Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment the Difference a ??2015-11-10Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment – the Difference a Year Makes ... Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment, ... • Research areas: Context Computing, Mobile Ad Hoc

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  • 1

    Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical

    Environment the Difference a Year Makes

    This document does not contain technical data as defined by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR 120.10(a), or technology as defined by the Department of Commerce Export Administration Regulations, and is therefore authorized for publication.

    Copyright Raytheon Company. All rights reserved.

    Panel Coordinator / Moderator: Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson 260-429-5457 Email: Noel_E_Johnson@Raytheon.com

  • 2 2

    Panel Topic & Members

    Panel Topic: Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment, the Difference a Year Makes

    Panel Coordinator / Moderator, Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson Raytheon Sr. Principal Systems Engineer, CISSP-ISSEP, CSSLP, Tactical Communications Solutions,

    multiple program supports as a Cybersecurity Subject Matter Expert,

    Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute,

    Principal Research Scientist

    Professor; Elisa Bertino , Purdue University, Professor CS, Research Director of CERIAS, Director of Cyber Center,

    Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow,

    Member of the Technical Staff

    Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud TIG C4I Business Area Technical Lead

    UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • 3 3

    Panel Format

    Panel Topic: Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment

    Each panel member will have 3-5 minutes to provide an initial position statement, Discussion based on initial position statements & moderator questions, Half hour will be reserved for questions from the audience, Each panel member will be provided 5 minutes final remarks,

    Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson Raytheon

    Provide the context of challenges and opportunities of Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment

    Opening position statements.

    Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute,

    Professor; Elisa Bertino , Purdue University, Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow, Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud TIG

    UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • 4 4

    What is Cloud Computing ?

    NIST SP 800-145, Mell and Grance, 2011 Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network

    access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models.

    Essential Characteristics, Rapid Elasticity Resource Pooling Measured Service Broad network access On-demand self-service

    Service Models Software as a Service (SaaS) Platform as a Service (PaaS) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)

    Deployment Models Public Cloud, Hybrid Cloud, Private Cloud, Community Cloud,

  • 5 5

    Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environments,

    Not all Tactical Environments are the Same !

    Types of Cloud Computing Services Software as a Service (SaaS)

    Platform as a Service (PaaS)

    Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS),

    Core Advantages Flexibility,

    Highly automated,

    Shared Resources,

    Increased storage,

    Pay for what your use,

    Back up and restoration,

    Easy installation and maintenance,

    Core Disadvantages Cost,

    Limited flexibility,

    Data security and privacy,

    Knowledge and integration,

    Dependence on outside agencies,

    Network connectivity and bandwidth,

    Long term stability of service provider,

    Service unavailability due to a variety of reasons,

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • 6 6

    USG & DoD Transitioning to the Cloud

    The Transition has begun: Is it secure? Will it meet the goals?

    UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    FedRAMP Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program Cloud computing for USG DoD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (SRG) Version 1, Release 1, 1/13/2015 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

    Cloud Computing Strategy working paper, April 2011 USG Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap Volume 1 Release 1.0 (Draft) November 2011

    NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and Special Publication (SP) Relevant to Cloud Computing FIPS 199; Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems NIST SP 500-291; NIST Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap, Version 2.0, July 2013 NIST SP 500-292; NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture, September 2011, NIST SP 800-37; Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems; A Security Life Cycle

    Approach; NIST SP 800-53 Rev.4; Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information systems and Organizations; NIST SP 800-53A Rev.3; Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations: Build

    Effective Assessment Plans; June 2010; NIST SP 800-92; Guide to Computer Security Log Management; September 2006 NIST SP 800-125; Guide to Security for Full Virtualization Technologies; January 2011 NIST SP 800-137; Information Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations;

    September 2011; NIST SP 800-144; Guidelines on Security and Privacy Issues in Public Cloud Computing, December 2011 NIST SP 800-145; The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing; September 2011 NIST SP 800-146; Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations; May 2012

  • 7 7

    The Solution must address

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Timely Keep Bad Guys & Malware Out

    Cloud

    Computing,

    COTS &

    GOTS Device(s)

    & Types

  • 8

    Cloud Security at the Edge Jeff Boleng, PhD

    Principal Research Scientist

    Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University,

    Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering

    Institute,

    Introduction & Opening Statement of Panel Member

  • 9 9

    Copyright 2015 Carnegie Mellon University and IEEE This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8721-05-C-0003 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN AS-IS BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution. This material may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, and freely distributed in written or electronic form without requesting formal permission. Permission is required for any other use. Requests for permission should be directed to the Software Engineering Institute at permission@sei.cmu.edu. DM-0002951

  • 10 10

    Dr. Jeff Boleng, PhD, Principal Research Scientist, Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellow University

    Since 2012, Advanced Mobile Systems Team

    Co-PI of Tactical Computing and Communications and Tactical Analytics research at SEI

    Research areas: Context Computing, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Scientific Computing, Parallel and Distributed Systems

    BS in CS from US Air Force Academy 1991, MS and PhD from Colorado School of Mines (1997 and 2002) in Mathematical and Computer Sciences

    25 years experience as AF Cyber Operation Officer, deployable networks, command post integration, 21st Mission Support Squadron Commander

    8 years on faculty at USAFA as Associate Professor, 4 years as Deputy Computer Science Department Head

    Jeff Boleng, PhD, CMU/SEI

  • 11 11

    Securing the cloud

    Tail of two layers

    Infrastructure

    Services

    Securing each is different

    Infrastructure

    Largely virtualized

    Depends on security of every VM

    Services

    Secured by numerous external administrators

    Largest risk to the hypervisor is through poorly secured services

  • 12 12

    Securing the Services*

    Simplify!

    Simple, well defined, and enforced interfaces

    Do one thing and do it well -- Doug McIlroy

    Favor composability over monolithic design

    Assume components are compromised

    Use fail-safe/fail-secure design

    Never implicitly trust the results of another service

    Always ask What will my service do when it fails?

    *Note: these ideas arent new or mine. Thanks to Ken Thompson, Dennis Ritchie, Brian Kernighan, Rob Pike, Doug McIlroy, Eric Raymond and others

  • 13 13

    Piping diagram of a Westinghouse Air Brake System - 1909

  • 14 14

    Elisha Otiss elevator patent drawing, 15 January 1861

  • 15 15

    Microservice architectures

    Modular operating system containers

    Docker and LXC

    OSv

    Unikernels and MirageOS

    CoreOS

    Intel Clear Containers

    Small, lightweight, typically single process, multi-

    threaded VMs built with only the OS and library

    components necessary to support the code

    implementing the service

  • 16 16

    Microservice architectures Our experience on an embedded robotics sensor system

    OSv with nanoMsg and protocol buffers on Xen

    12Mb VM on disk, 60Mb VM when running

    Redis benchmark 30% faster in OSv container

    No other OS service running (i.e. only 1 or 2 ports open at all)

    Pros

    cohesion coupling

    Forces rigorous commitment to interfaces and standardization

    Small size on disk and in RAM

    Faster startup and migration

    Reduced attack surface and complexity

    High availability (redundancy, load balancing, fail over) techniques from data center

    experience directly applicable

    Cons

    Timing, network latency, etc. (all the distributed computing challenges)

    Startup and shutdown orchestration

    Service discovery

  • 17 17

    Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication -Leonardo da Vinci

  • 18

    Sensor-Cloud:

    Opportunities and Research Directions Elisa Bertino

    Purdue University

    Cyber

    Center

    Professor; Elisa Bertino , Purdue University,

    Professor CS, Research Director of CERIAS, Director of Cyber

    Center,

    Introduction & Opening Statement of Panel Member

  • 19 19

    Definitions and Conceptual Architecture

    Military Target Tracking Natural Disaster Relief

    What is a Sensor-Cloud? An Infrastructure supporting pervasive computation based on: sensors as an interface between physical and cyber

    worlds the cloud as the cyber backbone the Internet and wireless technologies as the

    communication medium

    IoT and NoT These recent trends will further accelerate the deployment of sensor networks and sensor-based applications

    Drones and UAV The use of these devices will multiply the opportunities for collecting data from (possibly mobile) sensors on-the-ground and for managing these sensors

  • 20 20

    Research Directions

    Diagram from: A. Alamri et al. A Survey on Sensor-Cloud: Architectures, Applications, and Approaches, 2013.

    Network access management Encryption techniques for small devices Sensor software and firmware security Secure sensor localization techniques Provenance techniques for sensors Tools supporting the deployment and

    monitoring of sensors, and the design of sensor-based data collection applications

    Data fusion techniques to assess and enhance sensor data trustworthiness

    Fault-tolerant and reliable continuous data acquisition

    Efficient sensor streamed data processing techniques

    Event processing and management Privacy for sensor-based applications and data

  • 21

    Introduction & Opening Statement of Panel Member

    Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow,

    Member of the Technical Staff

  • 22 22

    Position Statement

    Cloud Security is difficult to achieve in a tactical

    environment. It is faced with connectivity issues, a

    lack of elasticity and limited Infrastructure as a

    Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS)

    providers.

    Outer Router

    On Prem Server Farm

    FirewallProxy

    (Deep Packet Inspection)

    IaaSServer Farm

    SaaSProvider

    PaaSServer Farm

    Host Operating System

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    App A App A App B App C

    Mobile User

    IsolatedServices

  • 23 23

    Cloud Computing

    Essential

    Characteristics:

    Rapid Elasticity

    Resource Pooling

    Measured Service

    Broad network access

    On-demand self-

    service

    PaaS

    Host Operating System

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    App A App A App B App C

    NIST SP 800-145, Mell and Grance, 2011

    Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand

    network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g.,

    networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly

    provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider

    interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three

    service models, and four deployment models.

  • 24 24

    Cloud Computing Models

    Service Models

    Software as a Service

    (SaaS)

    Platform as a Service

    (PaaS)

    Infrastructure as a

    Service (IaaS)

    Deployment Models

    Public Cloud

    Hybrid Cloud

    Private Cloud

    Community Cloud

    IaaSServer Farm

    SaaSProvider

    PaaSServer Farm

    Host Operating System

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    App A App A App B App C

    IaaSServer Farm

    SaaSProvider

    PaaSServer Farm

    Host Operating System

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    Clo

    ud

    Ap

    plic

    atio

    n (

    ho

    sted

    VM

    )

    Clo

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    )

    Clo

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    Ap

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    VM

    )

    App A App A App B App C

  • 25 25

    The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats

    Data Breaches

    Data Loss

    Account Hijacking

    Insecure APIs

    Denial of Service

    Malicious Insiders

    Abuse of Cloud Services

    Insufficient Due Diligence

    Shared Technology Issue

  • 26 26

    Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud

    TIG

    C4I Business Area Technical Lead

    Introduction & Opening Statement of Panel Member

  • 27 27

    The Power of Cloud Applications

    Instances are added, deleted, and restarted by the application

    itself based on need.

    Security is built in, or not, to the application.

    (Mobile) User Interface

    Service Interfaces

    Service Processing

    Data

    Cloud Application Designs are Scalable and Resilient when connected

    Cloud Native Applications are built differently.

    Stateless services are composed

    of many separate, identical instances.

  • 28 28

    The Solution must address

    UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Timely Keep Bad Guys & Malware...