climax of the syrian wars - the battle of raphia 217 bce

8/13/2019 Climax of the Syrian Wars - The Battle of Raphia 217 BCE

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Ancient Warfare 25

THEME: ROYAL STALEMATE

from Pelusium and a lack of concise

information regarding its whereabouts

likely occasioned the former. As for

the latter, Polybius (5.80.4-6) says this

was “to remove to more advantageous

ground and to inspire confidence in

his troops”. Antiochus, finding himself

outnumbered in phalanx infantry and

roughly even in cavalry, had no desire

to encourage Ptolemy from his defen-

sive posture. Advancing into the more

Ptolemy, who had force-marched his

army “through the waterless region”

from Pelusium to “the spot he was

bound for” (5.80.2-3) some nine kilome-

tres southwest of Raphia (near to mod-

ern Dikla, Egypt) in five days – a distance

of near 180 kilometres at 36 kilometres

per day – had chosen his ground with

a clear purpose. The Ptolemaic army,

unlike the Seleucid, had not fought a

major set-piece engagement in a gen-

eration with much of its work in theintervening years having been carried

out by mercenaries. At the head of this

largely untried host, Ptolemy’s general

staff chose to adopt a largely defensive

strategy and block the Jiradi Pass.

The chosen ground, inside the east-

ern end of the pass, was some four

and a half kilometres in width. Sea

dunes guarded the northwestern side

whilst desert dunes from the Sinai and

limestone knolls hemmed the south-

east. To the southwest, the wells of

Sheik-Zuwayid would provide water as

would the sea dune wells. Although

much preparation and drill

had been invested in the

Lagid (Ptolemaic) force (see

below), there remained the

fact that its reliability was

open to question and so the

narrower field of the pass would

be to its advantage. In the wider

world, Ptolemy and his generals

almost certainly encouraged the revolt

and dynastic pretensions of Achaeus –

Antiochus’ satrap of Asia Minor – in theSeleucid rear (5.42.7; 57.2; 66.3; 67.1). On

this battlefield, they would settle for

stopping Antiochus in his tracks. His

dispositions would reflect this strategy.

Antiochus had never really expect-

ed Ptolemy to fight – indeed he was

encouraged in that belief (5.66.6-8).

Having arrived the same night as

Ptolemy, his surprise at the size of the

army that had taken the field against

him is evidenced by both his cautious

final advance from Gaza and his move-

ment into the pass a few days after his

arrival. Reports of the army advancing

Climax of the Syrian WarsThe battle of Raphia, 217 BC

ON THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 22, 217 (ALL DATES ARE BC) PTOLEMY

IV PHILOPATER, LIKELY AT THE INSISTENCE OF HIS GENERALS,

RESOLVED TO BRING ANTIOCHUS III TO BATTLE. THE TWO ARMIES

HAD BEEN CAMPED OPPOSITE EACH OTHER FOR ALMOST FIVE

DAYS AND THE BOTCHED ATTEMPT ON PTOLEMY’S LIFE BY

THEODOTUS, HIS ERSTWHILE GOVERNOR OF COELE SYRIA

NOW IN SELEUCID SERVICE, WAS A PRODUCT OF THIS PRO-

CRASTINATION (POLYBIUS 5. 82.1; 81.1-6 – ALL REFERENCES

TO THIS AUTHOR UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED). TWO

DAYS PREVIOUS, ANTIOCHUS HAD CLOSED THE DISTANCE

BETWEEN THE TWO CAMPS FROM 1.8 KILOMETRES TO A LIT-

TLE LESS THAN ONE KILOMETRE. AS A RESULT THERE “WERE

FREQUENT STRUGGLES AT THE WATERING-PLACES” AS WELL AS

“INFANTRY AND CAVALRY SKIRMISHES IN THE SPACE BETWEEN THE

CAMPS” (5.80.5-7).

By Michael Park

Bust of Antiochus III the Great (242-187BC), now in the Louvre, Paris.

© L i v i u s . o r g

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26 Ancient Warfare

restricted field of the pass he would

“inspire confidence” in his troops by

accepting battle on the “more advan-

tageous ground” where he would nothave to stretch the lines of his phalanx

to match Ptolemy’s.

Given Ptolemy’s intentions,

Antiochus was compelled to adopt a

more aggressive posture. Not that he

would likely have chosen otherwise.

With Achaeus having assumed the dia-

dem at Sardis, Antiochus could il l afford

to wait. Having advanced into the pass

he could now deploy his line to match

Ptolemy’s with his experienced phalanx

holding the centre of the field. With a

combined arms assault from a stacked

right wing, Antiochus hoped to blastthe Ptolemaic left flank from its posi-

tion, crush its left wing infantry and

force Ptolemy back into the waterless

region he’d recently crossed. Antiochus,

controlling the water of Raphia and

Sheik-Zuwayid, would thus have a nat-

ural border and free himself to deal

with Achaeus.

The Syrian WarsThe fourth “Syrian War” in sixty years

would be decided by the greatest clash

of arms since the battle of Ipsus in

301. Great armies would fight and kill

– yet again – to press the claims of

rival kings over the possession of Coele

Syria. The one, Ptolemy, “absorbed in

unworthy intrigues and senseless and

continuous drunkenness”, who treat-

ed the “branches of government with

equal indifference” (5.34.10); the other,

Antiochus, young and aggressive scion

of the Seleucid house with an empire to

set in order, if not reclaim.

The conflict was the latest mani-

festation of a long running sore of

Hellenistic politics, whose roots lay in theevents of the Diadoch Wars. Coele Syria

was “unjustly occupied by Ptolemy”

(Diod.18.73.2) after Triparadeisos (320)

and again after the battle of Gaza in

312. Later, as his allies fought at Ipsus

in 301, Ptolemy Soter’s contribution

to the grand alliance of kings against

Antigonus Monophthalmus was to

reoccupy Coele-Syria. In the aftermath

Seleucus, a key member of the alliance,

marched into Syria “where in accor-

dance with the terms of the agreement,

he endeavoured to appropriate Coele

Syria”. Ptolemy refused to give it up,

claiming that his allies were “giving

him no part of the conquered territory,

even though he had been a partner

in the war”. Seleucus, on the basis offriendship, decided “he would not for

the present interfere, but would con-

sider later how best to deal with friends

who chose to encroach” (Diod. 21.5).

In the decades following, succes-

sive monarchs engaged in repeated

attempts to establish lasting control of

the strategic region, resulting in what

are termed the “Syrian Wars”. The third

and most recent of these, lasting from

246 to 241, saw Ptolemy III Euergetes

march as far as Babylon. After its set-

tlement, Ptolemy was left in control

of Coele Syria and the ports of Syria.Amongst these latter was the city of

Seleuceia-in Pieria “the capital, and so

to speak, the very inner shrine of the

king’s realm” (5.58.4).

Antiochus III, within a year of his

accession, was embroiled in a rebel-

lion in Media and the upper satrapies.

This, plus the determined resistance

of Ptolemy’s general Theodotus, fore-

stalled his attempt (221) on Seleuceia

and Coele Syria (5.43-46.5). Within two

years (219), though, Antiochus was back.

Advised to reclaim Seleuceia before any

other action was taken (5.58.4-8) he did

exactly that and might, for the moment

have been satisfied, but for the arrival

of a letter “from Theodotus offering

to put Coele-Syria into his hands, and

inviting him to come thither with all

speed”. At this Antiochus abandoned

“his expedition against Achaeus, and

regarding everything else as of second-

ary importance” and set about claim-

ing Coele Syria (5.61.6).

Ptolemy’s senior advisor, Sosibius,

and co-minister Agathocles imme-

diately set in play the only game intown attempting “by embassies to try

to retard the advance of Antiochus:

pretending to confirm him in the opin-

ion he originally entertained about

Ptolemy, namely, that he would not

venture to fight” (5.63.2-3). The dip-

lomatic delaying tactics – involving

Rhodes, Byzantium, Cyzicus, and Aetolia

– are illuminating in as much as they

illustrate the entire 84 years of dispute.

The real purpose though, “was delay

and time to make their preparations

for war” (5.63.5-6). And preparations

there most certainly were.

The Raphia campaignTaking the court to Memphis, Sosibius

and his co-conspirator, Agathocles,

received the ongoing embassies fromAntiochus “with every mark of courtesy

and kindness.” What Antiochus’ ambas-

sadors – or those sent by Sosibius

(5.66.9) signally did not receive was any

knowledge of what was transpiring

at Alexandria. Here the two ministers

of the crown had collected “the mer-

cenaries whom they had on service in

towns outside Egypt”. As well, they had

dispatched officers “to recruit foreign

soldiers and were collecting provisions

both for the troops they already pos-

sessed, and for those that were com-

ing in.” The recruiting did not stop atsoldiers: the Ptolemaic army required

seasoned officers and these too, came

from Greece. Echecrates of Thessaly,

Phoxidas of Melita, Cnopias of Allaria

and Socrates of Boeotia all came to

Alexandria and all, importantly, had

seen service under Demetrius II and

Antigonus Doson. They were swiftly put

in charge of the training of the army

(5.63.7-14).

As the interminable embassies

travelled back and forth, Antiochus

interested himself with the odd siege

and eventually agreed to a four month

truce over the winter of 219/18 (5.66.1-

2). Meanwhile the Lagid army trained

apace. The soldiers were divided by age

and nationality, after which they were

assigned to divisions and armed “tak-

ing no account of what they had borne

before” (5.64.1). Here the Greek merce-

naries were armed as phalangites and,

under Phoxidas and Andromachus,

drilled with the phalanx as one unit “on

the same ground” (see Ancient Warfare

I.1 “Alexandria’s Colourful Funeral

Stelae”). Here also Echectrates “splen-didly trained” the Greek mercenary cav-

alry and Polycrates the cleruchic cavalry

(“that which was obtained from Libya

or enlisted in the country” 5.65.5) and

the guard.

Convinced that Ptolemy would

not leave Egypt to fight, Antiochus

left his winter quarters in Seleuceia

(218) and stormed the Porphyrion Pass.

Subsequent resistance – aside from

Sidon – was sporadic and typified by

the desertion of Ptolemy’s commanders

(Theodotus had earlier given over Tyre

and Ptolemais). After consolidating his

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Ancient Warfare 27

hold on Coele Syria Antiochus retired

to Ptolemais for the winter. In the fol-

lowing spring of 217 Ptolemy finally

mobilized his retrained army and ven-

tured to make a contest of the province.

Antiochus, informed of his approach,

gathered his army and marched for

Raphia where he would “deal with

friends who chose to encroach”.

Deployment for battleMarching out from camp and form-

ing into line, the phalanx divisions of

Sosibius and Andromachus filled the

centre of the field; around these troops

the rest of the army would be arrayed.

The near 20,000 Egyptians under

Sosibius held the right of this block.

The “Greco-Macedonian phalanx” of

25,000 stood to their left. Both these

formations adopted a depth of 24 ranks

allowing the deployment of the rest of

the infantry thus plugging the pass,

whilst allowing some room

for the cavalry to maneu-

ver.

To the immediateright of the Egyptian

phalanx Phoxidas led the

8,000 mercenary Greek

phalangites into position

sixteen deep. Alongside

the Greeks the Gauls and

Thracians, 6,000 of them,

took their station under

Dionysius. Rounding out the

right was the Greek mercenary

cavalry under Echecrates who

commanded the right wing. To

his front was posted a 33 strong

elephant corps. Next to the Greco-Macedonian

phalanx Ptolemy arranged the

3,000 Libyans armed and trained

in the Macedonian fashion and

these were abutted by Socrates’ 2,000

sarissa-armed peltasts. Anchoring

the Lagid infantry on the far left were

the phalanx infantry elite: the 3,000

guard troops of the royal agema

(basilikon agema) under Eurylochus.

These last three divisions were also

arrayed sixteen deep. The extrem-

ity of the Ptolemaic left wing was held

by Polycrates and the cleruchic cav-

alry: 2,300 strong along with Ptolemy

himself and his cavalry guard of 700

(5.82.3-7). Forty of Ptolemy’s elephants

guarded this wing and 3,000 Cretans

stood behind them and alongside the

cavalry they would support. The Lagid

battle line ran slightly northwest to

southeast, from the ancient road near

to the sea dunes to somewhat south of

the modern El-Arish-Rafa road, occupy-

ing the available ground afforded by

the pass.

Antiochus’ phalanx, at the ‘regu-lar’ depth of sixteen (18.30.1), was

deployed opposite Ptolemy’s in the cen-

tre of the field. The phalanx of Greco-

Macedonians, almost 20,000 in num-

ber under Nicarchus and Theodotus

Hermiolius, stood opposite Ptolemy’s

virgin native phalanx. To its right,

“under Theodotus, the Aetolian who

had deserted from Ptolemy”, were “ten

thousand picked men from the whole

kingdom, armed in the Macedonian

fashion, most of whom had silver

shields” (5.79.4-5). These elite ‘Syrian’

troops, the argyraspides, likely formed

8,000 of this corps and the remaining

2,000, the nature of whom can really

only be guessed at, may well have been

hypaspists (peltasts).

To the left of the phalanx was

Antiochus’ ‘make do’ infantry of the

defensive left wing. Abutting the pha-

lanx were 10,000 Arabs, likely javelin

men, at a similar depth to the phalanx.

Alongside these were 5,000 light armed

Medes, Cissians and Carmanians and

they were joined by 3,000 Agrianians,

Thracians and Persians with 1,500

Lydian and Kardouchoi (“Cardaces”,

likely modern Kurds) javelin men at

the end. Themison, with 2,000 cavalry,

commanded the wing and 33 elephants

stood across its front (5.82.11-13).The Seleucid right wing, which

would lead the offensive, Antiochus

would command in person. Alongside

the argyraspides, he posted the 5,000

mercenary thureophoroi from Greece

under the command of Hippolochus

(cf 5.84.9). These troops would con-

front Ptolemy’s infantry agema and his

peltasts: their role would be crucial to

the battle plan. Byttacus, with 5,000

light troops (Daae, Carmanians and

Cilicians) under his command, provided

both extra width for the infantry line as

well as support for the sixty elephants

posted in front of the wing. Alongside

these lights stood 2,500 Cretans and

Antipater’s 2,000 strong cavalry corps

rounded out the main line. The royal

ile (regiment) and cavalry agema, of

1,000 each and which he would lead,

Antiochus placed “at an angle” to his

main line. This angle, given his attack-

ing posture, was near certainly ech-

eloned rearwards in deep column and

would be somewhat difficult to discern

from the Ptolemaic lines (5.82.8-10).

Both kings rode the lines with theirofficers and, in the case of Ptolemy,

his sister Arsinoe addressing “words

of encouragement and exhortation to

their officers and friends”. Neither hav-

ing been on the throne long enough

to point to “any glorious or famous

achievement of his own” instead

reminded them “of the glory of their

ancestors, and the great deeds per-

formed by them”. These words were

directed particularly to the officers and

men of the phalanx on both sides for

it was these that “they both rested

their strongest hopes on” (5.83.1-6). This

© K a r w a n s a r a y P u b l i s h e r s

Bust of Ptolemy IV Philopater (“Father

loving”, 244-205 BC), now in the

Louvre, Paris.

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28 Ancient Warfare

© Carlos de la Rocha

done, both returned to their chosen

stations opposite each other on the

north-western side of the field.

Battle beginsAntiochus signaled for the attack to

begin and the elephants lumbered off

at the run with Byttacus’ light infantry

following in support. Across the field

Ptolemy ordered his own elephants for-

ward. Polycrates’ cavalry, along with the

Cretans, began an advance left and for-

ward behind them. Immediately mat-

ters went astray as “only some few ofPtolemy’s elephants came to close quar-

ters with the foe”. These few, very likely

Indian rather than African given they

were towered, engaged fiercely as they

butted heads and swung tusks at and

into each other. In the towers atop the

elephants, amid the arrows and mis-

siles from the light armed, the soldiers

“maintained a brilliant fight lunging

at and striking each other” with saris-

sae. Too few to make any appreciable

difference, Ptolemy’s elephants were

forced back and onto their own lines.

Here, as Polycrates advanced, elephants

careered back onto his troops throwing

horse, rider and Cretans into panic

As the Seleucid elephants gained

the ascendancy Antipater’s cavalry

corps, launched at the Ptolemaic left

close behind them, charged into the

dust covered melee. Antiochus, skirting

the outer edge of the elephants, led his

column at the charge whilst the Greek

thureophoroi , on the other side of the

elephants, advanced toward the Lagid

elite units of foot at the double.

Echecrates, away on the Ptolemaic

right wing, “waited first to see theresult of the struggle between the

other wings of the two armies” (5.85.1).

Looking towards the north-west he

can have made out little of what was

unfolding. Heat haze combined with

over three and a half kilometres of

intervening distance obscured all

detail other than the immense cloud of

dust that was now the Ptolemaic left:

a cloud that appeared to be moving,

inexorably, rearwards. Beyond the light

troops of his own wing and the phalanx

of Greeks, the Egyptian phalanx, flank-

ing their ‘Macedonian’ counterparts,

stood with sarissae raised and waited.

Across the sand and dust, flashes could

be made out as the enemy’s shields

caught the sun: the Seleucid infantry

were drawing shields from their shoul-

ders.

Leading his royal ile and the cavalry

agema at the gallop, Antiochus swung

out and around the elephant battle.

Polycrates’ cavalry – rent by elephants

retreating onto and through his posi-

tion – was now a mass of terrified

and rearing horses. Ptolemy’s Cretans,

increasingly confined by the cavalrythey were to assist and taking any open-

ing for retreat available to them, added

to the escalating disarray. At this point

Antiochus, appearing from behind the

cloud and noise that was the elephant

disaster to Polycrates’ front, drove vio-

lently into the latter’s defenceless flank

(5.84.8). Troop after troop of Seleucid

cavalry charged into Polycrates’ men

who, unable to cope with the elephants

and the flank attack, died as spears

drove into both horse and rider. Under

impossible pressure Ptolemy’s left wing

cavalry gave ground falling back and

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Ancient Warfare 29

onto its own infantry.

The confusion and dislocation

amongst the Ptolemaic cavalry eventu-

ally turned to rout. Antiochus, envision-ing a crushing victory as Polycrates’

cavalry eventually fled, pressed the

rout and the pursuit. His object, more

likely than not, was Ptolemy himself

who, along with what remained of his

cavalry guard, had used the dust and

din of the tumult to circle back and

away towards the safety of his phalanx

which was unengaged (5.85.7).

Charge of the Lagid wingOpposite Echecrates’ position the trum-

peting of the Seleucid elephants quick-

ly drowned whatever sounds driftedacross from the Ptolemaic left wing.

Looking forward Echecrates “saw the

dust coming his way” and, worse, “that

the elephants opposite his division

were afraid even to approach the hos-

tile elephants” (5.85.1) and had either

remained stationary or began to back

away. The disaster of the left now por-

tended for the right and Echectrates

could wait no longer.

In a move that was doubtless

planned, Echecrates sent a rider to

Phoxidas ordering an advance and for

Phoxidas himself to “charge the part of

the enemy opposite him with his Greek

mercenaries” along with the Gauls.

Then, ordering the Thracian infantry

(“the division behind the elephants”)

to follow him, he led them and the mer-

cenary cavalry out to the right – off the

field and around the limestone ridge –

so as to get outside the elephant scrim-

mage and out of view of the Seleucid

cavalry behind its elephants. The Greeks

lowered their sarissae and set off at

the ‘charge’. The Gauls, as the Greeks

stepped off, advanced into and aroundthe elephants to engage the Seleucid

light troops advancing in support of

them (5.85.1-3).

On the Ptolemaic left, the infantry

agema was in the ineluctable process

of disintegration. Panicked elephants,

showing no respect for man or sarissa,

trampled the former and splintered the

latter. Phalangites, not already crushed,

were thrown into in a state of utter

terror as fleeing elephants caught pro-

truding sarissae skittling their wielders

and any near to them. To their right,

“the elephants having already thrown

their ranks also into confusion” (5.84.9),

Ptolemy’s peltasts also came under

attack. Antiochus’ Greek mercenaries

assaulted the Lagid phalangites as theystruggled for cohesion. Gaps in the pel-

tasts’ ranks – the inevitable result of

their own elephants falling back into

them – opened invitingly. Into these

gaps streamed the Seleucid Greeks

whilst the agema – shattered and lack-

ing any formation – broke and gave

way (5.84.7). Byttacus’ men, meanwhile,

were taking “targets of opportunity”

with impunity from the peltasts’ flank

as well as the remnants the Ptolemaic

left wing.

Ptolemy, sheltered by his phalanx,

was watching the disintegration of hisentire left wing. Whilst his phalanx

was still intact in the centre of the field,

both it and his camp might well be

overrun shortly. To his right his Greek

phalanx, along with the right wing

infantry, had advanced to the “charge”.

Urged on by his officers, Ptolemy came

around the right flank of his Egyptian

phalanx and riding along its front

“showing himself in the view of both

armies struck terror in the hearts of

the enemy, but inspired great spirit and

enthusiasm in his own men”. At this

Andromachus and Sosibius gave orders

for sarissae to be couched and for the

45,000 strong backbone of the army

to follow the right wing and advance

upon the enemy phalanx. (5.85.9)

Antiochus’ Greek mercenaries, shov-

ing sarissae aside with their thureoi ,

attacked Ptolemy’s disorganised pha-

langites with spear and sword in hand

to hand combat. With the Lagid infan-

try agema largely destroyed, its corps

of peltasts was now in danger of being

cut to pieces. As casualties mounted

alarmingly the peltasts gave ground.Stepping over and around the dead or

dying, the Greeks stabbed and hacked

at Ptolemy’s peltasts pushing them

backwards, with ever increasing ease,

until they were driven out of the line

(5.84.9).

Ptolemy’s camp, being close to

the battle line like that of Antiochus

(cf 5.80.6), now presented a strate-

gic obstacle. Antiochus’ troops could

not execute a turn to their left in an

attempt to roll up Ptolemy’s line as they

would be exposed on their right sides

to any missile fire or defenders sallying

from the camp including the survivors

of the peltasts and infantry agema.

The Seleucid cavalry of the left,

advancing in concert with their ele-

phants, were taken completely by

surprise in their flank and rear by

Echectrates’ assault column appear-

ing from around the limestone knolls.

The mercenary cavalry charged into

Themison’s troops and “quickly drove

them from their ground” (5.85.3) across

and onto their light troops. The Seleucid

lights – the Persians, Cardaces, Lydians

and Agrianians – found themselves cor-

ralled by the cavalry they were osten-

sibly supporting. Order quickly turned

to shambles as Echectrates’ Thracian

troops, having loosed javelins, createdmayhem with their romphaia – ‘pole

weapons’ with a blade some seventy or

more centimetres long. Horses and rid-

ers fell indiscriminately as the blades

were swung and thrust.

Seleucid collapseThe Seleucid phalanx, having watched

their elephants and light troops move

off, readied for the advance. As they

were about to step off the Arab tribal

levies, protecting their left flank, were

taken in a vicious assault by Phoxidas

and his Greek phalangites. The Arabs,

light javelin men, failed to withstand

the initial charge and those not imme-

diately run through or crushed in the

contact, began to look for any meth-

od of escape. As the cavalry fled the

Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians, taken

frontally by the Gauls, also came under

attack from Echectrates’ Thracians.

Ptolemy’s phalanx brigades,

advancing at the double, left behind

the carnage of their left wing and

closed on their Seleucid counterparts.

In the initial collision the “picked Syriantroops stood their ground” for a time.

Alongside them the ‘Greco-Macedonian’

phalanx came under severe pressure.

The ‘lights’ of the Seleucid left wing, led

by their defeated cavalry, were falling

back towards and behind them in the

direction of the camp and, eventually,

Raphia. Echectrates did not bother with

a headlong pursuit but drove across

into what remained of the light infan-

try. The Thracians and Gauls followed

and carnage was wrought by Galatian

swords and Thracian romphaia. As

their light infantry fled the field the

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32 Ancient Warfare

Further reading:- Polybius (Shuckburgh translation) is the literary source for Antiochus’

invasion and the campaign (5.58-71 and 79-87). The trilingual Raphia

Inscription provides confirmation of dating and the period of the cam-

paign. Polybius battle narrative, though, is very Diodorus-like and suffers

from summarising and cherry picking. As J.P. Mahaffy wrote “his descrip-

tion, as we have it, is incoherent”. Thus, for example, one has to work

out the probabilities of troop placement from the garbled 82.10 and I

have placed the medium infantry (Greeks) alongside the phalanx with

Byttacus’ lights supporting the elephants.

Modern works are not plentiful outside of general treatises. The exhaus-

tive – and exhausting to find – Raphia, 217 BCE, Revisited by E Galili

(Scripta Classica Israelica, 3, 1976-77) is a treasure trove and well worth

the tracking down. Bar Kochva, Seleucid Army Organisation and the GreatCampaigns provides a shorter analysis.

- J.P. Mahaffey, The Army of Ptolemy at Raphia. Hermathena 13 (1898), 140-5

provides some discussion of the textual problems.

- G.T. Griffith’s, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World. Chicago 1975

(reprint) deals with both armies - mainly from the mercenary point of

view and Bevan The House of Ptolemy (Chicago 1985, reprint) – chapter VII

for a general overview.

- F. Walbank, Historical Commentary on Polybius. I (Oxford 1957), 585-616

and III (Oxford 1979), 773-4.

For the possibility of Indian elephants in Ptolemy’s array see M. Charles,

‘Elephants at Raphia: Reinterpreting Polybius 5.84–5’, The Classical

Quarterly 57.1 (2007), 306-311 .

Seleucid Greco-Macedonian phalanx

found itself denuded of support and

under flank attack. With Ptolemy’sEgyptians driving them back they buck-

led and fled. The argyraspides, aware

of the imminent danger of envelop-

ment, also retreated towards camp.

Now Echectrates pursued “killing large

numbers of the enemy […] by means of

his cavalry and mercenaries on his right

wing” (5.86.1).

On the far side of the field Antiochus,

confident that the success of his Greek

mercenaries inside of his cavalry and

elephants was reflected across the line,

continued his pursuit. At the warning

of one of his older officers he called ahalt to collect his forces and assess the

state of battle. Looking back across the

field to his centre he realised “that the

cloud of dust raised by the phalanx

was moving towards their own camp”.

Antiochus and his cavalry returned to

the field at the full gallop to find “his

whole line in full retreat” and his cam-

paign in tatters (5.85.13).

Antiochus had lost some 10,000

infantry and 300 cavalry killed as well

as 4,000 men taken prisoner. He retired

to Raphia with “such of his men as

had fled in compact bodies”. Ptolemy,

seemingly taken aback by the victory

(5.87.3), “retired to his own camp and

there spent the night” having lost 1,500

infantry killed and seven hundred cav-

alry. These, almost to a man, fell dur-

ing the debacle on the left of his line.

Whilst Polybius says that “sixteen of

his elephants were killed, and most of

the others captured”, it is difficult to

see an army in flight capturing some

fifty elephants (5.86.3-6). Ptolemy, hav-

ing buried his dead and despoiled

the enemy’s, marched on Raphia thenext day. Antiochus, like Antigonus

Monophthalmus at Paraetecene, had

decamped before sunrise and found

refuge at Gaza (5.86.4).

AftermathThe towns and cities came over to

Ptolemy and within three months he’d

re-established control over the region.

Before concluding a one year truce with

Antiochus Ptolemy, in a display of phar-

aonic propaganda, made a “show inva-

sion” of Phoenicia. He then returned to

Egypt and, according to Polybius, lost

all interest in matters of interstate rela-

tions – “resuming his habitual effemi-

nacy and corruption of his manner oflife” (5.87.3) one suspects.

The military victory, though quite

emphatic, would not settle the issue.

Antiochus returned to his kingdom and

busied himself disposing of Achaeus.

His loss here actually facilitated the

stabilising of his own kingdom and

his following campaign to restore the

upper satrapies. Ptolemy took little

active part in interstate politics again.

The evidence (Egypt coining less in sil-

ver and eventually ceasing such) sug-

gests economic trouble and an inability

to pay for mercenaries on a continu-ing basis. The lasting result, for Egypt,

was the sudden spike in nationalism

brought on by the training of Egyptian

troops for the battle. Taken with their

success at Raphia “they refused any

longer to receive orders from the king;

but looked out for a leader to represent

them, on the ground that they were

quite able to maintain their indepen-

dence”. When they did the Ptolemies

would lose Upper Egypt for decades.

The struggle for Coele Syria, too, didnot end at Raphia. Antiochus would

take it back after the battle of Panion in

200. Thirty two years later the intermi-

nable dispute would have an end when

the final arbiter of all the Hellenistic

kingdoms, Rome, in the form of Gaius

Popilius Laenas literally drew a circle

around it (29.27.1-9).n

Michael Park trained as a teacher in

English, history and science back in

the seventies. When not working at his

day job, he pursues his real interests:decent red wine and collecting classics

and works on ancient history as well as

writing. Income not already disposed of

supports something of a mini Library of

Congress on the subject. He would like

to thank Christopher Webber and Paul

McDonnel-Staff for the answers to some

questions. They should not be blamed

for how those answers were utilised.

climax of the syrian wars - the battle of raphia 217 bce

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