2008; Marks & McAdam, 1996;

Van Der Heijden, 2006).

There is a significant body of work on civil society groups in environmental governance (see Section

1), but the literature reviewed above suggests that state–civil society relations represent a recently

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moving target, demanding continued original research. Bernauer (2013) links the need for ongoing

analysis of civil society in climate change politics to contemporary concerns including multiple

scales and quasi-independent regimes of governance, as well as questions of popular legitimacy. Fur-

thermore, although the growing literature describes principles of climate justice based in transnational

politics (e.g. Angus, 2011; Bond, 2011), relatively little work has examined the operationalization of

those principles in policy advocacy (although see Hemmati & Rohr, 2009; Okereke, 2010). Finally, pro-

ponents of comparative advocacy studies (e.g. Mahoney, 2008; Woll, 2006) note the importance of

norms and practices in addition to formal rules, suggesting the utility of interview and observational

methods in continuing empirical research.

Sections 4 and 5 therefore analyse POS for transnational climate justice groups and their policy pos-

itions in the global governance context using original qualitative data from interviews, observation,

and groups’ published statements (Lofland, 1996). Interviews highlight advocates’ and their interlocu-

tors’ ‘interpretations of their experiences and . . . understanding of the world in which they live and

work’ (Rubin & Rubin, 2004), emphasizing depth and context (Babbie, 2004).4 Observations provide

direct evidence of organization members’ interactions with each other and government counterparts,

and published statements document groups’ official positions (Lofland, 1996).

Based on the observation of climate justice advocacy during COPs 15 and 16, and prior research illus-

trating the importance of transnational advocates’ work within state and regional regimes (e.g. Fraser,

2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998), the EU, US, and UNFCCC were selected for comparative analysis, as poten-

tially significant targets of transnational groups’ work. Approximately 60 interviews were conducted

with members of EU and US government institutions, UNFCCC delegates, climate justice groups,

and other major civil society organizations active in each setting. Approximately 270 hours of obser-

vation were conducted at COPs 15, 16, and 17, open forums outside those meetings and Rio + 20,

and during 2011 at European Parliament workshops, civil society forums in Washington, DC, and acti-

vist gatherings in New York City and Antwerp. Observation sites were selected based on the involve-

ment of groups and individuals identified in the literature, stated topical focus (e.g. COP side events

devoted to issues of justice), and prior interviews and observations (Lofland, Snow, Anderson, &

Lofland, 2005).

Interviews and observations were documented with field notes (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011;

Lofland et al., 2005) and transcribed from recordings where permitted. Interview data were coded

for features of POS from the literature (Cope, 2003), as discussed in Section 4. Observation data and

documents from COPs and Rio + 20 were coded following grounded theory methods (Charmaz,

2004; Glaser & Strauss, 1977) to inductively characterize themes that link principles of global justice

with climate policy debates, as presented in Section 5.

4. Advocacy for climate justice in the EU, the US, and the UNFCCC

Three themes from interview and observation data characterize the EU, US, and UNFCCC as POS for

climate justice advocacy. First, the EU and US posed specific, and markedly different, conditions for

civil society advocates, focusing advocates’ efforts within those regimes. Second, advocates and gov-

ernmental representatives alike experienced a changed ‘political climate’ following COP15 and the

onset of the global financial crisis, which rendered their work for climate change mitigation and

Climate governance, justice, and transnational civil society 27

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justice more difficult in the US and EU. Third, despite recent interest in climate policy development at

national and regional scales, interviewees articulated the continued centrality of global governance for

their concerns, arguing that although the UNFCCC significantly limits civil society involvement, it

also represents unique opportunities for the pursuit of global justice and climate effectiveness. These

themes provide continued support for prior scholarship distinguishing environmental social move-

ments, advocacy, and policy conditions in the different regimes (e.g. Dryzek et al., 2003; Mahoney,

2008; Rabe, 2010), while also highlighting the cross-cutting impact of the financial crisis, and the con-

tinued salience of international and global forums for discussions of justice and mitigation in climate

governance.

4.1. Structures of opportunity in the EU and USMany transnational civil society groups work on climate issues in both EU and US contexts. The find-

ings of this research suggest, however, that the conditions within which linked and like-minded groups

operating in the two settings work are often notably different. Distinct policy contexts, as well as diver-

gent formal provisions and norms about civil society involvement, appear to drive those differences.

Interviewees described how the EU’s existing climate change policies, complex institutional struc-

tures, and bureaucratized consultation procedures create multiple predictable opportunities for Brus-

sels-based organizations to engage with European policy making and positioning in the international

negotiations.

Several EU government interviewees expressed keen appreciation for the work of their civil society

counterparts, who they saw as contributing to legitimate and effective regulation at the European level.

For these officials, NGOs in climate governance bring valuable expertise and counterbalance the influ-

ence of industry lobbyists. One parliamentary aide commented:

In the end it’s still the MEP who has to think for himself and make a decision, but it’s good to have both

sides. I’ve been comparing it to the banking crisis we have at the moment. There the financial sector is

the one with the expertise and you don’t really have a lot of . . . NGOs who do banking analysis . . .. In

that sense I think we are very happy in our environment sector where you have lots of people who

have been active and involved and have very good networks.

Civil society interviewees corroborated her perception that a variety of networks – partnerships with

other Brussels-based groups, member organizations across Europe, and allies around the world – are

essential to their EU work. At the same time, multiple, overlapping policy processes and evolving gov-

ernmental structures demand significant institutional knowledge and diligence, which tends to limit

EU civil society’s focus to Brussels. Also, while working in local networks helps organizations stay

current, it may represent a strategic response to the expectation observed and described among govern-

ment partners that there be only one ‘civil society’ perspective on a given issue.

Still, the inclusion of civil society voices in European environmental governance extends to groups

openly critical of EU policies, some of which receive EU support (see European Union, 2013). One offi-

cial involved in funding decisions justified such situations with reference to the analytical grounding

and large constituencies of funded groups, adding the broader the dialogue, the better.

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Some civil society respondents, however, did not feel included at the level of industry lobbyists.

Several noted that business groups command much greater resources and participate without repre-

senting citizen constituencies. At the three-panel-format parliamentary workshops I observed in Brus-

sels, only one panellist was a civil society member with views notably different from that of the

business and technical consultants invited to speak.

Finally, ‘justice’ and ‘equity’ were not terms in wide circulation among environmental agencies and

organizations in Brussels during summer 2011, although, for some organizations, reducing European

emissions is linked explicitly to justice (e.g. FOEE, n.d.). For many in the development community, by

contrast, climate policy was fundamentally defined by imperatives of global justice, pursued through

initiatives for innovative finance and rights safeguards (e.g. APRODEV, n.d.; CIDSE, 2011).

Advocacy for climate action and justice in the US is situated by less developed national policy, and

the ongoing negotiation of power relationships between federal and state governmental scales

(MacNeil, 2013; Rabe, 2011). Interviews and observations suggest, though, that conceptions of civil

society, funding arrangements, and consultation practices that differ from those common in EU insti-

tutions also significantly impact advocacy in the US. Overall, government and organization staff

confirmed depictions of a US climate governance regime as fragmented and localized, although still

active (see Rabe, 2010), which presents little opportunity for justice advocacy through formal channels

in Washington.

US government interviewees were generally more circumspect than their European counterparts

about the contributions of civil society in climate policy debates. A congressional aide who had

worked in public interest research described the two roles as similar and noted that, in her current pos-

ition, involving non-governmental groups that had technical expertise helped to build political

coalitions. She expressed frustration, however, at opposition from citizen groups to compromises in

the 2009 climate bills. An agency staffer experienced in international negotiations voiced similar mis-

givings about NGO and social movement campaigners at COPs, where he considered technical exper-

tise far more valuable than advocacy. Several government interviewees saw local initiatives with light-

handed federal coordination as presenting the best opportunities for climate action, with minimal con-

testation from organized citizens and other interest groups.

Beyond such orientations on the part of government actors, lower levels of public funding (Salamon

& Sokolowski, 2004) and less routinized advocacy practices (Mahoney, 2008) than provided by the EU

appear to shape structures of opportunity for civil society organizations in US climate politics, present-

ing them with different possible roles and partnerships depending on their capacities and values. Both

conditions impact the public sphere dimension of civil society’s activity. Private foundations, for

example, have been among the most visible organizations in US climate policy debates, hosting

topical forums for professionals across sectors and publishing extensive in-house research (see e.g.

Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013; Wilson Center, 2013). Politicized consultation practices were perceived

by interviewees as limiting for groups critical of nationally defined priorities, which justice-oriented

organizations often are. Members of these groups located in Washington described a tendency by gov-

ernment actors to ‘pick and choose’ civil society partners, heavily favouring some groups, and using

others only as ‘political cover’.

Some US climate justice advocates active in and around the UNFCCC pursue their domestic work as

part of long-standing and broad-based movements for social and environmental justice (see e.g. IEN,

2013; NAACP, 2013). Such actors articulate the differential impacts of climate change and emergent

Climate governance, justice, and transnational civil society 29

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responses in connection with their organizations’ core missions, often prioritizing education and

mobilization in communities. One interviewee characterized such work as necessarily proceeding in

relative independence of international policy-oriented climate justice advocacy in the nation’s

capital, despite broadly shared aims.

These findings resonate with Mahoney’s (2008) argument that while many similarities hold between

advocacy groups and their work in Washington and Brussels, regime-specific institutional design

factors importantly differentiate practices and outcomes in the two settings. In particular, whereas

EU advocacy targets and opportunities are heavily determined by policy-making procedures in the

context of less electoral democracy, encouraging advocates to invest in ‘inside’ engagement, US advo-

cacy targets are more ‘flexible’ (Mahoney, 2008, p. 208) and advocates make greater use of a range of

‘outside’ strategies. Furthermore, although reported and observed differences in climate advocacy

between the EU and US are surely influenced by the markedly different stages of policy development

in the two regimes and the institutional challenges that pertain to the US case (MacNeil, 2013), they

also confirm accounts that argue that regimes differ notably in responsiveness to legitimacy impera-

tives associated with environmental politics (Dryzek et al., 2003). Yet, while climate justice organiz-

ations may encounter more frequent and predictable advocacy opportunities in the EU, neither

there nor in the US can they easily tie their concerns with recent core state imperatives, as the following

section illustrates.

4.2. A changed ‘political climate’Many interviewees in Washington and Brussels described their work as taking place in a changed ‘pol-

itical climate’ after COP15 and the global financial crisis. Changed opportunities – and new con-

straints – for climate action advocacy were reflected in the articulation of policy positions in terms

of business interests and economic growth potential. As a seasoned climate strategist with the US

branch of a major international development organization put it:

Because of the current economic climate we’re operating within, we can’t really do our jobs well

unless we demonstrate business support for what we’re doing. That’s the kind of climate we’re

working in right now. Whether it’s potential job creation or just essential economic opportunity,

or risks that companies are facing due to these issues, we have to be able to demonstrate that in

a real way. If not, then our issue is going to go nowhere basically [with US policy makers], as far

as we can determine.

A US legislative aide described rewriting descriptions of long-running projects that in the past had been

framed as climate change responses to fit the new conditions, noting ‘now there’s this shift towards

[emphasizes] talking about economics. It’s the same policies, and they will always have the same benefits,

you just have to change which you talk about.’

A number of environment professionals concerned with justice emphasized the consequences of

what they termed the financialization of climate debates (cf. Broder, 2011). For one European NGO

worker this process represented a significant shift in terms of the actors involved in climate governance

as well as the level of governmental ambition:

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. . . environment people . . . are less and less important actually – sadly – in the whole climate discussion

because there’s so much financial implications, economic implications, and that’s a development that

we’ve seen over the last three to four years: that the finance ministries are often very much implicated

[in European climate policy and negotiation position] – economy ministries, industry ministries . . .. for

instance . . .. in March when the Road Map came out you had seven environment ministers who were

supporting 30%, which is good, but in the end it is quite meaningless, because it’s the environment

ministries, and you know . . . [pauses] And if you have environment ministries support you can be

almost sure that if it’s only environment ministries that the rest of the government is not agreeing to

that position.

An EU MEP offered similar analysis in another interview, linking increasingly economistic understand-

ings of climate change with conditions of financial crisis.

Frequent characterizations of a such a changed ‘political climate’ across the interview data suggest

that, despite differences in advocacy (Mahoney, 2008) and policy orientation (MacNeil & Paterson,

2012) between the US and EU, in the shadow of the global financial crisis both regimes have become

increasingly oriented toward economic imperatives (Dryzek et al., 2003).5

Although interviewees described conditions of crisis and constraints on civil society within the

UNFCCC as well, many also argued for that institution’s continued salience for climate effectiveness

and the pursuit of procedural and participatory forms of justice.

4.3. Civil society and the UNFCCCSeveral interviewees described the period following COP15 as one of reevaluation, during which organ-

izations, funders, and states debated the utility of continuing to engage with climate negotiations,

which require significant investment yet, they felt, have yielded little return. The continuing accumu-

lation of emissions also poses dilemmas. As one NGO analyst asked, could advocacy based in science

remain relevant when negotiators debate targets well below those science mandates? Still, numerous

governmental and civil society actors interviewed (in EU and US sites as well as COPs) insisted that

the global extent of climatic and economic processes meant that a ‘global deal’ on carbon was impera-

tive for effectiveness. Moreover, although civil society roles are limited at the UNFCCC, the institution

and parallel gatherings appear to provide unique opportunities for justice advocates. Thus, many saw

continued utility in engaging those forums, despite little expectation of a satisfactory agreement in the

near term.6

The sanctioned participation of civil society organizations at the UNFCCC can be seen as highly

limited. Their speaking opportunities in negotiations are often held to two-minute joint statements

at the close of plenaries, delivered, as advocates described, at the Chair’s discretion. Much of their

work during COPs consists of briefing the press on the progress of negotiations (relying for impact

on the quality and volume of coverage), distributing targeted reports and daily bulletins, and speaking

at side events, which have been shown to influence negotiations, albeit within the limits of formal and

spatial separation (Hjerpe & Linner, 2010; Schroeder & Lovell, 2012).7 Advocates also meet unofficially

with parties and other observers during negotiations – activity described by several interviewees as a

core component of their work. During and after COP15, protests and performance by civil society

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have also been notable features of COP meetings, leading in some instances to the ejection of official

observers, and legal sanctions (Fisher, 2010; Hansen, 2010; Heppenstall, 2011).

At the same time, for many advocates concerned with the uneven landscapes of international poli-

tics and development, negotiations represent important forums. Some groups work to support devel-

oping countries’ effective participation and programme implementation (e.g. CCAP, n.d.).

Interviewees pointed to instances where such work has influenced negotiated outcomes. Other

groups provide analysis aimed at highlighting and offsetting resource discrepancies between formally

equal negotiating parties. One advocate characterized the ability of developing countries ‘to speak and

communicate about their positions to the international stage . . .. [as] very, very limited’ noting that ‘a

few of these countries have only two or three or four people on their delegations’ in contrast to the

‘phenomenal media and economic power houses’ of developed countries’ delegations.

Beyond secured negotiation rooms, another set of gatherings involves many official observer groups

committed to justice advocacy (cf Fisher, 2010). Crowds in these ‘civil society’ or ‘people’s’ spaces are

largely uncredentialled local or regionally based stakeholders, including members of communities

affected by ongoing climate change impacts. By linking these gatherings with COPs, accredited organ-

izations seek to increase participation, transparency, and accountability. This work comes with its own

challenges. In interviews and discussions at venues such as Copenhagen’s KlimaForum, Cancun’s

People’s Forum, and on Durban’s UKZN campus, organizers described difficulties obtaining space and

permission for inclusive events during COPs; providing food, lodging, and amenities for visiting

regional constituencies; and making complex topics of negotiation accessible so that people ‘on the

outside’ might better ‘hold their politicians accountable’.

Indeed, much of the work in people’s spaces involves sharing knowledge. Programmes have

included testimonials by participants who travelled by bus across Mexico to Cancun gathering local

accounts of environmental impacts and responses, reports in Durban about experiences with changing

growing seasons across Africa, summaries of negotiations and policy instruments, and discussion of

counter proposals (see e.g. LVC, 2010; Hennig, 2011). As an accredited speaker at the people’s space

in Durban explained:

The meetings that happen – are about building from the ground up, whether it’s local campaigns

against extractives, or looking at transformations in food and agriculture, and in energy. It’s looking

at what the solutions are . . .. our policies and positions come from real positions from our communities:

from real experiences .. . .we formulate those, and we bring them into the UNFCCC space.

The interview and observation data summarized and excerpted here echo findings of earlier research,

that while the UNFCCC attracts extensive civil society participation (in numerical terms), the roles of

observer organizations, and their impact, are subject to significant limits (e.g. Arts, 1998; Betsill &

Corell, 2008; Fisher, 2010). At the same time, however, they also suggest that despite recent widespread

attention to climate governance and politics at national, regional, and local scales (e.g. Betsill & Rabe,

2009), the UNFCCC is still characterized, at least by some in key government and civil society pos-

itions, as an essential forum for effective climate regulation. Moreover, while certainly not the only

site of advocates’ engagement, global gatherings (closed and open) appear to provide significant oppor-

tunities to confront issues of justice and to forge connections, however tenuous, between widely

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dispersed, adversely affected communities and the institutional goings on of climate governance,

which powerful national and regional regimes in the EU and US do not.

Justice dilemmas are recognized as integral facets of the challenge of climate change, which have not

been effectively addressed in international negotiations to date. The literature reviewed in Section 2,

and the research reported here, suggest that working to include civil society actors in the policy and

negotiation process more effectively could be important to the realization of this goal. Accordingly,

within the limited scope of this article, the following section summarizes themes in recent climate

justice advocacy in global governance settings.

5. Civil society approaches to just global climate policy

Civil society groups (professionalized NGOs as well as broad-based social movements) are engaged in

climate justice work at political scales ranging from the global to the local. Indeed, for many in the

movement the necessity of community engagement is a clear lesson of involvement within and

outside of recent international meetings (e.g. Bond, 2012). To catalogue climate justice advocacy

across scales, however, is beyond the scope of this essay. Rather, following on the literature reviewed

and interviewees’ articulations of the continued salience of international negotiations and global

civil society forums reported above, this section briefly examines three themes in climate justice poli-

tics as observed at COPs 15, 16, and 17 and Rio + 20; described in interviews; and documented by

media and advocates. Although all three themes appear in the scholarly literature (e.g. Newell,

2008; Roberts & Parks, 2009; Sachs, 2008), the summaries here emphasize their articulation in relation

to recent international policy debates, and grounding in broadly subscribed principles of global justice.

5.1. RightsA broad range of work in civil society links the uneven responsibilities, vulnerabilities, and impacts

associated with climate change to rights language as mobilized in legal doctrine, international devel-

opment, and struggles for social and environmental justice. Such efforts respond to globally extensive

climatic processes by mobilizing cosmopolitan norms, international institutions, and widely used pol-

itical framings. Although varied, rights-based arguments (1) shift the focus of protection and entitle-

ment from the national scale to that of individuals and communities, (2) call for increased

recognition and representation of marginalized stakeholders, and (3) link climate governance with

legal principles (cf. Sachs, 2008).

Civil society organizations, legal scholars, and governments have analysed climate change impacts

in relation to human rights recognized in international law (e.g. ICC, 2005; ICHRP, 2008; Limon, 2009;

McInerney-Lankford, 2009). Much of this work reflects Mary Robinson’s view that ‘[h]uman rights law

is relevant because climate change causes human rights violations’, and that ‘human rights make clear

that government obligations do not stop at their own borders’ (ICHRP, 2008, pp. iii–iv). Among the

many ongoing rights-based initiatives, those aimed at ensuring the participation of indigenous com-

munities under REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) have made

the most impact in UNFCCC texts to date (CIEL, 2011). Several interviewees argued, however, that

rights provide more general principles for the design and implementation of climate policy, which

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accord with basic values of human dignity and the priority of human development for the poor and

marginalized.

Whereas human rights underscore the innate value of individuals and communities, articulations of

the rights of nature (e.g. Bond, 2011; Cullinan, 2003; WPCCC, 2010) extend consideration to non-

human entities, recognizing ecological relations in legal terms: if life itself is characterized by

mutual dependence among the elements of a more-than-human system, then each element in that

system warrants protection. The need for models of development not based on fossil fuels extends logi-

cally from this perspective.

5.2. Finance and responsibilityRights-based approaches are but one facet of transnational advocacy for climate justice. Groups have

also articulated a range of positions and proposals responding to what the interviewee quoted above

described as the financialization of climate discussions. On the one hand, this work problematizes

the increasing focus on new forms of climate finance through critical analysis of international financial

institutions, development aid, and transnational capital. On the other hand, it offers competing pro-

posals linked with principles recognized within the convention and in civil society debates, including

historical responsibility and ecological debt (see Roberts & Parks, 2009 regarding the latter).

Civil society groups have voiced concerns about the structure and operation of the Green Climate

Fund (GCF) and the ongoing exploration of finance instruments beyond the UNFCCC, including

the rising percentage of private investment. First, observers argue that substituting the admittedly

larger volume of private funds for scarce public ones is likely to entail prioritizing returns over goals

of climate effectiveness or development, leading to disproportionate investment in middle-income

countries instead of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (Redman, 2013). Second, private finance typi-

cally favours the higher return of mitigation projects, in lieu of badly needed funds for adaptation

(Orenstein, 2012). For debt relief advocates Jubilee South, the GCF and climate finance generally

must be based in principles of democracy, self-determination, and ‘the historical responsibility of

northern countries and the climate debt they owe to countries of the South for their excessive emis-

sions and the impact of these emissions’ (Jubilee South, 2010). A range of groups have advocated for

a permanent trustee other than the World Bank to administer the fund, because of the Bank’s involve-

ment in structural adjustment programmes and coal power (Bretton Woods Project, 2012).

Recent proposals for specific instruments based in principles of inter- and transnational justice

include widespread efforts to link a Financial Transaction Tax (e.g. Redman, 2012) and International

Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights (e.g. ActionAid, 2010) with climate finance commitments.

5.3. Transparency and accountabilityA third major theme in transnational climate justice advocacy targets the structure and practice of key

governance forums, seeking to deepen their grounding in norms of democracy, accountability, and

transparency (see Newell, 2008). For many groups, pursuing these goals in the current context

means calling governments and intergovernmental bodies to account, and demanding limits on cor-

porate influence (e.g. FOEI, 2012).

Rio + 20 occasioned the launch of a campaign to ‘Dismantle Corporate Power and End the Impunity

(Dismantle Corporate Power, 2012), which examines UN bodies and their global meetings as key

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deal-making sites for transnational capital. At the same time, Friends of the Earth International (FOEI)

released ‘Reclaim the UN’, a major report supported by a petition and endorsements by over 400 civil

society groups, which argues that while ‘[t]he UN is the most democratic and appropriate global insti-

tution’ through which to address current global economic and environmental crises, it is also subject to

increasing influence by corporations and business lobbies, as illustrated in six case studies (FOEI, 2012,

p. 4). The report calls for renewed commitment by the UN and member states to serve the public inter-

est; provisions to limit business representatives’ participation, increase that of civil society, and

improve transparency; and a new legal framework designed to ‘hold companies accountable to

environmental, human rights and labour rights law’ (p. 7). Related interventions appeared in Doha,

including an open letter by a coalition of youth civil society delegates to the UNFCCC Executive Sec-

retary (Canadian Youth Delegation, 2012). The letter flags the influence of oil, coal, and gas industries

over Canada’s and other parties’ negotiating positions, arguing that:

States like this are blocking progress in the name of an industry with the potential to break the planet .. . .

Observer organizations can be penalized, and even removed from the convention if we violate the pro-

tocols for participation. Perhaps there should be a similar process for observers and parties whose man-

dates fundamentally contradict the convention.

Such work builds on traditions of civil society watchdogging evident in side events and reports released

at COPs (e.g. Banktrack, 2011; Global Witness, 2010), and resonates with critique on ‘the outside’ and

in the liminal spaces linking climate politics and broader national and transnational movements for

democracy (see e.g. Climate Change Studio, 2012; R2 K, 2011; Vidal, 2012).

Common among such accountability and transparency efforts is the call to better link global climate

governance with norms of democratic representation in a globalized version of the ‘public sphere’ seen

as fundamental to politically and environmentally desirable ends (e.g. Dryzek et al., 2003; Edwards,

2009). Civil society advocacy within all three areas described in this section brings principles of

justice with support in broad political communities and social movements to bear on the international

structure of UNFCCC policy development.

6. Conclusions

While effective and just responses to climate change surely demand action by a full range of actors

across political scales, and recent debates in the UNFCCC have raised doubts about its actual potential

to shift the global economy away from fossil fuel reliance (e.g. Grubb, 2011), interviews with members

of civil society and government conducted for this study suggest that global and international forums

remain uniquely relevant. Indeed, in as much as powerful national and regional regimes like those of

the US and EU are driven by economic imperatives that tend to sideline discourses of environmental

justice (Dryzek et al., 2003) in response to the ongoing financial crisis, global politics and governance

– like work at the community scale (Bond, 2012) – provide venues for the articulation and pursuit of

justice. Given the exacerbation of political inertia and social inequality by the justice issues of climate

change and its governance, active and inclusive dialogue on those issues is essential.

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Each of the themes reviewed in Section 5 encompasses specific policy positions indicative of civil

society’s conceptualizations of climate justice in the context of global governance. At the core of

many of those, and of scholarly analyses of civil society’s value, is the notion of the public sphere.

As UNFCCC parties work to craft a new legal agreement for adoption by 2015, provisions promoting

and protecting a revivified, inclusive, and democratic public sphere within and encompassing the

negotiations could enable civil society organizations and their constituencies to constructively con-

tribute to legitimate responses to the challenges of climate injustice, and thereby the legitimacy and

efficacy of the global climate regime (see Bernauer, 2013, on civil society involvement and the percep-

tion of legitimacy).

Existing institutional provisions such as the Periodic Review (UNFCCC, 2013) represent opportu-

nities to pursue those goals. As observers have noted (e.g. Cameron, 2011; Field, 2013), the inputs, pro-

cesses, and priority associated with the Review could be consequential factors in overall ambition and

burden-sharing in future agreements. In line with civil society calls for democratization and special

consideration of those most vulnerable and least responsible for climate impacts, the Review’s evalu-

ation of the global goal and the implementation of existing commitments should be taken up with

the highest urgency, under robust conditions of transparency extending beyond the negotiating

process, and with substantive inclusion of civil society (see Field, 2013). Finally, the ‘global goal’

going forward must be considered in light of geographic and social variation in impacts and vulner-

ability. Although no single actor or institution can fully address the complexities of climate change

and the multiple justice issues it entails, the time is right to recognize and more fully draw upon the

potential for civil society’s contributions to facilitate a fair and effective global climate regime.

Funding

This material is based upon work supported by the United States National Science Foundation [grant

number 1129127] and by the European Union Centers of Excellence. The author bears sole responsi-

bility for its content.

Notes

1. Following recent conceptualizations of ‘civil society’ (e.g. Kaldor et al., 2012) that include NGOs as well as less

formalized social movements.

2. The Review process is currently in its first iteration, encompassing 2013–2015. Subsequent Reviews will be con-

ducted following each Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment Report or at least every

seven years (UNFCCC, 2013).

3. While Dryzek et al. (2003) differentiate their comparative historical approach from POS theory in part by arguing

that the latter considers opportunities to be static, more recent conceptualizations (e.g. Meyer, 2004) recognize

the dynamic character of opportunity and the impact of social movement activity on subsequent state

commitments.

4. Interviews with political actors also pose recognized methodological challenges including the potential for bias

associated with subjective individual accounts and necessarily limited sample size (Babbie 2004; Lofland, 1996).

Measures were taken to mitigate such bias in this study, including the selection of interviewees from diverse

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ideological and institutional positions, and independent observation wherever feasible (Baxter & Eyles, 1997).

Such measures, however, cannot ensure objectivity or representativeness.

5. While discourses linking economic inequality and climate impacts surfaced briefly in mainstream US media fol-

lowing ‘Superstorm’ Sandy (e.g. Rohde, 2012), debate over the President’s recently announced Climate Action

Plan (New York Times, 2013) appears focused pointedly on economic impact (Favole, 2013).

6. Many interviewees expressed frustration with international negotiations, and those who argued for their con-

tinued salience typically offered logical support for such convictions. However, it is noteworthy that the

views expressed by national and regional government and transnational NGO workers with years of involve-

ment in negotiations may have been biased by personal and/or institutional investment in that process.

However, it is also worth noting that appropriate scales, institutions, and strategies of engagement have been

the subject of ongoing debate amongst climate justice advocates, including within the people’s spaces around

COPs. It bears emphasizing, therefore, that interviewees did not (nor would the author) characterize the

UNFCCC as a forum for the pursuit of climate effectiveness or justice to the exclusion of others.

7. The latter can be significant for interaction between actors and venues. In Cancun, for example, travel between

side event and negotiation locations necessitated a chartered bus ride of approximately twenty minutes.

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