cmh_pub_11-6 rearming the french.pdf

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

Special Studies

REARMING THE FRENCH

by

Marcel Vigneras

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

UNITED STA TES ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C. , 1989

ForewordEvery thoughtful American interested in the history of our present mutual

assistance program should find this a profitable and illuminating book. Inrearming the French the War Department and the U.S. Army became agentsof an Allied policy which not only enabled this country to further a friendshipfor France that dated from the Revolution, but in addition served the militaryinterests of both nations. It equipped Frenchmen with the means to fight andby so doing increased at minimum cost the forces available to the United Nations.The Army can take pride in the success with which it administered a policyinvolving both political and military matters. The policy of mutual aid hassince been extended throughout the world with the Army again designatedas the agency principally responsible for its administration. The present thoroughand objective study of an early large-scale American experiment with mutualaid should therefore be highly instructive to all concerned.

JOHN H. STOKESWashington, D.C. Maj. Gen., U.S.A.30 August 1956 Chief of Military History

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Introductory NoteThe original intent of the European Theater of Operations series was to

portray the history of ground combat as carried on by U.S. forces in westernand central Europe during World War II. Very early in the planning devotedto this series it became apparent that two subjects were of such grand importand interest as to require separate treatment. For this reason volumes wereprepared and published on the history of the supreme command and the logisticalsupport of the U.S. armies that fought in the European Theater of Operations.Research for these two volumes unraveled one continuing but tangled threadwhich did not quite fit into the fabric of the series as a whole. This was theproblem posed by the French national forces serving under U.S. command andby the rearmament of these forces to permit their effective employment in thefight for the liberation of their homeland. The problems of command anddecision involved in French rearmament and in the logistic support furnishedto the French forces reached outside of the European Theater of Operations.It was decided, therefore, to devote a special study to the history of Frenchrearmament. This decision was supported by the fact that the United Stateshad once again embarked on the business of supplying weapons and other materialassistance to potential Allies, and that such military assistance appeared to havebecome a continuing feature of U.S. policy.

An author was available who had exceptional qualifications for a taskrecognized from the first as complex and delicate. A scholar who had studiedhistory at the Lycée of Limoges, France, and received his Ph.D. at WesternReserve University, Marcel Vigneras had served in the French Army in bothWorld Wars, although in World War II seconded to duty as an American citizenwith the Office of Strategic Services in 1943. He was a member of the facultyat Smith College before World War II. At the close of the war he joined theHistorical Division, European Theater of Operations, then in France. At presentDr. Vigneras is continuing research on military problems as a member of theOperations Research Office, from which he was granted leave to complete thepresent volume.

HUGH M. COLEChief, European Section, 1947-1952

PrefaceThis volume tells how the French forces were rearmed from the time they

re-entered World War II after their temporary eclipse from the battlefields ofEurope. The text inescapably focuses attention on the part played by Americain the undertaking if for no other reason than that the undertaking itself, whileshared between the United States and the United Kingdom, was largely American.

The purpose of this volume is twofold. It is a historical account of a sizableand laborious enterprise that enabled a friendly military establishment in direneed of assistance to take its place among the forces aligned against the Axis.It is intended also to serve as a guide for the solution of problems likely to ariseout of similar future enterprises. While this volume is not primarily concernedwith operational matters, it contains sufficient operational material to establishthe extent of the contribution made by the rearmed French forces toward thefinal victory of the United Nations. The reader is warned that only such Frenchpolitical developments that had a definite influence on the course of rearmamentare discussed, and the discussion is limited to that sufficient to place the evolutionof French rearmament in its proper perspective.

Rearming the French is the product of co-operative effort and it is a pleasureto acknowledge indebtedness to the many individuals, too numerous to be listedhere, who offered advice and help. While I express my deep appreciation tothem, I wish to emphasize that they are in no way responsible for the handlingof the material used, or for errors of fact or presentation.

I am especially grateful to those French and U.S. officers who granted meinterviews which enabled me to clarify a number of points. Some provided mewith information from their private files. Others were kind enough to readpart or all of the manuscript. Their names have been listed in the BibliographicalNote.

Several members of the Office of the Chief of Military History were par-ticularly helpful in suggesting improvements. I should like to thank Dr. GordonA. Harrison for generous and skillful assistance in achieving better organizationand clarity of text; Col. Leo J. Meyer for valuable comments on the substanceof the preliminary draft; Dr. George F. Howe for guidance in interpretingcontroversial points; finally Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield for his critical reviewof the revised draft.

For assistance in exploring the tons of files held by the War Department,I am indebted to Mr. Royce Thompson, of the European Section, OCMH,

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Mrs. Blanche Moore and Mr. Albert Whitt, of the Departmental Records Branch,AGO, Mrs. Mary Greathouse, of the Historical Section, G-3, Mr. Israel Wiceand members of his Reference Branch staff in OCMH.

The task of extracting pertinent data was greatly facilitated by the diligenthelp of Miss Katharine C. Jenkins. I am indebted to her for assembling andanalyzing the material now appearing in the section on French assistance tothe American Expeditionary Forces in World War I, and in the chapter on theJoint Rearmament Committee.

Miss Ruth Stout edited the entire manuscript and her suggestions greatlycontributed to improving the narrative. The excellent map is the work ofMr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff, Deputy Chief Historian for Cartography. MissMargaret E. Tackley selected and prepared the illustrative material. The copyeditors were Mrs. Marion P. Grimes and Mr. Arthur C. Henne.

Rearming the French was prepared at the suggestion and under the generaldirection of Dr. Hugh M. Cole, Chief of the European Theater Section. Itwas my good fortune to have his wise and learned counsel throughout the periodof research and writing.

30 August 1956 MARCEL VIGNERASWashington, D. C.

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ContentsChapter Page

PROLOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1French Assistance to the A.E.F. in World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1The American Decision To Rearm the French in World War II . . . . . . . . 6

PART ONE

The North African Forces

I. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE A REARMAMENTPROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1

Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1Initial Groping Toward a Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Setting Up the Joint Rearmament Committee . . . . . . . . . . . 25General Giraud Sends a Military Mission to Washington . . . . . . . 26Emergency Provision of Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27General Giraud Eyes the Larger Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29The Deadlock Over a Firm Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

I I . THE ANFA AGREEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Franco-Anglo-American Conversations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3President Roosevelt and General Giraud Negotiate an Agreement . . . . 36Clarification of the Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

III. PHASE I OF THE PROGRAM (JANUARY-JULY 1943). . . 45Phase I Is Launched . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45The CCS Agree on a Rearmament Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Implementing Phase I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

IV. EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . 62AFHQ Spells Out Rearmament Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62Allied Assistance in Handling Matériel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64The French Organize an Expeditionary Corps . . . . . . . . . . . 69

V. PHASE II OF THE PROGRAM (JULY-AUGUST 1943) ... 74Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4Political Complications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8Implementing Phase I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82Fusion of the Giraud and de Gaulle Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . 86Results of Phases I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

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Chapter Page

VI. PHASE III OF THE PROGRAM (MID-AUGUST-NOVEMBER1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1

The 15 August Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91French Political Situation Threatens Program. . . . . . . . . . . . 97Implementing Phase III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

VII. THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME (NOVEMBER 1943-FEBRU-ARY 1944): I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

"La Bataille des Services". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104The 1st DMI Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116Cutback of the Program—The 23 January Plan . . . . . . . . . . 121

VIII. THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME (NOVEMBER 1943-FEBRU-ARY 1944): II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

The French Reorganize Their Supply System . . . . . . . . . . . . 130Supply and Maintenance of the Expeditionary Forces . . . . . . . . . 138Supply Situation—End of January 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

IX. PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM (FEBRUARY-OCTOBER1944)1: BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . 148

Rearmament Operations Resume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148Control Over the French Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149Reorganization of the French High Command . . . . . . . . . . . 151Franco-American Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 3The 23 January Plan Becomes the Basis of Phase IV . . . . . . . . 155Secondary Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 8

X. PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM (FEBRUARY-OCTOBER1944) I I : IMPLEMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Equipping the Units on the ANVIL Troop List . . . . . . . . . . . 163Service Troops and the Lack of Technicians . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Shortages o f Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169SCAMA's Role During Phase IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174Repossession of U.S. Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176Disposal of British Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

XI. THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ACTION . . . . . . 178Italy and Other Battlegrounds in the Mediterranean . . . . . . . . 178France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 2Logistical Support of the French ANVIL Forces . . . . . . . . . . . 186The North African Rearmament Program Ends . . . . . . . . . . . 189

XII. REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE . . . . . . . . . . 195

XIII. REHABILITATING THE FRENCH NAVY . . . . . . . . . 214

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Chapter Page

XIV. LIAISON, LANGUAGE, AND TRAINING PROBLEMS ... 227Liaison and the Language Barrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 0

XV. CONTROVERSY OVER SUBSTITUTE WEAPONS . . . . . 241Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 2Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 4Small Infantry Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

XVI. OTHER MATERIAL PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 4Clothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 8Special Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260Miscellaneous Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264Accounting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 6

XVII. AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT . . . . . . . . . 271The Joint Rearmament Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271The Joint Air Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285SCAMA and Stock Control Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288French Training Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

PART TWO

The Metropolitan Forces

XVIII. INITIAL ASSISTANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299Supply of the Resistance F o r c e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299Employment of French Liberated M a n p o w e r . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

XIX. ARMING LIBERATED MANPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . 319Interim Organization and Equipping of Labor and Internal Security Units. 319The Liberated Manpower and Metropolitan Programs . . . . . . . . 328

XX. THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITANPROGRAMS IN OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

Implementing the Liberated Manpower Program . . . . . . . . . . 339Implementing the Metropolitan Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344Revising the Metropolitan Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348Carrying Out the Revised Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354

XXI. THE REARMAMENT OPERATIONS END . . . . . . . . . 361Suspension of the Metropolitan Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361Political Developments Doom Rearmament . . . . . . . . . . . . 367

Chapter Page

XXII. RE-EQUIPPING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE AND FRENCHNAVY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 3

The A i r Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373T h e Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 7

XXIII. REARMAMENT DIVISION, SHAEF MISSION TO FRANCE . . 381Membership, Organization, and Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . 381Training Under Inspection Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388

XXIV. FRENCH PLANS FOR A FAR EAST EXPEDITIONARYCORPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 1

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 0

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 5

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411

GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414

INDEX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 7

TablesNo.1. Equipment Furnished American Expeditionary Forces in World War I,

by Type and Supplying Country: 6 April 1917-11 November 1918 . . 42. Equipment, by Type, Available to the North African Forces: 1 October

1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 83. American and British-Equipped Squadrons of the FAF: December

1943). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 64. Quantities of Equipment Packaged by OSS in the United Kingdom and

Airdropped into France: January-October 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 3075. Major Items of Equipment Furnished by the United States to the French

Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 2

Charts1. Organization of the French High Command in North Africa: 1 April 1943. 662. Position of JRC and Related Agencies Within the Allied Command Struc-

ture: 1 April 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2773. Internal Organization of the Joint Rearmament Committee: 1 April 1944 . 2784. SCAMA: Internal Organization and Co-ordination With Other Agencies. 2895. Position of Rearmament Division in SHAEF: 1 January 1945 . . . . . 3836. The Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to France: March 1945 . . 384

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MapPage

Operations and Participating French Forces . . . . . . . . . . Inside back cover

Illustrations

Realization o f French Hopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FrontispieceVictory Parade, Paris, 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Lt . Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26General George C . Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7Meeting at Casablanca, 24 January 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37U.S. Vehicles for North African Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46General Eisenhower Delivering an Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark Presenting Newly Arrived U.S. Equipment . . . . 59Inspecting U.S. Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4Vehicle Assembly Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7Reviewing American Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8Col. Ernest A . Suttles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9General Alphonse Juin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3Goumiers of the 9th Colonial Infantry Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102Goumiers of the 4th Group of Tabors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112Spahis i n North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 4Conference i n Algiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 0Siena, Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 99 t h Colonial Infantry Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 0Troops Entering Portoferraio, Elba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 1French 2 d Armored Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 4Maj. Gen. Jacques Leclerc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 4Street Fighting i n Marseille . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 5Reviewing French Troops in Liberation Ceremony, Marseille . . . . . . . 185Victory Parade Through the Streets of Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192P-40 Warhawks for the Lafayette Escadrille . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197Unloading P-38 Fighter Planes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199French Submarine, Casablanca Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 5Battleship Richelieu Passing Under Manhattan Bridge . . . . . . . . . 216Battleship Jean Bart a t Casablanca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219Firing a 105-mm. Howitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 2U.S. Instructor Demonstrating the Use of Signal Equipment . . . . . . . 233Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240Tank Destroyer f o r t h e French . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 2French Tank Crew With U.S. Light Tank M5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2442d Moroccan Infantry Division Men Unloading American Rations . . . . 256French Wacs Assembling on the Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

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PageMembers of the Joint Rearmament Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273Brig. Gen. Harold F. Loomis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276French Forces of the Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305Insignia of 1st French Army and Its Major Components . . . . . . . . . 352Battleship Strasbourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 8Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to France . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

The illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense except for thosefrom the following sources:

Service Cinématographique des Armées, Frontispiece.National Archives, page 7.Acme Photograph, page 216.

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PrologueIn October 1942 Maj. Gen. Mark W.

Clark, representing the U.S. Army, andBrig. Gen. Charles Mast, spokesman forGeneral Henri Giraud, met secretly inCherchel, seventy-five miles west of Algiers.The subject of their conversations was amomentous one—the imminent re-entry ofFrench North Africa into the war. Gen-eral Clark, acting on instructions fromPresident Roosevelt, gave positive as-surances to General Mast that the UnitedStates would furnish the equipment neces-sary to outfit the North African forces.1

Clark's commitment was timely, forAnglo-American forces were about to landin northwest Africa. More important, itheralded an event of great significance: theforthcoming assumption, by the UnitedStates, of direct responsibility for re-equipping the French armed forces. TheBritish had been discharging this responsi-bility by maintaining the small band ofFrenchmen stubbornly fighting on their sideand under their control since mid-1940.

Before World War II had ended, theAmericans had fully equipped and trainedeight French divisions in North Africa,partially outfitted and trained three more inFrance, furnished equipment for nineteenair squadrons, and carried out an extensiverehabilitation program for the French Navy.They had supplied some 1,400 aircraft,160,000 rifles and carbines, 30,000 machineguns, 3,000 artillery guns, 5,000 tanks and

1 These instructions were relayed in Msg R-2080,Gen George C. Marshall to Lt Gen Dwight D.Eisenhower, 17 Oct 42, CM-OUT 5682. (SeeBibliographical Note.) "Clark . . . should state . . .the U.S. will furnish equipment for French Forceswhich will operate against the Axis."

self-propelled weapons, and 51,000,000rounds of ammunition.

An occurrence of historic import was thusre-enacted in reverse. Twice France hadsimilarly undertaken to assist an unpreparedAmerica at war. In 1781, in addition tosending an expeditionary corps to help theyoung colonies in their fight for independ-ence, France supplied weapons and matérielto the infant Continental Army. Muchlater, in World War I. France, herself atwar with Germany, again provided matérielto the American Expeditionary Forces(A.E.F.) sent to the European continent.In that second episode, the nature and ex-tent of the help rendered were vastly differ-ent from what they were to be in WorldWar II. Yet the parallel is striking enoughto warrant, for the sake of historical com-parison, a brief account of the aid extendedby the French to the American forces in1917-18.

French Assistance to the A.E.F. in WorldWar I

The entrance of the United States intoWorld War I, on 6 April 1917, found theAmerican forces totally unprepared for thearduous tasks which they were later to carryout on the battlefields of western Europe.Initially, these forces, transported to theContinent as fast as they were raised andas shipping facilities would allow, lackedthe most essential weapons of the armiesthen at war, namely, artillery, tanks, andaircraft. Their plight was made worse bythe fact that, at home; most ordnance andmunitions plants were not prepared to go

1 These instructions were relayed in Msg R-2080,Gen George C. Marshall to Lt Gen Dwight D.Eisenhower, 17 Oct 42, CM-OUT 5682. (SeeBibliographical Note.) "Clark . . . should state . . .the U.S. will furnish equipment for French Forceswhich will operate against the Axis."

2 REARMING THE FRENCH

into large-scale production for months tocome. In the case of airplanes, it was re-ported that American manufacturers couldnot begin to furnish them before the sum-mer of 1918.2

On reaching the Continent, in early June1917, Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing, Com-mander-in-Chief, American ExpeditionaryForces, at once investigated the possibilityof obtaining from Allied sources the im-plements of war so urgently needed for hisforces. The depredations of enemy sub-marines on Atlantic shipping made such aprocedure even more advisable, and Gen-eral Pershing began urging the War De-partment to make use to the fullest extentpossible of French and British factories,already geared to wartime production, forthe manufacture of war matériel for theA.E.F.

To the A.E.F. Commander-in-Chief,speed was the essential consideration, for hisobjective was to forge, as rapidly as possible,a well-organized and adequately equippedstriking force to be employed as a separateand autonomous component of the com-bined Allied armies. Without such a force,he would have no other alternative than tosubmit to the already strong pressure ex-erted by top Allied authorities for the useof his troops as replacements for their ownarmies.3

While Allied recognition of the principleof a separate American task force was de-layed for some months, the need of gettingequipment into the hands of U.S. troops fortraining and combat purposes was at oncerecognized. To this end, all available re-sources, it was agreed by everyone con-

cerned, must be tapped immediately. Gen-eral Pershing himself strongly supportedthis view. "It matters little whether wehave a particular kind of artillery; if wecannot get the French, we should get theBritish. The same can be said of small armsand personal equipment. If our ordnancecannot furnish them, the French and Britishhave them. So in equipment and arma-ment there should be no delay." 4

Investigation convinced General Persh-ing that French industry was in a far betterposition than its British counterpart to sup-ply a large part of the needed war matériel.Although not fully supplied themselves, theFrench were said to be industrially so situ-ated as to be capable of increasing theirproduction rapidly and substantially. Withthis realization and the assumption thatAmerican troops would operate in proximityto the French armies, A.E.F. officials de-cided to adopt the French types of artilleryfor the usual calibers and to seek Frenchassistance in obtaining the guns needed atleast for the first two years. "We securedan agreement that our troops, as they camealong, would be provided with French gunsand ammunition, including not only the75's and 155's, but 37-mm. guns and58-mm. trench mortars as well." 5

Although "France was responding gen-erously," her resources were not inexhaust-ible.6 Unless energetic measures were takento provide French factories with the neces-sary raw materials, their output could notbe expected to reach the required levels.With this in view, War Department officialsenlisted the help of American industry andbusiness in establishing a vast supply pro-gram. Figures on the tonnage of raw ma-

2 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the WorldWar (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931),I, 161.

3 Ibid., I, 159.

4 Ibid., II, 112.sIbid., I, 107.6 Ibid., I, 258.

PROLOGUE 3

terials supplied to the French up to theArmistice for the production of munitionsof war are illuminating. For the artillerypieces and ammunition of French manu-facture fired by the A.E.F., the United Statessupplied, in metals alone, over 700,000 tonsof steel, 30,000 tons of pig iron, 5,000 tonsof brass and zinc, 50,000 tons of copper, aswell as all the principal materials used inloading the entire supply of shells. For thefinished airplanes used by the Air Service,34,500,000 feet of spruce, fir, and cedar,7,000,000 feet of mahogany and walnut,4,000 tons of aluminum, and miscellaneousaircraft materials and supplies were fur-nished by the United States. All together,the French received from America, up toNovember 1918, over 800,000 tons of rawmaterials and semifinished products.7

On the other side of the ledger, availablefigures on the weapons of war manufacturedby the French for use by the A.E.F. are noless impressive. The forty-two divisions,representing a total of 1,390,000 combatanttroops, which at the time of the Armisticemade up the A.E.F. in France, wereequipped almost exclusively with Frenchartillery, artillery ammunition, tanks, andplanes. It has even been said that, if giventhe necessary raw materials, France couldhave supplied all the artillery, ammunition,tanks, and aircraft for an American armyof any size that could have been sent toEurope.8

The French produced 3,532 of the 4,194pieces of artillery used in combat by theA.E.F. up to 11 November 1918, 227 of the289 tanks, and all of the 240-mm. and 58-mm. trench mortars. As General Pershing

observed: "It was most fortunate that wewere able to get these guns from the French,as up to the end of the war no guns manu-factured at home for our army, of the typesused, except twenty-four 8-inch mortars andsix 14-inch naval guns, were fired in battle.9

Almost all of the railroad artillery used bythe U.S. forces consisted of equipmentloaned by the French. The entire supply ofammunition fired by American artillery upuntil the last days of the war was of Frenchorigin because practically none of U.S.manufacture (other than shrapnel) hadreached the front. As for automatic weap-ons, reports show that the first twelve U.S.divisions were completely equipped withHotchkiss heavy machine guns andChauchat rifles purchased from the FrenchGovernment.

Another striking figure is the number ofaircraft. By the time of the Armistice,equipment in the hands of the Air Serviceconsisted of 3,210 combat and 3,154 train-ing airplanes, or a total of 6,364, of which4,874 had been supplied by French indus-try. Of the forty-three American squad-rons engaged in operations on 31 October1918, only ten were equipped with aircraftmanufactured in the United States andthree with planes of British manufacture,as compared with thirty equipped withFrench-made planes.

Besides manufacturing and supplyingmunitions of war, the French also providedt r o o p s and facilities. The practice,adopted by agreement between GeneralPershing and the War Department, ofgiving priority of shipment to infantry andmachine gun units left the A.E.F. woefullyshort in supporting arms and services. Thiscondition never was corrected and GeneralPershing was compelled to obtain from the

7 Benedict Crowell, America's Munitions: 1917—1918 (Washington, 1919), pp. 590-92.

8 Grosvenor B. Clarkson, Industrial America inthe World War (Boston and New York: HoughtonMifflin Co., 1923), pp. 236-38. 9 Pershing, op. cit., I, 107. See Table 1, below.


TABLE 1—EQUIPMENT FURNISHED AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN WORLD WAR I,BY TYPE AND SUPPLYING COUNTRY: 6 APRIL 1917-11 NOVEMBER 1918

PROLOGUE 5

French a great part of the corps and armyartillery, aviation, and other services nec-essary to support his armies. For the move-ment of his supplies, the A.E.F. Com-mander-in-Chief likewise obtained fromthe French the use of their facilities suchas harbors, railways, depots, warehouses,and supply dumps. At the time of theArmistice, American cargo was utilizing98 berths in French ports of which 86 wereFrench-constructed and 12 American-built.During the three-month period from Sep-tember to November 1918, an average of300 trains per day, representing a dailyhaul of 22,000 miles, were operating atthe disposal of the American GeneralHeadquarters.10

When plans were first discussed for set-ting up a supply system for the A.E.F., theFrench strongly urged General Pershing toadopt their own for the sake of simplifica-tion. The proposal was turned down fora variety of reasons, not the least of whichwas the firm American intent to preservethe integrity of the U.S. forces as a separ-ate military establishment. Yet, in super-imposing the American supply system onthe existing French organization, effortswere made, whenever possible, to harmo-nize with the latter so as to prevent needlesscomplications.11 As a concession to theFrench plea for unification, U.S. adminis-trative sections generally were made to con-

form to the boundaries of French militaryregions. This resulted in simplification andgreater Franco-American co-operation.One important feature was borrowed fromthe French supply system—regulating sta-tions. Located near advance depots, thesestations controlled the flow of supplies fromthe zone of interior to the units at the front.At the time of the Armistice, the A.E.F. hadconstructed one such station, was in pro-cess of organizing another, and was makinguse of French stations whenever necessary.12

Another major contribution to moldingthe A.E.F. was the valuable assistance theFrench rendered in the field of training.The critical shortage of Allied manpowerhad made it necessary to send untrainedtroops to France immediately after the en-trance of the United States into the war.13

Although General Pershing, PresidentWoodrow Wilson, Secretary of War New-ton D. Baker, and the American publicwere insistent on the creation of a unifiedAmerican Army, trained and commandedaccording to U.S. methods, the urgency ofthe operational situation during the firstyear of American participation in the warrequired that every expedient be used to getU.S. troops in battle as speedily as possi-ble.14 For lack of time and better practices,Allied training methods were adopted, withthe result that no completely Americantraining organization was set up before hos-tilities came to an end.

10 Col. Jacques de Chambrun and Capt. Charlesde Marenches, The American Army in the Euro-pean Conflict (New York: The Macmillan Com-pany, 1919), p. 205; Lt. Col. Edouard JeanRéquin, America's Race to Victory, with Introduc-tion by General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff,U.S. Army (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co.,1919), p. 185.

11 Historical Branch, War Plans Division, Gen-eral Staff, Organization of the Services of Supply,American Expeditionary Forces, Monograph 7, WDDoc 1009, (Washington, 1921), p. 14.

12 Report of the Military Board of Allied Supply(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924),pp. 344-46.

13 As an illustration, over 50 percent of the com-ponent elements of the first U.S. division to reachthe Continent were completely untrained. His-torical Division, Department of the Army, UNITEDSTATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR: 1917-1919, III, Training and Use of American UnitsWith British and French (Washington, 1948), 426.

14 Ibid., p. 2.


Except for two divisions,15 U.S. unitsabroad were trained by the French sincethey were to fight alongside the latter atleast initially. This procedure was stronglyrecommended by the chief of LiaisonGroup, General Headquarters, who de-clared on 28 May 1917: "If the FrenchArmy is to be our model and if the Amer-ican is to fight beside the Frenchman ac-cording to the latter's methods, then thetraining of the American troops should bedone in as close contact as possible withthe French troops, not only from the tech-nical point of view but from that of mutualacquaintance, mutual understanding, mu-tual respect." 16 After the proposed proce-dure was approved, an effective methodwas adopted by which officers and enlistedmen of both armies were exchanged.American troops were detailed to Frenchtraining camps as students, and the Frenchcame to U.S. stations as instructors. Also,the practice was established of billeting aFrench division in proximity to a corre-sponding American organization for thepurpose of giving them both thorough in-struction. The French division would stayabout a month, lending its officer and tech-nician personnel to the American unit, andwould arrange for the parallel instructionof the two divisions. After this initialtraining period, American cadres wouldspend tours of duty with the French in

quiet sectors of the front for additional ex-perience in trench warfare.17

For the training of pilots, arrangementswere made for U.S. troops to enter flyingschools in France and in other Allied coun-tries until such a time as American trainingcenters could be established.

From this brief summary, it can safely beassumed that the services rendered by theFrench, and to a lesser degree by the British,both in supplying munitions of war and inproviding training and other facilities short-ened by many months the time it took theAmerican Expeditionary Forces to become awell-equipped and well-trained strikingforce ready to take a decisive part in opera-tions. Even so, a year elapsed before theA.E.F. was in a position to undertake offen-sive action, and then with the strength of buta single infantry regiment. It is probablethat without the generous assistance they re-ceived from the French, American troops,except for a few individual units, mightwell not have engaged in combat in 1917—18. It is equally probable that the rec-ord of this assistance influenced the U.S.decision in World War II to extend similarhelp to the nation that had proved itself aloyal provider in the earlier conflict.18

The American Decision To Rearm theFrench in World War II

The American assurances given theFrench at Cherchel in October 1942 auto-

15 Which were among the American units to betrained by the British for participation in combatalongside British troops, in accordance with theSix Division Plan agreed to by the United Statesand the United Kingdom in January 1918 (andrevised later in June to include ten divisions).Eight of the ten divisions were withdrawn beforethe training program was completed, leaving onlytwo entirely British-trained. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

16 Ibid., p. 238.

17 Serious consideration was given to the possi-bility of sending French and British officers to theUnited States to give advanced courses in tactics.General Pershing opposed this procedure which, hefelt, would tend to reduce the sense of responsi-bility and initiative of American officers. Further-more, he was not entirely in agreement with themilitary tactics taught by the French. Pershing,op. cit., II, 237.

18 See Bibliographical Note for list of World WarI source material used in this section.

PROLOGUE 7

VICTORY PARADE, PARIS, 1918. Leading Army troops is General John J. Pershing.

matically became a firm commitment themoment the North African forces threwtheir weight on the side of the Anglo-Amer-ican allies barely a month later. The re-entry of these forces into the war climaxeda long period of painful uncertainty for theAllies themselves, as well as for the French.This period, which began at the close of theill-fated Campaign in the West of May-June 1940, probably constitutes the mostcrucial page of France's recent history.

French Political and Military SituationJune 1940-November 1942

By the time of the Franco-Germanarmistice of 22 June 1940, the Germanforces had penetrated deep into French

territory. They proceeded at once to estab-lish themselves in a zone of occupation com-prising northern and western France, orapproximately one half of the country, and,by a demarcation line, virtually severed itfrom contact with the other half. A Frenchgovernment headed by Marshal HenriPétain organized in the "free zone" andfrom the small city of Vichy undertook torepair the physical and moral havoc causedby the blitzkrieg just ended. Fearful offurther German encroachments on what wasleft of French sovereignty, Marshal Pétainand his associates resolved to abide strictlyby the stiff armistice terms imposed by theGermans. Under these terms the FrenchArmy was being reduced to a skeleton policeforce, or "Armistice Army," of some 100,-


000 men for Metropolitan France and alike number for the overseas territories inNorthwest Africa. The fleet, still intact,was to remain in French harbors on suffer-ance so long as the French respected thearmistice.

It has now been established that, duringthe ensuing years, a number of officials inthe government and on the General Staffin Vichy secretly endeavored to strengthenthe Army, at home as well as overseas, be-yond the limitations imposed by the armi-stice clauses. These patriotic individuals,undaunted by a defeat which they regardedas only a temporary setback, were preparingfor the day when the Army would take uparms once more against the Germans.Their main effort was directed at buildingup a cadre force and a reserve of weaponsand maintaining organizations and servicesthen unauthorized in anticipation of theeventual mobilization of former combat-ants.19

At the end of June 1940, GeneralMaxime Weygand, Minister of NationalDefense, issued a secret directive on thehiding of weapons and requested militaryregion commanders in the free zone to con-ceal all antitank and antiaircraft guns intheir respective areas. These instructionsappear to have had the full support of boththe high military command and the headsof services. The SR (Service de Renseigne-ments, or Intelligence Service), ordered todisband, managed to retain the frameworkof its organization and continued to function

underground at the cost of many lives. Newcivilian organizations sprang up which ab-sorbed part of the General Staff and a num-ber of Medical, Engineer, Ordnance, andQuartermaster officers. Military transportunits reappeared under the guise of civiliantransport agencies. Even civilian organiza-tions created by the Vichy regime for na-tional rehabilitation purposes underwentsome unauthorized military instruction.Students attending a training center for theChantiers de Jeunesse in 1941-42 weretaught guerrilla warfare, a subject for ob-vious reasons taboo in the regular schools ofthe Armistice Army. On the basis of theexperience gained at that center, the com-manding officer later prepared and dis-tributed sub rosa a 200-page manual on theorganization and operational employmentof guerrillas.20

In addition to, and often at odds with,these efforts on the part of regularly consti-tuted authorities, other insurgent move-ments without official connection or back-ing developed after June 1940. Unwilling

19 Général Revers, "L'O.R.A.," La France et sonEmpire dans la Guerre, ed. Louis Mouilleseaux(Paris: Editions Littéraires de France, 1947), II,119-22; Maxime Weygand, Mémoires: Rappelé auService (Paris: Flammarion, 1950), pp. 303-21;Intervs with Lt Gen Augustin Guillaume, Dec 48,and with Brig Gen Marcel Pénette, Jul 50. (SeeBibliographical Note.)

20 After the Franco-German armistice of June1940, the Vichy Government created the Chantiersde Jeunesse (youth work camps somewhat similarto the CCC camps established in the United Statesin the thirties) for the purpose of putting to work,both in France and in North Africa, young menwho had not yet reached the age of military con-scription. Dressed in a green uniform of semi-civilian type, these men were primarily employedin tasks of public utility. The training center re-ferred to above was the Ecole des Cadres located atCollonges, near Lyon, barely eighty-five miles fromVichy. For the role played by Chantiers de Jeunessein North Africa, see p. 68, 68n, below.

The manual was Instruction Provisoire surI'Emploi des Corps Francs, prepared by Maj.Charles de Virieu in 1943, clandestinely printedand distributed under German occupation in early1944. Copy found in file "Material zur Freischzer-lerfrage" (Material on Partisan Problem), MilitaryCommander France, Oct 43 to Jul 44, GMDS No.75486, located in German Military Documents Sec-tion, AGO.

PROLOGUE 9

to bow to the enemy, many citizens, espe-cially in the German-occupied zone, beganto organize into Resistance movements.These were generally sponsored and con-trolled by political parties. Their aim wasto resist by force the occupying power aswell as the Vichy Government, which theyregarded as a defeatist, or even a pro-Ger-man, regime. The dubious behavior ofsome high officials, plus the increasinglyharsh measures—such as the conscription ofyoung men for forced labor in Germanyand the deportation of political enemiesof the "New Order"—taken by both theoccupant and the more collaborationistelement of the Vichy Government, forcedmany of the "resisters" to take refuge inremote areas. There they organized them-selves into Maquis or guerrilla groups.

Eager to strengthen the spirit of resist-ance of the French in view of its potentialmilitary value, the British undertook asearly as November 1940 to assist the under-ground forces morally and materially.Later, in 1943, the Americans joined in thetask of supplying ammunition, equipment,and even personnel such as leaders, radiooperators, and instructors in sabotage andguerrilla warfare.21

On 18 June 1940, four days before thesigning of the Franco-German armistice,Brig. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, who had justmade his way to London in a British plane,issued his now historic appeal over the BBCto the people of France urging them to con-tinue the battle. Although on 23 June hewas stripped of his military rank by theVichy Government, the general ralliedaround him all Frenchmen willing to re-

main in the fight on the side of the BritishCommonwealth. In a letter dated 7 Au-gust, the British Prime Minister, WinstonChurchill, recognized him as "head of allfree Frenchmen, wherever located, whorally around you to the support of the Alliedcause." 22 This recognition was followed,on the same day, by a formal agreement be-tween the British Government and Generalde Gaulle which constituted the Charterof Free France.

A year later, on 24 September 1941, theFree France organization established inLondon a French National Committee un-der the presidency of General de Gaulle.To the world at large and more especiallyto an increasing number of the French peo-ple then under German occupation, Gen-eral de Gaulle was fast becoming the symbolof the ultimate resurrection of France.

Meanwhile, a number of French over-seas possessions had broken with the VichyGovernment and announced their shift ofallegiance to General de Gaulle. By theend of 1942 de Gaulle had control overFrench Equatorial Africa, the Cameroons,Syria, Madagascar, Djibouti, and Reunion.Military manpower available in these areas,added to Frenchmen who had escaped tothe United Kingdom, produced a potentialarmy of about 100,000 men. In late 1940General de Gaulle had begun convertingit to reality by creating staffs as well asground, naval, and air units. These organ-ized groups, known as Forces FrançaisesLibres or Free French Forces, grew to some35,000 men by October 1942.23

2l A brief evaluation of this Anglo-American un-dertaking and of the American share in providingmaterial assistance to the Resistance forces is giv-en in Chapter XVIII, below.

22 Ltr, Churchill to de Gaulle, 7 Aug 40, quotedin Philippe Barrès, Charles de Gaulle (New York:Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1941), p. 147.

23 Theoretically, they were renamed ForcesFrançaises Combattantes (Fighting French Forces)when, on 19 July 1942, the Free France organiza-tion changed its name to Fighting France in order


From the start, the Free French Forcesoperated under the control of the Britishwho assumed the responsibility for feedingand equipping them. In mid-November1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt de-clared them eligible to receive Americanlend-lease equipment, not directly, butthrough the British.24 Soon after the entryof the United States in the war, their statuswas re-examined as British and Americansstudied the division of responsibility forequipping members of the United Nations.On 24 March 1942 the topmost Anglo-American military body, the CombinedChiefs of Staff, agreed on what amountedto a system of adoption by which the mem-bers of the United Nations would look forall their military supplies either to theUnited Kingdom or the United States. Bythis arrangement, the Free French Forcesremained under the tutelage of the British,who would provide for the rearmament aswell as the training of these forces exceptfor the few stationed in the Pacific.25 Thus,from the time they were organized in thefall of 1940 to the end of the Tunisian cam-paign in May 1943, the Free French were

almost entirely British-equipped and Brit-ish-trained. During those two and a halfyears, they took an active part in militaryoperations.

Their ground forces consisted of twomain units. The first was the L Force, alsoknown as the Leclerc Column, from thename of its commanding officer, Col.Jacques Leclerc. After making a spectacu-lar dash from Lake Chad across northeast-ern Africa, the column reached Tripolitaniawhere it fought gallantly under the opera-tional control of the British Eighth Army.It was subsequently engaged in southernTunisia. Later it was raised to the strengthof a division, operating as the 2d FreeFrench Division (2d DFL) under the com-mand of Brig. Gen. Jacques Leclerc. Thesecond unit was initially composed of the1st and 2d Free French Brigades, of whichthe 1st, under the command of Brig. Gen.Pierre Koenig, distinguished itself, also un-der the British Eighth Army, at the battlesof Bir Hacheim in Libya and El 'Alameinin Egypt. The two brigades having beenreorganized, in February 1943, as the 1stFree French Division (1st DFL), the unit

to include the members of the Resistance forces.In practice, however, they generally retained theirformer appellation throughout the war. They willbe referred to as Free French Forces or the FreeFrench throughout this volume. Most importantof the staffs created was the BCRA (Bureau Cen-tral de Renseignements et d'Action), whose func-tion was to carry out clandestine operations inFrance. See p. 299-300, below.

24 Ltr, Roosevelt to Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 11Nov 41, DAD Authority File of President's Ltrs.

25 Min, CCS 13th Mtg, 24 Mar 42. (See Biblio-graphical Note.)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, organized inJanuary 1942 with headquarters in Washington,consisted of the British Chiefs of Staff or theirdesignated representatives in the United States(British Joint Staff Mission) and the U.S. JointChiefs of Staff. Their task was to formulate andexecute, under the direction of the heads of thecountries involved, policies and plans relating to

the strategic conduct of the war, broad war require-ments, allocation of munitions, and transportationrequirements.

The British Chiefs of Staff were Field MarshalSir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial GeneralStaff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound(later replaced by Admiral of the Fleet Sir AndrewB. Cunningham), First Sea Lord, and Air ChiefMarshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were AdmiralWilliam D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Com-mander in Chief (President Roosevelt, later Pres-ident Harry S. Truman), General George C. Mar-shall, Chief of Staff of the Army, Admiral Ernest J.King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chiefof Naval Operations, and General Henry H.Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

See Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack,UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II(Washington, 1951), Ch. I.

PROLOGUE 11

was subsequently engaged, under the com-mand of Maj. Gen. Pierre Koenig, insouthern Tunisia along with the LeclercColumn. From their earliest commitmentto combat up to the end of operations inthat area the Free French Ground Forceshad suffered nearly 3,700 casualties, includ-ing 1,160 killed in action. Likewise partici-pating in Allied operations were the FreeFrench Naval Forces and the Free FrenchAir Forces. By October 1942 the AirForces had grown to five squadrons. Twowere operating from the United Kingdom,one in the Middle East, and one in Libyain conjunction with the Free FrenchGround Forces. Shortly afterward, the re-maining squadron departed for the USSR,there to participate in operations on theRussian front under Russian control.26

Not all of the overseas possessions hadrallied to General de Gaulle. In FrenchNorth Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and FrenchMorocco) and West Africa, military au-thorities had chosen the policy of "unity ofthe French Union behind the Marshal."The African Army had been greatly re-duced in numbers and efficiency as a resultof its participation in the campaign inFrance of May-June 1940 and subsequentdemobilization. Its chiefs—Generals Ma-xime Weygand, Alphonse Juin, AugusteNogues, and others—first undertook the taskof reorganizing, re-equipping, and trainingsuch forces as were authorized under theterms of the Franco-German armistice.27

The strength of these forces was set suc-cessively, with German agreement, at100,000, 120,000, and finally 137,000 in1942. By waging an active recruiting cam-paign especially among the native popu-lation, and by obtaining from the GeneralStaff in Vichy additional French cadres, theNorth African military authorities graduallybuilt the army to its authorized strength.Simultaneously they took steps to reorganizethe necessary services, find equipment, andrekindle the morale of the troops.

As in the case of the Metropolitan Armi-stice Army, it appears that individual staffofficers or groups of officers exerted consid-erable effort to increase the African Armyover and above the authorized level.28

They put into effect a bold, secret programwhich had a twofold objective: immediateconcealment of extra troops and equip-ment, and mobilization of additional menin the event of hostilities. The program,unlike that undertaken in continentalFrance, proceeded with relatively little in-terference from Axis armistice commissions.It was particularly successful in mountain-ous French Morocco; the geographicalsituation at the westernmost end of NorthAfrica encouraged and facilitated clandes-

26 Figures on losses are taken from Lt. Col. P.Santini, "Etude statistique sur les pertes au coursde la guerre 1939-1945," Revue du Corps de SantéMilitaire, X, No. 1 (March, 1954).

Les Forces Aériennes Françaises de 1939 a 1945,ed. Pierre Paquier (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949),pp. 53-65, a semiofficial publication prepared bya group of French Air Force officers. See alsopp. 195, 376, below.

27 Although the avowed purpose of the rehabili-

tation of the North African Army was to providefor the defense of that area against any invader,recent written and oral statements from variousArmy officials then in control leave little doubtthat their secret hope was that their forces wouldtake up arms once more against the Axis in con-junction with an eventual Allied intervention onFrench territory. Evidence in this connection:Weygand, op. cit.; Gen Noguès, Corres withOCMH; Intervs with Gen Guillaume, Nov 48,with Gen Juin, Dec 48, with Gen Pénette, Jul 50.

28 Adm. Pierre Barjot, Le débarquement du8 Novembre 1942 en Afrique du Nord (Paris:J. de Gigord, 1948); René Richard and Alainde Sérigny, L'Enigme d'Alger (Paris: LibrairieArthème Fayard, 1947), pp. 203-14; Weygand,op. cit., pp. 395-405; info provided by Gen Pénette,Jul 50.


tine activities. The results were impres-sive: some 60,000 men, including short-term volunteers, civilian workers, laborers,auxiliary police, and goumiers (or Moroc-can riflemen), were secretly maintained invarious mountain areas. A secret planwas worked out to mobilize 109,000 menand requisition transport vehicles, animals,and supplies in the event of hostilities.29

As for equipment, 59,000 weapons and22,000,000 rounds of ammunition abovethe levels authorized under the armisticewere hidden away. Most of this matérielhad been concealed immediately after thearmistice on orders from local commanders.Some weapons in time were manufacturedlocally from odds and ends.

Finally steps were taken to increase thecapabilities and efficiency of importantservices such as the radio communicationsystem and the medical corps, and to re-plenish quartermaster stocks. Additionalroads, trails, and rail lines were constructedto improve the transportation network.30

In French West Africa armistice com-missions had not determined the numberof men or the amount of equipment to beauthorized in that area. French militaryauthorities as a result had the opportunityto play up their defenseless position in theface of Allied threats to Dakar, and to con-

vince the Germans of the need for strength-ening West African garrisons. A force ofsome 50,000 men was eventually raised.But it received little equipment, no tanks,and no antitank guns.31

Pre-TORCH Negotiationson Supplying the French

By the spring of 1942, General de Gaullewas confident that in the event of an Alliedlanding in France, large numbers of French-men would rally to the common cause andassume under his leadership a substantialshare of the fighting. To implement theambitious rearmament program which hehad just completed, he decided to tap thereal source of equipment, the United States.In May and again in June, he and membersof his National Committee asked Americanofficials in London whether or not theUnited States would agree to allocate anddeliver equipment, under the Lend-LeaseAct, directly to the Free French Forcesinstead of through the British as was thepractice.32 Before American authoritiescould take action on the matter, Free Frenchheadquarters submitted in July and againin August and September of the same yeara series of concrete proposals. These calledfor re-equipping with U.S. matériel not onlythe existing Free French units but the muchlarger forces expected to be raised once anAllied assault on continental France hadbeen launched.33

29 Info furnished by Gen Pénette, Jul 50. Gen-eral Pénette, a captain assigned to General Wey-gand's staff in North Africa in early 1941, is creditedwith having initiated the program. See also Wey-gand, op. cit., pp. 395-405.

Col. Augustin Guillaume, then on GeneralNoguès staff, was in charge of recruiting, equip-ping, and training the goumiers. With the con-nivance of officials in the Vichy Government, heobtained substantial appropriations with which tocarry his work on and secured additional cadresfrom France. In this manner, he was able to con-ceal several thousand goumiers. Interv with GenGuillaume, Nov 48.

30 Info supplied by Gen Pénette, 1952.

31 Maj Gen Emile Béthouart's statement at 6thMRP Meeting, 7 Jan 43, CCS 334, Military Rep-resentatives of the Associated Pacific Powers(5-26-42); see also Interv with Gen Pénette,Jul 50.

32 Memo, Adm Harold Stark, 2 Jun 42, in ComdrU.S. Naval Forces in Europe, US-French Relations,App. B, Pt. I, copy in OCMH.

33 Notes 2 and 3, Gen de Gaulle's Special Staff,21 Jul and 4 Aug 42, OPD 336 France, Sec 1;

PROLOGUE 13

The proposals were turned down for anumber of reasons. First, there were at thetime more pressing needs for armament andmatériel elsewhere. In the opinion of Gen-eral George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff ofthe U.S. Army, the limited striking power ofthe Free French Forces did not warrant suchincreased allocations of matériel as thoserequested by General de Gaulle. In addi-tion, there was considerable reluctance onthe part of American authorities to havedealings with the Free French military head-quarters. Not that the integrity of Generalde Gaulle himself was in the least ques-tioned, but experience had convincedAnglo-American planners that his organiza-tion was "extremely leaky" from the stand-point of security.34 More important stillwas the fact that at the very moment whenthe Free French armament request wasbeing submitted, U.S. military authoritiesin London and Washington were puttingthe final touches to plans for an assault noton France but on northwest Africa (Opera-tion TORCH). In line with the policy ofavoiding all official exchange of informationwith the Gaullists, the latter were beingexcluded from planning for, and participa-tion in, the contemplated operation. At thesame time, however, American plannerswere negotiating with other French author-ities for active French support.35

General Giraud, who had been in south-ern France since late April 1942 after hisdaring and spectacular escape from intern-

ment in Germany, was regarded by Ameri-can officials as the available military figuremost likely to be successful in leading FrenchNorth and West Africa back into the war onthe side of the Allies. A soldier first andforemost, General Giraud cut a legendaryfigure in the eyes of most Frenchmen. Hisrecent escape was the second such exploit inhis life, the first having taken place in WorldWar I. At the outbreak of hostilities inSeptember 1939, he was leading the FrenchSeventh Army. In mid-May 1940, soonafter the German break-through at Sedan,he took command of a group of armies anddesperately attempted to stem the Germanadvance only to be taken prisoner. In early1942, after his return to France, Americanrepresentatives approached him secretly andobtained his promise of support. GeneralGiraud felt that the Allies should considera landing on the Mediterranean coast ofFrance simultaneous with the invasion ofNorth Africa. For the forces that he ex-pected to assemble in the bridgehead fromavailable French manpower, he urged theAllies on 27 October to include in theirlogistical planning the provision of some150,000 tons of war matériel to be broughtfrom Gibraltar to a port in southernFrance.36 Such a proposal was out of thequestion for, unknown to General Giraud,TORCH had long passed the planning stage.In fact, the assault troops were already atsea. Finally persuaded that he must acceptAllied plans and expecting that they wouldgo into effect in an operation beginningseveral months later, General Giraud signi-fied his readiness to be brought to NorthAfrica at the opportune moment.

In North Africa, meanwhile, the headsof a small band of determined French offi-

Memo, Col Emmanuel Lombard for Adm Stark,26 Aug 42, OCS A-45-523 (France).

34 Memo, Gen Marshall for Secy State, 20 Nov 42,OPD 336 France, Sec 1.

35 Memo, Marshall for Adm Ernest J. King, 1 Oct42, OCS A-45-523 (France); Memo, Brig GenAlbert C. Wedemeyer for Maj Gen George V.Strong, 29 Oct 42, OPD 336 France, Sec 1; Memo,Marshall for President, 3 Sep 42, WDCSA 381TORCH (9-3-42).

36 Général [Henri] Giraud, Un seul but, la Victoire(Paris: R. Julliard, 1949), pp. 336-38.


cers and civilians who had long pledgedthemselves to the Allied cause and had wel-comed General Giraud's promise of lead-ership were preparing for the role theyexpected to play at the time of the Alliedlandings. In the course of the secret meet-ing held at Cherchel on 23 October, atwhich General Clark relayed PresidentRoosevelt's pledge of assistance to the Afri-can forces in the event of their re-entry inthe war, he and General Mast, militaryleader of the French "dissidents" andspokesman for General Giraud, discussedthe nature and amount of armament thatwould be required. A week later, in twoletters addressed to General Giraud, RobertD. Murphy, the U.S. political representa-tive in North Africa, confirmed the Pres-ident's intent as disclosed at Cherchel:"During [the period following the land-ings] the Government of the United Stateswill bend its efforts to furnish the Frenchforces with arms and modern equip-ment. . . . The United States Govern-ment will extend the benefits of theLend-Lease Act to the requisitions for ma-tériel from the United States intended togive the French Army the means to partici-pate in the common struggle. The UnitedStates Government will facilitate the ne-gotiation and implementation of theserequisitions." 37

On the strength of the assurances he hadbeen given, General Mast submitted atonce and in great secrecy an extensiveand detailed rearmament program, knownthereafter as the Mast Plan. The programwas based on the assumption that FrenchNorth Africa would be able to raise, by theend of the first month after the landings,eight infantry and two armored divisions,

together with a number of tank, artillery,air, and service units. Actually the MastPlan was the third rearmament scheme tobe submitted before TORCH to Americanrepresentatives in North Africa. It wasdrawn up by Lt. Col. Louis Jousse, a Re-sistance member on the staff of GeneralMast, who had already proposed (in De-cember 1941 and June 1942) the equip-ping of two armored and six infantry divi-sions. Neither the first Jousse program northe still earlier rearmament study submittedin March 1941 by Capt. André Beaufre,another Resistance member on the staff ofthe Governor General of Algeria, was offi-cially acted upon.38 In point of fact thepossibility that the United States wouldsome day undertake a French armamentprogram had not yet been seriously con-sidered by the War Department, and fora number of reasons.

First, it was not until July 1942 thatBritish and American planners decided onan invasion of northwest Africa as part ofthe Anglo-American "Grand Strategy," astrategy which involved operations on manyfronts. For some time before, they hadtossed back and forth a plan to land inFrance itself, but had abandoned theproject in favor of the North African ven-ture, thus removing for the time any con-sideration of an armament program forMetropolitan France.39

Even after plans for TORCH began totake shape, there could be no question ofan armament program for the North Af-rican forces. Allied planners were beingfaced with crucial issues, in particular a

37 Text of both letters, dated 2 November, inFrench Records, File 221, OCMH.

38 Intervs with Col. André Beaufre, 7 and 9 Sep50; Barjot, op. cit., pp. 34-36, 54-55.

39 See Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell,Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLDWAR II (Washington, 1953), Chs. XII and XIII.

PROLOGUE 15

shipping and equipment situation renderedcritical by the heavy demands from Chinaand the USSR for matériel. An ambitiousAmerican armament program known asthe Victory Program had been initiated inlate 1941; it visualized a maximum U.S.ground force of over 200 divisions as nec-essary to accomplish the defeat of America'spotential enemies.40 The program still wasin its early phase of implementation. Evento equip the American divisions earmarkedfor TORCH required that other divisions intraining in the United States be "scalped"of their matériel.41 To provide arms forforces such as the North African Armywould necessitate stripping more U.S.units. At any rate the question was pre-mature in view of the uncertainty regardingNorth Africa's eventual reaction to TORCHitself.

By September the encouraging results ofthe secret negotiations carried out with thedissidents gave hope that the North Africanforces would join the Allies. The problemof providing them with arms was now in theforeground. In October the assurancesgiven at Cherchel forced the issue: the MastPlan would have to be taken into seriousconsideration in Washington.

In transmitting to the War Department apartial list of the Mast requirements, Lt.Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, commandinggeneral of the TORCH forces, urged that hebe informed as to the ability of the UnitedStates to furnish the necessary items ofequipment and the rates at which they couldbe made available. His intention was toinclude the matériel in later shipments "in

accordance with the situation as it de-velops." 42

After rapid examination of the Mast Plan,War Department officials concluded that,in general, the items on the partial list ofrequirements could be made available forshipment by 20 December 1942. To carryout the entire plan, they warned, wouldrequire stripping twelve American divisions.They urged therefore that only such matérielbe provided as was necessary to supplementexisting French equipment.43 Their recom-mendation was submitted to General Mar-shall, who approved furnishing supplemen-tary equipment when it could be determinedthat the French would take an active partin operations.44 Commenting on the Frenchrequest for aircraft, Lt. Gen. Henry H.Arnold, Commanding General, Army AirForces, urged that caution be exercised inthe employment of French pilots. He rec-ommended that as soon as practicable afterthe initial phases qualified French pilots,once their loyalty had been determined, beincorporated in American combat and serv-ice units. When their ability had beenascertained and as their numbers increased,flights within American squadrons mightbe formed, progressing gradually to all-French combat and service units using U.S.equipment. In his opinion, the factors ofimportance to be considered included de-termination of loyalty, need for security,language differences, ability to absorb train-ing, and familiarization with Americanequipment.45

The invasion of northwest Africa thus

40 See Richard M. Leighton and Robert W.Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940—1943, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLDWAR II (Washington, 1955).

41 Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 318.

42 Msg 4259, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 30 Oct 42,ABC 400 (11-11-42), Sec 1.

43 Memo, Chief, Logistics Gp OPD, for Lt GenJohn E. Hull, 31 Oct 42, OPD 400 France, Sec 1.

44 Planning Div Diary, ASF File, 1 Nov 42.45 Msg R-2728, Arnold to Maj Gen Carl Spaatz,

3 Nov 42, ABC 400 (11-11-42), Sec 1.


brought suddenly to a head the question ofAmerican large-scale and rapid rearmamentof the French. By November a plan was inbeing and it had been tentatively approved.Yet all the thorny problems of rearmamentstill lay ahead as the Allied armada steamedtoward the coast of Africa to deliver the firstAnglo-American blow for the liberation ofWestern Europe.

The French North and West AfricanForces Throw Their Weight on theSide of the Allies

Operation TORCH, directed by GeneralEisenhower, was launched on the night of7-8 November 1942.46 The assault troopsnumbered some 83,000 Americans and26,000 British, or a total of 109,000 men,the British in addition furnishing almost allthe shipping and carrier air support. Asthey landed, the invaders eagerly hopedthat the French would welcome them oroffer no more than token resistance. In theAlgiers area, the timely and effective inter-vention of the French dissidents circum-scribed hostilities and rapidly brought themto an end. At Oran and more particularlyin and around Casablanca, the Allies metwith strong, even bitter, resistance.47

When, on 9 November, General Giraudreached North Africa after much unex-pected delay, another French official, Ad-miral François Darlan, commander in chiefof all the armed forces of the Vichy Govern-ment, was already in control and had as-sumed the role of leader of the forces op-posing the Allies. He had agreed on theprevious day to a local cease fire at Algiersand was negotiating with the Allied author-ities there for a broader understandingwhile i n communication with Marshal Pe

order all resistance in French North Africato cease, and not until 13 November didhe succeed in arranging with other Frenchofficials for a provisional French govern-ment in Algiers under his leadership whichwould renew hostilities against the AxisPowers. On 14 November he appointedGeneral Giraud commander in chief of allFrench ground and air forces in the terri-tory. An agreement signed by AdmiralDarlan and General Clark on 22 Novemberset forth the terms under which FrenchNorth Africa was joining the Allied camp.The North African Army was back in thewar.48

The Germans, meanwhile, alarmed atthe turn of events across the Mediterra-nean, had made two quick moves. On 9

46 For a detailed account of TORCH, see GeorgeF. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiativein the West, UNITED STATES ARMY INWORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957).

47 French authorities in control at the time have,since then, ascribed this resistance to a lack ofunderstanding, before the operation, between theAllied command and themselves. They were caughtoff guard, they claim, and had no opportunity ofreleasing officers under their respective commandfrom the loyalty pledge which the latter had beenrequired to give to their commander in chief,Marshal Pétain. The dissident leaders, on thecontrary, have blamed it on faulty or insufficientco-ordination between their own forces and theAllies, and on the fact that General Giraud had notreached Africa by D Day. Whatever the reasons,

a brief but bloody encounter ensued accompaniedby considerable political and military confusion onthe side of the French.

48 For detailed information regarding the rela-tions of Darlan with the Allied authorities, seeWilliam L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (NewYork: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), and Howe, North-west Africa. The English text of the Clark-Darlan Agreement may be found in Arthur LaytonFunk, "A Document Relating to the Second WorldWar: The Clark-Darlan Agreement, November 22,1942," The Journal of Modern History, XXV No.1 (March, 1953), 61-65; a French translation, inRené Richard and Alain de Sérigny, L'Enigmed'Alger (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1947),pp. 270-76.

tain. Not until 10 November did Darlan

PROLOGUE 17

November, taking advantage of the con-fusion prevailing among the French NorthAfrican authorities, they had gained a foot-hold on the eastern coast of Tunisia andwere hastily building up strength in thatarea. On 11 November their occupationforces in France had crossed the demarca-tion line, overrun the free zone, and orderedthe Armistice Army disarmed. Not onlywould this German action cause the largeFrench fleet harbored in Toulon to scuttleitself,49 on 27 November, rather than to fallin enemy hands, but it would wipe outmany of the valuable gains laboriouslyachieved in great secrecy by the FrenchGeneral Staff. Resigning themselves tothe fact that the Allies had chosen not toland in France proper at this time, a smallnumber of officers and personnel of the Ar-mistice Army prepared to escape fromFrance in order to join French forces over-seas. A larger number formed a secret or-ganization known as Organisation de Ré-sistance de l'Armée for the purpose ofcontinuing underground the activities theyhad c o n d u c t e d in semiclandestinity.Working now in conjunction with otherexisting underground forces, they resolvedto prepare for the day when they couldagain fight in the open alongside the Alliesfor the liberation of their country.

With French North Africa, except forthe eastern coast of Tunisia, securely on theside of the Allies, the active participationof France in the common struggle sud-denly assumed considerably larger propor-tions. Until then it had been limited tothe relatively small force of Generalde Gaulle. Now another much largerFrench force was swelling the ranks of Al-lied military manpower by some 197,000

men, including the North African Armi-stice Army and the 60,000 troops heretoforemaintained in mountain hide-outs. By theend of November, when the effects of thesecretly prepared mobilization had beenfelt, another 68,000 men had answered thecall to the colors, bringing the total numberof effectives under arms in North Africato 265,000 men, or nearly twice the size ofthe Armistice Army. Meanwhile the rally-ing of French West Africa, on 22 Novem-ber, had provided a further increase of50,000 men, thus raising the effectivesavailable to General Giraud in both Northand West Africa to over 300,000 men.50

Initially these effectives were distributedas follows: one infantry division in Tunisia;three infantry divisions and one lightmechanized brigade in Algeria; two infan-try divisions, one light mechanized brigade,and 5,000 goumiers in French Morocco.In addition, scattered throughout the threeareas were several regiments of generalreserve troops, service units, Territorial andSovereignty troops and installations, somenaval and merchant ships for the most partin need of much repair, and a few airsquadrons.

Figures on equipment and war matérielin the hands of these forces as they werere-entering the war cannot be accurately

49 This fleet represented approximately one halfof the French Navy.

50 Although the secret mobilization program con-templated the recall of 109,000 reservists, only68,000, of whom half were natives, answered thecall to the colors. The partial response has beenattributed to three main factors:

1. inaccuracies in the mobilization program it-self caused by the conditions of secrecy existingat the time the program was drafted;

2. last-minute decision not to call up reservistsengaged in or needed for defense work;

3. near paralysis of the mobilization operationsbecause of the Allied requisition of most availabletransportation and housing facilities.

Interv with Gen Pénette, Jul 50; notes andstatistics from Gen Pénette, Jul 50, Aug 52.


given. The only available statistics, asshown in Table 2, are dated 1 October 1942and therefore apply to the pre-TORCHperiod. Of the equipment listed, an inde-terminate percentage was used up or de-stroyed in the course of the brief period ofresistance, 8-11 November. Losses werelight in infantry weapons but particularlyheavy in tanks, light armored cars, and air-planes. Over 50 percent of the latter aresaid to have been destroyed.51

As it passed under General Giraud'scommand, the African Army, half-organ-ized and ill-equipped, could be regardedonly as a "transition" force. Yet GeneralEisenhower, now Commander in Chief,

Allied Forces in North Africa (hereafterreferred to as Allied Commander in Chief),was already depending on it to cover thecontinuous flow of incoming Allied units,to maintain internal security in NorthAfrica, and to reinforce his own Anglo-American troops then rushing to meet themounting threat in the east. By his firstdirective of 15 November, General Giraudcommitted this transition force to the pur-suit of the German units established inTunisia.52 Four days later, French ele-ments, now part of the combined Alliedarmies, were firing their first shots at theirformer enemy in the hills west of Tunis, aprelude to a bitter campaign to come.

51 Ibid.52 Dir 1, in Fr Rcds File 220, Vol. I, Reorgn of

Fr Army, OCMH.

TABLE 2—EQUIPMENT, By TYPE, AVAILABLE TO THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES:

1 OCTOBER 1942

PART ONE

THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES

CHAPTER I

Early Attempts To Formulatea Rearmament Program

The alignment of French North andWest Africa on the side of the Allies posed amultitude of problems, political as well asmilitary. On the political scene, AdmiralDarlan's assumption of power, which theAllies had accepted as a temporary expe-dient at a time when resistance to the land-ings was going on, had produced a situationfraught with danger. The admiral's tieswith Marshal Pétain's government at Vichymade impossible the merging of his follow-ing with General de Gaulle's and createdinstead a condition highly conducive toFrench factionalism rather than nationalunity in prosecuting the war. The problemwas suddenly removed, on 24 December,when Darlan was struck down by an assas-sin's bullet. On orders from the ImperialCouncil which Darlan himself had created,General Giraud replaced him as High Com-missioner for North and West Africa whileremaining Commander in Chief of allarmed forces including naval units. Thepolitical calm was to be short-lived. Forthe ensuing sixteen months one crisis afteranother would erupt on the French politicalscene and create for Giraud in-creasingly difficult problems. The evolu-tion of French internal politics during thatperiod will not be treated in detail. How-ever, inasmuch as the situation did at timesaffect, to the point of endangering them,the good relations established at an early

date between the Anglo-American author-ities and the French High Command, no-tice will be taken of at least those politicalevents that had a decisive influence on thecourse of French rearmament.1

Procedures

On 13 November President Roosevelthailed North Africa's shift to the Alliedcamp by extending to its forces the benefitsof the Lend-Lease Act, benefits heretoforeenjoyed by General de Gaulle's FreeFrench. The North African forces nowwere eligible to receive munitions from theAnglo-American pool of equipment. Be-cause of the promises made at Cherchel,which placed them squarely within theAmerican sphere of influence, equippingthem would be a responsibility to be as-sumed by the U.S. Government and thematériel involved would be provided fromAmerican production. The Free French,on the other hand, would continue to re-ceive armament through the British, whostill held operational control of their largerunits.

The procedure expected to be followedfor the assignment and delivery of matérielto French North Africa would be that nor-

1 For additional information on the French po-litical situation from November 1942 to July 1943,see Howe, Northwest Africa.


mally applicable in the case of the UnitedNations whose re-equipment was similarlycharged against U.S. production. Each re-quirement submitted by any one of thesenations was transmitted to Operations Di-vision (OPD) of the War Department.If approved by OPD, it was forwarded tothe International Division of the ArmyService Forces (ASF).2 The variousbranches and sections of the InternationalDivision then screened the requirement,broke it down according to technical serv-ice, determined production possibilities inthe light of other requirements, charged itagainst U.S. production, and included it inthe over-all Army Supply Program. Fromthen on, ASF was responsible for the pro-duction and distribution of the items in-volved. In the case of airplanes and airforce items, the same procedure was fol-lowed except that the Army Air Forces in-stead of the International Division wasresponsible for processing the requirementand for including it in the Air Forces sec-tion of the Army Supply Program. In bothinstances, however, the decision to acceptthe requirement was one to be made by theWar Department alone.3

The decision to assign the equipmentinvolved bilateral action since it could beeffected only through the combined Anglo-American Munitions Assignments Boardsestablished, one in Washington (MAB),and one in London (LMAB), as part ofthe Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery.The United States having assumed theburden of furnishing matériel to the French,assignments to them became the responsi-bility of the MAB, the board charged with

allocating American munitions production.The MAB operated through three sub-

committees: the Munitions AssignmentsCommittee (Ground), MAC (G) ; the Mu-nitions Assignments Committee (Air),MAC ( A ) ; and the Munitions AssignmentsCommittee (Navy), MAC ( N ) . The Airand Navy committees assigned items pe-culiar to the Air Forces and Navy re-spectively. The Ground committee wasresponsible for the assignment of all otheritems. Since the membership of these com-mittees was a combined one, unanimousagreement was required before action couldbe implemented.

The MAB and its subcommittees con-sidered U.S. production of military itemsas a pool production without regard to theparticular requirement for which produc-tion had been initiated. Assignments ofcurrent production were made at weeklymeetings of the board and its subcommit-tees in the light of existing shipping andmatériel availability and of the over-allstrategic and operational requirements ofthe United Nations including the UnitedStates. Assignments normally followed ac-cepted requirements. There were in-stances, however, where production of agiven item was initiated as a result of arequirement stated on behalf of one mem-ber of the United Nations, while deliveryof the item so produced was made to an-other member nation because of changesin circumstances and operational require-ments between the time when productionwas initiated and the time when the itembecame available. Whether or not suchdelivery would be authorized and when itwould be effected was left to the decisionof the MAB.

Since the MAB received its policy fromthe CCS, it follows, therefore, that the

2 Known as Services of Supply (SOS) beforeMarch 1943.

3 Tab D to Memo, Maj Gen Wilhelm D. Styerfor Eisenhower, 10 Feb 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item5-a.

EARLY ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE A REARMAMENT PROGRAM 23

latter held the final authority in the matterof the granting or rejecting of munitionsrequests from individual members of theUnited Nations. In practice this CCS au-thority limited itself to laying down thegeneral policy to be followed with respectto the member nation concerned. To ar-rive at their decision, the U.S. Joint Chiefsof Staff (JCS) sought advice from thevarious sections of their respective GeneralStaff agencies. Of these, Operations Divi-sion was largely responsible for influencingor determining rearmament policies on thebasis of recommendations from theatercommanders and in the light of global U.S.commitments.4

Initial Groping Toward a Policy

Armament negotiations, suspended atthe close of the Cherchel meeting pendingthe outcome of TORCH, could now be re-sumed. As they got under way, it soonbecame clear that the main protagonists,General Giraud, General Eisenhower, theWar Department, and the CombinedChiefs of Staff, were approaching the re-armament problem from different points ofview. The problem itself, moreover, wascomplicated by the fact that it involvedtwo distinct yet closely related issues. Onewas the emergency provision of minimummatériel, chiefly arms, to the French unitsbeing sent to the Tunisian front in increas-ing numbers; the other was the large-scalerehabilitation of all African forces, such asthe Mast Plan advocated, for participationin subsequent operations. From mid-November to late January 1943, divergenceof opinion regarding the immediate as well

as future employment of the North Africanforces, anxiety over operational develop-ments in Tunisia, and the still critical ship-ping and equipment situation facing theAnglo-American allies all combined to im-pede attempts to formulate an armamentprogram.

In the judgment of the French Com-mander in Chief, emergency equipment ofthe forces in action was urgent, of course,but the main issue was the conversion ofhis large yet poorly equipped transitionarmy into a striking force capable of inter-vening in Tunisia as well as on future bat-tlefields. Only a reconstituted FrenchArmy could restore French prestige. Itwas essential, then, that a large-scale re-armament program be instituted at once.

General Giraud's estimate of Frenchcapabilities was highly optimistic. Fromthe outset he took the position that he wouldhave no difficulty in putting into the fieldan effective fighting force of 250,000, even300,000 men. These figures included thetroops already available, several classes ofnatives and Frenchmen, soon to be mo-bilized, Frenchmen who were expected toescape from France in increasing numbers,as well as French nationals residing in for-eign countries who were likely to enlist.

If the question had been mere numbers,General Giraud's planning would not havebeen unduly optimistic. But a modernarmy needs a high percentage of techni-cians. General Giraud had very few Euro-peans, and it soon became apparent thatMoroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian nativeseither could not be used at all in specializedcombat and service units or needed a verylong period of training. The lack of whitemanpower was to be the source of increas-ing difficulties for General Giraud. In thebeginning, however, the French com-

4 For detailed information on acceptance of re-quirements and assignments of matériel, see Leigh-ton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy:1940-1943.


mander, confident of his ability to raise asizable righting force, directed his headquar-ters to draft a large-scale rearmament pro-gram along the lines of the Mast Plan.

The CCS were still studying the MastPlan. On 13 November they directed theMAB to review assignments for Novemberand December in order to determine whatmatériel (except aircraft) could be madeavailable to the French before the end of theyear.5 Simultaneously they requested theAllied Commander in Chief to submit hisviews and recommendations on the plan,warning him to keep in mind that shipmentsof matériel for the French would necessarilybe at the expense of the build-up of his ownforces.6 General Eisenhower replied thatthe extent to which the African forces shouldbe re-equipped by the United States de-pended on how they would be employedultimately—a matter still to be deter-mined—and on the number of first-linetroops the French High Command wouldproduce. He felt that if General Giraudcould activate the number of units heclaimed he could raise, "which was doubt-ful," it would be possible to eliminate someof the last U.S. divisions planned for ship-ment to the theater. He pointed out thata detailed study of the matter would soonbe prepared by his headquarters and theresults forwarded to the CCS.7

General Eisenhower was not at first con-vinced of the value of arming the French inview of the uncertainty regarding their com-bat effectiveness against the Axis. Reportsreaching him during the first week ofFranco-Allied collaboration seriously ques-tioned the offensive spirit of the North Afri-

can forces. He felt, then, he could expectlittle of them for the present at least. Hewould use them initially as garrison forcesin the theater. Later he might employ cer-tain selected units in combat operations.In the belief that an early token shipment ofequipment "as a political gesture" wouldproduce beneficial effects "in every way,"he recommended to the CCS, on 18 Novem-ber, that small arms, antitank, and antiair-craft armament, with spare parts and am-munition, be sent forthwith to the French.As an initial shipment, he suggested 8,000rifles, 36 37-mm. antitank guns, and 32antiaircraft automatic guns of any typeavailable.8 The next day, French and Ger-man forces already were coming to blows.

Before long, reports from Tunisia indi-cated a marked stiffening of the Frenchfighting spirit. This in turn suggested thatthe French had succeeded in solving thecomplex morale problem which had facedthem in the second and third weeks ofNovember. They seemed to have recoveredfrom the successive psychological shocks ofthat early period: the "token" resistancedirected against the Allies, the conflictingorders to which they had been subjected,the sudden breaking off with the mothercountry, their shift of allegiance, finallytheir being thrown into battle almost with-out equipment. Now they were reported tobe doing well in combat. Gradually Gen-eral Eisenhower was acquiring the convic-tion that he could count on them.

For the Allied commander, then, theimmediate question was how to keep Frenchunits in the line in Tunisia. In his opinionthe emergency issue of minimum equipmentto enable them to fight must be the primaryconcern of any rearmament program. The

5 Min, CCS 48th Mtg, 13 Nov 42.6 Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 13 Nov 42, FAN 18.7 Msg 866, Eisenhower to CCS, 18 Nov 42, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip. 8 Ibid.


wholesale rehabilitation of the entire NorthAfrican Army, a long-range issue related tofuture, unpredictable campaigns in theMediterranean or in Europe, must be givensecond priority.

Setting Up the Joint RearmamentCommittee

Providing equipment to the French al-ready was posing serious problems for Gen-eral Eisenhower and his headquarters, AlliedForce Headquarters (AFHQ), establishedin Algiers shortly after the Allied landings.As problems kept multiplying the AlliedCommander in Chief ordered, on 16 De-cember, the organization at AFHQ of aspecial agency to act both as a clearinghouseand as the authority responsible for develop-ing an armament program. He then placedthe agency, known as the Joint RearmamentCommittee (JRC), directly under the au-thority of his chief of staff.9 The creationof the JRC had been urged by the Chief,Liaison Section, AFHQ, whom the Frenchhad for some time queried with mountinginsistence regarding a variety of matters,such as the procurement of token issues ofBritish and American equipment, probabledates of delivery, specifications of Americanmatériel, establishment of schools of instruc-tion, translation of technical manuals, andother problems.10

The responsibilities and functions of theJRC were as follows:

a. To centralize all equipment requestsfrom the French.

b. To develop a program for the reha-bilitation of the French armed forces.

c. To ensure that the executive actionnecessary to implement the approved pro-gram was placed with the responsible sec-tion of AFHQ.

d. To undertake all matters of co-ordi-nation with the French authorities, theLend-Lease Administration, and others con-cerned with the rearmament of the French.

The committee, composed initially ofnine members—four A m e r i c a n , fourFrench, and one British—met for the firsttime on 23 December under the chairman-ship of the senior U.S. member, Col. Wil-liam Tudor Gardiner.11 It operated forapproximately twenty-two months, its func-tions, responsibilities, membership, andplace in the staff structure varying fromtime to time. Throughout the entire periodthe committee played a major role in therehabilitation of the F r e n c h Africanforces.12

While the JRC and its parent organiza-tion, AFHQ, were charged with the over-all problem of equipping the French fromAllied sources, the responsibility for hand-ing over American matériel assigned inWashington rested solely with the com-mander of the U.S. forces in the theater.The responsibility was that of GeneralEisenhower, who commanded not onlyAFHQ but also Headquarters, EuropeanTheater of Operations, U.S. A r m y(ETOUSA), operating in London. Theresponsibility continued to be his after 3February 1943, when he took command ofthe newly created Headquarters, North Af-rican Theater of Operations, U.S. Army(NATOUSA), established in Algiers as aheadquarters separate from ETOUSA.

9 AFHQ Staff Memo 52, 16 Dec 42, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.

10 Memo, Col Julius C. Holmes for CofS AFHQ,5 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC.

11 Min, JRC Mtg, 23 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgnof JRC.

12 For information on organization, membership,and activities of the JRC, see Ch. XVII, below.


LT. GEN. DWIGHT D. EISEN-HOWER, commanding general of theTORCH forces.

General Giraud Sends a Military Missionto Washington

Eager to obtain from the United Statesan early decision on the provision of warmatériel, General Giraud, in the first weekof December, announced his intention ofsending to Washington a military missionempowered to discuss with the War De-partment all questions of supply. GeneralEisenhower greeted the proposal with someskepticism. In a message to General Mar-shall, he pointed out that missions of thiskind were "usually only a source of annoy-ance to the CCS" and could accomplish"little or nothing" in their dealings withthe MAB, and that recommendations fromhis headquarters would be required inany case. He suggested, however, thatthe mission be allowed to proceed as

"it might be a good thing for these peopleto realize at first hand the complicationsinvolved in supplying a world conflict." 13

The JCS having approved the proposal, themission, headed by Maj. Gen. EmileBéthouart, departed from Algiers on 20 De-cember. Its function, as defined by theFrench Commander in Chief, was to nego-tiate and expedite the delivery of matérielon the basis of the requirements set up bythe French High Command and within theframework of agreements to be concludedwith the U.S. Government.14 Temporarilyassigned to the mission was JacquesLemaigre-Dubreuil, then chief of the Re-search Section of General Giraud's head-quarters, whose duty was to obtain theproduction and shipping priorities neces-sary for the speedy delivery of matérielto the French forces and, incidentally,to act as the French commander's civilianrepresentative in the United States. BothGeneral Béthouart and Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil were stanch friends of the UnitedStates. Members of the North African"dissidence" of long standing, they had, amonth earlier, distinguished themselves intheir valiant attempt to prevent oppositionto the American landings.

The mission arrived in Washington on24 December.15 Throughout the war, itformed the principal link between theFrench High Command and the WarDepartment. Liaison, however, remainedalmost its sole function as General Eisen-hower had foreseen. The entire responsi-bility for initiating and implementing therearmament programs subsequently estab-

13 Msg 1812, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Dec 42,ABC 334.8 (12-4-42).

14 Memo, Giraud for Béthouart, 10 Dec 42, insame file.

15 AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Béthouart,Nov 42-Jan 43.


GENERAL GEORGE C. MAR-SHALL, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

lished by decision of the CCS rested withthe Allied Commander in Chief in thetheater of operations.16

Emergency Provision of Equipment

On 20 November the CCS approved therecommendation submitted two days beforeby General Eisenhower, and directed theMAB to assign the equipment. Theystipulated that the United Kingdom wouldfurnish the 8,000 rifles (from the stock ofEnfields sold to the British by the UnitedStates after Dunkerque), in spite of someobjection on the part of the British Chiefsof Staff since the transfer of these weaponsto the French was to be effected at theexpense of the Home Guard. In the eyesof the CCS, approval of this first requestfrom the Allied Commander in Chief forthe re-equipping of the French was givenas an emergency measure. At the sugges-tion of the British members of the commit-tee, they agreed that all further similarrequests from him would be referred tothe MAB for action.17 On 22 Novemberthe MAB assigned the equipment. In asense this action marked the real start ofthe International Division's responsibilityfor French rearmament, a responsibilitywhich it was to carry through to the end ofthe war.

Some equipment had been assigned, butno date was yet set for its shipment. On12 December General Eisenhower, in a

personal message to General Marshall,stressed the urgency of sending this equip-ment. He pointed out that the Frenchhad no antitank weapons at all, and that hecould do little to help them because of hisown pressing needs. "If we had availableat once antitank and light antiaircraftweapons for just one French regiment, itwould have a tremendous moral and ma-terial advantage. It would even help if Icould inform Giraud that the equipmentfor several AT and AA battalions, withsome motor transport, was being shippedimmediately." 18

By then General Giraud had alreadyplaced at the disposal of the Allied Com-mander in Chief for the battle of Tunisia a

16 In September 1943, General Giraud's missionand General de Gaulle's Free French Military Mis-sion (established in Washington in 1941), untilthen two separate agencies, merged into one singleorganization under the name of French MilitaryMission in the United States. OPD 336 France,Sec III.

17 Min, CCS 49th Mtg, 20 Nov 42; Msg R-3415,AGWAR to USFOR, 21 Nov 42, JRC Cable Log.

18 Msg 1825, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Dec42, JRC Cable Log.


substantial task force commanded by Gen-eral Juin. This force, then numbering ap-proximately 7,000 men, would increase to40,000 combat troops within the comingmonths. For the moment, the units wereunable, because of their still meager andfor the most part obsolete matériel, to takeoffensive action against an enemy equippedwith tanks and all the modern weapons ofwar. It was clear that they could be usedonly as a holding force until either adequateequipment or Allied reinforcements ar-rived.19 Even if they were to hold theirpresent positions, it was urgent that they beissued weapons without delay. Pendingthe arrival of the equipment ordered fromthe United States, Eisenhower turned tothe theater for help.

On 13 December he authorized the Com-manding General, Eastern Task Force, toprovide French units engaged in combatunder his command with such equipment,supplies, and matériel as they needed toconduct operations current or imminent.The supply of this equipment was to be ontemporary loan without prejudice to anyarrangements likely to be concluded withFrench authorities for the permanent re-equipment of their forces. A few days laterthe Allied Commander in Chief also ap-pealed to the Commanding General, West-ern Task Force, with a request to send anysurplus equipment such as automatic rifles,rifles, submachine guns, and light machineguns for loan to French units in Tunisia.20

Cognizant of the fact that technical in-struction on the proper use of matériel wasas important as the issue of the equipment it-

self, Eisenhower took a number of measuresin this connection. He requested U.S.Fifth Army then stationed in French Mo-rocco to assist in organizing, equipping, andtraining French forces located within itszone. Simultaneously, he directed AFHQto ensure that "all possible assistance" begiven by American troops to the FrenchAfrican forces in their training with Ameri-can arms and equipment. Pursuant tothese instructions, the various responsiblecommands and agencies in the theater pro-ceeded to establish technical training pro-grams and arranged to get them under waywithout delay.21

Finally, pending definite arrangementson the provision of lend-lease supplies andequipment to the French, the Allied Com-mander in Chief prescribed the manner inwhich items currently being issued to themon an emergency basis were to be transferredand accounted for.22

By the third week of December, no wordhad yet been received from Washingtonregarding the equipment requested on 18November. As the situation in Tunisia wasgrowing critical, Eisenhower appealed di-rectly to the CCS for a decision that wouldenable him to tell General Giraud preciselyhow much equipment was being sent andwhen it would arrive. The CCS promptlyreplied, on 24 December, that the promisedrifles would be shipped from the UnitedKingdom within forty-eight hours, and theantitank and antiaircraft guns as well as2,000 grenade launchers from the UnitedStates on 6 January. Only a shortage of

19 For detailed information on the part played bythe French in Tunisia, see Howe, Northwest Africa.

20 Dir, Eisenhower to CG Eastern Task Force,13 Dec 42, AFHQ AG 400/042-C; Msg 2481,CinC to CG Western Task Force, 19 Dec 42,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.

21 Ltr, CinC to CG Fifth Army, 30 Dec 42,quoted in Fifth Army History, I, 2, DRB AGO;Ltr AG 353/082 C-M, AFHQ, 31 Dec 42, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. II (3) ;see pp. 230 ff., below.

22 AFHQ Cir 5, 10 Jan 43, JRC 400.2/001 Adminof Sup—-Gen.


shipping, they pointed out, prevented theinclusion of more matériel for the French inthe 6 January convoy. Some 3,400 addi-tional weapons including machine guns,mortars, and howitzers were available fromthe United Kingdom and the United Statesif required. They warned, however, thatthese weapons, if shipped, would take thecargo space allotted to organizational equip-ment for Anglo-American forces in NorthAfrica. They asked the Allied Commanderin Chief to make specific recommendationsas to the amounts and types of armamentrequired for the French.23

Reviewing the French operational situa-tion as it stood at the close of the year 1942,Eisenhower urged the U.S. Joint Chiefs ofStaff to give constant consideration to thequestion of equipping and maintaining theFrench forces engaged in Tunisia as it had"a strong influence on morale." Their mostimmediate need, he explained, was for lightantiaircraft and antitank equipment. Sincethese items were not bulky, he recommendedthat they be shipped to the full extent ofspace available. A few days later, GeneralEisenhower appealed once again directly tothe CCS. "If we can provide GeneralGiraud with only a few tanks and someadditional AA and AT equipment, he maybe able to help us when the more criticalphase of the battle arrives. It must be clearto all that the enthusiastic and effective co-operation of the French forces is a vitalfactor in all our calculations." Havingcabled anew for emergency deliveries ofclothing, tentage, and other matériel, hefelt he had done everything in his power toassist the French. In his judgment, the

problem of their re-equipping was definitelyone for the governments of the United Statesand the United Kingdom to solve.24

So far, only a small amount of matériel,largely from U.S. sources in the theater,had been or was in process of being trans-ferred to the French, It consisted of equip-ment for approximately one light tank com-pany, two tank destroyer companies, andthree to four antiaircraft batteries.25 Anumber of miscellaneous weapons also hadbeen turned over directly by U.S. com-manders in Tunisia to their French neigh-bors in the field.

General Giraud Eyes the Larger Program

While pleading for more weapons forhis hard-pressed troops in Tunisia, GeneralGiraud was giving increased attention tothe larger armament objective, the rehabili-tation of all his forces. By mid-Decembermembers of his staff had prepared a revisedand more detailed version of the Mast Plan,based on their latest estimates of Frenchcapabilities. They submitted it first toAFHQ where it was subjected to the scru-tiny of the Joint Rearmament Committee.Later, General Béthouart handed anothercopy of it to War Department officials.26

The new program was slightly larger thanthe Mast Plan, the proposed number ofdivisions being raised from ten to eleven.Briefly it called for the delivery, in order ofpriority, of:

23 Msg 2392, Eisenhower to CCS, 18 Dec 42,ABC (11-11-42), Sec 1; Msg, CCS to Eisenhower,24 Dec 42, FAN 47; Memo, Maj Gen Thomas T.Handy for Marshall, 26 Dec 42, OPD 400 France,Sec I.

24 Msg 3664, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Dec 42,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip; Msg4141, Eisenhower to CCS, 4 Jan 43, NAF 84;AFHQ Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch, The NorthAfrican Campaign: 1942-1943, pp. 29-30, copy inOCMH.

25 Memo, ACofS G-3 for Gen Clark, 21 Dec 42,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops.

26 Ltr, Brig Gen Roger Leyer to AFHQ, 30EMG/IM/S, 14 Dec 42, and Memo, Béthouart forWD, 26 Dec 42, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab P.


a. The matériel necessary to maintainthe normal life of the North African forces,such as medical supplies, railway equip-ment, coal, gasoline, motor transport, andthe like.

b. The entire equipment for one armyheadquarters, two infantry corps headquar-ters, one armored corps headquarters, eightinfantry divisions, three armored divisions,and miscellaneous tank destroyer, antiair-craft, and air units.

c. The matériel for the service units anddepots required for the support of the aboveforces.

As the Mast Plan still had not been actedupon by the CCS, General Marshall trans-mitted the new French proposal to ASF forexamination and again asked GeneralEisenhower for comment. The AlliedCommander in Chief replied that the com-position of the forces as indicated in therevised program was agreeable to him.However, since activation, equipping, andtraining had to be governed by a long-termpolicy and be influenced by United Nationsstrategy, he felt that the last word was notwith him but with the CCS. As for thesuggested sequence of shipments, hepointed out that the phasing of any ap-proved program would be affected bychanges likely to occur in the military situa-tion in North Africa. With regard to therehabilitation of the North African AirForces as proposed by the French, Eisen-hower, after summing up the action alreadytaken in the theater, offered the followingcomment: The French, he explained,were reported to have sufficient personnelfor eight hundred aircraft of various types;it was important for him to know if andwhen he could expect this number of air-craft; in the meantime he was consideringsending selected French student pilots,

bombardiers, gunners, and radio operatorsto training schools in the United States.27

The Deadlock Over a Firm Plan

The six-week debate on French rearma-ment at the end of 1942 had produced nodecisions, but it had served to define thepoints of view of the various parties con-cerned. The French, now definitely inthe fight, were impatient to receive modernweapons of war. To them speed was theessential factor. As General Béthouartpointed out on 7 January, in the course of ameeting of Allied military representatives inWashington, equipment must be furnishedto French troops rapidly so as to avoid their"complete paralysis" and to prevent a "seri-ous blow to morale." 28 The Allied Com-mander in Chief, while fully convinced ofthe French desire to fight and ready to pro-vide all possible material assistance, con-sidered French rearmament in relation tohis over-all requirements. These, in turn,were conditioned by the amount of shippingallocated to his theater and more particu-larly by the current and probable opera-tional developments. For the moment, thefailure of the Allied drive on Tunis and therapid westward movement of the Germanforces had created an urgent need for theearliest possible presence in southern Tunisiaof a strong Allied force. In General Eisen-

21 Msg 3664, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Dec 42,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip; Msg3503, Eisenhower to Arnold, 29 Dec 42, JRC CableLog. The North African Air Forces is discussedin Ch. XII, below.

28 Min, MRP 6th Mtg, 7 Jan 43, CCS 334, Mili-tary Representatives of Associated Pacific Powers(5-26-42). This was the first meeting to whichFrance was invited to send representatives. (Thename of the committee was subsequently changedto Military Representatives of Associated Powers.)The last meeting of the committee was held on 18June 1943.


hower's judgment, therefore, the initiation,at this juncture, of a full-scale, long-rangerearmament program was untimely. Thispoint was made clear in a message addressedto General Marshall on 31 December. Ex-cluding the needs of French troops engagedin combat which "must receive constantconsideration," he set forth the shippingpriorities for his requirements as follows:(1) the logistical build-up, still incomplete,of the Anglo-American forces under hiscommand; (2) the rehabilitation of theNorth African civil economy so as to preventunfavorable repercussions on the politicaland military situation.29

War Department officials, on the otherhand, were weighing French rearmamentin relation to world-wide logistical commit-ments and in the light of its probable impacton the U.S. war effort. Yet their conclu-sions regarding the practicability of a large-scale French rearmament program werealmost identical, for reasons quite apart,with those of the Allied Commander inChief. The report which the LogisticsDivision of Army Service Forces issued on9 January on the implications of Béthouart'sproposal pointed out that American produc-tion would probably make it possible toequip the 272,000 troops required under theFrench program, and to equip and maintainthe U.S. troops already overseas or plannedfor shipment abroad in 1943. However,equipping the French would interfere seri-ously with equipping units in the UnitedStates. Furthermore, the shipping neces-sary to float equipment for the French hadto be provided principally by the UnitedStates. This would defer the shipment ofapproximately 250,000 to 270,000 Ameri-can troops to the Mediterranean theater in

1943 and interfere considerably with theequipping and maintaining of U.S. troopsalready in the theater, unless convoy restric-tions were relaxed and port capacities aug-mented. In the light of these considera-tions, the report recommended, in part, thatthe equipping of American troops in NorthAfrica take priority over that of the French;that only those French troops be activatedand equipped which could be utilized inAllied operations; and that their initialequipping be restricted to the minimum re-quired for their maintenance and training.30

To the CCS, finally, French rearmamentwas a matter to be viewed in relation to itslikely effect on global strategy. A programof the size proposed by General Béthouartwas bound to cut across the lines of Anglo-American logistical plans. The question,to the CCS, boiled down to this: would thecommitment, if accepted, be feasible in viewof the world-wide shipping situation? Ifso, what would its strategic advantage be?

Shipping, then, and not production—ex-cept in the case of some critical items ofequipment—would be the main factor to beconsidered in drawing up any large-scaleFrench rearmament program. This wasmade unmistakably clear to GeneralBéthouart and Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuilwhen, on 10 January, they called on As-sistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy,himself a stanch proponent of French re-armament. "Every American," Mr. Mc-Cloy declared, was "anxious that thereshould be a strong French Army in NorthAfrica." But it was well not to lose sightof the enormous difficulties involved. Asan illustration he pointed out that to floatthe equipment necessary for eleven divisions,exclusive of all other matériel listed in the

29 Msg 3664, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Dec 42,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.

30 Rpt, Logistics Div SOS, 9 Jan 43, ASF PlanningDiv A-47-147.


Béthouart program, would require 325cargo vessels. These, quite simply, were notavailable.31

Increasingly alarmed over the severelosses incurred by his ill-equipped forces inTunisia, General Giraud was prone to brushaside the unfavorable logistics of the situ-ation facing the Allied Commander inChief. In an effort to dispel his apparentmisconception of the facts, Maj. Gen. Wal-ter Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff, AFHQ,accompanied by the British and Americanpolitical representatives in the theater,called on him on 12 January. GeneralSmith described the "extraordinary efforts"made by the Allies to overcome the many ob-stacles hampering the delivery of arma-ment. He referred to the inadequacy ofport and railroad facilities, the limitationsof shipping and other obstacles. GeneralGiraud then countered that all availableFrench merchant shipping was beingturned over to the Allied shipping pool.Some of it, he insisted, ought to be used totransport equipment for his forces.32

The next day, 13 January, Mr. Lemai-gre-Dubreuil was leaving Washington forAlgiers, his mission completed. In thecourse of his talks with State Departmentofficials, he had stressed the political as-pect of French rearmament. GeneralGiraud, he had pointed out, was primarilyconcerned with bringing Frenchmen back

into active participation in the war. Tosucceed, he was dependent on the fulfill-ment of a number of conditions, moral aswell as material. Among the latter was thespeedy issue of U.S. equipment to his troops.At a time when General Giraud and Gen-eral de Gaulle were discussing the unifi-cation of their forces, it was imperative thatGiraud's hand be strengthened by all pos-sible means. In Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil'sopinion, only then could the French Com-mander in Chief pursue the war with max-imum efficiency, dispel French anxiety, andestablish himself as the leader of Frenchmilitary resistance.33

That General Giraud was fully confidentof the intent and ability of the United Statesto re-equip his forces cannot be doubted.Answering a New Year's message fromPresident Roosevelt, he declared:

The responsibility which I assume is mademuch lighter by the military support broughtby the United States and the Allied Nationsand by the promise of help which you werekind enough to send me. Thanks to Amer-ican matériel, the restored French Army willbe able to resume at the side of the UnitedNations a strong and effective action for theliberation of France and of Europe, and forthe achievement of a just peace.34

Still, by mid-January, approximately tenweeks after the Allied landings, no decisionwas yet in sight on "the subject closest toGiraud's heart.35

31 Min, Conf McCloy with Béthouart andLemaigre-Dubreuil, 10 Jan 43, JRC Misc Doc,Item 5-a.

32 Msg 3585, Eisenhower (from Murphy) toCCS, 13 Jan 43, NAF 100.

33 Msg 1049, Marshall to Eisenhower (State Deptfor Murphy), 13 Jan 43, JRC Cable Log.

34 Msg 3731, AFHQ to AGWAR (Giraud forPresident), 1 Jan 43, AFHQ AG Sec 336.91.

35 Msg 3585 cited n. 32.

CHAPTER II

The ANFA Agreement

Franco-Anglo-American Conversations

The question of French rearmament,both immediate and long range, drew con-siderable attention from the CombinedChiefs of Staff when, having shifted thescene of their next deliberations from Wash-ington to French Morocco, they assembledfor the sessions of the Casablanca Confer-ence. Presiding over the conference heldat Anfa, a suburb of Casablanca, from 14 to26 January 1943, were President Rooseveltand Prime Minister Churchill. Both Gen-erals Giraud and de Gaulle were expectedto attend. In inviting them, the Presidentand the Prime Minister had intended tobring them together in the hope that theywould conclude an agreement on the unifi-cation of their forces. General Giraudreached Anfa on 17 January and immedi-ately began a series of consultations withthe President, the Prime Minister, GeneralMarshall, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell,Commanding General, A r m y ServiceForces, and others. The head of the FreeFrench at first declined to come to themeeting. This rebuff angered Churchill,who had given strong backing to the Gaul-list group, and prompted both him and thePresident to question "whether or notde Gaulle was a leader who merited theirsupport." l The general finally relentedand, on 22 January, toward the end of the

conference, left London for Anfa where hemet briefly with Allied officials and withGeneral Giraud.

At their first meeting, held on 15 January,the CCS heard General Eisenhower himselfstress the urgency of providing immediateassistance to the North African units en-gaged in Tunisia. Called upon to report onthe latest developments in the campaignthere, the Allied Commander in Chief em-phasized that a serious situation would de-velop if the French were unable, for lack ofequipment, to stand firmly on the line theynow held between the British in the northand the Americans in the south.2

To the CCS the two issues of immediateand long-range assistance to the Frenchcould not be separated. In their judgment,the question was simply this: how muchrearmament and how soon? To answer,they had first to determine what use theyintended to make of the North Africanforces, and this, in turn, depended on howmuch they were prepared to trust theseforces. British and Americans were insharp disagreement over this particularpoint. The British seemed hesitant to relyon an army which until recent weeks hadremained obstinately loyal to MarshalPétain's government, in their eyes a de-featist, even pro-German, regime. TheAmericans, although they had cause to beresentful after the costly resistance put up by

1 Min, ANFA 2d Mtg, 18 Jan 43, CasablancaConf. (See Bibliographical Note.)

2 Min, CCS 57th Mtg, 15 Jan 43, CasablancaConf.


that same army in November 1942, never-theless were willing to forget the distastefulepisode and accept the pledges of the newally at their face value. The U.S. JointChiefs of Staff had discussed this matter oftrust in the North African forces. AdmiralErnest J. King had urged his colleagues to"insist" on making the "maximum use" ofthese forces by giving them appropriatetasks and relying on them to carry throughtheir assignments. He realized that therewould be "some British opposition," and heconsidered it essential to convince the BritishChiefs of Staff of the "necessity of trustingthe French fully." 3

Two subsequent CCS meetings under-lined the reluctance of the British to placefull confidence in the North African forcesand as a result their disinclination to con-sider more than a limited rearmament. On16 January, General Marshall, speaking forthe JCS, voiced the belief that the Frenchcould be used effectively and economically.He proposed therefore that selected divi-sions be re-equipped as soon as practicable.Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief ofthe Imperial General Staff, agreed on maxi-mum employment of the North Africanforces, but regarded their usefulness as con-fined largely to "garrison work." The pos-sibility of wider employment, he thought,would depend greatly on whether a satis-factory government could be established inNorth Africa, for good leadership was re-quired to "rekindle in the French the desireto fight." 4

At the next CCS meeting, held two dayslater and attended by the President and thePrime Minister, Roosevelt urged that every

effort be made to provide equipment forthe army of 250,000 men which GeneralGiraud expected to raise. Field MarshalBrooke then observed that the British forcesin North Africa had offered to transfer tothe French some used tanks once they them-selves had received their new American ve-hicles. The proposal elicited from GeneralMarshall the remark that the North Africanunits must be given "the best equipmentobtainable." This, he continued, he pro-posed to provide out of U.S. resources sub-ject to shipping limitations. If the Alliesintended to equip the French, he pointedout, they must make "good units" of them.5

Apparently concerned over the diver-gence between the British and Americanattitudes toward General Giraud's forces,Admiral King brought up the subject at ameeting of the JCS on 19 January. Heagain urged his colleagues to place fullconfidence in these forces and to equip themas rapidly as possible. General Marshallagreed, saying that he thought it "imprac-ticable to go halfway with the French."They must be trusted "either completely ornot at all." Personally, he had "everyreason" to believe that certain divisions,when equipped, would be excellent. Hefelt that the objections to placing full confi-dence in the North African forces werebased on technical matters rather than onanything else. True, he foresaw difficultiesas to control or command, but he was cer-tain that such difficulties could be overcomeas they arose.6

Later that same morning, the CCS heardGeneral Marshall declare that he was infavor of proceeding with a definite rearma-

3Min, JCS 50th Mtg, 13 Jan 43, CasablancaConf. For a list of the British and U.S. Chiefs ofStaff, see page 10, above.

4 Min, CCS 58th Mtg, 16 Jan 43, CasablancaConf.

5 Min, ANFA 2d Mtg, 18 Jan 43, CasablancaConf.

6 Min, JCS 55th Mtg, 19 Jan 43, CasablancaConf.

THE ANFA AGREEMENT 35

ment program for the North African forces.Such an undertaking would of course implyacceptance by the French of Allied organi-zation and training methods and wouldinevitably delay the progress of equippingU.S. forces. He considered, however, thatthe undertaking should be carried out"wholeheartedly." He was prepared, sub-ject to General Eisenhower's views, to mod-ify the American logistical program in orderto equip French forces up to a strength of250,000 men. The necessary matérielwould be provided at the expense of U.S.units forming in America. He proposed toship it to North Africa in French bottoms.General Somervell disclosed that GeneralGiraud had agreed to turn over to the Alliedshipping pool 160,000 tons of shipping ofwhich he expected about 75,000 tonsto be earmarked for transportation ofequipment to his forces. Somervell esti-mated that this would make it possible toequip approximately one division permonth.7

The most important debate on Frenchrearmament took place on the afternoonof the same day. Appearing before theCCS at their invitation, General Giraudoutlined his plans for the rehabilitation ofhis forces. He explained that with thecadres then at his disposal he could forman army of thirteen divisions, includingthree armored and ten motorized infantrydivisions. In addition, he wished to raiseas "an indispensable accompaniment to amodern army," an air force consisting of50 fighter squadrons, 30 light bombersquadrons, and a number of transportsquadrons—with a total of 1,000 airplanes.He was fully aware, he admitted, of the

serious difficulties that his program wouldinvolve, considering the shortage of ship-ping and the needs of other United Nationsforces. He felt confident, however, thatthe French Army, if properly equipped,could make a great contribution to theEuropean campaign.

Speaking for the U.S. Army, GeneralMarshall asserted that he had undertakento determine how quickly modern equip-ment could be provided for the NorthAfrican forces. He then proceeded to out-line the steps already taken in this connec-tion by various American authorities.Admiral King had begun discussions withFrench naval officers on the shipping ques-tion. General Arnold had conferred withFrench aviation personnel on the provisionof air force equipment. General Somervellhad examined with General Giraud theproblem of delivery of matériel. Twopoints still remained to be taken up withthe French Commander in Chief, namely,the desired priority of items and the pro-cedure for equipping his units. GeneralMarshall then emphasized that it was tothe interest of the United States to bringthe North African forces to a high state ofefficiency. It was "not a question ofwhether to equip the French Army, butrather of how to do it." Transport, hepointed out in conclusion, and not avail-ability of equipment was the limitingfactor.

Whether they were impressed by the de-termination evident in General Giraud'sstatements or reluctant to appear unfriendlyto the French in his presence, the Britishmembers of the CCS expressed great sym-pathy for his aims. While they made nospecific commitments, at least they raised noobjection to the principle of rearmament.Speaking for the British Chiefs of Staff,

7 Min, CCS 61st Mtg, 19 Jan 43, CasablancaConf.


Field Marshal Brooke assured the confereesthat he fully realized the important partwhich General Giraud's forces would playin bringing the war to a successful end.The British, he asserted, would do whatthey could within the more limited resourcesat their disposal to provide modern equip-ment. Admiral Sir Dudley Pound thendeclared that, in view of the growingU-boat menace, the help of the Frenchnaval forces would be most welcome. Asfor the French air forces, Air Chief MarshalSir Charles Portal expressed the hope thatthey would be equipped as soon as possibleto fight once more alongside the Allies. Hetoo felt sure that, within the limits of Britishresources already considerably strained, theUnited Kingdom would do everything pos-sible to hasten the day of this collaboration.Field Marshal Sir John Dill closed the dis-cussion by declaring that it was "a matterof great pleasure" to have General Giraudback to lead France to victory.8

By this time, the Americans had made un-mistakably clear their stand on the rearma-ment issue. Confident of the ability of theNorth African forces to put up a good fight,they were determined to see these forcesused to the maximum and, to this end,rearmed fully and speedily. Eager to trans-late this determination into action, GeneralMarshall, on 23 January, proposed that theJCS set forth a policy with respect to thecontemplated employment of the NorthAfrican forces, and the scale of equipmentto be provided.9

President Roosevelt and General GiraudNegotiate an Agreement

The issue was settled on 24 Januarywhen the President, having taken the mat-ter in his own hands, reached an agreementwith General Giraud which, in principleat least, committed the United States to aprogram of rearmament. This unexpectedaction on his part was the culmination ofexchanges of views between himself andthe French Commander in Chief regardingthe French situation in general and therearmament question in particular.10 Theseinformal meetings had proceeded in an at-mosphere of mutual confidence. Appar-ently disregarding the adverse criticism ofGeneral Giraud's ability as an administra-tor which had just reached him,11 thePresident had shown keen understanding ofthe many difficult problems then facing theFrench Commander in Chief and expressedgreat interest in his plans for the reorganiza-tion and rearmament of the African forces.On the basis of these and other discussions,and in line with his statements before theCCS, General Giraud had prepared a mem-

8 Min, CCS 62d Mtg, 19 Jan 43, CasablancaConf. Field Marshal Dill was head of the BritishJoint Staff Mission and senior British member ofthe CCS organization. He took part in the CCSmeetings as a representative of the Minister ofDefence (Mr. Churchill).

9 Memo, CofS for JCS, 23 Jan 43, JCS 206.

10 President Roosevelt and General Giraud ap-pear to have met three times during the CasablancaConference. The first meeting was on 17 Jan-uary, 1630-1730 hours, and was attended by Cap-tain Beaufre, then Giraud's military aide. Afterthis meeting, General Giraud had a short inter-view with the British Prime Minister. The secondmeeting, on 19 January, about 1200 hours, wasattended by Harry L. Hopkins, Mr. Murphy, Lt.Col. Elliott Roosevelt, Capt. John L. McCrea(USN), and Captain Beaufre. The third, on 24January, appears to have been a brief one withno other participants present, before the meetingat which Churchill and de Gaulle were also present.It is to be noted that the Prime Minister did nottake part in these Giraud-Roosevelt meetings. In-terv with Col Beaufre, Sep 50; Robert E. Sher-wood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), Ch.XXVII.

11 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Ch. XXVII.


MEETING AT CASABLANCA, 24 JANUARY 1943. From left: General HenriGiraud, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, General Charles de Gaulle, and Prime MinisterWinston Churchill.

orandum embodying the substance of hisseveral conversations and submitted it forthe President's concurrence.12 The Presi-

dent, on 24 January, recorded his approvalon the margin of the memorandum.

The part of the memorandum pertainingto rearmament, together with the Presi-

12 Title of the memorandum: Resume of theAgreements in Principle Resulting From the Con-versations at Anfa. Complete text in English andin French in OPD Exec 1, Item 13.

The exact time at which General Giraud sub-mitted this memorandum has yet to be determined.At any rate, this was one of two memorandumssubmitted by the general to the President andapproved by the latter in the course of their meet-ing of 24 January. Both later became known asthe ANFA Agreements. The second memorandum,the text of which had been prepared by Mr. Le-maigre-Dubreuil, was a resume and a synthesis of

the conversations just ended in Washington be-tween the French representative and the Depart-ment of State regarding the political relationshipbetween General Giraud and the Anglo-Americanauthorities subsequent to the Allied intervention inNorth Africa. In effect it officially sanctioned theMurphy-Giraud agreements of 2 November andofficially recognized General Giraud as the solemilitary "trustee" of French interests.

Copies in English of both memorandums weresent to General Giraud on 24 January and toGeneral Eisenhower on 28 January.


dent's marginal comments, was knownthereafter as the ANFA Plan.13 It read asfollows:

It has been agreed between the Presidentof the United States and General Giraudthat the French forces will receive, by priority,the equipment which is indispensable to themand that this shall be made up of the mostmodern matériel.

In subsequent talks with General Marshalland General Somervell, it was agreed that thedelivery would amount to matériel for threearmored divisions and eight motorized divi-sions as well as for a first-line air force con-sisting of five hundred fighters, three hundredbombers and two hundred transport planes,and that of this equipment, there would bedelivered in the weeks to come four hundredtrucks and the equipment for two armoredregiments, three reconnaissance battalions,three battalions of tank destroyers and threemotorized divisions, and such of the aviationequipment as can come by air.

In regard to transport, it has been agreedwith General Somervell that the resupplyingof French Africa would be assured by themonthly allocation of 65,000 tons (50,000tons of wheat, 12,000 tons of sugar, and 3,000tons of fabrics) and that the shipment of thematériel would be effected before next sum-mer. France would furnish to the interalliedpool 165,000 tons of shipping and the allieswould furnish the remainder necessary forthe delivery to be completed within the agreedtime. The aviation matériel [coal and fuelexcepted] would be sent, as far as possible, byair.14

Basically the ANFA Plan did not differgreatly from the pre-TORCH Mast Planwhich called for ten divisions. It was some-what less ambitious than the thirteen-divi-sion program outlined by General Giraudhimself in the course of his appearance be-fore the CCS.15 In practice, it was a re-statement of the eleven-division programsubmitted by General Béthouart to the WarDepartment on 26 December, except thatthe air portion of the new plan was sub-stantially larger.

Well might General Giraud rejoice.After weeks of anxious waiting, he had atlast a definite promise of American assist-ance. The Chief Executive of the UnitedStates Government himself had sanctionedthe principle of French rearmament andhad agreed to a target of eleven divisionsplus a substantial air force. Greatly en-couraged by the turn of events, the FrenchCommander in Chief returned to Algierseager to expedite the reorganization of hisforces in anticipation of the delivery of themuch-needed matériel.

Clarification of the Agreement

The ink was hardly dry on the ANFA Planwhen its far-reaching implications becamethe subject of considerable speculation.Some commitment had clearly been madeby the President, but precisely what?Moreover, how would the British, who hadso conspicuously not been consulted, react?There was no evidence that the PrimeMinister, who had not been invited toattend the Roosevelt-Giraud conversations,had even discussed the rearmament prob-lem with the President. When on 5 Feb-

13 The rest of the memorandum dealt with minorfinancial and political problems.

14 The phrase "coal and fuel excepted" was omit-ted in the official English translation. Incidentally,this version (as distinguished from the one, correctin all respects, prepared by General Béthouart'sstaff) contained at least two errors in translation:"étoffes" (fabrics) was incorrectly rendered as"matériel," and the words "le transport du ma-tériel" (the shipment of the matériel) was im-properly translated as "the shipment of thismaterial," thereby giving the erroneous impressionthat only the shipment of civilian supplies (wheat,sugar and the l ike) would be effected before thesummer.

15 It is most likely that, during his various con-sultations at Anfa, the general was made awareof the impracticability of a thirteen-division pro-gram.


ruary, two weeks after the close of the Casa-blanca Conference, Mr. Churchill chancedto be in Algiers, he did not fail to point outto Mr. Murphy this and other political andmilitary implications of the ANFA Agree-ments. He emphasized in particular thatGeneral de Gaulle, the then protege of theBritish Government, had been practicallyleft out of the new Franco-Anglo-Americanrelationship. In an attempt to meet thePrime Minister's objections, Mr. Murphyrevised the text of the agreements and sub-mitted a single memorandum to GeneralGiraud. The French Commander in Chiefendorsed the new document, a copy ofwhich was cabled to the Foreign Office,and to Washington where the President ap-proved it on 22 April. The text of theANFA Plan reappeared as Part II of thenew memorandum and was worded asfollows:

1. On the military plane it has been agreedbetween the President of the United Statesand the British Prime Minister on the onehand and General Giraud on the other thatthe French forces will receive equipmentwhich is indispensable and with that prioritywhich their military situation demands andas may be determined by the CombinedChiefs of Staff, and this shall be made of themost modern matériel.

2. [Same as in original agreement.] 16

Although a belated party to the rearma-

ment agreement, the British at any ratewere now fully informed as to the scope ofthe commitment.

Another serious question arose as soonas American officials responsible for imple-menting armament programs began exam-ining the ANFA Plan in relation to world-wide strategy, other armament commit-ments, production, and shipping. Howbinding was the agreement just concluded?Was it really an agreement "in principle"only? If so, emphasis could reasonably beplaced on the spirit rather than the letterof the text, and a rearmament programestablished in the light of, and in properrelation with, the many aspects involved.Or was it, as the French were already in-sisting, a firm commitment to a specificprogram? There was of course the possi-bility that the President, although quiteconversant with the French language, hadnot realized that the words "Oui en prin-cipe" as written by him in the margin ofthe original document had a much strongermeaning than the less binding translation"yes in principle" subsequently used in theofficial English text.

Ten days after the conclusion of theagreement, General Béthouart, at the re-quest of the French Commander in Chief,called on General Marshall to discuss theimplementation of the ANFA Plan. Theconversation, from the outset, elicited con-siderable surprise on both sides. GeneralMarshall first informed his caller that hehad not yet been advised by the Presidentof any specific agreements with GeneralGiraud other than the confirmation of whathe himself had already assured the FrenchCommander in Chief during their conver-sations at Anfa, namely, that the UnitedStates would proceed with the greatestspeed to equip his troops and that the mat-

16 Title of the new memo: Memo of the PointsAgreed Upon at the Casablanca Conference Be-tween the President of the U.S. and the BritishPrime Minister on the One Hand, and GeneralGiraud on the Other. Text in Crusoë, Vicissitudesd'une Victoire (Paris: Les Editions de l'AmeFrançaise [1946]), p. 147. The copy approved bythe President: Memo, Brig Gen John R. Deanefor JCS, 22 Apr 43, OPD 400 France, Sec 1.

The main difference between the original andthe new document was that the latter limited thetrusteeship of General Giraud to the territories ofNorth and West Africa, thus leaving General deGaulle in control of other areas, pending an ulti-mate fusion of the two administrations.


ter of cargo space, character of equipmentas to priorities of shipment, and the likewould be determined later.17 GeneralMarshall then assured General Béthouartthat he did not contest the principle ofFrench rearmament. Generals Eisenhowerand Clark and Maj. Gen. George S. Patton,Jr., whom he had consulted, all agreed thatNorth African units could be made effectivefor battle provided they received modernequipment. It was a foregone conclusion,he continued, that the Americans wouldfeel justified in delaying the organizationof U.S. divisions now on the War Depart-ment program in favor of equipping Frenchdivisions overseas. However, he pointedout, there were practical and technicalaspects of the problem to be taken into con-sideration. The rearmament of the Frenchwould have to be undertaken in the lightof other similar commitments, as the warwas being fought on many fronts through-out the world. In addition, it was agreedthat the requirements of matériel for theNorth African Army should be met, bothin quality and quantity, under the sameconditions as those of the U.S. Army.Hence it was obvious that the provision ofsuch matériel must be made according toan order of priority to be determined forthe whole of the United Nations forces.Finally, there was shipping to be reckonedwith. At the present time, he explained, itwas not possible to determine delivery dateswith any exactness. But, since it was con-sidered important that at least a part ofthe French forces be re-equipped at once,

War Department officials were taking stepsto have matériel ready to fill availablecargo space.18

On 5 February, the Combined Chiefsof Staff, meeting in Washington, examinedthe status of the negotiations on Frenchrearmament. Lt. Gen. George N. Mac-ready inquired, on behalf of the BritishChiefs of Staff, whether any agreement onthe matter had been reached at the Casa-blanca Conference. General Marshall ex-plained that "a favorable view" had beentaken by Generals Eisenhower, Patton, andClark regarding the "potentialities" of theNorth African forces but that no decisionhad been reached with regard to whatequipment should be sent.19 Shipping, hepointed out, would be the limiting factor.One of the effects of providing equipmentto the French, concluded General Marshall,would be to delay equipping U.S. units.The CCS then agreed that they should, assoon as possible, give guidance to theMunitions Assignments Board with respectto French rearmament.20

In the theater, officials of Allied ForceHeadquarters also were discussing the im-plications of the ANFA Plan. On 6 Feb-ruary, pending further instructions fromWashington, the chief of staff, GeneralSmith, issued the following statement:"The President's promises to General Gi-raud deal with matters which are beyondGeneral Eisenhower's scope because they

17 General Marshall was absent from Casablancaduring the last days of the conference and had notseen the President since his return to Washington.The first knowledge he had of any agreement waswhen General Béthouart handed him, in the courseof the above interview, a memo on the subject aswell as a copy of the ANFA Agreements.

18 Min, Marshall Béthouart Mtg, 3 Feb 43, JRC902/11 Rearmt Plan; Memo, Marshall for McCloy,4 Feb 43, OCS A-45-523 (France).

19 It is most likely that General Marshall, whohad been apprised only two days before by GeneralBéthouart of the Giraud-Roosevelt agreement inprinciple, had not yet talked to the President toascertain the facts regarding that commitment.

General Macready was a member of the BritishJoint Staff Mission in Washington.

20 Min, CCS 70th Mtg, 5 Feb 43.


involve additional tonnage which has notyet been allocated to him. General Giraudmust deal with these matters with Wash-ington through the Béthouart Mission." 21

In the opinion of the Allied Commanderin Chief, therefore, it was clearly up to theCCS and the War Department to carry outthe ANFA Plan, and to arrange for thenecessary additional tonnage.

General Giraud, meanwhile, on his re-turn from Casablanca had publicly pro-claimed that he had been promised"substantial equipment to arrive by thesummer." Subsequently his staff submit-ted a request for the immediate shipmentof the matériel constituting the first partof the ANFA Plan. The Joint RearmamentCommittee was then working on a scheduleof shipments based on the allocation of25,000 tons per convoy which GeneralEisenhower had approved on 26 January asbeing "the maximum tonnage which couldbe spared for French military equipment."The figure, incidentally, represented aboutone sixteenth of the total maximum ton-nage per convoy (approximately 400,000tons). It was somewhat lower than thefigure of 30,000-35,000 tons allocated forcivilian consumer goods as a result of Eisen-hower's decision to place the requirementsof the North African economy abovethose of the French military. Consideringthat convoys were contemplated at therate of about one per month, the 25,000tons thus allocated monthly to Frenchmilitary requirements would permit nomore than a start on the rearmament pro-gram before the summer.22 On 10 Febru-

ary General Béthouart informed GeneralGiraud that, as now envisaged by the WarDepartment, the composition of the nextshipments under the 25,000-ton allocationwas to be limited to 400 vehicles and themedical and training equipment requestedon 26 December. He added, however, thatWar Department officials had undertakena study of the "possibility" of equipping afirst increment consisting of three divisions,a few tank battalions, and correspondingantitank and antiaircraft units. Deliverydates had yet to be determined, as ship-ments were dependent on production andshipping.23

These and other disclosures broughtGeneral Giraud's rejoicing to a sudden end.Greatly disturbed because the re-equippingof his troops was not being pushed withmore vigor, the French Commander inChief called on General Eisenhower on 16February and made "strong representa-tions." Believing the ANFA Agreements tobe a firm commitment, Giraud expected atleast the first part of the plan to be ac-complished without delay. Under the al-location of 25,000 tons per convoy, theeleven-division target set at Anfa wouldnever be reached. The negligible materialassistance now offered by the Americanswas inconsistent with his recent under-standing with the President and GeneralMarshall. Moreover, it gave credence to a

21 Memo, DCofS AFHQ for Liaison Sec, 6 Feb43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan.

22 As an illustration, 25,000 tons (or less thanthree cargo ships) represent no more than thevehicles of the three infantry regiments and divi-sional artillery of a division. FM-101-10, Staff

Officers' Field Manual: Organization, Technical,and Logistical Data, 1941.

Msgs 1453, Eisenhower to OPD and Marshall,17 Feb 43, 7433, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Jan43, and 1768, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Feb 43,JRC Cable Log; Msg 3664, Eisenhower to Mar-shall, 31 Dec 42, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div OpsFr Equip; Memo, International Div ASF for OCT,26 Apr 43. ASF ID 400.318 France, Free Fr, Vol. 1.

23 Ltr, Béthouart to Giraud, 10 Feb 43, andMemo, Styer for Eisenhower, 10 Feb 43, JRC902/11 Rearmt Plan.


rumor that had lately reached him, to theeffect that it was the policy of the Americangovernment not to equip his forces in sucha manner as to permit them to take partin overseas operations, but to furnish themonly matériel sufficient to defend NorthAfrica. If that was the American intent,he would withdraw from his position asFrench Commander in Chief.24

General Eisenhower, reporting Giraud'sstand, urged the War Department to setforth a definite policy which would enablehim to deal with the French Commanderin Chief. He needed to know in particularin how many monthly increments the com-mitment made at Anfa could be met. Hisstaff could then determine shipping priori-ties and proceed intelligently with the re-armament of forces available for immediatecombat as well as those later to be employed.In the meantime, he was reassuring Gen-eral Giraud, on his own authority, that theAllied governments had "no dispositionother than to carry through their originalpromises" and that it was "their intent anddesire" that the North African forces par-ticipate in the liberation of France. Stress-ing the urgent need for immediate action,General Eisenhower added this gravewarning: "I have here to face the insinua-tion that we are not straight-forward, thatwe are long on promises and short onperformances. . . . This impression must bedispelled before the situation deterio-rates." 25

To make his position unmistakably

clear, General Eisenhower, on the sameday, sent a personal message to GeneralMarshall. He stressed his own and Gen-eral Giraud's concern over the serious re-sults likely to follow from Americanfailure to deliver equipment. He feareda further lowering of morale among Frenchunits and a corresponding weakening ofGeneral Giraud's hold on his army. Dis-content was already rampant among thetroops fighting in Tunisia. They contendedthat, just as in 1940, they had been sentto battle without proper equipment withthe result that they were suffering heavylosses. It was difficult for them to reconcilethis situation with General Giraud's re-peated optimistic statements following hisreturn from Casablanca. Prompt action,asserted General Eisenhower, was impera-tive to fulfill in part the "obligation impliedat Anfa." The "immediate situation"could be met, he suggested, if about 100,000tons of military supplies and equipmentwere earmarked for delivery from theUnited States during the following two orthree months. If this action was supple-mented by a definite schedule for futuredeliveries, "the matter would be settled."The necessary tonnage, he explained, wouldhave to be provided by General Somervellfrom shipping at his disposal includingFrench tonnage. With a probable refer-ence to those officials who might be object-ing to French rearmament on the groundthat it was politically inopportune, Eisen-hower concluded with this pointed observa-tion: "The plan for equipping elevendivisions has no relationship to the greatquestion of whether France shall be re-armed after the war. The latter would bea gigantic undertaking covering manyyears." 26

24 Msg 1453 cited n. 22. The rumor, allegedlyof American origin, had been picked up in Algiersby French officers. Approached on the matter,Mr. McCloy hastened to furnish formal assuranceto the French that the rumor was without founda-tion. Memo, Jacques Tarbé de Saint-Hardouinfor Béthouart, 26 Feb 43, OCS A-45-523 (France).

25 Msg 1453 cited n. 22.26 Ibid.; Msg 1620, OPD Algiers to AGWAR,


In a subsequent message addressed tothe Secretary of State for transmittal toPresident Roosevelt, Mr. Murphy corrobo-rated General Eisenhower's disclosure ofthe critical situation arising from the rearm-ament issue. The French, asserted Mr.Murphy, were manifesting a growing feel-ing that they were being "hoodwinked."They had listened with "respectful cre-dence" to repeated announcements of U.S.armament production. On the other handthey realized fully the seriousness of theshipping problem. But what they couldnot understand was that three months afterthe landings in North Africa, during whichtime the Allies had of necessity dependedon them for many things, no evidence of asubstantial armament program was yet insight. Mr. Murphy then reviewed the mili-tary and political implications of the cur-rent fumbling on French rearmament. Thesecurity of the North African base requiredthat the fighting spirit of the French bestimulated. Instead there was a growingfear among them that France would be "ex-cluded from real participation in the peacesettlement." In addition, General Giraud'sforces, aware that the Gaullist troops had re-ceived modern equipment from the British,were now looking more and more towardthe United Kingdom for practical encour-agement. Finally the French Commanderin Chief felt that "somewhere along the line"there was "opposition if not deception."The American political adviser then urgedthat "we lay at least some cards on thetable and enter into franker discussions asto the future of French participation if thisis at all practicable. Our prestige and pol-icy are being challenged." If possible, he

finally recommended, General Eisenhowershould have more support. Additional ton-nage with necessary escort vessels should beallocated to him for the purpose of rearmingthe French.27

Impressed by the gravity of the situationas described by General Eisenhower andMr. Murphy, General Marshall referredthe entire matter to President Roosevelt.28

The President's reaction was immediate.Within a few hours after Murphy's messagehad been communicated to him, Rooseveltrequested the American political repre-sentative in Algiers to tell the French that"at no time did [he] or General Marshallpromise equipment for the French divisionson any given date." What had been agreedto, he asserted, was "the principle of rearm-ing them." The rearmament itself was tobe carried out "as soon as practicable fromthe shipping point of view." His agree-ment in principle, therefore, did not involvedetailed commitments. The Presidentthen added this somewhat caustic advice:"Tell your good friends in North Africathat they ought not to act like children.They must take prompt steps to deny thesilly rumors that they have been let downin equipping an expeditionary force to gointo France or that slowness in supplyingarmament is delaying political progress. . . .They must remain calm and sensible." 29

In a message of the same date addressedto Eisenhower, Marshall first restated thePresident's own interpretation of the ANFAAgreement, then disclosed some ratherstartling facts concerning the conversationsheld immediately before the President's

Eisenhower to Marshall, 18 Feb 43, OPD Exec 1,Item 13; Msg 1628, Eisenhower to OPD, 18 Feb43, JRC Cable Log.

27 Msg 252, Murphy to Secy State for President,20 Feb 43, OPD Exec 1, Item 13.

28 Memo, Marshall for President, 20 Feb 43, OCSA-45-523 (France).

29 Msg, President to Murphy, 20 Feb 43, OPDExec 1, Item 13.


approval of the Giraud memorandum.Specifically, the Chief of Staff referred toparagraph 2 of the document. As worded,it implied that, after Giraud and the Presi-dent had reached an understanding on thegeneral principle of French rearmament,Generals Giraud, Marshall, and Somervellhad subsequently agreed on the details ofthe program. The U.S. Chief of Staff nowwanted to have clearly understood thatneither he nor General Somervell had madeany detailed commitments such as werespecified in the paper submitted to thePresident for his signature. In their con-versation with General Giraud, they haddealt "only in general terms," and agreedsolely to a rearmament program "as speedyas could be managed." They had informedthe French Commander in Chief that, be-cause of shipping limitations, his programwould be impossible of immediate attain-ment in view especially of American com-mitments with the USSR and China, andrequirements in the southwest Pacific.General Marshall further disclosed that thePresident had had no opportunity to seehim or General Somervell after his receiptof General Giraud's memorandum. ThePresident's agreement in principle, there-fore, was "based on General Giraud's state-ment of a detailed arrangement withGenerals Somervell and Marshall whichhad not been reached." 30

Both American and French observerswere later to express the opinion that Gen-eral Marshall's implication that Giraud hadknowingly misrepresented the facts and had

secured the President's approval on falsepretenses did not square with Giraud's char-acter. It seemed to them far more likelythat the French Commander in Chief, car-ried away by his eagerness to see his forcesrearmed, was misled by the encouragementhe received and that he readily translatedpreliminary agreements into firm commit-ments because he wanted so badly to havesuch commitments.31 As for the President,the haste with which he had approved thedocument suggests the possibility that hehad not examined its terms and implicationswith sufficient care. His endorsement wasambiguous to say the least. Under the cir-cumstances, it was bound to lead to mis-understandings.

In an effort to dissipate General Giraud'smisgivings, the MAB dispatched to Al-giers, at the request of the French Com-mander in Chief and with the approval ofthe President and of the British Govern-ment, Mr. Jean Monnet, the French finan-cial expert then in Washington. The pur-pose of his mission was to acquaint Giraudwith the situation as seen from Washington,to review with him and with General Eisen-hower the entire matter of French rearm-ament in relation to over-all Allied require-ments, and generally to "give through ap-propriate channels every assistance to thesolution of questions arising in connectionwith the rearmament of the Frenchforces." 32 The details of the rearmamentprogram still had to be established.

30 Msg 2641, Marshall to Eisenhower, 20 Feb 43,JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan.

31 Intervs with Col George L. Artamonoff, Dec49, with Brig Gen Jean Regnault, Sep 50, andwith Lt Gen Paul Devinck, Jun 50.

32 Ltr, Hopkins to Monnet, 22 Feb 43, JRC902/11 Rearmt Plan.

CHAPTER III

Phase I of the Program(January-July 1943)

Phase I Is Launched

General Giraud had been correct inassuming, as he had in the course of hisconversation with General Dwight D.Eisenhower on 16 February, that no definiteschedule had yet been established for givingfull effect to the ANFA Plan. Still it didnot follow that War Department officialshad detached themselves altogether fromthe question of furnishing large-scale ma-terial assistance to his forces. On the con-trary, they had already begun to makeavailable some of the matériel requiredunder the plan. In their opinion, suchprovision represented the first increment ina program still to be elaborated by theCombined Chiefs in the light of the ANFAAgreements.

At the request of the War Department,the Munitions Assignments Committee(Ground) had acted favorably on onearmament requisition for the French andwas about to act on a second, such actionbeing taken subject to the ultimate approvalof the CCS and pending final decision bythe latter regarding the over-all program.On 1 February, the MAC (G) had recom-mended, and the MAB had subsequentlyapproved, the assignment of the matériel—vehicles and medical and training equip-ment—requested for the North African

forces by the theater on 26 January.1 Thismatériel, incidentally, was much the sameas that listed under Priority I of the Bé-thouart program. Two weeks later, on 16February, the MAC (G) also approvedthe immediate transfer to the French ofsome 400 machine guns, 24 medium tanksfor training purposes, as well as the matérielrequested earlier by General Eisenhower forre-equipping one infantry division, twotruck companies, one service company, andone ordnance battalion.2 Army ServiceForces then made arrangements for theshipment of the equipment as filler cargoon the next convoys to North Africa.

These measures clearly indicated thatWar Department officials were no less de-termined than General Eisenhower to begin

1 Min, MAC (G) 74th Mtg, 1 Feb 43. (SeeBibliographical Note.)

2 Msg 8496, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 2 Feb 43,JRC Cable Log; Min, MAC (G) 78th Mtg, 16Feb 43. MAC (G) withheld the 17,500 riflesrequested by General Eisenhower because thereexisted at the time a shortage of 1,300,000 in theUnited States. As rifles were available from Britishsources, the London Munitions Assignments Boardwas requested to release them to the French com-plete with bayonets and scabbards, accessories, andmaintenance spare parts. These rifles, all .30-caliber, were from the old U.S. stock turned overto the British after the battle of Dunkerque. Msg5826, AFHQ to USFOR, 21 Apr 43, JRC CableLog. On the question of rifles and other infantryweapons issued to the French during the war, seepp. 246-53, below.


U.S. VEHICLES FOR NORTH AFRICAN FORCES, Casablanca, 22 February 1943.

rearming the French while awaiting a deci-sion of the CCS on the extent of the pro-gram. They intended to proceed generallywithin the framework of the Béthouart pro-posal of 26 December, and on the basis ofrecommendations of the Allied Commanderin Chief as to armament and shipping pri-orities. They concurred fully in GeneralEisenhower's position that matériel andshipping priorities must be decided by him,except when the CCS might have to inter-vene.3 To avoid dual shipping procedures,they recommended, and the theater agreed,that shipments for the French, distinctivelymarked, should continue as U.S. Armyshipments consigned to Commanding Gen-eral, NATOUSA, and handled like anyother U.S. military shipments.4

On 16 February Marshall referred toEisenhower a request he had just receivedfrom General Béthouart for the equipmentto complete the initial phase of the ANFAPlan. Béthouart was asking for an alloca-tion of 100,000 tons monthly, for the nexttwo months, over and above the 25,000-tonallotment authorized by the theater. WarDepartment officials, explained GeneralMarshall, considered that the decision inthe matter was up to the theater, not them.5

The Allied Commander in Chief, on 18February, confirmed General Giraud'seagerness to complete the initial phase ofthe ANFA Plan as speedily as possible. He

3 In the course of a conference held at AFHQ,it had been agreed that Eisenhower would be thefinal authority on the matter of French requisitions.Min, CofS Conf, 29 Jan 43, AFHQ AG Sec 337.2.

4 Memo, Styer for Eisenhower, 10 Feb 43, JRC902/11 Rearmt Plan. In accordance with anearlier request from the theater, the followingdistinctive markings were subsequently adopted:

all packages containing equipment for the Frenchbore the code symbol NAFUS (for North AfricanFrench-U.S.) and were stenciled with vertical red,white, and blue stripes. Msg 8496 cited n. 2.

5 Ltr, Béthouart to Marshall, 15 Feb 43, OCSA-45-523; Msg 2399, Marshall to Eisenhower, 16Feb 43, JRC Cable Log. The submission ofBéthouart's request to the War Department wasentirely consonant with General Smith's statementof 6 February (see p. 41, above) that the Frenchmust take up shipping problems directly with theWar Department.

PHASE I OF THE PROGRAM 47

then submitted a detailed request for thenecessary equipment. On the question ofshipping, he pointed out in a subsequentmessage that for him to allocate more ton-nage for the French forces from his presentshipping allotment would be to competedirectly with his other military require-ments. He fully realized that the "apparentcommitment of Anfa as understood by theFrench" might require an immediate in-crease in rearmament tonnage. Existingdemands, however, were "quite beyond"his capacity to meet if future plans were tobe executed, as he hoped, within the periodof time currently contemplated.6

Without waiting for Eisenhower's reply,Marshall had instructed ASF to explore atonce the possibility of allocating more ton-nage for the shipment of military equipmentto the French. On 19 February GeneralSomervell had announced that a specialconvoy of approximately 125,000 tonscould be arranged for this purpose.

The request submitted by the theater on18 February called for the shipment ofmatériel to equip two infantry divisions, twoarmored regiments with Sherman tanks,three tank destroyer battalions, three recon-naissance battalions of the type containedin armored divisions, and twelve antiaircraftbattalions. Operations Division gave therequest a very high priority, so high in factthat American ground units in the UnitedStates were to be stripped of equipment, ifnecessary, to meet the French requirements.7

So far, the organization of the specialconvoy was an American project. Theprecipitate American action prompted the

British to point out with perfect accuracythat to date the Combined Chiefs had madeno basic policy decisions on French rearma-ment. To assign equipment without benefitof direction from the CCS was, in theirjudgment, "putting the cart before the ox."Despite the British demurral and pendingfinal action by the MAB, arrangementsfor the convoy proceeded. Arms and equip-ment, on order of ASF, were moved intoports and the convoy was assembled. TheCombined Chiefs meanwhile continued thedebate on long-range policy.8

The convoy, known as UGS 6½ 9 andconsisting of fifteen cargo ships, was toleave about 19 March and arrive in NorthAfrica around 11 April. It had been ar-ranged with great difficulty for it repre-sented a "terrifically stiff demand on a very,very tight shipping situation." Not all theequipment assigned on 20 February,amounting to some 150,000 tons, could belifted in the fifteen ships. It was agreedthat items left behind would be shipped assoon as practicable. Also to go later was asubstantial amount of the air equipment re-quested by the theater on 14 February.10

All together, the matériel to be shippedon UGS 6/2 and on convoys immediatelyfollowing, for which assignment either hadbeen obtained or was then pending, ex-

6 Msgs 1628, Eisenhower to OPD, 18 Feb 43,and 1930, Eisenhower to Marshall, 20 Feb 43,JRC Cable Log.

7 Memo, Secy for Chairman MAC (G), 18 Feb43, attached to Min, MAC (G) 80th Mtg, 20 Feb43.

8 Min, MAC (G) 80th Mtg, 20 Feb 43. It wasnot until 24 March 1943 that the MAB, actingin accordance with a decision taken by the CCStwelve days earlier, approved the assignment recom-mended by the U.S. members of the MAC (G)on 20 February.

9 The conventional symbol UG was used toidentify a cargo convoy originating in U.S. ports(whereas KM signified a convoy from the UnitedKingdom). The added symbols "S" and "F"meant "slow" and "fast" respectively.

10 Quotation from Memo, Lewis Douglas forSomervell, 19 Feb 43, Somervell File, Shipping;Msg 2833, Somervell to Eisenhower, 25 Feb 43,JRC Cable Log.


ceeded substantially the equipment listed byGeneral Béthouart on 15 February. Withit, General Giraud would be able to equip3 infantry divisions, 2 armored regiments,4 tank destroyer battalions, 5 reconnais-sance battalions, 14 40-mm. antiaircraftbattalions, 12 truck companies, and airunits representing more than 200 air-planes.11 In actuality, these shipmentswould complete the first phase of the ANFAPlan.

General Béthouart could well be pleasedwith the arrangements just concluded.Aware of the important part which GeneralMarshall had played in shaping them, theFrench representative expressed to him hispersonal appreciation in a letter of thanks.12

The announcement regarding the specialconvoy could not have reached GeneralEisenhower at a more appropriate time, forhe was about to convey to General Giraudthe President's interpretation of the ANFAAgreement. In his letter General Eisen-hower first stressed the United States Gov-ernment's desire and policy to equip theFrench forces properly as fast as shippingcould be allocated for that purpose. Hethen broke the news about the special con-voy. The decision of the War Departmentto set it up, he pointed out in conclusion,was "a further evidence of our desire toshare with you to the fullest extent possibleconsistent with the means at our disposal." 13

At the close of the six-week period justended, extending from the opening sessionof the Casablanca Conference to 23 Febru-

ary, when Eisenhower wrote to Giraud, theAmericans as well as the French could pointwith satisfaction to the great strides beingmade toward the rehabilitation of the NorthAfrican forces. The principle of a rearma-ment had been recognized by the Ameri-can government and made the subject of anagreement. The implications of the agree-ment had been analyzed and subsequentlyclarified. Finally, a substantial amount ofequipment was about to leave the UnitedStates for North African ports, a tangibleproof of the American intent to carrythrough the promises made at Anfa andearlier at Cherchel.

The question now uppermost in theminds of all was this: How soon and howoften could shipments be made? The diver-gence of views demonstrated by the Britishand American members of the MAB on20 February was clear proof that the boardwas not in a position to make further as-signments unless it received the necessaryguidance from the CCS. Obviously nopolicy would be forthcoming until such timeas the CCS had considered the French re-armament problem in its entirety and agreedto the establishment of a firm over-all pro-gram.

The CCS Agree on a Rearmament Formula

Eager to obtain the formalization of theaction taken by ASF as well as a definitepolicy with regard to equipping the French,the U.S. Chiefs of Staff brought the entirerearmament question before the CCS. Thememorandum which they submitted on 23February first pointed out that as a resultof discussions held at Anfa between Presi-dent Roosevelt and Generals Marshall,Somervell, Giraud, and Eisenhower, it hadbeen agreed that equipment would be

11 Memo, Marshall for Béthouart, 24 Feb 43,OSC A-45-523 (France).

12 Ltr, Béthouart to Marshall, 25 Feb 43, OCSA-45-523 (France).

13 Msg 2641, Marshall to Eisenhower, 20 Feb 43,JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan; Ltr, Eisenhower toGiraud, 23 Feb 43, AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Fr Mat-ters.


furnished "as expeditiously as practicablein accordance with requests submitted fromtime to time through and coordinated withthe CinC [Allied Forces in North Africa]."The CCS, asserted the JCS, had been in-formed of this "policy," 14 and had furtherbeen advised that the U.S. Chiefs of Staffintended to "delay the organization ofcombat units in the U.S. in approximateproportion to French units to be rearmed."The U.S. Chiefs of Staff now proposed thatthe CCS approve the following directiveto the MAB for guidance in allocatingequipment to General Giraud: "Munitionsof war will be assigned to French landand air forces in North Africa from thecommon pool to the extent that these forcescan be organized as units around a nucleusof trained officers and NCO's in accordancewith priorities to be established by the CinC,Allied Forces in North Africa, and to theextent that shipping can be made availablefor the transport of these munitions."Naval forces were specifically excluded asthey were to be the object of a separatepaper.15

The memorandum, it must be noted, wasstrangely silent regarding the scope of theproposed rearmament. It made no men-tion of the eleven-division target as agreed

to by President Roosevelt, an omission pos-sibly due to the fact that the revised versionof the ANFA Agreements had yet to be ap-proved by the President.

The reaction of the British Chiefs of Staffwas prompt and vigorous. On 25 Febru-ary, they expressed their views on the pro-posal just offered by their American col-leagues. The rearmament of the Frenchin the immediate future and on a large scalewould, they asserted, cut across the agree-ments reached at Casablanca regardingfuture strategy. They pointed out that theNorth African forces could not be re-equipped in time to take part in currentoperations in Tunisia and were "unlikely tobe required" for any of the subsequent oper-ations decided upon at the conference.16

The British Chiefs considered further thatany shipping allocated to French rearma-ment above that actually required for op-erations then contemplated would be at thedirect expense of these operations, therebyseriously prejudicing them. The directiveproposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, theypointed out, made no mention of the factthat the commitment to rearm the Frenchwas to be carried out at the expense of theactivation of U.S. units. They now under-stood this was "the policy agreed on atAnfa." Since French rearmament involveda problem of assignment which differed inno way from similar problems in othertheaters, they considered that it should bedealt with by the MAB in the light of otherglobal commitments and be accorded suchassignments as its strategic priority merited.In conclusion, the British Chiefs of Staff

14 Obviously a reference to the disclosures madein this connection by General Marshall at the 61stand 62d CCS Meetings on 19 January.

15 Memo, JCS for CCS, 23 Feb 43, CCS 181.The memorandum was approved by the JCS attheir 63d Meeting, 23 February 1943. It is in-teresting to note that before submitting the draftof this paper to the JCS for their approval, Brig.Gen. John R. Deane, secretary of the committee,made this rather startling statement in a memoran-dum for General Marshall: "The President agreedin principle with General Giraud that FrenchForces would be re-equipped but did not specifyany particular number even though General Giraudbelieves that he did." Memo, Deane for Marshall,22 Feb 43, OPD 400 France, Sec 1.

16 The contemplated operations were: ANAKIM,consisting of a large land operation for the re-opening of the Burma Road and an amphibiousoperation for the recapture of Rangoon; andBOLERO, a preliminary build-up of the forces re-quired for an operation across the English Channel.


urged that the proposed directive to theMAB be revised to indicate the priority tobe given to French rearmament "in itsproper relation to the requirements of othermilitary operations already agreed upon."They recommended further that the MABbe informed of the ultimate scale of rearma-ment and the speed at which it should beaccomplished.17

On 26 February, the CCS engaged in alively debate centering on the Americanproposal and the British answer. AdmiralWilliam D. Leahy prefaced the discussionby emphasizing that a commitment hadbeen made "on a higher level than the CCS"and that the question now confronting thecommittee was "the manner" in which thecommitment should be implemented. Inhis opinion the agreement reached at Anfacould not be voided. General Marshallthen called attention to the "inconsistency"of some statements in the British memoran-dum. If equipment was to be furnished theNorth African forces at the expense of U.S.units, "it was hardly a question about acommon pool." Speed of deliveries andamount of equipment involved, he pointedout, were matters still to be determined.He felt, however, that it was important,both politically and strategically, that "somemeasure of the agreement be carried out inthe near future" so as to bolster Eisen-hower's position, especially in FrenchMorocco where his strength had been de-pleted by preparations for future operations.Asked whether the dispatch of equipmentto the French would prejudice otherplanned operations, General Somervell ex-pressed the belief that it would not. Thepresent major shortage, he explained, wasin troopships, not in cargo carriers. Gen-

eral Somervell then voiced his "great sur-prise" at learning that there was any ques-tion regarding the rearming of the French,as it was his understanding that the matterhad been agreed on at Anfa. He urgedthat the MAB be authorized to assignthe equipment then being loaded on thespecial convoy.

Speaking for the British Chiefs of Staff,General Macready first questioned the wis-dom of leaving the decision as to the extentof French rearmament to the theater com-mander, who, he felt, was not in a positionto judge all the rival claims of other plannedoperations. While fully recognizing the"political necessity" for delivery of a mini-mum amount of equipment, he feared thatthe contemplated shipments to North Africawould conflict with commitments in theIndian Ocean where General Sir ArchibaldP. Wavell was asking for an additional126,000 tons monthly. However, addedGeneral Macready, the British Chiefs ofStaff were prepared to authorize the MABto go ahead with the present proposed as-signments, "provided any delay whichmight thus be caused to British assignmentswould be made good later in the year."In an effort to reconcile the American andBritish stands on the matter, General Mar-shall proposed that the directive to theMAB be amended to read "without jeop-ardizing other commitments." 18

The directive, thus amended, was referredto the British Chiefs of Staff in London.On 2 March they signified their willingnessto accept it provided it was amended furtheras follows: "Munitions of war will be as-signed to the French Forces up to the limitsand at a speed to be decided by the CCS . . .without prejudicing other commitments."Their own proposed amendment, they de-

17 Memo, Representatives of COS for CCS, 25Feb 43, CCS 181/1. 18 Min, CCS 73d Mtg, 26 Feb 43.


clared, was prompted by their feeling thatassignments of vital items in short supplyshould not be made to the French for opera-tional use at the expense of assignments toU.S. or British troops. Since, in addition,existing shipping was insufficient to meetall present combined commitments, theyconsidered it essential to leave it to the CCSto decide, "on purely military grounds andafter due consideration of the situation inall theaters," what was to be assigned.19 Itwas now clear that one of the fears expe-rienced by the British regarding French re-armament as proposed by the U.S. Chiefsof Staff was that the commitment wouldjeopardize the delivery of American equip-ment to their own forces.

At their next meeting, the JCS took upthe controversial directive to the MAB.Admiral Leahy first informed his colleaguesthat the President had directed that theloading of the special convoy be continued.He then called attention to the statementcontained in the British memorandum of2 March that the Prime Minister had con-firmed that he had not discussed the ques-tion of French rearmament with the Presi-dent while at Anfa. The President,declared Admiral Leahy, had just informedhim to the contrary. Admiral King thenpointed out that, since there was no agree-ment such as that reached with the USSR,and since the JCS had not clearly definedthe extent of the proposed rearmament, theBritish obviously were concerned lest thematter be carried too far. He felt thatsome definite statement should be made tothe British indicating that for the momentnot more than three divisions or theirequivalent were to be re-equipped.

In a less conciliatory mood, Admiral

Leahy urged that a definite program be"made, held to, and the British so in-formed." This was important, he pointedout, in view of a possible United Nationsmanpower shortage. General Somervell,chief of ASF, then explained that thereexisted no shortage of equipment, not evenof tank destroyers for which the British hadalso made a request. Shipping, he asserted,was the only question that mattered. Andhe believed that when French ships, once re-paired, had been added to the Allied pool, itwould be possible to increase the current25,000-ton allocation for French militarysupplies by some 40,000 additional tons perconvoy. There was no intention, he added,to continue shipments at a heavy rate,but only at the rate provided by Frenchshipping plus the tonnage allocated by Gen-eral Eisenhower. In the case of the specialconvoy, he explained, ships had been takenout of the U.S. shipping allocation and hadbeen made available by the War ShippingAdministration. Admiral Leahy then of-fered this advice: "The best attitude toadopt is to inform the British that the USJCS intend to ship the equipment." Askedby Admiral King what stand the BritishChiefs of Staff had taken at the CasablancaConference, Brig. Gen. John R. Deane,secretary of the committee, replied that atno time had they acquiesced to the Ameri-can plans to rearm the French; they hadlistened without comment and had neveragreed or disagreed.20

In the opinion of General Somervell,British objections to sanctioning the meas-ures already taken by the War Departmentto arm the French appeared groundless.Only the matériel for three divisions hadbeen assigned to date, a commitment "ap-parently concurred in by the British Chiefs

19 Memo, Representatives of COS for CCS, 2Mar 43, CCS 181/3. 20 Min, JCS 64th Mtg, 2 Mar 43.

REARMING THE FRENCH52

of Staff." In addition, very few of theitems involved could be considered in shortsupply and even in their case the amountsassigned represented but a small proportionof the monthly production rate. Finally,in allocating the necessary tonnage, the WarShipping Administration had advised thatthe allocation had been made "withoutprejudice to the fulfillment of other op-erational shipping needs considered asurgent." 21

Operations Division officials had come tothe conclusion that the amendment to theMAB directive as proposed by the Britishwould make action by the CCS mandatoryon every armament request for the French.The CCS, they feared, would then be as-suming the role of a munitions assignmentsboard. Brig. Gen. John E. Hull, Chief,Theater Group, OPD, declared flatly that,as written, the British proposal was not ac-ceptable. He offered as a possible com-promise the following counterproposal:

Munitions of war will be assigned to theFrench forces . . . from the common pool tothe extent that these forces can be organizedas units ... in accordance with priorities tobe established by the Allied CinC in NorthAfrica and to the extent that shipping andequipment can be made available withoutjeopardizing other commitments. Equip-ment allotted by the MAB will not, withoutprior reference to the CCS, exceed that neces-sary to equip eleven divisions, an air force of450 planes, and appropriate supporting andauxiliary troops.General Hull considered that his proposal,if adopted, would fulfill the President's"agreement in principle" and would notcommit the British Chiefs of Staff to thegranting of blanket authority to theMAB.22

On 5 March, the CCS resumed their dis-cussion of the terms of the draft directive.First, Admiral Leahy restated the Americanposition and reminded his British colleaguesthat at Casablanca they had raised no ob-jection to the U.S. proposal to arm theFrench. It would now be "as impossible asit would be inadvisable" to withdraw fromthe commitment given General Giraud byPresident Roosevelt. Speaking for the Brit-ish Chiefs of Staff, General Macready statedthat the point of disagreement concernedthe details of the commitment. What theMAB required were instructions as to theamount of equipment to be furnished andthe approximate speed of delivery. With-out such instructions, he explained, theMAB would not be in a position to fit theassignments to the French into the over-allclaims upon available munitions. The factwas, he concluded, that "no document ex-isted" which indicated what was to be sup-plied to the French.

Admiral King agreed with GeneralMacready. Referring to the minutes of theCasablanca Conference, he asserted that, tohis knowledge, no definite decision had any-where been recorded regarding equipmentfor the North African forces.23 He felt thatsome sort of protocol similar to that for theUSSR should be agreed on for the French.It was quite right, he added, that a "brake"be put on the French project so as "to insurethat other existing commitments would notbe prejudiced." Admiral Leahy, on theother hand, considered that the U.S. Chiefsof Staff could not subscribe to the amend-ment proposed by the British as it ran coun-ter to their own commitment. For the bene-fit of the British representatives, General

21 Memo, Somervell for Deane, 3 Mar 43, OPD400 France, Sec I.

22 Memo, Hull for CofS, 4 Mar 43, OPD Exec 1,Item 13.

23 The minutes of the Casablanca Conference didnot record the conversations between the Presidentand General Giraud.


Somervell, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney,then Deputy Chief of Staff, and AdmiralLeahy in turn outlined briefly the ANFAPlan and explained how they proposedto meet it. Field Marshal Dill observedthat the British Chiefs of Staff mighttake the view that eleven French divisionswere more than could ever be made use ofin Tunisia, particularly as a large part ofthis force would not become available untillong after the fighting in that area was ex-pected to cease. However, in the light ofthe commitment which had been made, herecognized that equipment would have to bedelivered. He proposed to refer the matterto the British Chiefs of Staff and informthem of the suggested ceiling of 11 divisionsand 450 aircraft. He would explain tothem that "it was the impression of the U.S.Chiefs of Staff that the matter had beenfully discussed at Casablanca and approvedin principle." 24

In the belief that a clearer statement oftheir aims might dispel British objections,the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, on 6 March, offereda revised version of their draft directive tothe MAB which read as follows: "Equip-ment allotted to the French by MAB willnot, without prior reference to the CCS,exceed that necessary to equip 11 divisions,450 planes, and appropriate supporting andauxiliary troops." 25

The proposed amendment failed to winover the British Chiefs of Staff. On 11March, they flatly declared that a diversionof shipping at the present critical stage, forthe rearmament of forces not required toimplement agreed strategy, "could not bejustified militarily." It was now clear, theycontinued, that the CCS could carry thematter no further in view of the commit-

ment which the President was "understoodto have given" to General Giraud. ThePresident, they pointed out, had probablynot been aware of the gravity of the ship-ping situation or of the certainty that opera-tions agreed to at Casablanca could not becarried out if even a fraction of the UnitedNations shipping resources was diverted toother purposes. As they understood thatthe Prime Minister would be taking thewhole matter up with Mr. Roosevelt, theysuggested that, in the meantime, the U.S.Chiefs of Staff consider steps to obtainFrench shipping then lying idle in Mar-tinique and other French West Indies ports.This shipping comprised several small ves-sels whose commander, Rear Adm. GeorgesRobert, had refused to rally to the Allies.26

In the opinion of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff,there was no question of diverting shippingfor the rearmament of forces not required toimplement agreed strategy. Their pro-posed directive in fact placed the responsi-bility for the allocation of shipping squarelyon the Allied Commander in Chief in NorthAfrica, and specifically stated that the al-location of munitions to the French wascontingent on the shipping that could bemade available without jeopardizing othercommitments. They considered furtherthat the British argument over the shippingquestion was inconsistent. In papers sub-mitted by them concerning projects of theirown in which shipping was involved, theBritish had made no mention of the criti-cal shipping situation.27 As for their pro-posal regarding French shipping then lyingidle in Martinique, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

24 Min, CCS 74th Mtg, 5 Mar 43.25 CCS 181/4, 6 Mar 43.

26 Memo, Representatives of COS for CCS, 11Mar 43, CCS 181/5.

27 The projects were: AFLOC, a trans-Africa sup-ply route for the supply of vehicles and equipmentto the Middle East and east Africa; and FREETOWN,the development of the port of Freetown.


discussed it in curious language as "a goodbut worthless suggestion." The use of suchshipping, they added, would not affect ma-terially the issuance of a directive to theMAB.28

At the next meeting of the CCS, held on12 March, negotiations came to a completedeadlock. The committee first discusseda report (CCS 142/1) from the CombinedStaff Planners (CPS) concerning the allo-cation of aircraft to the French under theANFA Plan. The report showed that theStaff Planners had been unable to agree onthe matter. The American members hadrecommended an initial allocation of air-craft for one light bomber group and onefighter group, and of fifty light transports.While agreeing to the principle of an initialallocation, the British members were un-willing to have specific numbers set at thistime. Commenting on the U.S. proposal,Air Vice Marshal W. F. MacNeece Fosterasserted that the British Chiefs of Staff weregravely concerned at the prospect thatFrench rearmament might prejudice the re-quirements for future operations. Heurged the CCS to ascertain, before reachingany decision on the matter, whether or notGeneral Eisenhower and his Air deputy inthe theater, Air Chief Marshal Sir ArthurTedder, considered that any particular al-location of aircraft to the North African AirForces was "in the best interests of opera-tions in Tunisia." The CCS then took upthe question of equipment for the NorthAfrican Ground Forces. The British Chiefsof Staff, asserted General Macready, didnot object in principle to a rearmamentspread over a period when it could beachieved without prejudicing other opera-tions. Their feeling was that, with thevery serious shipping situation then existing,

operations such as HUSKY and ANAKIMwould suffer if equipment was shipped tothe French in large quantities at this time.29

In view of the imminence of these opera-tions, "it might be right," he added, "to goso far as to stop the ships now earmarked forFrench equipment and to divert them toother uses." General Macready reiteratedthat the theater commander was not in aposition to weigh shipping priorities as be-tween his own and other theaters. Hepointed out that General Eisenhower him-self might hesitate to recommend the ship-ment of matériel to the French if he thoughtthat it might result in prejudicing Opera-tion HUSKY. Thereupon General Somer-vell emphasized that there was no questionof HUSKY being prejudiced. AdmiralLeahy then flatly declared that there couldbe no stoppage of the presently plannedshipments. Realizing that they were notlikely to get out of the impasse, the CCSfinally agreed to suspend further actionpending the result of the exchange of viewsthen taking place between the Prime Min-ister and the President. They "took note,"however, that the initial ground and airequipment set up with General Eisen-hower's concurrence would be sent to NorthAfrica.30

From available evidence, it appears thatthe high-level exchange of views referred toby the CCS was not concerned with the is-sue at stake and as a result was not likely toproduce the expected clarification. In amessage to the President, Churchill hadbroached not the question of French re-armament, which he regarded as merelyone of the conflicting demands on shipping,but the broader problem of global shipping

28 CCS 75th Mtg, Notes for the Mtg, 12 Mar 43.

29 Operation HUSKY: an assault on Sicily; Opera-tion A N A K I M : see note 16, above.

30 Min and Suppl Min, CCS 75th Mtg, 12Mar 43. Rpt, CPS to CCS, 142/1, 10 Mar 43.


requirements. That was the problemwhich Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden dis-cussed with American officials in the courseof his subsequent visit to Washington,13-19 March.31

It will be recalled that, on 23 January,General Marshall had urged the JCS to setforth a policy with respect to the con-templated employment of the North Afri-can forces and the scale of equipment to beprovided. At the request of the JCS, theU.S. Joint Staff Planners (JPS) had under-taken a study of the problem. Theirrecommendations, submitted on 20 Marchand subsequently endorsed by the JointChiefs, constituted in effect the basic decla-ration of U.S. policy on French rearma-ment.

In full recognition of the important partthat French air and ground forces will playnot only in the forthcoming operations in theMediterranean region but also shoulder toshoulder with American and British troops inthe ultimate liberation of continental France,the CCS accept herewith the obligation toequip with modern equipment and to main-tain a French Army of approximately 250,000officers and men, in accordance with the fol-lowing which will be considered an integralpart of the agreement:

a) Munitions of war will be assigned forFrench land and air forces from the commonpool to the extent that these forces can beorganized as units around a nucleus oftrained officers and noncommissioned officersin accordance with priorities to be establishedby the CinC, Allied Forces in North Africa,and to the extent that shipping and equip-ment can be made available without jeopar-dizing other commitments.

b) Equipment allotted to the French bythe MAB will not, without prior referenceto the CCS, exceed that necessary to equipthe units listed below:

11 divisionsair force of 450 planesappropriate supporting and auxiliary

troopsc) Equipment for French Forces, either

already sent to North Africa or now on theway, shall be considered part of, and not inaddition to, the equipment referred to inparagraphs (a) and (b) above.

d) The US and UK shall share equitablyin equipping the French African Air Force,the ultimate strength of which shall be re-garded as approximately 450 aircraft.

e) French forces will be employed to themaximum practicable extent (1) in the forth-coming battle in Tunisia, (2) for garrisonduty in North Africa after the Axis is ejectedtherefrom, and (3) in such other operationsas the Theater Commander may desire.

f) This agreement applies only to Frenchforces in North Africa, and nothing hereinshall be construed as binding the US and theUK to equip the French continental Army,either upon the liberation of France or aftertotal victory over the Axis is won.

g) Although the need therefor cannotnow be foreseen, in view of the speed withwhich the strategic situation in a global warcan change, the US and the UK must re-luctantly, but necessarily, reserve the right tomodify the specific provisions of this agree-ment, should future circumstances so de-mand.32

This declaration, laid before the CCS, re-flected the official American view that theUnited States and the United Kingdomwere fully committed to a program specifi-cally established as to scope if not as totime schedule. In line with this view, Maj.Gen. Thomas T. Handy, chief of OPD, on15 March informed Army Service Forcesthat "it [had] been decided" to furnish suffi-cient matériel from the common pool of

31 Memo, E. I. C. Jacob (LMAB) for Brig GenWilliam F. Tompkins (MAB), 10 Apr 43, CCS400.17 (7-6-42), Sec 4.

32 Rpt, JPS to JCS, sub: Equip for Fr Forces inNorth Africa, 20 Mar 43, JCS 206/1. A first draftof the report, completed 8 March, was examinedat the 64th Meeting of the JPS on 10 March, and arevised version subsequently sent to JCS on 15March.


munitions manufactured in the UnitedStates to equip eleven French divisions.He then requested ASF to study the impactwhich the provision of such matériel waslikely to have on the equipping of Americanforces, and to examine in particular to whatextent it would be necessary to defer theactivation of U.S. units during 1943. ASFreplied that there was no serious conflict andthat the activation of U.S. units could pro-ceed as scheduled. The 1943 Army SupplyProgram as then established was adequateto take care of existing units and those pres-ently planned for activation. With a con-templated cushion of matériel for some six-teen divisions, French rearmament couldeasily be carried out without dislocating the100-division program scheduled for the U.S.Army in 1943. At General Somervell's di-rection, ASF promptly incorporated theFrench requirements in Section V-A andV-B of the Army Supply Program.33

The inability of the CCS to arrive at adecision could not but produce a climateof uncertainty, even apprehension, in thetheater. As pointed out by Colonel Gardi-ner, chairman of the Joint RearmamentCommittee, the absence of a directive set-ting forth the aims of French rearmament"left room for discussion of the merits ofthe question and opened the way to the ex-pression of diverse views on the subject."The French, he insisted, needed encourage-ment as well as "an example of decisiveaction" and should be given an objective assoon as possible.34

Still the Combined Chiefs seemed in nohurry. They did not even discuss the mat-ter from mid-March until the middle ofMay when they convened for the TRIDENTConference in Washington. Then the situa-tion had changed. The ending of the Tuni-sian campaign had placed the French arma-ment issue in an entirely new light.35 Inaddition, President Roosevelt, earlier inApril, had authorized the redrafting of theANFA Agreement leaving out the contro-versial paragraph which set forth the extentof the program at eleven divisions.36 Asthey met, on 18 May, the CCS were now freeto discuss the matter without having to feelany longer that they were committed to aspecific program.

Even so, the argument at first picked upabout where it had left off in March. Tothe Americans, it still seemed wise to speedup the arming and training of the NorthAfrican forces in view of their potentialvalue for operations in France. AdmiralLeahy pointed out that, while somewhatmore than three divisions had been re-equipped, eight others already activatedwere almost without modern equipment.The French had been promised the equip-ment at Anfa, recalled General Marshall.Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith then ex-plained that AFHQ had been guided by theANFA decisions. Since French units had "ingeneral fought excellently" in Tunisia, hedeclared, General Eisenhower now wantedto use them not only to defend French Mo-rocco, guard lines of communications, andman antiaircraft defenses in North Africa,but possibly to assault Corsica and Sardinia.General Giraud, he added, was especially

33 Memo, Handy for CG SOS, 15 Mar 43, Memo,Maj Gen Lucius Du B. Clay for ACofS, 27 Mar 43,and Memo, Hull for CofS, 10 Apr 43, OPD 400France, Sec 1 ; Control Div ASF, The Determina-tion of Army Supply Requirements, Hist MS File,OCMH.

34 Memos, Gardiner for Brig J. F. M. Whiteley,12 and 30 Apr 43, copies in Col Gardiner's PrivateFile.

35 Hostilities ended on 13 May with the captureof the remaining Axis forces in Tunisia.

36 Memo, Deane for JCS, 22 Apr 43, OPD 400France, Sec 1.


anxious to equip his forces "on an expedi-tionary basis." Unless the Combined Ship-ping and Adjustment Board arranged toprovide additional tonnage, General Gi-raud's requirements of 100,000 tonsmonthly would not be met.

The British reiterated their earlier cau-tions. While agreeing to the importanceof rearming the French, Field Marshal SirAlan Brooke voiced once again the Britishbelief that it was a matter of timing andavailability of shipping. Shipping, he as-serted, should not be diverted to re-equipthe North African units at the expense of abuild-up of Allied forces for important op-erations. He agreed that, in general, the"correct policy" was initially to equip theFrench for the static role of relieving Alliedforces for offensive operations. At a laterstage the French then could be equipped asan expeditionary force.

Both sides having thus again affirmedtheir separate points of view substantiallyunchanged from the earlier debates, theCCS settled suddenly on a compromiseformula: "The rearming and re-equippingof the French Forces in North Africa shouldbe proceeded with as rapidly as the avail-ability of shipping and equipping will allow,but as a secondary commitment to the re-quirements of British and U.S. Forces in thevarious Theaters." They agreed furtherthat the possibility of using captured Ger-man matériel to re-equip the French shouldbe explored.37

The wording represented a considerableif not total surrender to the view of theBritish Chiefs in providing the double safetyvalve for which they had consistentlyargued: that the commitment be not firm as

to the amount of equipment to be deliveredand that it be made contingent on the priorclaims of British and American forces. Itseems likely that the Americans conceded thepoint for two main reasons—a sense firstthat it had become critical to have some kindof decision, and second that agreement inprinciple would permit, even if it did not re-quire, the carrying out of the original ANFAcommitment. The Americans were con-vinced that neither shortage of equipmentnor shortage of shipping would interferewith the arming of the eleven divisions asagreed. They were equally convinced thatthe North African troops had proved theirusefulness and that therefore it would bemilitarily justifiable, if necessary, to armthem at the expense of American units.

In effect the TRIDENT decision simplyreaffirmed the primary responsibility of theUnited States for rearming the French inNorth Africa and gave the U.S. Joint Chiefsof Staff a comparatively free hand in carry-ing out that responsibility. That point wasunderlined in a meeting with the Presidentand the Prime Minister when Air ChiefMarshal Portal, after pointing out that theBritish were supplying the North AfricanAir Forces with aircraft for patrol dutiesoff the West African coast, emphasized thatexcept for this contribution "the entireproject was in the hands of the UnitedStates." 38

While the TRIDENT decision for the timebeing settled the rearmament policy to thesatisfaction of the British and Americans,it left something to be desired from theFrench point of view. The urgency of re-armament had been forcibly brought tothe French by their recent experience in

37 Min, CCS 87th Mtg, 18 May 43, TRIDENTConf.

38 Min, 4th Mtg with President and Prime Min-ister, 21 May 43, TRIDENT Conf.


GENERAL EISENHOWER DELIVERING AN ADDRESS at the ceremony, 8 May1943, in Algiers in celebration of the fall of Tunisia and the arrival of U.S. matériel for theFrench. General Giraud is at the right.

Tunisia. The 40,000 North African troopsthrown into the battle had suffered some9,600 casualties (including 2,300 killed inaction) or 24 percent of the forces en-gaged.39 For these heavy losses, the in-adequacy of equipment had been in largemeasure responsible. To General Giraud,facing the prospect of perhaps again com-mitting troops to such an ordeal, the com-

promise formula of TRIDENT, with its in-definite program of rearmament to be car-ried out only as it could be fitted into morepressing obligations, offered little comfort."The French," one American observer hadwarned, "are deadly serious about the mat-ter." 40 For the moment, however, they hadno choice but to go along with the ad hocsolutions permitted by the CCS decision.

39" Figures on losses are taken from Lt. Col. P.Santini, "Etude statistique sur les pertes au coursde la guerre 1939-1945," Revue du Corps de SantéMilitaire, X, No. 1 (March, 1954).

40 Memo, Gen Tompkins for Maj Gen J. M.Burns, 29 Mar 43, CGS 400 France (11-3-42),Sec 2.


LT. GEN. MARK W. CLARK PRESENTING NEWLY ARRIVED U.S.EQUIPMENT to the French Ground Forces in a ceremony held at Casablanca, 9 May 1943.General Auguste Nogués is at the left.

Implementing Phase I

Ten days before the formula on Frenchrearmament was finally agreed to in Wash-ington, a significant event had taken placein North Africa. On that day, 8 May, animposing ceremony was held in Algiers inthe dual celebration of the fall of Tunisia,just wrested from Axis control, and of theformal handing over to General Giraud ofU.S. matériel recently unloaded in NorthAfrican ports. The speech that Gen-eral Eisenhower made on this occasion in-

cluded a special message from PresidentRoosevelt to the French. "American work-ers," said the message in part, "are proudto deliver the goods and weapons to be usedby French soldiers." 41 In accepting thearmament in the name of the French Army,General Giraud echoed the feelings of prideand gratitude of his countrymen when hedeclared:

Today the pledge that was made at Anfaby the President of the U.S. and the British

41 Memo for Rcd, SGS, 9 May 43, AFHQ 0100/4SACS Politics.


Government has been fulfilled. The convoysare arriving. The news is spreading throughthe country and among the troops and bringsthem comfort and hope. Today's ceremony,simple and great, allows us to express ourgratitude to the workmen of America whohave wrought that precious matériel andbrought such a contribution to the restorationof Liberty in the world.42

Later in the day several North Africancontingents, formerly horse cavalry and nowre-equipped as armored units, paradedthrough the flag-decked streets of the cityand exhibited their newly acquired tanks,tractor-drawn artillery, jeeps, and com-bat cars to the enthusiastic populace. Inthe eyes of the French, the occasion sym-bolized the rebirth of their armed forces.The new French Army, proud of its modernweapons, was "taking its first steps." 43

This and other similar demonstrationswere vivid proof of the American determi-nation to proceed with the re-equipping ofthe French.44 In fact, even before the cam-paign in Tunisia had come to a close, the

first phase of rearmament was well on itsway to completion. No development couldhave been more welcome at this time. For,if a few units were proudly displaying theirnewly acquired U.S. matériel, the remain-ing combat forces were still woefully lackingin equipment. Early in the Tunisian cam-paign, the French High Command hadrushed to the units engaged there nearly allthe matériel of French origin painstakinglyaccumulated before Operation TORCH.This matériel was now considerably reducedthrough damage, wear, and capture. Whatwas left of it might possibly serve to equippart of the forces assigned to guard the linesof communications. Even for this purposeit would be necessary to obtain from othersources a substantial number of additionalsmall arms. As for the British and Ameri-can matériel loaned in the heat of battle,which consisted of miscellaneous quantitiesof Sten guns, British 2-pounder guns,75-mm. guns, Valentine tanks, and approxi-mately 500 assorted vehicles, it was under-stood that the items still serviceable at theend of the campaign were to be returnedwhen the troops left the forward area. Con-sidering in addition that only a small quan-tity of captured enemy matériel was likelyto become available for use by the French,it was clear therefore that the only equip-ment on which the North African forcescould rely for participation in further opera-tions would be that received from U.S.sources.45

Of the 256,000 tons of equipment as-signed by the MAB in February andMarch for the French Ground and AirForces, approximately 193,000 tons (in-cluding the 126,151-ton special convoy)had reached North African ports by the end

42 Rpt, C. Phillips, Import Div North AfricanEconomic Board, to L. L. Short, 14 May 43, AFHQ0100/26 Liaison Sec, Rpts.

43 Georges Marey, "Le Réarmement Français enAfrique du Nord (1942-1944)," Revue Politique etParlementaire (October and November, 1947).

44 A ceremony of similar character was held on9 May at Casablanca, at which General Clark, onbehalf of the Allied Commander in Chief, presentedsome newly arrived U.S. equipment to the com-manding general of the French Ground Forces inMorocco. There followed a parade of motorizedequipment before a large crowd which could notfail to be impressed by this "tangible demonstra-tion of the determination of the United Nationsto put the French Army in the field as an effective,modern fighting organization." Rpt, Liaison SecFifth Army to Liaison Sec AFHQ, 15 May 43,AFHQ Liaison Sec 0100/12C Fr Rpts From FifthArmy. Likewise, in the course of a ceremony heldin liberated Tunis on 10 May, a Spahis regiment,hurriedly re-equipped with U.S. matériel for theoccasion, paraded through the city, a third tangibledemonstration of the rehabilitation now going onin the North African Army.

45 Memo, Artamonoff for Col Clement Blanc, 10Jul 43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan.


of April. The backlog, amounting to about63,000 tons, had been inventoried and wasto be shipped on the next available convoysand at the 25,000-ton monthly rate author-ized by the theater. Some 8,000 tons ofsupplies, including 200 airplanes, groundequipment, vehicles, and matériel for oneparachute regiment, were intended for theair units. The remainder, or 248,000 tons,would serve to equip the ground troops pro-vided for in the initial phase of the ANFAPlan. These, it will be recalled, included3 infantry divisions, 2 armored regiments,4 tank destroyer battalions, 5 reconnais-sance battalions, 14 antiaircraft battalions,

12 truck companies, and 3 ordnance bat-talions. The distribution of equipment toindividual units had already started and insome cases was completed, as the enthusias-tic witnesses to the parade held on 8 Maycould testify.46

46 Msg 4688, Marshall to Eisenhower, 26 Mar 43,JRC Cable Log; Memo, Artamonoff for Gardiner,1 May 43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan. The 256,000tons included the training equipment requested bythe theater on 26 January (Msg 7433), specialitems and organizational equipment requested on2 February (Msg 8496), equipment for the bal-ance of the first phase requested on 18 February(Msg 1628), and air equipment requested on 14and 27 February (Msgs 776 and 3271). (Allmsgs in JRC Cable Log.)

CHAPTER IV

Early Organizational Problems

The process by which American matérielwas being channeled into the hands ofFrench units, from the time it was requisi-tioned by the Joint Rearmament Commit-tee to the time of its actual distribution, wasa complicated one. It involved a numberof important problems the solution of whichrequired much patient labor and close team-work on the part of the staffs and servicesconcerned.

AFHQ Spells Out Rearmament Policies

The mission of the JRC consisted chieflyof determining, in collaboration with theFrench High Command, what units could beactivated from available manpower, whenthey could be activated, what equipmentthey would need first, and how they bestcould be trained. In carrying out this mis-sion, the JRC was guided by directives issuedfrom time to time by the Allied Commanderin Chief. General Eisenhower, on 31 Jan-uary, had set forth the policy to govern thefirst phase of rearmament:

a. The French authorities will submit theirrequisitions periodically to this headquarters.However, the Allied CinC remains the ap-proving authority and may modify the requisi-tions to conform to the availability ofequipment and shipping, and to the terms ofthe general policy.

b. The JRC will maintain an up-to-dateschedule showing:

1) How equipment issued by this Head-quarters has been assigned by the Frenchauthorities.

2) How the French authorities intend toassign future issues of equipment.

He also stated that the initial rearmamentphase was designed to provide forces for thedefense of North and West Africa, as well asa picked force to form part of an Allied over-seas expedition. Generally, the objectiveto be reached was "quality, not quantity."Finally, he defined the policy with regard tothe rehabilitation of the naval and air forcesin the light of their probable employment.1

It will be recalled that General Eisen-hower, on 30 December 1942, had in-structed the U.S. Fifth Army to assist theFrench in equipping and training their units.It was imperative therefore that the FifthArmy should familiarize itself with the re-armament problem. On 26 March, thedeputy theater commander recommendedthat a procedure be arranged with the JRCwhereby Fifth Army would "definitely en-ter the rearmament picture," and "act as abalance-wheel" to ensure that equipmentwas turned over to the French at a rate com-mensurate with proper care and main-tenance.2

Later, on 30 March, the Allied Com-mander in Chief restated Fifth Army'sobligation to assist the French military au-thorities with organizing and training the

1Dir AG 400/322-A-M, AFHQ, 31 Jan 43,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol.II (3).

2 Memo, Maj Gen Everett S. Hughes for GenClark, 26 Mar 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div OpsFr Rearmt, Vol. II (Pt. I).

EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS 63

forces stationed in French Morocco.3 Thenext day General Clark and his chief ofstaff, Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, dis-cussed ways and means to effect proper co-ordination between Fifth Army and AFHQon the rearmament question.4 Five dayslater, representatives from various AFHQstaff sections, including the JRC, met to de-termine the respective responsibilities ofAFHQ, Fifth Army, and other interestedheadquarters. The basis for their discus-sion was a study prepared by G-3 Section,AFHQ, in which, curiously enough, it wasstated that the rearmament policy "hadalready been fixed by the CCS." Nothingcould have been further from the truth, forin that first week of April the CCS debateon French armament was in a state of com-plete deadlock. Except for this erroneousassertion, the memorandum furnished val-uable data on the status of rearmamentoperations and made several important rec-ommendations. It proposed in particularthat AFHQ alone be made responsible forcontact with the French High Command,the drafting of a rearmament program, andthe control of requests for shipping, and thatFifth Army be given the responsibility forthe "mechanical and tactical training" ofthe French.5 On the basis of the decisionsreached at the meeting, the Allied Com-mander in Chief, on 13 April, set forth indetail the policy to govern the entire re-armament process. His directive first de-scribed how the rate of provision of equip-ment was to be regulated; the role of U.S.

base sections in assisting the French withthe immediate reception, storage, assembly,and issue of equipment; the assistance whichthe U.S. land forces in North Africa wereto give in familiarizing French personnelwith the technical details of storing, assem-bly, care, and maintenance of U.S. equip-ment. He then defined the respective re-sponsibilities of AFHQ, the CommandingGeneral, NATOUSA, and the Command-ing General, Fifth Army, in the matter ofFrench rearmament. AFHQ was chargedwith initiating programs and obtaining thenecessary equipment from the United States.The Commanding General, NATOUSA,was responsible for handling equipmentfrom the moment it reached North Africanports to the time of its transfer to the French.The Commanding General, Fifth Army,was charged with assisting in the re-equip-ment and technical training of French Armyunits stationed throughout the U.S. Com-munications Zone.6

Eisenhower issued other directives at vari-ous intervals which set forth the manner inwhich French requisitions were to be proc-essed and transfers of matériel accounted forso that proper charges could be made to theFrench lend-lease account in the UnitedStates. A separate directive was issuedwhich governed the accounting procedurefor transfers of matériel from British sources.Subsequent administrative memorandumsestablished on the basis of directives fromthe War Department regulated the pro-cedure to be followed by the bases at Casa-blanca, Oran, and Algiers for turning U.S.equipment over to the French.7

3 Dir, CinC AFHQ to CG Fifth Army, 30 Mar43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab K.

4 Note, Conf between Clark and Gruenther, 1Apr 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab K.

5 Note for Mtg, G-3 Sec AFHQ, 4 Apr 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt,Vol. II (Pt. I);Min, Mtg, 5 Apr 43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan.

6 Ltr, CinC to CG Fifth Army and Deputy The-ater Comdr NATOUSA, 13 Apr 43, JRC 902/IIRearmt Plan.

7 See pp. 266-70, below.


INSPECTING U.S. EQUIPMENT to be used by the French Army. From left: Col.Clement Blanc, General Henri Giraud, and Brig. Gen. Roger Leyer.

Allied Assistance in Handling Matériel

The arrival in North Africa of matérielfor the French posed physical and technicalproblems of considerable importance.From the outset AFHQ officials feared thatthe French military authorities might not beable, by themselves, to handle, assemble,sort out, distribute, and maintain the vastquantities of highly specialized equipment,much of which was entirely new to them.If units were to be equipped within thebriefest possible time and with the least pos-sible confusion, if, in other words, the opti-mum use was to be made of Americanmatériel, it was indispensable that responsi-ble Allied agencies come to the assistance ofthe French High Command by providingthe skill and means to handle it.

In this initial phase of the rearmamentoperations, the French were particularlylacking in qualified administrative and tech-nical personnel. The roster of the FrenchGeneral Staff and services included manyvery able officers, the foremost in the fieldof rearmament being Brig. Gen. RogerLeyer and Col. Clement Blanc, whose su-perior qualifications as organizers and tech-nicians made of them then and thereafterthe artisans of the rehabilitation of theFrench Army.8 But in the services espe-

8 From December 1942 to May 1943, GeneralLeyer served under General René Prioux, then chiefof Administrative Services, as first assistant for or-ganization. In May, he became chief of staff of theGeneral Staff War, a post which he occupied untilNovember 1944, first as a major general, later as alieutenant general. Colonel Blanc served under


cially, many of the officers, including someof the chiefs themselves, were unqualifiedand inefficient by American standards.Officials of the JRC were distressed over theslowness of action displayed by various head-quarters. They quoted an instance whenequipment delivered to French authoritiesin Algiers did not reach the front line inTunisia until one month later. Even urgentinquiries, they complained, were "delayedfor days notwithstanding repeated follow-ups." The situation had led General Eisen-hower, earlier in the year, to suspect thatGeneral Giraud had "no idea of Adminis-tration." 9 It was clear that little improve-ment could be expected until the FrenchCommander in Chief had corrected the de-fects of his organization. Changes in ad-ministrative personnel and in methods ofwork were urgently required. It should bepointed out, however, that the difficult taskof setting up almost from scratch and onshort notice an entire command and serviceorganization, with limited and often un-trained help, made some fumbling almostinevitable. "II fallait faire vite et avecpresque rien." 10

The shortage of material means was aneven greater obstacle to establishing an ef-fective organization. Office equipmentwas worn out or nonexistent. As late asJune 1943 few typewriters were availableand the JRC was urging the War Depart-

ment to send adequate supplies of them tothe French.11 Most of the indispensablefacilities, such as covered space and depots,transportation, communications, and thelike, had been requisitioned by the Anglo-American forces for their own use.

As General Giraud undertook to set hishouse in order, a task in which he graduallyachieved a substantial measure of success,he found himself in need of friendly advice,"encouragement as well as tactful help andguidance." 12 The American and Britishmembers of the JRC did not fail to respondgenerously and loyally. He needed alsoconsiderable material assistance. Againthe JRC spared no effort to have the neces-sary means placed at his disposal. No bet-ter illustration could be given of this deter-mination on the part of the Allies to facili-tate his task than a brief account of themanner in which the large shipment thatreached North Africa in April was handled.

The magnitude of the organizationalproblem facing the French High Commandupon the arrival of UGS 6½ with its126,151 tons of matériel can easily be ap-preciated. For some days before, Ameri-can, British, and French staff officers soughtways and means to supplement the limitedreception and sorting facilities available tothe French. At a G-3 meeting held atAFHQ on 5 April, a detailed program waslaid out for the reception of the matériel.It was decided that at Casablanca, wherefour of the fifteen ships were to dock, theU.S. base section in charge of the port wouldunload, assemble, and deliver the equip-ment "complete and in running order." AtAlgiers, the British who ran the port andthe base were to unload the eleven ships due

General Leyer first as assistant chief of staff, G-1and G-4, later as deputy chief of staff, a post whichhe occupied until September 1944. He was pro-moted to brigadier general in April 1944. For therole played by Blanc in the rearmament operations,see pp. 280, 285, below.

9 Statement by Eisenhower at CCS 57th Mtg, 15Jan 43, Casablanca Conf; JRC quotation fromMemo, Artamonoff for Delaney, 3 Mar 43, JRCMisc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab I.

10 "We had to work fast and with practicallynothing." Statement by General Giraud in thecourse of an interview, December 1948.

11 Msg W-2573, AFHQ to AGWAR, 12 Jun 43,JRC Cable Log.

12 Memo, Gardiner for Whiteley, 12 Apr 43, copyin Gardiner's Private File. See Chart 1.


VEHICLE ASSEMBLY LINE, Algiers, April 1943.

to dock there and transport the matériel toeight local French depots.13 At one ofthese, the French were to have the use of avehicle assembly line operating under U.S.management. Once they had assembledthe equipment, they would then distribute it.

Setting up and operating the assemblyline at Algiers constituted one of the mostremarkable instances of efficient planningand teamwork. First, AFHQ requested the

War Department to ship if possible on con-voy UGS 6½ the necessary tools and gear toassemble about 200 vehicles daily.14 Later,at a meeting between French and Americanstaff officers, an understanding was reachedregarding the extent and nature of the as-sistance to be furnished by SOS, NATOU-SA, in setting up the assembly line. Itwas agreed that the Mediterranean BaseSection (MBS) at Oran would be respon-sible for organizing and operating the as-sembly facilities until such a time as the

13 French headquarters had strongly urged thatfive vessels only be unloaded at Algiers and the othersix at Oran. However, anticipated port conditionsnecessitated the unloading of all eleven at Algiers.Msg 7575, AFHQ to AGWAR, 19 Mar 43, JRCCable Log.

14 Msg 6400, AFHQ to AGWAR, 13 Mar 43,JRC Cable Log.


REVIEWING AMERICAN TROOPSwho placed the French vehicle assembly linein operation. General Eisenhower and Gen-eral Giraud are riding in the back of thevehicle.

French were qualified to take over.15 On10 April, barely four days before the arrivalof the first ship, the MBS supply officer, Col.Ernest A. Suttles, together with some fortyU.S. officers and men, arrived in Algiersand began organizing the line.16 They hadbrought with them crane equipment, black-smith, welding, machine, and carpentertools, and related items essential for theoperation of assembly plants. Within fivedays, Colonel Suttles and his team had im-provised five such plants: one twin-line

General Motors plant capable of assemblingone 2½-ton truck every three minutes, oneDodge-Chevrolet plant with a capacity of 70vehicles a day, one jeep plant with a capacityof over 200 ¼-ton vehicles daily, onetrailer plant with a capacity of over 150vehicles per day, and one tank and armored-vehicle servicing and testing plant.

The ships arrived on 14 April. Unload-ing began immediately and was completedby 21 April.17 The matériel was unpackedand assembled as fast as boxes could bebrought to shore. A French team of some75 officers and 2,300 men, mostly from theChantiers de Jeunesse, assisted by ColonelSuttles' team, accomplished the work in rec-ord time.18 In spite of language difficultiesand the fact that lack of proper tools andequipment often necessitated improvisation,1,900 vehicles were assembled in the firstweek of operations, and 5,100 more duringthe following two weeks, making a total of7,000 in less than one month.19 French

15 Memo, Artamonoff for CG SOS NATOUSA,1 Apr 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab J.

16 Notes extracted from A Photographic Storyof the Assembly of T. U. P. Motor Vehicles by theNew French Army in the North African Theaterof Operations. Text by Col. E. A. Suttles, Main-tenance Div, MBS, Ord. Copy in OCMH.

17 Unloading proceeded with such efficiency andspeed that the British port commander thanked allpersonnel concerned, American, British, and French,for what had been "a record for the port." JRCWeekly Rpt 5, 24 Apr 43, JRC Rearmt Rpts.

18 From the time of their creation in French NorthAfrica in 1941, the Chantiers de Jeunesse (seeabove, pp. 8, 8n) quickly developed into a well-disciplined body of approximately 3,000 men.Although they were officially organized for peace-time purposes, their leader, Lt. Col. Jean VanHecke, himself a member of the North AfricanResistance, had prepared them secretly for the rolewhich they were to play in conjunction with aneventual Allied operation in that area. They de-serve an honorable mention not only for the val-uable assistance they rendered the Allies at the timeof the landings in November 1942, but for thework which they subsequently performed on impor-tant military and public projects. In late 1943 theywere incorporated in the North African Army as the7th Chasseurs d'Afrique Regiment (a tank de-stroyer unit) under the command of Colonel VanHecke.

19 The highest production rate reached 776 ve-hicles in a single day.


COL. ERNEST A. SUTTLES, MBSSupply Officer, relinquishes control of theassembly plant to Col. Jacques Simon, FrenchArmy, at a ceremony in Algiers.

officials watched this mammoth operationwith keen interest. On one occasion Gen-eral Giraud accompanied by General Eisen-hower visited the assembly line and ex-pressed to the American personnel his deepappreciation of their valuable assistance.

Not all the equipment brought over byUGS 6½ could be assembled at the time.For a number of vehicles, tanks, and anti-aircraft guns, necessary parts were not dueto arrive until later with the shipment ofthe backlog of equipment.20

On 5 May, with the work nearly com-pleted, the U.S. officers and men officiallyturned the whole assembly line over to theirFrench associates who continued to operateit by themselves.

The French Organize an ExpeditionaryCorps

Unless modifications had been orderedand arranged beforehand, the equipmentshipped to French units was identical withthat authorized for corresponding U.S.units under War Department tables of or-ganization and equipment current at thetime. It included everything from uni-forms and medical supplies to rifles, ma-chine guns, and tanks. It included in ad-dition two units of fire, a thirty-day replace-ment allowance of major items and majorassemblies, and a six-month supply of spareparts. Once unloaded, the equipment wasturned over to the French military authori-ties for assembly, warehousing, if necessary,and distribution through the French Sup-ply Services according to priorities fixed bythe French General Staff. AFHQ hadagreed, on 7 April, that the French them-

selves would be responsible for designatingwhich units were to receive American equip-ment. This, it was recognized, was an or-ganizational matter for the French HighCommand alone to settle.21

As they prepared their distribution plan,the French military authorities were urged

20 JRC Rpt 4, 17 Apr 43, and JRC Progress Rpt1, 4 May 43, JRC Rearmt Rpts.

21 Memo for Rcd, JRC, sub: Responsibility forFr Rearmt, 5 Apr 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 DivOps Fr Rearmt; Ltr, Loomis to Brig Gen WillisMcD. Chapin, 12 Jul 44, JRC 400.2/002 StockControl System; Min, CofS Conf, 7 Apr 43,AFHQ AG Sec 337.2. A unit of fire is a specifiednumber of rounds of ammunition for each weapon,varying with each type and caliber of weapon. Amajor assembly is a combination of several majoritems. The 155-mm. howitzer is an example of amajor assembly as it includes three major items:the howitzer, the recoil mechanism, and thecarriage.


by AFHQ not to mix new and old equip-ment within units. This was to prevent, inparticular, an undesirable demand for spareparts and service in efforts to make unserv-iceable matériel serviceable. They werealso reminded that thereafter their head-quarters must cease submitting requests forequipment to Allied depots. All their re-quirements, they were told, must be metfrom their own sources. This was essentialif U.S. reserves in the theater were to bemaintained at their normal level. As theFrench kept on submitting direct requeststo British Ordnance for items of equipment,AFHQ on 15 May reminded all concernedof the established policy and pointed out inaddition that the British had no rearma-ment commitments to the French.22

The matériel issued on loan to units en-gaged in Tunisia was now to be returnedto Allied depots since the French were re-ceiving new equipment from the UnitedStates. The policy was confirmed on 14May in the course of a conference betweenrepresentatives of various AFHQ sections.It was agreed that the equipment in ques-tion would be regained as a result of show-down inspections upon departure of theunits from Tunisian area.23

The French had decided that the troopsengaged in Tunisia should be the first to berearmed. Accordingly, they had, early in

April, pulled out of the Tunisian front forimmediate re-equipping the equivalent ofone infantry division. By the beginning ofMay they had rearmed one infantry division,the 2d Moroccan Infantry (2d DIM), andwere in process of equipping two more, the3d Algerian Infantry (3d DIA) and a divi-sion later to be known as the 4th MoroccanMountain (4th DMM). It was the FrenchCommander in Chief's belief that in generalhis units would reach an efficiency of 100percent in eight to ten weeks from the timethey had received their matériel. At leastsix weeks, he thought, would be required fortechnical training. This estimate appearedreasonable to AFHQ officials although theyconsidered that an additional period of onemonth would be needed to bring armoredunits to a satisfactory state of readiness.24

In this initial rearmament phase, theFrench military authorities organized unitsaccording to tables of organization andequipment substantially similar to those cur-rently in use in corresponding U.S. units.In the case of infantry divisions, however,they requested, for tactical reasons of theirown, that the U.S. table of organizationand equipment be modified to provide onereconnaissance battalion instead of troop,four Quartermaster truck companies in-stead of one, and one 40-mm. antiaircraftbattalion.25 The modifications, which theWar Department approved at the urgingof the JRC, were designed to providestronger initial cover for deployment, facili-tate the quick locating of hostile positionsand flanks, and hasten the deployment of

22 Memo, Brig Gen Lowell W. Rooks for G-4, 15Apr 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt,Vol. II (2) ; Memo, Gardiner for Fr Sec JRC, 14Mar 43, JRC 908 Policy and Plan—Misc; Memo,DCofS AFHQ, 15 Apr 43, AFHQ 0100/4 SACSRcd Sec, Fr Matters; Memo, AFHQ To All Con-cerned, 15 May 43, JRC 908 Policy and Plan—Misc.

23 Memo, Rooks for Fr Liaison Sec AFHQ, 22Apr 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt,Vol. II (2) ; Diary of a Certain Plan, 14 May 43,ASF File Planning Div, 433-a-5.

24 JRC Progress Rpt 1, 4 May 43, JRC MiscRpts; Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 28 Apr 43, andMemo, Rooks for CofS AFHQ, 4 May 43, JRC902/11 Rearmt Plan.

25 Memo, Handy for CG SOS, 15 Mar 43, OPD400 France, Sec 1.


infantry elements. The same modified tablewas adopted for all infantry divisions sub-sequently re-equipped.

The intentions of the French High Com-mand were to group the units then receivingAmerican equipment under Phase I into atask force or expeditionary corps. It willbe recalled that the creation of such a forceto become part of an Allied overseas expe-dition had been formally approved by theAllied Commander in Chief as early as 31January.26 In the opinion of the JRC, theunits currently receiving equipment did notconstitute a coherent force capable of oper-ating overseas independently if required.They did not include Engineer, Signal, andChemical Warfare units, for which equip-ment was still lacking. Unless anotherspecial convoy brought additional matériel,the JRC felt that by 1 July, when the back-log of equipment of the first phase had beenreceived from the United States, GeneralGiraud would have to reshuffle the composi-tion of the task force and, if necessary, re-duce the number of units either by combin-ing them or eliminating some. This wouldmean shifting personnel, reassigning maté-riel already distributed, slightly modifyingdivision tables of organization, and usingsome salvaged French equipment. Only inthat way could the proposed corps becomean efficient task force.27

General Giraud was of course eager torearm more than a limited expeditionarycorps. With a total troop strength estimatedin mid-April at 16,000 officers and 317,000men, he had already activated most of theeleven divisions of the ANFA Plan, although

some in cadre only. To form these divisionsinto a self-supporting and coherent force,General Giraud needed 50,000 traineddrivers as well as large numbers of technicaltroops for Ordnance, Signal, Engineer, andMedical units. That meant a large propor-tion of Frenchmen. On the basis of oneFrenchman for two natives, a ratio con-sidered "reasonable" by General Giraudhimself, no less than 100,000 Frenchmenwould have to be found for the proposedarmy of 300,000 men. It was doubtful thatsuch a number could be raised. There laythe real bottleneck in a larger rearmamentprogram. The JRC considered that, for thepresent at least, General Giraud must con-centrate on activating, equipping, and put-ting into the field a small independent taskforce of the expeditionary-corps size nowenvisaged, for which troops of all types wereavailable in Africa. Later it might be ad-visable to incorporate in American or BritishArmy corps such other infantry units up todivisions as were raised and equipped overand above the initial task force. Thus theFrench would not have to furnish the spe-cialized service troops. The extent to whichthe North African Army could and shouldreasonably be expanded beyond the first ex-peditionary corps soon became the subjectof much lively discussion between AFHQand the French High Command, and lin-gered as a source of considerable friction formonths to come.28

Convoys arriving in May, June, and Julybrought in the backlog of equipment of

26 Dir AG 400/322, AFHQ, 31 Jan 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. II (3) .

27 Memo, Artamonoff for Gardiner, 1 May 43,JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan.

28 Memo, JRC for Joint Intelligence CollectingAgency, AFHQ, 26 Apr 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item5-a, Tab K; Interv with Gen Giraud, Dec 48;Memo, JRC for CofS AFHQ, 25 Apr 43, JRC MiscDoc, Item 5-a, Tab M; Memo, Artamonoff forDelaney, cited n. 9.


Phase I.29 With this matériel the Frenchmilitary authorities completed the equippingof the expeditionary corps as then set up.They had to resort to some juggling to ensurethat all units were properly equipped. Thusthey were forced to dissolve several units notpart of the corps, but to which they hadissued some American equipment on theassumption that more was to come from theUnited States, and to redistribute the ma-tériel so recovered among units on the trooplist, especially the 4th Moroccan MountainDivision. At the same time they issued, withthe approval of the JRC, to several infan-try units already equipped with British orFrench matériel, a small complement ofU.S. equipment, largely infantry weaponsand vehicles, and added these units to thetroop list. These nonprogram units con-sisted of one separate brigade of 8,000 mencreated out of the former Corps Francd'Afrique (organized in early December1942), one group of tabors (the equivalentof one regiment of goumiers), and oneShock Battalion (Bataillon de Choc).These troops were to constitute part of thecorps reserves.30 Finally, the French Gen-eral Staff turned over to the Territorial

forces assigned the task of guarding lines ofcommunication and of maintaining internalsecurity all obsolete equipment available inFrench stocks as well as some equipmentreceived from the United States.

In late April the U.S. Fifth Army had,with the co-operation of the JRC, launcheda training program to instruct the rearmedunits in the technical use and care of theirnew equipment. By June the program car-ried out under the direction of Brig. Gen.Alien F. Kingman was in full swing.31

On 18 June General Giraud informedAFHQ that he was appointing General Juinto command the expeditionary forces des-ignated for participation in forthcomingoperations.32 These operations were thecontemplated assault and conquest of Sicilyand Italy.

Throughout Phase I, as well as in subse-quent phases, the American members of theJRC devoted their efforts, in pursuance ofthe recommendations of the Allied Com-mander in Chief himself, to making theunits being rearmed a picked force. Theirtask was not an easy one for their positionof buffer between the French High Com-mand and AFHQ made their dealings withboth often difficult. To reach the goal of"quality," they had requested and obtainedfrom the War Department the assignmentof matériel for units not specifically men-tioned in the ANFA Agreement but con-sidered necessary in organizing a balancedmodern force. At a meeting held on 14June, the Deputy Theater Commander,

29 Tonnage of military equipment shipped fromthe United States between January and July 1943and turned over to the French as part of Phase I ofthe program:

MeasurementMonth Tons

Total....................................... 256,621January.......................................... 736February ..................................................... 1,842March............................................. a 135,335April............................................. 55,263May......................................... 38,359June............................................. 19,086July (estimated)................................... 6,000

a Includes 126,151 tons in convoy UGS 6½.

Source: Tab D, Memo, International Div ASF for Gen Clay, 7Jul 43. JRC 905.6/1 Corres on Statistics of Rearmt.

30 JRC Rpt 5, 3 Jul 43, JRC Rearmt Rpts. Onthe organization and equipment of nonprogramunits, see pp. 112-13, 158-60, below.

31 See Ch. XIV, below.32 Acknowledging the announcement of this ap-

pointment, General Smith pointed out that "theexcellent relationship" established between GeneralJuin and his U.S. and British associates during theTunisian campaign was a "guarantee of effectivecooperation in the future." Ltr, Smith to Giraud,28 Jun 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops FrCorres.


NATOUSA, Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes,objected to this procedure. He urged thatthe ANFA Agreement be followed to theletter and nothing supplied beyond the ma-tériel required for the units listed in theagreement. Should this procedure not beacceptable to the French, he felt that it wasup to them to obtain an "interpretation ofthe agreement on the same level as the agree-ment itself." 33 In the belief that a clarifi-cation of this important matter was required,the JRC urged AFHQ to set forth a defi-nite policy and to advise the French ac-cordingly. On 31 July General Eisen-hower directed that the ANFA Agreement be"interpreted" as follows:

a. The object of the Agreement was tocreate a French force capable of taking part,in conjunction with the Allies, in the libera-tion of France.

b. Under the terms of the Agreement,Corps and Army Troops and Service organ-izations will be required. The number ofheadquarters and the number of service troopswill depend upon the use to be made of theFrench force which is being rearmed and willbe a matter of negotiation between the properFrench military officials, the JRC, and G-3,AFHQ.

c. Since U.S. T/O's do not exactly fit theFrench organization and since U.S. TBA'scontain many items not suited to FrenchForces, particularly those composed of nativetroops, great care will be exercised in sub-mitting requisitions in order that equipmentnot suitable for the French forces will not berequisitioned from the U.S.34

The policy fully upheld the stand alreadytaken by the JRC and gave the committeethe necessary authority to proceed with therehabilitation of the North African Army insuch a manner as to make of it a truly effec-tive force.

33 Memo, Artamonoff for CofS AFHQ, 28 Jun 43,JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab O.

34 Memo, CinC for Liaison Sec AFHQ, 31 Jul 43,JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan.

CHAPTER V

Phase II of the Program(July-August 1943)

Negotiations

In mid-March 1943, long before the ma-tériel of Phase I had been received from theUnited States, the French military authori-ties had submitted a proposal calling for asecond phase of rearmament to follow im-mediately on the completion of the first.1

AFHQ had taken no action on the proposal,largely because the allocation of shippingremained 25,000 tons monthly. The trans-portation of matériel to complete the firstexpeditionary corps, of spare parts, of re-placement and maintenance items, and ofsupplies generally necessary for the normallife of the French Military Establishment inNorth Africa was expected to take up themonthly allocation for the better part of theyear. Any equipping of units over andabove that of the first corps would thereforerequire additional shipping, possibly specialconvoys similar to UGS 6½- As pointedout by G-3, AFHQ, to the JRC on 30March, no such convoys were contemplatedin the near future "although they could berequested if found necessary." 2

The possibility of using French merchantships to transport military matériel for the

North African forces had already been con-sidered, especially by General Giraud, whofully realized that shipping would determinethe tempo of future armament deliveries.In writing to General Eisenhower on 22February, the French Commander in Chiefhad outlined the measures taken or contem-plated by him to put French merchant ship-ping to the greatest possible use in the com-mon war effort. He had placed all person-nel and cargo ships in the Allied shippingpool, arranged for the rehabilitation of Ves-sels in need of repair, and had slowed downthe movement of effectives from West toNorth Africa so as to release additional ton-nage to the Allied shipping pool.3

The tonnage promised by Giraud wasbeing turned over very slowly to the pool.Most ships first had to be sent to the UnitedKingdom for repairs. Refitting in NorthAfrica was almost impossible since dry docksand repair facilities in the area were beingused by British and American vessels; theFrench themselves could use them only atthe discretion of the U.S. and British au-thorities.4 For some weeks French mer-chant shipping remained available only onpaper.

While General Eisenhower argued that1 Ltr, Prioux to JRC, 12 Mar 43, JRC Misc Doc,Item 5-a, Tab N.

2 Memo, Gardiner for CofS AFHQ, 16 Mar 43,JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab K; Memo, Rooksfor JRC, 30 Mar 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a,Tab M.

3 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 22 Feb 43, JRC902/II Rearmt Plan.

4 Msg 6798, Eisenhower to Somervell, 15 Mar 43,JRC Cable Log.

PHASE II OF THE PROGRAM 75

there should be no relation between Frenchshipping and the delivery of arms to theNorth African forces, both General Mar-shall and the War Department, with an eyeon the global demands on limited cargo ton-nage, took the contrary view. Any increasebeyond the 25,000-ton rate, Somervell toldEisenhower, would have to depend on theFrench shipping effectively made availableto the united pool.5

On 7 April General Béthouart informedGeneral Marshall that French merchantships representing over 246,000 tons hadnow been incorporated in, and were operat-ing as part of, the Allied pool.6 He hoped,therefore, that the War Department wouldmake "appropriate" tonnage available toGeneral Giraud to enable him to plan hisprogram accordingly.7 General Marshallreplied that, although some 163,000 dead-weight tons of French cargo shipping al-lotted to the pool were on the high seas, noneof the ships allocated to the United Stateshad yet made an outbound voyage. Itwould be several months before the shipscould make the initial outward trip as muchrepair work would be necessary once thevessels had reached the United States. Asthis shipping became available, it might bepossible to increase the tonnage allotted for

the transportation of French armament."In this worldwide war," he concluded, "itit necessary to allocate the material resourcesof the Allies in such a manner that they willbe of the greatest benefit to the commoncause regardless of the effect produced onany particular group or nation, and it will benecessary to view the matter in this light atthe appropriate time." 8

It was clear that for the moment at leastthe French High Command and the JRCwould have to continue re-equipping unitswithin the limitations of the 25,000-tonmonthly allocation.

Near the end of April, General Leyer,then chief of organization at French head-quarters, submitted a new proposal toAFHQ for a second phase of rearmament.Simultaneously he broached the question ofa tonnage increase with which to transportthe additional equipment. General Giraud,he explained, intended in the near future tomake an official request for further tonnageallotments to the extent of 100,000 tons permonth for May and June. The object ofthe proposed second phase, as pointed outby General Leyer, was to increase the num-ber of combat units in the expeditionarycorps in order "both to absorb some of theavailable native manpower, and to make ofthe Corps a well-balanced, coherent force."The strength of the corps was to be raisedto five divisions (three infantry, one moun-tain, and one armored), elements of a sec-ond armored division, and other units.9

AFHQ turned down the proposal for anumber of reasons, the most important be-ing that the shipping situation was stillcritical and the additional tonnage could

5 Msg 6798, Eisenhower to Somervell, 15 Mar 43,JRC Cable Log; Msg 2641, Marshall to Eisenhower,20 Feb 43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan; Msg 4050,Somervell to Eisenhower, 17 Mar 43, JRC CableLog.

6 These ships included 9 troopships, 2 tankers,and 19 cargo vessels capable of transoceanic travel.The French were also using 50 cargo vessels forcoastwise service representing 170,000 tons. Even-tually they furnished a total of 420,000 tons ofshipping to the Allied pool. H. H. Dunham, U.S.Army Transportation and the Conquest of NorthAfrica, 1942-43, OCT HB Monograph 9, Jan 45,p. 118, OCT HB.

7 Ltr, Béthouart to Marshall, 7 Apr 43, OPD400 France, Sec 1.

8 Ltr, Marshall to Béthouart, 18 Apr 43, OPD400 France, Sec 1.

9Ltr, Leyer to CofS AFHQ, 25 Apr 43, andMemo, JRC for CofS, 25 Apr 43, JRC Misc Doc,Item 5-a, Tab M.


not be made available. Simultaneously,AFHQ offered a counterproposal with thesuggestion that immediate future shipmentsunder the 25,000-ton allocation be utilizedto equip, in order of priority, the serviceunits necessary for a corps of three infantrydivisions, the mountain division alreadypartly equipped, the balance of a firstarmored division, as well as additional corpsand army troops, especially corps artillery.10

On 15 May General Leyer submitted athird, more modest proposal. Its objectivewas to increase the strength of the expedi-tionary corps, by 31 July, to four divisions,miscellaneous corps troops, and air unitsconsisting of two pursuit and two divebomber groups. After pointing out that thefinal organization and training of this forcedepended on the nature of its future em-ployment, General Leyer suggested thatGenerals Eisenhower and Giraud meetwithout delay to determine the role of thecorps "for the campaign of the summer of1943." 11 AFHQ officials received the sug-gestion with little enthusiasm for they werestill without instructions from the CombinedChiefs of Staff as to the future employmentof the French forces. Pending the resultsof the conference (TRIDENT Conference,11-27 May) then taking place in Wash-ington, Maj. Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley,Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, informedGeneral Leyer that nothing was to be gainedfrom a discussion between the two com-manders in chief at this juncture. He inti-mated, however, that in the event of such ameeting, it would be well for the FrenchHigh Command to begin revising furtherthe composition of the expeditionary corps.

He pointed out in particular that the corpswas completely lacking in heavy antiair-craft units.12

Two days before receiving AFHQ'sanswer, General Leyer had submitted onemore proposal. It called for a second phaseof rearmament designed to achieve thefollowing objectives: ground forces—com-pletion of a first armored division aroundthe two armored regiments already in proc-ess of re-equipment, nucleus of a secondarmored division, one mountain division,headquarters for one infantry, one armored,and one expeditionary corps, corps artillery,and additional service units; air forces—additional units representing 300 planes ofall types; naval forces—18,000 tons ofequipment.13

The program being consonant with thesuggestions offered by AFHQ on 14 May,the JRC immediately approved it withminor exceptions and recommended itsadoption.14 Subsequently, General Leyerurged that the backlog of Phase I then ar-riving in North African ports be followed bythe matériel of the proposed second phase"without any break." It would be regret-table, he pointed out, if, because of the delayin passing the requests on to the War De-partment, the small monthly tonnage al-lotted to the French forces should not beentirely used up.15

On 8 June the JRC informed GeneralLeyer that AFHQ had approved with minormodifications the naval and ground forcerequirements of his proposal. The air part

10 Memo, Whiteley for Leyer, 14 May 43, JRC902/II Rearmt Plan.

11 Memo, Leyer for CofS AFHQ, 15 May 43,JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab M.

12 Memo, Whiteley for Leyer, 22 May 43, JRCMisc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab M.

13 Ltr, Leyer to JRC, 20 May 43, JRC Misc Doc,Item 5-a, Tab L.

14 Memo, Gardiner for CofS AFHQ, 23 May 43,JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab L.

15 Ltr, Leyer to JRC, 29 May 43, JRC 902/IIRearmt Plan.


of the program was being put off pendingcertain major adjustments. General Leyeraccepted the proposed modifications andurged that the necessary requisitions becabled to the War Department withoutdelay to make it possible for deliveries tofollow immediately upon the liquidationof the first phase. As no action had yet beentaken by 11 June, General Leyer pleadedwith the JRC to urge AFHQ not to postponesending the cable any longer.16

Still it was to be nearly four weeks beforethe requisitions were sent. The delay madesense only in the light of the military andstrategic situation in the Mediterraneantheater at the time. Since the close of theTunisian campaign, AFHQ had been en-gaged in feverish preparations for OperationHUSKY, the invasion and conquest ofSicily.17 U.S. troops withdrawn from Tu-nisia had been regrouped in Algeria wherethey were being re-equipped. Ports inTunisia were being cleared and restored.The shipping situation had become morecritical than ever as more troops and sup-plies were being brought to the theater fromthe United States and a large fleet was beingmade ready for the forthcoming operation.In addition, the CCS decision, reached on18 May, to rearm the French had madethe commitment secondary to the equippingof American and British units. It had more-over established no specific program.French rearmament had become "a hand-to-mouth procedure in which the basicdirective was vague and its execution

unmanaged." 18 Not one piece of initialequipment had been assigned since March.The program had reached a state of "defi-nite lethargy." 19

It was not until 4 July that AFHQ finallycabled the necessary requisitions to the WarDepartment with a request that the matérielbe shipped immediately after the liquidationof the first phase and within the 25,000-tonallocation per convoy. Of this allocation,current maintenance needs were expectedto take up 4,000 tons and French Navyneeds 3,000 tons, leaving a balance of 18,000tons monthly for the proposed secondphase.20

The cable reached Washington whileGeneral Giraud himself was en route to theAmerican capital. The French Com-mander in Chief was accepting the invita-tion extended to him by President Roose-velt, at the time of their meeting at Anfa,to come to the United States for a visit."Multiple reasons, not the least of whichwas the stepping-up of French rearma-ment," had prompted him to undertake thevoyage at this juncture.21

Anticipating that General Giraud wouldpress for a substantial increase in tonnageto implement a second phase of rearmament,General Eisenhower warned the War De-partment of the impossibility of handlingadditional tonnage in North African portsunder existing conditions. Limited portcapacity, he explained, was further compli-cated by the present use of berths for loadingtroops and supplies for Operation HUSKYand for the departure of large numbers of

16 Memo, Artamonoff for Leyer, 8 Jun 43, JRCMisc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab L; Memo, Leyer for JRC,8 Jun 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab L; Memo,Leyer for JRC, 11 Jun 43, JRC 902/II RearmtPlan.

17 The assault on Sicily was launched on 10 July1943.

18 Memo, Col Magruder for Director of OpnsASF, 26 Jun 43, ASF Planning Div File A-46-371,Fr Military.

19 ASF Diary, 23 Jun 43, ASF Planning Div Diary.20 Msg W-4078, AFHQ to AGWAR, 4 Jul 43,

JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-e.21 Giraud, Un seul but, la Victoire, p. 189.


service troops for Sicily. As a result, cargoships were being held at Gibraltar until in-side berths became available in North Af-rica. Only when the proposed reductionof shipping to Casablanca was effectedwould an increase in shipments be recom-mended. The French would then be askedto take over port operations in Casablancato receive and handle all equipment in-tended for them. Eisenhower estimatedthat 1 November was the earliest date atwhich such a change would be possible, sub-ject of course to the results of HUSKY andpost-Husky operations.22

General Somervell immediately under-took to determine a shipment schedule con-sonant with General Eisenhower's latestinformation on port capacity in NorthAfrica. On 6 July he informed GeneralMarshall that the equipment requiredunder the proposed second phase could bemade ready for shipment beginning inSeptember at the rate of from 50,000 to100,000 tons monthly. Although GeneralGiraud might feel that this increase was tooconservative, General Somervell consideredthat, in view of the present port conditionsin North Africa, "Eisenhower was correctrather than Giraud." Still, he questionedwhether some of the 70,000 additionaltroops now requested by the Allied Com-mander in Chief for his operations couldnot be French. To equip such Frenchforces, he went on to explain, it would bepossible to increase shipments, within sixtydays, to the 50,000 to 100,000-ton figureprovided North African port facilities weremade available. The necessary shippingitself was "in sight." 23

The Army Service Forces had meanwhilecompleted a thorough study of the Frenchrearmament situation and had drafted adetailed memorandum, dealing in particu-lar with the proposed second phase now onthe CCS agenda.24

Political Complications

General Giraud was coming to Washing-ton primarily to press for a resumption ofarmament deliveries. He was also comingfor stronger political aid. To understandthe full import of his visit and of his rela-tions with the U.S. Army, it is necessary togo back a little to pick up the tangledthreads of internal French politics.

It will be recalled that, since the death ofAdmiral Darlan on 24 December 1942,General Giraud exercised the supreme civiland military authority in French North andWest Africa. In London, meanwhile, Gen-eral de Gaulle continued as president of theFrench National Committee and chief ofthe Free French Forces. Some time beforethe conference at Anfa in January, the twoleaders agreed in principle that a union oftheir respective followers and armed forceswas highly desirable. At the close of theTunisian campaign they decided that thetime was ripe for such action. On 30 MayGeneral de Gaulle and his associates flew toNorth Africa with a view to establishingthere, in agreement with General Giraud, acentral executive body to govern all Frenchareas not under Axis control.

Both men were equally concerned withthe restoration of a free, independentFrance. But they viewed the problem fromwholly different experiences, preconcep-

22 Msg W-4173, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 6 Jul43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-e.

23 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 6 Jul 43,Somervell Files, Fr 1943-44, A-46-257, Ser 1.

24 Memo, International Div ASF for GenClay, 7 Jul 43, JRC 905.6/1 Corres on RearmtStatistics.


tions, and temperaments. Briefly, Generalde Gaulle and his followers believed thatthey alone—who, since June 1940, had keptthe French flag flying high by refusing tolay down their arms—were entitled to leadthe French forces to final victory. In thepolitical field, they envisaged the establish-ment, after the liberation of France, of anew, more progressive government. Gen-eral Giraud and his associates, on the otherhand, considered that the recognition theirleadership had received from the Anglo-American allies in November 1942 con-ferred upon them the right and duty to con-trol the renascent French forces. Politicallymore conservative, they favored, after theliberation of the motherland, a gradual re-turn to political freedom. The divergencebetween the views of the two leaders and theclash between their personalities promisedfrom the beginning not harmony but apolitical struggle to the death.

After three days of what appear to havebeen violent discussions and bitter politicalintrigues, there was established in Algiers,on 3 June, a French Committee of NationalLiberation (Comité Français de la Libe-ration Nationale—CFLN) composed ofmembers of both factions and with the twogenerals as copresidents.

Recognition by the United Nations of theCFLN as a de facto government of Franceor, in the narrow field of rearmament, asrepresenting the agency of final jurisdictionin respect to French armament requirementswas put off owing especially to PresidentRoosevelt's distrust of the political motivesof the Gaullist element in the committee.The British, apparently less reluctant to dealwith the CFLN regarding military matters,proposed to the Munitions AssignmentsBoard on 26 June that the existing proce-dure for assigning munitions to the French

armed forces be revised to include an en-dorsement by the CFLN of all rearmamentrequests. This, they felt, was important forboth political and financial reasons. Theywere prepared, however, to block anyFrench request for membership in the MABon the ground that the French were "cus-tomers for arms and not producers." 25 TheAmerican members of the MAB, on theother hand, considered that, barring a re-versal of the policy regarding recognition ofthe CFLN, the board had no authority toconcur in, or process, the changes in pro-cedure proposed by the British. They feltthat, for the moment, existing CCS direc-tives on the assignment of armament to theFrench should continue to apply.26 No fur-ther action was taken then on the matter.The Allied Commander in Chief kept sub-mitting armament requests for the NorthAfrican forces since they operated in theAmerican sphere. Demands for otherFrench forces throughout the world followedsupply channels of the nation or forces withwhich such troops were operating.

No sooner had the CFLN been establishedthan General Giraud's authority, alreadygreatly curtailed, was further questioned byGeneral de Gaulle and his followers. Theyclaimed that it was not practicable or ad-visable for one individual to hold the twoposts of Commander in Chief and copresi-dent of the CFLN. The changes whichthey proposed to effect in the structure ofFrench administration were such that Gen-eral de Gaulle would in practice assume thecontrol of the armed forces. Apprised oftheir plan, President Roosevelt, on 17 June,directed General Eisenhower not to permit

25 Memo, Wing Comdr T. E. H. Birley, Br JSM,for Maj Gen J. H. Burns, Exec MAB, 26 Jun 43,JRC 472 MAB.

26 Memo, Gen Burns for Maj C. W. Garnett,Br JSM, 9 Aug 43, JRC 472 MAB.


de Gaulle or any other agency not under thecomplete control of the Allied Commanderin Chief to command the French armedforces, and not to tolerate any military orcivil direction that might interfere with mili-tary operations. The Americans, added thePresident, would not continue arming anyFrench force in whose co-operation in Al-lied military operations they did not havecomplete confidence. Consequently, theywould not, at this juncture, allow de Gaulle"personally or through his partisans" to con-trol the French Army in Africa.27 Comply-ing with these instructions, General Eisen-hower, on 18 June, called in the two Frenchleaders for a conference at which he declaredthat General Giraud must remain as FrenchCommander in Chief as this was "no timefor radical changes endangering theRear." 28

Four days later, on 22 June, the CFLNreached a compromise solution which theyembodied in a Decree on the Organizationof the Armed Forces. Under the terms ofthe decree there was established the Per-manent Military Committee of which bothleaders and their respective chiefs of staff,General Juin and Maj. Gen. Edgar deLarminat (the latter representing the FreeFrench) were members. This committee,which had full authority over the entiremilitary establishment, was charged pri-marily with the task of accomplishing thefusion of the two groups of forces. Pendingsuch fusion, each of the two leaders was toretain the command of his respectiveforces.29 The arrangement was of little

comfort to General Giraud, whose views onthe organization of the High Command asdisclosed by him in early June were wellknown. While agreeing to the principlethat the CFLN must control the militaryestablishment, he held to the belief that theCommander in Chief must exercise thecommand of all forces wherever stationedand that one of his responsibilities must beto allot equipment.30

The two-headed organization adopted on22 June was bound to increase rather thandissipate political friction. The month ofJuly in fact witnessed a rapid deteriorationof the situation. While the theater's policywas not to intervene in purely French affairs,the Allied Commander in Chief could notremain indifferent to the potential dangercreated by the numerous desertions of in-dividuals, even units, of one faction to theforces of the other, as well as by the reportedundisciplined behavior of troops currentlyassigned to guard duty.31 Secretary of StateCordell Hull became alarmed over theCFLN's leanings toward the political aspira-tions of General de Gaulle and the lack ofsympathy then shown by the committee

27 Message summarized in William D. Leahy, IWas There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950),p. 168.

28 Msg 3472, Eisenhower to Sherwood, 22 Jun43, AFHQ 0100/21 AG Sec.

29 Decree, CFLN, 22 Jun 43, JRC 320/004 Orgnof Fr Army.

30 JRC, Note on Giraud's Formula on Organiza-tion of Command (circa 1 Jun 43), JRC 320/004Orgn of Fr Army.

31 "Our policy is not to intervene in squabbles be-tween the Free French and the Giraud French."Statement by DCofS in Memo for G-3, 29 Jul 43,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr. When,earlier in the year, mass desertions from Giraudistto Gaullist vessels docked in New York Harborthreatened to cripple the battleship Richelieu andother North African naval units, American officialswere compelled to intervene and put a stop to thepractice on the ground that it endangered thesuccessful conduct of the war. Ltr, Forrestal toSecy Hull, 20 Feb 43, OPD 336.3 France, Sec 1.Seventy-seven incidents involving Free French unitswith the native population in Tripolitania werereported by the British 10 Corps for the six monthsending 31 July. Msg 3D/94156, MIDEAST toTROOPERS, 10 Aug 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3Div Ops Free Fr.


toward the Allies. He even suggested thatit might be desirable for the U.S. Govern-ment to suspend deliveries of war matériel,at least until the situation was clarified.32

No such drastic action was taken, for it wasonly a few weeks since the CCS, on 18 May,had finally reached an agreement on re-arming the French. Furthermore, it washoped that General Giraud's visit in Wash-ington might gain him such material andmoral advantages as to strengthen his ownauthority.33

Not only did the 22 June arrangementfail to establish military unity, but it tendedto complicate the relationship and channelsof communications between the French andAFHQ. An illustration may be found inthe efforts of the Free French headquarters,on 1 July, to establish contact with AFHQwith a view to obtaining equipment and,incidentally, representation on the JRC.G-3, AFHQ, urged that these efforts begiven no encouragement until French politi-cal and military unity had been achieved,and then not until a change of policy hadbeen approved by CCS. General Smithendorsed the recommendation and advisedGeneral de Larminat, chief of staff of theFree French Forces, to contact the appro-priate sections of General Giraud's head-quarters which, he pointed out, had com-plete information on the organization of theU.S. Army. He then closed the door on the

matter of Free French representation in theJRC by explaining to de Larminat that allappointments to the committee had in thepast been made by General Giraud andwould in all probability be made in thefuture by the Permanent Military Com-mittee.34

The issue was soon reopened by the FreeFrench. On 3 July General de Larminatoffered several units from a Free Frenchdivision for rear guard duty in Tunisia inreplacement of American troops about to berelieved, on condition that the division itselfbe re-equipped by AFHQ within the follow-ing two months. Again G-3, AFHQ, rec-ommended that no consideration be givento re-equipping more units except througha unified French High Command. Maj.Gen. Humfrey M. Gale, Chief Administra-tive Officer, AFHQ, went even further. Heproposed that issues of British equipment tothe Free French Forces be discontinued in-asmuch as "it was assumed" that thesewould shortly be absorbed in the NorthAfrican Army. The purpose of his recom-mendation, he explained, was not to removea liability from the British, but to simplifythe supply and maintenance of the Frenchforces.35

In the opinion of Allied officials, there-fore, it was essential that the French achievethe fusion of their forces without delay.Only such a step would put an end to theinconsistent arrangement under which someunits (those controlled by General deGaulle) were equipped and maintained by

32 Leahy, op. cit., p. 169.33 It was during General Giraud's absence from

Algiers that the CFLN, on 9 July, fixed by decreethe powers of the newly created Commissioner ofArmament, Provisioning, and Reconstruction.Decree, CFLN, 9 Jul 43, JRC 320/004 Orgn of FrArmy. Under the terms of the decree, the Com-missioner (Monnet) was charged, inter alia, withthe task of ensuring—with the co-operation of mili-tary authorities—the implementation of rearma-ment programs as laid down by the PermanentMilitary Committee.

34 Ltr, de Larminat to CofS AFHQ, 1 Jul 43,Memo, Rooks for CofS AFHQ, 3 Jul 43, and Ltr,Smith to de Larminat, 4 Jul 43, AFHQ 0100/12CG-3 Div Ops Free Fr.

35 Ltr, de Larminat to Smith, 3 Jul 43, Memo,Rooks for DCofS AFHQ, 4 Jul 43, and Memo, Galefor ACofS G-3, 6 Jul 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3Div Ops Free Fr.


the United Kingdom through the MiddleEast Command, while the others were pro-visioned by the United States throughAFHQ. But as General Giraud sped to-ward the United States, fusion was still inthe planning stage.

Implementing Phase II

The French Commander in Chief reachedWashington on 7 July and began at once aten-day round of important conferenceswith President Roosevelt, Generals Marshalland Somervell, and other officials. On 8July the CCS invited him to present an ac-count of the French military situation.36

After describing briefly the part which hisforces had played in the battle of Tunisiaand the "tremendous moral effect" whichthe first phase of rearmament had had onthem, General Giraud reported that theexpeditionary corps was now ready foraction. The corps, of a strength of from70,000 to 75,000 men, included two in-fantry divisions, one mountain division, andone half of an armored division. He in-tended to add to it approximately 13,000goumiers (Moroccan riflemen), "who hadgiven a good account of themselves inTunisia." General Giraud then outlined hisplans regarding a second corps similar tothe first, this to be available by September.The second corps, he explained, would serveto relieve the first after the initial phase ofoperations had ended. To prepare it, hemust receive by 1 August the equipmentnecessary to complete the first armored divi-sion and to rearm a second, as well as twoadditional infantry divisions and generalreserve and service troops. He needed also

an allotment of uniforms and shoes for100,000 men, because his forces, which heestimated then at 417,000 men, were "prac-tically in rags, a factor naturally detrimentalto morale." 37 Finally he desired some lightescort vessels to be assigned to him for con-voy duty between West and North Africa.He was fully aware, he added, of the supplyand tonnage implications of his proposal.He urged, nevertheless, that the utmost ef-forts be made to ensure that the additionaldivisions and general reserve units would beplaced on a fully active footing by Septem-ber. He felt certain that the CGS appreci-ated the importance of having a Frenchforce "big and powerful enough to seize theopportunity of waging war on French soil."Giraud then spoke of the efficient overhaul-ing and refitting of naval units being effectedin the United States "under conditions ofgreat pressure." He expected that a num-ber of vessels such as the battleship Riche-lieu, the cruiser Montcalm, and several mod-ern destroyers would shortly be ready to taketheir place in battle wherever they were mostneeded. Before concluding, General Gi-raud urged the CCS to place full trust inthe French Army and its command, and tolook upon it as a weapon capable of ren-dering the greatest service to the commoncause, especially when operations shouldextend to the continent of Europe and toFrench soil.

The CCS immediately took up GeneralGiraud's proposals. General Marshall firstpointed out that the U.S. Chiefs of Staffwere "in full harmony" with General Gi-raud's plans and that the details of his re-quirements were being studied by the Com-

36 General Giraud was accompanied by GeneralBéthouart, Vice Adm. Raymond Fenard, Lt. Col.Albert Le Bel, and Maj. Andre Beaufre.

37 This was in addition to a previous request for100,000 sets of summer clothing from General Eis-enhower (Msg 5746, AFHQ to AGWAR, 11 Mar43, JRC Cable Log).


bined Staff Planners. He then disclosedthat War Department officials had decidedto suspend the activation of a number ofU.S. divisions previously planned for theperiod between August and the end of theyear, in order to make certain that the ma-tériel required by the French would beavailable to them. All that needed to bedone, General Marshall declared, was toimplement the requests just submitted byGeneral Giraud. Heretofore, the limitingfactor in rearming the French had been ashortage of tonnage and escort facilities.Now the tonnage situation had improved,although the problem of port capacity inNorth Africa had become rather acute be-cause of forthcoming operations. TheU-boat situation likewise had improved, saidAdmiral King, who added that he was"much in favor" of General Giraud's plan.In his opinion it was clearly an economy ofeffort to arm the French forces already pres-ent in North Africa. The American Navy,he asserted, would continue to do its beston behalf of the French Navy. His viewwas fully supported by General Arnold whoconsidered it "expedient and economical"to equip the French Air Forces already inthe theater. He explained that a recentFrench request for 300 additional planeswas being studied and a proposal for theallocation of this number of aircraft wouldsoon be submitted.38 On the whole, heconcluded, the French squadrons would beequipped with the planes they needed toaccomplish their mission. As the meetingbroke up, General Giraud expressed hisgratitude for the assurances he had beengiven and added that time was the essentialfactor to be considered.39

The next day, General Giraud called onGeneral Somervell to discuss the details ofhis proposal. After their conference, Gen-eral Somervell expressed to General Mar-shall his confidence that the French requestcould be implemented. The major itemsof equipment, he explained, were availablefor immediate shipment except for the nec-essary rifles which would have to be obtainedas before from the United Kingdom. Ship-ping could be provided to the extent of200,000 tons representing approximatelytwenty-eight ships. These ships would beadded to a number of convoys, for the cur-rent heavy drain on escort vessels precludedthe possibility of a special convoy. Thechief stumbling block, Somervell empha-sized, remained the limited North Africanport capacity. It would be well, therefore,if General Giraud were required to obtainEisenhower's consent to the addition of anyshipping before any promises were made inWashington to deliver the matériel before1 November—the date at which GeneralEisenhower expected the situation of portcapacity to ease up. The 100,000 uniforms,on the other hand, could be shipped at oncein July and August as filler cargo. GeneralSomervell then reiterated an opinion he hadexpressed on earlier occasions. Inasmuchas a successful assault on Sicily would bringincreasing demands from General Eisen-hower for additional troops to exploit theinitial gains, "it certainly would seem de-sirable to make use of French troops inNorth Africa rather than to employ troopsfrom America and the additional shippingwhich their use would entail." He sug-gested accordingly that the Allied Com-mander in Chief be asked to review theNorth African port situation with Giraudafter HUSKY had progressed a little further,and to advise the War Department of the

38 The request was contained in General Leyer'smemorandum of 20 May.

39 Min, CCS Spec Mtg, 8 Jul 43.


date when port capacity would becomeadequate.40

The French Commander in Chief thenreported to General Marshall the substanceof his conference with General Somervell.He stressed the importance he attached tothe dispatch of a special convoy to arrive inAfrica the latter part of July, a matterwhich, he declared, he had put before thePresident.41 General Marshall informedhim that twenty-eight ships probably wouldbe found, although not at one time, butwarned him both of the difficulty of findingescort vessels for a separate convoy or forthe enlargement of scheduled convoys, andof the congestion in North African ports.He also pointed out that priorities wouldhave to be determined by the Allied Com-mander in Chief. The War Department,he explained, could not "from this distance"deny General Eisenhower's requests forcertain shipments in favor of some others,and at the same time hold him responsiblefor the success of operations. No final de-cision therefore could be reached untilGiraud had discussed the entire problemwith Eisenhower. Turning to the questionof the employment of French troops, Gen-eral Marshall repeated a statement he hadmade at nearly every CCS meeting at whichthe matter had come up for discussion: itwas the "urgent desire" of the U.S. Chiefsof Staff to have General Eisenhower useFrench troops wherever possible rather thanto import U.S. troops. Thus was high-lighted the often-expressed American thesisthat the rearmament of the North Africanforces constituted one of the most economi-cal ways of providing additional troops for

future operations on the European conti-nent. As he took leave of General Marshall,the French Commander in Chief expressedthe hope that the promise of another largeshipment of supplies and the assurance thathis forces would be employed in futureoperations would have a "tremendouspsychological effect" on the political situa-tion in North Africa.42

The conversations with General Giraudhaving come to an end, War Departmentofficials urged the MAB to take immediateaction on the latest French demands.Simultaneously, General Marshall informedAFHQ of the plans now under considera-tion in Washington for Phase II. ThePresident, he pointed out, was naturallydesirous of backing Giraud's hand as muchas possible and would like to tell him "some-thing encouraging" before his departurefrom the United States. Could the theater,at this time, give any hint as to what mightbe done beyond the pessimistic prospectindicated in Eisenhower's earlier report onNorth African port capacities? 43

This appeal brought instant, hearteningnews from the theater. General Smith ex-plained that plans now in effect at Casa-blanca would free sufficient port capacityto permit the proposed 200,000 tons ofadditional French rearmament to be un-loaded in that port. He recommended,however, that shipments be made afterJuly and at a rate of not more than nineships a convoy. The monthly 25,000-tonallocation could continue to be delivered inOran, Casablanca, and Algiers.44

40 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 10 Jul 43, JRC902/II Rearmt Plan.

41Memo, Giraud for Marshall, 10 Jul 43, JRC902/II Rearmt Plan.

42 Memo, Marshall for Arnold, Somervell, Mc-Narney, Handy, and Brig Gen Raymond G. Moses,12 Jul 43, OCS A-45-534 (France).

43 Msg 2594, Marshall to Smith, 15 Jul 43, JRC902/II Rearmt Plan.

44 Msg W-4989, Smith to Marshall, 16 Jul 43,JRC Cable Log.


General Giraud, then in Canada on afour-day visit before his return to Algiers,was apprised by General Marshall of thegood news and of the details of the finalarrangements just concluded: approxi-mately twenty-seven ships would bring theequipment of Phase II to Casablanca at therate of nine per convoy.45 In addition,clothing and accoutrements for 200,000men would be shipped as filler cargo on theregular July and August convoys. Rifleswould be ordered from the United King-dom. Ammunition would continue to beshipped at the customary monthly rate.Such action, General Marshall noted, repre-sented an "immediate substantial compli-ance" with Giraud's requests. The WarDepartment also proposed, he added, toplace the French forces on the same statusas U. S. troops in regard to issue and main-tenance of uniforms and personal equip-ment entailing usual replacements.46

In the theater, meanwhile, plans were

being made for the reception of the matérielof Phase II. Since heavy demands for U.S.service troops in other areas were forcingthe rapid closing down of all American baseactivities at Casablanca, it soon would benecessary to turn over to the French theentire responsibility for handling matérieland for operating the motor vehicle assem-bly in that port. In anticipation of sucha move, French authorities were urged totake immediate steps, in agreement with At-lantic Base Section, to make sure that theywould become self-sufficient in handlingfuture shipments at Casablanca at the earli-est possible date. They were also advisedthat they, and not SOS, NATOUSA, wouldbe responsible for handling directly fromthe ships the distribution of uniforms, per-sonal equipment, and maintenance itemsdue to arrive as filler cargo on futureconvoys.47

On 31 July AFHQ requested the WarDepartment to delete from the standardtables of allowance certain corps and armyheadquarters items which the French didnot require. Among the items listed wereregimental reference libraries, general-usedictionaries, manual coin-counting ma-chines, American flags, and the like. Thearrival of full complements of Americanflags in earlier shipments had already causedconsiderable surprise among the Frenchservice troops assigned the task of openingboxes containing rearmament. By then theMAC (G) had approved the assignment of200,000 sets of clothing and of the equip-ment requested by the theater on 4 July.Phase II was now a reality. Still, no less

45 While in Canada, General Giraud was offered,under Canada's lend-lease program, some 200 ar-tillery pieces, including 3.7-inch antiaircraft guns,100,000 complete sets of clothing, and 1,000 trucks.The guns were to be used for the defense of theprincipal ports of embarkation, and the truckslargely for the transportation of mobile reserves.General Béthouart having requested the War De-partment's approval of this offer of assistance, theviews of General Eisenhower were sought regardingthe matter. The Allied Commander in Chief re-plied that he saw no objection to the acceptanceof the Canadian offer, provided the effect was toreduce the U.S. assignment under the eleven-divi-sion program, which he considered of "highestpriority." He cautioned, however, against accept-ing the 3.7-inch antiaircraft guns, as he regardedthe introduction of a new caliber undesirable, espe-cially in view of the present shortage of trainedFrench artillery personnel. The French eventuallyreceived the 100,000 sets of clothing. Msg 4246,Somervell to Eisenhower, 5 Aug 43, and MsgW-6985, Eisenhower to Somervell, 10 Aug 43, JRCCable Log.

46Msg, Marshall to Giraud, 16 Jul 43, JRC902/II Rearmt Plan.

47 Memo, CofS NATOUSA for JRC, 17 Jun 43,and Memo, JRC for Leyer, 19 Jul 43, JRC 902/IIRearmt Plan; Msg L-436, SOS NATOUSA to CGNATOUSA, 27 Jul 43, and Msg 5718, CGNATOUSA to CG SOS NATOUSA, 29 Jul 43,JRC Cable Log.


than two months had elapsed between thesubmission of General Leyer's memoran-dum of 20 May and the action finally takenby the MAB.48

When General Giraud landed in Algierson 25 July, after a brief stop in England, hecould be well pleased with the results of histrip to the American continent. Not onlyhad he succeeded in reviving interest in therearmament program, but in addition hehad the promise that within a few daysanother substantial shipment would be onits way to North African ports. There wasa chance that these positive material gainsmight help disperse the dark clouds hover-ing over his political horizon. At any rate,when they became known, these gains actedas a tonic on the morale of French troops.The French, cabled General Eisenhower,were most enthusiastic about the actiontaken in Washington. They regretted onlythat the assignment of additional aircrafthad been deferred until the next calendaryear. As the first ships bringing the equip-ment of Phase II reached Casablanca inlate August, General Giraud seized theoccasion to thank General Marshall for his"comprehensive, warm, and effective sup-port in making known to all in America theneeds of the French Army." 49

Fusion of the Giraud and de Gaulle Forces

Fusion of all French armed forces stillremained the major problem facing boththe French and AFHQ. To expeditefusion, General Eisenhower had, during

General Giraud's visit to the United States,submitted to the CCS three important rec-ommendations. He had proposed thatthereafter all French forces be controlledthrough AFHQ; that, pending a final CCSdecision on the matter, no further issue ofBritish equipment be made to the FreeFrench; and that General Giraud be re-quested to include the Free French Forcesin the target of eleven divisions due to bere-equipped under the ANFA Agreement.The Combined Chiefs, on 30 July, endorsedthe recommendations.50

By this time the French themselves hadcome to the realization that the two-staffarrangement established on 22 June wasimpracticable and must be done away with.On 31 July, after several weeks of tension,the CFLN finally promulgated two decreeswhich brought unity of command and madethe fusion of forces a reality. All armedforces were to be integrated under one singlemilitary administration and placed underthe over-all command of General Giraud.In addition, the existing arrangement underwhich the two copresidents of the CFLNpresided alternately was modified: Giraudwas to preside over debates whenever theydealt with purely military matters; de Gaullewas to be in the chair when political oreconomic matters or general policy wasto be discussed.51 The new organization,incidentally, was consonant with the wishesof the Resistance forces in France. Meetingsecretly in Paris on 27 May, the NationalCouncil of the Resistance had formally rec-

48 Ltr, CinC AFHQ to TAG, 31 Jul 43, JRC 904Modification of Rearmt; Min, MAC (G) 102dMtg, 15 Jul 43; Min, MAC (G) 103d Mtg, 24Jul 43.

49 Msg W-6517, Eisenhower to Marshall forArnold, 4 Aug 43, JRC Cable Log; Ltr, Giraud toMarshall, 27 Aug 43, OPD 400 France, Sec II.

50 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 14 Jul 43, NAF 289;Min, CCS 104th Mtg, 30 Jul 43; Msg 3825, CCSto Eisenhower, 31 Jul 43, FAN 176.

51 See The Kittredge (Capt. T. B., USN) Papers:FRANCE: Political A-2 Aug 43, copy in OCMH;see also, Marey, "Le Réarmement Français enAfrique du Nord (1942-1944)," Revue Politique etParlementaire (October, 1947).


ognized General de Gaulle as the politicalleader, and General Giraud as the Com-mander in Chief, of all elements, both withinand outside of France, aligned against theAxis.52

In the ensuing reorganization of theFrench High Command, officers from bothfactions were appointed to key posts: Chiefof Army Staff, Maj. Gen. Roger Leyer;Assistant Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. PierreKoenig; Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Adm.André Lemonnier; Assistant Chief of Staff,Rear Adm. Philippe Auboyneau; Chief ofAir Staff, Lt. Gen. René Bouscat.53

A final step toward unification was takenin September with the establishment of aCommissariat of National Defense, a sortof inner war cabinet which replaced thePermanent Military Committee and whosefunction was to co-ordinate the activities ofthe three chiefs of staff.

The belated fusion of the armed forcesgave rise at once to a number of crucialproblems. One was the manner in whichthe former Free French Forces were to re-ceive further issues of war matériel.

A few days after his return to Algiers,General Giraud was informed of the CCSdecision regarding the incorporation of theFree French Forces in the eleven-divisionprogram. He then learned "with stupefac-tion" that, not only would the British-equipped Free French units cease to be aBritish responsibility, but they were to returnto British depots without delay all thematériel in their possession, including cloth-

ing, individual equipment, armament,armored vehicles, and other organizationalequipment. In practice the French Com-mander in Chief was acquiring 13,000 addi-tional combatants, that is to say, 3,000 fromthe Leclerc Column, and 10,000 from the1st Free French Division, also known as theKoenig Division, without obtaining a corre-sponding increase in matériel. He pro-tested, but in vain. Faced with the prospectof having to "sacrifice" two of his owndivisions in order to make room for theformer Free French, General Giraud an-nounced his intention to revise the composi-tion of the ANFA Plan as follows: 4 armoreddivisions of the proposed new triangulartype, instead of 3 of the old square type (inthis manner, the Leclerc Column, trainedin tank warfare and now in process of beingraised to the strength of a division [the 2dDFL], would be re-equipped as a fourtharmored division, thus leaving intact the 3already activated), and 7 infantry divisions,with an eighth, the British-equipped 1stDFL, remaining for the present at least aBritish responsibility outside the ANFAPlan.54

G-3, AFHQ, immediately objected thatthe ratio of 7 infantry to 4 armored divisionsas proposed by General Giraud constitutedan unbalanced force. The deputy theatercommander, on the other hand, consideredthat four armored divisions of the new typewould require fewer tanks,55 therefore lesstank maintenance and technical supervisionas well as less shipping.56 Overriding G-3'sobjection, he urged that the proposed ratio

52 MS #B-035, Role joué par les Forces Fran-caises de l'Intérieur pendant l'occupation de laFrance avant et après le débarquement du 6 Juin1944 (Commandant Rogé, Service Historique del'Armée, Section Etudes), OCMH.

53 Memo, Lt Col John C. Knox for Col J. Ter-rence, 2 Aug 43, AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec Rptsto G-3 on Political Situation.

54 Interv with Gen Giraud, Dec 48; Memo, BrigGen Sidney P. Spalding for CofS, AFHQ, 5 Aug43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab Q.

55 980 as against 1,170 in three old-type divisions.56 Memo, Deputy Theater Comdr for CofS

AFHQ, 10 Aug 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a,Tab Q.


be accepted. AFHQ approved Giraud'sproposal and the 2d DFL was incorporatedin the rearmament program as a fourtharmored division. It was then renamed the2d Armored Division (2d DB), and theformer 2d DB, commanded by Brig. Gen.Jacques de Vernejoul, was re-designated the5th DB.

General Giraud's plan regarding the 1stDFL posed a more delicate problem. Asreported by G-3, the further issue of Britishequipment to that division could be madeonly at the expense of British troops com-mitted to battle, since shipping limitationsprecluded for some time to come the ship-ment to the theater of sufficient Britishequipment to take care of the unit.57 It wasconsidered inadvisable, therefore, to main-tain the division any longer with Britishequipment. On 29 August General Smith,after warning General Giraud that the 1stDFL could not begin to receive British issuesuntil after the end of the year (by whichtime its equipment would be reduced asa result of normal deterioration), urgedhim to consider making such adjustmentsin his program as might appear to himexpedient.58

While discouraging, the above statementwas, as later pointed out by G-3, "suffi-ciently indefinite as to lead the French tolive in hopes of finding a solution to theproblem within a month or two." 59 Thesolution which General Giraud adopted wassimply the one he had proposed earlier,namely, to keep the British-equipped 1stDFL, now being raised to the strength of a

full division by the addition of a third bri-gade, as an eighth infantry division.60 Hethen announced that it would be employedin Italy "alongside their old comrades ofthe Eighth Army." To complete its equip-ment, the French Commander in Chiefordered the other British-equipped unitstripped of its matériel before leaving Tu-nisia for Morocco, there to receive its newU.S. equipment. Such action had becomepossible, for the British military authoritieshad just reversed their earlier policy requir-ing the Free French Forces to return theirBritish equipment. They had now come toregard this matériel as unserviceable.61

Soon, however, it became known that thethird brigade being added to the 1st DFLwas a U.S.-equipped unit. AFHQ authori-ties immediately pointed out that the ideaof having any division take part in activeoperations with two different types of equip-ment was "verging on madness." 62 To dis-pel once and for all the uncertainty thencurrent in French circles, the Deputy Chiefof Staff, AFHQ, made it clear to GeneralGiraud that the Eighth Army "no longerregarded the 1st DFL as theirs and wouldnot call it forward." 63 The French Com-mander in Chief had now no other recoursebut to incorporate the division in the re-armament program.

In a letter to General Eisenhower, dated

57 Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS AFHQ, 25 Aug 43,AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters, Vol. I.

58 Ltr, CofS AFHQ to Giraud, 29 Aug 43, signedand mailed 6 Sep 43, AFHQ 0100/4 SACS RcdSec, Fr Matters, Vol. I.

59 Memo, ACofS G-3 for DCofS, 5 Oct 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr.

60 The division, organized from the time of itsactivation on the British model, retained the brigadeorganization throughout the war. All other Frenchdivisions adopted the American organization withonly minor modifications.

61 Memo, CinC for G.O.C. Tunisia District, 9 Sep43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr.

62 Ltr, Whiteley to Gruenther, CofS Fifth Army,17 Oct 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr.

63 Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 6 Oct 43, JRC370/002 Employment of Free Fr Divs; Handwrit-ten comment, Whiteley to G-3, 18 Oct 43, onMemo, Rooks for DCofS, 5 Oct 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr.


26 October, General Giraud proposed asecond revision of the ANFA Plan to includethe 1st DFL, now renamed 1st MotorizedInfantry Division (1st DMI), as an eighthinfantry division.64 The four armored di-visions now on the program being prac-tically equivalent to three of the type orig-inally planned, he considered that thenumber of infantry divisions could be raisedfrom 7 to 8 without increasing the over-allfigure of 11 divisions with regard to ma-tériel. The revision, he concluded, wouldbe "within the spirit of the ANFA Agree-ment." G-3 officials voiced the opinionthat General Giraud's proposal was a stepin the right direction. The addition of oneinfantry division, they pointed out, wouldimprove the ratio between infantry andarmor. The issue with respect to the 1stDMI could not be settled then and there.Suffice it to say that the division ultimatelywas re-equipped with U.S. matériel andincluded among the expeditionary forcesfor operations overseas.65

Results of Phases I and II

By the time the last shipments of Phase IIequipment reached North Africa in lateSeptember, the French had re-equipped orwere in process of re-equipping with Amer-ican matériel an expeditionary force con-sisting of four infantry divisions (the 2dMoroccan Infantry, 3d Algerian Infantry,4th Moroccan Mountain, and 9th ColonialInfantry), two armored divisions (the 1st

DB and 5th DB), as well as headquarters,corps troops, and service units. The taskof arming these units was complicated bythe fact that there had been serious gapsin deliveries of U.S. matériel. No auto-matic rifles had yet been received. Therewere shortages in certain types of trucks,signal and medical equipment, tentage, andother items. Equipment for the four Ord-nance companies requested in July had notbeen assigned by the MAB. As a resultthe French were forced to make substitu-tions for the missing items from existingFrench stocks. Already, in August, theJRC had called attention to these facts andhad pointed out that because of their ex-pansion the expeditionary forces required aconsiderable monthly tonnage of spare ma-jor items, major assemblies, and spare parts.A plan to furnish them with D and C rations(to which the French had nothing corre-sponding), as well as ammunition, wasunder consideration.66

Training, meanwhile, was proceedingsatisfactorily. The task of General King-man's French Training Section was madeeasier by the fact that most of the unitsbeing re-equipped consisted of old andbattle-tried regiments, a large part of whosepersonnel had gone through both the1939-40 and the Tunisian campaigns.67

In fact there were exceptionally few menwho had not had some military training.Hence, the state of preparedness of theexpeditionary forces depended upon theircapability of becoming acquainted with thenew matériel, of learning equipment main-tenance and repair techniques, and oftraining additional drivers for general-purpose vehicles. It was believed that a

64 Throughout the remainder of the war thepersonnel of the division continued, for senti-mental reasons, to refer to their unit as the 1st DFL.

65 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt; Memo, BrigGen William C. Crane, DACofS G-3 for G-3, 1Nov 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr;for final re-equipment of 1st DMI, see pp. 116-117,below.

66 Memo, Artamonoff for Brig Gen Clarence L.Adcock, 2 Aug 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab T.

67 See pp. 230 ff., below.


sufficient number of tank crews with pre-vious experience in French tank units wasavailable for the regiments of the twoarmored divisions. Most combat units ofthe four infantry divisions had alreadyacquired a good knowledge of their newmatériel, and it was reported that theywould shortly be ready for action. Thearmored divisions on the other hand wouldnot be ready for some months yet, largelybecause of delays expected in the receiptof signal and ordnance equipment, tools,service trucks, and spare parts.68

The status of the rearmament of the airunits was less encouraging. The air pro-gram was said to have completely stalled.So far squadrons had been issued only a fewplanes with the result that their morale wasseriously impaired. As for naval units, theyhad received only a small monthly alloca-tion of supplies.69

The effort to rearm the French NorthAfrican forces was, it can be seen, almostexclusively American, and rightly so sincethe original commitment, by agreementwith the British, was an American one. By

way of comparison, it is interesting to notethat the contribution of the British to therearmament of the ground forces was thenestimated at 5 percent in terms of tonnage,and of the air forces at 10 percent in termsof aircraft and related equipment. As forthe naval forces, practically the entire fleetwas being overhauled and re-equipped inthe United States. It was also being sup-plied and maintained chiefly with Americanmatériel in the Mediterranean. The Brit-ish for their part had made temporary re-pairs on vessels harbored in Alexandria, toenable them to reach the United States forcomplete overhauling.70 They had also re-paired a number of small craft not capableof crossing the Atlantic. It was estimatedthat, when the naval program had beencompleted, the United States would havefinanced 95 percent and the British 5 per-cent of the cost.71

68 Memo cited n. 66.69 Ibid.

70 The French fleet harbored at Alexandria sinceJune 1940 had thrown its lot with the NorthAfrican Naval Forces at the end of April 1943.

71 Memo, Spalding for Brig Gen A. R. Wilson,14 Aug 43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan. The figureswere prepared in reply to a question raised by asenatorial committee as to the relative amount ofrearmament furnished by the United States andby the United Kingdom to the French in NorthAfrica.

CHAPTER VI

Phase III of the Program(Mid-August-November 1943)

The 15 August Plan

The practicability of a third rearmamentphase had been examined in Washingtonlong before the ships carrying the equip-ment of the second had docked in Casa-blanca. In late June, while waiting forthe theater to send in the requisitions forPhase II, War Department agencies werealready seeking ways and means to com-plete the eleven-division program in itsentirety. To proceed with intelligent plan-ning, they needed to obtain an accuratepicture of the current status of equipmentfrom all sources in the hands of the Frenchor available to them in the theater. To thisend, Operations Division requested AFHQon 1 July to furnish information on (1) theamount of enemy matériel captured in Tuni-sia likely to become available for French re-armament; (2) the amount of Americanequipment turned over to the French fromAmerican theater stocks over and abovethat shipped from the United States; (3)the number of units still to be completelyor partially equipped and, in the latter case,the list of items already provided; and (4)the amount of matériel required to com-plete the eleven-division program, with anindication of the earliest dates on whichthis equipment could be "profitably re-

ceived and assimilated" by the French.The warning was added, as it had been inconnection with Phase II, that rifles, somesignal equipment, and certain trucks werenot available from stocks in the UnitedStates.1

The desirability of using captured enemyequipment for French rearmament hadlong been considered by AFHQ. Pursuantto a CCS directive on the disposal of suchequipment, the Allied Commander in Chiefhad, on 16 May, given French requirementsfourth priority in the allocation of usableenemy matériel. He had instructed theJRC to handle its issue to the French. Inthe case of captured equipment and trans-port of French origin, he had directed theAllied forces in Tunisia to hand over allsuch items to the French. While enemyequipment, much of which had been leftin woods, mountains, and isolated locations,was being collected, removed, segregated,and classified, advance reports indicatedthat Axis troops had smashed and burnedthe bulk of their matériel "with their usualthoroughness." Just as Eisenhower had an-ticipated, when the count was completed, itwas found that the total serviceable equip-ment from this source was very small in-

1 Msg 1453, AGWAR to Eisenhower, 1 Jul 43,JRC Cable Log.


deed. It would not be sufficient to equipeven one division.2

The situation with regard to U.S. andBritish equipment loaned to North Africantroops during the Tunisian campaign wasnot any brighter. The matériel was nowin such poor condition that AFHQ, revis-ing its earlier decision, ruled that it was nolonger to be returned to U.S. and Britishstocks but was to be turned over to Terri-torial units to supplement the French maté-riel in their possession.3 As far as the re-armament program was concerned, thisequipment simply did not exist.

In order to answer the other questionsraised in the Operations Division query of1 July, the JRC requested the French HighCommand to furnish without delay a com-plete list of the units still to be re-equippedafter Phase II had been completed, to-gether with a computation of the groundand air force equipment required for thepurpose.4

While the French General Staff was pre-paring the necessary lists, General Giraud,then in Washington primarily to obtain thearmament of Phase II, was also pressing fora third phase. General Marshall agreedwith him in regarding as a commitment thetask of completing the eleven-division pro-gram, and so informed General Eisenhower.The U.S. Chief of Staff then dispatched tothe theater Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spaldingfor the purpose of working out with AFHQa progressive plan to bring the entire pro-gram to completion. At the same time, he

requested General Eisenhower to indicateat an early date the rate of shipping andpriority of supplies desired for such a com-mitment.5

All together five divisions, several head-quarters, and a number of supporting com-bat and service units remained to beequipped. The task was substantial. Toenable the Joint Rearmament Committeeto carry it out with greater efficiency, the-ater officials decided that the committeemust undergo some changes. On 7 Augustthey transferred it from the control of Liai-son Section, where it had been since 5 June,to that of NATOUSA. The move was alogical one considering that the commitmentto rearm the French was almost entirelyAmerican. As technical training was in-separable from re-equipping, AFHQ alsodecided to place General Kingman's Train-ing Section, until then under the control ofFifth Army, directly under the supervisionof the JRC. The section became known asFrench Training Section, JRC. Thus allactivities in connection with the re-equip-ping and training of the North Africanforces thereafter were co-ordinated and su-pervised by a single agency, the JRC.6

AFHQ then proceeded to give the com-mittee more prestige and authority by ap-pointing a general officer, General Spald-ing, as its chairman. Similarly impressedby the need for higher-ranking representa-tion, the French military authorities ap-pointed a field-grade officer, Col. JeanRegnault, to head the French Section ofthe committee. This action on their partindicated clearly that they had come toregard the committee and not the Béthouart

2 CCS 200/2/D, 23 Apr 43; Dir, Eisenhower ToAll Concerned, 16 May 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item5-a, Tab T; Quotation from Ltr, Eisenhower toGiraud, 20 Jun 43, AFHQ 0100/12C Div Ops FrRearmt, Vol. II.

3 Msg W-4636, AFHQ to AGWAR, 11 Jul 43,OPD 400 France, Sec II.

4 Memo, JRC for Col Blanc, 10 Jul 43, JRC902/II Rearmt Plan.

sLtr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 17 Jul 43, AFHQ0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters.

6 NATOUSA Staff Memo 74, 7 Aug 43, JRC320/001 Orgn of JRC.

PHASE III OF THE PROGRAM 93

GENERAL ALPHONSE JUIN, actingFrench commander in chief.

mission in Washington as the authoritativeagency in matters of rearmament. A fewweeks later AFHQ established a separateJoint Air Commission (JAC) which itplaced under the control of the Mediter-ranean Air Command. This commission,composed of U.S., British, and Frenchmembers, was made responsible for han-dling strictly air armament matters. Prob-lems concerning equipment common toboth air and ground units remained theresponsibility of the JRC. The closest liai-son was established between the twoagencies for the discussion of questions thatinvolved their joint attention.7

In Washington, meanwhile, the JointWar Plans Committee (JWPC) had con-cluded a study of the rearmament problem.Its final report, dated 26 July, pointed outthat the CCS decision of 18 May to arm theFrench was merely the "reaffirmation of anindefinite commitment" which avoided themost important issues.8 In particular, thedecision had set no target date, and hadgiven no indication whatsoever as to whenthe rearmed forces could or would be usedin combat. The committee felt that forpolitical as well as military reasons, theseissues could no longer be avoided. It wasurgent that the commitment to arm theFrench be carried out and that United Na-tions strategy be "designed so as to permittaking full advantage of the potential com-

bat power of a re-equipped French army inthe Mediterranean." 9

Endorsing the conclusions of the JWPCreport, General Marshall, at the next CCSmeeting on 30 July, urged that French re-armament be continued, especially now thatthe shipping situation had improved. Re-sorting again to the familiar argument thatsuch rearmament would provide over-alleconomy in the exploitation of Allied re-sources, he recommended that a more de-termined effort be made to bring the NorthAfrican forces into action. So far, he ex-plained, nothing further had been done inthis connection than to plan for their em-ployment in an operation against Corsica.10

The conquest of Corsica had, indeed,been assigned to the French and was sched-

7 NATOUSA GO 74, 7 Aug 43, JRC 320/001Orgn of JRC; MAC Hq GO 9, 6 Sep 43, in TheHistory of MAAF: December 1943-1 September1944, Vol. II, AAF Hist Office Archives; see Ch.XVII, below.

8 "The re-arming and re-equipping of the Frenchforces in North Africa should be proceeded withas rapidly as the availability of shipping andequipment will allow, but as a secondary commit-ment to the requirements of British and U.S. forcesin the various theaters." Min, CCS 87th Mtg, 18May 43; see p. 57, above.

9 JPS 231, 26 Jul 43, OPD CS 381 File 2.10 Min, CCS 104th Mtg, 30 Jul 43.


uled to take place at some later date whenthe current operations in Sicily came to asuccessful end.11 But on 21 July, G-3,AFHQ, also had strongly urged that otherNorth African forces, possibly one or twodivisions if available, be employed in theplanned invasion of the Italian mainland.G-3 stressed the advantageous psychologi-cal effect which the use of French troopswas likely to have on the Italians. Threedays later Eisenhower asked General Juin,acting French Commander in Chief in theabsence of Giraud, then in Washington, toconsider the employment on the Italianmainland, with the U.S. Fifth Army, ofFrench units available over and above thosescheduled to take part in the assault onCorsica. On 29 July General Smith re-quested General Juin to indicate how manysuch units could be embarked and when.The further employment of the NorthAfrican expeditionary forces, therefore, wasactually under serious consideration, andenergetic plans were being made to bringthem into action as speedily as possible.12

General Eisenhower's recommendationsfor the completion of the rearmament pro-gram reached Washington on 12 August.They embodied a detailed plan—concurredin by General Giraud himself—drawn onthe basis of an army of four corps (threeinfantry and one armored) consisting ofseven infantry and four armored divisions,the ratio just approved by AFHQ.13 Al-ready a total of four infantry and two

armored divisions, as well as two corpsheadquarters had been equipped. The ob-ject of the plan therefore was to obtain thematériel for the rest of the program. Underthe plan, which became known as the 15August Plan, this matériel was to be shippedin four installments as follows: one infantrydivision, one armored division (minus cer-tain elements already outfitted), and onearmy corps headquarters in September; oneinfantry division in October; one infantrydivision and one army corps headquartersin November; one armored division in De-cember. Each slice was to include thematériel to equip all the necessary support-ing combat and service units. Shipmentswere to be made to Casablanca, now anentirely French base. The total tonnagerequired for initial equipment, plus main-tenance of major items and assemblies, wasestimated at approximately 180,000 tonsfor September, and 150,000 tons monthlythereafter. Air and naval requirements, aswell as rations and ammunition, would notcome within this tonnage but would beshipped under the 25,000-ton monthlyallocation.14

Anticipating early approval by the CCS,the JRC promptly forwarded to the WarDepartment the priority lists of matériel forthe September slice.15 The lists differedsomewhat from those submitted earlier bythe French, especially as to service units.After some discussion with various AFHQsections, the JRC had made some changeswhich the French were now reluctant toaccept. The proposed distribution ofmaintenance units, they objected, no longercorresponded to theirs. Because of a critical

11 Participating in the Sicilian campaign was onebattalion of goumiers (the 4th Moroccan Tabor),the only French ground unit then engaged in battleanywhere. Its equipment was largely of Frenchorigin, with a sprinkling of U.S. matériel.

12 Memo, Rooks for Smith, 21 Jul 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Opns in Italy, Pt. II;Ltrs, Smith to Juin, 24, 29 Jul 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres.

13 See pp. 87-88. above.

14 Msg W-7177, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Aug43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan.

15 Msg 7274, AFHQ to AGWAR, 13 Aug 43,JRC Cable Log.


shortage of technical personnel, they couldnot, they asserted, commit themselves tofollow the proportion as now set up by theJRC for the various maintenance com-panies within the divisions. Perhaps at alater date, if it proved possible to enlargethe flow of selected men from the Continent,the proposed adjustments might becomefeasible.16

The reluctance of the French HighCommand to accept the increase in serviceunits as proposed by the JRC raised animportant issue. Just who would supportthe rearmed divisions in combat? TheFrench themselves, or the Allies? The mat-ter had until then been given little attention.Within a few short weeks, it would becomethe subject of heated debate and a sourceof considerable friction between the FrenchHigh Command and AFHQ.

On 16 August General Somervell an-nounced from Washington that the 15 Au-gust Plan could in general be met. A largepart of the necessary equipment would soonbecome available in the theater as a resultof the expected departure from NorthAfrica of four U.S. divisions. In pursuanceof a CCS decision taken in May, these unitswere shortly to be moved to the UnitedKingdom to provide a core of battle-triedtroops for the cross-Channel operation thenunder consideration. Their organizationalequipment would be transferred and cred-ited to the French program. This wouldresult in a corresponding reduction of theallocation of matériel from the UnitedStates and, by the same token, in a con-siderable reduction of shipping tonnagerequirements. Pending a CCS decision onthe plan, General Somervell requested his

services to compute at once the items re-quired from the United States and makepreliminary arrangements for their ship-ment.17

General Eisenhower's recommendationsregarding the 15 August Plan had reachedWashington just as the Joint Staff Plannerswere completing a report entitled Equip-ping Allies, Liberated Forces, and FriendlyNeutrals. Incorporating his proposal intheir paper, they recommended that sup-plies and equipment necessary to imple-ment the plan be authorized for shipmentduring the period 1 September to 31 De-cember 1943. They urged, however, thatthe over-all program itself be limited to theobligations of the Casablanca Conference,or seven infantry and four armored divisionsas now approved by AFHQ.18

To avoid any delay, the U.S. Joint Chiefsof Staff on 18 August submitted the JPSreport directly to the CCS, then assembledin Quebec for the QUADRANT Conference(11-24 August). The British members ofthe committee having expressed their fear,as they had on similar occasions, that theFrench program might run counter to othercommitments, the CCS, on 23 August,amended the American proposal by addingthe following proviso: "in so far as thisdoes not interfere with operations scheduledprevious to QUADRANT Conference." Theythen requested the War Department to takeappropriate measures to implement the pro-gram. Simultaneously the CCS agreed that"such French forces as may be re-equippedand fit for war" would be used in operationsin the Mediterranean. This decision, in

16 Memo, Col Blanc for Chief Fr Sec JRC, 19Aug 43, and Memo, Theater Comdr for AGWAR,18 Aug 43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan.

17 CCS 242/6, Final Report to the President andPrime Minister, 25 May 43; Memo, Somervell forMarshall, and Msg 2315, Somervell to Styer, 16Aug 43, Somervell Files, Fr 1943-44, A-46-257,Ser 1, Dr 3.

18 CCS 317, 18 Aug 43, QUADRANT Conf.


effect, merely formalized the action alreadytaken in the theater to prepare a Frenchexpeditionary corps for service in Italy withthe U.S. Fifth Army.19

Thus, nearly ten months after the landingsin northwest Africa, the first definite, Anglo-American rearmament commitment, spe-cific as to scope and time, was finally made.Henceforth all interested Allied agencies aswell as the French High Command couldlook to a clear-cut directive for guidancein rearming the North African Forces.

The QUADRANT Conference, it must benoted, had brought forth another importantdecision with respect to the French. On26 August the British, Canadian, and U.S.Governments had agreed to extend limitedrecognition to the French Committee ofNational Liberation as representing allFrenchmen fighting the Axis, pending theestablishment by the liberated people ofFrance of a government of their own choice.The CFLN therefore was recognized notas a government but as the body adminis-tering French Africa and all other terri-tories under its control during the war, andproviding the official channels throughwhich all French contributions to the com-mon war effort should be made under thecollective responsibility of all its members.20

The French in North Africa received theannouncement of this decision with "en-thusiasm and gratification." By 3 Septem-ber twenty-three other members of the

United Nations had taken similar action.21

Recognition of the CFLN did not, for themoment at least, affect the existing rela-tionship between Allied military authoritiesin the theater and the French High Com-mand. AFHQ continued to handle arma-ment matters directly with the responsibleFrench Army, Air, and Navy staffs or,when co-ordination between the latter wasrequired, with General Giraud or the chiefof his personal staff, Brig. Gen. Paul De-vinck. These authorities in turn obtainedfrom the CFLN such sanction as was nec-essary. The procedure had worked wellin the past. As pointed out by the chair-man of the JRC on 25 August, there was noreason to change it whether or not CFLNwas recognized.22

Now that the CCS had approved the15 August Plan, the War Department tooksteps to put it in effect. General Somervellinformed his services on 23 August that theorganizational equipment expected to be leftbehind by the four U.S. divisions when theymoved to the United Kingdom in Novemberwould be diverted to French rearmamentwithin the limits of General Eisenhower'sstated requirements and would be deductedfrom shipments to North Africa. As a re-sult, October, November, and Decembershipments to the French would include indi-vidual equipment only, such as would becarried by the American divisions going toEngland. To determine with accuracy thenature and quantities of items remaining tobe shipped from the United States, GeneralSomervell requested AFHQ to furnish with-out delay a detailed list of all matériel likely

19 Memo, COS for CCS, CCS 317/3, 23 Aug 43,QUADRANT Conf; Min, CCS 115th Mtg, 23 Aug 43,QUADRANT Conf; CPS Rpt, CCS 329/2, Implemen-tation of Assumed Basic Undertaking and SpecificOperations for the Conduct of the War, 1943-44,26 Aug 43, QUADRANT Conf.

20 Memo, Col Knox, Liaison Sec, for G-3, 27Aug 43, AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec, Rpts to G-3on Political Situation; see also Sherwood, Roose-velt and Hopkins, p. 746.

21 Capt. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years WithEisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster,1946), p. 399; Charles de Gaulle, Discours etMessages (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1946), p. 348.

22 Personal Ltr, Spalding to Lt Col Roger Jones,MAB, 25 Aug 43, JRC 472 MAB.


to be left behind by the four Americandivisions.23

Meanwhile, the Munitions AssignmentsBoard had approved the transfer to theCommanding General, NATOUSA, of theweapons and materiel constituting the Sep-tember slice. This would serve to equip afifth infantry division, the units necessaryto complete a third armored division of thethree-battalion type, and various servicetroops.24

The French military authorities had longsince activated the entire eleven divisions ofthe program, not counting the British-equipped 1st Motorized Infantry Divisionwhich they were retaining as a nonprogramunit. It was now reported that, in addi-tion, they were activating four other infan-try divisions, the nucleus of what they hopedwould become a second army.25

On 26 August General Giraud listed forAFHQ the divisions to be fully rearmedunder the 15 August Plan. For each heindicated an approximate date of readiness.The exact date, he pointed out, dependedon the reception of the necessary materiel.He warned that in the case of many servicetroops, such as the maintenance units re-quested by AFHQ, their activation wasbound to encounter great difficulties forlack of trained personnel.26

By this time the first ships carrying theequipment of Phase II were being unloadedat Casablanca. When General Giraudwrote to General Marshall on 27 Augustto express his gratefulness for this new evi-

dence of American intent to rearm hisforces, he urged that the effort be continuedand the ANFA Plan brought to speedy com-pletion. The men of the remaining five di-visions, he explained, were "eagerlyawaiting the materiel which had beenpromised them." He hoped that the entireprogram would be completed by the endof the year and he counted on the U.S.Chief of Staff to make the necessary ar-rangements to this effect. "America willnot regret it," he asserted in conclusion. Inhis reply, General Marshall assured theFrench Commander in Chief that "everypracticable effort" would continue to bemade to complete the program.27

It must be noted in passing that no lessthan six weeks elapsed between Giraud'sletter and Marshall's answer. Recordsshow that at least three drafts were succes-sively prepared by the Operations Divisionfor the Chief of Staff's signature. Thefirst stated that the present goal was to com-plete the eleven-division program "by theend of the year." The second, somewhatshorter, asserted that the program would becompleted "according to schedule." Thefinal draft contained no such assurances.Only an examination of the turbulentFrench political situation during these sixweeks can provide a clue to the delay andthe noncommittal wording of General Mar-shall's answer.

French Political Situation ThreatensProgram

Just as the implementation of Phase IIIwas about to begin, a recurrence of Frenchpolitical strife in North Africa created a

23 Memo, Somervell for Styer, 23 Aug 43, Somer-vell Files, Fr 1943-44, A-46-257, Ser 1, Dr 3;Msg 7783, AGWAR to AFHQ, 16 Sep 43, JRC903 Requests for Units.

24 Min, MAC (G) 108th Mtg, 26 Aug 43.2 5Chart, JRC, Plan for Equipment, 26 Aug 43,

JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan.26 Memo, Giraud for AFHQ Planning Staff, 26

Aug 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.

27 Ltrs, Giraud to Marshall, 27 Aug 43, Marshallto Giraud, 8 Oct 43, OPD 400 France, Sec II.


situation which threatened to put an endto the rearmament program.

Immediately after the limited recogni-tion of the CFLN on 26 August, climaxinga month of truce during which the fusion ofall French armed forces had become areality, General de Gaulle and his followersraised a new issue: the committee's controlover French military affairs. In particularthey questioned once more GeneralGiraud's remaining authority. The FrenchCommander in Chief had seemingly re-signed himself to the fact that he must soonrelinquish his post of copresident of CFLNin view of the failure of the two-headedarrangement. He insisted, however, that,by virtue of his recognition by the Allies inNovember 1942 as the supreme French mili-tary commander, he alone had the author-ity to speak for the French forces. It washis firm belief that the armament furnishedby the United States had been given to himin his personal capacity. General de Gaulleand his supporters, on the other hand, wereequally insistent that the powers then exer-cised by General Giraud, except as theyconfined themselves to the control of ex-peditionary forces, should revert to theresponsible civil authority, namely, theCFLN. In the words of Mr. Murphy, theAmerican political representative in thetheater, the controversy had "reached apoint where it was threatening the prosecu-tion of the war." 28

Apprised of the situation, PresidentRoosevelt was tempted at first to order theimmediate stoppage of all shipments ofequipment and munitions to the French.On second thought he realized it was notnecessary to force a showdown. It would

come anyway and probably soon. He di-rected General Marshall to keep in closetouch with the situation.29

In early October the CFLN reorganizeditself, eliminated the two-head arrangement,and elected General de Gaulle as its solepresident. General Giraud was thus re-moved from the political sphere. Thataccomplished, the CFLN established aNational Defense Committee, placed theCommander in Chief directly under theCommissioner of National Defense, andassigned him command of such forces asit made available to him for military oper-ations. As a member ex officio of the Na-tional Defense Committee, the Commanderin Chief was to share with the president ofthe CFLN and the Commissioner of Na-tional Defense the task of administering andmaintaining the armed forces.30 Althoughthese measures went a long way towardstripping General Giraud of effective con-trol over the French Army, he retained forthe moment the title of Commander inChief. AFHQ officials therefore decidedthat they would continue to deal directlyand only with him regarding rearmamentand other military matters. Yet it was clearthat he no longer could make decisions thatwere final and that agreements reached withhim would be subject to approval or rejec-tion by other French authorities. GeneralMarshall's reluctance, as evidenced in hisletter of 8 October, to make a firm commit-ment on the completion of the programclearly reflected the trend of the situation

28 Msg, Murphy to State Dept, 3 Sep 43, OPD400 France, Sec II.

29 Memo, President for Marshall, 13 Oct 43, OPD400 France, Sec II.

30 Decree on Reorganization of CFLN and DecreeEstablishing a National Defense Committee, textof both documents in Giraud, Un seul but, la Vic-toire, pp. 262-64.


Implementing Phase III

Two problems of matériel faced theFrench military authorities during Phase IIIand, for that matter, long afterward. Thefirst, to which the JRC had briefly referredin its report of 2 August, concerned short-ages of items in the hands of units whosere-equipping was supposed to have beencompleted. The International Division,ASF, had already made a study of it. TheMAB likewise had looked into it afterlearning that the French were requisitioningfor supplies which had been assigned anddelivered to them.31

As explained by General Spalding, chair-man of the JRC, on 25 August, shortagesexisted largely because the French militaryauthorities had distributed among severaldifferent units matériel originally assignedfor some particular organization. They haddone so because of training demands,changes in priority of equipping, transpor-tation difficulties, and various other emer-gencies. It was up to the French to re-shuffle in due time the equipment availableto them and to turn it over to the units forwhich assignments had been made. Whereshortages existed because matériel had notbeen assigned or shipped from the UnitedStates, it was urgent that the missing itemsbe sent to North Africa without delay.32

The JRC attempted with the help of itsFrench Training Section to determine theextent of shortages by conducting show-down inspections of French units. Simi-larly, the International D i v i s i o n in

Washington began making a check of allshortages in shipments made against PhasesI and II. But this check did not take intoconsideration losses at sea as well as losses,breakage, or diversion on and after arrivalin North Africa.33

The second problem facing the Frenchwas lack of spare parts. In mid-Augustthey reported that they were dangerouslyshort of such items, especially parts forcombat vehicles; a large proportion of these,as a result, was reported to be currentlydeadlined. In answer to repeated appealsfrom AFHQ, the War Department ar-ranged to have some 11,000 tons of spareparts assigned as part of the Septemberslice of Phase III.34

On 19 September AFHQ officials in-formed the War Department that to main-tain properly their American equipment theFrench needed considerable numbers ofmajor assemblies for replacement and ex-change purposes. They pointed out thatthe one-month supply included in originalshipments of matériel was inadequate.They requested that automatic monthlyshipments of major assemblies be made forall shipments of organizational equipment,beginning at once and continuing until suchtime as the French themselves would be ina position to make monthly requisitions. 35

By then, Army Service Forces had madeavailable for shipment to North Africa prac-tically all the equipment, including spareparts, requested by the theater as part of

31 Memo, International Div ASF, sub: Summaryof Status of Equip of Fr Rearmt by Units as of1 Aug 43, JRC 475 MAB; Personal Ltr 4, ColJones, MAB, to Gen Spalding, 13 Aug 43, JRC472 MAB.

32 Personal Ltr, Spalding to Jones, MAB, 25Aug 43, JRC 472 MAB.

33 Memo, Spalding for ACofS G-4, 18 Aug 43,JRC 400.0/009 Sup of Combat Units; Ltr 5, ColJones, MAB, to Spalding, 27 Aug 43, JRC 472MAB.

34 Msg W-7322, AFHQ to AGWAR, 14 Aug 43,and Msg W-8081, 23 Aug 43, JRC Cable Log;Msg 7177, Somervell to AFHQ, 7 Sep 43, JRC903 Requests for Units.

35 Msg W-465, AFHQ to AGWAR, 19 Sep 43,JRC Cable Log.


the September slice, with the exception ofcertain ordnance and signal items then un-available in the United States.36 The totalamounted to 143,000 tons. Of these, 120,-000 tons were to be shipped in September,5,000 tons in October, and the remainderafter October. Tools and equipment forbase maintenance shops requested by thetheater would be shipped to the extent of4,000 tons per month under the 25,000-tonmonthly allocation.37

The sudden arrival, at the end of Septem-ber, of the large shipment of maintenanceequipment created a new and unexpectedsituation: the French were reported to beunable to handle the avalanche of spareparts presently reaching Casablanca. Casesof equipment were being unloaded by thethousands. Lacking adequate materialmeans, facilities, and personnel, the FrenchSupply Services simply could not segregate,inventory, and make ready for issue the in-numerable items of equipment reachingthem. Where indeed could they have foundthe 60,000-odd storage bins necessary forthis huge operation? All they could do wasto remove wrappings in great haste and dis-tribute sets of spare parts immediately, oftenright out in the open. "To the great in-dignation of the Americans," the preciousmatériel was sometimes lost or damaged.38

Aware of this serious situation, the chiefOrdnance officer in the theater, Col. David

J. Crawford, recommended on 29 Septem-ber that prompt action be taken to hold upfurther shipments of parts in all cases inwhich a large portion of the first six-monthquota had been received. He also urgedthat the JRC and the French Supply Serv-ices bend all efforts toward the speedy es-tablishment of an organization responsiblefor attending to the needs of the FrenchArmy for spare parts. He urged furtherthat special attention be given to the devel-opment and prosecution of a plan for thesupply of the expeditionary forces due tobe sent to Italy. In this connection heregarded as essential the "immediate mobili-zation" of the supplies necessary for theseforces by segregating and binning the itemsat strategically located depots, and theestablishment of proper procedures of issueand replenishment by requisitions. Finally,he recommended that replenishment ofparts be effected, not by automatic supplylikely to result in wasteful accumulation,but by requisition, and then only after theestablishment of an initial stockage at whatwas considered to be a satisfactory level forthe troops involved. In line with theserecommendations, the JRC requested theWar Department to cancel the second6-month automatic shipment of spare partsbut to continue the initial 6-month ship-ment. The committee then proposed theestablishment of a 45-day reserve and a30-day operating level of Class II and IVsupplies. The French had been instructed,and were already organizing, to requisitioneach month all supplies by item.39

36 M5A1 tanks could be sent to the French onlyat the expense of U.S. troops overseas. Accord-ingly, M3A3 tanks were being substituted, pendingavailability of M5A1, for French rearmament aswell as for some U.S. troops. Msg 5460, Somer-vell to Eisenhower, 20 Aug 43, JRC Cable Log.

37 Msg 7177, Somervell to AFHQ, 7 Sep 43, JRC903 Requests for Units; Msg 6005, Somervell toEisenhower, 26 Aug 43, JRC Cable Log.

38 Marey, "Le Réarmement français en Afriquedu Nord (1942-1944)," Revue Politique et Par-lementaire (October, 1947), p. 57.

39 Memo, Col David J. Crawford for G-4 AFHQ,29 Sep 43, JRC 402 Sup Policy; Msg 1852/3931,JRC to AGWAR, 6 Oct 43, JRC Cable Log. ClassII covers supplies and equipment, such as cloth-ing and weapons, for which allowances are estab-lished by tables of equipment or allowances; ClassIV covers supplies and equipment, such as con-


Before taking action on the matter, theWar Department reviewed for the benefitof AFHQ the status of spare parts and ma-jor assemblies as seen from Washington inthe light of past shipments.40 AFHQ didnot concur in the facts as given by the WarDepartment. As a result a long exchangeof correspondence followed which lastedseveral months and was marked with con-siderable confusion due largely, it seems, tothe different terminology used at both ends.

The ceaseless flow of U.S. equipment intoFrench hands and the readying of units forservice in Italy brought the question oftechnical training to the fore as a preoccu-pation of theater officials. To increase thescope and efficiency of the program offeredby General Kingman's French TrainingSection, General Eisenhower in mid-Augusthad requested the War Department to sendto North Africa 385 additional highly qual-ified U.S. instructors, including 25 officers.The request had been granted and the menwere to be dispatched to North Africa atthe end of September.41

Meanwhile, the first major engagementof French forces in operations outside north-west Africa, one to which General Marshallhad briefly referred in his statement beforethe CCS on 30 July, was taking place.Operation VESUVIUS, the liberation ofCorsica, planned and directed by GeneralGiraud under the over-all supervision ofAFHQ, had begun on 13 September at atime when Corsican patriots were alreadybattling the 10,000-odd German troops en-

trenched on the island. Except for oneU.S. Ranger unit and, during the last weekof operations, elements of an Italian Armycorps, the participating forces—naval, air,and ground—were French. The groundforce, commanded by Lt. Gen. Henry Mar-tin and numbering some 15,000 men, in-cluded units of the 4th Moroccan MountainDivision, a regiment of goumiers (the 2dMoroccan Tabor Group, or 2d GTM), theShock Battalion, plus antiaircraft artillery,engineers, and other supporting troops.The 2d GTM and Shock Battalion, not partof the eleven-division program, wereequipped with a mixture of French, Amer-ican, and other matériel.42 The invadingtroops, unopposed at first, soon met withstiff resistance as the enemy, suddenly de-ciding to evacuate the island (as well asneighboring Sardinia), fought a series ofrear guard actions to protect his movementtoward northeastern ports. Pressing hardon the retreating columns, General Martin,on 30 September, launched a general attackwhich ended on 4 October with the com-plete liberation of the island.43 His forceshad suffered some 500 casualties including100 killed in action.

As the implementation of the first sliceof Phase III was coming to an end, Alliedmilitary authorities turned their attention tothe second, or October, slice. On 7 Octoberthe Munitions Assignments Committee(Ground) approved the assignment of sig-nal and individual equipment (less clothingalready assigned and rifles, carbines, and pis-tols to be obtained from the United King-dom) for a sixth infantry division andtwenty-two supporting units, and of all the

struction and fortifications materials for which al-lowances are not prescribed. The others are: ClassI, rations; Class III, POL (petrol, oil, and lubri-cants) ; Class V, ammunition.

40 Msg 831, AGWAR to AFHQ, 25 Oct 43, JRCCable Log.

4 1Msg W-7177, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Aug43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan; Msg 8547, Marshallto Eisenhower, 24 Sep 43, JRC Cable Log.

42 Nonprogram units are treated in pp. 111-13,158-60, below.

43 J. Joubert, La Liberation de la France (Paris:Payot, 1951) pp. 90-94.

GOUMIERS OF THE 9TH COLONIAL INFANTRY DIVISION boardinglanding craft at Corsica for the invasion of Elba.


matériel required to outfit units which werenot the same as, or comparable to, the U.S.organizations scheduled to move from NorthAfrica to England. The rest of the matérielnecessary to equip fully the division and itssupporting arms and services was to be pro-vided by the theater from the equipment tobe made surplus as a result of the departurefrom North Africa of similar U.S. units.44

Another question came up for discussionduring the same period. It concerned themanner in which French forces were to bemaintained. In answer to a query fromthe JRC, the War Department replied on26 October that NATOUSA was author-ized to maintain garrison-trained units ona zone of interior maintenance basis, andunits ready and designated for combatservice on a combat maintenance basis.The maintenance of all other forces was ofcourse the responsibility of the French HighCommand. Troops certified and desig-nated for combat service in the theater wereauthorized the theater level in all classes ofsupply except Class I (rations).45 The

issue of maintenance items from U.S. thea-ter stocks was to be made in accordancewith existing War Department regulations.These stipulated that, except in case of anemergency, the authority to transfer suppliesand equipment to foreign governments mustbe obtained from the MAB. Lend-leaserequirements of foreign governments couldnot be requisitioned through Army supplychannels but must be submitted throughnormal lend-lease channels.46

Near the end of October War Depart-ment officials began planning for the third,or November, slice of the 15 August Plan.As they prepared to submit the necessaryrequisitions to the MAC (G) , they re-quested the theater to forward pertinentinformation on the amount of equipmentexpected to become available as a result ofthe departure of further U.S. units fromNorth Africa.47 At this point, however, im-portant developments in the theater, longpresent but increasingly troublesome, hadcreated a situation which forced a suspen-sion of the 15 August Plan and led to acomplete re-examination of the program.4 4Min, MAC (G) 114th Mtg, 7 Oct 43; see

also Memo, Col George Olmstead for Chmn MAC(G), 4 Oct 43, JRC 472 MAB, Msg W-1282,AFHQ to AGWAR, 29 Sep 43, JRC 903 Requestsfor Units.

45 Msg 859, Marshall to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 43,

JRC Cable Log.46 WD Cir 220, 20 Sep 43.47 Msg 1165, AGWAR to Eisenhower, 29 Oct 43,

JRC 903 Requests for Units.

CHAPTER VII

The Program Marks Time(November 1943-February 1944)

I

"La Bataille des Services"

Nothing, it will be recalled, had been saidin agreements and CCS directives regardingthe manner in which support of the Frenchforces was to be provided. The ANFAAgreement had been interpreted to meanthe rearmament of eleven divisions plusauxiliary troops, without any clear defini-tion of the number and nature of suchauxiliary troops. In equipping the first ex-peditionary corps, the Joint RearmamentCommittee had endeavored to make of ita coherent force capable of operating inde-pendently. With the much larger groundand air force being outfitted for combat, theproblem of support was assuming vast pro-portions. The 15 August Plan merelyaimed at equipping the three infantry andtwo armored divisions remaining on theANFA program. It made no provision forarmy and corps artillery, antiaircraft, andservice units; nor did it provide for baseunits, depots, service installations, repairshops, hospitals, and the like. How, then,were the rearmed divisions and air squad-rons to be supported in combat? Wherewould the support come from?

Just before General Spalding's assump-tion of office as chairman of the JRC, hispredecessor, Lt. Col. George L. Artamo-noff, warned that the French lacked the

technicians, even semitechnicians, necessaryto organize all the service troops requiredfor a modern eleven-division army. Heproposed, much as he had done severalmonths earlier, that if maximum use wasto be made of the "excellent source of fight-ing manpower" that was the French Armyit should be backed by U.S. Ordnance units.The number of such units would dependupon the number of similar units that theFrench themselves could not activate fromtheir own resources.1

Colonel Artamonoff's proposal had nochance of being translated into action. Thepossibility of placing U.S. service troops insupport of the French had just been ruledout by General Eisenhower himself for thesimple reason that his own American forceswere short of such troops. Already GeneralMarshall had explained to General Giraud,during their July conversations in Wash-ington, the dilemma then facing the WarDepartment in meeting General Eisen-hower's requisitions for service units. Hehad pointed out that the Allied Commanderin Chief had been urged to secure Frenchservice troops as these would be required toround out French army corps organization.

1 Memos, Artamonoff for Delaney, 3 Mar 43,and for Gen Adcock, 2 Aug 43, JRC Misc Doc,Item 5-a, Tabs I, T.

THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 105

General Giraud had made no comment onthat point at the time.2

On 31 July Eisenhower made it clear that,as he interpreted the ANFA Agreement,French service organizations would be re-quired. Their number, he indicated, wasto be decided by negotiation between theproper French military authorities, theJRC, and G-3, AFHQ. In line with thisdecision, the deputy theater commander,General Hughes, promptly informed Gen-eral Spalding that in the build-up of theFrench Army, adequate provision must bemade for complete service organizationsand installations. U.S. base sections, hepointed out, were currently being taxed tothe maximum to provide mobile serviceunits for U.S. fighting forces; the remain-ing service troops still had the responsibilityof receiving shipments from the UnitedStates as well as preparing, transporting,and loading supplies from North Africanports to advance elements of American com-bat forces. It was imperative, then, that theFrench be required to plan for the hugetask of supplying such of their forces aswould take part in overseas operations.3

There could no longer be any doubt thatthe French were under obligation to pro-vide, from their own manpower resources,the units necessary to support adequatelytheir combat forces. Yet, in their eyes,the issue was far from settled. A heateddebate soon arose between the French HighCommand and AFHQ. The bitter con-test was to last to the end of the war.

The feud began in earnest when GeneralLever, on 16 September, informed the JRC

that the proposal to add supporting unitsto the 15 August Plan was unacceptable.French military authorities, he explained,had been led, by "pressing considerationsof a moral, psychological, and political na-ture, more than military," to set a relativelyhigh figure for divisions at the expense ofnondivisional combat and service units.The JRC proposal, he agreed, was a rea-sonable one, but the increase which it ad-vocated simply was out of question. Evenas it stood, the 15 August Plan representeda maximum which could be reached onlywith considerable difficulties. As for modi-fying it by lowering the number of divisionsin order to activate more service units,the French High Command "flatly rejectedthe idea." The present program, concludedGeneral Leyer, should stand until the liber-ation of continental France, either in partor in whole, provided additional manpower.Until then, it was adequate to enable theFrench Army to play the role likely to beassigned to it "within the framework of theAllied armies and with their assistance." 4

The last part of General Leyer's letterwas a clear indication that the French mili-tary authorities still entertained hopes ofreceiving outside assistance in the form ofU.S. or British service units. That they alsoconsidered the August Plan in its originalform as thoroughly adequate was evidencedby the content of a memorandum from theNational Defense Committee dated 18 Sep-tember. Signed by both Generals de Gaulleand Giraud, and addressed to General Mar-shall and to the heads of the American,British, and Russian Governments, the com-munication stressed the committee's inten-tion to carry out "in as complete a manner

2 Memo, Marshall for Somervell, 12 Jul 43,WDCSA 400 France.

3 Memo, CinC for Chief Liaison Sec AFHQ, 31Jul 43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan; Memo, Hughesfor Spalding, 5 Aug 43, JRC 370/003 Employ-ment of Sv Units.

4 Ltr, Leyer to Spalding, 16 Sep 43, JRC 902/IIRearmt Plan.


as possible" the program as initially estab-lished. In support of this intention, thecommittee pointed out that the total num-ber of effectives soon to be available wasestimated at approximately 500,000 men.Significantly, it was silent on the questionof service units.5

Just what "pressing moral, psychologi-cal, and political considerations" motivatedFrench resistance to Allied demands for aself-sustaining French Military Establish-ment, General Leyer's letter had not stated.But the reasons had long been clear toAFHQ. The French wanted above all amaximum of combat forces as a means ofredeeming French honor on the battlefieldand restoring France to its former positionas a great nation. The same desire hadprompted thousands of men, and was in-ducing still more, to escape from the mothercountry, often at considerable personal risk,for service with the overseas forces. Tothem and to most white elements already inNorth Africa, the idea of serving in admin-istrative, labor, maintenance, or other serv-ice units was repugnant. Their reluctanceto pick up the shovel instead of the riflegreatly hampered the organizing of servicetroops. The white manpower reserve wassmall to start with, and the native element,although numerous, in general made poortechnical personnel. Faced with a dearthof men capable of manning highly special-ized units, the French High Command rea-soned thus: the Allies had the know-how,the technical skills, and a vast manpowerreserve; it was up to them, the Americansin particular, to provide the necessary sup-port and thus make it possible for elevengood combat divisions to get into the firingline as speedily as possible. The French

could cite as precedent for their position thefact that the U.S. divisions engaged in com-bat in World War I were backed largelyby French supporting units.6 The proce-dure, adopted then as an expedient to hastenthe entry of American troops in battle, hadworked well. Why couldn't the practice berepeated at least until such time as the lib-eration of France provided additionaltechnical manpower?

There were other reasons for the attitudeof the French High Command regardingsupporting troops. In the judgment ofAllied observers, a judgment corroboratedafter the war by French officers, GeneralGiraud and much of his staff lacked tech-nical knowledge and as a result failed toappreciate the importance of adequate sup-port. Their thinking had not progressedbeyond the prewar concept. They sufferedfrom the same incomprehension that hadbeen one of the causes of the French Army'sdownfall in 1940. The JRC could point tothe fact that whenever the French GeneralStaff submitted requisitions they invariablygave last priority to the equipping of serv-ice units. The same lack of understanding,it must be noted, persisted long after Gen-eral Giraud's disappearance from the mili-tary scene. The French, consequently,never became fully self-sufficient even whenfighting on French soil, and the U.S. Army,in the long run, had no other choice but toprovide a large part of the necessary sup-port.7

The publication in mid-September 1943by the French military authorities of a chartgiving the contemplated dates of completeactivation of the principal service units

5 Ltr and Memo, de Gaulle and Giraud to Mar-shall, 18 Sep 43, CCS 358/3.

6 See pp. 3-5, above.7 Intervs with Col Artamonoff, Dec 49, Col Gar-

diner, Apr 50, Brig Gen Harold F. Loomis, Junand Jul 50, and Lt Gen Jean Valluy, Jun 55.


clearly emphasized their inability, or reluc-tance, to fulfill their obligations in the mat-ter. According to the chart, no more thana nucleus of personnel for any Engineer unitwas to be organized before 1 January 1944.The only Engineer depot company plannedfor the entire French Army was not to be ac-tivated until December and then in cadreonly. Except for the three Ordnance depotcompanies about to be equipped from U.S.matériel already at hand, no other Ordnanceunits were planned for the remainingmonths of 1943. General Kingman fearedthat, as a result, the entire load of heaviermaintenance and repair for all units of theFrench Army—except the expeditionarycorps—would be thrown on U.S. Ordnancetroops. The same held true of transport,gasoline supply, and base depot services,for which few or no units were contemplatedin the near future.8

AFHQ officials decided to appeal directlyto General Giraud. On 9 October GeneralWhiteley, deputy chief of staff, pointed outto the French Commander in Chief that,while the strength and balance of the ex-peditionary forces in terms of combat unitsappeared satisfactory, deficiencies in com-munications and service troops would con-stitute a grave weakness in a period of of-fensive operations. Certain adjustmentsand additions, he asserted, were necessaryto provide a more balanced force and ulti-mately increase its effectiveness. Repeatingthe warning that resources presently avail-able to the American forces precluded thepossibility of filling existing gaps with U.S.units, General Whiteley urged GeneralGiraud to make every effort to provide therequired units from French manpower.9

General Giraud did not reply for morethan two weeks. Meanwhile AFHQ putforward a number of solutions. GeneralSmith, then in Washington, recommendedscaling down the rearmament program toperhaps eight divisions.10 Brig. Gen. Har-old F. Loomis, who on 10 October took overthe chairmanship of the JRC in replace-ment of General Spalding, called to otherduties, proposed holding up deliveries ofequipment for combat troops until theFrench activated the required number ofservice units. He believed that, despite ad-mitted difficulties, the service units could beformed without delay. If trained man-power was not available, then Frenchpersonnel could be attached to U.S. or-ganizations for instruction. Plans hadalready been discussed between the JRC,NATOUSA Services of Supply, and theFrench High Command for training a num-ber of French service units by giving themtemporary employment with U.S. bases.11

General Loomis was convinced that thetime had come to force the French militaryauthorities to adopt "a sound program, notjust a program." NATOUSA, however,considered that to hold up further deliveries,as he recommended, was premature and, atany rate, should be delayed until GeneralGiraud had replied to General Whiteley'sletter of 9 October.12

When General Giraud's letter came, on26 October, it contained nothing at all onthe subject of service troops. Instead it sug-gested an expansion of the whole program

8 Memo, Kingman for Spalding, 23 Sep 43, JRC370/003 Employment of Sv Units.

9 Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 9 Oct 43, JRC 370/003Employment of Sv Units.

10 Memo, Handy for CofS, 18 Oct 43, OPD 400France, Sec II.

11 Memos, Loomis for CofS AFHQ, 23 Oct 43,and Maj Gen Thomas B. Larkin for CGNATOUSA, 12 Sep 43, and Ltr, Lever to Loomis,19 Oct 43, JRC 370/003 Employment of Sv Units.

12 Interv with Loomis, Jun and Jul 50; Memo.Brig Gen E. L. Ford for Loomis, 26 Oct 43, JRC370/003 Employment of Sv Units.


from eleven to twelve divisions in order toincorporate the 1st Motorized InfantryDivision in the North African forces. Gen-eral Eisenhower's reaction was immediateand blunt. In a strongly worded letter, hefirst sought to shatter General Giraud's il-lusions that U.S. service units might be usedin support of French combat troops. Heruled out such an arrangement as being"obviously unacceptable." He explainedfurther that he would not commit Frenchforces "even in Metropolitan France" un-less they could operate as self-sustainingunits—if necessary at the expense of someof the combat units presently set up on theeleven-division program. Immediate ad-justments, he warned, must be made to theextent necessary to ensure that each corps,as it was prepared for active operations,would have its full complement of corpsand army service elements on a scale com-parable to that recommended for the firstexpeditionary corps.13

Echoes of the feud over service unitshad by this time reached War Departmentofficials and convinced them that the 15August Plan was inadequate. Before ini-tiating any further assignments to theFrench, they sought General Eisenhower'sopinion. The Allied Commander in Chiefreplied that a re-examination of the re-armament program was under way, whichhad in view the establishment of a balancedarmy "in increments of self-sustaining armycorps." Pending the result of this study,the War Department decided to hold upassignments on the third, or November,slice of the 15 August Plan.14

General Eisenhower's reply was the firstintimation that AFHQ had reached a de-cision regarding the future tactical employ-ment of the North African forces. G-3on 3 November confirmed that FrenchArmy corps were to be used in incrementsas self-sustaining units operating with theAllied forces as soon as these corps wereprepared to participate in operations. Thedecision was important in many respects.It would in particular govern all further re-armament operations. According to G-3'sinstructions, the French program wasto be revised with a view to providing (1)in the immediate future: increments ofself-sustaining army corps; (2) ultimately:"a balanced army capable of independentand sustained operations and composed ofthese successive army corps increments pluswhatever additional units were neces-sary." 15 With this twofold objective inmind, the JRC and other interested AFHQstaff sections undertook, once again, to de-termine the number and types of units tobe added to the program.

Simultaneously, General Loomis decidedto have a frank talk with the French andinform them of the plans under considera-tion. Meeting with General Leyer andColonel Regnault on 7 November, he out-lined the reasons for the sudden "sharpchange" in the attitude of the U.S. authori-ties. With the program well under way, aclearer concept was being developed as tohow the French Army was to be employed,and the wide scope of the program wasbeing realized. If in recent days the French

13 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt; Ltr, Eisen-hower to Giraud, 27 Oct 43, JRC 370/003 Em-ployment of Sv Units; also see pp 88-89, above.

14 Memo, Col Robert A. Case, Director StockControl Div ASF, for Director Sup ASF, 3 Nov

43, OPD 400 France, Sec II; Msg 1464, Marshallto Eisenhower, 2 Nov 43, JRC 904 Modificationof Rearmt; Msg W-4199/5981, Eisenhower toMarshall, 3 Nov 43, JRC Cable Log; Msg 2702,Marshall to Eisenhower, 17 Nov 43, JRC 903Requests for Units.

15 Memo, Rooks To All Concerned, 3 Nov 43,JRC 370/001 Employment of Units.


military authorities had been required to"justify fully" their requirements from U.S.resources, it was because such requirementsmust be weighed and their need consideredin the light of other United Nations de-mands. For the French alone, there were,in addition to the eleven-division program,a number of other requirements such asmaintenance levels, maintenance of the Ter-ritorial forces, and POL (petrol, oil, andlubricants) requirements. The size of theAllies' global commitment was such that itwas imperative to keep French requests"within minimum requirements." 16

On 13 November General Eisenhowerrejected General Giraud's proposal for anexpansion of the ANFA program to twelvedivisions. He then seized the opportunityto remind the French Commander in Chiefthat previous American appeals for a revi-sion of the 15 August Plan had been un-heeded, and to reiterate his warning thatU.S. service troops would not be providedto support French combat units. Headded:

I am now convinced that you should havethe program restudied and revised so that thelargest possible balanced force will be re-armed. It must be apparent to all that thereis nothing gained in raising divisions which,for lack of adequate supporting arms andservices, we are unable to employ in combat.... As the revised program will be the basisfor the supply of U.S. equipment, I naturallywish to approve it before it is sent to the WarDepartment.

Voicing his belief that only by effecting acutback of the program would the personnelbe found for manning the necessary sup-porting arms and services, General Eisen-hower then revealed his intentions in thematter. He proposed to recommend to the

War Department that the equipment forone infantry and two armored divisions beeliminated from the program. It was hishope that the French Commander in Chiefwould signify his agreement to the proposalor offer any alternative thereto withoutdelay.17

While AFHQ staff sections were revisingthe program along the lines set forth byG-3 on 3 November, General Eisenhowerinformed the CCS of his proposal to reducethe number of divisions. In anticipation ofGiraud's reply, he urged that he be author-ized to determine the appropriateness ofany solution which General Giraud mightoffer and, if necessary, to inform the latterthat three divisions would definitely be de-leted from the program. Such a reduction,he explained, would free qualified troopsfor the organization of a balanced armyadequately supported by the necessarytroops and base units.18

The French military authorities, it wasthen learned informally, were planning tosubmit a counterproposal calling for theelimination of two divisions only (one in-fantry and one armored), with the justifi-cation that they could properly support inpersonnel the remaining nine. Hopes werehigh that a satisfactory agreement couldbe effected between AFHQ and GeneralGiraud in the near future.19

On 20 November the JRC submittedto General Giraud a revised version (knownthereafter as the 20 November Plan) ofthe 15 August Plan. Prepared with theassistance of the general and special staffsections of AFHQ, the new plan represented

16 Notes of Conf, Loomis, Leyer, and Regnault,7 Nov 43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan.

17 Ltr, Eisenhower to Giraud, 13 Nov 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.

18 Ltr, Eisenhower to CCS, 23 Nov 43, in samefile.

19 Memo, Loomis for G-4, 23 Nov 43, JRC 902Modification of Rearmt.


a substantial increase in service troops andbase section units considered necessary foran army of eleven divisions. It was to beused by the French as a basis in decidinghow many increments of self-sustainingarmy corps they could reasonably activate.20

General Giraud's long-awaited reply toGeneral Eisenhower's two communicationsfinally came on 29 November.21 Contraryto all expectations, the French Commanderin Chief merely reaffirmed his determina-tion to implement the 15 August Plan inits original form, meanwhile retaining the1st Motorized Infantry Division as a non-program unit. In support of his position,he furnished statistics intended to show thatsufficient white effectives would be found toprovide the necessary technicians and spe-cialists. Service units, he explained, wouldbe set up progressively as matériel andtroops became available, and in such amanner that the last unit would be readyby 15 July 1944. The 15 August Plan, heasserted in conclusion, could be achievedin its entirety "with a necessary time lag"between the activation of combat units andthe setting up of the corresponding services.As for the 20 November Plan, he had re-quested his staff to study it and he wouldsend his comments on it shortly. A post-script, penned by the general himself, con-tained this last plea: "At the present time,the main consideration is to equip the divi-sions as originally contemplated, for whichcadre and fighting personnel are now com-

plete. To delay their rearmament will bean error likely to have grave consequences.22

AFHQ officials received General Giraud'scommunication with considerable appre-hension. In the opinion of G-3, the FrenchCommander in Chief either failed to under-stand the importance of providing an armyproperly balanced in combat and essentialservice units, or "purposely ignored" thesuggestion made to him by General Eisen-hower on 13 November. Not only was theproposal to retain the 1st Motorized In-fantry Division as an eighth infantry divi-sion regarded as likely to aggravate analready serious deficiency in service units,but it was feared that it would result insetting up a force better adapted to an oc-cupational role than combat against a first-class enemy.23

Reluctant to act in a manner that mightbe construed as arbitrary, General Eisen-hower agreed to call a conference with theFrench, presided over by G-3, for the pur-pose of re-examining the entire rearmamentquestion. To provide the conference witha working basis on which to draft a pro-gram commensurate with available qualifiedmanpower, AFHQ staff sections undertookto prepare alternate tables of the minimumessential supporting service and base unitsfor an expeditionary force of 7 infantry and3 armored divisions, 7 infantry and 2 ar-mored divisions, or 6 infantry and 2 armoreddivisions. These tables were to serve as abasis for scaling down, if found necessary,the present 20 November Plan of 7 infantryand 4 armored divisions to whichever ofthe three combinations would be most prac-ticable in the light of French capabilities.

20 Chart, 20 Nov Plan, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. I.

21 On that same day, incidentally, Allied repre-sentatives attending the EUREKA Conference (heldat Tehran on 28 November-1 December) heardMarshal Joseph Stalin raise the question of Frenchrearmament. President Roosevelt outlined for hisbenefit the progress achieved to date and disclosedthat "nine" divisions, re-equipped and trained bythe United States, would soon be ready.

22 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 29 Nov 43, JRC904 Modifications of Rearmt.

23 Memo, Rooks for CofS AFHQ, 1 Dec 43,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. I.


Copies of the tables, once completed, wereforwarded to the French for their consid-eration.24

As the month of December opened, therearmament operations were still boggeddown. No action beyond shipment of theOctober slice of the 15 August Plan hadbeen taken to assign equipment. The pros-pect of an immediate resumption of ship-ments was dim. Yet the weeks just endedhad not been altogether fruitless. Thereadying of the first French expeditionaryforces had gone on at an accelerated pace.In fact it was about to reach its culminationin an event of significant importance.

On 8 December, two days before thescheduled rearmament conference, a U.S.-equipped North African division was com-mitted to combat in Italy. The action re-sulted from a decision reached at a meetingof the Commanders in Chief held on 3November, and in execution of plans drawnin August by AFHQ and the French HighCommand.25 The division, the 2d Moroc-can Infantry (2d DIM), commanded byMaj. Gen. André Dody and accompaniedby a regiment of Moroccan goumiers, the4th Group of Tabors (4th GTM), consti-tuted the advance party of the Frenchincrement expected to be engaged in opera-tions in the Italian theater. For the mo-ment, it was to reinforce, and fight as partof, the U.S. VI Corps, one of the componentcorps of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's FifthArmy, itself part of the Eighth British Army,commanded by General Sir Bernard L.Montgomery. As General Marshall hadpointed out a week before in the course of

the Tehran Conference, the build-up of theFrench increment was to be effected pro-gressively on the basis of the performanceof the first division.26 Actually, however,another division, the, 3d Algerian Infantry(3d DIA), under the command of Maj.Gen. Aimé de Goislard de Monsabert, wasalready en route to join the 2d DIM inbattle. The dispatch of these units wasconsonant with a decision reached by theCCS themselves at the Cairo Conference onthe very eve of the engagement of the 2dDIM. All French troops, they had thenagreed, would be given battle experience inItaly before their ultimate employment inoperations in continental France.27

These and other developments were tan-gible proof that the rearmament opera-tions, notwithstanding their setbacks, werebeginning to bear fruit. The entry of the2d DIM into combat at this juncture wasan excellent case in point. The divisionhad been activated, equipped, schooled inthe technical use of its matériel, subjectedto extensive and intensive tactical training,briefed, shipped, and brought to the frontline, all in just seven months. This was arecord that those responsible for Frenchrearmament could well be proud of. Inaddition to the 2d DIM and the 3d DIA,a third division, the 9th Colonial Infantry(9th DIC), was being readied for shipmentoverseas, and another, the 4th MoroccanMountain (4th DMM), was completingits re-equipment in Corsica. Of the ar-mored divisions, two (the 1st DB and 5thDB) were ready; a third (the 2d DB), al-ready trained, was waiting for the rest ofits equipment.

The 4th GTM entering the front line24 Memo, Rooks To All Concerned, 4 Dec 43, in

same file.25 Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander,

The Allied Armies in Italy From 3rd September1943, to 12th December 1944 (London: His Maj-esty's Stationery Office, 1950).

26 Min, Plenary Sess, 29 Nov 43, EUREKA Conf.27Min, CCS 138th Mtg, 7 Dec 43, SEXTANT

Conf.


GOUMIERS OF THE 4TH GROUP OF TABORS, Italy, December 1943. Menaround the fire have American C rations.

alongside the 2d DIM was one of severalsmaller organizations which were not origi-nally planned for under the rearmamentprogram, but which the French had acti-vated and made ready largely at the urgingof AFHQ. These nonprogram units, mostof which were earmarked for service in Italy,included 4 Moroccan tabor groups cor-responding to 4 U.S. light infantry regi-ments, 8 mule pack companies correspond-ing to 16 U.S. mule pack companies, 1brigade of spahis corresponding to 1 U.S.horse cavalry regiment, 1 Commando Bat-talion and 1 Shock Battalion correspondingto 2 U.S. infantry battalions of the Ranger

type, various headquarters, and divisionaltraining centers.

The four Moroccan tabor groups, eachconsisting of three tabors, or battalions, rep-resented a total of approximately 13,000goumiers. The basic organization of theserobust, hardy, fearless mountaineers, mostof them Berbers from the Atlas region, wasthe goum, or company, of a strength ofapproximately 220 men including Frenchcadres of 2 officers and 12 noncommissionedofficers, and 16 native noncommissionedofficers. Because of its extreme mobilityand lightness, the goum was regarded bythe French military authorities as a sort


of "foot cavalry" unit able to accomplish,over difficult terrain, some of the missionsordinarily assigned to mounted cavalry.28

In view of the mountainous country inwhich the U.S. Fifth Army was then operat-ing, Allied and French commanders ex-pected to gain substantial advantage fromthe employment of goumiers. Already anumber of tabors had proved their worthin the Tunisian campaign, in the conquestof Sicily, and in the assault on Corsica.All goumiers were, since 1 July 1943, underthe operational command of Brig. Gen.Augustin Guillaume.

The mule pack companies were necessarynot only for the support of the French divi-sions being sent to Italy but, as GeneralSmith pointed out in a letter to GeneralGiraud, for the support of the U.S. FifthArmy as a whole. Several such companieswere already in Italy.29

Operational developments in Italy hadprompted AFHQ, in October, to requestGeneral Giraud to nominate a horse cavalryregiment for service with the U.S. FifthArmy. General Giraud had then offered abrigade of spahis (native horsemen) con-sisting of two regiments, the 7th AlgerianSpahis and the 5th Moroccan Spahis, witha total strength of approximately 2,200men. To equip the brigade, the FrenchGeneral Staff had drawn a substantialamount of American equipment from pro-gram units, and obtained additional maté-riel (vehicles, armament, and technicalitems) from U.S. theater stocks in answerto an urgent appeal from General Giraud.The brigade, incidentally, never reached

Italy; a subsequent change in the opera-tional situation made its dispatch to thattheater no longer necessary.30

Both the Commando Battalion and theShock Battalion had been organized frompersonnel released after the disbandment ofthe Corps Franc at the close of the Tuni-sian campaign. The Shock Battalion, itwill be recalled, had participated in theliberation of Corsica. The French GeneralStaff had issued both units some Americanequipment to complete their French ma-tériel. They were not required for servicewith the Fifth Army, but were being heldin readiness for possible employment in theMediterranean.

All together the equipping of these vari-ous nonprogram units had consumed a sub-stantial amount of American equipmentoriginally intended for program units. Asa result, program units were feeling morethan ever the pinch of shortages. It wasimperative, therefore, that some definite pol-icy be established with regard to the presentand future equipping of nonprogram units.The issue, in fact, was one of the manyquestions on the agenda of the armamentconference scheduled for 10 December.

Attending the conference, held at AFHQ,were some twenty U.S. officers representingvarious AFHQ and NATOUSA staff sec-tions and headed by General Smith. TheFrench delegation included General De-vinck, chief of General Giraud's personalstaff, Colonel Regnault, chief of the FrenchSection, JRC, and other officers from theFrench General Staff. Opening the meet-ing, Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks, AssistantChief of Staff G-3, AFHQ, reiterated the28 For information concerning the organization

and employment of Moroccan goums, see Memo2453/EMGG/3/CEF, Gen Juin, 15 Jul 43, AFHQAG Sec 336.2 (F r ) Foreign Armies.

2 9Ltr, Smith to Giraud, 2 Dec 43, JRC 370/001Employment of Units—Gen.

3 0Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 12 Oct 43, Ltrs,Giraud to Eisenhower, 19 Oct, 4 Nov 43, and Ltr,Hq NATOUSA to SOS, 8 Nov 43, JRC 400.1/003Equip and Sups for Spahis.


SPAHIS IN NORTH AFRICA

need of creating a balanced French forceand asked the conference to determine andagree upon a reasonable basis, fully con-sonant with French manpower availability,on which to establish a final program. Toarrive at such a basis, he pointed out, itmight be necessary to reduce the number ofdivisions from 11 to 10, 9, or even 8.

The conferees first examined the practi-cability of the larger program as revised on20 November. Speaking for GeneralGiraud, General Devinck, while readilyagreeing to the elimination of a fourth corpsand of a twelfth division as proposed by theFrench Commander in Chief in late Octo-ber, made a strong plea for the retention ofthe 15 August Plan. The current activa-tion program as developed by the FrenchGeneral Staff, he explained, was based onthe assumption that the August Plan was

firm and final. Implementation of the plan,he pointed out in addition, was proceedingsatisfactorily, as evidenced by the arrival ofthe first combat divisions in Italy. Turningto the troublesome question of service units,General Devinck declared that the activa-tion of these units, although now behindschedule, would be effected in due timebecause the French General Staff was ex-erting every effort in that direction. Someof the units, he added, were unnecessaryin any case. The French Army could dowith fewer service units than the U.S. Army;furthermore, inasmuch as it was destinedultimately to operate on home soil, it wouldbe in a position to use local resources.31

31 The French were generally of the opinion thatthe U.S. Army had an overabundance of servicessome of which would be of little use to their ownfrugal forces. As an example they pointed out


Apparently impressed by General Devinck'sarguments, the conferees attempted to reacha compromise between the 20 Novemberand 15 August Plans by deleting a numberof unnecessary service units. Discussionson the matter were to be resumed four dayslater.32

General Devinck's strong assertion thata program of eleven divisions was practi-cable must be weighed in relation to thestand then taken by other members of theFrench High Command. From availableevidence it appears that the earlier solidarityof French thought on the subject, as re-flected in the de Gaulle-Giraud memoran-dum of 18 September, had dissipated.33 Infact Giraud's personal staff, of which Gen-eral Devinck was the chief, and the FrenchGeneral Staff were in sharp disagreementover the matter. Their divergence of viewsresulted from a different approach to theproblem. General Staff officers felt thatit would be next to impossible to find thenecessary technicians and specialists forseven infantry and four armored divisionsas provided under the 15 August Plan. Theyreasoned as follows. To activate the entireprogram would require 403,800 men,147,500 of whom must be Frenchmen toserve as cadres, technicians, and specialists.The prospects of getting this large numberof white effectives were slim. Fewer menthan originally anticipated were escaping

from France to North Africa. The inte-gration of the Gaullist forces had yieldeda relatively small number of Frenchmen.Even with the application of the contem-plated mobilization measures (such as therecall of the 1919-35 classes of reservists,that is, of men twenty-nine to forty-fouryears of age), it was estimated that a totalof not more than 138,000 Frenchmen couldbe found. The resulting deficit in whiteeffectives would amount to approximately9,500 for the expeditionary forces alone.To this number must be added the whitepersonnel required to maintain both an ade-quate reserve pool for the combat troopsand the military establishments in the zoneof interior. In the opinion of the GeneralStaff, therefore, the 15 August Plan couldnot be implemented until such time as theliberation of part of the Metropolitan terri-tory had yielded additional French man-power.

General Giraud's personal staff, on theother hand, considered the manpowerproblem from the standpoint of quantityrather than of quality. According to theircalculations, the reserve pool for the eleven-division program could reasonably be re-duced from 20 percent as now set to 15percent of the strength of the expeditionaryforces. This would lower the minimum ofeffectives required to 350,750 men. Sinceit was anticipated that total resources inNorth Africa could reach 540,000 men,there would be left 189,250 men for pur-poses other than the expeditionary forcesand the reserve pool. With the needs ofzone of interior establishments not exceed-ing 180,000 men, officers of Giraud's per-sonal staff c o n s i d e r e d that availablemanpower would be more than sufficientto permit the setting up of the entire pro-gram. It is interesting to note, incidentally,

that their divisions had no need for laundry com-panies since African natives, who formed the bulkof their effectives, were used to washing their ownlinen. See Marey, "Le Réarmement français enAfrique du Nord (1942-1944)," Revue Politique etParlementaire (October, 1947), p. 56.

32Min, Fr Rearmt Conf, 10 Dec 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. I.

33 See Résumé des Opérations de Réarmement,undated and unsigned, original provided by GenDevinck, copy in Fr Reds File 218, OCMH; seealso Interv with Gen Regnault, Aug 50; de Gaulleand Giraud Ltr and Memo cited n. 5, above.


that in spite of this claim the French militaryauthorities were already having difficulty insending to Italy the personnel needed to re-place the heavy losses currently being sus-tained by the 2d Moroccan InfantryDivision.

At the end of the conference the delegatesagreed to reconvene four days later. It wasat this juncture, just when negotiations wereproceeding satisfactorily although at a slowpace, that a flare-up in the political tug ofwar between the French Committee of Na-tional Liberation and the French HighCommand threatened, once again, the veryexistence of the rearmament program.

The 1st DMI Incident

Having been requested by AFHQ severalweeks back to nominate a third infantrydivision for service with the U.S. Fifth Armyin Italy, General Giraud had designated theBritish-equipped 1st Motorized InfantryDivision. The reasons for this selection, ashe gave them to General Smith, were mili-tary as well as political. The 1st DMI was,in his estimation, well trained and containeda high percentage of Foreign Legion troopsof first-class fighting capacity. Moreover,it was an ex-Free French unit. As such, itsinclusion among the forces being sent toItaly was highly desirable if only to ward offany possible criticism on the part of theGaullists.34

After much exchange of correspondence,AFHQ informed General Giraud on 1 De-cember that the Commanding General,Allied Armies in Italy, General Sir Harold

R. L. G. Alexander, was not prepared to ac-cept the 1st DMI as then equipped butwould welcome it if rearmed with U.S. ma-tériel. This view was shared by GeneralClark in whose Army the French divisionswere fighting.35

On 3 December, after restating that the1st DMI could not be employed as cur-rently equipped, AFHQ requested Gen-eral Giraud, in view of the urgency of thematter, to nominate at once another in-fantry division to be ready for embarkationbeginning 20 December. General Giraudpromptly announced that he was assigningthe American-equipped 9th Colonial In-fantry Division (9th DIC) in lieu of the 1stDMI.36

Apprised of this nomination, the NationalDefense Committee, acting presumablyunder authority of the decree of 2 October1943, rejected General Giraud's decisiontwenty-four hours after it had been an-nounced.37 Endorsing General de Gaulle'sviews on the subject, the members of thecommittee, excepting of course GeneralGiraud, ordered that the designation of the1st DMI be maintained. Their action wasindicative that the French Commander inChief no longer held any influence with thecommittee. To many an observer it seemedbut a matter of a short time before he wouldbe relegated to a back seat and possiblyforced to withdraw entirely from the mili-tary scene. Informal word of the commit-tee's action, followed one day later by offi-

34Ltr, Smith to Giraud, 18 Nov 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres; Hq Fr HighComd, GO 14, 18 Nov 43, quoted in Memo, G-3Fr CinC's Personal Staff, n. d., copy in OCMH;Msg 6357, Smith to CG 15th Army Gp, 27 Nov43, JRC Cable Log.

35 Msg MA-792, Alexander to CinC AFHQ, 30Nov 43, JRC Cable Log.

36 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 9 Dec 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Authority for Control ofFr Exp Forces.

37 Article 6 of the decree: "Within the scope ofthe directives of the CFLN, the National DefenseCommittee shall decide upon the over-all plans con-cerning the organization, distribution, and employ-ment of the French forces."


cial confirmation from General Giraud,reached AFHQ just as General Devinckwas pleading for the retention of the eleven-division program.38 Its effect could not beanything but detrimental, especially at atime when Franco-American relations werealready strained. AFHQ viewed the actionwith considerable apprehension. G-3 offi-cials in particular regarded it as a threat tothe successful prosecution of the war.

Complying with the National DefenseCommittee's decision, General Giraud or-dered the immediate integration of the 1stDMI in the rearmament program as one ofthe seven infantry divisions, a course of ac-tion which elicited a word of praise fromGeneral Eisenhower.39 The length of timerequired to re-equip and train the divisionwith American matériel was bound to delayits departure for several months. The delayin turn seriously threatened the success ofoperations in Italy. Later events demon-strated that the threat was real. The 2dDIM and 3d DIA, regrouped in early Jan-uary 1944 as the nucleus of a separate corps,known thereafter as the French Expedi-tionary Corps (Corps ExpéditionnaireFrançais—CEF), under the command ofGeneral Juin, did not receive a third divi-sion until the end of February, instead ofmid-January as had been hoped. For lackof reinforcements during the intervening sixweeks, General Juin was unable to exploitthe successes achieved by his forces north of

Cassino.40 The third division to join theCEF, it must be noted, was the 4th Moroc-can Mountain, commanded by Maj. Gen.François Sevez, ready long before the 1stDMI. The 1st DMI, under the commandof Brig. Gen. Charles Brosset, arrived fi-nally in April as the fourth and last divisionof the CEF.

The committee's action in reversing Gen-eral Giraud's decision focused attention onan important and delicate issue, presentsince November 1942, but one that hadengaged only the sporadic attention ofAnglo-American authorities, namely, thequestion of the control of French forces. Nofirm understanding had yet been reachedregarding the matter other than the arrange-ment set forth in the Clark-Darlan Agree-ment of 22 November 1942. The agree-ment stipulated that the status, command,functions, employment, rights, and privi-leges of the French land, sea, and air forceswere to remain "under French direction."No basis, therefore, existed on which theAllied Commander in Chief could claim au-thority to issue orders either to the FrenchCommander in Chief, to the French Com-mittee of National Liberation, or to the lat-ter's military representative, the NationalDefense Committee, concerning the disposalof French forces. Eisenhower was in factdependent on voluntary French acquies-cence in his proposals. In the past, it hadbeen possible to deal directly with Giraudwith reasonable assurance that just demandswould be met. The committee's recent ac-tion constituted a reversal of the existingarrangement and a dangerous precedent.The time had come to obtain the CFLN'sagreement that in the future the troops in-

3 8Ltr 924/3.S, Giraud to AFHQ, 11 Dec 43,quoted in Memo, G-3 for CofS, 11 Dec 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Authority for Control ofFr Exp Forces.

39 In a letter to General Giraud, General Eisen-hower praised the French Commander in Chieffor "sacrificing" some of his own desires in order"to promote the best interests of the French anda better understanding among the Allies." Ltr,Eisenhower to Giraud, 31 Dec 43, AFHQ SACSRed Sec, Fr Matters, Gen Giraud.

40 General Marcel Carpentier, Les Forces Alliéesen Italie; la Campagne d'Italie (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949), p. 69.


eluded in the rearmament program wouldbe made available as and when requested,for employment in areas and under com-mands designated by the Allied Command-er in Chief. Divisions, corps, and armies,when employed as such, would of coursebe under French commanders. Convincedthat the practice of dealing directly with theFrench Commander in Chief was desirableand should be continued, General Rookssuggested that "the onus of getting the re-quired guarantee from the Committeeshould be placed on him." 41

In line with this recommendation, Eisen-hower requested General Giraud, on 14 De-cember, to transmit to the CFLN the fol-lowing warning. In view of the NationalDefense Committee's action, which from thetactical standpoint entailed "grave conse-quences," the rearmament program wouldnot be continued unless the CFLN gave defi-nite assurance that the use of the rearmedforces would be "governed solely by militaryconsiderations and subject to the decisionsof the Combined Chiefs of Staff throughtheir representative, the Allied CinC in thisTheater." 42 AFHQ immediately cabled acopy of Eisenhower's letter to the CCS andinformed President Roosevelt and PrimeMinister Churchill of the incident. ThePresident requested General Marshall tokeep him abreast of subsequent develop-ments.43

General Giraud was now placed in a

doubly embarrassing position, for the warn-ing which he was to transmit to the CFLNwas the indirect result of one of his own de-cisions. The committee seized the oppor-tunity to tighten further its grip on the con-trol of French military affairs. By a newdecree on the Organization of the HighCommand, issued on 16 December, theCFLN transferred much of the power here-tofore vested in the Commander in Chiefto the National Defense Committee.Thereafter the National Defense Commit-tee was to make all decisions concerning theemployment and distribution of forces aswell as the general armament and organi-zation programs. The Commander inChief was "appointed by decree of theCFLN." Placed on a level with both theCommissioner of War and Air and the Com-missioner of the Navy, he was to "take part"in rearmament discussions and negotiations,and countersign all rearmament requisitionssubmitted by the individual Commissionersin accordance with the general directivesof the National Defense Committee.44

To say that the 16 December decree hadcurtailed General Giraud's functions wouldbe an understatement. By it, the only forcesleft under his control were the expedition-ary forces, and even his control over themceased the moment they were committedto an overseas operation, for they thenpassed under Allied command. All otherforces were under the direct control of theCommissioners of War and Air and of theNavy. Commenting on the implicationsof this and other decrees,45 AFHQ officials

41Memo, Rooks for Smith, 12 Dec 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Authority for Control ofFr Exp Forces.

42Ltr, Eisenhower to Giraud, 14 Dec 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Authority for Control ofFr Exp Forces.

43 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 15 Dec 43, NAF 548;Msg W-8446, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Dec 43,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. I;Msg WX-5492, Marshall to Eisenhower, 22 Dec 43,OPD Cable Files.

44Decree of 16 Dec 43, CFLN, JRC 320/004Orgn of Fr Army.

45 Such as the decree concerning the Organiza-tion of the Expeditionary Ground Forces, dated7 January 1943 and signed by General de Gaulleand André Le Troquer, Commissioner of War andAir.


admitted that the authority of the FrenchCommander in Chief was on its way to be-coming "negligible." They agreed, how-ever, that since he was being held "respon-sible for liaison," the practice of dealingwith him should continue as before untilsuch time as it would prove ineffective.46

Meanwhile, General de Gaulle, as Presi-dent of the CFLN, had asked for a con-ference with representatives of the AlliedCommander in Chief to discuss the terms ofthe assurance required of the committee inconnection with the control of French forces.The meeting, first planned for 24 Decemberbut postponed pending the outcome of an-other serious French political crisis, washeld three days later in General de Gaulle'soffice.47 It was attended by General Smith,Edwin Wilson, Minister of the UnitedStates, Harold Macmillan, Minister of theUnited Kingdom, and René Massigli,French Commissioner of Foreign Affairs.Massigli handed to his American and Brit-ish colleagues the text of a draft agreementprepared by the CFLN setting forth theconditions under which the Allied Com-mander in Chief could employ the land, sea,and air forces placed at his disposal by thecommittee. Smith then informed Massiglithat a recent CCS decision to undertakean assault on continental France in the near

future envisaged the participation of allFrench land and air forces, whether Ameri-can- or British-equipped. The greater partof the land forces, he added, would be em-ployed as a French army in an operationof which he gave the general outline andthe approximate location.48

The decision to which General Smith re-ferred had been made a fortnight before inthe course of the Cairo Conference. TheCombined Chiefs had agreed that the cross-Channel attack ( OVERLORD ), with a targetdate of 1 May, would be supported by asimultaneous assault on southern France(ANVIL, later DRAGOON). They had de-cided further that the bulk of the Frenchforces would participate in ANVIL, and onlya token force in OVERLORD. The CCSagreement that the rearmed forces wouldultimately be employed on French soil wasa momentous one. It would tend to reas-sure the French that their legitimate ambi-tion to participate in the liberation of theirhomeland would be fulfilled. It wouldalso serve to stimulate interest in Frenchrearmament, for it represented a definiteobjective on which AFHQ and the WarDepartment could base the next phase.Once the extent of French participation inboth OVERLORD and ANVIL had been deter-mined, it would be relatively easy to de-velop and implement a final program.49

Two days after the conference in Generalde Gaulle's office, Massigli informed theBritish and American political representa-tives that General Smith's disclosures re-garding the future employment of theFrench forces had "removed the essentialanxieties" of the CFLN. As a result, the

46 Memo, G-3 Opns for G-3 Sec AFHQ, 20 Jan44, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Negotiations,No. 1, Vol. II.

47 Informed that the CFLN was planning to meteout severe punishment in the case of several offi-cials who in the past had shown strong pro-Vichytendencies, President Roosevelt requested GeneralEisenhower on 22 December to "direct" the com-mittee to take no action against these individualsat the present time in view of the assistance givenby them to the Allied armies during the campaignin Africa. The CFLN complied with the request.Msg 5456, WAR to Algiers (secret and personalfrom the President for Gen Eisenhower), 22 Dec43, White House File.

48 Ltr, Massigli to Wilson, 30 Dec 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Negotiations, No. 1,Vol. II.

49 Min, CCS 136th Mtg, 4 Dec 43, and CCS 138thMtg, 7 Dec 43, SEXTANT Conf.


CONFERENCE IN ALGIERS, November 1943. From left: René Massigli, Andrei Y.Vishinsky, Maj. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Harold Macmillan, and Robert D. Murphy. The27 December meeting was attended by Edwin Wilson, Minister of the United States, and thoseshown in the photograph except for Mr. Vishinsky.

committee had decided to place these forcesat the disposal of the CCS to be used by theAllied Commander in Chief, in consulta-tion with the French High Command, forthe execution of the contemplated opera-tions. While eager not to hinder the con-duct of these operations, the committee re-served the right to appeal to the Americanand British governments, and the right ofthe French High Command to appeal to theAllied Commander in Chief to ensure thatthe use of the forces in question would takeFrench interests into account "as completelyas possible." 50

The solution offered by the CFLN forthe control of French forces was received byAFHQ with considerable satisfaction. AsGeneral Eisenhower had been given to ex-pect by his advisers, the committee had rec-ognized the "reasonableness" of his de-mands, and in turn was making a reasonableproposal.51 It now remained for the CCSto settle the issue. For the moment thedanger of a serious crisis had subsided. Thetension brought about by the 1st DMI epi-sode was rapidly abating. On 4 JanuaryAFHQ informed the CCS of the details ofthe CFLN proposals, adding these comfort-

50Ltr, Massigli to Wilson, 30 Dec 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Negotiations, No. 1,Vol. II.

51 Msg W-8446, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Dec43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt,Vol. I.


ing words: "The equipping of the Frenchforces is continuing." 52

Cutback of the Program—The 23 JanuaryPlan

Staff discussions, meanwhile, had gone onundisturbed. The problems raised in thecourse of the 10 December conference weretaken up again at the second meeting heldas scheduled four days later. The con-ferees examined once more the 20 Novem-ber Plan and proceeded to reduce it byeliminating certain unnecessary engineer,field artillery, and antiaircraft artillery units.General Devinck then expressed his convic-tion that the French High Command hadthe necessary personnel to fulfill the programas now revised. Turning to the question ofnonprogram units, he urged that some pro-vision be made for their equipment. Theseunits, he pointed out, had been requestedfor employment by the Allies and a numberof them were already in Italy. After somediscussion, the conferees agreed, in part,that (1) the JRC would, as a matter ofurgency, examine the revised program inthe light of available qualified French man-power, and determine whether or not itcould be effectively fulfilled; (2) the FrenchHigh Command would make available tothe JRC all pertinent information neededfor such an examination; (3) the schedulefor activating and equipping units in theprogram would be phased so that the forcescould be made ready for employment in in-crements of self-sustaining army corps withproportionate supporting combat and serv-ice units for the corps, army and base in-stallations; and (4) some provision would

be made for the issue of equipment to non-program units.53

Immediately after the conference, theFrench military authorities took steps toforce a decision with respect to the provi-sion of equipment to nonprogram units. Intheir opinion the matter was a serious one,for the issue of U.S. matériel to these unitshad produced critical shortages in the equip-ment of program units. To fill these short-ages, they announced their intention to sub-mit additional requisitions. Commentingon the proposal, General Loomis declaredhimself opposed to requisitioning completeinitial equipment for the nonprogram unitssince they were basically French-equipped.He considered that their inclusion on theprogram for maintenance only would ade-quately take care of their needs. His rec-ommendation was endorsed by G-3 andG-4, AFHQ, and, for the moment at least,made the basis of the theater's policy on thematter.54

General Eisenhower had already in-formed the War Department that he wouldsoon forward, for submission to the CCS, thefinal recommendations of the theater on theauxiliary units to be added to the program.He had also indicated that an entirely newproject, incidental to the rearmament pro-gram and under consideration at AFHQ forsome time, was being transmitted to Wash-ington by separate cable, likewise for sub-mission to the CCS.55

The new project concerned the provisionof matériel to French CommunicationsZone establishments considered necessary to

52Msg W-9307/23731, Eisenhower to CCS, 4Jan 44, NAF 579.

53 Min, Fr Rearmt Conf, 14 Dec 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. I.

54 Memos, Regnault for Loomis, 15 Dec 43, andLoomis for G-3 AFHQ, 15 Dec 43, JRC 904 Modi-fication of Rearmt.

55 Msg W-7569, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 14 Dec43, in same file.


maintain the normal life of the expedition-ary forces. The question was not a newone. In fact, since February 1943, the WarDepartment had been shipping maintenancematerials for these establishments, such asammunition, petroleum, and subsistence, atthe rate of approximately 4,000 tonsmonthly and on the basis of requisitionssubmitted by the French Military Missionin Washington.56 The French, however,had come to regard this assistance as totallyinadequate and not commensurate with theexpansion of their expeditionary forces.The question of increasing this assistancecame up in the fall of 1943 in connectionwith a study of French maintenance require-ments for the future months. In early Oc-tober War Department officials requestedthe French military authorities to prepare,with the assistance of the JRC, and submitwithout delay an estimate of their mainte-nance requirements for the calendar years1944 and 1945. This estimate was to be in-corporated in the Army Supply Programthen under preparation in Washington. Itwas to include a computation of the mainte-nance requirements on all matériel, Ameri-can, British, French, and enemy-captured,other than that sent from the United Statesunder the rearmament program. The WarDepartment, lacking adequate information,delegated the study to the theater. In mid-October General Leyer submitted to theJRC a number of requisitions. At the sametime the National Defense Committee pro-duced a long memorandum which theFrench Military Mission in Washingtonpassed on to General Marshall.57

An analysis of these various documents re-vealed that they envisaged new projects ex-tending far beyond the maintenance of theforces being rearmed under the current pro-gram and the Communications Zone troopsassigned to the support of expeditionaryforces. The new projects included addi-tional units to be activated from manpowerresources of the French Union not pres-ently utilized for the build-up of the expe-ditionary forces, a task force for employmentin the Far East, and units to be activated incontinental France once OVERLORD andANVIL had been launched.

American officials promptly turned downthese proposals. They regarded them asgoing "far beyond any possibility of earlyconsideration by the CCS" and, insofar asthe Army Supply Program was concerned,as wholly irrelevant.58 In General Mar-shall's opinion, the projects, especially theproposal to rearm Metropolitan forces, werematters for decision by President Rooseveltinasmuch as they involved far-reachingquestions of policy.59 On 4 NovemberGeneral Loomis informed General Leyerthat the theater would retain, for considera-tion and processing, only that portion ofthe requisitions which dealt with theCommunications Zone establishments. Hepointed out that the French High Com-mand was at liberty to take up all otherprojects, if it so wished, directly with theWar Department through the French Mil-itary Mission.60

The requisitions submitted by GeneralLeyer on behalf of the CommunicationsZone troops were quite substantial. To

56 Memo, Loomis for CG NATOUSA, 12 Mar 44,JRC 400.4/002 Maintenance for Territorial Forces.

5 7Ltrs, Leyer to Loomis, 5 Oct, 18 Oct, 20 Oct43, JRC 907 Rearmt Plan '44-45; Memo, Na-tional Defense Committee for Fr Military Missionfor Marshall, 16 Oct 43, ABC 091.711 France (6Oct 43), Sec 1-A.

58 Memo, Loomis for Deputy Theater Comdr, 4Nov 43, JRC 907 Rearmt Plan '44-45.

59 Memo, Marshall for JCS, 2 Nov 43, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 45), Sec 2-A.

60 Memo. Loomis for Leyer, 4 Nov 43, JRC 907Rearmt Plan '44-45.


justify their validity as well as urgency, hesent to General Loomis, on 10 November, adetailed report. The forces in question, heexplained, fell into two categories, namely,Sovereignty and Territorial forces.

Sovereignty forces were the Army units,none larger than a regiment, and serviceorganizations whose functions GeneralLeyer described as follows: to ensure Frenchsovereignty over the North and West Afri-can territory after the departure of the ex-peditionary forces for overseas service, tomaintain internal order, and to assume thecoastal and antiaircraft defense of the ter-ritory as well as the guarding of airfields,depots, and POW camps. These forces rep-resented a total strength then estimated at103,000 men for both North and WestAfrica. Of these, 8,000 were already em-ployed by U.S. military authorities as guardsin American POW camps.

Territorial forces were the forces respon-sible for the running of headquarters, train-ing centers, schools, port bases, hospitals,shops, Quartermaster depots, and other sim-ilar establishments. Representing a totalof some 100,000 men, these troops workedalmost exclusively for the support of expedi-tionary units.

The equipment then in the hands of bothSovereignty and Territorial forces was, ex-plained General Leyer, in deplorable condi-tion. All of it was of old French stock andwas now worn out. It was urgent, he con-cluded, to provide these troops with initialequipment in addition to maintenance ma-terials, lest the expeditionary forces them-selves be deprived of proper support in theimmediate future.61

General Loomis was fully aware of theconditions described by the French Chief of

Staff and recognized the necessity of fur-nishing equipment at least to the forces andestablishments devoting their activities tothe support of expeditionary forces. Heurged General Smith to consider the prepa-ration of a separate project for submissionto the CCS. With this in view, he pro-ceeded to list the Territorial establishmentswhich he considered indispensable, and esti-mated the personnel necessary to run themat 93,000 men. He then recommendedthat maintenance only be issued to theseestablishments, and that no considerationbe given, for the moment, to the require-ments of Sovereignty forces.62 Endorsingthese recommendations, General Eisen-hower requested the CCS to authorize theissue of specific materials, largely nonmil-itary, to such Communications Zone estab-lishments as the theater considered nec-essary. Prompt approval of the project,he pointed out, would ensure the propersupport of the expeditionary forces expectedto be re-equipped under the rearmamentprogram as currently revised.63

The revision of the program was, ofcourse, the main issue still to be solved. Thetwo armament conferences had emphasizedthe desire of the French High Command toimplement the eleven-division program inits entirety. General Giraud had not re-plied to Eisenhower's proposal, made on 13November, to reduce the number of divi-sions to be rearmed. The growing suspicionthat he was not prepared to change his viewson the subject gained weight when AFHQofficials learned that he had appealed di-rectly to General Marshall.

The American Chief of Staff had, by his

61 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 10 Nov 43, JRC 400.4/002 Maintenance for Territorial Forces.

62 Memos, Loomis for CofS AFHQ, 13 Nov, 29Nov, 4 Dec 43, and Memo, Loomis for G-4, 4 Dec43, in same file.

63 Msg W-7589/13853, Eisenhower to CCS, 14Dec 43, NAF 546.


attitude and utterances in the course of thepreceding months, shown himself to be afirm and constant advocate of French re-armament. General Giraud had not failedto recognize this fact and to express to Gen-eral Marshall, as he did again in a NewYear's greeting, his appreciation.64 It was tobe expected that in his final attempt to retainthe original program, Giraud would appealto the one American official whom he re-garded as his staunchest supporter. In a let-ter submitted on his behalf, Lt. Gen. PaulBeynet, the new chief of the French Mili-tary Mission in Washington, assured Mar-shall that the reluctance of the French mili-tary authorities to accept AFHQ's proposalto eliminate three divisions from the pro-gram was not due to lack of good will ontheir part.65 Rather it resulted from the im-possibility of reaching a satisfactory solutionto the problem of service troops. To con-vert into service units, he explained, goodcombat divisions now trained in the use ofU.S. weapons and presently awaiting theirfinal equipment would result in a loweringof morale bound to affect the entire FrenchArmy. The conversion, in any case, wasnot likely to produce efficient service unitsconsidering that the personnel so transferred,mostly native, had none of the professionalaptitude or skill required to make goodmechanics or technicians. In short, toadopt the proposal advocated by AFHQwould merely result in breaking up excellentfighting units and necessitate their replace-ment by American combat units. The help

of the American services, therefore, was aprimary necessity, if only to eliminate theneed for a greater number of U.S. divisions.66

The argument was one which GeneralMarshall could not dismiss lightly consider-ing his often repeated statement that it wasmore economical for the United States torearm available French manpower than toship both equipment and American man-power overseas. But the decision regardingthe composition of the French forces, whilesubject to CCS approval, rested with Gen-eral Eisenhower. It was not likely that heand his staff would retreat from the firmposition they had taken regarding the ne-cessity for the French forces to become self-sustaining. In his answer to GeneralBeynet, Marshall merely observed that "thepresent position is that we are awaiting areply from General Giraud." The FrenchCommander in Chief had still to be heardfrom regarding Eisenhower's proposal to re-duce the program.67

The position of the theater had beenmade unmistakably clear to the French onlya few days before by the Allied Commanderin Chief himself. About to leave NorthAfrica to take up in London his new postof Supreme Commander for the cross-Chan-nel operation, General Eisenhower had paidan impromptu visit to General de Gaulle.One of the subjects he brought up for dis-cussion was the controversy over servicetroops. First he offered this sound advice:"We must not be mesmerized by the num-ber of divisions to be rearmed." Profess-ing not to know what this number was, hestressed that it was better to have one divi-sion completely organized than several

64 Msg 109 BT, Giraud to Marshall (signed Eisen-hower), 31 Dec 43, OCS A-48-11 (091 FranceSec 1).

65 General Beynet was appointed Chief, FrenchMilitary Mission in the United States, in November1943, in replacement of General Bethouart, whowas recalled to North Africa to take command ofan Army corps.

66 Ltr, Beynet to Marshall, 3 Jan 44, SomervellFiles, Fr 1943-44, A-46-257, Ser 1, Dr 3.

67 Ltr, Marshall to Beynet, 5 Jan 44, in samefile.


which were not. General de Gaulle im-mediately declared himself in agreementwith this view. The correct policy was, herecognized, to complete the activation andequipping of some units before trying toform others. He agreed that they must be"made complete above all from the stand-point of Services" even if this meant thattheir number could not reach that whichwas at first contemplated. Still, he hopedthat it would be possible to arm six infantryand three armored divisions as well as threearmy corps headquarters and have themready by 1 April 1944. General Jean deLattre de Tassigny, under whose commandit was intended to place these forces, wasto go into the details of their organization.The matter, he agreed, was one to be han-dled "meticulously and thoroughly." Ap-parently pleased by these arrangements,General Eisenhower then made clear to deGaulle that he intended to use a tokenFrench force in the cross-Channel opera-tion: "I will not enter Paris without theFrench at my side." 68

General de Gaulle's statements were anindication that his concept of armamentproblems was more realistic than GeneralGiraud's. Granted that he did not feel themoral obligation, as Giraud did, of holdingfirmly to the ANFA Agreement since he hadnot been a party to it, his views neverthelesswere known to be more in line with thoseheld by AFHQ officials.69 At any rate,Eisenhower's advice not to be mesmerizedby the number of divisions to be re-equippedhad accurately identified the chief weaknessin General Giraud's reasoning. TheFrench Commander in Chief's insistenceon adhering strictly to the original eleven-

division program was understandable fromboth the psychological and national pointsof view. Yet it could hardly stand upagainst the realities of the time. Primarilyit was irreconcilable with the firm Ameri-can decision not to provide troops and serv-ices in support of the French expeditionaryforces.

Meeting on 31 December, the CCS re-jected Eisenhower's proposal of 23 Novem-ber that he be authorized to determine theappropriateness of any solution of the re-armament problem which Giraud mightpropose. They felt and agreed that, for thesake of co-ordination on the part of theagencies involved, matters pertaining toFrench rearmament should continue to bepresented for their consideration with therecommendation of the Allied Commanderin Chief in the theater.70 The decision wascommunicated to General Sir Henry Mait-land Wilson, who was succeeding GeneralEisenhower in the Mediterranean with thenew title of Supreme Allied Commander,Mediterranean Theater.71

The Munitions Assignments Board hadmade no assignments to the French sinceOctober but was ready to resume them ifand when the theater so requested. Forsome time now, the theater had delayedtaking final action on the proposed reduc-tion of the program pending word fromGeneral Giraud.72 AFHQ, however, couldwait no longer. The decision to use thebulk of the French forces in the ANVIL op-eration on 1 May made it necessary to endpolicy debates. On 1 January AFHQ setthe deadline for the readiness of partici-pating French troops at 1 April. With only

68 Min of Interv, Eisenhower with de Gaulle, 30Dec 43, JRC 908 Policy and Plan—Misc.

69 Interv with Loomis, Jun 50.

7 0Min, CCS 139th Mtg, 31 Dec 43.71 Msg 6133, CCS to AFHQ, 1 Jan 44, FAN 288.7 2Rpt, MAB to CCS, 31 Dec 43, sub: Status

of Fr Rearmt Program, ABC 091.711 France (6Oct 43), Sec 2-a.


three months left for preparations, therecould no longer be any question of devot-ing further effort to revising the 15 AugustPlan. Instead it was imperative to deter-mine what units were considered essentialfor the contemplated operations andwhether or not they could be equipped andmade ready by 1 April.

Expecting that a firm French troop listfor ANVIL would soon be established, AFHQagreed to resume shipments from theUnited States. On 1 January the JRC or-dered the equipment for those units of theNovember and December slices of the Au-gust Plan which it considered essential forthe contemplated operations, and which inits estimation the French could be expectedto have trained and ready by 1 April. TheJRC eliminated all other units, such as onearmy corps headquarters, one armored di-vision, one tank destroyer battalion, fourshore battalions, and various supportingunits for which the French did not havethe necessary trained personnel. Further-more, in anticipation of a reduction of theover-all program, the committee requestedthe War Department to place the remain-ing infantry division of the November slicein last priority. On 2 January GeneralLoomis queried the War Department re-garding the possibility of equipping eighty-three other supporting combat and serviceorganizations whose addition to the AugustPlan was considered necessary. No equip-ment was currently available for these unitsin North Africa.73

On 9 January Lt. Gen. J. A. H. Gammell,successor to General Smith as Chief of Staff,AFHQ, informed General Giraud of the

measures being taken by AFHQ as a resultof the limited time available for prepara-tions. He urged Giraud to bend all effortsto provide units for which there was urgentneed, and to postpone the formation of thosenot required in the immediate future. Ap-pended to his communication was a list ofunits on the 15 August Plan no longer con-sidered essential and therefore being de-ferred, and of those urgently needed by 1April or immediately after that date forwhich equipment would be made availableif they could be trained and made ready indue time.74

General Gammell's letter brought an im-mediate reply from General Giraud. Whilesignifying his agreement in principle, theFrench Commander in Chief restated hisintention of retaining "as a basis" the 15August Plan. He confirmed the news thathad already reached AFHQ informally thatthe National Defense Committee had or-dered the deactivation of two infantry di-visions (the 8th Algerian Infantry and the10th Colonial Infantry). The action, hepointed out, was expected to make availablelarge numbers of personnel for the creationof supporting units. Giraud then voicedhis belief that it would be possible at a laterdate to set up the units deferred at thistime, in particular the fourth armoreddivision.75

AFHQ's proposal to eliminate the fourtharmored division from the program hadgreatly distressed General Giraud. In amoving appeal to General Marshall, he ex-plained that he had consented to the elim-ination of two infantry divisions in orderto retain the fourth armored division. Heurged Marshall to demonstrate once again7 3Msg 22135/W-9044, Eisenhower to AGWAR,

1 Jan 44, JRC Cable Log; Memo, Loomis forLutes, 2 Jan 44, JRC 904 Modification of Rearmt:Msg W-9934/27229, Wilson to CCS, 11 Jan 44,NAF 586.

74 Ltr, Gammell to Giraud, 9 Jan 44, JRC 903Requests for Units.

75 Ltr, Giraud to Wilson, 11 Jan 44, in same file.


his "sympathy for France" by pressing forthe maintenance of a unit which, for tacti-cal reasons, would be "indispensable" in theforthcoming operations.76

The National Defense Committee's deci-sion to abolish two infantry divisions, con-firmed in General Giraud's Order 16 of 11January, had been reached after the com-mittee became convinced that no other stepcould produce personnel for service units.Even officers of General Giraud's personalstaff, who for several months had foughttooth and nail for the retention of the entireprogram, had finally come to the conclusionthat deficits in technical personnel were toogreat to permit implementation of the pro-gram in its entirety. The elimination oftwo infantry rather than one armored andone infantry divisions had been decidedupon by the committee for two reasons.First, it was expected to yield 3,500 moremen. Second, it would make it possible,much as Giraud himself had indicated inhis last letter to General Marshall, to retainthe greatest possible number of armored di-visions whose role in the forthcoming opera-tions the committee considered important.The French General Staff was planning touse the 30,000-odd men now made avail-able to fill deficits in two other divisions(the 7th Algerian and 9th Colonial Infan-try Divisions), to provide personnel for sup-porting combat and service units, and finallyto complete army corps headquarters andbase units.77

AFHQ officials did not share the Frenchview on the fourth armored division. Intheir judgment, terrain in southern Francedid not favor the employment of armor.

They had fixed the composition of theFrench-U.S. invading force at two armoredto eight infantry divisions. The two ar-mored divisions, they agreed, would be pro-vided by the French, and a third Frencharmored division, if required, would be em-ployed in the cross-Channel operation.They saw no use, therefore, for the fourtharmored division (the 3d DB), which theFrench had already organized and partlyequipped.78 Moreover, they suspected thatthe French action in deactivating two in-fantry divisions would result, in practice, inthe elimination of only one from the pro-gram. Indeed the 1st DMI, heretofore re-tained as a twelfth nonprogram division,was now being incorporated in the pro-gram. There would still be left, in effect,six infantry and four armored divisions, ora total of ten. Such an arrangement hardlyaccorded with the recommendations of thetheater that the program be reduced to eightdivisions.

The need for a speedy decision in thematter was becoming increasingly urgent ifonly for psychological reasons. Uncer-tainty as to their future was causing amarked lowering of morale among the offi-cers and men of the two divisions whose fatewas still in the balance. These were the3d Armored and the 7th Algerian Infantry.The 3d DB was only partly equipped andtrained. The 7th DIA had at one time re-ceived most of its American equipment andhad done considerable training. In recentweeks some of its matériel had been turnedover to the Spahis Brigade; now more of itwas being transferred to the 1st DMI.79

Once they had eliminated the 8th DIA

76 Ltr, Giraud to Marshall, 10 Jan 44, OPD 336.2France, Sec 2.

77 Résumé des Opérations de Réarmement, FrReds File 218, OCMH.

78 Msg 578, Devers to Marshall, 28 Jan 44, CM-IN 19255.

79 Memo, Loomis for G-3 AFHQ, 30 Dec 43,JRC 370/001 Employment of Units—Gen.


and 10th DIC, the French military author-ities undertook to revise their activation pro-gram on the basis of manpower now avail-able to them. On 17 January the NationalDefense Committee submitted to the JRC acopy of the revised program together withappropriate requisitions for matériel withwhich to equip new units. The programrepresented an attempt to effect a compro-mise between the demands of AFHQ forcertain essential supporting units and theFrench desire to retain units recently de-ferred by AFHQ. It still included a fourtharmored division, although in second pri-ority, as well as a number of units whichAFHQ considered no longer necessary. An-ticipating that AFHQ would raise objec-tions to their proposal, the committee askedthat a conference be held without delay atwhich representatives of the French Gen-eral Staff would furnish all pertinentinformation.80

While the French proposal was beingstudied by the JRC, discouraging news wasreceived from Washington. The CCS, itwas learned, had approved only partiallythe recommendations submitted by the thea-ter in mid-December on behalf of FrenchCommunications Zone establishments.81

They ruled out the provision of organiza-tional equipment and authorized only theissue of certain maintenance materials gen-erally falling into the category of expenda-ble supplies, and of such indispensable items(tools, electrical machines, and so on) ascould not be obtained from other sources,provided the French would present sufficientmilitary justification for each request.82 In

short, the Combined Chiefs were not ap-proving the full amount of even the ratherlimited quantities of matériel which thetheater had requested initially. In a subse-quent meeting with Brig. Gen. AugusteBrossin de Saint-Didier, the new chief ofthe French Military Mission in the UnitedStates, about to depart for Washington,General Loomis urged his visitor to takethe matter up directly with the War Depart-ment. He expressed the hope that a per-sonal approach would succeed where im-personal cables had failed in securing thenecessary supplies.83

The conference requested by the NationalDefense Committee was held on 22 January.It was attended by Brig. Gen. William C.Crane, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff,G-3, Generals Loomis and Leyer, ColonelsBlanc and Regnault, and other officers.After much discussion, the conferees drafteda list of the units considered necessary forparticipation in ANVIL. The list repre-sented in effect the basis of a final rearma-ment program. It was immediately sub-mitted to the National Defense Committee,which approved it formally on 23 January.The committee agreed that the troopsneeded to implement the plan, knownthereafter as the 23 January Plan, were tobe drawn from the 7th DIA and the 3d DB.These two organizations were to be retainedin cadre only, in the hope that they wouldbe reactivated and equipped at some laterdate.84 As Colonel Regnault pointed out toGeneral Loomis, the action constituted a"painful sacrifice" for the divisions con-cerned. The French High Command

80 Ltr, Regnault to Loomis, 17 Jan 44, JRC 903Requests for Units.

81 Msg NAF 546 cited n. 63, above.82 Msg 7468, CCS to Wilson, 18 Jan 44, FAN

321, as corrected by Msg 8743, AGWAR to Devers,3 Feb 44; Msg 267, AGWAR to Devers, 20 Feb 44,JRC Cable Log.

8 3Min, Conf Loomis with de Saint-Didier, 12Feb 44, AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec 337 (Fr)Mtgs and Confs, Vol. I.

84Decision, National Defense Committee, 23 Jan44, Rearmament Plan for Ground Forces, JRC902/I Rearmt Plan.


would try not to disintegrate their compo-nent elements but use them as constitutedunits within other organizations so as tomaintain coherence and efficiency. It wasimperative, then, that the necessary equip-ment be made available to them forthwith.Any delay would result in further loweringmorale and reducing efficiency.85

Before replying to Giraud's appeal of 10January for the retention of all four armoreddivisions, General Marshall sought the viewsof the theater on the question.86 Lt. Gen.Jacob L. Devers, who had recently replacedEisenhower as Commanding General, NA-TOUSA, reviewed for Marshall's benefit thestatus of the negotiations to date. He ex-plained how AFHQ had finally establisheda program aimed at equipping units whichthe French had the manpower to organizein full and which would be engaged in AN-VIL. As for the fourth armored division,General Devers expressed the opinion that itmight be advisable to agree to its retentionon the program with the understanding thatthe furnishing of equipment would be de-ferred indefinitely and that no personnelwould be reserved for it. Such a procedure,he explained, would "appease French am-bitions and at the same time accomplish ourpurposes." 87

The long and irksome struggle over serv-ice units appeared over for the moment at

least. The victory won by AFHQ hadmade possible the establishment of a newarmament plan, sound and reasonable andtherefore workable. When it had been ap-proved by the CCS, an action which theywere certain to take, both the French andthe Americans would have before them adefinite objective: the readying of a specifictask force for operations in France. Dur-ing the final implementation of the program,as many of the units as operationally prac-ticable would be battle-tested beforehand inItaly in accordance with the desires of theCCS. The others would train in NorthAfrica. Ultimately, all would take part inOVERLORD and ANVIL.

The 23 January Plan included in theorysix infantry and four armored divisions, andsome 245 supporting organizations of whichapproximately 210 were units of the former15 August Plan and 35 were additions. Ac-tually, since one infantry division was beingretained in cadre only, and one armoreddivision was deferred indefinitely, the pro-gram consisted of just five infantry andthree armored divisions, or a total of eightdivisions. That was the number whichGeneral Smith had recommended as a rea-sonable target in the course of his conversa-tions in Washington back in October 1943.

The French had so far received from U.S.sources the equipment considered necessaryfor eight divisions and 164 supporting com-bat and service organizations. To imple-ment the 23 January Plan in full, the task ofsupplying matériel for approximately 80supporting organizations remained to beaccomplished.

85 Memo, Regnault for Loomis, 25 Jan 44, insame file.

86 Msg 8180, Marshall to Devers, 26 Jan 44, JRCCable Log.

87 Msg W-1489, Devers to Marshall, 30 Jan 44,AFHQ Cable Log.

CHAPTER VIII

The Program Marks Time(November 1943-February 1944)

II

The French Reorganize Their SupplySystem

Efforts to induce the French High Com-mand to establish a sound supply systemparalleled those which were exerted to prodit into organizing service units. Almostfrom the beginning of the rearmament op-erations, AFHQ attempted to push theNorth African Army into a position whereit would ultimately be able to supply andmaintain itself properly. As early as 24March 1943 the chairman of the JRCpointed out informally to his French col-leagues on the committee how desirable itwould be for the French military authoritiesto reorganize their supply system along thelines of the American Services of Supply inthe theater. Two weeks later, just beforethe arrival of convoy UGS 6½, the firstlarge-scale shipment of U.S. matériel, heurged the French General Staff, this timein writing, to centralize the control of sup-ply services and to institute material statusreports similar to those used in the U.S.Army.1

After UGS 6½ was unloaded, reportsreached the JRC indicating that U.S.equipment was piling up in ports becausethe existing French supply system was un-

able to keep pace with the rate of deliveries.By September the situation appeared tohave worsened considerably. GeneralKingman, Chief, French Training Section,was expressing deep concern over the ap-parent incapacity of the French to organizetheir supply services on a good workingbasis. On 3 September, General Kingmanwarned the JRC at length that lack of sup-ply organization was having a serious effecton the efficiency of the entire French ord-nance system. Even division ordnanceunits, he reported, were accomplishing rela-tively little real maintenance work becausethey could not obtain spare parts from theresponsible supply agencies. As a result,the troops were getting insufficient training.The number of deadlined vehicles in thedivisions was slowly increasing, and thesupply services were making little effectiveeffort to forward the required spare partsfrom depot establishments. These andother deficiencies were, in the opinion ofGeneral Kingman, unfortunate from thepoint of view of both morale and training.Nor was the situation due to lack of ma-tériel. The French were at the time re-ceiving large amounts of spare parts, butthey were having extreme difficulty in iden-tifying them and had little, if any, knowl-edge as to what echelon of maintenancethe parts should be assigned. Units ap-

1 Memo, Col Ira A. Crump for Loomis, 18 Oct43, JRC 400.2/002 Stock Control System.

THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: II 131

peared not to know what agency or author-ity they must look to for the satisfaction oftheir needs. Division ordnance officers hadno definite idea where they should go to se-cure the required parts and no knowledgeas to the exact location of depots.2

Already War Department officials inWashington had been receiving a "collec-tion of informal reports, rumors, and gos-sip," tending to show that the French wereunable to absorb properly their U.S. maté-riel and were misusing some items.3 In theopinion of General Spalding, then chair-man of the JRC, the facts as reported toWashington were probably exaggerated.True, there had been "certain accumula-tions," but the congestion was no more thancould be expected under the circumstances.The French, he explained in a letter to aMAB official, were still having consider-able difficulty in obtaining space for theirdepots as the British and U.S. Armies weresuperimposed on the limited facilities avail-able in North Africa.4

Briefly, the inadequacy of the existingFrench supply system could be ascribed totwo causes. First the supply services werehandicapped by insufficient storage facilities,a matter soon to be remedied, for the U.S.Army was giving up considerable spaceespecially at Casablanca. Second, their or-ganization, judged by American standards,was totally inadequate. In French Mo-rocco there was as yet no individual officerresponsible for over-all supply and mainte-nance activity in connection with serviceinstallations, depots, and central stock con-trol in the area. No stock record cards werebeing kept of what was available in depots.

At the vehicle assembly plant in Casablanca,personnel rotated so rapidly that the estab-lishment of any efficient organization wasimpossible. Practically no use was made ofthe instruction literature sent along with theitems; it was often thrown away. Nor wasthe lack of a supply authority peculiar toFrench Morocco. JRC officials were con-vinced that no one in the French Army,either in Algiers or elsewhere, knew whatmatériel was available or where. Theywere told that division commanders werevisiting depots for the purpose of helpingthemselves.5

The situation called for immediate correc-tive measures. In the opinion of GeneralKingman, the time had come for the Amer-icans to undertake a detailed survey ofthe entire French ordnance organization,then to assign qualified U.S. personnel tothe French for the purpose of helping themestablish a sound supply system within theshortest possible time.6

Endorsing General Kingman's views andrecommendations, General Spalding re-solved to bring the whole matter up for theconsideration of the French. Preferring forthe moment not to approach the FrenchGeneral Staff officially, he invited ColonelRegnault to discuss informally with him andhis assistant, Colonel Artamonoff, the exist-ing situation, as well as possible correctivemeasures. AFHQ officials, he pointed out,were eager to learn whether or not theFrench High Command contemplatedadopting the U.S. ordnance system. Therewas some doubt on their part as to the in-terest shown by many officers of the Servicedu Matériel, or Ordnance Department, inAlgiers regarding their functions. On theother hand, they were aware of the difficulty

2 Memo, Kingman for Spalding, 3 Sep 43, JRC333/001 Inspections—Misc.

3 L t r 5, Lt Col Roger Jones, MAB, to Spald-ing, 27 Aug 43, JRC 472 MAB.

4 Ltr, Spalding to Jones, 8 Oct 43, JRC 472 MAB.

5 Interv with Loomis, Sep 51.6 Memo cited n. 2.


the French services faced in finding sufficientqualified technicians to carry out their workproperly. General Spalding then voiced hisown and Colonel Artamonoff's belief that itwas highly desirable for the French HighCommand to reorganize its supply systemor at least give it a shot in the arm by apply-ing the U.S. system "in its spirit." Therewas need, he observed, of building up themorale of Ordnance Department officers atall echelons. Theirs was an essential role.It was possible, concluded General Spald-ing, that the issuance by the French HighCommand of a general directive on the re-sponsibilities of the Ordnance Departmentcould improve the situation if it were strin-gently enforced.7

Colonel Regnault immediately conveyedto General Leyer the American desire to seethe French establish their own counterpartof the U.S. stock control section then func-tioning in Oran. Maj. Gen. Thomas B.Larkin, chief of SOS, NATOUSA, had forsome time urged the French to establishsuch a unit in Oran close to the U.S. section.The unit could serve a twofold purpose:provide centralized control of supplies andequipment, and prepare requisitions for theinitial equipping of units or their mainte-nance after departure from North Africa.General Larkin recommended that the unitbe operated by the French themselves withsuch assistance as might be necessary fromqualified U.S. Army personnel.8

Official French reaction to the Americanproposal was mixed. The French wel-comed the opportunity to establish a stockcontrol unit at Oran, but did not believe it

necessary to give up altogether the existingorganization in Algiers.9 In an effort toprod them into quick action, General Spald-ing took the matter up directly with theFrench General Staff. On 27 Septemberhe informed General Leyer that both thecommanding general of SOS and the dep-uty theater commander considered the es-tablishment in Oran of a central stock con-trol unit for the French forces to be a ne-cessity. He then outlined the desirable com-position and responsibilities of such a unitas envisaged by SOS on the basis of experi-ence acquired through similar earlier un-dertakings. The unit should be composedof French officers and enlisted men havingas much acquaintance as possible with U.S.matériel and with problems connected withrequisitions, stock control, and related mat-ters. It should also include a small groupof U.S. experts in questions of supply andrequisitions to assist in setting up and op-erating the unit. General Spalding sug-gested a tentative ratio of one American tofour French. He then recommended thatthe unit be established preferably in a build-ing adjacent to the office of SOS. In thismanner, constant, close contact would bemaintained with SOS in all matters per-taining to requisitioning of supplies and is-sue of items to expeditionary corps units.By the same token, unnecessary delays inthe exchange of correspondence betweenOran and Algiers would be avoided. Inthe past, such delays had often been thesource of considerable annoyance.10

General Spalding's recommendationbrought forth the desired result. The nextday, 28 September, the French High Com-mand ordered the establishment in Oran of7 Min Mtg, Spalding, Artamonoff, and Regnault,

4 Sep 43, in Gen Regnault's private papers.8 Note 568, Regnault to Blanc, 13 Sep 43, in

Gen Regnault's private papers: Msg, Larkin toDevers, 14 Sep 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div OpsFr Rearmt.

9 Msg 6314, Devers to Larkin, 18 Sep 43, JRC400.2/002 Stock Control System.

10 Memo, Spalding for Leyer, 27 Sep 43, JRC400.2/002 Stock Control System.


a central supply authority known as ServiceCentral des Approvisionnements et Maté-riels Américains (SCAMA). Its chief wasto be an officer of French G—4 responsibledirectly to the Chief of Staff. Because oflimited personnel and material means, how-ever, serious difficulties were anticipated insetting up the unit. Nevertheless, FrenchG—4 was currently preparing a directive onits functioning and mission.11

The speedy establishment of SCAMAseemed essential at a time when the firstexpeditionary units were getting ready toleave for Italy. By the provisions of a planthen under consideration by Allied andFrench staffs, the French supply system andSOS, NATOUSA, were to share in the re-sponsibility for the supply and maintenanceof these units.12 Effective implementationof the plan required that the French supplyagencies be in a position at all times to pro-vide SOS with detailed information as tothe quantities available in their depots foreach type of supply. General Larkin wasinsistent that, in addition to organizing acentral authority in Oran, the French estab-lish at once in Casablanca a competent ad-ministrative agency vested with sufficientauthority to act with vigor and promptnessin consolidating all French Army supply ac-tivity in Morocco. Unless this was done,he warned, the French supply headquar-ters would not have a stock provisioningsystem "in any sense of the term." 13

The first of a series of instructions onstock control was issued by General Leyeron 15 October. It dealt with the organiza-

tion and functioning of the newly createdSCAMA. Initially, SCAMA was given thefollowing mission:

To keep the French High Command postedon the exact status of U.S. supplies and equip-ment of all types, and their distribution at thetime, so that the Command can, with fullknowledge of the facts, place orders with aview to satisfying, in the shortest possible timeand under the best conditions, the needs of theunits, and send to the U.S. authorities justi-fiable requisitions whenever necessary.

Later on, "at a date yet to be fixed,"SCAMA was to centralize material and fi-nancial accounting operations for all U.S.equipment.14

The instruction, although representing astep in the right direction, was wholly in-adequate. In the opinion of Col. Ira A.Crump, chief Ordnance officer of the JRC,its provisions were only half measures en-acted with little or no conviction of the realimportance of the entire undertaking. Cen-tralization, he pointed out, was needed atonce, not at a later date. He feared thatthe French military authorities did not real-ize the magnitude of the problem with re-spect to both volume of supplies to be han-dled and necessity of a rigid stock control,or else they were expecting the U.S. Armyto assume part or all of their supply func-tions. It was all the more urgent, there-fore, to press them for a concrete supply planof their own so that a definite basis for fu-ture requirements and assistance could beestablished. The current situation, hewarned, was critical and likely to result indelaying the employment of French units.15

Colonel Crump's suspicion that theFrench military authorities were countingon assistance from U.S. Army supply and

11 Memos, Leyer for Spalding, 30 Sep 43, andRegnault for Spalding, 30 Sep 43, JRC 400.2/002Stock Control System.

12See below, pp. 138-39.13 Msg L-6335, Larkin to Devers, 7 Oct 43, and

Memo, Larkin for Hughes, 21 Oct 43, JRC 400.2/001 Admin of Sup—Gen.

14 Instruction 3751/3/EMGG/4, 15 Oct 43, JRC400.2/002 Stock Control System.

15 Memo cited n. 1, above.


ordnance services merely confirmed the feel-ing that AFHQ had already gained as aresult of the feud over French service units.The current lack of interest on the part ofthe French in reforming their supply sys-tem could be construed as one more indica-tion that they expected the U.S. Army tosupply, service, and maintain their forces.Yet they had been repeatedly warned notto depend on such assistance and urged towork toward self-reliance by all possiblemeans. In the opinion of AFHQ officials,the time had come to put them in a positionwhere they must take energetic action.

Writing to General Giraud on 20 Oc-tober, General Whiteley, Acting Chief ofStaff, AFHQ, set forth in clear termsAFHQ's position on the matter of supplycontrol. To make it possible for the Com-manding General, SOS, NATOUSA, tohave accurate and timely information onthe status of supply in French installations,the French Army was requested to estab-lish in Oran a central stock control group.This group was to maintain stock recordsand a central provisioning control on allclasses of supply held by depots. Such con-trol was to be based on U.S. Army propertyaccounting and supply control procedure.In addition, the French Army was requestedto maintain at Headquarters, SOS, NA-TOUSA, a liaison group consisting of onesenior grade officer, well-qualified and ex-perienced in supply matters and with suf-ficient authority to act for the French Com-mander in Chief on all supply problems, andof qualified officers for liaison duty withthe various U.S. Army supply services.Finally, the French Army was to make avail-able upon the request of the CommandingGeneral, SOS, NATOUSA, any necessarydata to assure complete utilization of stocks

on hand for the maintenance of Frenchforces.16

This was no longer a suggestion but afirm request calling for General Giraud'searly approval so as to enable AFHQ toissue final directives to the responsible Al-lied agencies. Five days later, on 25 Oc-tober, the French Commander in Chief sig-nified his agreement on the various pointsraised in General Whiteley's letter.17

Once again, as in the case of service units,the American concept that the French forcesmust achieve self-reliance had triumphedover the reluctance of the French to under-take what seemed to them an unnecessaryand, in all likelihood, an almost impossibletask considering the lack of qualified per-sonnel.

The French General Staff had now noother alternative than to set up an ordnancesystem patterned after the American SOS.The success of such an undertaking re-quired, first of all, that supply officers at allechelons be fully convinced of the urgencyof the proposed reorganization. That theywere subsequently won over was largely be-cause of the efforts of Colonel Blanc, thenAssistant Chief of Staff for both CM andG-4. His energetic intervention succeededin allaying the reluctance, indeed the hos-tility, shown by various heads of services tothe projected reorganization. ColonelBlanc's own rallying to the American pointof view had been the result of the convinc-ing interpretation which the French repre-sentatives on the JRC had given him ofAmerican views and procedures. Their ef-forts, coupled with the persistent yet tact-ful, and friendly guidance offered by the

1 6Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 20 Oct 43, AFHQ0100/4 SACS Red Sec, Fr Matters, Vol. I.

17 Memo, Giraud for CinC Allied Forces, 25 Oct43, JRC 400.2/001 Admin of Sup—Gen.


successive chairmen of the JRC from Col-onel Gardiner down to General Loomis,contributed much to bringing about thefinal meeting of French and Americanminds on the matter of supply organization.

To assist the French in establishing asound and efficient supply machinery andmore generally to effect liaison with them onall supply matters, SOS, NATOUSA,placed, beginning 4 October, trained per-sonnel at the disposal of SCAMA. The of-ficers and men so detailed soon formed adetachment known as Stock Control Section,JRC. Technically on duty with the JRC,the section, headed by Col. Michael J.Geraghty, acted as a link between SOS,SCAMA, and the JRC.18

The early history of SCAMA was markedby unparalleled confusion.19 For someweeks nothing seemed to get done. But thejob was tremendous. SCAMA had to dealwith literally hundreds of depots, small ware-houses, and storage annexes scatteredthroughout French North Africa and in-dividually responsible to one of several au-thorities. Among these was an organiza-tion known as Centre de Réception des Ma-tériels Américains (CRMA), set up in thespring of 1943 in Casablanca. It controlledall supplies of American origin and waslargely responsible for their distribution.However, it was not co-ordinated in any waywith the French Supply Services, which con-cerned themselves primarily with matérielof French source, and it maintained ware-houses separate from those of the services.Controlled from Algiers, CRMA worked in

conjunction with a special branch of theGeneral Staff which had been establishedin Casablanca for the purpose of gettingAmerican equipment into the hands of units.CRMA kept no stock record accounts. Theother agency at least kept a card for eachunit being rearmed. But the card listedonly the major items issued; no entry wasmade of accessories, tools, spare parts, basicloads, allowances of all categories, andindividual expendable equipment. Stillanother branch of the General Staff, func-tioning in Oran and apparently working in-dependently of the Casablanca branch, wasresponsible for building up stocks of mainte-nance supplies for the units preparing to gooverseas.

The confusion created by two sets of de-pots was evident everywhere. Service de-pots, which frequently received supplies asan overflow from CRMA depots, were ac-tually issuing to units items of equipmentno one had any record of having received.Little attempt was being made in either cate-gory of depots to account for supplies onhand and very few records of stocks wereavailable anywhere. Such a chaotic situa-tion emphasized the urgent need of settingup SCAMA as the central authority in ac-counting, recording, and stock reporting.

The lack of qualified personnel servedonly to aggravate the confusion. Scarcityof personnel can best be appreciated whenit is realized that, as late as the end of No-vember 1943, one officer with no assistancewhatsoever was handling the CasablancaPharmacy, a medical depot somewhat sim-ilar to the U.S. Medical Issue Warehouse.20

For several months the manpower problemremained a serious one. Men assigned to

l8 For details on the composition, evolution, andtechnical operation of SCAMA and of Stock Con-trol Section, see pp. 288-93, below.

19 History of Stock Control Section, JRC, n. d.,copy in JRC files: Memo, Geraghty for Loomis, sub:Rpt of Stock Control Sec, 8 Jul 44, JRC 400.2/002Stock Control System.

20 Memo, Lt Col A. T. Maxwell, Atlantic BaseSec, for Larkin, 27 Nov 43, JRC 400.2/002 StockControl System.


SCAMA by the French General Staff wereuntrained and often untrainable, for theyincluded a substantial proportion of nativesunwanted elsewhere and generally ignorantof the French language—in short, of a typeunsatisfactory even as common laborers.

Lack of physical means was equallyacute. Warehouse equipment, transporta-tion, tools, and covered space were insuffi-cient. Depots even lacked such office sup-plies as pencils, typewriters, carbon paper,stationery, forms, and filing cabinets. Theywere using school tablets and scraps ofpaper on which to record stocks. Their re-ports to chiefs of services in Algiers or toCRMA were made largely by telephone inthe absence of other means. Providingthem with a minimum of essential suppliesproved at first difficult because SOS wasforbidden by NATOUSA from issuing any-thing to the French without special author-ity in each case. In mid-October a specialinitial authorization from NATOUSA en-abled SOS to turn over to the depots suchstationery and office supplies as were inexcess of its own needs. On 4 NovemberNATOUSA approved issue to SCAMA of200,000 U.S. stock record cards. Withina short time, SCAMA was receiving Ameri-can catalogues, standard nomenclature lists,tables of organization, tables of equipment,and many other useful publications. It wasalso able to obtain on loan freight-handlingequipment.

Other difficulties hampered the setting upof SCAMA, such as language differencesand the frequent impossibility of reconcilingFrench nomenclature as given by ware-houses with that used in American cata-logues or standard nomenclature lists.And then there were differences in nationalidiosyncrasies. The easygoing NorthAfrican natives were not always ready to

adopt the American practice of gettingthings done in a hurry.

More disquieting, especially to ColonelGeraghty who was determined to see thereorganization project through, was the factthat SCAMA, after two months of existence,was still without anything but a very gen-eral statement of what it was to accomplish.It had no official standing or place withinthe French military organization. Threesuccessive directives had failed to vest inSCAMA the authority needed to effect realcentralization. Its director, Col. EmileCharpentier, although regarded by hisAmerican colleagues as highly qualified forthe position he held, could not prevent in-dividual supply services from frequently dis-regarding his orders.

With SCAMA unable to assert itselfspeedily and effectively, the general Frenchsupply situation was bound to deterioratefurther. First to suffer were the troopsabout to depart or already en route for Italywith incomplete equipment. Their predica-ment, General Larkin pointed out on 13November, was indicative of a completefailure of the supply system; the failureprecluded any substantial support of the ex-peditionary forces from French sources.There was no solution but for the U.S. Armyto assume the entire maintenance respon-sibility until such time as the French them-selves knew what they had and where itwas.21 Thereupon General Larkin re-quested and obtained from General Eisen-hower the authorization to inspect depotsfor the purpose of assisting French supplyofficers in locating items needed by unitsabout to depart, and if necessary to removeand ship any items so found to appropriate

2 1Msg L-9908, Larkin to NATOUSA, 13 Nov43, JRC Cable Log.


destinations.22 After he had inspected sup-ply installations in Casablanca, GeneralLarkin reported that supplies were being"dissipated through absence of centralizedcontrol." He warned that maintenance bythe French of their forces would be ex-tremely difficult under the present "loose"organization. He urged once again thatSCAMA be given sufficient authority to en-able it to carry out its mission.23

It was not until 9 January 1944 that theFrench General Staff, rescinding all priorinstructions, issued a new one that greatlyextended SCAMA's authority in the sup-ply field. Many of the administrative re-strictions which in the past had provedharmful were now removed. ThereafterSCAMA was:

1. to furnish to the French High Com-mand, whenever called upon to do so, theexact status of all stocks of matériel and sup-ply of all kinds; and to do this in such a man-ner as would permit the French High Com-mand to arrange for the best use of availablestocks and to prepare requisitions for sub-mission to the United States;

2. to ensure the proper execution of theHigh Command's decisions relative to bothinitial equipping of troops and their main-tenance ;

3. to maintain close liaison with SOSNATOUSA with a view to settling quicklyall questions of shipping or transfer ofsupplies.24

To SCAMA's director, Colonel Charpen-tier, the instruction delegated specific au-thority over organization and function. Ac-

tually, organization was not designed by thedirector, but was thrust upon him by themanner in which activities, previously op-erating independently, were associated, oneby one, with his office. The higher com-mand still seemed reluctant to grant the nec-essary absolute authority. SCAMA founditself repeatedly hampered by official inter-ference. A case in point was the Casa-blanca Base. The French High Commandhad placed all military bases established inthe ports of embarkation and debarkationunder SCAMA control, either directly orthrough representatives. Yet the same com-mand did not hesitate to infringe onSCAMA's authority by organizing theCasablanca Base and naming its director.As a result, the base became a source of con-stant confusion.

Another unsatisfactory feature of the 9January instruction was that it containedseveral ambiguous phrases and loose termswhich subsequently gave rise to a numberof misunderstandings. As late as March1944 some French agencies were still tryingto bypass SCAMA in submitting requisi-tions. Greatly disturbed over this situa-tion, Colonel Geraghty feared that, unlesscorrective measures were applied withoutdelay, SCAMA's brave efforts would befutile.

It is interesting to note that, whereasSCAMA remained under the effective con-trol of the French General Staff, at no timewas the American Stock Control Section,JRC, the subject of a single order fromhigher U.S. authority. In fact it had no of-ficial existence. Even its name was as-sumed, having merely been approved by thechairman of the JRC. Colonel Geraghtyhad been given free hand in running hissection as he deemed best. He determinedits internal organization, issued the neces-

22 Msgs L-40, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 14 Nov43, 1752, Eisenhower to Larkin, 16 Nov 43, andL-773, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 22 Nov 43, JRCCable Log.

23 Msgs L-2271, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 5Dec 43, L-2459, Larkin to JRC, 6 Dec 43, andL-2805, Larkin to JRC, 9 Dec 43, JRC 400.2/002Stock Control System.

24 Instruction 340, EMGG/4, 9 Jan 44, JRC400.2/002 Stock Control System.


sary instructions, and detailed his person-nel with a view to providing the Frenchwith the maximum assistance. He suc-ceeded in developing a highly efficient sys-tem by which French and American tech-nicians were put to work together. Thiscollaboration ultimately made possible thesetting up of a sound supply system. To en-sure its spread to French depots and in-stallations in other areas, Stock Control Sec-tion later opened branch offices in Algiersand Casablanca (February 1944) and inTunis (May 1944).

In spite of its many handicaps and short-comings, SCAMA began to grow in statureand efficiency, largely through the excellentco-operation between its personnel and thatof Stock Control Section. Recognizing itsincreasing importance in the supply sys-tem, the French General Staff gradually as-signed to it additional qualified members,both military and civilian. Numberingsome 20 officers and 20 civilians at the endof October, SCAMA could boast, twomonths later, a total strength of 320 per-sons, including 65 senior and junior officers,70 enlisted men, and 185 civilian employees.Issuance of the 9 January instruction defi-nitely accelerated progress by providing thenecessary spur. Colonels Geraghty andCharpentier prepared and issued a pam-phlet for use by the services as a sort of text-book on all supply matters. By mid-Janu-ary they had printed and were distributingsome three million forms which standard-ized procedures and made possible "a com-mon language and a common meetingground for supply interests throughout theServices." An instruction issued by ColonelCharpentier on 26 January set forth the re-lations to be established between the variousechelons of SCAMA, and prescribed theforms to be used throughout the entire sup-

ply system.25 By this time some progresscould be noted in the preparation of stockrecord accounts and in the reporting ofstocks to SCAMA. It was apparent that therecasting of the French supply system hadpassed the planning stage: the "house ofSCAMA" was about to enter the finalphase of its organization.

Supply and Maintenance of theExpeditionary Forces

Efficient and timely re-equipping of unitswas not the only benefit expected from thereorganization of the French supply sys-tem. It was hoped in addition that theFrench military authorities would be betterable to supply and maintain their forces incombat, another responsibility which hadbecome theirs as a result of the broad appli-cation of the concept of self-reliance.

The development of a supply plan forforces in the field began to receive consid-erable attention in August 1943 when thedecision was reached to use French unitsin Italy. The basic policy as set forth byHeadquarters, NATOUSA, was thatFrench troops, from the moment they de-parted from North Africa, passed from thesupply control of the French General Staffto that of Fifth Army.26 Fifth Army's re-sponsibility in the matter was limited, how-ever. It consisted merely in ensuring thecontinuous flow of maintenance suppliesinto the hands of the French units under itscontrol. The French military authoritiesthemselves were charged with providing

25 Instruction 43/D, SCAMA, 26 Jan 44, in His-tory of Stock Control Section, JRC, copy in JRCfiles.

2 6Msg 390, CG NATOUSA to CG SOSNATOUSA, 12 Aug 43, JRC 400.4/003 Mainte-nance for Forces Operating With Fifth Army.


from their own sources, be they of French,American, or other origin, a determinednumber of equipment items. SOS, actingas the supply agent for Fifth Army, wasresponsible for making certain that all thenecessary items were made available fromFrench sources, or, if necessary, from U.S.sources pending reimbursement by theFrench, and for effecting their transporta-tion to the theater of operations. Its rolewas far from negligible and its position be-tween provider and consumer a thanklessone. In the last analysis, however, it wason the French General Staff that the chiefresponsibility fell for furnishing the main-tenance supplies for the expeditionaryforces.

There remained the task of determiningwith accuracy the division of responsibilityamong the three authorities concerned—the French General Staff, SOS, and FifthArmy—and of taking adequate steps tomake certain that each was carrying out itsrespective share of the combined operation.This led to a long series of discussions, con-ferences, and studies.

At a preliminary conference, held atAFHQ on 29 September 1943, the en-tire question of the supply of French ex-peditionary forces was examined. Theconference, attended by representativesfrom the JRC, SOS, the Fifth Army, andthe French Supply Services, emphasizedtwo important points. The first was theneed for the French authorities to submit, inample time, requisitions on the UnitedStates, through the JRC, for the assignmentto them of items not currently available intheir stocks. Second, it was urgent forthem to accelerate the setting up of the pro-posed SCAMA system then under consid-eration in order to guarantee the speedy

and continuous flow of supplies to the ex-peditionary forces.27

Three weeks later, General Whiteley,Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, submitted toGeneral Giraud for his concurrence a plancovering all aspects of the supply problem,including completion of initial equipment,transportation of troops and matériel, andmaintenance of forces in combat. The rec-ommended policy with respect to mainte-nance envisaged the following division of re-sponsibility: Fifth Army was to submit toSOS separate requisitions for the mainte-nance of French units under its control;SOS was to fill such requisitions by placingcalls upon the French military authorities;the latter were to deliver the required itemsfrom stocks available to them or made avail-able to them through the JRC.28

The French Commander in Chief havingconcurred in the proposal, AFHQ, on 29October, issued a directive officially charg-ing SOS, NATOUSA, with the responsi-bility for the mounting and maintenance ofthe French forces operating with the FifthArmy in accordance with the provisions sub-mitted to General Giraud. AFHQ stipu-lated, in addition, that essential supplieswhich definitely could not be furnished fromFrench resources would be provided fromU.S. stocks if available, such issues to bereported and accounted for in accordancewith established procedures. The Frenchwere, of course, to reimburse SOS for theitems so transferred as soon as practicable.29

The success of the supply plan was de-

27Min, Conf on Sup of CEF, 29 Sep 43, JRC400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat.

2 8Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 20 Oct 43, AFHQ0100/4 SACS Red Sec, Fr Matters, Vol. I.

29 Ltrs, Giraud to CinC Allied Forces, 25 Oct 43,and AG 381/399 D-O, Hq NATOUSA to CG SOSNATOUSA, 29 Oct 43, JRC 400.2/001 Admin ofSup—Gen.


pendent in a large measure on the extentto which units would manage to completetheir initial equipment before embarking.General Whiteley had made this point clearto General Giraud when he requested thatdeparting troops be "completely equippedto authorized allowances under currenttables for equivalent organizations of theU.S. Army." Yet, a week later, it waslearned that the French military authoritiesproposed to embark their first division, the2d Moroccan Infantry, with what appearedto be insufficient winter equipment, such asone coat or one field jacket instead of bothitems per man, one pair of trousers insteadof two, two blankets instead of three, andso on. At the request of General Clark,Commanding General, U.S. Fifth Army,AFHQ impressed upon the French GeneralStaff the desirability of equipping units inaccordance with prescribed Fifth Army ad-ministrative instructions.30

In spite of the warning, it was reported afew days later that the same division hadembarked almost completely lacking inbasic load requirements of maintenanceparts and accessories and short of majoritems of equipment, including twenty-two57-mm. guns. Furthermore, when the di-vision reached Italy, an inspection revealedserious shortages, by Fifth Army standards,of winter clothing and equipment. Thisprompted General Clark to request AFHQthat he be authorized to issue to the divisionadditional blankets and warm clothing onthe same basis as for U.S. troops. In fact,without waiting for an answer from Algiers,he ordered the emergency issue of theseitems.31

Investigation showed that the unit inquestion had received its normal allowanceof winter equipment but not the additionalitems which troops in Fifth Army had beenissued under special authorization fromNATOUSA. The French High Com-mand, although urged to take similar steps,had for reasons of its own deemed it un-necessary to issue winter equipment overand above the rates prescribed under thecurrent AFHQ tables of allowances. As forthe shortages of major items, maintenanceparts, and accessories, it was discovered thatthe division commander and the FrenchGeneral Staff had been working on differenttables of organization. NATOUSA imme-diately brought the matter to the attentionof General Leyer with a view to preventinga recurrence of the situation.32

The confusion surrounding the equip-ment of the 2d DIM underlined a graveweakness in the Allied command structure.From the time the French in North Africahad joined the Allies in November 1942.they had been in a peculiar position in whichtheir military establishment functioned par-allel to the Anglo-American administrativesystem, but was at no point, except in thefield, fully part of it. This being so, theycould be urged, or requested, to take cer-tain measures, but the Allied command waswholly dependent on voluntary acquies-cence on their part. They considered them-selves free, to a large degree, to decidewhether the equipment standards as estab-lished by non-French commands, such asFifth Army headquarters, were practicableor desirable for their own troops. Theycould, and they did, modify U.S. tables of

30 Msg 4192, Fifth Army to CinC, 27 Oct 43, JRCCable Log.

31 Msgs L-9908, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 13Nov 43, 5732, Fifth Army to CG AFHQ, 18 Dec

43, and 5753, Fifth Army to CG AFHQ, 20 Dec 43,JRC Cable Log.

32 Msgs 2733, CG NATOUSA to Larkin, 18 Nov43, and 17842, CG NATOUSA to Fifth Army, 22Dec 43, JRC Cable Log.


equipment to fit what they considered theparticular needs of their forces.33

To make sure, therefore, that equipmentstandards of French units operating underAmerican control approached the U.S.counterparts as closely as possible, the ut-most co-operation was required between allresponsible authorities before the embarka-tion of troops. Once the troops were in thetheater of operations, the issuance of initialequipment to fill shortages or emergencyneeds entailed a labyrinthine process ofrequisitioning. If General Juin wished anadditional issue of initial equipment, suchas winter clothing items for the 2d DIM,his corps G-4 submitted the prescribedrequisition to Fifth Army supply sections forclearance and transmission to SOS, NA-TOUSA. There the French liaison officer,Lt. Col. A. Dufourt, prepared appropriatelists which he forwarded to the French Gen-eral Staff for examination, first by G-4, thenby Rearmament Section. Once approvedby the French General Staff, the lists weresent to the French Section of the JRC forsubmission to the committee, then for-warded to NATOUSA for final decision.Only in "dire emergency" cases was ColonelDufourt authorized to bypass the FrenchGeneral Staff altogether and request SOSto transmit requisitions to the JRC or toG-4, NATOUSA, for action.34

In spite of French urgings that the exist-ing channels of communications be simpli-fied, NATOUSA maintained that thesechannels were not unduly cumbersome andthat they must be adhered to. The positiontaken by NATOUSA was in accordance

with War Department instructions, whichrestricted to operational emergency casesthe authority of a theater to transfer suppliesto a foreign government without prior ap-proval from the MAB.35 As supplies sotransferred were later to be replaced in U.S.stocks by the foreign government concerned,the theater was under obligation to ensureproper and accurate accounting of all trans-actions. Consequently, the procedureadopted by NATOUSA whereby all re-quests from the French forces under U.S.control had to be cleared and approved byboth the French General Staff and NA-TOUSA was a logical one. In additionand equally important, such a procedurewould tend to prevent wastage in the formof needless expenditures of matériel.French supplies, largely of American origin,were not expendable any more than stocksavailable to U.S. troops. Sound utiliza-tion of resources mattered as much as speedof delivery.

Yet complete observance of the estab-lished policy frequently proved impossible.Many cases arose in which operationalneeds required the issue of equipment toFrench forces engaged in combat "withoutregard to strict adherence to the finer pointsof Lend-Lease bookkeeping." 36 Eager toset the record straight on the matter, AFHQ,on 14 January 1944, informed GeneralClark that the action he had taken in De-cember in issuing additional winter equip-ment to the 2d DIM was contrary to theestablished policy.

It must be emphasized that the initial issueof organizational and individual equipmentmust occur in North Africa from stocks madeavailable to the French under the rearma-33Ltr, Giraud to Allied CinC, 25 Oct 43, JRC

400.4/003 Maintenance for Forces Operating WithFifth Army.

34 Memos, Regnault for Spalding, 10 Oct 43, andSpalding for Leyer, 11 Oct 43, JRC 400.2/001Admin of Sup—Gen.

35 Msg 859, Marshall to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 43,JRC Cable Log.

36 Ltr, Loomis to Col George Olmstead, 11 Dec43, JRC 908 Policy and Plan—Misc.


ment program prior to the embarkation ofFrench units for Italy. . . . Where FifthArmy administrative instructions containprescriptions which can be met by suppliesavailable in North Africa to the French Army,the French authorities will be advised to com-ply therewith.37

In the meantime, NATOUSA had takensteps to effect closer co-operation betweenthe various Allied command and supplyechelons on the matter of initial equipmentloads. Such co-operation was indispensableif confusion and discrepancies were to beavoided in the future. When Fifth Armyinstructions or tables of equipment were atvariance with those given earlier to theFrench by the JRC, NATOUSA officialsundertook to bring the three interested par-ties together to solve the problems involved.They also urged the French General Staffonce again to verify the completeness ofequipment in the hands of units before em-barkation and requested General Kingman'sFrench Training Section to give full as-sistance in this connection. Finally, theyasked the JRC to expedite the preparationof requisitions for shortages of equipmentas these were reported.38

The objective of the supply plan, as put inforce on 29 October 1943, could be reachedonly if the French military authorities werein a position to make available to SOS, oncall from the latter or in execution of agreedschedules, the supplies required for themaintenance of their expeditionary forcesin Italy. This, incidentally, was only oneof their maintenance commitments. Theywere also responsible for maintaining alltroops while in training, forces employedunder operational control other than Amer-

ican (such as the units which the FrenchHigh Command itself had committed to theliberation of Corsica in September 1943),all Territorial and Sovereignty troops, andzone of interior establishments. To carryout these heavy and varied assignments,which the concept of self-reliance as im-posed on the French had forced them toassume, required that they establish andmaintain considerable stocks of supplies ofall types, readily available on a moment'snotice, for the support of any of their forces.

AFHQ had long urged the French to ac-cumulate adequate reserves of both Ameri-can and locally procured supplies. By thefall of 1943 the Americans had the distinctfeeling that their urgings had not beenheeded, possibly because the French wereplacing undue dependence on U.S. theaterstocks as a reserve. On 7 September Gen-eral Spalding, chairman of the JRC, warnedGeneral Leyer that "such a source couldnot be taken for granted in the future." Hethen proposed a number of measures which,if carried out by the French, would enablethem to make their Military Establishmentself-sufficient. With regard to foodstuffs,he recommended that the responsible au-thorities exploit North African resources andtake energetic steps to increase productionto the maximum. He suggested that theyprepare a monthly food program and, incase of shortages, make arrangements toobtain the rest from U.S. sources. As forammunition and all authorized expendableitems of American equipment, he urged thatthey maintain adequate reserves either undertheir control or available to them in U.S.theater stockages, these to be supported bya flow of supplies from the United States.This operation would require the earlyestablishment, after detailed study, of asound plan carefully co-ordinated with

37Msg 28417, CinC AFHQ to Fifth Army, 14Jan 44, JRC Cable Log.

38Msgs 6765, Eisenhower to CG SOS NA-TOUSA, 5 Nov 43, and L-9158, Larkin to CGNATOUSA, 5 Nov 43, JRC Cable Log.


American and British programs and involvethe submission by the French of regularmonthly requisitions on the United Statesfor maintaining stocks at established levels.In reply, General Leyer announced that afood program of the sort recommended byGeneral Spalding was in preparation andthat the responsible military as well ascivilian authorities had already taken stepsto increase the production of certain fooditems both in North Africa and in otherFrench territories. He announced furtherthat, beginning 1 October, the French Gen-eral Staff would forward monthly requisi-tions for the procurement of U.S. supplies,such as ammunition and other expendableitems. A fortnight later, in the course ofa meeting with General Leyer, GeneralSpalding again broached the food questionwhich, he reiterated, required very seriousconsideration in view especially of heavy de-mands on U.S. foodstuffs for Soviet andBritish troops.39

The French were to submit to the JRCfor necessary action requisitions for all pur-poses except emergency issues. The requi-sitions were designed to make possible theestablishment and operation of a 45-dayreserve of supplies for the maintenance ofunits dispatched overseas. It soon becameevident that the paper work involved wasposing for the French insurmountable dif-ficulties. SCAMA was making so littleprogress that, even at the end of December,it had no accurate information as to theactual supplies on hand and was unable todetermine what items it should requisition.To make matters worse, SOS reported, on1 January, that the French military authori-

ties had replaced in U.S. theater stocks lessthan 50 percent of the maintenance itemsadvanced as an initial stockpile to their ex-peditionary forces in Italy. SOS blamedtheir failure to do so on SCAMA's inabilityto complete the required 45-day supply re-serve, a fact which emphasized, once again,the urgent need for a more efficient Frenchsupply system. General Larkin feared thatthe situation, if allowed to continue, wouldresult in a considerable drain upon U.S.Army reserves since SOS was required tomake up for any deficiencies in the Frenchdeliveries.40

By this time, experience gained from thepresence of French units in Italy had shownthat the existing system of channeling sup-plies from the United States to North Afri-can depots for reshipment to the combatzone increased movement and accountingoperations unnecessarily. In an attempt tosimplify the procedure, SOS had recom-mended earlier in November that PeninsularBase Section (PBS) in Naples be given theresponsibility for maintaining the FrenchExpeditionary Corps, and that the Frenchmilitary authorities be required in turn toeffect replacements in American depots inNorth Africa from a stockpile established bythem for this purpose. Thus no shipments,except of rations and special items obtain-able only from French sources, would bemade to Italy for the supply of the CEF,nor would any lend-lease accounting be nec-essary in Italy.41 The proposal, a soundone, had been submitted to the variousNATOUSA staff sections then considering

39 Memo, Spalding for Leyer, 7 Sep 43, Memo,Leyer for Spalding, 17 Sep 43, and Aide Mémoire,Spalding for Leyer, 2 Oct 43, JRC 908 Policy andPlan—Misc.

4 0Msg W-8584/19360, Eisenhower to AGWAR,26 Dec 43, CM-IN 16426; Msg L-5742, Larkinto JRC, 1 Jan 44, and Memo, Larkin for Loomis,13 Jan 44, JRC 400.4/003 Maintenance for ForcesOperating With Fifth Army.

41 Memo, DCofS SOS for CG NATOUSA, 28Nov 43, JRC 400.4/003, Maintenance for ForcesOperating With Fifth Army.


steps to improve conditions. The ills whichit sought to correct, however, were minor incomparison with others. So damaging werethese that the entire supply plan as estab-lished on 29 October had become an un-workable arrangement.

In a long message to the War Departmenton 26 December, NATOUSA outlined thebasic weaknesses of the plan in its currentform. The chaotic situation of the Frenchsupply system made it impossible for theFrench military authorities to make avail-able to SOS the supplies which they wereexpected to furnish for their expeditionaryforces. It would, in addition, prevent themfrom preparing and submitting properrequisitions in time to provide any assist-ance, from the supply standpoint, towardthe mounting of Operation ANVIL. NA-TOUSA then recommended a sweepingchange of policy: the responsibility for sub-mitting requisitions for the procurement ofequipment and supplies necessary for themaintenance of French units participatingin operations under U.S. control should beassumed by SOS, no longer by the French.Otherwise, the large French force desig-nated for participation in ANVIL would notbe properly supplied.42

War Department officials immediatelyendorsed NATOUSA's proposal with minormodifications. On 16 January 1944, afterfurther discussions on the matter betweenthe War Department and the theater, SOSissued a new directive on the maintenanceof French expeditionary forces.43 Draftedafter consultation with and approval byGeneral. Giraud, the directive was appli-cable to forces specifically operating under

U.S. control whether, as then, in Italy orin future operations in continental France.It set forth in detail the latest policy withregard to the provision of both initial equip-ment and maintenance supplies.

Initial equipment was to be provided tothe greatest extent possible from stocks sup-plied the French through the rearmamentprogram. Only when items were unobtain-able from such sources, was the Command-ing General, NATOUSA, empowered toauthorize their issue from U.S. theater stocksto the extent available and without jeop-ardy to the proper supply of U.S. forces.All items so transferred to complete initialequipment were charged against the Frenchlend-lease account in North Africa. As forequipment and supplies required for main-tenance of troops in operation, these were,with some exceptions, provided by SOSthrough the submission to the New YorkPort of Embarkation of single consolidatedmonthly requisitions for both French andU.S. troops. Levels of supply furnishedwere those authorized for the U.S. forces,and combat maintenance provided wascomputed on U.S. Army replacement fac-tors. Food rations, ammunition, post ex-change, and Special Services supplies wereexcepted from these regulations.44

Rations were provided partly from U.S.sources, partly from French sources, as inthe case of items peculiar to the Frenchmenu, in accordance with agreementsreached between NATOUSA and theFrench General Staff. Post exchange andSpecial Services supplies were provided en-tirely by the French. Ammunition was sup-plied from U.S. stocks in North Africa tothe extent available, and the remainder42 Msg W-8584/19360 cited n. 40.

43 Cir 7, SOS NATOUSA, sub: SOP on Sup andMaintenance of Fr Forces, 16 Jan 44, JRC400.4/003 Maintenance for Forces Operating WithFifth Army.

44 The question of rations, post exchange, andSpecial Services supplies is treated at some lengthin Chapter XVI, below.


obtained from the United States throughconsolidated requisitions for both Frenchand U.S. troops. The French Supply Serv-ices were required to replace in U.S. depots,from stocks available to them, the supplies(food, post exchange items, and other ma-terials) which it was their responsibility toprovide for the maintenance of participatingFrench units. All items furnished by SOSeither by direct shipment from the UnitedStates or from U.S. stocks in the theater, andnot replaced by the French Supply Services,were charged against the lend-lease account.

The directive contained other importantprovisions concerning the handling of ma-tériel intended for the expeditionary forces.Supplies furnished from French sourceswere delivered by the French Army to ship-side or to U.S. depots as requested by SOS,and were loaded aboard ship and dischargedby the U.S. Army, with French assistanceif required. The French liaison group atSOS headquarters was charged with ensur-ing that complete utilization was beingmade of French stocks for the maintenanceof French forces. To this end, it obtainedfrom SCAMA periodic reports of supplieson hand in French depots.

The advantages gained from the appli-cation of the new plan were many and sub-stantial. Supplies were now reaching thebase serving the expeditionary forces by di-rect shipment from the United States or, inthe case of a relatively small percentage, byshipment from North African ports, thussaving much valuable time and shipping.More important yet, it now was almost cer-tain that the expeditionary forces would re-ceive in due time all the supplies necessaryfor their continued support. To make cer-tain that French and Allied agencies re-sponsible for the mounting of ANVIL clearlyunderstood the details of the new policy,

a letter on the subject, which AFHQ ad-dressed to General Giraud on 11 Februaryin the name of the Supreme Allied Com-mander, was made the basis of an officialdirective.45

In execution of the new policy, SOS,NATO USA, immediately assumed the re-sponsibility for preparing and submitting,with French assistance, requisitions for thesupplies which had to be obtained fromU.S. sources for the maintenance of allFrench forces then, or destined to be, partof an American task force. The Frenchcontinued to be responsible for preparingand submitting requisitions for the main-tenance of all other forces, and for short-ages of initial equipment. Subsequentlythey were urged to consider the submissionof requisitions for the replenishment ofequipment in the hands of units engagedin combat for some length of time. Thismatter was expected to present a problemof considerable scope in the not too dis-tant future.46

A sound supply plan for the maintenanceof French expeditionary forces was now areality. Its establishment, incidentally,was being effected at a time when thedrafting of a workable rearmament plan(the 23 January Plan) was about to becompleted. In the last analysis, much ofthe direction for the supply and mainte-nance of French troops was now to restin American hands. This was in line withrecommendations from War Departmentofficials who had come to the conclusionand strongly urged that, in the theater,"American management should follow

45 Ltr, Wilson to Giraud, 11 Feb 44, JRC 400.4/003 Maintenance for Forces Operating With FifthArmy; Dir, AFHQ, AG 400-1 (Fr), 11 Feb 44, sub:Sup and Maintenance of Fr Forces.

46 Memos, Loomis for Leyer, 15, 22 Jan 44, JRC400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat.


American equipment." Such a course ofaction, they believed, was a sound devel-opment in the lend-lease program and thetime was opportune to put it into effect.47

Supplies reached the CEF in Italythrough Peninsular Base Section, set up inNaples on 1 November 1943 for the sup-port of the U.S. Fifth Army. Long beforethe arrival of the first North African unit,it had been agreed that the French mili-tary authorities would assume their share ofthe responsibility for the operation of PBS.As early as October, Generals Juin andClark decided that French Base 901, alreadyactivated in North Africa, would join PBSin Naples, there to serve as the supply or-ganization for CEF. Accordingly, an ad-vance detachment from that base was dis-patched to Naples where, on 22 November,it set up shop in the G-4 office of PBS.48

Just then the first division, the 2d DIM,was on its way to the front line.

Headquarters, Fifth Army, having an-nounced, on 23 November, that it was tak-ing over the full responsibility for the sup-ply of the CEF, SOS, NATOUSA, recom-mended that the French themselves beurged to contribute to the fullest extent pos-sible to the "housemaiding" of their ownforces. Since it was expected that threeeighths of Fifth Army combat troops wouldultimately be French, SOS considered thatFrench service units should be assigned forduty with PBS in approximately the sameratio. On this basis, a list of the requiredsignal, ordnance, quartermaster, transpor-

tation, and medical units was subsequentlydrawn up and incorporated in the 23 Jan-uary Plan. The list represented, it wasthought, a proper proportion of the totalnumber of base section units required forthe support of Fifth Army. AFHQ con-sidered that their assignment would, in addi-tion to helping relieve the acute shortage ofU.S. service personnel in PBS, provide themwith excellent practical training towardtheir ultimate employment in ANVIL. Gen-eral Loomis strongly urged the French Gen-eral Staff to accelerate the activation of thenecessary units. Yet by the end of January,no such troops had been made available.When queried on the matter, General Leyercould only give the assurance that he would"try" to activate as many units as he pos-sibly could and as quickly as practicable.49

Such was the situation as the next phaseof the rearmament program was about tobegin. The blueprint for a French base sec-tion to support the CEF had been com-pleted. Running the section now hingedon the ability of the French High Commandto assign to it the necessary personnel.

Supply Situation—End of January 1944

By the end of January the long and tedi-ous period of re-examination, begun withthe suspension of the 15 August Plan, hadcome to an end. It had given rise to ex-tensive reorganization in every field of therearmament operations. A new equipment

47 Ltrs, Col Olmstead, International Div ASF, toLoomis, 6 Nov 43, and Loomis to Olmstead, 11Dec 43, JRC 908 Policy and Plan—Misc.

48 Hq, Peninsular Base Section, History of thePeninsular Base Section, North African Theater ofOperations, United States Army, Vol. II, Coveringthe Period 28 August 1943 to 31 January 1944(Naples, 1944), Ch. IV, copy in OCMH.

49 The three-eighths ratio was reached at the peakof Fifth Army's strength in May 1944. Of a totalof some 13 divisions, 4 plus elements of a fifthwere French.

Hq Fifth Army, Admin Dir 12, 23 Nov 43, inOpn Rpts, Fifth Army G-3, Sep 43-Jan 44, andMsg L-4528, Larkin to JRC, 22 Dec 43, JRC CableLog; Memos, Loomis for Leyer, 29 Dec 43, 29 Jan44, and Leyer for Loomis, 1 Feb 44, JRC 370/003Employment of Sv Units.


program, the 23 January Plan, had beendrafted which, unlike its predecessors, wasconsidered reasonable, therefore capable ofaccomplishment. The substantial reduc-tion of the number of combat divisions asagreed to by the French High Commandwas expected to produce personnel for theactivation of supporting arms and servicesand for the manning of supply installations.A central supply authority similar to theAmerican SOS was attempting, withAmerican assistance, to set up an efficientsupply system. A sound plan for the main-tenance of expeditionary forces had beenput into operation. A program of requisi-tions had been devised which, it was hoped,would guarantee the continuous flow of sup-plies from U.S. sources. These and othersimilar measures had one common purpose,the building up, within the shortest possibletime, of a well-balanced French task forceadequately equipped and properly main-tained in battle.

The need to apply these measures withspeed and vigor was emphasized by devel-opments in Italy. Reports currently beingreceived from that theater indicated thatFrench troops were still arriving withouttheir full initial equipment. The two divi-sions already there, the 2d DIM and the3d DIA, were said to be fighting extremelywell. It was all the more urgent thereforethat they and their corps commander, Gen-eral Juin, be given all the necessary materialmeans with which to maintain their good

record. On 26 January General Kingmanvoiced to General Loomis the fear that theFrench had not learned ordnance supplyas yet. He then pointed to a curious differ-ence between the respective attitudes ofFrench and American troops regarding sup-ply matters: ''Americans howl for what theywant. The French anticipate that HigherCommand will send what they shouldhave." 50 Yet it was known that CEF au-thorities themselves had registered their con-cern over the shortage situation and takensteps to correct it. The Chief of Staff, Brig.Gen. Marcel Carpentier, had urged GeneralGiraud to intervene energetically with theCommissioner of War to ensure that rein-forcements reaching Italy would arrive fullydressed and equipped. Unless this wasdone, he had warned, maintenance stocksavailable to the CEF would gradually dis-appear.51

Despite these disturbing reports, therewere signs that the supply situation wouldrapidly improve, for the French, bent asthey were on assuming as large a shareas possible of the fighting, were equally de-termined to correct errors as they were de-tected. In addition, the experience beinggained as a result of their battle-testing inItaly was expected to be a valuable guidein implementing the next rearmamentphase.

50 Memo, Kingman for Loomis, 26 Jan 44, JRC333/002 Inspections by Gen Kingman.

51Msg 182-A, CofS CEF to Giraud, 7 Jan 44,JRC Cable Log.

CHAPTER IX

Phase IV of the Program(February—October 1944)

I: Background and Objectives

Rearmament Operations Resume

The 23 January Plan for rearming theFrench forces was formally presented toGeneral Giraud by the Chief of Staff,AFHQ, on 1 February 1944 for his ap-proval of its details. General Gammellreminded Giraud that the plan had beendeveloped after lengthy conversations be-tween French and AFHQ staffs, on thebasis of available qualified manpower. Theobjective, which General Gammell hopedthe French Commander in Chief wouldconcur in, was to provide a sound trooplist representing a balanced force suitablefor the type of combat anticipated in AN-VIL. 1 Thus was set forth in precise termsthe final rearmament goal which AFHQwas determined to reach.

Three days earlier, General Devershad informed the War Department ofthe proposed revisions. Pending the finaldrafting of the plan, he had requested theearly shipment of the matériel necessaryto equip the remainder of such supportingunits on the 15 August Plan as were ex-pected to become part of the new plan.This matériel had already been assignedby the MAB but had not yet been de-livered. He had also requested the War

Department to fill as completely as possibleshortages in previous assignments andshipments.2

AFHQ officials were confident that theFrench part of the ANVIL troop list as rep-resented by the 23 January Plan providedas large and as well-balanced a force asthe French military authorities could or-ganize and train within the limitations oftime and manpower.3 The National De-fense Committee, it will be recalled, hadalready approved the troop list. It onlyremained to obtain General Giraud's finaldecision. No word had been received fromthe French Commander in Chief since 11January, when he had approved in prin-ciple the revisions then under considerationwhile reaffirming his intention of retainingthe 15 August Plan "as a basis."

Concern at AFHQ increased when itwas learned that Giraud had appealed di-rectly to General Marshall for the retentionof a fourth armored division. The U.S

1Ltr, Gammell to Giraud, 1 Feb 44, JRC Inclto 320/001.

2 Msg W-1313/44211, Devers to AGWAR, 28Jan 44, AFHQ Cable Log; Memo, Loomis forLeyer, 29 Jan 44, JRC 903 Requests for Units;Msg 8524, Somervell to Devers, 30 Jan 44, OPDExec 1, Item 13-A; Msg W-1520, Devers toAGWAR, 31 Jan 44, AFHQ Cable Log.

3 Memo, Brig Gen Daniel Noce, ACofS AFHQ,for CofS, 1 Feb 44, AFMQ 0100/12C G-3 DivOps Fr Rearmt 2.

PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: I 149

Chief of Staff seized this opportunity toremind him that General Wilson was ea-gerly awaiting his views on the current re-study of the program, on which to base finalrecommendations to the CCS.4

On 4 February, deciding to wait nolonger for a reply from General Giraud,General Wilson cabled to the CCS the fulldetails of the 23 January Plan. His mes-sage listed the units of the 15 August Planto be deleted, those to be added, as well asthe nonprogram organizations (Moroccantabors, mule companies, and so on) forwhich maintenance only was requested. Ina letter of the same date the SupremeAllied Commander recommended that theprogram be approved and assignmentsmade without delay so that priority of ship-ments could be established at an early date.5

By his action, General Wilson was settingthe wheels of the rearmament machineryin motion once again. There was littledoubt that the CCS would endorse his rec-ommendations without delay, for the pro-posed plan involved a relatively small out-lay of equipment and its prospect of beingcarried out successfully was greater thanthat of any preceding plans. After a three-month period of re-examination, duringwhich no assignments and only a few de-liveries of equipment had been made to theFrench, the rearmament operations wereentering a new phase, the fourth and last.

Control Over the French Forces

With the entire French forces expectedto be engaged in combat in the near fu-ture, the question of their operational con-

trol was taking on increased importance.It will be recalled that at a conference heldon 27 December 1943, Mr. Massigli, theFrench Commissioner of Foreign Affairs,had submitted to the U.S. and British po-litical representatives in the theater the draftof a military agreement on the control andemployment of the French forces. Twodays later he had made known to his Amer-ican and British colleagues the great interestwhich the French Committee of NationalLiberation attached to the speedy conclusionof an agreement.

The entire question was subsequently re-ferred to the CCS who, on 11 March 1944,instructed General Wilson to present to theCFLN a counterproposal they had just ap-proved. Article III of their own draftagreement stipulated that "the Frenchforces to be placed at the disposal of theCCS is a matter for agreement between theCCS and the CFLN, it being understoodthat the forces placed at the disposal of theCCS will include all French forces whichhave been rearmed and re-equipped by theU.S. or the U.K." 6

On 3 April, the CFLN proposed somemodifications of the CCS document. Thecommittee held, in particular, that the agree-ment should be with the two Allied gov-ernments and not with the CCS.7 It wasclear that the committee, which regarded it-self as a de jure government in full posses-sion of its sovereignty, desired that militarymatters be dealt with at government level.Already French civil authorities had at-tempted to take over the handling of re-armament negotiations with AFHQ. TheCommissioner of War and Air, André Le

4 Ltrs, Marshall to Giraud, 2 Feu 44, and toDevers, 3 Feb 44, OPD 336.2 France, Sec II.

5 Msg W-1847/47163, Wilson to AGWAR, 4Feb 44, NAF 597; Ltr, Wilson to CCS, 4 Feb 44,SHAEF 388.3/3 Fr Rearmt, 16 Mar 45, Dr 5418.

6Msg 1913, CCS to Wilson, 11 Mar 44, FAN343; Ltr, Wilson to de Gaulle, 14 Mar 44, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres.

7 Ltr, CFLN to U.S. and Br Representatives, 3Apr. 44, AFHQ 0100/12A G-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr.


Troquer, had requested on 12 January thatthereafter all correspondence on armamentquestions be addressed to him. He haddone so in pursuance of the decree of 16December 1943 which specifically chargedthe Commissioner of War and Air with thetask of implementing the decisions of theNational Defense Committee regardingarmament matters. But AFHQ officialsconsidered that to deal with Le Troquerthrough the American and British min-isters would be a particularly cumbersomemethod. Barring a CCS decision to thecontrary or new developments in the thea-ter, they agreed to continue to regard theFrench Commander in Chief as the officiallink between themselves and the FrenchHigh Command on all rearmament ques-tions.8 Although informed of this decision,the commissioner kept writing directly toAFHQ. Replies to his queries wereforwarded to him through Frenchheadquarters.

As the CFLN kept insisting that mili-tary matters be handled on a political levelas between governments, General Marshallsought President Roosevelt's advice on thematter. The President informed him on 28April that it was his desire that militaryquestions which involved the French forcescontinue to be discussed directly between theSupreme Allied Commander and theFrench military authorities, and "not as be-tween one sovereign government in full pos-session of its sovereignty and another gov-ernment which has no de facto sover-eignty." 9 This was a restatement of the

policy long advocated by the President, apolicy based on his firm conviction that noFrench, government could exist until theliberated people of France themselves es-tablished one of their choice. In Decem-ber 1943 he had specifically informed theDepartment of State that he wished all mil-itary matters to be treated directly betweenGeneral Eisenhower and the French mili-tary authorities and not on a government orcommittee basis. Later, in March 1944,when the question of establishing Britishand U.S. military missions to the CFLNwas under discussion, the CCS showed, bytheir action, that they held the same view.They ruled that the proposed missions, ifestablished, should "in no way infringe onthe [Supreme Allied Commander's] posi-tion as the CCS representative in dealingwith the French on military matters, espe-cially French rearmament." 10 Finally,when, at about the same time, GeneralEisenhower began negotiating with Frenchmilitary authorities in London an arrange-ment to govern French-Allied relations inthe proposed cross-Channel operation, Gen-eral Marshall restated for his benefit thePresident's policy.11

In mid-May, after AFHQ had carefullyexamined the French proposal of 3 April,General Wilson cabled the views and recom-mendations of the theater on the control ofFrench forces. First he outlined the prac-

8 Memo, Le Troquer for Gen Wilson, 12 Jan 44,Memo, Whiteley for Minister Edwin Wilson, 14Jan 44, AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Red Sec, Fr Matters,Vol. IV; Ltr, Gammell to Le Troquer, 26 Jan 44,AFHQ 400/1 Rearmt.

9 Memo, President for Marshall, 28 Apr 44, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 1-A.

10Msg, CCS to Wilson, 28 Jan 44, FAN 329:Msg 890, Wilson to CCS, 20 Feb 44, NAF 623:Msg 197, JCS to Wilson, 29 Feb 44, SHAEF SGS092 France, Vol. I, Fr Relations; Msg 2500, Mar-shall to Devers, 17 Mar 44, JRC Cable Log.

11 Msgs 324, Marshall to Eisenhower, 17 Mar 44,and S-50531, SCAF 15, Eisenhower to CCS, 21Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 092 France, Vol. I, FrRelations.


tices then current. Under the terms of anaval agreement to which the French hadsubscribed, the Allied naval area comman-der exercised the operational control of allFrench naval units, rearmed and otherwise.This was consonant with the general pol-icies set forth by the CCS on 4 October1943 on the subject of French naval ves-sels.12 With respect to the air squadrons,on the other hand, no formal agreementexisted, the current informal arrangementbeing that when a squadron was ready, theFrench Commander in Chief notified theAllied air command in the Mediterranean,which assigned the unit to duty and assumedoperational control of it. General Wilsonthen strongly recommended that a writtenagreement, similar to the naval agreement,be concluded with the CFLN which wouldensure that all French land, air, and seaforces that were rearmed by the UnitedStates or the United Kingdom would auto-matically come under Allied operationalcontrol.13

By the end of May the control questionhad not been solved and no agreement wasyet in sight. The launching of OVERLORDand ANVIL, in early June and mid-Augustrespectively, would take place without anyformal agreement having been reachedother than a temporary arrangement con-cluded by General Eisenhower pendingfurther negotiations with the French.

Reorganization of the French HighCommand

Meanwhile the showdown between theCFLN and General Giraud, which ob-

servers had long regarded as unavoidable,had come to pass. In spite of continuedAllied support, the French Commander inChief had had his powers so reduced bysuccessive ordinances and decrees that byFebruary he was able to make few, if any,decisions that were final.14 In early April,a few days after his return to Algiers froma tour of inspection of the French units en-gaged in Italy, General Giraud was sud-denly confronted with a dramatic situa-tion. An ordinance issued by the CFLNon 4 April, apparently without prior con-sultation with him, announced a reshufflingof the National Defense setup. Invokingthe law of 11 July 1938 bearing upon thegeneral organization of the nation in war-time, the ordinance made the president ofthe CFLN titular Chief of the ArmedForces.15 It established, in addition to theexisting National Defense Committee, aGeneral Staff of National Defense, a sortof war department placed directly under thepresident. Finally it abolished, although byimplication only, the post of Commanderin Chief. Feeling that his position wasuntenable, General Giraud at first declaredhis firm intention to resign. General Wil-son, while concerned over the situation, didnot anticipate that immediate serious re-percussions would result from the FrenchCommander in Chief's resignation. He wasconvinced that he could depend uponGiraud loyally to use his influence in favorof continuing the existing Franco-Alliedcollaboration.16

During the following three days, GeneralGiraud deliberated with General Juin,

12 CCS 358 (Revised), 4 Oct 43, sub: Policies Re-garding Fr Naval Vessels.

13 Msg F-46812, Wilson to CCS, 16 May 44.NAF 701 ; Memo, Col J. Terrence for Maj GenDaniel Noce, 30 Jun 44, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3Div Ops Fr Comd and Liaison 2.

14 Personal Ltr, Devers to Marshall, 13 Feb 44,Somervell Files A-46-257, Ser 1, Dr 3.

15 CFLN, Ordinance, 4 Apr 44, AFHQ 0100/12AG-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr.

16 Msg F-27715, Wilson to CCS, 4 Apr 44, NAF661.


whom he had summoned to Algiers, andwith various AFHQ officials including theU.S. and British political representatives inthe theater. He then decided not to re-sign. The crisis came to a head on 8 Aprilwhen General de Gaulle offered Giraudthe post of Inspector General whose dutieshad been defined by a special decree pro-mulgated the day before.17

The reasons for the committee's latestaction, as given by de Gaulle in a letter toGeneral Giraud, appear sound when exam-ined in the light of the situation then pre-vailing.18 The post of Commander in Chiefhad lost much of its significance, consider-ing that French expeditionary forces, whenengaged in operations, passed under Alliedcommand. It was not likely, moreover,that present and future Allied operationalplans offered any chance for General Gi-raud to assume a field command commen-surate with his rank. In addition, theCFLN had come to regard the handlingof problems of organization and employ-ment of forces its prerogative. In the opin-ion of the committee, therefore, the postof Inspector General was a logical substi-tute, one which General Giraud could fillwith greatest advantage to French inter-ests. Giraud, on the other hand, felt thatacceptance of the post would entail a less-ening of authority which would "preventhim from fully serving his country." Pro-testing against the decree which he con-sidered arbitrary, General Giraud declinedde Gaulle's offer and expressed his inten-tion of continuing to serve as Commanderin Chief.19

Announcement came on 12 April that Lt.Gen. Emile Béthouart was being appointedby decree Chief of Staff of National De-fense. In effect, he was supplanting Gen-eral Giraud. Thereafter, liaison withAFHQ was to be divided between Béthouartas Chief of Staff, National Defense, andGeneral Leyer as Chief of Staff, GroundForces. General Béthouart immediatelycalled first on General Gammell, Chief ofStaff, AFHQ, then on General Wilson, theSupreme Allied Commander, Mediterra-nean Theater, to inform them of the latestchanges in command.20

Two days later, on 14 April, the CFLN,on the ground that General Giraud was un-willing to accept the post to which he hadbeen assigned, decided to relieve him of allcommand although retaining him on activereserve.21 The next day, General Giraudissued his last order, a pathetic farewell tothe French forces. In it he took occasionto recall how he had obtained from Americathe armament which now enabled the unitsin Italy to show their worth.22

Whatever the merits or demerits of theCFLN actions that led to General Giraud'sremoval from the French High Command,it cannot be denied that he played a de-cisive role in the North African rearma-ment program. He had been its ardentchampion even before his escape fromFrance in October 1942; at Anfa in Jan-uary 1943 he extracted a promise for armsfrom President Roosevelt; in July of thesame year he went to Washington, there to

17 Msg F-29518, Wilson to CCS, 8 Apr 44, NAF669.

18 Text of letter in Giraud, Un seul but, la Vic-toire, p. 287.

19 Ltr, Giraud to de Gaulle, 9 Apr 44, in Giraud,Un seul but, la Victoire, p. 300.

20 Min Mtgs, Béthouart with Gammell, and withWilson, 12 Apr. 44, AFHQ 0100/12A G-3 DivOps BIGOT Fr.

21 Min Mtg, Béthouart with Wilson, 14 Apr 44,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Comd andLiaison, Pt. I.

22 Fr CinC, GO 19, 15 Apr 44, AFHQ 0100/12 AG-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr.


plead for more arms and supplies; formonths afterward he relentlessly fought forwhat he considered to be a major objec-tive: the speedy rearming of a large strik-ing force capable of taking a full share inthe common fight against the Axis. At thetime of his removal, the undertaking wasnearly complete.23

Command of the French forces was nowvested in the National Defense Committee,with General de Gaulle as its President, andthe new General Staff headed by GeneralBéthouart as its executive organ. On 15April an instruction issued by the committeeset forth the respective functions of the pres-ident of the CFLN and of the several Com-missioners. The President, assisted by theGeneral Staff of National Defense, was re-sponsible for the general organization anddistribution of forces as well as the generalplans for their employment and equipping.The National Defense General Staff ensuredliaison with military and civilian depart-ments and with Allied staffs. The func-tions of the National Defense Commit-tee and of the Commissioners of War andAir and of Navy remained as defined by theearlier decree of 16 December 1943.24

On 4 May General Béthouart outlinedthe internal organization and the functionsof the National Defense General Staff ofwhich he was the chief. One of its dutieswas to establish and carry out rearmamentplans in pursuance of decisions reached bythe Commissioners.25

Franco-American Relations

The departure of General Eisenhowerand some members of his staff from NorthAfrica in early January had brought a re-organization of the Allied command in thattheater. As newly appointed officials wereassuming their posts, Liaison Section,AFHQ, urged them to start a round of callson French military authorities. Pointing tothe hypersensitivity of which the Frenchhad seemed to be the victims since 1940,Liaison Section believed that these courtesycalls would do much to strengthen Franco-Allied co-operation.26 The first meetingtook place on 1 February when General Wil-son, the Supreme Allied Commander, calledsuccessively on General de Gaulle, LeTroquer, and General Giraud. With thelatter, he discussed, in particular, Frenchparticipation in the Italian campaign. Aweek later, General Wilson received Generalde Lattre de Tassigny, commander desig-nate of the French forces assigned to ANVIL,and with him discussed, among other mat-ters, the perennial question of service units.27

Since his appointment, on 8 January, tothe posts of deputy commander in chief andcommanding general of NATOUSA, Gen-eral Devers likewise was giving close atten-tion to French matters, especially rearma-ment. Writing personally to General Mar-shall on 13 February 1944, General Deversoutlined the French situation as he hadfound it upon assuming his command. Hedealt largely with the question of Franco-American relations. At a time when in-creasing numbers of French and Americantroops were being or would soon be thrown

23 General Giraud received the degree of ChiefCommander of the Legion of Merit on 23 October1943.

24 National Defense Committee General Instruc-tion, signed by de Gaulle, 15 Apr 44, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Corres From the Fr.

25 Memo, Béthouart for Col L. Higgins, ChiefLiaison Sec AFHQ, 4 May 44, AFHQ 0100/12CG-3 Div Ops Corres From the Fr.

26 Memo, Higgins for CofS AFHQ, 11 Jan 44,AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec, Mtgs and Confs,Vol. I.

27 Min Mtg, Wilson with de Lattre, 7 Feb 44,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops, F-1, BIGOT Fr.


together in combat, the question was takingon considerable importance.

General Marshall, it appears, had beengreatly disturbed by the tenor of a confi-dential report which had recently reachedhim. Emanating from International Di-vision, ASF, the report implied that Franco-American relations, which had started off sowell, had seriously deteriorated, therebycreating "a condition which augured ill forthe good of combined operations." TheFrench, explained the report, were ascribingthe present "unfortunate trend" to impa-tience, intolerance, lack of elementary cour-tesy, officiousness, and a belittling of Frencheffort on the part of U.S. Army officers inthe theater when dealing with their Frenchallies.28 While recognizing that misunder-standing did exist, Devers assured GeneralMarshall that conditions as reported byASF were grossly exaggerated. Discour-tesy, even rudeness, had been present in iso-lated, instances, he admitted. There wasno evidence, however, that it was wide-spread. It would in no case be tolerated.29

There is sufficient reason to believe thatGeneral Devers' statement reflected accu-rately the situation prevailing at the timeand, for that matter, during the two and onehalf years of Franco-American collabora-tion. French and American officers for-merly associated with the Joint RearmamentCommittee, when queried on the subjectsince the war, loudly and unanimously dis-counted the assertions of the ASF report.Several of the French officers so questionedfrankly admitted that there had been occa-sions when an American official, presum-

ably exasperated at French incomprehensionof his own views or at French slowness byAmerican standards, had, under the impulseof the moment, acted in a harsh, even scath-ing manner. But, they quickly admitted,his behavior was generally quite justified,and, at any rate, never unfair. In otherinstances, they said, American incomprehen-sion of the French viewpoint had causedthe French to misinterpret the American po-sition and intentions. They quoted thecase of an American general officer who,because he had frequently questioned thevalidity or soundness of various armamentrequests submitted by the French, had ledthe latter generally to believe that he wasanti-French. On the whole, they empha-sized, American officials had been sympa-thetic to the French cause.30

General Loomis, who for nearly two yearssupervised French rearmament operationsand therefore can speak with authority onthe subject, could not, when queried on thematter, recall a single instance of bad feel-ings other than the alleged anti-French casereported above. He, too, emphasized that,considering the basic difficulties encoun-tered, such as the language barrier anddifferences in national idiosyncrasies,Franco-American relations were, at the timeof the ASF report and thereafter as well,"remarkably good."31

Having reduced the allegations containedin the ASF report to their true proportions,General Devers in his letter to Marshall nextexamined the causes of some of the griev-ances currently being voiced by the French.Until recently, he pointed out, they had beenespecially irritated by the very complex

28 Memo, Col Eugene Villaret, International DivASF, for Director International Div ASF, 21 Jan44. JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-d.

29 Personal Ltr, Devers to Marshall, 13 Feb 44,Somervell Files, Fr 1943-44, A-46-257, Ser 1,Dr 3.

30 Intervs with Lt Col Roland de Beaumont, Jul50, Brig Gen Jean Regnault, Jul and Sep 50, ColAndré L'Huillier, Sep 50, Gen Aimé de Goislardde Monsabert, Nov 48, and others.

31 Interv with Loomis, Jul 50.


procedure through which their armamentrequests had to pass. He hoped that thisparticular grievance would soon be dispelledas a result of steps which he had just taken.He had authorized General Loomis to dealdirectly with General Larkin in all arma-ment matters arising within the frameworkof established policies. He believed thatthis change in procedure would be appre-ciated by the French and would have an im-mediate favorable effect on relations withthem.

Another grievance voiced by the Frenchwas that Americans in Washington prom-ised more than Americans in the theaterperformed. They felt there was contradic-tion between the decisions announced bythe War Department and the restrictionsimposed by AFHQ and other Allied agen-cies. To clear up their misgivings in thisconnection, General Devers had undertakento explain to them the existing relationshipbetween the CCS, the War Department, andthe theater.

The paucity of equipment available toFrench communications zone establishmentsnecessary for the support of the expedition-ary forces had been another source of fric-tion. No provision had been made at Anfaor since for the issue of supplies to theseestablishments. It was hoped that themeasures recently taken on their behalfwould settle the issue to the satisfaction ofthe French.

General Devers then turned to one finalFrench grievance. In the course of his re-cent visit to French troops fighting in Italy,he had heard them make one complaint:not enough food. This, he explained, wasnot the fault of the Americans, but of in-sufficient planning on the part of the Frenchmilitary authorities themselves.32 AFHQ,

he pointed out, had taken action to makesure that, thereafter, French troops wouldget the full U.S. ration.

The 23 January Plan Becomes the Basis ofPhase IV

All things considered, Phase IV got off toan auspicious start. A sound over-all pro-gram had been drawn up and submitted toWashington for approval. The Frenchwere putting their supply system in order.Closer relations with them were beingsought. More important, glowing accountswere being received of their fine perform-ance in action in Italy, a tangible proof thatAmerican efforts to rearm them were beingwisely expended, and a decisive argumentin favor of the speedy completion of therearmament operations.

The general feeling of optimism was en-hanced further by the announcement thatGeneral Giraud was approving the re-visions contained in the 23 January Plan.Writing to General Marshall on 16 Feb-ruary, he declared himself in completeagreement with the principle that "a bal-ance should be brought about between com-bat forces and service and supply units."In Washington, the Combined Staff Plan-ners had already considered the plan fa-vorably. On 2 March the CCS approvedit "insofar as availability of equipmentwould permit." War Department officialsimmediately informed General Wilson thatthe necessary matériel, once assigned, wouldbe shipped in accordance with theater pri-ority. They warned him, though, thatshortages were likely to occur in signalequipment, trucks, and artillery.33

32 See the discussion on the food and troop ra-tion problem, pp. 254-58, below.

33 Ltr, Giraud to Marshall, 16 Feb 44, OPD336.2 France, Sec II; Msg 1255, CCS to Wilson,2 Mar 44, FAN 340.


On 13 March the MAB assigned allavailable equipment for the eighty-odd sup-porting combat and service organizationsstill to be equipped. Not all the matérielwas to be shipped from the United States.Some of it had already been delivered aspart of Phase III toward the requirementsof the two divisions now deferred. For therest, as much as possible was to be trans-ferred from stocks available in the theater.At the request of the French, the JRC ar-ranged with NATOUSA to have the lo-cally available items of equipment issued tothem before the arrival of the more impor-tant shipments. In this manner there wouldbe no sudden congestion of their supplyfacilities.34

Before long, AFHQ and French authori-ties came to recognize the necessity of sub-jecting the 23 January Plan to minor modi-fications. Initially they had drafted theplan with a view to filling specific require-ments for an operation, ANVIL, scheduledto take place around 1 May. As timepassed, the target date was changed to earlyJune, then to late July, finally to mid-August. Operational requirements werebound to fluctuate accordingly and withthem the composition of the French trooplist. Headquarters, Force 163, the Alliedcommand organized in early January forthe purpose of planning ANVIL, urged fromtime to time the addition of new units andthe elimination of others no longer regardedas essential.

By the end of May the JRC had drawnup a tentative list of the units considerednecessary for addition to the plan. All

were supporting service organizations ex-cept for two antiaircraft operations detach-ments and one tank destroyer battalionwhich American authorities urged theFrench to include in their troop list. Inthe case of some of these units, AFHQ feltthat maintenance equipment only need beprovided. To arrive at a final decision,some thirty-five representatives fromAFHQ, NATOUSA, Force 163, and theFrench General Staff met on 13 June. Theydrew up a final list of revisions to be sub-mitted first to the French High Command,later to the theater commander. At a sec-ond conference, held a fortnight later, theFrench proposed the further addition ofthree replacement depots and sixty replace-ment companies. The proposed revisionshaving been formally approved by all con-cerned, General Wilson recommended tothe CCS on 17 July their incorporation inthe 23 January Plan.35

The French, in the meantime, had re-quested and obtained inclusion in the pro-gram of an additional infantry regiment(the 4th Zouaves) for use not in ANVILbut in Corsica to reinforce the Sovereigntyforces charged with the defense of the is-land. General Devers had already author-ized SOS to issue the necessary equipmenton loan, pending its assignment in Wash-ington and replacement from futureshipments.36

In early July the French also had urgedthe addition to the 23 January Plan of twomore infantry regiments of two battalions

34 Min, MAC (G) 134th Mtg, 13 Mar 44; Msg2099, AGWAR to Devers, 13 Mar 44, and Memos,Leyer for Loomis, 29 Feb 44, Loomis for Leyer, 4Mar 44, JRC 903 Requests for Units; Msg 223,Somervell to Devers, 18 Feb 44, ASF InternationalDiv Files, A-45-192.

35 Min, Conf on Fr Rearmt, 13, 27 Jun 44, JRC904 Modification of Rearmt; Msg, Wilson to CCS,17 Jul 44, NAF 752; Memo, Loomis for Leyer,7 Aug 44, JRC 904.

36 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 21 May 44, Msg F-58925, Devers to Larkin, 13 Jun 44, and Memo,Loomis for Leyer, 21 Jul 44, JRC 903 Requestsfor Units.


each, to provide for a stronger infantryreserve in the forthcoming operations insouthern France. They considered this in-crease necessary in view of the nature ofthe terrain and to offset the numerical in-sufficiency of infantry as compared withtanks in the existing composition of armoreddivisions. The two regiments were the 9thZouaves and the 1st Algerian Tirailleurs(1st RTA). Again, on 10 August, theFrench recommended the addition of amobile salvage unit to be used in southernFrance for the salvage and repair of ma-tériel abandoned by the enemy within theFrench sector of operations. While theaterofficials were examining these two requests,the CCS, on 13 August, approved the re-visions recommended earlier by GeneralWilson. They directed that the equipmentalready in the hands of units deleted fromthe troop list be repossessed and put intoU.S. stocks without delay.37

By the time of the launching of ANVILin mid-August, AFHQ officials had come toregard the French troop list as it stood thenas quite satisfactory. This was evidencedby the action they took on the French re-quest for two infantry regiments and a sal-vage unit. In a letter to General Béthouartdated 17 August, General Wilson declaredthat AFHQ would give no consideration toadditional units or equipment until the cur-rent program had been completed. Hepointed out that the CCS had been "verycooperative" and therefore should not beasked to approve equipment or units unlessthese were vitally necessary. In the case ofthe salvage unit in particular, AFHQ con-sidered that there was no need for it in

view of the existence of similar Alliedorganizations.38

In spite of General Wilson's warning,the French submitted, on 30 August andagain on 22 September, a request for ma-tériel to equip one escort troop and oneheadquarters company which General deGaulle considered necessary for his own se-curity and "for reasons of prestige." 39 De-ciding against making any further recom-mendations to the CCS, AFHQ officials in-formally advised the French to resubmittheir request to Supreme Headquarters, Al-lied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), thenestablished in Paris.

At the end of August, General Leyer fur-nished pertinent information on the state ofactivation of the units now approved foraddition to the program. The tank de-stroyer battalion, for which 3-inch M10guns had been requested, was organized andhad been placed on the troop list. All otherunits were or would be ready by 30 Sep-tember at the latest.40 On 20 October theWar Department advised the theater thatno equipment for these units had yet beenassigned in the absence of information as tothe desired priority of shipment and ulti-mate destination. The theater had, in fact,cabled this information some six weeksearlier but its message had apparently beenlost in transit. AFHQ then repeated thecontent of its first communication and statedthat it wished the entire equipment, less thequantities reported earlier as being availablein theater stocks, shipped immediately to theport of Oran from which French troops werebeing embarked for service in southern

37 Ltrs, Leyer to Loomis, 8 Jul 44, and Mr.André Diethelm to Loomis, 10 and 18 Aug 44,JRC 904; Msg, CCS to Wilson, 13 Aug 44, FAN390.

38 Memos, Noce for JRC, 23 Aug 44, and Loomisfor Leyer, 28 Aug 44, JRC 904.

39 Ltrs, Leyer to Loomis, 30 Aug and 22 Sep 44,in same file.

40 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 28 Aug 44, in same file.


France.41 The War Department immedi-ately submitted the necessary bids to theMAB. Once assigned, the matériel wasshipped along with the rest of the equip-ment being furnished under the 23 JanuaryPlan.

Secondary Programs

Approval by the Combined Chiefs ofthe 23 January Plan, including the riderhaving reference to nonprogram units, camesome five to six weeks after other importantdecisions. On 18 January they had author-ized the issue of maintenance materials toa number of French Communications Zoneestablishments. Ten days later they hadalso approved an extensive rearmamentprogram for the French Air Force.42 Thesevarious measures were proof that the Anglo-American allies were determined to rehabil-itate the North African forces to the fullestextent possible. Moreover, they were evi-dence of a desire to establish programs con-sistent with both French manpower andAllied production capabilities. But it soondeveloped that the French considered theprovisions made with respect to nonprogramunits and Communications Zone establish-ments as wholly insufficient, and they re-opened the issue.

Nonprogram Units

The letter that General Giraud had ad-dressed to General Marshall on 16 Feb-ruary signifying his general agreement to theterms of the 23 January Plan included anappeal for a more generous provision ofmatériel to nonprogram units. Under the

plan, they were to receive maintenance sup-plies only. It was indispensable, he urged,to replace without delay the initial equip-ment now in the hands of these organiza-tions, as it had been issued at the expenseof program units. In his answer, the U.S.Chief of Staff explained that, since the thea-ter itself had originally recommended thatonly maintenance items be furnished, Gen-eral Giraud should take the matter of fur-ther provision up directly with GeneralWilson.43

AFHQ had, by this time, recognized thenecessity of granting the French request soas to make it possible to reduce shortages inprogram units from which equipment hadbeen diverted. At a conference held on12 March with General Devinck, chief ofGeneral Giraud's personal staff, GeneralGammell, Chief of Staff, AFHQ, promisedthat steps would be taken to obtain the nec-essary equipment. The French GeneralStaff immediately prepared the requisitionsand in early April submitted them alongwith others to the JRC. In transmittingthem to the War Department, GeneralLoomis requested that NATOUSA be au-thorized to transfer at once to the French, aspartial fulfillment of the requirements, anumber of items then available in theaterstocks. Before reaching a decision, WarDepartment officials asked for a justifica-tion of the contemplated transfer. Gen-eral Loomis explained that the transfer wasintended not to make up for shortages ofassignments or shipments but primarily toreplace equipment diverted for the benefitof nonprogram units. These units, he care-fully pointed out, had been organized at the

41 Msgs FX-94554, AFHQ to AGWAR, 10 Sep44 (repeated in FX-46207, 31 Oct 44), and WX-54256, Somervell to SHAEF Mission to France, 29Oct 44, in same file.


43 Ltrs, Giraud to Marshall, 16 Feb 44, andMarshall to Giraud, 4 Mar 44, OPD 336.2 France,Sec II; Msg 1372, Marshall to Devers, 4 Mar 44,JRC Cable Log.


request of the theater commander for serv-ice in Italy.44

By this time Lt. Gen. Roger Leyer hadsubmitted to the JRC new requisitions formatériel urgently needed by the Shock Bat-talion and the Commando Battalion, twononprogram units not intended for servicein Italy. These units, each composed of oneheadquarters company, three combat com-panies, and one demolition company, andwith a combined strength of 1,100 to 1,300men, were then stationed in Corsica andparticipating in raids on enemy territory.45

Their equipment was so inadequate thatany further training was considered inad-visable. Also the men were reported to besuffering from such neglect in all spheres(insufficient clothing and food rations inparticular) that they lacked energy andshowed apathy in their work.46 The JRC,however, decided that most of the items re-quested on their behalf by General Leyerhad been included in the requisitions sentto the War Department on 17 April and thatthere was no need for further action.

On 5 May the War Department an-nounced that the transfer of matériel pro-posed by General Loomis to fill shortages ofinitial equipment was approved except incases where such shortages resulted from di-version of matériel to units not authorizedinitial equipment by the CCS.47 With thisruling, all hopes vanished, temporarily atleast, for the replacement of initial matérielissued to nonprogram units.

It soon became obvious that the diver-

sion of equipment to nonprogram units hadcreated such shortages as to make it im-possible for the French military authoritiesto complete the equipping of program units.Gravely concerned over the situation, Gen-eral Devers appealed once again to the WarDepartment on 14 June. First he pro-ceeded to justify the operational necessityfor the activation and equipping of thenonprogram units. The tabor groups andmule companies, he explained, had beenorganized by the French at the urgent re-quest of General Clark and with NATOU-SA's approval in order to meet unexpectedoperational requirements presented by con-ditions of terrain that were unforeseen whenthe Italian campaign was planned. Theyhad been engaged for several months andhad rendered "invaluable support" in thesuccessful operations of the U.S. FifthArmy. The Shock and Commando Battal-ions were standing ready for the conquestof the Island of Elba (Operation BRAS-SARD). Divisional instruction centers wereconsidered necessary in view of the Frenchreplacement system. The Spahis Brigadehad been issued initial equipment as a re-sult of a personal agreement between Gen-erals Smith and Giraud. It was not pos-sible, warned General Devers, to takeequipment away from these units nor couldthe units themselves be withdrawn frompresent operations or deleted from theANVIL and BRASSARD troop lists. Thepromise had been made to the French thatthe equipment issued these organizations atthe expense of program units would be re-placed. Failure to fulfill this commitmentwas bound to jeopardize ANVIL. The onlypossible course of action, concluded Gen-eral Devers, was to assign and float theequipment in question without delay.48

44 Msgs F-33327, Devers to AGWAR, 17 Apr 44,WX-26296, Somervell to Devers, 22 Apr 44, andF-36083, Loomis to AGWAR, 22 Apr 44, JRC400.4/005.

45 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 9 Apr 44, in same file.46 Memo, Capt J. McNeil, Officer Commanding

Commando Training Teams, for G-3 AFHQ, 27Apr 44, in same file.

47 Msg W-32523, Somervell to Devers, 6 May44, in same file.

48 Msg F-59425, Devers to AGWAR, 14 Jun44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A.


Apparently impressed by the strength ofGeneral Devers' arguments, War Depart-ment officials took immediate action. Fourdays later they announced that initialequipment for the Spahis Brigade and ta-bor groups had been assigned. They were,however, referring the entire question tothe CCS, the latter being the sole authorityin the matter of the provision of initialequipment. In case the CCS turneddown the proposal, the matériel alreadyassigned would be deducted from futureassignments to program units which hadreceived no equipment, such as the fourtharmored division and the remainder of thesixth infantry division.49

It was not until 14 July that the CCS fi-nally approved the issue of initial equip-ment to Moroccan tabors, pack companies,and the Commando and Shock Battalions.With respect to replacement training cen-ters, they approved the issue of a minimumamount of equipment to be used solely forthe training of replacements earmarked forexpeditionary units. The CCS then warnedGeneral Devers to make no further com-mitments to rearm additional French or-ganizations without their approval. Tokeep the record straight, Devers repliedthat, except for the equipment given non-program units for operational reasons andthat furnished for the purpose of fillingshortages in program units alerted for oper-ations, the theater had transferred noserviceable major items of initial equip-ment to the French without prior CCSapproval.50

Sovereignty Forces

In the fall of 1943 theater officials, it willbe recalled, had recommended against theprovision of equipment to Sovereigntyforces.51 This position they maintained forsome months but reconsidered it in May1944 when the question of the responsibilityfor the ground defense of French NorthAfrica came up for re-examination.

The Sovereignty forces had long takenan important share of the antiaircraft de-fense of North Africa and, since October1943, had gradually assumed the entirecoastal and air defense of Corsica. Whenin April 1944 AFHQ suggested that theytake over the entire responsibility for theground defense of North Africa, the FrenchHigh Command accepted the commitmentprovided the units charged with the taskreceived additional help in the way ofequipment. AFHQ had hoped that theywould take on the added responsibility withthe equipment already available to them.52

Asked to comment on the matter, Gen-eral Loomis pointed out that the needs ofthe Sovereignty forces must be assessed inthe light of their operational duties. Theunits charged with the defense of the terri-tory were, in his judgment, sufficientlyequipped. Only in the case of those chargedwith the ground defense of Corsica was theresome justification for providing more equip-ment. Even then, the inclusion in the 23January Plan of an additional infantry regi-ment (the 4th Zouaves) for use as reinforce-ment on the island would probably be suf-ficient.

49 Msg 53405, AGWAR to Devers, .20 Jun 44,ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A.

50 Msg WX-64781, AGWAR to Devers andSACMED, 14 Jul 44, ABC 091.711 France (6Oct 43), Sec 2-A; Msg F-7307, Devers to CCS,17 Jul 44, JRC Cable Log.

51 See p. 123, above.52 Two Ltrs, Smith to Devinck, 26 Oct 43,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres; Ltr,Béthouart to Gammell, 1 May 44, AFHQ 0100/12CG-3 Div Ops Corres From Fr; Ltr, Gammell toBéthouart, 14 May 44, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 DivOps Fr Rearmt.


It was with respect to the units respon-sible for maintaining internal security that,in the opinion of General Loomis, the pro-vision of material assistance was whollyjustified. He urged that these troops, theninadequately equipped, be furnished suffi-cient matériel to enable them, should theneed arise, to carry out their duties satis-factorily. The forthcoming departure fromNorth Africa of the bulk of the French ex-peditionary forces made this course of ac-tion all the more necessary. AFHQ imme-diately endorsed General Loomis' recom-mendation and requested the French mili-tary authorities to prepare and submit ap-propriate requisitions for consideration bythe CCS. The new project was intendedto provide generally for supplies of an ex-pendable nature to be used for the main-tenance of the clothing and equipment,French as well as German and Italian, cur-rently in the hands of the troops concernedand for which U.S. maintenance materialswere available. When the French requisi-tions were received and screened by theJRC, General Wilson cabled a request on8 June for supplies consisting largely of rawmaterials and representing a total estimatedat from 3,000 to 3,500 tons semiannually.53

The French felt that the internal securityunits needed also more arms. At their re-quest, General Wilson urged the BritishChiefs of Staff and the CCS to authorizethe transfer to them of 100 Crusader tanksand 30 armored cars, all obsolescent, withsufficient spare parts for six months. TheBritish Chiefs of Staff agreed to the pro-posed transfer provided the French clearlyunderstood that the British Army accepted

no continuing liability for the maintenanceof the vehicles once the initial provision ofspare parts had been exhausted.54

It was not until 1 July that the CCS fi-nally approved the request for the provisionto internal security troops of 3,000-3,500tons of materials semiannually. They madeit clear that their approval did not consti-tute authority for the issue of additional or-ganizational and individual equipment. Atthe end of the month they authorized theproposed transfer of obsolescent British ve-hicles, such transfer to take place approxi-mately ninety days before the departurefrom North Africa of the last British, French,or U.S. unit equipped with tanks and ar-mored cars. As the last Allied unit of thistype was due to leave within ninety days,General Wilson recommended and obtainedapproval that the proposed transfer be ef-fected forthwith.55

The French, in the meantime, had re-quested and General Wilson had subse-quently agreed, that the CCS be asked toapprove the further transfer of Americanhalf-tracks, forty M3's and twenty-four M2'sin all, with which to effect the motoriza-tion of the units due to receive the tanks.Motorization, they had explained, wouldenable the units to extend their radius ofaction and increase their mobility. TheCCS approved the proposal on 11 August,with the proviso that the transfer be madeconcurrent with that of the British tanks andarmored cars.56

53 Memo, Loomis for Dever, 15 May 44, JRC902/1 Rearmt Plan: Msg F-66424, Wilson toTROOPERS, 30 Jun 44, JRC Cable Log; Msg,Wilson to CCS, 8 Jun 44, NAF 691.

54 Msg, Wilson to CCS and COS, 15 Jun 44,NAF 714; Msg F-66424 cited in 53; Msg 3256,AMSSO to AFHQ, 22 Jun 44, AFHQ 0100/12CG-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.

55 Msg, CCS to Wilson, 1 Jul 44, FAN 375; Msg,CCS to Wilson, 31 Jul 44, FAN 714; Msg, Wilsonto CCS, 6 Aug 44, NAF 757.

56 Msg, Wilson to CCS, 19 Jul 44, NAF 753; Msg,CCS to Wilson, 11 Aug 44, FAN 388.


The delivery to the security units of thetanks, armored cars, half-tracks, and mainte-nance materials followed close on the heelsof the CCS approval. With this matériel,the units, within a short time, were in aposition considered favorable should they becalled upon to engage in operations for themaintenance of internal security. It is wellto note here that throughout the ensuingmonths their duties remained light. No de-velopment occurred significant enough to

warrant their employment, at least whilethe war in Europe was in progress.57

57 Just after the war ended, on 11 May 1945,severe rioting broke out at Sétif, Algeria. FortyEuropeans were killed by natives. Rioting was fol-lowed by disturbances including the burning ofoutlying European farms. The Sovereignty forcesquickly gained control of the situation. To rein-force them, the French authorities, with the ap-proval of SHAEF, moved a few combat units fromFrance to North Africa. Msg 4237, Lewis toSHAEF, FWD, 11 May 45, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3Div Ops Fr Movements.

CHAPTER X

Phase IV of the Program(February-October 1944)

II: Implementation

Equipping the Units on the ANVILTroop List

While revisions of the 23 January Planwere being effected and secondary programsinitiated, implementation of Phase IV wasproceeding at a pace that quickened as thelaunching of ANVIL drew near.

On 18 March AFHQ requested theFrench High Command to nominate spe-cific units for inclusion in the ANVIL trooplist, and to indicate for each the respectiveU.S. or French table of organization andequipment, its strength in personnel andvehicles, present location, status of equip-ment, and date of readiness. Within a fewdays the French General Staff submitted thenecessary information on the basis of whichAFHQ immediately established and subse-quently published, on 1 April, the officialFrench troop list. The troop list actuallyincorporated all of the units included in therearmament program. On 17 April theFrench headquarters informed AFHQ thatGeneral de Gaulle had officially appointedGeneral de Lattre de Tassigny to commandthe French ANVIL forces.1

The American ANVIL forces comprisedthe Seventh U.S. Army, commanded byMaj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, also Com-manding General, Force 163. GeneralPatch, under whose control the Frenchforces were to operate during the initialphase of ANVIL, was watching the progressof their equipping with considerable inter-est. At his direction, Headquarters, Force163, on 5 April, instructed NATOUSA tomake sure that participating French unitswould be equipped and maintained on ex-actly the same scale as corresponding U.S.organizations. All logistical and other planswere being prepared accordingly.2

Aware that some U.S. tables of organi-zation and equipment were currently beingmodified, G-3, AFHQ, voiced the opinionthat any attempt at this juncture to changein a like manner the corresponding Frenchtables would result in confusion and delayin readying units for combat. Instead, G-3recommended that the JRC be asked to de-termine, with the assistance of all inter-ested staff sections, the minimum require-ments of equipment involved in each re-

1 Memo, Gen Noce To All Concerned, 16 Mar44, ASF Planning Div Files, A-47-192 Theater Br15—Fr Military NA; Ltr, Gammell to Giraud, 18Mar 44, JRC 320/004 Orgn of Fr Army (1 Jan44) ; Memos, Noce for Liaison Sec AFHQ, 30 Mar

44, and G-3 AFHQ To All Concerned, 29 May 44,AFHQ 0100/12D G-3 Div Ops, Vol. I; Ltr,Béthouart to Wilson, 17 Apr 44, AFHQ 0100/12CG-3 Div Ops Fr Forces in ANVIL, Vol. I.

2 Memo, Hq Force 163 for CG NATOUSA, 5Apr 44, AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups.


vised U.S. table, and to establish a methodof obtaining the necessary additional equip-ment for the French. G-4 opposed the pro-posal on the ground that changes in U.S.tables would bring about a "continual del-uge" of requests from the French for addi-tional equipment without their turning inthe matériel made surplus also as a result ofchanges. The JRC, on the contrary, agreedwith the recommendation of G-3, and in-formed the latter that a procedure had al-ready been established by which the WarDepartment, upon the recommendation ofthe theater commander, obtained from theMAB the assignment of the minimumequipment required.3

On 17 June Headquarters, Force 163, in-dicated the dates by which French units wereto be ready and requested NATOUSA toensure that they would be fully equippedbefore their release to Force 163. SOSbeing vitally interested in the matter, itschief, Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin, rec-ommended a number of measures. He sug-gested that SCAMA, the JRC, and Frenchheadquarters be briefed sufficiently in theoperation to know what troops must beequipped, in what order of priority, andhow soon; that French Training Section berequested to perform thorough showdowninspections of each unit on the troop list;finally, that shortages of equipment be filled,first from French stocks and then from U.S.stocks.4

Representatives from G-4, the JRC,NATOUSA, Force 163, and SOS immedi-ately took up General Larkin's recommenda-

tions in the course of a series of conferences.They agreed first to brief SCAMA and theFrench General Staff. General Leyer washanded, on 23 June, a priority list of theunits, program as well as nonprogram, tobe fully equipped, trained, and made ready.Later General Loomis suggested to him thateach organization be asked to submit requi-sitions for shortages to SCAMA, and thatSCAMA be directed to issue all items avail-able in French stocks and to forward con-solidated requisitions to SOS for the remain-ing shortages. He promised that both theFrench Training Section and the Stock Con-trol Section of the JRC, which he supervised,would furnish all possible assistance in thisconnection.5

Meanwhile, a large part of the equipmentordered from the United States under PhaseIV had been assigned and delivered toNorth Africa. Only a small amount re-mained to be shipped. In a message dated23 June, General Devers requested the WarDepartment to float "on highest priority"all the rest of the equipment then awaitingshipment at ports and depots in the UnitedStates. The French units, he explained,were to be used in scheduled operations; itwas urgent, therefore, that everything bedone to reduce their shortages, particularlyof critical items not available in theaterstocks. The War Department replied thatthe necessary action was being taken andannounced that the MAB had just assigneditems omitted from previous assignments be-cause of nonavailability at the time. Simul-taneously, NATOUSA turned over to theFrench, in pursuance of earlier agreementswith the War Department, substantialamounts of equipment available in U.S.

3 Memos, Noce for JRC, 3 Jun 44, G-4 for JRC,6 Jun 44, and Loomis for G-3, 6 Jun 44, JRC320/004 Orgn of Fr Army (1 Jan 44).

4 Memo, Hq Force 163 for CG NATOUSA, 17Jun 44, AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups; Memo, Hq SOSNATOUSA for CG NATOUSA, 19 Jun 44, HqMTOUSA File, Fr Policy (Feb-Oct 44).

5 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 23 Jun 55, HqMTOUSA File, Fr Policy; Memo, Loomis for Leyer,6 Jul 44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designatedfor Combat.

PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: II 165

stocks in North Africa, especially itemsrequired for the further training of troops.6

On 7 July General Béthouart, then on abrief visit in Washington with General deGaulle, called on General Marshall to dis-cuss with him the general situation ofFrench rearmament. He urged that therest of the matériel needed to complete theequipment of the fourth armored and thesixth infantry divisions be assigned withoutdelay. The U.S. Chief of Staff promptlyreferred the matter to General Devers andasked whether it was the theater's inten-tion to order any additional equipment overand above that delivered for the five in-fantry and three armored divisions. Gen-eral Devers replied that all essential equip-ment required for pending operations hadbeen ordered and, in fact, should arrive ontime if action already initiated was com-pleted as scheduled. It was true, he ex-plained, that some matériel had not beenordered, but only because of the decisionof the theater not to maintain organiza-tions in the program for which the FrenchHigh Command did not seem to haveenough personnel. General Devers thenoffered a word of caution in connectionwith the presence in Washington of Gen-erals de Gaulle and Béthouart. The Frenchhad just submitted several requests, whichAFHQ had ignored, for equipping unitsto be activated from personnel expected tobecome available in continental France. Itwould be well, General Devers recom-mended, if General Marshall refrainedfrom making any commitments based onstatements made by Béthouart or de Gaullewithout the theater's comments.7

By the beginning of August, no signifi-cant items of equipment for which thetheater had cabled requisitions to Washing-ton remained unassigned. Moreover, allitems assigned had been shipped, receivedin North Africa, and turned over to theFrench along with the matériel availablelocally. Yet, the various inspections con-ducted in the preceding weeks by FrenchTraining Section had revealed some star-tling and disturbing deficiencies. At a timewhen the launching of Operation ANVILwas getting dangerously close, some unitswere reported to be still short an appre-ciable amount of initial equipment, withthe result that much of their personnel hadnot been trained. Worse yet, several units—all supporting service organizations—hadnot even been activated. These were in-deed serious matters, creating a situationlikely to jeopardize the successful employ-ment of the French in ANVIL. The prob-lems involved were familiar ones: lack oftechnicians and shortages of equipment.

Service Troops and the Lack of Technicians

Activation of the units necessary to imple-ment the 23 January Plan in its entiretywas bound to create for the French mili-tary authorities insuperable difficultiesowing to the continued dearth of techni-cians and specialists. The elimination oftwo divisions and the deferment of twomore had not produced the expected num-ber of skilled troops. The inability of theFrench High Command to organize in par-ticular base units for the support of theirforces in Italy forced a re-examination ofthe entire question of service troops.

6 Msgs FX-63398, Devers to AGWAR, 23 Jun44, and W-57516, AGWAR to Devers, 28 Jun 44,JRC 903 Requests for Units; Msg W-57137, Som-ervell to Devers, 28 Jun 44, JRC Cable Log.

7 Memo, Béthouart for Somervell, 6 Jul 44, OPD

400 France, Sec IV; Msg W-61762, Marshall toDevers, 7 Jul 44, JRC 903 Requests for Units;Msg FX-70274, Devers to Marshall, 8 Jul 44,SHAEF Mission to France 475 Rearmt Plan andPolicy, Ground, 900-1.


It will be recalled that, by the end of Jan-uary, the French still had not made avail-able to Peninsular Base Section in Naplesany of the units necessary for the operationof Base 901, the French subsection of PBS.8

On 3 February General Loomis requestedGeneral Leyer to nominate at least some ofthe required units as their presence in Italywas urgently needed. On the same day hecomplained to General Larkin of continuedhesitation on the part of the French in pro-viding units for PBS in spite of several con-ferences with them on the subject. If hislatest communication to General Leyer didnot produce immediate results, he intendedto take the matter up with General Giraudor General de Gaulle.9

General Leyer promptly promised thatsome units would be made available by theend of February and others activated at alater date. What rendered their organi-zation difficult, he explained, was the exten-sive reshuffling of personnel and equipmentthen going on in the army as a result of theapplication of the January Plan.10 ThePoste de Statistique, or Statistical Branch, ofthe General Staff was working feverishly toeffect the necessary transfers.11 GeneralLeyer hoped that an accurate report onreadiness for combat could be prepared bythe end of February, when sufficient ad-justments would have been effected.12

By this time the French military authori-ties were making frantic efforts to find qual-

ified service troops for their many commit-ments. Most of the divisional and corpsservice units were activated. General Leyeralso had succeeded in assigning approxi-mately 8,000 additional effectives for dutywith the French bases at Oran and Casa-blanca. But he still was faced with theproblem of activating the army base andother service units provided for under theJanuary Plan, and of assigning additionaltechnicians and specialists to SCAMA,depots, and warehouses. Further aggravat-ing his difficulties, AFHQ was urging himto activate two ordnance maintenance bat-talions in addition to the ordnance units re-quired under the January Plan. GeneralLoomis informed him that the need for thesebattalions was urgent; without them,French forces participating in ANVIL wouldhave inadequate fourth and fifth echelonmaintenance of artillery and armored ve-hicles. General Leyer flatly rejected theproposal on the ground that he could notundertake this additional commitment.All present reserves of specialists as well astroops in training and available at a laterdate, he explained, would be absorbed byservice units already on the program.13

Intervening directly in the matter, Gen-eral Giraud, on 3 March, informed GeneralWilson that the current general lack ofservice troops made it impossible for hisheadquarters to assign to PBS as many unitsas desirable for the support of the Frenchforces in Italy.14 A few days later, in thecourse of a meeting with Generals Wilsonand Devers, Giraud warned that the same

8 See p. 146, above.9 Memos, Loomis for Leyer, 3 Feb 44, and for

Larkin, 3 Feb 44, JRC 370/003 Employment ofSv Units.

10 Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 4 Feb 44, JRC 370/003 Employment of Sv Units.

11 It had been established in March 1943 forthe purpose of allotting U.S. matériel to the unitsdesignated for activation in first priority.

12 Memo, Lt Atlas Cheek, Jr., for Col Crump, 15Feb 44, JRC 905.6/1 Corres on Statistics of Rearmt.

13 Memo, Loomis for Larkin, 3 Feb 44, JRC370/003 Employment of Sv Units; Memos, Loomisfor Leyer, 5 Feb 44, and Leyer for Loomis, 11 Feb44, JRC 904 Modification of Rearmt.

14 Ltr, Giraud to Wilson, 3 Mar 44, JRC 370/003Employment of Sv Units.


lack of service troops would prevent the or-ganization of the army and base services re-quired for ANVIL. Reiterating his often-expressed conviction that it was "a pity towaste excellent combat troops by convertingthem into service units in which duty theywere poor," he urged that the U.S. Armymake every effort to furnish men for theservices, thus permitting him to put moremen in combat units. General Devers re-plied that the U.S. Army itself was short10,000 men to meet its own service require-ments in the theater. He voiced the hopethat the French Army, after landing on theContinent, would find competent personnelto meet the requirements for service techni-cians. In the meantime he recognized thatthe U.S. Army would have to provide troopsfor the port and lines of communications,but would provide none for corps services.15

In the apparent belief that GeneralDevers' statement left the door open for amore generous provision of U.S. serviceunits, the French High Command, on 17March, sounded out AFHQ on the matter,only to be told that General Devers hadnot meant that commitments made in Jan-uary with respect to the ANVIL troop listwere to be modified. The January agree-ment constituted the basis of the currentprogram. The program itself had been for-mally acted upon by the CCS; it shouldtherefore be considered as "firm and stillbinding." 16 The next day General Devershimself clarified his statement in the courseof an interview with General Giraud. TheU.S. Army, he asserted, would assist to thefullest possible extent in providing certain

port and base service units but it could notdo more.17

There were sound reasons why GeneralDevers' offer of limited assistance could notbe extended further. He had sought,earlier in January, to obtain from the WarDepartment the assignment of some U.S.service units to the French. General Mar-shall had informed him that the War De-partment "specifically decided and di-rected" that service units for support ofFrench troops as requested by him couldnot and would not be provided.18

With the issue now closed, the FrenchHigh Command endeavored to fulfill itscommitments to the limit of available man-power. At the end of March a few serviceunits were ready for movement to Italy.By special agreement between AFHQ andGeneral Giraud, they were being assignedto General Juin's CEF for employment withBase 901. On 23 April the base was placedunder the command of a general officer,Brig. Gen. Jean Gross, himself under theoperational control of PBS. At the endof May and during the first two weeks ofJune, more service units were assigned tothe CEF for employment, at the discretionof General Juin, with either the corps it-self or Base 901.19

That the French military authorities didnot reopen the issue with respect to tech-nical troops does not mean that they suc-ceeded in activating all the required units.Already at the end of March they had an-nounced that they were unable, for themoment, to organize a number of units,

15 Min Mtg, Giraud and Devinck with Wilsonand Devers, 9 Mar 44, AFHQ CAO 1202 BIGOTANVIL, Pt. I.

16 Min Mtg, Devinck with Rooks and Noce, 17Mar 44, AFHQ 0100/12A G-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr.

17 Min Mtg, Giraud with Devers, 18 Mar 44,AFHQ 0100/12A G-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr.

18 Msgs W-9779, Devers to Marshall, 10 Jan 44,and 2704, Marshall to Devers, 17 Mar 44, OPDCable Files.

19 Dir, Hq PBS, 1 Apr 44, JRC 370/003 Em-ployment of Sv Units; CEF Rcds, File 88, OCMH.


among which were three general hospitalsthen on the 23 January Plan. The orderof battle of the CEF as of 22 May 1944,when the corps was at the peak of itsstrength, shows that the U.S. Army hadbeen forced to place at its disposal a con-siderable number of supporting units bothcombat and service. Practically all thecorps field artillery and antiaircraft unitswere American.20

At the end of June, with preparations forANVIL in full swing and the launching ofthe operation itself only a few weeks away,a report on the equipment status of theservice units on the troop list revealed thatas many as forty such units had not yetbeen activated. The French "divisionslice" was currently being estimated at32,500 men instead of the required 40,000.On the basis of eight divisions it was fearedthat the French would lack approximately60,000 service personnel needed to permitoperation as an independent force. Therewas little doubt that the American Armywould be compelled, as it had been inItaly, to make available substantial servicetroops of its own to the French expedition-ary units if the latter were to be supportedadequately in operations. In recognitionof a situation which the French High Com-mand was not likely to correct in time, theearlier stringent policy as contained in Gen-eral Marshall's message of 17 March toGeneral Devers was modified on 14 June.The War Department agreed that untilFrench communications zone troops be-came available, U.S. Army service unitscould be employed "in indirect support ofFrench combat organizations, but only when

such organizations were employed togetherwith U.S. combat troops in operations un-der U.S. command, and when such supportwas incidental to the major mission of sup-porting U.S. combat units." 21

Meanwhile, AFHQ officials were re-doubling their efforts to induce the FrenchHigh Command to activate forthwith allthe remaining required service units. Theirpatience was severely tried when they wereinformed in early August that the Frenchwere planning to delay the activation of anumber of organizations, mostly truck bat-talions and ordnance maintenance com-panies, while at the same time they were re-questing equipment for infantry and otherunits not on the troop list. General Gam-mell seized the opportunity to remind themthat any reduction of the number of serviceunits or any delay in their readiness wouldhave serious repercussions in the pursuitof the war. For this reason no considera-tion could be given to new requests forarmament while such a situation existed.22

In mid-August, as ANVIL was about tobe launched, the situation with respect to

20 Msg F-25964, Devers to AGWAR, 1 Apr 44,ASF International Div Files A-45-192 Cables,Vol. IX: Fifth Army History, Pt. V, pp. 251-56.

21 Memo, Hq Force 163 for SACMED, 21 Jun44, AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups; Memo, Col J.Terrence for Gen Noce, 30 Jun 44, AFHQ 0100/12C Div Ops Fr Comd Liaison 2; Quotation fromMsg W-50668, Marshall to Devers, 14 Jun 44,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.

The "division slice" consists of the total strengthof the division plus the number of troops involvedin maintaining the division in the field, that is tosay, corps, army, army group, and communica-tions zone troops. It is determined by dividingthe theater strength (minus air forces) by the num-ber of divisions in the theater. The normal divi-sion slice for the U.S. forces operating in Europein 1944 was estimated at 40,000, made up asfollows: 15,000 in the division itself; 15,000 corpsand army troops; 10,000 communications zonetroops.

22 Ltr, Gammell to Juin, 15 Aug 44, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres; see p. 157,above.


service units was far from satisfactory.Some units were insufficiently manned,others were only partially equipped andtrained, others had not even been activated.There was no alternative but for the U.S.Seventh Army to direct its own service unitsto assume such support of the French forcesas the French High Command was unableto provide.

Shortages of Equipment

As Phase IV opened, the problem ofshortages, which had plagued the Frenchfor many months, was facing them with un-diminished gravity. Reports currentlybeing received from Italy indicated thatunits were still arriving without essentialitems of equipment. The reasons weremany.

Not all the equipment expected from theUnited States had been or was being re-ceived in North Africa. Some items wereunobtainable; others were deleted by theWar Department because they were con-sidered nonessential, or because their ship-ment would jeopardize other commitments.Sometimes, initial equipment arrived with-out some of the required 30-day mainte-nance items or 6-month spare parts. Atother times, the French failed to submitproper and timely requisitions, or the equip-ment was ordered by the JRC on the basisof U.S. tables of organization and equip-ment for units activated on different tables.Furthermore, of the matériel actually re-ceived, the French were diverting substan-tial amounts to equip nonprogram units,run depots and training centers, or maintainunits during their period of training, a pe-riod extending not infrequently over severalmonths. Finally, and not the least impor-

tant, the order of priority for the readyingof alerted units and the corresponding datesof readiness were subject to sudden changesby order of AFHQ.23

The French supply system, which still hadnot progressed to a point where it couldhandle even routine matters smoothly, wasseriously taxed by the unexpected. In spiteof considerable juggling of equipment, in-volving at times the complete and hastyturnover of matériel from one unit to an-other, the French military authorities werecontinually faced with the alternative ofcalling on SOS to complete the initial equip-ment and basic loads of alerted units or ofembarking the units improperly equipped.Greatly concerned over the situation, Amer-ican officials in the theater undertook to sur-vey its causes with a view to devising ade-quate remedial measures.

The submission by the French of requi-sitions for initial equipment still appearedto be a source of considerable difficulty tothem. To clear up some of the technicalproblems involved, a conference, called atthe suggestion of the French themselves, washeld on 17 February between members ofthe JRC and French G-4 officers respon-sible for the submission of requisitions. Theconferees discussed and finally agreed on asatisfactory procedure. They agreed fur-ther that the requisitions would serve tocomplete the equipment of the units desig-nated for combat. The matériel to be req-uisitioned was to replace that previouslydrawn from program units and diverted for

23 Memo, Charpentier To All Concerned, 21 Feb44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated forCombat; Memo, Director International Div forCG North African Theater, 25 May 44, JRC 903Requests for Units; Memo, G-4 Sup Br for ACofSG-4 SOS, 18 Jun 44, Hq MTOUSA File, FrPolicy.


various purposes; it would also be used tore-equip units after combat.24

Having been informed by GeneralLoomis on 19 February that the Frenchhad not requisitioned any additional ma-jor ordnance items for replacements, Gen-eral Larkin once again inferred that theywere depending on the United States formaintenance of their units in North Africaand elsewhere. The French, he pointedout, still were not providing full initial equip-ment for departing units, as evidenced bytwo new cases just reported. One artilleryregiment had reached Italy equipped withonly one pair of shoes per man, and withthree of its twelve 155-mm. guns not inworking condition; a training center had ar-rived short of tents and training equipment.Warning that the Fifth Army stocks wouldsoon be depleted if emergency issues to in-adequately equipped troops were allowed tocontinue, General Larkin urged that theJRC arrange to have every French organi-zation about to depart from North Africainspected by U.S. officers to ensure com-pleteness of equipment. General Loomisobjected that such a procedure was not prac-ticable owing to lack of personnel. Hepointed out that the U.S. advisers withFrench divisions were already submittingweekly reports to the JRC indicating whatshortages existed. The attention of theFrench had been drawn to the matter andhe felt certain that the situation would soonimprove.25

General Loomis immediately informedGeneral Leyer of the great concern currentlyfelt by Generals Larkin and Devers regard-ing the question of shortages. He reiteratedthat responsibility for the completion ofequipment of units alerted for movementrested solely with the French High Com-mand.26 Realizing that only energetic ac-tion taken without delay could solve theproblem, Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce, G-3,AFHQ, called Generals Larkin (SOS),Loomis (JRC), Kingman (French Train-ing Section), and others for a conferenceon 4 March. General Larkin repeated hisearlier recommendation that units be com-pletely inspected before leaving NorthAfrica in order to determine shortages."Someone has to decide whether they arebattle-fit," he insisted. This, explainedGenerals Loomis and Kingman, was beingdone. Inspections, however, were inFrench hands and the responsibility forcompleteness of equipment, they believed,should remain French. Once in the field,the units reported shortages to the U.S.teams attached to them by General King-man. In some instances, they claimed to beshort certain items of equipment, when infact the French tables of organization andequipment under which they were equippeddid not call for them. In other cases, theresponsible authorities had not received thenew French table in time. The confereesagreed that efforts should be made to ex-pedite the printing and distribution to allunits of the exact table under which eachwas to operate. After the conference,AFHQ informed General Clark, Com-manding General, Fifth Army, that diffi-culties incidental to shortages appeared tobe due largely to lack of knowledge of the

24 Memo, Regnault for Loomis, 7 Jan 44, JRC402 Sup Policy; Min, Conf AFHQ, 17 Feb 44, JRC400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat.

25 Msg 53748, Loomis to Larkin, 19 Feb 44, JRC402 Sup Policy; Msg L-1635, Larkin to Loomis, 20Feb 44, JRC Cable Log; Msgs L-1603, Larkin toJRC, 20 Feb 44, and 55172, Loomis to Larkin, 22Feb 44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designatedfor Combat.

26 Memos, Loomis for Leyer, 25, 26 Feb 44, JRC400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat.


appropriate tables of organization andequipment under which French units wereorganized and equipped. Copies of thesetables were being prepared in sufficientquantity and would be forwarded to hisheadquarters without delay.27

On 8 March, the War Department issueda directive on the replacement and main-tenance of equipment for the French forces.The directive embodied and formalized theseveral actions taken earlier. It set forthin detail the manner in which shortages ofinitial equipment and of replacement andmaintenance items were to be requisitionedfor both combat and noncombat units, andprescribed the accounting procedure to befollowed for each category of items. Theprocedure remained in force until Junewhen it was revised to conform with newWar Department policies.28

In spite of vigorous action on the part ofFrench and Allied headquarters, the prob-lem of shortages continued to be a thornyone. In early April the U.S. Fifth Army in-formed General Devers that two pioneer(labor) regiments had arrived in Italy"with such large number of initial shortagesas to be impractical to list by cable." Inmid-April an inspection of the 1st Motor-ized Infantry Division about to depart forItaly revealed important shortages of mor-tars, machine guns, radio sets, trucks, andother items. The division, until recentlyBritish-equipped, had been re-equippedwith U.S. matériel largely drawn from"nonparticipating" units. These were theunits not designated by AFHQ for immedi-

ate participation in operations. Amongthem were the 1st and 5th Armored Divi-sions, both program units and both on theANVIL troop list, but whose presence was notrequired in Italy. The 1st DMI was stillholding some British equipment (such asmortars, Brens, tents, wreckers) besidesFrench and Italian matériel. Fifth Army,having no maintenance facilities, parts, andammunition for such non-U.S. equipment,requested AFHQ to effect its immediatereplacement. It was not until the middle ofApril that the division, then on its way toItaly, was reported as having all its initialU.S. equipment except antiaircraft weap-ons.29

Simultaneously with the 1st DMI's de-parture from North Africa, the 2d Armoredwas being readied for shipment to theUnited Kingdom, there to be included inthe forces designated for the cross-Channeloperation (OVERLORD). The CCS hadagreed at the TRIDENT Conference in May1943 that a token French force would par-ticipate in OVERLORD.30 In late January1944 the Allied command had further de-cided that French elements would be in-cluded among the first troops to enter Paris.The 2d DB had subsequently been chosenfor this honor by the French military au-thorities. This division, like the 1st DMI,was once British-equipped and had nowbeen rearmed with U.S. matériel. Itmoved to the United Kingdom in mid-April with approximately 100 percent ofits initial equipment and basic loads, plus

27 Msg 60678, CinC to Fifth Army, 6 Mar 44,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt; Msg2345, Fifth Army to CinC AFHQ, 21 Mar 44, JRCCable Log.

28 Ltr, WD AG 400 (8 Mar 44) to CGNATOUSA and CG N.Y. Port of Embarkation, 14Mar 44, amended by Ltr, WD AG 400 (7 Jul),11 Jul 44, JRC 402 Sup Policy.

29 Msgs 2245, Fifth Army to CG NATOUSA, 3Apr 44, RFTS 101, Inspection Team to CG FifthArmy, 19 Apr 44, 8321, Fifth Army to CG AFHQ,10 Apr 44, and F-35027, CinC AFHQ to AlliedArmies in Italy, 20 Apr 44, JRC 400.1/009 Supof Forces Designated for Combat.

30 Min, 5th Mtg with President and Prime Min-ister, 24 May 43, TRIDENT Conf.


a 30-day supply of tank replacements.31

While in the United Kingdom, the divisionbecame the supply and training responsi-bility of the U.S. Third Army, under whosecontrol it was placed, and was maintainedin the same manner as U.S. divisions. ThirdArmy determined the exact status of itsequipment and submitted requisitions toSOS, ETOUSA, operating in the UnitedKingdom, for the few existing shortages.These were filled from U.S. Army stocksin the theater and all transfers of matérielwere reported by chiefs of services in ac-cordance with current lend-lease direc-tives.32

Another division about to depart foroverseas duty was the 9th Colonial Infan-try. Its destination was Corsica, liberatedin September 1943 by French troops, whereit was to prepare for future operations inthe Mediterranean.

The final equipping of the 1st DMI, 2dDB, and 9th DIC had necessitated the fill-ing of numerous shortages. This had beenaccomplished by securing the missing itemsfrom one of the following sources, in orderof precedence: from French sources otherthan nonparticipating units, that is, from allstocks available to the French; fromexcess U.S. theater stocks; from non-participating units; and from U.S. theaterstocks, provided it did not jeopardize thesupport of U.S. forces. The procedure fol-lowed had been that established by NA-TOUSA on 7 April.33 SCAMA, SOS, and

Stock Control Section, all had shared inthe task.

The procedure as set forth by NATOU-SA, although simple in appearance, was,when put into application, quite complexbecause of the many channels of communi-cation involved. As pointed out later byone of the U.S. advisers to the French di-visions, to fill a shortage of initial equipmentmight require no less than twenty adminis-trative steps.34 Nevertheless, in spite of itscomplexity, NATOUSA extended its appli-cation thereafter to all other units subse-quently alerted.

In mid-April the French began submit-ting, at the request of the JRC, a large num-ber of requisitions designed to complete asfully as possible the initial equipment andbasic loads of all remaining units on thetroop list. These requisitions were also de-signed to provide, at least for the secondhalf of 1944, the minimum maintenancerequirements of the Territorial establish-ments necessary for the support of expedi-tionary forces. The requisitions were firstscreened by the JRC, then checked againstthe list of equipment currently available inexcess theater stocks, which SOS furnishedat frequent intervals. From these lists theJRC extracted the items required and re-quested the War Department to authorizetheir transfer. Granting this authorizationwas a routine matter in itself but necessaryfor proper co-ordination with supply agen-cies in the United States. NATOUSAthen arranged for the immediate turnoverof the equipment. The locally unavailableitems were requisitioned from the UnitedStates.

Feeling that some French requisitions

31 Msg F-34203, Devers to AGWAR, 18 Apr 44,JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated forCombat.

32 Memos, Hq ETOUSA for CG Third Army andSOS ETOUSA, 10 May 44, and Hq ETOUSAfor CG Third Army, 24 Aug 44, SHAEF G-3091 France, Vol. I.

33 Ltr, NATOUSA AG 400/466 D-O, 7 Apr 44,JRC 370/001 Employment of Units—Gen.

34 Memo, Liaison Office Fr Training Sec forJRC, 26 May 44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of ForcesDesignated for Combat.


were excessive, General Larkin questionedwhether the French Supply Services wereexploiting their own resources to the maxi-mum before calling on U.S. theater stocksfor equipment. He recommended that, ex-cept in cases of actual emergency, onlyitems listed as "excess" in theater stocks begiven to the French. The continued issueof other items, he feared, would jeopardizeseriously the American supply situation and,in addition, would encourage the Frenchto depend too heavily on the U.S. Army forcompletion of initial equipment of bothalerted and nonparticipating units.35 Gen-eral Loomis, likewise, was disturbed by thesize of some of the French requisitions, es-pecially those submitted for medical items.He could not help but feel that they wereindicative of a desire on the part of theFrench to build up stocks for ultimate usein continental France either by the civilianpopulation, or by units raised there.36

To ensure that the French requisitionswere fully justified, the JRC subjected themto more stringent scrutiny and screening.Simultaneously the JRC urged the Frenchonce again to exploit their own resources tothe limit. In the case of the units whichhad left North Africa incompletelyequipped, General Loomis arranged for theU.S. base section nearest to them to honorthe French requisitions as rapidly as possible.

In late May General Leyer forwarded tothe JRC a list of requisitions for matérielwith which to re-equip the 2d DIM and 3dDIA after their expected withdrawal fromthe Italian front, in anticipation of their ulti-mate engagement in ANVIL. GeneralLeyer's action was consonant with a recom-mendation made several months earlier by

General Loomis. As the requisitions ap-peared to contain for the most part suppliesnormally furnished through SOS as main-tenance, General Loomis and SOS agreedthat they need not be acted upon. Theythen informed General Leyer that SOSwould assume the responsibility for re-equip-ping all French units operating in Italy be-fore their engagement in ANVIL.37

On 16 June Headquarters, NATOUSA,issued a final directive on the readying ofFrench participating units. The directiveinstructed SOS to see to it that the Frenchcompleted from their own stocks the initialequipment and basic loads of each unit be-fore it was alerted for movement overseas.As the unit was alerted, SOS would issue toit from U.S. stocks such supplies as wereunobtainable from French sources.38

The remaining task now was to make ar-rangements for the adequate and timely pro-vision of the maintenance supplies expectedto be required in the course of the follow-ing twelve months by forces other than ex-peditionary units. It will be recalled thaton 18 January 1944 the CCS had approvedthe issue of some maintenance materials toTerritorial units and establishments support-ing the expeditionary forces and, on 1 Julyof the same year, the provision of 3,000-3,500 tons semiannually of maintenancematerials for the Sovereignty forces. Infulfillment of these decisions, the French,in mid-July, submitted requisitions coveringthe second half of 1944 and, on 15 Septem-ber, those for the first half of 1945. Oncethe requisitions were screened and properly

37 Ltr, Loomis to Leyer, 22 Jan 44, and Memos.Loomis for McKay, 1 Jun 44, Loomis for Leyer, 21Jun 44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designatedfor Combat.

38 Ltr AG 400/466 D-0, Hq NATOUSA to CGSOS, 16 Jun 44, JRC 370/001 Employment ofUnits—Gen.

35 Msg L-17212, Larkin to JRC, 26 Apr 44, JRC400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat.

36 Memo, Loomis for CofS NATOUSA, 17 Apr44, JRC 902/1 Rearmt Plan.


cut down in the case of unnecessary items,the matériel available in the theater wasturned over to the French and the rest or-dered from the United States.39

By the time ANVIL was launched, thesituation with regard to shortages had sub-stantially improved. In addition, sincesome units, especially service organizations,were not expected to land before D plus 25,it was hoped that their shortages would befilled by then. At any rate, General Loomiswas satisfied that the French military au-thorities were making a "real effort" to sup-ply all available items from their stocks.Their task, he recognized, was still greatlyhandicapped by the dearth of competentsupply personnel and the fact that seriousshortages and delays in shipments from theUnited States were placing "a tremendousburden" on them.40

SCAMA's Role During Phase IV

Throughout Phase IV, SCAMA, ably as-sisted by the American Stock Control Sec-tion, continued its efforts to assert itself asthe supreme French supply authority.41 Itsdifficulties, numerous enough from the start,had increased as a result of the applicationof the decree of 16 December 1943 whichdivided military responsibility between theCommissioner of War and Air and the Com-mander in Chief.42 In January and earlyFebruary, this responsibility was split fur-

ther by the delegation of some authority tothe General Staff, the heads of services, andto a smaller extent to the commander-desig-nate of the French ANVIL forces. GeneralLoomis greatly feared that the establishmentand continued operation of an effective sup-ply organization were next to impossible.In his judgment the time had come for theFrench High Command to nominate a gen-eral officer armed with sufficient authorityto correct a situation likely to affect ad-versely current and future operations.43

The French took no such step, but the ap-pointment, later in April, of GeneralBéthouart as Chief of Staff of National De-fense did result in a centralization of re-sponsibility.

As SCAMA and supply installationsstruggled toward standardization, theFrench General Staff authorized, about 1February, certain depot and port units foractivation one month later. Even thoughthese units never materialized, their au-thorization served to call attention to theneed of reinforcing the personnel in depotsand ports. To fill this need, General Leyerrecruited additional civilian employees andordered service units of the expeditionarycorps placed on temporary duty withSCAMA while they waited to be shippedoverseas. In general, the personnel situa-tion began to improve in early Februaryeven though no definite plan had been es-tablished.

On 15 February Maj. Gen. Arthur R.Wilson, Commanding General, Mediter-ranean Base Section, informed General Lar-kin that all U.S. officers assigned to Frenchdepots were reporting notable improve-ments. Progress was further evidenced bythe fact that the French were now replac-

39 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 15 Jul 44, JRC 400.4/006; Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 15 Sep 44, SHAEFMission to France Requisitions, 1st half of 1945;see pp. 128, 161, above.

40 Memo, Loomis for G-4 SOS, 12 Sep 44, JRC400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat.

41 Sources for this section: JRC 400.2/002 StockControl System; History of Stock Control Section,JRC, copy in JRC Files.

42 See p. 118, above.

43 Memo for Rcd, Loomis, 2 Mar 44, JRC 320/004 Orgn of Fr Army (1 Jan 44).


ing in U.S. depots, at an increased rate,the items of equipment issued for the main-tenance of their forces in Italy. By earlyMarch, SCAMA's director, Colonel Char-pentier, felt that "the worst was over." Hepredicted that the sample inventory sched-uled for the second week of March forthe purpose of checking the accuracy ofSCAMA's records would show a definiteimprovement. Actually, the inventory didreveal substantial errors, in extreme casesrunning as high as 80 percent. The dis-covery shocked the French into realizationof the need for still more energetic action.

Meanwhile a publication depot atSCAMA headquarters had been set up.English-French technical dictionaries pre-pared especially for each service becameavailable. So did a second supply textbookwritten in both languages. French andAmerican officers on duty with SCAMAwere given courses of instruction on thenew supply system and the correct use offorms. Once thoroughly schooled, theU.S. officers were posted in French officesand warehouses throughout North Africato give on-the-spot assistance on all supplymatters. Still there were frequent caseswhere French chiefs of services would is-sue to their depots directives at variancewith the SCAMA textbooks.

By 15 May, when the French were con-ducting a general inventory of stocksthroughout North Africa, it became ap-parent that rapid strides in warehousingand recording had been made. SCAMAhad reached a turning point in its exist-ence. For the first time it had a fairlycomplete and accurate picture of all stockson hand, with the possible exception ofordnance and engineer spare parts. InJune detailed inspections of all depots con-ducted by joint Franco-American teams re-

vealed that the SCAMA system was in op-eration in all warehouses and offices. Es-tablishment of SCAMA as the sole supplyauthority in the French Army could atlast be considered an accomplished fact.The system had become sufficiently en-trenched to render almost impossible anyreturn to the haphazard practices of theold days.

SCAMA extended its activities to the en-tire supply field. It was now responsiblefor preparing and submitting requisitionsto the JRC; for receiving, sorting out, as-sembling, and stocking matériel in the va-rious depots; for maintaining supply levels,regulating the movement and transport ofsupplies, and keeping proper accountingof U.S. matériel according to lend-leaseregulations. It had full authority to dis-tribute equipment in accordance with pri-ority lists and tables of organization andequipment established by the French HighCommand. If a unit was called forwardbefore it was completely equipped, SCAMAwas empowered to issue to it a "cheque" orbill of credit which enabled it to draw thenecessary items from the U.S. base in thetheater of its destination. In short, SCA-MA had become the SOS of the FrenchArmy.44

By early July Colonel Geraghty, chief ofStock Control Section, considered thatSCAMA could be left to continue its de-velopment "along lines natural to theFrench" and that the presence of his sectionwas no longer needed. On his recommen-dation, Stock Control Section was disbandednear the end of the month. But SCAMAcontinued to operate long after the launch-ing of ANVIL, since much work remained to

44 Notes from Col Maurice Labarbarie, Jan 52;Rpt, Col Labarbarie, 18 Jul 44, sub: Functioningand Role of G-1 SCAMA, copy in OCMH.


be done for the supply of the expeditionaryforces.

Repossession of U. S. Equipment

Repossession by the U.S. Army of Amer-ican matériel in French hands took placein a number of cases and for a variety ofreasons, all consonant with established pol-icies governing French rearmament andwith the theater's responsibility for ensuringthe judicious and economical use of allAmerican equipment. Frequently the pur-pose was to recapture matériel issued in anemergency on the understanding that itwould be returned out of subsequent ship-ments to the French. A case in point is thereturn to SOS depots of the tools, spareparts, and supplies which SOS had loanedto the French in early April 1943 for settingup and operating their motor vehicle assem-bly plant at Algiers. In this instance, re-possession was effected simply by appropri-ating the same materials directly from sub-sequent convoys bringing equipment for theFrench.45

In other cases, particularly numerous dur-ing Phase IV, repossession was ordered be-cause the matériel in question was consid-ered "excess" in French stocks for one of thefollowing reasons: it had been delivered byerror, it was now in the hands of units oncepart of approved troop lists, or American of-ficials considered its further use by theFrench no longer justified. In such cases,repossession involved considerable difficulty,often making it impracticable. The prob-lem became particularly acute in April 1944,when a number of units, not likely to beactivated, were stricken off the troop list.

The theater requested from the War Depart-ment the authority to instruct the Frenchto return to U.S. depots all ordnance equip-ment which had then become excess, exceptgeneral-purpose vehicles of which theFrench were still short. The authority wasimmediately granted with the understand-ing that proper credit reports would be madeon all returns and a detailed list of items in-volved transmitted to the MAB in Wash-ington for information. The French thendirected SCAMA to effect the necessary re-turns.46

The operation proved to be more complexthan had been anticipated. In the firstplace, SOS had no knowledge of just whatthe French were to return. NATOUSAasked the War Department for a detailedlist of all equipment that had actually beenshipped for the units in question. To com-plicate matters, the French had used theequipment received on a French table oforganization basis with the result that thematériel currently in the hands of the unitsdid not correspond to what had been or-dered initially. Finally the French felt thatthey could not return certain items as theyhad used them to fill shortages in other unitsor had given them to training centers. Asa result a considerable exchange of corre-spondence took place during June, July, andAugust between NATOUSA, SOS, the WarDepartment, and French headquarters.Such items as the French were finally ableto return were held in SOS depots pending adecision on their ultimate disposition.47

The confusion was further increased bythe addition, throughout the early summer

45 Msgs L-2316, SOS to CG Atlantic Base Sec,15 Apr 43, and L-2317, SOS to JRC, 15 Apr 43,JRC Cable Log.

46 Msgs F-34037, Devers to AGWAR, 18 Apr 44,and W-26607, Somervell to Devers, 22 Apr 44,JRC 909 Surplus Equip.

47 Msg F-47011, Devers to AGWAR, 17 May 44,JRC Cable Log; Memo, CG SOS for CG NATOU-SA, 2 Jun 44, JRC 909 Surplus Equip.


months, of new units to both the 23 Janu-ary Plan and the Air Force program. Tosimplify matters, General Loomis asked theFrench to transfer to these units the greaterpart of the items which had become excessas a result of the elimination of others, andto keep him informed of such transfers.48

Repossession of U.S. equipment was con-sonant with the basic principle under whichFrench rearmament had operated from thebeginning, namely, that only approved unitswere entitled to receive and hold Alliedequipment. The CCS did not fail to re-mind the theater commander on 13 Augustthat the French were to return the matérielin the hands of units no longer on approvedtroop lists.49

Disposal of British Equipment

A minor issue raised at the beginningof Phase IV and rapidly settled concernedthe ultimate disposal of British equipmentstill in the possession of the French. On8 February General Wilson, the SupremeAllied Commander, requested the Frenchmilitary authorities to hand over all suchequipment to the British Ordnance Services.The National Defense Committee immedi-ately instructed Le Troquer, the Commis-sioner of War and Air, to take the matter upwith AFHQ and settle it within the frame-work of the Protocol of Anglo-French Mu-tual Aid recently signed.50 The protocolhad laid down that the government of the

United Kingdom could, after the cessationof hostilities, ask for the return of "such ma-tériel supplied by it that was not destroyed,lost or worn out." The French military au-thorities interpreted this to mean that theycould continue to use the equipment for theduration of the war. Although not intend-ing to maintain any organizations equippedwith British equipment, Le Troquer ex-plained to General Wilson that the FrenchHigh Command had "various needs closelyrelated to the common war effort" whichcould not be satisfied from Americansources.51 This was true, he said, of gen-eral-purpose vehicles, tank transporters, andspare parts for the maintenance of Britishequipment. To arrive at a satisfactory so-lution, Le Troquer suggested that respon-sible French and British authorities meet todetermine what items urgently needed bythe British should be handed over. Gen-eral Wilson having approved the proposal,British and French staff officers drew up alist of equipment to be replaced in Britishdepots and advised General Leyer to com-plete the agreed transfer at the earliest pos-sible date.52 With respect to the matérielwhich the French were to keep, GeneralWilson pointed out that the British Armycould not accept permanent liability for itsmaintenance now that the French forceswere being re-equipped with U.S. matériel.Whenever possible, however, the Britishsupply services would make every effort tofurnish spare parts or provide maintenance.

48 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 5 Jul 44, JRC 909.49 Msg, CCS to Wilson, 13 Aug 44, FAN 390.50 Memo, Commissioner of War and Air for CinC,

3 Mar 44, AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups.

51 Ibid.52 Memo, SACMED for EMGG, 18 Mar 44,

AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups.

CHAPTER XI

The North African Forces in Action

Italy and Other Battlegrounds in theMediterranean

Vindication of the decisions which hadled to the arming of the North Africanforces came promptly after their commit-ment to battle. Units of the French Expe-ditionary Corps, dispatched to Italy as fastas they could be equipped and trained, al-ready were giving a good account of them-selves. More would soon be put to the testof combat in anticipation of their ultimateemployment in ANVIL.

From a two-division corps in January1944, CEF had, by 1 May, grown to anoversize corps of a strength equivalent tonearly five divisions. Its component ele-ments were then: the 2d Moroccan In-fantry Division, Maj. Gen. André Dody;the 3d Algerian Infantry Division, Maj.Gen. Aimé de Goislard de Monsabert; the4th Moroccan Mountain Division, Maj.Gen. François Sevez; the 1st Motorized In-fantry Division, Brig. Gen. Charles Brosset;the 1st, 3d, and 4th Moroccan TaborGroups, Brig. Gen. Augustin Guillaume;and general reserve units comprising tworegiments of tank destroyers, six battalionsof artillery, various services, and Base 901.Total strength of the corps was approxi-mately 105,000 officers and men.1 This

figure represented a division slice onlyslightly more than half the size recom-mended for the ANVIL force (40,000), anindication that the French forces still lackedsupporting combat and service troops.While no units of the French Air Force wereassigned to the direct support of the CEF,some squadrons were actively engaged inoperations as part of the Allied air pool inthe Mediterranean theater.2

Such was the force which, led by GeneralJuin, bore the brunt of the offensivelaunched in mid-May by General Clark'sU.S. Fifth Army for the purpose of break-ing through the German troops then solidlyentrenched in the Gustav Line. In thewords of General Alexander, Commanderin Chief, Allied Armies in Italy, the French,on 11 May, attacked with splended élanand "drove like the wind" across the moun-tainous terrain between the Liri River andthe Tyrrhenian Sea. Showing themselvesquick to exploit each local success, "possiblyquicker than U.S. and British troops," theysucceeded, "to the surprise and elation ofthe Allied Command," in overrunning theenemy, forcing him to pay a heavy toll incasualties and prisoners.3 Within three daysthey had completed the break-through andoutflanked the German positions in the Liri

1 For details on division and regimental organi-zation, fire power, and weapon distribution, seeCol. Adolphe Goutard, Le Corps ExpéditionnaireFrançois dans la Campagne d'ltalie (1943-1944)(Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1947), pp. 5-9.

2 See Ch. XII, below.3 Quotations are from statements made by Field

Marshal Alexander to Dr. Sidney T. Mathews dur-ing an interview in Ottawa, 10-15 January 1949.

THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ACTION 179

SIENA, ITALY. French troops moving through the streets of Siena, 3 July 1943.

valley. Their "sensational advance"4 hadbeen a major surprise also to the enemy.5

Greatly pleased with the French perform-ance, General Devers, on 15 May, cabled toGeneral Marshall: "French forces haveachieved outstanding victory," a statement

followed two days later by a message fromGeneral Clark himself, addressed also to theU.S. Chief of Staff: "French troops arefighting splendidly with our Americanmatériel." 6

Having broken through the Gustav Line,units of the CEF pursued the enemy relent-lessly, disorganized German resistance, andcontinued their rapid advance through themountains south of Rome. After the cap-ture of that city by Allied units, on 4 June,the French pushed forward to Siena, whichthey seized on 3 July, and drove in the di-rection of the Arno River. Just as their firstelements were reaching a point only a fewmiles from Florence, the order was issuedfor their withdrawal. The rest of the

4 General Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (NewYork: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 348. Onthe same page: "For this performance, which wasto be a key to the success of the entire drive onRome, I shall always be a grateful admirer of Gen-eral Juin and his magnificent CEF." Again onpage 360: "A more gallant fighting organizationnever existed."

5 "The French," wrote Field Marshal AlbertKesselring, commander in chief of the opposingGerman forces, "fought with great elan, and ex-ploited each local success by concentrating imme-diately all available forces at the weakened point."Statement in First Evaluation by the CinC South-west (Army Group C) of Enemy Tactics Duringthe Offensive Since 12 May 1944, dated 19 May1944, in Fifth Army History, V, 203.

6 Msg, Devers to Marshall, 15 May 44, CM-IN11577; Msg, Clark to Marshall, 17 May 44, OPD319.1, Sec V, Case 182.


9TH COLONIAL INFANTRY DIVISION disembarking from LCI's for the invasionof Elba, 17 June 1944.

corps had already begun, on 20 June, toregroup behind the front line and makeready for the forthcoming assault on south-ern France. By 23 July the relief of theCEF by Allied units had been completed.From December 1943, when the first divi-sion had been committed, to the final with-drawal, the French had sustained a total ofapproximately 30,000 combat casualties (ofwhich over a third had been incurred duringthe three-week period of the May offensive),including 5,900 killed and over 24,000wounded in action. They had taken morethan 8,000 prisoners.7

Meanwhile other French units had beencommitted to combat elsewhere in the Med-iterranean, notably in an amphibious opera-tion, known as BRASSARD, launched againstthe island of Elba in mid-June 1944.

Conquest of the island had first been ad-vocated by General Giraud in October 1943but ruled out at the time by the Allied com-mand as premature. Suggested a secondtime by the French Commander in Chief, inFebruary 1944, it had then received the ap-proval of AFHQ and planning had begun inApril. The operation was assigned to Gen-

7 Figures on losses are taken from Lt. Col. P.Santini, "Etude statistique sur les pertes au coursde la guerre 1939-1945," Revue du Corps de SantéMilitaire, X, No. 1 (March, 1954). For a detailed

account of French participation in Italy for theperiod March-July 1944, see Sidney Mathews, TheDrive on Rome, a volume in preparation for theseries UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLDWAR II; see also Goutard, op. cit.


TROOPS ENTERING PORTOFERRAIO, ELBA, 19 June 1944. Destruction wascaused by Allied bomb attacks.

eral Martin, then commanding general of1st French Corps, with headquarters inCorsica, and was carried out by him underthe general direction of General de Lattrede Tassigny, commander-designate of theFrench forces assigned for participation inANVIL. General Martin, it will be recalled,had, under General Giraud's direction, com-manded in September 1943 the all-Frenchoperation for the liberation of Corsica (Op-eration VESUVIUS).8

The ground forces taking part in the as-sault of Elba were exclusively French.With a strength of 12,000 men, they con-sisted of approximately two thirds of the9th Colonial Infantry Division, com-

manded by Brig. Gen. Joseph Magnan, onegroup of Moroccan tabors (2d GTM), twounits of Commandos (Groupe de Com-mandos d'Afrique and Bataillon de Choc),and supporting antiaircraft and engineerunits. Assisting the ground elements wereAllied naval forces, largely British but in-cluding several French naval vessels, allunder the command of Rear Adm. ThomasH. Troubridge (RN), and Allied air unitscommanded by Col. Thomas C. Darcy(U.S.), among which were two Frenchfighter s q u a d r o n s . The operation,launched on the night of 16-17 June, rap-idly achieved its goal. After two days ofsevere fighting against well-defended posi-tions, the French overcame the resistance8 See p. 101, above.


put up by the German garrison of some2,700 men. By the evening of 19 June,Elba as well as the neighboring island ofPianosa had been entirely liberated. Theassaulting forces had killed several hundredenemy troops, made about 2,000 prisoners,and captured more than 60 pieces of artil-lery. They had suffered some 900 casual-ties including 258 killed in action.9

Committed to other operations in theMediterranean under Anglo-American con-trol were French air units and naval ves-sels. Air squadrons were engaged in con-voy and coast protection or in air missionspreparatory to ANVIL.10 Naval vessels, anumber of which had been repaired andmodernized by the Americans and the Brit-ish, were carrying out various missions notonly in the Mediterranean but in other areasas well. All were under the operational au-thority of the Allied commanders in the re-spective theaters of operations.11

Yet not all the units on the North Africanrearmament program had been committedto action. For some, no employment hadbeen found; they were undergoing addi-tional training and were kept in readinesspending their ultimate engagement inOVERLORD and ANVIL.

FranceOVERLORD

Of all the ground forces re-equippedunder the North African program, only one,the 2d Armored Division, participated inthe cross-Channel operation. Since its

transfer to the United Kingdom in April1944, the division had completed its equip-ping and training. On 31 July, or approxi-mately two months after the launching ofOVERLORD, the division, still under the com-mand of Maj. Gen. Jacques Leclerc, waslanded in Normandy as part of Third U.S.Army, under Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.Immediately engaged in battle, the divisionsubsequently took an active part in the pur-suit to the Seine. On 23 August Lt. Gen.Omar N. Bradley, commander of 12thArmy Group, directed it to push to Paris.The division entered the French capital twodays later along with the 4th U.S. InfantryDivision. After the liberation of Paris, the2d DB continued its drive eastward still asa component of the Third Army.12

Also engaged in OVERLORD were the Brit-ish-equipped and British-controlled squad-rons of the French Air Force, a number ofFrench naval vessels operating as part ofthe Allied naval pool, and two paratroopunits. These were the 2d RCP (Regimentde Chasseurs Parachutistes) and the 3dRCP. The two units, organized in early1941 in the United Kingdom and equippedby the British, actually were component bat-talions (the 4th and 3d) of the British Spe-cial Air Service (SAS) Brigade. They wereparachuted in June and July respectively toassist the Resistance forces operating in con-junction with OVERLORD.

ANVIL

By early August all alerted French or-ganizations on the ANVIL troop list, includ-

9 Figures on losses are taken from the Santiniarticle cited note 7. For detailed account of Op-eration BRASSARD, see Rpts, Adm Troubridge toAdm Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, 24 Jun 44, andGen de Lattre to Allied CinC, 2 Aug 44, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops BRASSARD; also General[Jean] de Lattre de Tassigny, Histoire de la PremièreArmée Française (Paris: Plon, 1949), pp. 16-30.

10 For details on organization, re-equipping, andemployment of French air units, see Ch. XII, below.

11 For details on the refitting and employment ofthe French naval forces, see Ch. XIII, below.

12 See Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command,UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WARII (Washington, 1954), Ch. XIII.


ing those that had been withdrawn from theItalian front and those which had takenpart in the capture of Elba, were re-group-ing in staging areas in southern Italy, Cor-sica, and North Africa. While waiting fortheir respective D Days they completed theirinitial equipment or, in the case of unitswhich had already seen action, drew re-placement items from U.S. base sections inthe same manner as the American unitsabout to participate in ANVIL. Meanwhile,organizations which remained to beequipped under the 23 January Plan and itssubsequent revisions hastily procured equip-ment in the hope that they would be readyin time for effective participation in theforthcoming operation.

One question was causing considerableconcern to American officials in the theater.The French were short, not only of auxiliarytroops to support their ANVIL forces ade-quately, but also of the necessary replace-ment personnel to maintain them at strengthin combat. General Devers estimated thatthey had replacements for only two monthsof fighting after landing in France. In amessage dated 2 July he had urged GeneralMarshall to impress on General de Gaulle,upon his arrival in Washington where hewas expected shortly, the seriousness of thesituation and the necessity for planning therecruitment of replacements in continentalFrance after the launching of ANVIL.1 3

The long-awaited assault on the FrenchMediterranean coast took place on 15 Au-gust. Directing the operation was Lt. Gen.Alexander M. Patch, Commanding Gen-eral, U.S. Seventh Army. Although in theinitial stages the attack was led by threeAmerican divisions (VI Corps) experiencedin amphibious landings, assisted by some

French Commandos and armored ele-ments,14 the operation was largely backed upby French troops. These formed a taskforce known as Armée B, under the controlof General de Lattre de Tassigny. Within afew days, six French divisions had landedand one by one joined VI Corps in battle.By 31 August, with Marseille and Toulonsecurely in French hands, the bulk of theFrench ground forces, then comprising ap-proximately two thirds of the combatstrength of Seventh Army, had been com-mitted to battle. Progressively General deLattre grouped his units into two Armycorps—1st Corps under the command ofGeneral Béthouart, and 2d Corps under thecommand of General de Monsabert.15 Inmid-September, when Armée B left the con-trol of the Seventh Army to become a tac-tically independent organization, it renameditself Première Armée Française (1stFrench Army). From this time on, 1stFrench Army and U.S. Seventh Army wereto fight side by side as the two componentelements of the U.S. 6th Army Group com-manded by General Devers.

At the end of September, after a 450-mile dash northward from Provencethrough Lyon and Dijon, up to Belfort, 1stFrench Army had received most of theunits on the ANVIL French troop list. Thesewere: five infantry divisions—1st DMI, 2dDIM, 3d DIA, 4th DMM, and 9th DIC;three groups of Moroccan tabors—1st

13 Msg 13244, Devers to Marshall (Eyes Only),2 Jul 44, OPD Exec 10, Item 52-D.

14 One combat command from the 1st ArmoredDivision.

15 General Béthouart was Chief, General Staffof National Defense, until 7 August 1944; he be-came Commanding General, 1st Corps, on 6 Sep-tember 1944. General de Monsabert was Com-manding General, 3d Algerian Infantry Division,first in Italy, then in France until 2 September1944, when he was promoted to the rank of lieu-tenant general and assumed command of 2dCarps.

FRENCH 2D ARMORED DIVISION passing through a small town near Paris,25 August 1944.

MAJ. GEN. JACQUES LECLERC (left foreground), commanding general of the French2d Armored Division, is followed by liberated Frenchmen as he walks through the street of asmall town on the way to Paris, 23 August 1944.

STREET FIGHTING IN MARSEILLE, 28 August 1944. By 31 August the city wasin French hands.

REVIEWING FRENCH TROOPS IN LIBERATION CEREMONY, MAR-SEILLE. The French Minister of War, Mr. André Diethelm, is followed by General Jean deLattre de Tassigny (left) and Lt. Gen. Aimé de Goisland de Monsabert, 29 August 1944.


GTM, 2d GTM, and 3d GTM; two ar-mored divisions—1st DB (commanded byMaj. Gen. du Touzet du Vigier) and 5thDB (commanded by General de Verne-joul ) ; and general reserve elements, services,and base units.

Within a short time, 1st French Armyreached a strength of some 200,000 menrepresenting nearly all the expeditionaryforces equipped and maintained, or main-tained only, by the United States under theNorth African rearmament program. Yetthis army, sizable as it was, could not oper-ate as an entirely independent force. Be-cause it still lacked sufficient service units,it was relying heavily on the U.S. SeventhArmy for a considerable part of its support,thus creating a situation similar to thatwhich had existed in Italy with respect tothe former CEF. In addition, few replace-ments were reported to be available inNorth Africa to maintain the existing unitsat strength. Progress toward self-suffi-ciency could be envisaged, however, forduring its advance through French terri-tory 1st French Army had absorbed consid-erable numbers of liberated Frenchmen,40,000 by 20 September, 20,000 more by15 October. Still larger numbers werewaiting to be enrolled. Ultimately 137,000men were mustered in as replacements oras personnel for new units, thus boostingthe strength of 1st French Army to a peakof 290,000 men.10

Meanwhile the larger part of the Frenchair squadrons and a substantial number ofFrench naval vessels had been committed to

action as part of the Allied air and navalpools operating in support of ANVIL.

Remaining in North Africa were a hand-ful of expeditionary forces soon to beshipped to France for use as replacementsor as additional reserve elements of 1stFrench Army. All other forces in the area,that is, Territorial and Sovereignty troops,were continuing their normal activities, suchas maintaining the expeditionary forces inoperation or ensuring the defense and inter-nal security of North Africa and of Alliedcommunications lines.

Logistical Support of the French ANVILForces

The same basic principles which hadgoverned the supply and maintenance of theCEF in Italy were applied to the logisticalsupport of the French forces operating inANVIL. The over-all maintenance andsupply responsibility rested with the U.S.Army. The U.S. supply services obtainedall maintenance items of American originrequired for the participating French andU.S. forces by means of combined monthlyrequisitions, consolidated these supplies inU.S. stocks, and saw to their proper dis-tribution. The French themselves fur-nished items peculiar to their troops, suchas wine, brandy, and oil, as well as postexchange and Special Services supplies.French service units and supply officers as-sisted in the entire operation.

In early July 1944 a U.S. base sectionwas organized to support the combinedFrench-American forces from the time oftheir entry on the Continent. The base,known as Coastal Base Section (COSBASE)and commanded by Maj. Gen. Arthur R.Wilson, was to operate in Marseille as soonas practicable. On 27 July Headquarters,

16 These additional effectives being of local re-cruitment, and consequently not part of the NorthAfrican rearmament program, the question of theiramalgamation and equipping is treated in ChapterXVIII, below, which deals with the rearmamentof the French Metropolitan forces. For finalcomposition of 1st French Army, see p. 353, below.


SOS, NATOUSA, set forth in detail thepolicies to be followed by COSBASE withrespect to the issue of and accounting forrations and replacement and maintenancesupplies to the French.17

The French had not yet been able to acti-vate enough service units, especially truckcompanies, to operate a base section of theirown to support their combat forces. Inearly July they had hastily begun settingup an organization to function side by sidewith COSBASE. They assigned to it thepersonnel formerly operating Base 901 inNaples, elements from other French bases,and officers recruited from training centersand elsewhere for the purpose. The base,bearing the old designation "901" andcommanded by General Gross, was officiallyactivated on 1 August. Not only was thisaction belated since the launching of ANVILwas only two weeks away, but the organiza-tion of the base itself was, from the start,wholly inadequate. Its personnel was in-sufficient in number and poorly trained.Few of the officers knew English, a mostserious deficiency considering that the basewas to work in conjunction with a U.S.base. Material means were almost nonex-istent. Consequently, no planning could bedone which would effectively guide the basein its future work.

The situation was so serious that by com-mon agreement it was decided to attachBase 901 to COSBASE, thus making Gen-eral Wilson responsible for the logisticalsupport of both the French and the U.S.forces. As a result, Base 901 became, inpractice, a French section of COSBASEand a liaison agency between the latter andthe French.

Landing on 16 August along with thefirst French combat elements was a smalladvance party from Base 901. The partywas so unprepared for the difficult task ofhandling vast quantities of personnel andmen, and so hampered by lack of physicalmeans, that it could do little valuable work.As a result, the combat elements wereforced, during this critical period, to relyentirely on the U.S. Army for their support.It was not until 31 August that the firstechelon of the base arrived in Marseille.By this time French combat elements hadalready reached Lyon, or a point some 200miles away. The second echelon arrivedon 15 September just as 1st French Armywas being formed. Two weeks later, whenthe third and fourth echelons finally reachedMarseille, the lines of communications hadstretched to such an extent that the base wassnowed under with tasks entirely out of pro-portion to its still meager means—1,200men and 200 vehicles.

Its work was made even more difficult inearly October as a result of the reorganiza-tion of the American supply lines. Withthe ANVIL forces continuing their rapid pushnorthward, the Americans decided to set upan advance base in the liberated town ofDijon, while maintaining the coastal base inMarseille. To conform with this reorgani-zation, Base 901, although still greatly un-derstaffed and poorly equipped, was splitinto two sections. On 12 October a detach-ment headed by the new base commander,Brig. Gen. Georges Granier, was sent toDijon to work with Continental AdvanceSection (CONAD) commanded by GeneralWilson, while the remainder stayed withDelta Base Section commanded by Brig.Gen. John P. Ratay. A few days later, on 23October, General de Lattre announced thatCONAD was taking over the direct re-

17 Memo, Hq SOS NATOUSA for CG COSBASE,27 Jul 44, MTOUSA File, Sup of Fr (Mar-Nov44).


sponsibility for the supply of 1st FrenchArmy, and authorized General Wilson toappoint French officers from Base 901 tothe various staff sections and commands ofCONAD. These provisions were to applyas long as 1st French Army was operatingas part of U.S. 6th Army Group and onFrench soil.18

CONAD's responsibility was to supplyboth component armies of the 6th ArmyGroup. Delta Base Section concerned it-self with the operation of the port of Mar-seille, the base depots, and the maintenanceinstallations in that area. Both sectionsremained under the control of SOS,NATOUSA, until 20 November when anew headquarters, Southern Line of Com-munications (SOLOC), commanded byGeneral Larkin, took over the entire Ameri-can supply system in southern France.19

The place of the French within the finalAmerican organization was as follows: Gen-eral Granier, as Commanding General,Base 901, was deputy to General Larkin.French officers were posted at the variousU.S. command headquarters, SOLOC,CONAD, and Delta Base Section. AtSOLOC and CONAD they were fully in-tegrated in the staffs of these commands,and therefore under the control of the re-spective U S. commanding officers. AtDelta Base Section the French section wasattached to the U.S. organization. Formatters of discipline and administration, allFrench personnel were responsible to Gen-eral Granier.

Base 901 played a dual role. It wascharged with obtaining, largely from North

Africa, and distributing supplies drawnfrom French stocks. In this task it workedindependently of U.S. supply agencies anddealt solely with the French High Com-mand. With respect to supplies of Ameri-can origin, including rations, it assisted U.S.supply organizations in effecting distribu-tion to authorized units, that is, troop listunits and their replacements. No U.S.Army responsibility existed for any otherFrench personnel.20

The missions assigned to Base 901 wereexacting enough considering the limitedpersonnel available. Their execution, how-ever, was made even more difficult fromthe start as unexpected major problemssuddenly arose, in particular, the absorptionby 1st French Army of considerable num-bers of liberated Frenchmen. Even whenthis army grew in size, Base 901, whose ef-fectives, according to American estimates,should have amounted to 112,000 for a cor-responding eight-division army, never ex-ceeded some 29,000 men. As a result,much of the logistical support continuedto be provided throughout the war byAmerican supply lines.21

It had been agreed between AFHQ andthe French High Command in Algiers thatmatériel ordered from the United Statesto complete the equipping of certain unitswhose presence was urgently needed insouthern France would be shipped directlyto Marseille. To ensure its proper distrib-ution, SCAMA opened an office in that porton 25 September, and established the nec-essary liaison between the units concerned

18 GO, Hq 1st Fr Army, 23 Oct 44, in GO 27, HqCONAD, 27 Oct 44, MTOUSA File, Fr Policy(Feb-Oct 44).

19 Msg S-66620, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 13 Nov44, SHAEF Mission to France, 091.711-1 (Fr).

20 Msg BX-18007, Devers to de Lattre, 17 Oct44, JRC Cable Log.

21 For additional information on Base 901, see1st French Army Report, Maj. Gen. Henri Cou-draux, La Base d'Opérations 901 dans la Bataillepour la Libération de la France, 1944-1945 (Paris:Imprimerie Nationale, 1947).


and COSBASE.22 In late October SCA-MA's remaining staff in North Africa wasordered to the Continent where it contin-ued to supervise the supply of the Frenchforces.

The North African Rearmament ProgramEnds

While the fighting was progressing insouthern and then in eastern France, re-armament operations were continuing inNorth Africa. Their object was to com-plete the equipping and training of the re-maining troop list units.

Reports reaching AFHQ immediatelyafter the entry of the first French troopsinto action emphasized the need of dispatch-ing to the Continent all available Frenchservice and base units to ease the burdennow thrown on the U.S. Army. Some, itwas known, had not yet been activated;others were only partly manned andequipped. At a conference called on 21August, Brig. Gen. Clement Blanc, of theFrench General Staff, agreed that all re-quired truck battalions would be activatedat once but with only half their personnel,the remainder to be raised later in southernFrance. With respect to the other units,he insisted that they could not be madeready before the beginning of Decemberfor lack of troops.23

A week later representatives from SOS,Mediterranean Base Section, the JRC, andSCAMA met to examine the equipmentand training status of the units currentlyalerted for movement to the Continent.

They agreed that, on the whole, the unitsconcerned had made substantial progress.However, they were deeply concerned overthe fact that some units, mostly ordnancemaintenance organizations and quarter-master truck battalions designated for theoperation of Base 901, were so deficient inequipment, personnel, and training thatthey could not possibly be made ready intime to meet the commitment dates as thenset up.24

It was not likely that deficiencies in per-sonnel could be remedied in time, if at all,for already there were reports that thecaliber of students, both white and native,then attending the French OrdnanceTraining School at Meknès (Morocco),was far below that of the previous classesas far as mechanical aptitude and expe-rience were concerned.25 Obviously, therecruiting of technical personnel in NorthAfrica had reached the limit. No improve-ment could be expected until the liberationof part of France produced additionalmanpower.

Shortages of equipment were anothercause for grave concern both at Allied andFrench headquarters. The most acuteshortage appeared to be that of general-purpose vehicle (¼-, 1½-, and 2½-tontrucks especially), although all necessaryvehicles were known to have been assignedin Washington. The shortage was ascribedto unauthorized diversions to nonprogramunits and incomplete shipments from theUnited States. Already SOS had beencompelled to draw upon U.S. theaterstocks, even to the extent of threatening themaintenance of American units. By 8 Sep-22 Msg LX-43235, Larkin To All Concerned, 21

Sep 44, JRC Cable Log; Memo, SCAMA Hq, 29Sep 44, MTOUSA File, Fr Policy (Feb-Oct 44).

23 Memos, Knox for Loomis, 21 Aug 44, andLeyer To All Concerned, 24 Aug 44, JRC 370/003Employment of Sv Units.

24 Rpt on Conf, SOS, 8 Sep 44, JRC 400.1/009Sup of Forces Designated for Combat.

25 Memo, Kingman for Loomis, 10 Sep 44, JRC353/003 Training Fr Army Personnel.


tember the shortage was estimated at ap-proximately 1,100 vehicles. Since thesecould not be provided from U.S. stocks,General Larkin recommended thatNATOUSA redouble its efforts to get theFrench to withdraw all vehicles from unitsnot entitled to hold U.S. equipment. Thisrecommendation was followed a few dayslater by a warning to the French that SOSwould stop issuing vehicles to them as longas any remained in the hands of unauthor-ized units.26

The warning was accompanied by a re-quest from General Loomis that he be in-formed by 1 October of the number ofvehicles being withdrawn from nonprogramunits for re-issue to alerted units. A monthlater, still without an answer, GeneralLoomis again broached the question. Hepointed out to General Leyer that, accord-ing to a recent study of assignments andshipments from the United States, Frenchstocks should have, not a shortage, rathera surplus, of some 900 vehicles. It was dif-ficult, he observed, to reconcile this factwith the considerable shortage currently re-ported. General Leyer replied that figuresavailable to him indicated a "theoreticaldeficit" of some 560 trucks. However, hewas able to report that approximately thesame number of vehicles had been returnedand would be transferred to troop list units;more would soon be returned. He al-lowed only schools and training centersto retain their vehicles.27

Meanwhile, other shortages, such as var-

ious ordnance items, including individualweapons, and signal supplies, were beingfilled as a result of action by SOS. On 19September General Larkin explained to theWar Department that all possible steps hadbeen taken to complete the equipping ofFrench units from French and U.S. stocksavailable in North Africa. It was urgent,he concluded, that existing shortages befilled by shipments from the United Statesin order that the units concerned be madefit for operations.28 Simultaneously, tomake sure that the French were complyingwith earlier repeated warnings, SOS,NATOUSA, on 21 September, made an im-portant announcement: thereafter, the U.S.Army would issue no major item of equip-ment as long as any similar or suitable sub-stitute remained in the hands of Frenchorganizations not on the troop list or notauthorized U.S. equipment by the theatercommander. Future requests were to beaccompanied by a certificate stating that theequipment could not be supplied from anyFrench source.29

Efforts to repossess from the French allitems in their hands considered "excess"continued unabated. The matter had be-come more urgent now that emergency is-sues of equipment to alerted French unitshad considerably depleted some Americantheater stocks. It was expected that asshipments from the United States reachedthe French, surpluses in their stocks wouldapproximately equal the amounts of emer-gency items turned over to them initially.It was essential for SOS to repossess suchitems as well as items in the hands of unitsonce in the program but no longer on the

26 Ltr, Loomis to Leyer, 19 Sep 44, and Memo,Loomis for Leyer, 3 Sep 44, JRC 451/001 Ve-hicles—Misc; Msg LX-41201, Larkin toNATOUSA, 8 Sep 44, JRC 903 Requests forUnits; Msg LX-41818, SOS to JRC, 13 Sep 44,JRC Cable Log.

27 Ltrs, Loomis to Leyer, 19 Sep 44 and 17 Oct44, and Leyer to Loomis, 30 Oct 44, JRC 451/001 Vehicles—Misc.

28 Msg LX-42836, Larkin to CG Pembark, 19Sep 44, JRC Cable Log.

29 Msg LX-43288, SOS to MBS, 21 Sep 44, JRC909 Surplus Equip.


troop list. On 5 September GeneralLoomis requested General Leyer to submitto SOS at frequent intervals an inventoryof all initial items of equipment on hand inFrench depots. He pointed out that theitems of U.S. origin currently in trainingcenters had been issued on a loan basis tocomplete the training of replacements; theywere subject to recall by SOS when andif required.30

Attempts to repossess the equipment inthe hands of a combat unit that had foughtbrilliantly in Italy, but had subsequentlybeen withdrawn from the ANVIL troop listby the French High Command, precipitateda minor crisis in early September. The unitwas the 4th Moroccan Tabor Group. Un-like the other three tabor groups then fight-ing in France, the 4th GTM had been re-turned to French Morocco, there to begiven some much needed rest. Since it re-verted to the status of a Sovereignty unit, itwas no longer authorized to retain its Amer-ican equipment. Repossession in this caseposed a delicate problem. Should a vic-torious unit returning to its native countrybe stripped of its matériel? American offi-cials finally agreed that, for morale reasons,the regiment would retain its individualequipment including arms. The rest wasordered returned to U.S. depots.31 Thecrisis soon came to a head when it becameknown that the French military authoritieshad turned over a substantial part of theorganizational equipment such as vehicles,weapons, and radio sets to a Commando

unit not on the troop list.32 General SirHenry Maitland Wilson expressed to Gen-eral Juin, then Chief of Staff of NationalDefense, his dissatisfaction over the Frenchaction which, by diverting without authori-zation equipment to a nonprogram unit,had violated the directives of the CCS.33

As repossession frequently tended to inter-fere with the work of equipping the remain-ing program units, the JRC decided to trya fresh approach to the problem. GeneralLoomis, on 8 September, recommended asuspension of the repossession operationsuntil such a time as the French had receivedall equipment due them from the UnitedStates. Meanwhile, only critical itemswould be repossessed as required.34 Thatwas the procedure adopted and followed forsome weeks, during which time the JRCprepared a study on excess stocks in antici-pation of the eventual resumption of therecapture operations.

In early October a new situation arosein the theater as a result of operationaldevelopments on the Continent. WithParis liberated, on 26 August, the Frencharmed services had already begun to movefrom North Africa to the French capital onthe heels of General de Gaulle's ProvisionalGovernment (Gouvernement Provisoire dela République Française), the successor toCFLN since 3 June. Before leaving, Gen-eral Leyer had submitted plans for themobilization and equipping of manpowerthen becoming available as a result of the

30 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 5 Sep 44, JRC320/001 Incl: Corres File B.

31 Msgs LX-39978, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 1Sep 44, JRC/176, CG NATOUSA to AFHQ, 3Sep 44, and FX-91969, CG NATOUSA to Larkin,4 Sep 44, JRC 370/001 Employment of Units—Gen; Msg FX15252, CG NATOUSA to JRC, 14Sep 44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designatedfor Combat.

32 The Staouelli Commandos, organized atStaouelli, a small town near Algiers; later knownas Commandos de France during the campaign ofFrance and Germany.

33 Ltr, Gammell to Juin, 9 Sep 44, JRC 370/001Employment of Units—Gen; Memo, Loomis forCofS SHAEF, 13 Oct 44, SHAEF Mission toFrance, 091.711-1 (F r ) .

34 Msg JRC/199, JRC to CG NATOUSA, 8 Sep44, JRC Cable Log.


VICTORY PARADE THROUGH THE STREETS OF PARIS, 26 August 1944.Leading the parade is General de Gaulle, left, and General Pierre Koenig, right; center, rear,is General Leclerc.

advance of the Allied armies. These andother developments, including the antici-pated closing down of U.S. installations inNorth Africa, prompted AFHQ to questionwhether it was qualified to act as agent indealing with French authorities on militarymatters not directly affecting the theater.General Wilson proposed, on 8 October,that thereafter such matters be dealt with bySupreme Headquarters, Allied Expedition-ary Force, in Paris. Already an advancedetachment from the JRC, headed by Gen-eral Loomis, had reached the French capital

on 3 October, and was organizing atSHAEF an agency to handle French arma-ment problems arising within the EuropeanTheater of Operations. Pending a decisionon the proposed transfer to SHAEF of theover-all responsibility for future rearma-ment, the rear echelon of the JRC keptfunctioning in North Africa. It supervisedthe movement of French Training Sectionto France where its presence was urgentlyrequired, and screened the general supplyprogram requisitions submitted by theFrench for their Sovereignty and Territorial


forces. In these various tasks JRC Rearwas assisted by SCAMA and by Mediter-ranean Base Section (MBS), the Oran portorganization serving Delta Base Section inMarseille.35

By the end of October the study whichthe JRC had conducted of excess matérielin French hands had been completed andits findings embodied in a memorandumprepared for the benefit of MBS by ColonelCrump, acting chairman of the committeesince General Loomis' departure. ColonelCrump listed the four sources known topossess such matériel: SCAMA stocks,training centers and schools, program unitsnot on current troop lists, and nonprogramunits. He pointed out that a portion of theexcess items should be repossessed for usein France with the remainder revertingto MBS stocks.36 Pursuant to ColonelCrump's recommendation, SCAMA pro-ceeded to prepare and submit inventoriesof items excess in French stocks. These werecarefully screened by appropriate theatersupply services to determine what itemswere to be recaptured from the French. Ex-cept where large excesses already existed inU.S. theater stocks, most of the items re-ported by French inventories were finallyrepossessed by MBS and placed in U.S. de-pots, and due credit was given the Frenchon theater lend-lease reports.37

Throughout the month of November thequestion of the responsibility for French

armament matters continued to be a livelyissue. SHAEF was handling entirely newproblems arising from the liberation ofFrench manpower in vast numbers and,through ETOUSA, had assumed the sup-port of the French expeditionary forcesoperating in France. Meanwhile the Amer-ican command in the Mediterranean,MTOUSA, was supplying the forces,largely Sovereignty and Territorial, oper-ating in that theater. In view of thepresence in Paris of the heads of Frenchservices, and of the approaching closingdown of all U.S. military installations inNorth Africa, MTOUSA recommended tothe War Department that SHAEF be askedto assume the responsibility for the con-tinued support of Territorial and Sovereign-ty forces in addition to its present commit-ments. The War Department endorsed theproposal, which fitted with its desire to seea single agency dealing with all French re-armament problems, particularly since thegeneral supply situation had become criticalas a result of heavy demands from U.S.troops. SHAEF finally agreed, on 3December, and from that date on assumedall supply responsibility for the French forcesincluding Sovereignty and Territorialtroops, as well as replacements for the ex-peditionary forces.38

By this time most armament activities inNorth Africa had ceased. On 8 November,JRC Rear had been officially disbanded.39

So had the remaining echelon of FrenchTraining Section whose presence in thetheater had become superfluous as a result

35 Msg FX-35102, Wilson to AGWAR, 8 Oct44, AFHQ Cable Log; Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 16Aug 44, Msgs MF-12547, Lewis to JRC, 5 Oct 44,and JRC/295, Larkin to Loomis, 24 Oct 44, JRC320/001 Orgn of JRC.

36 Memo, Crump for MBS, drafted 20 Oct 44,sent 8 Nov 44, in same file.

37Logistical History of NATOUSA—MTOUSA:11 August 1942 to 30 November 1945, ed. Col.Creswell G. Blakeney (Naples, Italy: G. Montanino,1946), p. 372.

38 Msgs FX-52426, MTOUSA to SHAEF, 14Nov 44, WX-63198, AGWAR to SHAEF, 15 Nov44, FX-60290, MTOUSA to SHAEF, 29 Nov 44,and S-69284, SHAEF to MTOUSA, 3 Dec 44,SHAEF Rearmt Div File 900-1.

39 Memo, Crump for CofS, Fr Ground Forces,8 Nov 44, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC.


of the transfer to southern France of thedivision and army training centers operat-ing as part of the ANVIL troop list. Suchofficers and enlisted men of JRC Rear andFrench Training Section as were neededto reinforce General Loomis' new sectionat SHAEF had been dispatched to the Con-tinent. SCAMA's rear echelon was on itsway to France.

With all equipment problems henceforththe responsibility of SHAEF, the NorthAfrican rearmament program could be re-garded as having come to an end.

All together the contribution to the wareffort of French North and West Africaand other French territories then alignedon the side of the Allies had been substan-tial both in quantity and in quality. Totaleffectives under arms, as of 1 September1944, had reached the impressive figureof 560,000 men. Of this number, Northand West Africa had furnished approxi-mately 295,000 natives and 215,000Frenchmen (of whom some 20,000 hadescaped from France), or a total of 510,000.

The effort had been greatest in NorthAfrica (Tunisia, Algeria, and French Mo-rocco) where 16.4 percent of the Frenchpopulation had been mobilized (20.5 per-cent in French Morocco). Natives underarms represented 1.58 percent of the Mos-lem population, a figure kept necessarilylow for lack of sufficient white cadres. Yet,in French Morocco, where natives werenot subject to compulsory service and there-fore could enter military service only asvolunteers, it had been possible to raise twoinfantry divisions (2d DIM and 4thDMM), four tabor groups, and variouscavalry, artillery, and service units.

The operational distribution of effec-tives, again as of 1 September, was reported

to be as follows: in the expeditionary forces,260,000 men of whom approximately onehalf were whites; in the Territorial andSovereignty forces, 250,000; in the Colo-nial forces—that is to say, the forces, largelynative troops, maintaining the security ofthe numerous French colonies throughoutthe world—50,000.40

Equally impressive had been, as alreadyrelated, the contribution of these forces onthe field of battle, a contribution whichcould only increase as the critical opera-tional situation in the last months of 1944became more demanding. When, on 1November, all French forces passed fromthe control of AFHQ to that of SHAEF,General Wilson, under whose supreme com-mand they had been for approximately tenmonths, seized the opportunity to express toGeneral Juin his admiration for the "heroicperformance" of those French troops whohad shared in the campaigns of Italy andsouthern France. "Their courage in com-bat, their devotion to duty, their excellentleadership, their sacrifices and successes inbattle have brought us to an overwhelmingcommon victory and given mute testimonyto the rebirth of French arms." 41 In asimilar message to General de Gaulle, alsodated 1 November, General Wilson con-cluded: "Thus it is with certainty that Ilook forward to new and glorious victoriesof French arms, in the final crushing of thecommon enemy. The gallant traditions ofFrench arms live on in safe hands." 42

40 Memo with statistics, Poydenot To All Con-cerned, 21 Sep 44, SHAEF Misc Fr 320-2NA,Orgn Fr Army: Colonel Spillman, "L'Arméed'Afrique," Revue Historique de l'Armée (Decem-ber, 1948), p. 40-41.

41 Ltr, Wilson to Juin, 1 Nov 44, SHAEF SGS092 France, Vol. III.

42 Ltr, Wilson to de Gaulle, 1 Nov 44, in same file.

CHAPTER XII

Rearming the French Air Force

Shortly after the November 1942 land-ings in North Africa, the French air unitsthen aligned with the Allies began a longperiod of reorganization and re-equipping.1

At the time, they fell into two groups: theFree French Air Forces of General deGaulle, the first elements of which had beenorganized and engaged in operations asearly as August 1940, and the French NorthAfrican Air Forces then under GeneralGiraud's authority. Both groups of forcescontinued to operate separately until thesummer of 1943, when, with the fusion ofthe de Gaulle and Giraud forces, all Frenchsquadrons became an integral part of asingle air force.

The five squadrons of the Free FrenchAir Forces, commanded by Lt. Gen. Mar-tial Valin, had been equipped, maintained,and controlled by the Royal Air Force(RAF). Two were operating from basesin the United Kingdom, one in the MiddleEast, and one in Africa in conjunction withthe Leclerc Column. In October, just be-fore the landings in North Africa, the fifthunit, the Normandie Fighter Squadron, hadleft for the USSR to be re-equipped withSoviet matériel and engaged under Soviet

operational control.2 In January 1943 twoadditional fighter squadrons, coming fromNorth Africa, would join the two units al-ready in the United Kingdom.

The North African Air Forces, com-manded initially by General Jean Mendigal,included some 20 fighter, bomber, recon-naissance, and transport squadrons scat-tered throughout Tunisia, Algeria, andFrench Morocco, and 10 more stationed inFrench West Africa. Total strength ofthese units amounted to approximately12,000-15,000 men, including some 1,500fully trained pilots and corresponding crews,all of them with wide experience. Most ofthe pilots had seen action in the 1939-40campaign of France and had served sincethen in North and West Africa. Theirequipment, largely of French origin withsome American planes purchased in 1939,was highly inadequate both in quantity andin efficiency. Of the 700-odd aircraft avail-able on 8 November 1942, a large propor-tion, approximately two thirds, had beendestroyed in action or damaged by sabotagein the course of the brief resistance to the

1 Except as otherwise noted, the sources for thischapter are: JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Planand Policy; JRC 360/005 Status and Employmentof Units; Hq MAAF, The French Air Force inMAAF, A Preliminary History, 1945, copy in AAFHist Office Archives; Les Forces Aériennes Fran-çaises de 1939 à 1945, Col. Pierre Paquier, ed.(Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949).

2 On reaching the USSR in December 1942, thesquadron was equipped with the YAK-1, later(July 1943) with the YAK-9, a third time (sum-mer 1944) with the YAK-3, all fighter aircraftof the Red Air Force. The unit, reorganized inearly 1944 as a regiment (known after October1944 as the Normandie-Niemen Regiment) on themodel of similar Soviet units, participated in op-erations around Smolensk, Vitebsk, in easternPrussia, and finally over Germany.


assaulting American forces, leaving from225 to 250 planes—some fit for combat,others in various degrees of air worthiness.Most were Dewoitine-520's from which theguns had been removed for use elsewhere.The rest included some Bloch, Lioré, andPotez aircraft and a few American GlennMartins. The immediate problem nowfacing General Giraud was to find sufficientequipment to rehabilitate his air units.

Eager to assist the French Commanderin Chief was the Joint Rearmament Com-mittee, whose responsibility at the time ex-tended to French air matters. The chair-man, Colonel Gardiner, himself a U.S. AirForces pilot, represented AFHQ, U.S. ArmyAir Forces (USAAF), as well as G-3 on thecommittee. Representing French head-quarters was Capt. Fernand Rébillon.Little effective assistance, however, could berendered by the JRC, at least until an over-all air rearmament program could be estab-lished. For the moment the committeeacted as a clearinghouse for French requestsand as a liaison agency between French andAllied air force commands and establish-ments.

During the months of December 1942and January 1943, most pilots of the NorthAfrican Air Forces remained idle for lackof flying equipment, and their morale beganto sag.3 Four squadrons were hastily en-gaged in the battle of Tunisia under variousAllied commands. Three were flying theirold French equipment. Two of these wouldbe moved to the United Kingdom at theend of the campaign to be re-equipped withBritish Halifaxes. The fourth unit, knownas the Lafayette Squadron, was flying itsnewly acquired American P-40 Warhawks;

it owed the honor of being the first NorthAfrican squadron to be re-equipped to thememory of the American pilots who, in1914-18, had distinguished themselves inthe celebrated Lafayette Escadrille. Its re-equipping, effected independently of theJRC, had been arranged by the Allied AirCommander in Chief in Northwest Africa,Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz.

Meanwhile, in Algeria and FrenchMorocco, other pilots and crews were beingtrained in U.S. squadrons. In addition,plans were under consideration for sendingto the United States a number of selectedstudent pilots for a complete course of in-struction, as well as sending transport andbomber crews for a refresher course.4 Con-versely, local USAAF commanders weretaking advantage of the presence of expe-rienced French pilots by having them de-tailed to help train younger American pilotsin actual fighting.

Obviously, what the North African airunits needed, and quickly, was sufficientmodern equipment. It will be recalled thatthe ANFA Plan of January 1943 envisageddelivery from the United States of 500fighters, 300 bombers, and 200 transportplanes. It was on this basis that GeneralBéthouart, then chief of the French Mili-tary Mission in the United States, submittedthe first air rearmament program.5 Aftera detailed study of the Béthouart proposal,General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of theU.S. Army Air Forces, recommended thatthe CCS determine without delay the ex-tent, composition, utilization, training, andequipment of the North African Air Forces.His report outlined the advantages, politi-

3 Memo, Maj Paul Chemidlin for Asst Secy ofWar for Air, 14 Jan 43, ABC 091.711 France (6Oct 43), Sec 1-A.

4 Msg 5142, Eisenhower to Arnold, 11 Jan 43,JRC Cable Log.

5 Memo, Béthouart for Marshall, 3 Feb 43, JRC902/11 Rearmt Plan.

REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORGE 197

P-40 WARHAWKS FOR THE LAFAYETTE ESCADRILLE, January 1943.Note the squadron's emblem, the head of a Sioux Indian.

cal, psychological, and military, which there-equipping of these forces would offer. Italso listed the disadvantages, such as thediversion of aircraft at the expense of U.S.and British air units, and the likely strainon the command system due, in part, tolanguage difficulties. The report was thensubmitted to the Combined Staff Plannersfor study and recommendation to the CCS.6

Only when the latter had reached a deci-sion could the Munitions Assignments Com-mittee (Air) assign any equipment.

On 14 and again on 27 February 1943,General Eisenhower advised the War De-partment that the situation of the North

African Air Forces was becoming critical.He urged that equipment for at least onelight bomber group and one fighter groupbe shipped without delay, as recommendedby General Spaatz and agreed to by Gen-eral Arnold in the course of his recent visitto the theater.7 In answer to these appeals,the War Department informed Eisenhowerand Spaatz of the steps presently contem-plated for furnishing immediate assistanceto the French. The training of their pilotsin the United States could be arranged tostart in June, and an initial shipment of 90P-39 fighters, 67 A-35 dive bombers, and

6 Msg 2143, Marshall to Eisenhower, 11 Feb 43,JRC Cable Log.

7 Msgs 776, Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 Feb 43,and 3271, to Marshall and Arnold, 27 Feb 43,JRC Cable Log.


60 C-78 transport planes would be madebeginning late March or early April.8 Al-location of these aircraft, it must be noted,was being made at the sole initiative ofAmerican officials. It represented unilat-eral action on their part, since the CCS hadreached no decision. They felt quite justi-fied in taking such action, pending CCSapproval, as the request had come fromGeneral Eisenhower, himself the officialrepresentative of the Combined Chiefs inthe theater.

The responsibility for supplying the neces-sary aircraft and air force items of equip-ment rested with the U.S. Army Air Forces.International Division, Army S e r v i c eForces, on the other hand, was to handle allitems common to air and ground forces.The procedure for the assignment, ship-ment, and accounting of all items wassimilar to that used in connection withthe French ground force program.

In late February Colonel Gardiner under-took a tour of inspection of North Africanair units. Favorably impressed by theirresourcefulness, he reported, on his returnto Algiers, that they were doing the bestthey could with the equipment at theirdisposal. He pointed out that theirDewoitines, which had proved to be goodfighter planes in 1939, were still serviceablebut were wearing out fast and needed partsurgently. To assist the French in makingmaximum use of their equipment, ColonelGardiner made arrangements with one airservice command to issue some spare partsto them.9

The month of March 1943 marked the

beginning of the gradual integration of theFrench air forces of North Africa into theAllied air organization then established inthat area, known as Northwest African AirForces (NAAF) and commanded by Lt.Gen. Carl Spaatz. It marked also the be-ginning of real assistance on the part ofNAAF and its component units toward therehabilitation of the French squadrons. On13 March, at the request of General Mendi-gal, authorization was granted by GeneralSpaatz for a first increment of three Frenchsquadrons to be placed under the opera-tional control of Northwest African TacticalAir Force (NATAF). A week later, Gen-eral Spaatz announced that French air unitsassigned to NAAF were to be supplied byNorthwest African Air Service Command(NAASC) in the same manner as anyAmerican unit, and that another compo-nent of NAAF, the XII Air Force Train-ing and Replacement Command, was toassume the responsibility for the trainingof French combat crews. Thus were estab-lished the basic policies which were togovern thereafter the relationship betweenthe Allied and the French air forces innorthwest Africa. In a further effort toachieve close co-operation on matters ofsupply and service requirements, a first in-crement of two French junior officers wasassigned in April to XII Air Force ServiceCommand (AFSC) as a technical detach-ment.

In spite of these and other measurestaken by the theater, the rehabilitation ofthe French squadrons was proceeding at anextremely slow pace. Allied deliveries of airequipment were still very small. By the endof March only thirty P-39's had beenshipped from the United States, enough toequip one squadron, while the British had,

8 Msg 2985, Marshall and Arnold to Eisenhowerand Spaatz, 27 Feb 43, JRC Cable Log.

9 Memos, Gardiner for CofS AFHQ, 4 Mar 43,and 5 Mar 43, JRC Misc Doc, "Annexes toHistory."

REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE 199

UNLOADING P-38 FIGHTER PLANES for the French, Casablanca, 13 April 1943.

from local resources, furnished Spitfires foranother.10

No real progress could be expected untila high-level decision had been reached onthe extent and rate of expansion of the airprogram. Such a decision was not in sight.At the time, it will be recalled, Anglo-Amer-ican policy makers were in sharp disagree-ment over the scope of French rearmament,the British expressing the fear that the com-mitment would jeopardize the interests ofboth the U.S. and British forces. In theirreport (CCS 142/1) dated 10 March 1943,the Combined Staff Planners merely recom-mended that matériel assigned at GeneralEisenhower's request should not exceed thatnecessary to equip an air force of 450 planes.

At their meeting of 12 March, the CCS, de-ciding against action for the moment, simplytook note of the deliveries then being madewith Eisenhower's concurrence.11

By the end of April the French had re-ceived approximately 100 planes from theUnited States. In addition the LafayetteSquadron was undergoing a second re-equipment, this time with P-47 Thunder-bolts. On the basis of the fine performanceof that unit in the course of the precedingfive months, AFHQ officials estimated thatcombat efficiency of future French airsquadrons would approximate that of Alliedunits, particularly in piloting ability. Forthis reason they agreed that new combat

10 Msg 4939, Marshall to Eisenhower, 24 Mar 43,OPD Cable Files.

11 Rpt, CPS to CCS, 142/1, 10 Mar 43. Min andSupplementary Min, CCS 75th Mtg, 12 Mar 43.See p. 54, above.


squadrons should receive only the bestmatériel, and that old equipment should beused exclusively for training and for trans-port and liaison duties.12

A directive issued on 9 May by Maj. Gen.Delmar Dunton, Commanding General,Northwest African Air Service Command,set forth in detail NAASC's responsibilitywith respect to the supply and maintenanceof French air units. Such combat units aswere assigned to NAAF, or attached to thelatter for operational control, were, as di-rected earlier by General Spaatz, to be sup-plied as were other NAAF units. Squadronsnot yet assigned or attached were to ob-tain supplies by means of requisitions sub-mitted by Headquarters, French Air ServiceCommand, to the JRC.13

The 9 May directive, although explicit asfar as NAASC was concerned, was insuffi-cient to deal adequately with the entireproblem of French supply and maintenance—a problem seriously complicated by thefact that some units had British and someU.S. equipment. In addition, the issue ofair items, and of items common to groundand air forces, was to be effected accordingto widely different procedures. It soon be-came apparent that proper co-ordinationbetween the various supply agencies had notbeen established. As late as 7 July basesections had not received orders to honorrequisitions submitted by French air units.To clarify the matter, MAC (Air) set forth,on 22 July, the policy to be put into effectat once. Briefly, the new directive stipu-lated that squadrons not equipped withBritish or American aircraft were ineligibleto receive supplies of British or U.S. origin

unless special authorization was granted byMAC (Air). All other squadrons were toconform to British or U.S. tables of equip-ment. Such items, other than aircraft andspecial air force equipment, as were issuedto them by NAASC from USAAF or RAFlocal sources were to be replaced from ship-ments from the United States effected underthe 25,000-ton monthly allocation to theFrench.14

Meanwhile French military authoritieshad continued to press for an expansion oftheir air forces. In May General Leyer re-quested an additional assignment of 300planes of various types.15 His proposal,similar to the one submitted on 19 April byGeneral Mendigal to General Spaatz, washeld up pending a complete restudy, by theFrench themselves, of the entire French airposition. A reorganization of their air andnaval forces was then taking place.16

By mid-June the French had receivedfrom the United States 126 planes—includ-ing 90 P-39's, or enough for four fightersquadrons, 21 A-35's originally intended toform a dive-bomber squadron but laterdiverted for training and use in police andsecurity squadrons, and 15 C-78's subse-quently used for training and communica-tions—as well as most of the necessaryground equipment requested in February.17

12 Memo, Chief Air Unit IG for OPD, 22 Apr 43,OPD 336.2 France, Sec 1.

13 Memos, Spaatz for CG NAASC, 5 May 43, and65-62, Hq NAASC, 9 May 43, JRC 360/001 AirForce Rearmt Plan and Policy.

14 Quoted in History of FAF in MAAF, p. 5.15 Memos, Leyer for CofS AFHQ, 12 May 43,

and SGS for DCofS, 17 May 43, JRC 360/001 AirForce Rearmt Plan and Policy; Ltr, Leyer to JRC,20 May 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab L.

16 Memo, Deputy Air CinC for DCofS Mediter-ranean Air Comd, 10 Jun 43, JRC 360/001 AirForce Rearmt Plan and Policy.

17 The A-35 was so constructed that it requireda major overhaul after fifteen to thirty hours offlight. This proved too great a burden on themeager mechanical resources then available to theFrench. As a result, deliveries of this type ofplane were discontinued. Statement in Corres fromCol Gardiner, OCMH.


In addition, General Spaatz had giventhem, from available theater stocks, some50 P-40's. All deliveries from the UnitedStates had been based upon the recom-mendations of the theater commander.The MAB had assigned to date a total of217 planes of which 100 still remained to beshipped. No further assignments wouldbe made without a new request from thetheater.

With the fusion of the Free French andNorth African armed forces in July 1943and the resulting reorganization of theFrench High Command, General Bouscatwas appointed Chief of Staff of the Com-bined Armée de l'Air (French Air Force—FAF). In a memorandum to Air ChiefMarshal Tedder, who, as CommandingGeneral, Mediterranean Air Command,controlled all Allied air forces in theMediterranean. General Bouscat outlinedthe steps he was taking to bring the organiza-tion of the FAF in line with that of theAllied air force in the theater, and toeffect the closest co-operation possible be-tween the two. He then reviewed FAF'sposition and capabilities and urged that theJRC be instructed to undertake withoutdelay a detailed study of the air rearma-ment problem. His staff, he pointed out,was preparing a new program which wouldsupersede all previous ones.18

Meanwhile the British had made avail-able enough additional Spitfires to equip 2more squadrons. Allocation of these air-craft had been made entirely on localinitiative, as the United Kingdom madebulk allotments to the British air officercommander in chief for redistribution.Only those French squadrons which werestationed in West Africa or in the United

Kingdom were included in the War Officeprogram.

By August, excluding the squadrons oper-ating with the Royal Air Force in the UnitedKingdom, no more than 8 French squad-rons had been re-equipped: 3 with Spit-fires, 4 with P-39's, and 1 with P-47's.The rehabilitation of the FAF was stillpainfully slow. To make matters worse, theaction taken by the MAB in July, whilefavorable with respect to the ground forces,did not contemplate any extension of theair part before January 1944. The reasonsascribed for the postponement were theacute needs for aircraft of the Americansand British themselves and shipping diffi-culties. In the opinion of the chairman ofthe JRC, the "stalling" was regrettable.The FAF had received only a few planesand its morale was deteriorating.19 Thisview was shared by General Eisenhowerwho, on 4 August, cabled the followingwarning to the War Department: "TheFrench are much disappointed. . . . Themorale of their air units is low. This isunfortunate, for an air force with highmorale, even though small, would be of realassistance from a military standpoint.They have many excellent pilots, and per-sonnel skilled in maintenance. GeneralBouscat has the confidence of both politicalfactions and should make an able leader."The Allied Commander in Chief then rec-ommended, as an emergency measure, thatthree groups of the Twelfth U.S. Air Forcebe converted from medium bomber to heavybomber groups, and the medium bombersthus made available transferred to theFrench. "The result will be a material in-crease in our effective strength." 20

18 Memo, Bouscat for Tedder, 13 Jul 43, JRC360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

19 Memo, Artamonoff for Adcock, 2 Aug 43, JRCMisc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab T.

20 Msg W-6517, Eisenhower to Arnold, 4 Aug 43,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.


On 8 August a conference on the re-equipping of the French Air Force tookplace at AFHQ. It was attended byTedder and his chief of staff, Brig. Gen.Gordon P. Saville, both representing Medi-terranean Air Command, General Bouscatrepresenting the FAF, Brig. Gens. EdwardP. Curtis and Harold A. Bartron of theNAAF, General Spalding and Colonel Arta-monoff of the JRC, and a number of otherofficials. Opening the meeting, Tedder an-nounced that an Anglo-American commit-tee was being formed for the purpose ofhandling the rearmament of the FAF. Itsfirst aim would be to make certain that allpresent French squadrons equipped withBritish or American equipment, whether op-erating in the Mediterranean or in theUnited Kingdom, had sufficient suppliesand adequate reserves of airmen andground crews. In the opinion of Tedder,this objective should be reached before therearming of other squadrons was contem-plated. Speaking for the FAF, GeneralBouscat disclosed that he had just drawnup a rearmament plan, already approved byGenerals Giraud and de Gaulle, based pre-cisely on availability of both airmen andground personnel. Since June, he contin-ued, French pilots were being trained inthe United States at the rate of one hundredmonthly. The rest of the training was ef-fected either in the French training centerestablished in Morocco, or under the su-pervision of the U.S. Air Forces in NorthAfrica. Once ready the French squadronswould be assigned to the Allied air pool foremployment, preferably in groups of twoor more, under the control of the Air Com-mander in Chief in the Mediterranean andaccording to operational requirements.21

This was in line with the tacit agreementreached in the earlier days of Franco-Alliedcollaboration and under which the Frenchplaced their squadrons at the disposal of theCCS for employment by the appropriateAllied commanders.

By mid-August, some 230 planes hadbeen shipped from the United States, with30 more to follow before the end of 1943.Plans as then made by the War Depart-ment for the first half of 1944, subject ofcourse to CCS approval, contemplated theshipment of some 700 additional aircraft.22

In terms of squadrons, total deliveries fromthe United States for the years 1943 and1944, if approved and carried out, wouldprovide equipment for 27 squadrons by theend of 1944.23

On 29 August General Spaatz informedGeneral Arnold that he was equipping oneFrench squadron with B-26's and wouldmaintain the squadron through 1943 fromaircraft assigned to the Twelfth Air Force.He was also giving the French additionalB-26's for training to prepare for a secondsquadron in January. Furthermore, he an-nounced that the rearmament program,then in preparation, would soon be for-warded to Washington for action and thatboth Eisenhower and Tedder concurred inthe steps being taken in the theater to re-arm the FAF. To support the squadronsalready equipped, AFHQ requested theWar Department to provide equipment foreight service units. These were to be inaddition to the three for which matérielhad been ordered earlier in April.24

21 Min, Conf on FAF Rearmt, 8 Aug 43, JRC360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

22 Msgs, AGWAR to Spalding, 5163, 16 Aug 43,5237, 17 Aug 43, and 5448, 19 Aug 43, JRC CableLog.

23 Msg 4752, Arnold to Eisenhower, 11 Aug 43,JRC Cable Log.

24 Msg W-8617, Spaatz to Arnold, 29 Aug 43,JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy;


On 6 September the Allied committeewhose impending creation had been an-nounced by Air Chief Marshal Tedder atthe recent AFHQ conference on French airrearmament was formally established inAlgiers. The new agency, known there-after as the Joint Air Commission (JAC),with General Saville as its first chairman,was placed under the control of Mediter-ranean Air Command. It took over fromthe JRC, heretofore responsible for allFrench armament matters, the handling ofproblems peculiar to the French Air Force.To ensure proper and effective liaison be-tween the two bodies, JAC's chairman wasmade a member ex officio of the JRC. FAFofficers, selected by the French air commandand approved by the Allied Air Commanderin Chief, were assigned to the JAC.25

The Joint Air Commission immediatelyundertook to work out, in co-operation withGeneral Bouscat, a comprehensive program,taking into account the matériel which hadalready been ordered and delivered andcovering aircraft, crews, and ground units.Functions assigned to the JAC included notonly the supervision of the program butthe training of units and the upkeep ofFrench air bases, repair depots, trainingschools, and meteorological stations. Thecommission, in effect, paralleled for the FAFthe functions of the JRC with respect to theground forces. In it was vested the re-sponsibility for overseeing the administrativepreparation of the French air and serviceunits for combat, and making certain thatthey were adequately trained and equipped

before being turned over to MediterraneanAir Command to take part in operations.26

Thereafter the War Department wouldrefer to the JAC, for appraisal, co-ordina-tion, and recommendation, all air requestssubmitted by French military authorities inWashington.

Concerned over the slowness of the airprogram, Generals de Gaulle and Giraud,on 18 September, appealed directly to Gen-eral Marshall. It was most regrettable, theystressed, that the 30,000 men constitutingthe FAF, which contained elements withexcellent technical training, were not beingutilized to the maximum of their capacity."In view of the high production capacity ofthe United States and the United King-dom," they urged that the program beaccelerated.27 Their communication wasimmediately referred to the Joint StrategicSurvey Committee for study.

Meanwhile, one of the main objectives ofboth the French and the Allied commandshad been to push the training of French airpersonnel as thoroughly and speedily as pos-sible. Already substantial numbers ofpilots, crews, and mechanics had attendedAllied air training centers in Africa. Inaddition the French had opened, mostly inFrench Morocco, a number of schools oftheir own, operating largely with Americanand British assistance in matériel and per-sonnel, the British limiting such assistance tothe British-equipped squadrons. Trainingwas reported to be highly effective, studentsresponding readily and well to Allied in-struction. Only with respect to technicalquestions, such as electronics and the assimi-lation of the U.S. supply system, did they

Msg W-7723, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 20 Aug43, OPD 400 France, Sec II.

25 Msg W-8409, Spaatz to Arnold, 27 Aug 43,JRC Cable Log; GO 9, Hq Mediterranean AirComd, 6 Sep 43, JRC 360/001 Air Force RearmtPlan and Policy. For detailed information on theorganization, membership functions, and commandof the JAC, see Chapter XVII, below.

26 MAAF, French Air Force Rearmament Plan, 7Mar 44, JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan andPolicy.

27 Ltr 796, de Gaulle and Giraud to Marshall, 18Sep 43, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 1-A.


seem weak, possibly because of their reluc-tance to be used as technicians instead ofas combatants.28

Such squadrons as had completed theirtraining did not remain idle. As fast asthey became operational they passed underAllied control and were assigned for dutywith the Northwest African Air Forces.The arrangement gave the squadronsexactly the same status in the Allied organi-zation as the British and the Americans:unity of command over all, but separateadministration. Allied control over theFrench squadrons was questioned only onceindirectly and briefly in June 1944 whenthe French were contemplating an opera-tion (CAIMAN) in support of Resistanceforces in central France. Debate overwhether or not they might use FAF squad-rons for the purpose was cut short by Alliedrejection of the whole operation as imprac-ticable.29

By agreement with the French HighCommand, a procedure was established inSeptember 1943 to formalize the assignmentof squadrons to Allied control. Thereafterwhen a unit was ready for operations, Gen-eral Bouscat notified Mediterranean AirCommand, which in time would publish ageneral order assigning the unit to the ap-propriate command. The procedure wasnot always followed to the letter and in Jan-uary 1944 it proved necessary to trace theassignments of several units far back andmake them a matter of record.30

Once assigned for operations, units werebroken in gradually. Initially they weregiven relatively easy patrol and convoy

duties under Northwest African Coastal AirForce; later, when their flying proficiencyhad reached a point where they could profit-ably undertake offensive operations, theywere transferred to Northwest African Tac-tical Air Force. By September 1943 thethree Spitfire squadrons had taken part inthe support of operations in Sicily, southItaly, and Corsica. Five U.S.-equippedunits were employed in convoy and coastprotection in the western Mediterranean.

On 29 September the final draft of theair rearmament program was completed.It had been worked out after considerableresearch and study in the JAC by repre-sentatives of USAAF, RAF, and FAF, andunder the guidance and supervision of theAir Commander in Chief in the Mediter-ranean. The program, known thereafteras Plan VII, was designed to provide asmall, well-balanced force within the limi-tations imposed by the scarcity of Frenchtechnical personnel and by other U.S. andBritish commitments. Such a force wouldconstitute the nucleus around which therenovated air establishment would subse-quently be built. All essential elements ofa tactical force were present in the plan.31

Plan VII contemplated no expansion ofFrench naval aviation, the matter beingstill under discussion between French andAllied naval authorities.

Under Plan VII the total number ofsquadrons, including those based in theUnited Kingdom, was scheduled to be in-creased from 16 to 21 by the end of 1943,and to 31 (of which 18 would be U.S.-equipped) by July 1944. The plan alsocontemplated the delivery of matériel neces-28 Intervs with Col Gardiner, Apr 50, Col Ervin,

Jul 51, and Gen Saville, Jul 51.29 History of FAF in MAAF, p. 13.30 GO 11, Hq Mediterranean Air Comd, 26 Sep

43, JRC 360/003 Status and Employment of Units;History of FAF in MAAF, p. 12.

31 Memo, Smith for CCS, 29 Sep 43, AFHQ0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters; Memo, AFHQfor Sec CCS, 29 Sep 43, SHAEF Mission to France091.711 Rearmt (Fr ) Air Force. 900.2.


sary to equip 1 parachute regiment, 37 serv-ice organizations, as well as a number oftraining centers, depots, and other installa-tions. Priority of build-up for both oper-ational and service units was established onthe same level as for the first four Armydivisions. Touching upon the question ofcontrol, Plan VII merely restated the exist-ing practice, namely, that all FAF tacticalunits, both combat and service, formed andequipped in North Africa would be assignedto NAAF and be employed as elements ofthe Allied air force pool of tactical units.Army Air Forces headquarters in Washing-ton approved Plan VII on 1 October and,three weeks later, informed General Eisen-hower that it was prepared to include theplan, once it had been approved by theCCS, in the Army Supply Program thenunder consideration.32

Meanwhile the FAF supply situation, farfrom improving, had become increasinglychaotic. In an attempt to formulate properremedial action, General Saville, chairmanof the JAC, held a lengthy series of con-ferences with representatives of Mediter-ranean Air Command, XII Air ForceService Command, AFHQ, NATOUSA,the JRC, and SOS, NATOUSA. Finallyhe was able to announce, on 2 November,the supply policy and procedure as nowagreed to by all agencies concerned.33

Henceforth priority for distribution of sup-plies and equipment common to air andground forces was set as follows: (1) oneexpeditionary corps of four divisions, (2)air force units already activated and formed,(3) air force units to be activated and

formed in accordance with the programrecently approved by AFHQ, (4) balanceof ground forces. Headquarters, FrenchAir Force, was to requisition from FrenchGround Forces the matériel needed for AirForce units (initial items and 30-daysupplies) and at the same time submitrequisitions on the United States for iden-tical supplies for repayment to FrenchGround Forces. Pursuant to this policy,General Saville submitted to GeneralLoomis, for approval by the JRC and trans-mittal to the War Department, a first setof requisitions needed to get the supply sys-tem working. Thereafter, he thought, itwould be a matter of automatic supply.

The problem of automatic supply hadalready been raised in connection with themaintenance of French ground troops.Queried on the matter, the War Depart-ment listed the categories of items for whichautomatic supply was provided and thosefor which requisitions were to be submitted.After a further exchange of communica-tions between the theater and the War De-partment, General Loomis, on 24 January1944, informed the French of the procedureto be followed by them for the submissionof requisitions in cases where no automaticsupply was provided. General Bouscat wasinvited "in the interests of economy" toarrange without delay that items common tothe air and ground forces be stocked underthe authority and control of the FrenchArmy.34

So that there would be no doubt as towhich FAF organizations were entitled toobtain supplies from U.S. sources, NA-TOUSA headquarters, on 31 December1943, listed the Air projects which had been32 Msgs 8262, Arnold to Spaatz, 1 Oct 43, 830,

Styer to Eisenhower, 25 Oct 43, and W-4465, Eisen-hower to AGWAR for CCS, 6 Nov 43, JRC CableLog.

33 Memo, Saville for Loomis, 2 Nov 43, JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

34 Msg W-3378, AGWAR to Eisenhower, 25 Nov43, JRC Cable Log; Memo, Loomis for Bouscat,24 Jan 44, JRC 360/002 Items Common to Air andGround; see pp. 99-101, above.


approved by the Allied Commander inChief. These included the rearmamentplan (Plan VII) of 29 September and themaintenance of such establishments(schools, depots, meteorological stations,bases, and airfields) as were considered nec-essary. NATOUSA stipulated that all req-uisitions for the projects were to be sub-mitted to the JAC for review, revision, andapproval. JAC would then forward therequisitions to the XII Air Force ServiceCommand in the case of supplies andequipment peculiar to the Army air forces,and to the JRC in the case of supplies andequipment common to air and groundforces. It was further directed that XIIAFSC and the JRC would forward theapproved requisitions, through their re-spective lend-lease channels, to agencies inthe United States for appropriate action.35

About the same time (26 December), adirective issued by XII AFSC and effective1 January 1944 changed the Detachmentof Technical Liaison (French), assigned toNAASC since April, into French Section,NAASC. The section was charged with,among other duties, the command and in-spection of all French air units.36

By the end of December, approximatelytwenty-two squadrons had been re-equippedfrom U.S. and British sources. (Table 3)So had a number of squadrons of the FrenchNaval Air Arm.37 Finally, the Frenchthemselves had equipped and were main-taining, largely with old equipment, fourair "security squadrons" for colonial gen-darmerie purposes.

It was not until 28 January that the CCSfinally approved Plan VII, subject to the

condition that modifications might be madewhen required by the military situation.Approval of the plan marked the beginningof a new phase in the rehabilitation of theFAF. Until then "at the end of the queuefor Allied attention," FAF could now feelreasonably certain that, within a short time,it would become an effective fightingweapon.38

TABLE 3 — A M E R I C A N - AND B R I T I S H -EQUIPPED SQUADRONS OF THE FAF:

DECEMBER 1943

Location and Type Number

T o t a l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a 2 2North Africa b_ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ - - . - . . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ 16

Bomber. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3Light, A - 3 5 _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ 2Medium, B-26. _ _ . _ _ - - . - _ _ - - - - - - - - _ 1

F i g h t e r - - . . - . - . . . - - . - - _ - _ - _ - - _ - - - - - - - - _ 10Hurricane. - _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . - . . _ _ _ _ - - . _ _ _ . 2P - 3 9 _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4P - 4 7 _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1Spitfire.. - - _ - - - . - - . . - . - - - - - _ _ . - . - - _ 3

Transport, C - 7 8 _ . _ _ - - . . . _ - _ . _ . - _ _ _ - - - - - 3United Kingdom c - _ _ _ _ _ - - . . . - - - _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ - - - 6

Bomber _ _ _ _ _ , - . . - _ - - _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - _ _ - _ - - - _ 3H e a v y . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ - _ - - _ - - - - 2Light- . . - - - . - - ---- . - - . - - . - - ------- 1

Fighter- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ - - _ - 3a Plus 1 flight of photographic reconnaissance equipped in North

Africa.b American-equipped.c British-equipped.

Source: Memo, Fr Liaison Sec NAAF for A-4 Hq NAAF, 29Jul 43, and GO 11, Mediterranean Air Comd, 26 Sep 43, JRC360/003 Status and Employment of Units; Fr Air Force RearmtPlan, 7 Mar 44, JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

Just before the CCS action, a reorgani-zation of the Allied air forces in NorthwestAfrica had been effected coincidental withthat of the over-all Allied command in thetheater. In mid-January Lt. Gen. Ira C.Eaker replaced Air Chief Marshal Tedder

35 Ltr, NATOUSA to SOS and JRC, 31 Dec 43,JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

36 History of FAF in MAAF, p. 10.37 See Ch. XIII, below.

38 Min, CCS 143d Mtg, 28 Jan 44; Msg, CCS toAllied CinC Mediterranean, 29 Jan 44, FAN 330;quotation from History of FAF in MAAF, p. 4.


as Air Commander in Chief in the Medi-terranean and assumed command of thenewly created Mediterranean Allied AirForces (MAAF) now consolidating andsuperseding both NAAF and Mediterra-nean Air Command. One of GeneralEaker's first steps was to centralize the airservice responsibility for all U.S. compo-nents of MAAF in a single agency knownas Army Air Forces Service Command(AAFSC), Mediterranean Theater of Op-erations. The latter, commanded by Gen-eral Bartron, was charged, among otherduties, with supervising the supply of theFAF. On 11 February General Bartronissued, on orders from General Eaker,a directive setting forth the basic policywith respect to FAF supply: thereafter allrequests for supplies not available in Frenchstocks and needed for immediate con-sumption (except rations, post exchangeand Special Services supplies which werethe responsibility of the French themselves)were to be submitted to AAFSC, on thebasis of the tables of basic allowances inforce for equivalent U.S. units. Appro-priate charges were to be made by AAFSCin the monthly lend-lease reports to SOS,NATOUSA. Within AAFSC the unitcharged with co-ordinating FAF matterswas the French Section which had beentaken over from NAASC upon the latter'sdeactivation.39

Immediately after the command reor-ganization in the theater, the French Chiefof Air Staff, General Bouscat, sought andobtained from the Supreme Allied Com-mander, General Wilson, the definite assur-ance that French air units would ultimatelyparticipate in operations for the liberation

of France. Presently the number of squad-rons actively engaged in combat had slightlyincreased. In addition to those operatingfrom bases in the United Kingdom or em-ployed under Mediterranean Allied CoastalCommand, in early November an initial in-crement of two fighter squadrons and onereconnaissance flight had joined the com-bined Allied air forces in Italy. Six moreunits were on their way to that theater.Others would follow as soon as they couldbe made operational.

Meeting with General Wilson on 7 Feb-ruary, General Bouscat reviewed the situa-tion of the FAF at the time. The trainingof crews and replacements was completedand the necessary maintenance and othersupporting services were organized. Whatwas needed to guarantee that units wouldbe ready on time was to speed up the de-livery of planes and equipment. "We onlyawait the matériel." The FAF, he assuredthe Supreme Allied Commander, was eagerto carry on the fight against the enemy.General Wilson cautiously replied that thequestion of equipment deliveries was one forthe decision of the CCS who, he remindedGeneral Bouscat, were the final authorities.40

It now remained generally to implementthat part of Plan VII which applied to theyear 1944, the October-December 1943slice being almost completed. Under theterms of the plan, the United States wasto assume the greater share of the task. Ofthe eleven additional combat squadrons tobe re-equipped by 1 July 1944, ten wereto receive some 320 American planes ofvarious types. All together, the UnitedStates was scheduled to furnish for theentire years of 1943 and 1944, 615 single-

39 Ltrs 65-5, Hq AAFSC MTO, 11 Feb 44, and65-2, Hq AAF MTO, 3 Jun 44, JRC 360/001 AirForce Rearmt Plan and Policy.

40 Min Mtg, Bouscat with Wilson, 7 Feb 44,AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Confs—Gen (Fr), Feb 44-Aug 44.


engine and 216 twin-engine planes, or atotal of 831 combat and transport aircraft.41

Deliveries of British aircraft would be lim-ited to equipping, with Spitfires, one addi-tional squadron in the United Kingdom,and maintaining the existing British-equipped squadrons in the Mediterranean,less, however, the two Hurricane units nowbeing converted to P-47's.

Very shortly, shipments of American air-craft and equipment reached North Africanports at an increased tempo. Yet betweenFebruary and August, when Plan VII wasto end, deliveries of airplanes fell con-siderably behind schedule. Shortages ofB-26's and P-47's in particular resulted indelaying as much as three months the finalre-equipping of several French squadrons.The JAC, headed by Colonel Gardiner(since 9 February), later by Col. R. GilpinErvin (after 4 May), grappled with theaircraft shortage problem as best it could,often by obtaining loans from theaterstocks pending the arrival of allocations forthe French.42

In early February a request from GeneralBouscat, approved by the JAC, for the de-livery of. 100 additional A-24's for use intraining schools and in police and securitysquadrons was turned down by the MABbecause the craft were not available.43 Asecond request, this time submitted to theWar Department by the French MilitaryMission in Washington, for 100 primaryand 100 basic training aircraft likewise wasdisapproved "for failure to submit through

the JAC and lack of a definite trainingplan." American authorities in Washing-ton felt that there was no necessity forsending training aircraft to North Africa aslong as a training program was continued inthe United States. This training program,incidentally, called for a monthly produc-tion of some 80 pilots. But the French werereported to be having difficulty in findingthe necessary candidates.44

Having been informed by the War De-partment that the B-26's being delivered tothe French were not to be equipped withthe Norden bombsight, General Eaker, ina letter to Maj. Gen. Barney McK. Giles,chief of the Air Staff in Washington, voicedthe opinion that this was a mistake. Therewas little point in delivering an aircraft thatwas not fully equipped to do a good mili-tary job. Moreover, there could be noquestion of security since more than a thou-sand of these bombsights had been left inbombers that had gone down over enemyterritory. Two weeks later War Depart-ment officials reversed their stand andauthorized General Eaker to leave thebombsight on the B-26's allocated to theFrench.45

Apparently feeling that more energeticaction should be taken in Washington to-ward the implementation of Plan VII, nowthe "accepted guide" in the theater, Gen-eral Eaker urged General Giles to organizea staff agency which would take promptaction on requests from his command formateriel to equip the FAF.46 A visit to theFrench squadron then training in Sardiniawith B-26's had convinced General Eaker

44 Msg AFHQ-604, Arnold to Eaker and JAC, 24Feb 44, JRC Cable Log.

45 Ltrs, Eaker to Giles, 29 Feb 44, and Giles toEaker, 25 Mar 44, History of MAAF, Vol. II.

46 Ltr, Eaker to Giles, 6 Mar 44, History of MAAF,Vol. II.

41 Memo, Bouscat for Ervin, 13 May 44, JRC360/002 Items Common to Air and Ground.

42 Both Colonels Gardiner and Ervin were AirCorps officers. Colonel Gardiner, it will be recalled,had already served as the first chairman of the JointRearmament Committee (16 December 1942 to 5June 1943).

4] Msg W-2124, Eaker to Arnold, 7 Feb 44, JRCCable Log.


that French pilots were "tops." In hisopinion, it was essential that the Americanagreement to rearm French air units befully carried out. "This program shouldbe pressed to the limit," he asserted in apersonal letter to General Arnold. "Weought to give the French the equipmentsince they have such a fine offensive spirit."General Eaker then praised their willingnessto serve as subordinates. "They fit rightinto our organization willingly and cheer-fully and there is never any question aboutwho is in command." All the Frenchwanted, he concluded, was an airplane anda bomb.47

By April the number of units availablefor combat had not increased as substan-tially as the French had hoped. Yet inMay, during the great Allied offensive lead-ing to the fall of Rome, no less than 11squadrons were operating within the com-bined Allied air forces. Three more soonwere to reach Italy, making a total of 14divided in 4 groups. From the fall of Romeon 5 June up to 15 August, date of the as-sault on the southern coast of France (AN-VIL) , several of the 14 squadrons would beengaged in various pre-ANVIL activities: 3in coastal protection, 7 in bombing actionon German airfields, fortifications, and linesof communication, and 2 flights of 1 squad-ron in reconnaissance missions.48 Nearlyall crews of the B-26, P-47, and P-38squadrons had undergone their training at

the "transition school" specially set up forthe French by MAAF in early May. Theschool, located near Tunis and run underthe control of the JAC, offered a modifiedinstructional program as the students all hadpreviously received some training.49

To enable the squadrons contemplatedunder Plan VII to maintain their war effortthrough the second half of 1944, it was in-dispensable that the needs of French auxil-iary organizations in North Africa, such asschools, replacement centers, airfields, andmedical and quartermaster services, beproperly assessed and filled. To this end,General Bouscat submitted to the JAC, on14 May, a list of requisitions. He reviewedthe composition, purpose, and activities ofthe various organizations concerned. Theirtotal strength was estimated at 20,250 mili-tary and 6,500 civilian personnel. Thenumber of aircraft in use in the trainingcenters was given as 819, of which 322 wereof old French design, 181 of U.S. pre-1939manufacture, 274 of recent American types,and 42 of British design which had beenturned over to the French by the RAF since1942. General Bouscat's requisitions werepromptly reviewed by the JAC and trans-mitted to the JRC for study and approval.50

In anticipation of the disbandment ofXII Air Force Training and ReplacementCommand, which had been giving combattraining to French bomber crews and fight-er pilots, the JAC, JRC, and other theateragencies arranged for the transfer to theFrench of sufficient equipment to enablethem to continue their own training. Asno advance trainers were available fromU.S. sources, the French, at the suggestionof the JAC, attempted to obtain 25 Harvard

47 Ltr, Eaker to Arnold, 21 Mar 44, History ofMAAF, Vol. II.

48 It was in the course of a reconnaissance mis-sion that the celebrated writer, Maj. Antoine deSaint Exupéry, met with a fatal accident over theMediterranean on 31 July 1944.

For details on organization, control, and opera-tions of FAF units in the various theaters of opera-tions, see "Les Forces Aériennes Françaises"; Gen-eral René Bouscat, "L'Armée de l'Air françaisedans la Campagne d'ltalie," Revue de la DefenseNationale (February, 1946), pp. 233-37; Historyof FAF in MAAF.

49 Interv with Ervin, Jul 51.50 Memos, Bouscat for JAC, 13 May 44, and Ervin

for Loomis, 5 Jun 44, JRC 360/002 Items Commonto Air and Ground.


planes from the Canadians. The MAB,having no authority to assign Canadian air-craft, advised the French to refer their re-quest to the Canadian Government throughBritish channels. The project was subse-quently abandoned. The MAB, however,authorized the transfer of 26 aircraft(including 21 B-26's) used in the Frenchtraining program and no longer needed bythe American air forces in the theater. Thiswas in addition to earlier similar transfers(13 aircraft in October 1943 and 8 morein February 1944) by XII Air Force Train-ing and Replacement Command. Later, inJuly, the theater would approve one moretransfer, also for training purposes, of 90P-40's which the RAF no longer needed inNorth Africa.51

On 6 June 1944 the powerful Alliedarmada, which for many months had pa-tiently organized and trained in the UnitedKingdom, was off on its initial assault ofwestern France. Among the air units en-gaged in the gigantic undertaking, a smallbut determined French air force, integratedinto the RAF, was playing its part. It wascomposed of the seven squadrons (4fighter, 1 light bomber, and 2 heavy bombersquadrons) which had already participatedin air operations over western Europe be-fore D Day.

Meanwhile, in the Mediterranean thea-ter, the squadrons engaged in Italy werepursuing their combat and reconnaissanceactivities, and three others, then in train-ing in North Africa, were making ready tojoin their comrades at a later date. How-ever, French air participation in operations

in that theater would soon cease. In ac-cordance with earlier agreements, all Frenchair squadrons were pulled from Italy alongwith the units of the French ExpeditionaryCorps and sent to join the pool of forcesbeing readied for ANVIL.

Headquarters, Force 163, the headquar-ters charged with the planning and execu-tion of ANVIL, on 28 June published thelist of FAF organizations designated for theoperation. The list included twelve squad-rons and several service units. To ensurethat the units would be thoroughly equippedbefore their release to Force 163, GeneralEaker requested and obtained from theMAB the authorization to transfer tothem such items as were necessary to com-plete their equipment. Transfers were madeon the basis of requests submitted by theFrench directly to NATOUSA. Mean-while, the JAC inspected the units to as-certain whether or not they had their fullload of equipment.52

It soon became evident that, as in thecase of the ground forces, the French mili-tary authorities had activated too fewservice units to make the combat squadronsself-supporting. For lack of personnel, theywere not organizing all the maintenanceunits required under Plan VII. The squad-rons, as a result, were operating "on a shoe-string." To keep them going, MAAF hadbeen compelled to provide, by mid-July,more than 450 American maintenancemen.53

51 Memo, Ervin for Loomis, 23 Jun 44, JRC 360/002 Items Common to Air and Ground; Msgs W-45370, Arnold to Eaker, 3 Jun 44, and Eaker toArnold, F-52950, 31 May 44, MX-24412, 13 Jul44, 25045, 18 Jul 44, and M-25071, 18 Jul 44,JRC Cable Log.

52 Memo, Hq Force 163 for CG NATOUSA, 28Jun 44, AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups; Msgs, Eakerto Arnold, M-25502, 21 Jul 44, and M-28515, 18Aug 44, JRC 360/002 Items Common to Air andGround; Msg W-86188, Arnold to Devers, 26 Aug44, JRC Cable Log.

53 Msg M-23957, Eaker to Arnold, 8 Jul 44, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A; MsgM-24150, Eaker to Arnold, 10 Jul 44, History ofMAAF, Vol. XXII.


Participating in ANVIL operation, on 15August, were twelve French squadrons op-erating from bases in Corsica, Sardinia, andItaly and representing approximately onetwentieth of the combined Allied airarmada. They were joined later by otherFrench squadrons operating elsewhere inthe Mediterranean. Tactically they wereemployed, at least during the initial phaseof the operation, in exactly the same man-ner as the U.S. and British units engagedin support of ANVIL. They operateddirectly under the control of XII TacticalAir Command (TAC), commanded byGeneral Saville who, it will be recalled, hadserved as the first chairman of the JAC. Onthe recommendation of General Wilson,who felt that for psychological and politicalreasons French units should be employed insupport of French Resistance forces, Gen-eral Eaker directed XII TAC to put Frenchsquadrons, whenever operationally practi-cable, to such use. While so employed, theunits, nevertheless, remained firmly underAllied control.54

Also taking part in ANVIL was 1er Régi-ment de Chasseurs Parachutistes (1stRCP), a parachute regiment equipped un-der Plan VII as one of the auxiliary unitsof the FAF. The regiment was to functionindependently of the other parachute units(2d RCP and 3d RCP) activated andequipped in the United Kingdom anddestined to operate as part of the SASBrigade.55 Organization and equipping ofthe 1st RCP were the subject of much dis-cussion and the source of considerable dif-ficulties for many months.

In March, and again in early May 1943,

General Giraud had requested, and AFHQhad subsequently approved, the equippingof a parachute regiment composed of oneheadquarters company, one service com-pany, and two combat battalions. On 18May the War Department authorized thedelivery of the ground items, the air equip-ment not being available at the time.56

Twice in August and September AFHQrequested that the air items be shipped. Notuntil the end of September did the WarDepartment announce that most of thenecessary equipment had been assigned andwould reach North Africa shortly. Mean-while, the unit which until then had beenissued only vehicles and clothing had beentraining with its old French rifles. By Octo-ber the regiment, with a strength of approxi-mately 1,600 men, had reorganized on aU.S. table of organization and received onloan from SOS some weapons, includingM1 rifles, to permit immediate trainingwith U.S. equipment. In November theunit learned the American parachute-jumptechnique at the Fifth Army AirborneTraining Center. It was still expecting itsequipment, most of which was said to havealready left the United States. Yet by theend of November it had received no para-chutes.

The situation of the regiment at the be-ginning of the year 1944 was not a happyone and held little hope for early employ-ment in combat. The regiment had notcompleted its training (half of the men hadnot even fired their M1 rifles). Of theparachute boots issued, 30 percent had beenfound to be too large. Worse yet, reportsindicated that insufficient personnel replace-ments were available to maintain the unit at

54 History of FAF in MAAF, pp. 20-21.55 The following brief outline draws upon JRC

360/006 Fr Parachute Regt. On 2d RCP and 3dRCP, see p. 182, above.

56 Msgs W-3, AFHQ to AGWAR, 7 May 43, and8258, AGWAR to AFHQ, 18 May 43, JRC CableLog.


strength in case it was engaged in operations.These and other considerations promptedAFHQ officials to decide, on 14 January,that the regiment was unfit for combat andwould not be sent to Italy as originally con-templated. Instead it would be held inNorth Africa for future operations. InApril it underwent further training at FifthArmy Airborne Training Center. Asthe unit was still short of equipment,NATOUSA authorized SOS to issue to itsome of the missing items subject to theirultimate replacement by SCAMA. In lateMay, at the request of the French HighCommand, the regiment was designated forparticipation in the conquest of Elba (Oper-ation BRASSARD). On 13 June, four daysbefore the attack, AFHQ announced that,owing to heavy demands for air transport inItaly, no aircraft would be available for theairlift of the regiment.57 The regiment wasfinally included in the ANVIL troop list andsubsequently transported to southernFrance, not, however, as a parachute unit,much to the disappointment of its person-nel, but as a general reserve infantry organ-ization assigned to 1st French Army.Activated some eighteen months earlier, 1stParachute Regiment had yet to fire its firstshot in combat.

Near the end of August, with the ANVILforces in fast pursuit of the enemy, Alliedcommanders agreed that the French air in-crement operating in France under XIITactical Air Command should be granteda measure of tactical autonomy. As a firststep, there was established, on 1 September,a "French Section, XII Tactical Air Com-mand," the nucleus of what was to becomea month later the "1st French Air Corps"commanded by Brig. Gen. Paul Gérardot.

On 13 November 1st French Air Corps,now a full-fledged tactical air command,left the control of XII TAC, and the twoorganizations were consolidated under theFirst Tactical Air Force (U.S.). TheFrench component included two B-26bomber groups and three fighter groups,each consisting of three combat squadronsand one tactical reconnaissance squadron.In order adequately to supply, maintain,and support these units, a French AirDepot group was created with the ap-proval of the CCS, its equipment beingprovided from matériel available in Ameri-can stocks in North Africa.58 Thereafter,1st French Air Corps was to enjoy, underFirst Tactical Air Force, a degree of auton-omy similar to that enjoyed by 1st FrenchArmy within the U.S. 6th Army Group.Its essential mission was generally to act indirect support of 1st French Army.

By November most of the FAF had leftNorth Africa and MAAF's control. More-over, the JRC and the JAC whose presencewas no longer needed in that theater hadbeen disbanded and their key personneltransferred, at General Devers' suggestionand with the concurrence of Generals Eisen-hower and Marshall, to the control ofSHAEF. Already General Bouscat hadmoved his staff to Paris.59

All twenty-five operational squadrons re-equipped under Plan VII were then activelyengaged in combat, seven in northernFrance with the RAF as part of the 2dTactical Air Force (British), and approxi-mately sixteen, constituting 1st French AirCorps, as part of the First Tactical AirForce (U.S.). Two others were still op-erating in northern Italy.

57 De Lattre de Tassigny, Histoire de la PremiereArmée Française, p. 22.

58 Msg, CCS to Wilson, 23 Oct 44, FAN 441.59 Msgs FX-24575, Devers to Marshall, 13 Sep

44, and WX-32283, Marshall to Devers, 17 Sep 44,JRC Cable Log.


After nearly two years of Allied team-work in the Mediterranean, the rebirth ofFrench military aviation had become an ac-complished fact. The North African airrearmament program could now be consid-ered as having come to an end. It hadproduced a "small but damned good" airforce whose performance, "second to none"in the Italian campaign, would for the AN-VIL period be remembered "with pride." 60

Operationally, the undertaking had beenhighly successful. Morally—and to use thewords of one chairman of the JAC—"itwould have been a cruel thing, harmful toour international relations, to have neg-lected the French Air Force. ... Thepsychological effect of re-equipping suchsplendid personnel was most far reaching.... It helped greatly the cause of the Al-lies and played an essential part in the de-velopment of the winning team." 61

60 Intervs with Saville and Ervin, Jul 51. Theseand other equally favorable statements by Alliedfield commanders—Generals Alexander and Clarkin particular (see pp. 178-79, 179n, above)—aregreatly at variance with the curt and disparagingremarks about the French in General H. H. Arnold'sGlobal Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers,1949). His implication that they were playing pol-

itics when submitting a particular air equipment re-quest (p. 541) and his statement that, by January1945, the French Army and Air Force "had not wona battle," although vast quantities of equipment andsupplies had been given to them (p. 543), do notappear consonant with the facts.

61 Statement in Corres from Gardiner, OCMH.

CHAPTER XIII

Rehabilitating the French Navy

When the members of the Joint Rearma-ment Committee assembled for their firstmeeting on 23 December 1942, they wereto consider plans for the rehabilitation ofthe naval as well as the other French armedforces. The committee confronted a situ-ation unique in the annals of naval history.A month earlier, on 27 November, nearlyone half of the entire French Navy, immobi-lized in the port of Toulon since June 1940,had chosen to scuttle itself, when threatenedwith German seizure, rather than join theAllies in North Africa. Of the four vessels,all submarines, which had escaped the holo-caust by putting to sea, three successfullyreached North African ports. Anothergroup of vessels under the command of Ad-miral René Godfroy, demilitarized and keptunder British surveillance in the port ofAlexandria since July 1940 as a result of theadmiral's unwillingness to join the RoyalNavy, was still refusing to rally to the Allies.A third, smaller group, consisting of Ad-miral Robert's vessels anchored in FrenchWest Indies ports, was likewise rejectingAllied appeals to join North Africa.

There was a brighter side. Two Frenchfleets were now at war with the Axis—theFree French Naval Forces of General deGaulle, which had been in operation sincethe fall of 1940, and the North AfricanNaval Forces of General Giraud. Bothwere under Anglo-American operationalcontrol, but were acting independently ofeach other and would continue to do so un-

til the fusion of all French armed forces inlate July 1943.

The Free French fleet, commanded firstby Vice Adm. Emile Muselier, later, afterFebruary 1942, by Admiral Auboyneau,had, from modest beginnings, grown to awell-equipped and seasoned force composedof 5 destroyers, 4 submarines, 13 corvettesand sloops, 1 training ship, and variousmiscellaneous auxiliary ships.1 The ves-sels, some British, the others French orenemy captured, had been operating large-ly as convoy escorts under the control ofthe Royal Navy which provided them withequipment and maintenance.

The North African fleet, then com-manded by Vice Adm. François Michelier,represented a considerable potential forceconsisting of some forty-five combat vesselsand a number of auxiliary craft. The shipsgenerally were in such poor condition, how-ever, that the question of their employmentposed a serious problem. Many had beenstripped of armament and equipment dur-ing the 1940-42 armistice period; othershad been severely damaged in the brief butbloody encounter with Allied naval forces.The French North African authorities hadinsufficient means and materials at theirdisposal to make the ships fit for furtheroperation. The few weapons, tools, andparts which they had concealed at great

1 App. 2 to Ltr, Fénard to Leahy, 15 Oct 43,SHAEF Mission to France 900-4 Rearmt Planand Policy.

REHABILITATING THE FRENCH NAVY 215

FRENCH SUBMARINE, CASABLANCA HARBOR, joins Allied forces in NorthAfrica, 12 November 1942.

risk from Italo-German armistice commis-sions represented only a minor proportionof the matériel required.2

The work of rehabilitating the NorthAfrican Naval Forces began in December1942. The Anglo-American Allies thenagreed to assist them by furnishing mate-rials to carry out relatively minor repairs inFrench shipyards, by placing Allied ship-yards and naval facilities in North Africaat their disposal in the case of more impor-tant overhauling, or by sending vessels re-quiring considerable repairs or refitting, but

able to make the journey, to naval estab-lishments in the United States. The re-sponsibility for co-ordinating these activi-ties was assigned to the JRC upon itscreation in mid-December.

At the end of December Admiral Miche-lier submitted to the JRC a general pro-gram of repairs and alterations which heconsidered necessary for the rehabilitationof the forces and establishments under hiscommand. His proposal involved fitting8 escort vessels and 6 destroyers with mod-ern antiaircraft armament, asdic (antisub-marine direction indicator) and radarequipment, sending the battleship Richelieuto the United States for repairs, and fitting13 submarines with asdic. It also calledfor the delivery from Allied sources of a

2 One French naval official is said to have suc-ceeded in assembling and hiding seventy-five75-mm. guns, and forty-five 37-mm. guns. Ad-miral Pierre Barjot, "Le Débarquement," La Franceet son Empire dans la Guerre (Paris: EditionsLittéraires de France, 1947), I, 207-34.

BATTLESHIP RICHELIEU PASSING UNDER MANHATTAN BRIDGEheading for dry dock at a New Jersey port.


considerable amount of stores and suppliesfor naval shore establishments, dockyards,and naval aviation.

In forwarding Admiral Michelier's pro-gram to the CCS, General Eisenhowerpointed out that the provision of secretmatériel such as modern radar and firecontrol equipment would require an earlypolicy decision between Washington andLondon. He saw no objection to the issueof some form of asdic since several Frenchvessels already had Allied equipment of thistype. In his opinion and that of Alliednaval officials in the theater, the most ur-gent problem was to have French convoyescort ships properly furnished with asdicand close-range antiaircraft. The rearma-ment of the Richelieu, reputedly one of thefinest battleships in existence at the time,was largely a matter of French prestige;but the vessel, if put into operation, wouldserve usefully in releasing an Allied battle-ship from the Atlantic. The French wereready and willing to start immediately onthis general program in which Admiral SirAndrew B. Cunningham, commander of allAllied naval forces in the Mediterranean,concurred.3

Pending approval of the program, Gen-eral Giraud proposed to send to Washingtona naval mission, headed by Vice Adm. Ray-mond Fénard, to cooperate with Alliedofficials on such matters as the eventualcompletion of the Richelieu, the repair andrefitting of other units, and similar ques-tions. The proposal having been endorsedby the Allied Commander in Chief andthrough him by the CCS, Admiral Fénardleft for Washington in late January 1943.4

The Naval Mission, though separate from

General Béthouart's Military Mission,worked in close collaboration with it.

It was then that a curious and somewhatbefuddled situation arose in connection withthe payment of French naval personnel.The confusion originated as a result of thedispatch, on 29 December, of a messagefrom Navy Secretary Frank Knox to RearAdm. John L. Hall, commander of SeaFrontier Forces, Western Task Force. Themessage authorized and directed the pay-ment by U.S. naval disbursing officers ofall personnel of the French North and WestAfrican naval units operating with and forthe United Nations. Greatly surprised atthis offer, which was described to him asemanating from President Roosevelt, Ad-miral Michelier consulted General Giraud,who in turn registered considerable aston-ishment since he had already taken thenecessary financial measures for the pay-ment from funds available to him of allground, sea, and air forces under his com-mand. At the direction of the French Com-mander in Chief, Admiral Michelier ex-plained to Admiral Hall why the offer couldnot be accepted, and expressed his personalgratitude "for the generosity which had in-spired this gesture."5 Apprised of thesenegotiations and of the initial offer madewithout his knowledge, General Eisenhowerinformed the CCS on 18 January that itwould continue to be his policy to respectthe apparent desire of the French to main-tain their forces in North Africa without re-course to direct financial assistance from theUnited States.6 The issue was now closed.The French North African authorities, whohad already begun paying their personnelfrom funds available to them, continued to

3 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 2 Jan 43, NAF 78.4 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 7 Jan 43, NAF 91.

5 AFHQ Msg (no re f ) , I Armed Corps (signedPatton) to FREEDOM, 16 Jan 43, JRC Cable Log.

6 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 18 Jan 43, NAF 108.


do so. In the case of crews and other per-sonnel temporarily stationed in the UnitedStates, arrangements were made for ad-vances from the Treasury Department sub-ject to repayment from French resources.7

Meanwhile, a program of rehabilitationhad been worked out after consultation withthe French and a conference with AdmiralCunningham and Rear Adm. William A.Glassford, commander in chief of Amphib-ious Forces, Northwest African Waters.The latter, who had just returned fromCasablanca where he had had an oppor-tunity to inspect French naval vessels in thatarea, submitted to the CCS, on 17 January,the final recommendations of the theaterregarding action and priorities for the re-habilitation program. The recommenda-tions were made with a view to puttingFrench ships in operation at the earliestpossible date.8

The CCS, already assembled for theCasablanca Conference (14-26 January)examined the problem of reconditioning theFrench fleet in general and the specific pro-gram proposed by Admiral Glassford. Atone of the meetings attended by GeneralGiraud, Admiral King pointed out thatarrangements were well in hand for therefitting in rotation of the French warships.Resources, he explained, would not permitof their being dealt with all at once. Ad-miral Pound then seized the occasion towelcome the entry of the North Africanfleet on the side of Allied naval forces.From his experience at the beginning of thewar, he was confident that the French Navywould render, once again, substantial andvaluable assistance especially in fighting the

U-boat menace.9 Two days later, on 21January, the Combined Chiefs informedAdmiral Glassford that they approved cer-tain of his recommendations. They alsoinformed him of the respective parts whichthe United States and the United Kingdomwere prepared to play in arming, equipping,and overhauling French naval vessels andinstallations in North and West Africa.All vessels to be overhauled, such as escorts,submarines, cruisers, and destroyers, wereto be sent to shipyards in the United States;none would be sent to the United Kingdomfor the moment as it would be impracti-cable.10 When, a few weeks later, the firstvessels reached U.S. shipyards, the recondi-tioning program got fully under way. Itsprogress was not affected by the temporarydesertion of crews to Gaullist vessels thenanchored in U.S. harbors.11

On 27 January, AFHQ formulated apolicy to govern the rehabilitation of theNorth African Naval Forces. The under-taking was to aim at providing forces cap-able of carrying out the following roles:local defense of ports, escort for coastal con-voys, ocean escort, submarine operations.Rehabilitation of course meant repair andrefitting of existing vessels. In the eyes ofthe French it also meant the acquisition ofnew units. At their request, General Eisen-hower urged the CCS, on 1 March, to ap-prove the transfer to them of a number ofships including destroyers, escorts, and tugs,planes and equipment for their Naval AirArm, clothing and foodstuffs for their per-sonnel, as well as ship repair and construc-tion materials and machine tools for theirnaval installations. He also recommended

7 Ltr, D. W. Bell to Hull, 26 Feb 43, OPD 336.2France, Sec I.

8 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 17 Jan 43, NAF 105.

9 Min, CCS 62d Mtg, 19 Jan 42, CasablancaConf.

10 Msg 2226/22, CCS to Glassford, 21 Jan 43,OPD 336.3 France, Sec 1.

11 See p. 80n, above.


BATTLESHIP JEAN BART AT CASABLANCA after receiving three direct bomb hitsfrom a carrier-based dive bomber.

that the Fénard mission in Washington beasked to designate the equipment to be de-livered under the shipping allotment re-served by General Giraud for naval unitsout of the total 25,000-ton monthly alloca-tion. Shipments would be made as agreedupon by Admiral Fénard and OverseasSupply Division of New York Port of Em-barkation (and not International Division),the agency responsible for handling navalmaterials.12

12 Memo, AFHQ (signed Whiteley), 27 Jan 43,AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters; Msgs3729, Eisenhower to CCS, 1 Mar 43, and 4498,Eisenhower to AGWAR, 5 Mar 43, JRC CableLog; Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 8 Mar 43, ASFFile 124 Task Force Chronology, 18 Oct 43.

On 17 April the CCS examined thevarious piecemeal recommendations sub-mitted by the theater, then drafted andapproved a supply policy for North Africannaval vessels and bases. The policy de-termined the extent of the rehabilitationprogram, the procedure to be followed forthe issue of materials, and the respectiveparticipation of the United States and theUnited Kingdom in the commitment. Withregard to vessels in operation, the policy stip-ulated that the United States and the UnitedKingdom each would supply the necessaryammunition, fuel, and other items to thevessels operating under their control.13

13 Note, CCS Secretaries to CCS, 16 Apr 43, OPD400 France, Sec II; Min, CCS 80th Mtg, 17 Apr 43.


By this time a number of ships were beingoverhauled in various dockyards. In NewYork, the Richelieu was having main arma-ment completed, radar equipment installed,and antiaircraft armament improved. InCasablanca, the battleship Jean Bart, badlydamaged in November 1942, was under-going repairs sufficient to enable her tosteam to the United States later in the yearfor final refitting. In Philadelphia, Boston,Hampton Roads, and other American ports,cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and variousmiscellaneous vessels were undergoing re-pair, with many more to follow in the nearfuture. Repairs and refitting were alsobeing effected in Casablanca, Algiers,Dakar, Oran, and even Bermuda. TwentyFrench merchant ships were being issueddefensive armament and ammunition. TheBritish were about to furnish twenty Walruspatrol planes for use by the French NavalAir Arm. At all Allied ports in NorthAfrica, French officers were being trainedin British and American methods of harbordefense. A French antisubmarine warfareschool was functioning at Casablanca.Gunnery schools were in operation at Al-giers and Oran. Selected French personnelwere being sent to sea in British destroyersescorting convoys to study the latest methodsin antisubmarine warfare.14

On 30 April, pursuant to the CCS direc-tive issued a fortnight before, the theaterforwarded to Washington a revised list ofnaval items of munitions and warshipsstores for the French. Two months laterGeneral Eisenhower proposed to the CCSthat thereafter new requests for ships, pro-posals for major overhauls, and requests forincreases in armament be referred by Gen-

eral Giraud's headquarters to AFHQ forrecommendation, leaving matters of detailrelating to requests for naval supplies fordirect handling between the Fénard missionand appropriate agencies in Washington.Endorsing the proposal, the CCS directedthat the French submit their requests forships and major items of matériel to AFHQ,for recommendation, simultaneously withtheir requisitions to the MAB in Washing-ton. They stipulated further that no con-sideration would be given in Washingtonto items disapproved by AFHQ.15

In early July the theater cabled a requestfor the issue to the French of gun and ma-chinery spare parts and maintenance re-placements on a scale comparable to thatauthorized similar American naval vessels.16

The request was approved by the CCS amonth later.

While the overhauling operations wereproceeding, the question of employment ofthe North African naval vessels and person-nel was made the subject of a detailed studyby the Combined Staff Planners in full con-sultation with Admiral Fénard. Until thenthe operational assignment of vessels hadbeen effected upon a basis of "cooperation"in accordance with the terms of the still validClark-Darlan Agreement: "French war-ships shall operate in close cooperation withthe CG, US Army, or Allied representativesacting with his approval." 17 Feeling thatthere was need for a more precise andorderly arrangement, the CPS recom-mended that thereafter French naval units,when ready for duty, be assigned to opera-tions areas by the CCS, initially according

14 Memo, Naval Members JRC for Gardiner, 7May 43: Memo, Gardiner for DCofS, 14 May 43,JRC 905.6/VIII Naval Rearmt.

15 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 25 Jun 43, NAF 245;Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 10 Jul 43, FAN 156.

16 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 5 Jul 43, NAF 276;Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 13 Aug 43, FAN 190.

17 Article VII, Clark-Darlan Agreement, 22 Nov42, AFHQ 0100/5 CAO/302/1 MAEB.


to a specific detailed plan, later, if changeswere required, at the direction of the CCSthemselves. On 30 July the CCS approvedthe recommendations of the CPS but post-poned the issuance of a statement on thequestion of control pending further dis-cussion of the matter.18

In late July the long-awaited fusion ofthe Free French and North African Forcesbrought into being a single MarineNationale (referred to hereafter as FrenchNavy) under the supreme command ofGeneral Giraud. Admiral Lemonnier wasappointed Chief of Staff of the integratedforce, and Admiral Auboyneau the DeputyChief of Staff. The new Navy includedalso the forces which earlier had refused tojoin the Allies. In May Admiral Godfreyhad finally agreed to rally to General Giraudand arrived in Dakar, via the Suez Canaland the Cape of Good Hope, with his eightships of which one was the battleship Lor-raine. In July the seven vessels immobi-lized in the French West Indies had like-wise joined the common struggle after theresignation of Admiral Robert, then HighCommissioner for that territory. As a re-sult of these successive additions, the FrenchNavy now represented a large force of some80 ships including 3 operational battle-ships,19 1 aircraft-carrier, 9 cruisers, 21 de-stroyers, 22 submarines, and 20 smaller ves-sels. Besides these, there were about 60auxiliary craft. Available naval personnelnumbered some 45,000 men.

By this time the work of rehabilitationhad made substantial progress. Refittingof the Richelieu was nearly completed andthe vessel was about to be subjected to aperiod of trials and practice runs in the

United States. At Casablanca, temporaryhull repairs to the Jean Bart were con-tinuing. A number of ships had left U.S.ports upon completion of their refitting andhad joined others already operating underthe control of the Naval Commander inChief, Mediterranean. Others were ontheir way to the United States. The British,for their part, had made sufficient tem-porary repairs to the ships of Admiral God-frey's fleet to enable them to sail fromAlexandria to Dakar, and eventually to theUnited States. They also had repaired andrefitted in North African ports a number oftrawlers, escort vessels, and miscellaneoussmall craft unable to cross the Atlantic formodernization in American yards. It wasestimated that when the program was com-pleted, the United States would havefinanced approximately 95 percent of thecost of French naval rearmament.20

The memorandum on the status of theFrench armed forces which Generals Gi-raud and de Gaulle jointly addressed toGeneral Marshall on 18 September con-tained a plea that the naval rehabilitationprogram be implemented speedily. Manyof the 45,000 sailors constituting the navalforces otherwise would remain unused orpoorly used. The two generals also re-quested new ships: 12 destroyers and 30escort vessels from the United States, and 3destroyers, 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier, and3 submarines from the United Kingdom.21

In late September, the CCS consolidatedall existing policies with respect to theFrench Navy into one single memorandum

18 Rpt, CPS to CCS (CCS 207/10), 19 Jul 43,OPD 336.3 France, Sec 1; Min, CCS 104th Mtg,30 Jun 43.

19 Two more could not be repaired.

20 Rpt, JRC Naval Members to Chairman JRC,1 Aug 43, JRC 905.6/VIII Naval Rearmt; Memo,Spalding for Brig Gen Arthur R. Wilson, 14 Aug43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan.

21 Ltr and Memo, de Gaulle and Giraud to Mar-shall, 18 Sep 43, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43),Sec 1-A; see also pp. 105-06, above.


(CCS 358). The memorandum coveredall aspects of administration and operation-al control, such as overhauling, refitting,assignment, and employment; it also pro-posed a detailed supply policy in connec-tion with repairs and the issue of matériel.The memorandum was subsequentlyamended on 4 October. The amendedversion (CCS 358/Revised) became theofficial policy governing the rehabilitationand employment of the French naval andnaval air forces and the basis on which allsubsequent programs or revisions thereofwere shaped.22 The provision relating tothe assignment of vessels was a restatementof the policy advocated earlier by the Com-bined Staff Planners in their report of 19July. With respect to operational control,the directive contained a clause whichmerely formalized the practice then cur-rent: "French ships assigned to any opera-tional area will operate under the opera-tional command of the Allied naval areacommander. They will be utilized to theextent of their capabilities and in the samemanner as other similar Allied ships in thearea, operating normally under subordi-nate French commanders." Internal ad-ministration was to remain, of course, theconcern of appropriate French naval au-thorities. The French immediately en-dorsed the provisions of the directive andsignified unqualified approval.23

Now that the French Admiralty in Algierscontrolled vessels operating world-wide,many outside of his own theater, the AlliedCommander in Chief requested the CCS, on17 October, to review the procedure withrespect to French naval rearmament. He

recommended that British and Americannaval missions operating under the controlof the Naval Commander in Chief in theMediterranean be accredited to the FrenchAdmiralty as representatives of the BritishAdmiralty and the Commander in Chiefof the U.S. Fleet respectively.24 The Com-bined Chiefs replied that they had no ob-jection to the proposal provided the FrenchAdmiralty, in compliance with CCS 358(Revised), took up all policy matterswith the CCS through the executive agentof that body, namely, the Commander inChief of the U.S. Fleet acting in concur-rence with the British Admiralty delegationin Washington.25

In late November Admiral Lemonniersubmitted to the Joint Rearmament Com-mittee a list of requisitions for the year 1944superseding all previous similar requestsmost of which had been nullified as a resultof the change in supply policy effected bythe CCS. The list included a request forships, aircraft, clothing, medical supplies,and the normal maintenance of vessels.The requisition for clothing was based ona personnel strength of 49,000 men.26 Therequest for additional ships had little chanceof being granted because the CCS had justdecided that it would not be beneficial tothe war effort to make further assignmentsof vessels to the French in the near future.27

Another request submitted almost simul-taneously by Admiral Lemonnier on behalfof the French Naval Air Arm (Aéronau-tique Navale) brought the question of therearmament and maintenance of that forceinto focus. Four naval air squadrons were

22 Min, CCS 121st Mtg, 1 Oct 43; CCS 358 (Re-vised), 4 Oct 43.

23 Memo, Fénard for Leahy, 15 Oct 43, SHAEFMission to France 091.711 Rearmt Plan and Policy900-4.

24 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 17 Oct 43, NAF 472.25 Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 6 Nov 43, FAN 272.26 Ltr, Lemonnier to Loomis, 30 Nov 43, JRC

045/001 Plan, Policy, Progress of Rearmt of FrNavy.

27 CCS 358/3, approved by CCS 4 Nov 43.


operating under Mediterranean Air Com-mand. Two had been equipped withSunderlands and Wellingtons by the RAF,one with Walruses by the Fleet Air Arm ofthe Royal Navy, and one with Catalinasby the U.S. Navy.28 These units had beenrearmed at the initiative of individual Alliedcommanders without any definite over-allplan and, as a result, the question of theirmaintenance was presenting serious diffi-culties.

The advisability of expanding the NavalAir Arm had been the subject of long nego-tiations in the course of 1943. As early asJuly the French High Command had re-quested the War Department to deliver 255planes to be used for the defense of basesand ports and for the protection of Frenchnaval units. The request, although favor-ably received by General Eisenhower, laterwas disapproved by the War Departmenton the ground that it had not been con-sidered by the theater in relation to FrenchAir Force requirements.29 As the proposedAir program (Plan VII) contemplated noexpansion of the Naval Air Arm, theFrench, in mid-December, made a secondattempt to obtain equipment for their navalair units. This time the request, largely arepetition of the first one, was submitted byAdmiral Fénard to the U.S. Navy Depart-ment.30 It called for 250 aircraft to equip

naval squadrons "for combat duty underAllied control as may be prescribed by theCCS." The request was referred to Gen-eral Wilson for advice and recommendationin accordance with the recent CCS decisionthat all French rearmament matters becleared by the Allied Commander in Chiefin the theater before their submission to theCCS.31

On 24 January 1944 General Wilson in-formed the War Department that no planhad been submitted to him by the Frenchfor the rearmament of their naval airsquadrons. He urged that no considerationbe given to arming such units at the expenseof Allied air forces, and added the informa-tion that the French were reported to haveinsufficient trained crews and maintenancepersonnel either for the activation of newnaval air units or for their continued sup-port.32 In addition, he warned, the theaterwas having considerable difficulty in solvingthe supply problem of the four existingsquadrons because of the diversity of the re-sponsibilities involved.33

Endorsing General Wilson's advice andrecommendation, the CCS, on 25 February,disapproved the French request and Ad-miral Leahy so informed Admiral Fénard.34

Meanwhile, President Roosevelt, consultedon the matter by General Arnold, had di-rected that French naval air personnel beemployed in the Mediterranean in French

28 Memos, Saville for Loomis, 30 Nov 43, andLoomis for Saville, 16 Dec 43, JRC 045/009 NavalAviation.

29 Msgs 3062, Arnold to Eisenhower, 22 Jul 43,W-6872, Eisenhower to Arnold, 8 Aug 43, and4752, Arnold to Eisenhower, 11 Aug 43, JRCCable Log.

30 Admiral Fénard's initial request was submittedto the U.S. Navy and not to the Army Air Forcesas indicated by General Arnold in his Global Mis-sion, p. 541. Subsequently, however, a secondrequest from Admiral Fénard, dated 7 January 1944and addressed to Admiral Leahy as Chief of Staff tothe Commander in Chief, was forwarded by the

latter to the Army Air Forces for action. Ltrs,Fénard to Navy Dept, 18 Dec 43, and to Leahy,7 Jan 44, ABC 091.711 France (12 Oct 43).

31 Msg to AFHQ, 1 Jan 44, FAN 288; Msg 7165,Arnold to Wilson, 14 Jan 44, JRC Cable Log.

32 Msg W-919, Wilson to AGWAR, 24 Jan 44,JRC Cable Log.

33 Memos, Saville for Loomis, 30 Nov 43, Timber-lake for Loomis, 13 Dec 43, and Loomis for Saville,16 Dec 43, JRC 045/009 Naval Aviation.

34 Min, CCS 147th Mtg, 25 Feb 44; Ltr, Leahyto Fénard, 25 Feb 44, ABC 091.711 France (12Oct 43).


Air Force units equipped and supplied fromU.S. sources.35

Obviously the matter of expanding theNaval Air Arm was, for the present at least,a closed one, considering in addition thatthe CCS had just reached an important de-cision with respect to French military avi-ation. Indeed, on 28 January, they hadfinally approved Plan VII, which, in theiropinion, represented the maximum objec-tive likely to be reached by the French inthe field of aviation during the currentwar.36

In mid-February 1944, the French Ad-miralty once again attempted to obtain anextension of the naval program. Appear-ing before the CCS, Admiral Fénard dis-cussed the request for additional vesselssubmitted by Admiral Lemonnier in No-vember. He explained that some 10,000naval personnel, including specialists, werecurrently unemployed for lack of sufficientnaval units. A month later the CCS in-formed Admiral Fénard that existing con-struction programs for combatant ships, al-though absorbing all available resources ofthe United Kingdom and the United States,would be short of the requirements forplanned operations during the current year.As a result it was not possible to meet theFrench request except for some escorts, sub-marine chasers, mine sweepers and othermiscellaneous ships which the Commanderin Chief of the U.S. Fleet proposed to trans-fer to the French Navy as soon as possible.37

So far the French had received or wereabout to receive from U.S. sources 6 de-stroyer escorts, 6 patrol craft, and 6 sub-

marine chasers,38 and from British sources 4frigates. During the following months, thetransfer of additional Allied vessels, mostlyAmerican, such as mine sweepers, sloops,and patrol boats, as well as the refloatingand refitting of salvaged French or capturedItalian ships, resulted in a substantial in-crease of the French Navy. By May it wasestimated that nearly 100 ships had beenadded, bringing the total of units to ap-proximately 240.39

Meanwhile, such ships as had been over-hauled or acquired had not remained idle.For over a year they had been carrying outmissions in various theaters of operationsunder British or U.S. command, as partof the Allied naval pool. In September1943 a number of submarines, destroyers,and cruisers had temporarily been releasedfrom Allied control and placed by AdmiralCunningham at General Giraud's disposalfor use in transporting the French groundforces engaged in the assault of Corsica(VESUVIUS ) .40 In November the Richelieuhad joined the Home Fleet and four monthslater had been sent to the Indian Oceanas part of the British Far Eastern Fleet.Other vessels were operating in the Atlan-tic and Indian Oceans, as well as in theMediterranean. Several were escortingconvoys to Murmansk.

During the coming months of June, July,and August 1944, the reborn French Navywas to furnish its greatest contribution tothe Allied war effort and to regain the placeof honor it had long occupied. Participat-ing in the cross-Channel operation (OVER-LORD) as elements of the Allied supportingnaval pool, commanded by Admiral Sir

35 Memo, Arnold for JCS, 9 Feb 44, ABC 091.711France (12 Oct 43).

36 For details of Plan VII, see pp. 204-05, above.37 Ltr, Leahy to Fénard, 13 Mar 44, OPD 336.3

France, Sec 1.

38 Rpt, MAB to CCS, 31 Dec 43, ABC 091.711France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A.

39 André Truffert, "La Marine Nationale," LaFrance et son Empire dans la Guerre, II, 188-96.



Bertram H. Ramsay, were a number ofcruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, tor-pedo boats, submarine chasers, and othersmaller craft. These vessels, under the com-mand of Rear Adm. Robert Jaujard, wereattached to Rear Adm. Alan G. Kirk'sU.S. naval force.41 A week later, on 16June, several units commanded by RearAdm. Robert Battet, operating alongsideBritish vessels under the over-all commandof Admiral Troubridge (RN), participatedin the assault on the island of Elba(BRASSARD).4 2

The most substantial contribution of theFrench Navy was that given in connectionwith the landings in southern France (AN-VIL) . The Allied naval task force, com-manded by Vice Adm. Henry Kent Hewitt,included a French increment under Ad-miral Lemonnier which comprised thebattleship Lorraine, eight cruisers, a num-ber of destroyers, and many other smallercraft. Like the British and American shipsengaged in the operation, the French vesselswere given the task of protecting the invad-ing forces and neutralizing enemy coastaldefenses. In their after-action reports, Ad-miral Hewitt and other U.S. naval com-manders highly praised the French crewsfor their excellent seamanship and gun-nery, their intrepidity under fire, as well asthe fine sportsmanship of their command-ing officers.43

A word must be said here of the units offusiliers marins (marines) which the French

High Command activated and put to ex-cellent use in operations. Two such unitsaccompanied the French ExpeditionaryCorps in Italy, the 1st Fusiliers Marins Reg-iment as the reconnaissance regiment of the1st Motorized Infantry Division (1stDMI), and the Groupe de CanonniersMarins (Naval Gunners Group) as a gen-eral reserve artillery unit of the CEF. Later,in June 1944, the 1st Battalion of FusiliersMarins Commandos (Marine Comman-dos) operated as part of the French navalforces engaged in OVERLORD, and the Re-giment Blindé de Fusiliers Marins (Ar-mored Marine Regiment) landed in Franceas the tank destroyer regiment of the 2dArmored Division. All these units,equipped and trained under the NorthAfrican rearmament program, gave an ex-cellent account of themselves.

Shortly before the launching of ANVIL,General Wilson had recommended to theCCS that the policy contained in CGS 358(Revised) with respect to the supply ofFrench ships and ports under immediatecontrol of the United States and UnitedKingdom be extended to the ports expectedto be captured in the forthcoming operationand to the French warships and naval per-sonnel likely to be operating outside directU.S. and British control.44 In mid-Sep-tember, a month after the operation hadbeen launched, the CCS approved the pro-posal provided that the supply of repairequipment and materials, ships, and storesto the French Navy in its home ports andto the ports themselves for their rehabilita-tion be limited to the extent required forthe support of operations.45

Soon after, the responsibility for the

41 The old battleship Courbet and other ships nolonger seaworthy and anchored in U.K. ports since1940 were brought close to shore, sunk, and usedas breakwaters for the protection of artificial har-bors.

42 See pp. 180-81, above.43 Ltrs, Vice Adm Lyal A. Davidson, Comdr

Task Force 86, 29 Aug and 5 Sep 44, and Hewitt,3 and 15 Sep 44, to CinC U.S. Fleet, AFHQ RoyalNavy Op file, Op DRAGOON, Fr Ships, Rpts.

44 Msg, Wilson to CCS, 15 Jul 44, NAF 719.45 Msg, CCS to Wilson, 21 Sep 44, FAN 424.


supply and maintenance of the French Navypassed, along with that of all other Frencharmed forces, from AFHQ to SHAEF.The rehabilitation of the French Navy,within the limits set forth by the CCS, was

nearly completed. The question of fur-ther expansion would, thereafter, be amatter for discussion between SHAEF au-thorities and the French officials in Parisbefore consultation with the CCS.

CHAPTER XIV

Liaison, Language, and Training Problems

In implementing the North African re-armament program, AFHQ was confrontedwith a variety of problems affecting, notany one phase in particular, but rather theentire period of operations. Some resultedfrom human or personal considerations,others involved purely material matters.All resulted from a situation in which thearmy of one nation was committed to therehabilitation of another nation's forceshaving needs peculiar to them, thereforerequiring special attention. In general theproblems stemmed from lack of sufficientplanning or because of unforeseen develop-ments. Their solution depended entirelyon the action or arrangements initiated byAFHQ or NATOUSA subject to final ap-proval by the CCS or the War Department.

Liaison and the Language Barrier

Foremost among the factors vitally in-fluencing Franco-Allied relations, particu-larly in the field of rearmament, were thelanguage barrier and a dearth of qualifiedliaison officers on both sides.

American as well as French officers agreethat, to be successful, a rearmament officermust have certain qualifications. Next to athorough knowledge of his subject, he mustpossess a keen understanding of the otherfellow's approach to the problem, hispersonal and national idiosyncrasies, hisworking habits, and his probable reactions.In short, the rearmament officer must dis-

play a sympathetic attitude. Fluency in theforeign language, although highly desirable,is not the prime qualification required forthe position.1 Judged by such exactingstandards, few on either side possessed allthe skills required to perform their taskadequately. Among the Americans, except-ing those officials directly supervising therearmament and training operations whosesympathetic attitude was fully recognizedand appreciated by the French, many wereunable to understand the French, usuallyfrom lack of preparation for the positionsthey occupied. Similarly, French officersother than those appointed to key postsfrequently lacked technical knowledge,understanding of American organizationand methods, and fluency in the Englishlanguage. Notable among the exceptionswere a number of officers recruited in early1943 among French residents abroad, espe-cially in the United States and Canada.After a period of training in U.S. schools inthe use of American equipment, some fiftyof these highly qualified bilingual officerswere assigned by the French High Com-mand to the JRC, SCAMA, and Frenchdepots and supply installations where theyrendered valuable assistance.

Fluency in the foreign language, whileit may be a secondary qualification for re-

1 Intervs with Col Artamonoff, Dec 49, ColGardiner, Apr 50, Gen Loomis, Jun and Jul 50, Colde Beaumont, Jul 50, and Gen Regnault, Jul andSep 50.


armament officers, is obviously of primaryimportance for liaison officers. When theseofficers were unable to cope with the finerlinguistic problems and, in addition, werenot thoroughly familiar with the technicalproblems involved, their inadequacy led tomistranslations or misinterpretations thatoften strained inter-Allied relations. A casein point is the serious misunderstanding be-tween AFHQ and French Headquartersbrought about by a letter addressed in Octo-ber 1943 by General Whiteley, then DeputyChief of Staff, AFHQ, to General Giraud.In his communication, General Whiteleyrequested that, "whenever necessary, equip-ment will be drawn from non-participatingunits" in order to complete the re-equip-ment of units designated for combat. Whenit became clear, from subsequent Frenchrequisitions, that General Whiteley's in-structions had not been complied with, theFrench were accused of willfully disregard-ing orders received. Resentment on bothsides increased until an investigation re-vealed, nearly three weeks later, that theEnglish text of the paragraph in questionhad erroneously been translated at FrenchHeadquarters as: "equipment will bedrawn from stocks available to non-partici-pating units." 2 The very point whichGeneral Whiteley had wished to stress,namely, that nonparticipating units shouldbe stripped of their equipment if necessary(a matter of considerable dispute at thetime), had been entirely missed. In otherinstances, misunderstanding resulted fromfaulty translation by Americans. The fol-lowing sentence contained in a French di-rective, "Des forces françaises opérant dansun cadre américain" (French forces oper-ating within the framework of an American

command), was given by a translator atAFHQ as, "French forces operating withAmerican cadres."3 War Departmenttranslators, as well, occasionally missed theparticular meaning of a French word. Ina letter to General Marshall, GeneralGiraud spoke of a certain armament pro-gram "which we have drawn up" (le pro-gramme que nous avons arrêté). Thesentence was rendered, first, as "the pro-gram which we have held up," later in asecond translation, intended no doubt toimprove on the first, as "which we havepostponed." 4 The resulting inference thatthe French Commander in Chief was post-poning his rearmament program, when inreality he was fighting for its retention, musthave been somewhat of a surprise to thosewho read the letter. Not all linguistic er-rors, fortunately, were serious in conse-quence. Some, by their humorous impli-cations, probably contributed to the reliefof tension between Allied and Frenchstaffs. In this category can be classed theunexpected statement appearing in theminutes of the 30 December 1943 meetingbetween Generals Eisenhower and deGaulle, as drawn up by the French record-ing officer present. According to theFrench text, the Allied Commander inChief is reported to have assured his visitorthat he would not fail to include a French"talking force" in the cross-Channel opera-tion.5

In addition to being the source of occa-sional misunderstandings, the language bar-

2 Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 20 Oct 43, AFHQ0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec. Italics supplied.

3 Dir 6014, Fr Hq, 8 Dec 43, JRC 400.2/002Stock Control (SCAMA).

4 Ltr, Giraud to Marshall, 27 Aug 43, OPD 400France, Sec. II.

5 The two words appear in English and in quo-tations in the French text. Min Mtg, Eisenhowerwith de Gaulle, 30 Dec 43, AFHQ 0100/26 LiaisonSec, Mtgs and Confs, Vol. I.

LIAISON, LANGUAGE, AND TRAINING PROBLEMS 229

rier raised considerable technical difficul-ties. These might have been greatly re-duced had it been possible in the earlystages of the rearmament operations to pro-vide the French with translations in theirlanguage of U.S. technical manuals andpublications, none of which were availableat the time. Recognizing the urgency ofthe matter, the War Department promptlyundertook a vast program of translation andbegan furnishing French texts as fast asthey could be prepared and printed. Asearly as March 1943 thousands of copiesof various manuals were sent along withthe first large shipments of matériel. Psy-chological warfare booklets and numeroustechnical bulletins were subsequently deliv-ered, first through the JRC and FrenchTraining Section, later through the Frenchbase at Oran, for distribution to troops, de-pots, and shops. In September of the sameyear the War Department announced thatthe translation had been undertaken in theUnited States of all American technicalpublications needed for the current re-armament program. Yet, by the beginningof Phase IV in February 1944, much stillremained to be done in connection withthe translation program.

Even publications in English were notalways available to the French when mostneeded. In the course of the summer of1943, when the first divisions were beingissued their U.S. equipment, the FrenchHigh Command complained of not havingcomplete sets of standard nomenclaturelists as well as the bulletins, circulars, andother publications distributed by the va-rious American services. It was not untilOctober that the first lists were deliveredto them.

To ensure that French units would ob-tain all the necessary technical literature,

whether in English or in French, GeneralLarkin recommended in November that theFrench High Command organize a centralpublications depot.6 The French approvedthe suggestion and on 1 January 1944 es-tablished such a depot (Dépot français dePublications américaines) at Oran to serveas a clearinghouse for all requests for, andissues of, American publications. Thesewere of two types: War Department pub-lications—such as technical manuals, fieldmanuals, and tables of organization andequipment—and Ordnance technical pub-lications.

By the end of January the French stillhad not been issued base shop data manualsor lists of maintenance factors. In additionthey had received only half of the publica-tions in French promised earlier by the WarDepartment. Without waiting for the restof the documents to arrive, they had under-taken the translation of a number of U.S.publications. Already in November theyhad published an English-French lexicon, amost useful manual in view of the scarcityof English-French dictionaries in the theater.Technical dictionaries were and continuedto be in great demand. In April 1944 theFrench General Staff tried unsuccessfullyto obtain from U.S. sources in the theatersuch dictionaries, for use in particular at theCasablanca Vehicle Assembly Line to whichwomen interpreters with no technicalknowledge had been assigned. Dictionariesof this sort were not available in U.S. theaterstocks and the French were advised to ob-tain them from the United States throughtheir Military Mission in Washington.

Efforts of War Department and AFHQofficials to provide adequate material bothin French and in English continued through-

6 Msg L-1076, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 24Nov 43, JRC 461/001 Publications (1943).


out the spring of 1944. That they wereultimately successful is best illustrated bythe comments of General Juin, Command-ing General, CEF, at the end of Frenchparticipation in the Italian campaign. On10 July 1944 General Juin requested thechief of the French Military Mission in theUnited States to express to the responsibleWar Department authorities his apprecia-tion of the "great care, accuracy and excel-lent taste" with which translations of U.S,publications had been prepared.7

Training

U.S. assistance in the French trainingprogram was limited to technical instruc-tion in the use of American matériel. Atno time was tactical training, except inminor infantry tactics and amphibious land-ings, ever given. By the time that rearma-ment operations were fully under way, inMay 1943, the bulk of the French units con-sisted of old and tried regiments, a largepart of whose personnel had gone throughboth the 1939-40 and the Tunisian cam-paigns. Few were the men who had nothad some military training. It was felt thatFrench cadres were sufficiently experiencedto assume the burden of tactical training.In fact, American commanders frequentlysought qualified French officers, especiallyAir Force officers, to assist in the tacticaltraining of comparatively green Americantroops.8

In the initial phase of Franco-Americancollaboration, American technical trainingassistance was extended by local U.S. com-manders acting on their own initiative. As

early as mid-November 1942 General Pat-ton arranged to have some French techni-cians as well as fighter pilots trained inhandling American equipment.9 In De-cember, at the request of the French HighCommand, training materials and instruc-tors were placed at the disposal of theChantiers de Jeunesse school near Algiers.10

Schools for instructing French Ordnanceand Quartermaster personnel in the use ofU.S. weapons and matériel were being or-ganized in various parts of North Africa.As there appeared to be some hesitancyabout how far this assistance was to be ex-tended, General Eisenhower, on 30 and 31December, directed the U.S. Fifth Armyand AFHQ to make sure that U.S. troopswere giving all possible assistance to theNorth African forces in their training withU.S. arms and equipment.11 AFHQpromptly issued an instruction setting forththe purpose and general scope of the train-ing to be given the French and outlining atraining plan.12 Already many Frenchcadres, officers as well as noncommissionedofficers, were receiving instruction withinAmerican divisions for periods of approxi-mately two weeks in armament, vehicledriving and maintenance, and signal com-munications.

By mid-March G-3 Training Section,AFHQ, found that the training programwas proceeding satisfactorily. The Frenchwere reported to have a "keen appreciationof problems, both mechanical and person-

7 Ltr, Juin to Chief Military Mission in Washing-ton, 10 Jul 44, JRC 461/001 Publications (1 Jan44).

8 Memo, Artamonoff for G-4 AFHQ, 2 Aug 43,JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab T.

9 Memo, Patton for Eisenhower, 21 Nov 42,AFHQ SAC 000.2-2 NA Political.

10 On Chantiers de Jeunesse, see pp. 8n, 68n,above.

11 Ltr, CinC to CG Fifth Army, 30 Dec 42,quoted in Fifth Army History, I, 2; Ltr, AG353/082 C-M, AFHQ, 31 Dec 42, AFHQ 010012C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. II (3 ) .

12 AFHQ Training Memo 1, 1 Jan 43, JRC353/003 Training Fr Army Personnel.


nel," and to be making great strides. Theywere supplying personnel for liaison andfor instruction, and were expected to takeover the brunt of the burden of instructionwithin a short time.13 Training equipmenthad been requisitioned by the theater, as-signed in Washington, and would soon beon its way to North African ports.

General Eisenhower on 30 March re-stated Fifth Army's responsibility in organ-izing and training the French forces thenstationed within its area in French Morocco.In a subsequent directive setting forth thegeneral policies that would govern the proc-ess of French rearmament, AFHQ pre-scribed the manner in which training as-sistance was to be provided. Basically, theU.S. Army was to assist the French Armyin familiarizing its personnel with the tech-nical details of storing, assembly, care, andmaintenance of all U.S. types of equipment.To this end, the practice already establishedof attaching French technical personnel toU.S. service units handling equipment fordelivery to the French was to continue. Inaddition, teams of instructors from U.S.combat and service units were to be at-tached to French units while they werebeing re-equipped and for as long afterwardas would be necessary. Responsibility inthe matter was to be divided. The Com-manding General, Fifth Army, was to assistcombat and supporting service units beingre-equipped in the care and maintenanceof their equipment, during both basic train-ing in unit stations and field training, untilsuch time as the French authorities con-sidered assistance no longer necessary. TheCommanding General, NATOUSA, on theother hand, was responsible for instructing

supply service units in the technical aspectsof handling and maintaining matériel.14

In Washington, meanwhile, War De-partment officials were eager to know howefficiently the French were going to use theirnewly acquired equipment. On 18 AprilGeneral Marshall asked approximately howlong a time should be allowed after receiptof material for complete training of units;also what degree of combat efficiency couldbe expected of these units after the expira-tion of the training period. After consulta-tion with General Giraud, the Allied Com-mander in Chief replied that training wouldtake two months for existing infantry divi-sions, three months for existing armoredregiments and reconnaissance and tank de-stroyer battalions, and six months for tech-nical units.15

To co-ordinate its activities with respectto the French training program, Fifth Armyorganized, on 23 April, a Rearmament Ad-visory Section, redesignated on 15 May asthe French Training Section (FTS).16

FTS was charged with the over-all direc-tion and supervision of the training of theFrench divisions stationed in Fifth Armyarea. The section, headed at first by Col.Harry A. Flint, consisted of "advisers," as-signed one to each of the divisions being re-armed, instructors detailed to teach Frenchinstructors in the use and care of U.S. equip-ment, and staff co-ordination teams whosemain function was to observe the training

13 Memo, AFHQ G-3 (Training) for Col Ross,17 Mar 43, JRC 353/002 Training of Fr ArmyPersonnel.

14 Dir AG 322.1/060 CS-M, Eisenhower for CGFifth Army, 30 Mar 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item5-a, Tab K; Ltr, Eisenhower to CG Fifth Armyand Deputy Theater Comdr NATOUSA, 13 Apr43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan.

15 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 28 Apr 43, JRC902/11 Rearmt Plan; Msgs 6213, Marshall to Eisen-hower, 18 Apr 43, and 8565, Eisenhower to Mar-shall, 1 May 43, JRC Cable Log.

16 For details on composition, organization, andworking methods of FTS, see pp. 293-96, below.


FIRING A 105-MM. HOWITZER, part of the program to train French soldiers in theuse of U.S. equipment, North Africa, March 1943.

and maintenance activities of the units.17

Three weeks later, on 13 May, GeneralKingman replaced Colonel Flint (who hadbeen transferred at his own request to com-bat duty) as chief of the FTS. ThereafterFTS rapidly grew in size and efficiency.Its essential mission became twofold—togive maximum training assistance to theFrench and to make sure, by means of in-spections, that units were adequately trainedand properly equipped. In this latter con-nection, FTS was in a position to render in-valuable service to the JRC.

A visit made at the end of May to theunits stationed in French Morocco con-

vinced Colonel Artamonoff of the JRCthat U.S. instructors should be placed withinthe units to teach, in particular, preventivemaintenance of equipment.18 At his sug-gestion, General Kingman immediatelyspread his personnel among the divisions,but the number of available instructors wastoo small (150 officers and men by July) tofill the needs of a rapidly expanding army.By August the chief of FTS recognized thatthe procedure was not satisfactory since itwas teaching every soldier only a little abouta certain subject and dissipating Americaninstructor personnel through the division.General Kingman then recommended that

17 Memo, Clark for U.S. Advisers, 23 Apr 43,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.

18 Memo for Rcd (Artamonoff), 31 May 43, JRCMisc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab V.


U.S. INSTRUCTOR DEMONSTRATING THE USE OF SIGNAL EQUIP-MENT to French personnel, North Africa, February 1943.

division schools be established to whichcould be sent students selected from all in-dividual units of the divisions. Thismethod, he felt, would make it possible toco-ordinate training within each division.19

The recommendation was warmly endorsedby General Giraud, who agreed that itwould provide better instruction. Pursuantto an order dated 25 August, the FrenchGeneral Staff immediately established divi-sional technical schools, one for each of thedivisions to be rearmed. Each school hadthe benefit of the collaboration of all theU.S. instructors assigned to the technical in-struction of its division. It trained simul-

taneously instructors for the division directlyconcerned as well as instructors for the divi-sion of the same type next to be rearmed.20

The system proved highly successful andmade it possible for U.S. assistance to reachmaximum efficiency.

As those divisions that by then had re-ceived their equipment in French Moroccoand eastern Algeria were being moved tothe general vicinity of Oran in order toutilize areas better suited for training, Gen-eral Kingman, his French deputy, Lt. Col.André L'Huillier, and staff, moved to Oran.Once there, FTS was placed under the con-

19 Memo, Kingman for Spalding, 9 Aug 43, JRC353/002 Training Fr Army Units (1943).

20 Ltr, Giraud To All Concerned, 25 Aug 43,JRC 353/002 Training Fr Army Units (1943).


trol of the JRC and instructed by the latterto prepare to conduct a series of inspectiontours.

Meanwhile, a number of small problemshad come up in connection with training.Most important had been the establishmentof a program in the use of radar equipment.The CCS, on 13 May, had approved therelease of such equipment to the French andthe disclosure to them, "where cooperationwas necessary," of information on any radarequipment in operational use, but none onequipment in research or developmentalstages.21 Meeting on 11 June, the Com-bined Signal Board, AFHQ, appointed asubcommittee to study and present a defi-nite training plan for the consideration ofthe board.22 On the basis of the plan sub-sequently recommended by the subcommit-tee, some twenty French officers were sentto the United States in July to receive radarinstruction.

By the end of August the various train-ing programs instituted in the United Statesfor French personnel were well under way.Training of pilots at the rate of 100 month-ly had begun in June under the directionof Southeast Training Command. A planhad been approved but was not yet inoperation for the training of 200 Air Forcemechanics at Army Air Forces TechnicalTraining Command installations. At FortBenning, Georgia, some 200 liaison officerswere taking a course in infantry weaponsand minor tactics. At Camp Hood, Texas,a number of officers were being given tankand antitank training. Other officers wereattending the Quartermaster School atCamp Lee, Virginia. A battalion of 2,000men from Martinique was undergoing in-

fantry training at Fort Dix, New Jersey.Plans were under consideration for thetraining of other officers at artillery, ar-mored force, antiaircraft, and engineerschools in the United States. The necessaryco-ordination for the assignment of studentsto these various schools and centers waseffected by the French members of FTS.One drawback in the implementation ofsome of these programs was the fact that anumber of officers sent to the United Stateswere not proficient enough in English and,as a result, were having difficulty in absorb-ing the instruction offered.23

Beginning in September and continuingthroughout the fall and winter of 1943 andthe spring of 1944, FTS, at the request ofthe JRC, inspected the divisions being re-equipped. Inspections were conducted byGeneral Kingman assisted by mixed teamsorganized by him for the purpose, eachteam consisting of U.S. members of FTSreinforced, one for one, by French tech-nical officer counterparts. These inspec-tions, it must be emphasized, were notshowdown inspections as official memoran-dums seemed often to imply. They wereprimarily designed to determine the statusof technical training of the inspected units.Only indirectly did they help to completethe action of the JRC whose responsibilityit was to make sure that the units were fullyactivated and fully equipped. After eachinspection, General Kingman prepared adetailed report which he forwarded to theJRC.24

To expedite the training of service units,

21 Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 13 May 43, FAN 97.22 Min, CSB AFHQ 15th Mtg, 11 Jun 43, AFHQ

0100/4 SACS 337 (SGS) Conf, Military, Naval,and Other.

23 Memo, G-2 MIS WD for ACofS OPD, 28Aug 43, OPD 226.2 France, Sec 1; Interv with LtClaude Tiers, Jul 50; Msg 6934, Marshall toFREEDOM, 12 Jan 44, JRC Cable Log.

24 Memo, Spalding for Kingman, 15 Aug 43, JRC333/002 Inspections by Gen Kingman; Intervswith Kingman, Jul 50, L'Huillier, Sep 50, andTiers, Jul 50.


especially those designated for the supportof the expeditionary forces, the French Gen-eral Staff and the JRC arranged, in earlySeptember 1943, to place a number of suchunits side by side with similar U.S. serviceunits to permit their working together. Atthe end of the same month NATOUSAdirected that five divisions be given am-phibious training at the Fifth Army In-vasion Training Center located at Port-aux-Poules, near Oran, with the understandingthat the French themselves would take overmost of the instruction duties as soon aspracticable.25

By October, General Kingman was ableto report that the technical training of theFrench had reached a satisfactory level. Hepointed out that more progress could havebeen achieved but for shortages of spareparts, cleaning and preserving materials,and the frequent lack of adequate officersupervision. To increase the efficiency ofthe program, he recommended the followingmeasures: the immediate activation of allFrench nondivisional units, at reducedstrength owing to personnel limitations, andthe prompt attachment of the cadres thusassembled to appropriate U.S. service unitsfor training. The French authorities hadalready been approached on the matter.They were urged to adopt the plan forth-with.26

All together, seven divisions were under-going instruction from U.S. personnel, withone more (the 1st DMI) to be addedshortly. Moreover, some 720 officers and3,500 enlisted men from smaller units were

receiving or about to receive individualtraining. To expand its program, FTSneeded more personnel. Although addi-tional instructors were due to arrive shortlyfrom the United States, General Kingmanrecommended that the training personnelof his section be increased still further.27

Reviewing the progress in instruction ofunits designated for service in Italy, Gen-eral Carpentier, Chief of Staff, CEF, voicedthe belief that the technical preparation andgroup instruction of the units concernedappeared generally satisfactory, a situationwhich, he underlined, had been made pos-sible by the assistance of U.S. authorities.He warned, however, that in some instances,training was being hindered or even madeimpossible by lack of equipment, such astraining ammunition, gasoline, mine de-tectors, and chemical warfare matériel.28

By the end of October training of serviceunits still lagged behind schedule. TheFrench had not fully taken advantage of theopportunities offered by AFHQ, such asplacing the units alongside similar U.S. or-ganizations. Meeting with a French Gen-eral Staff representative on 30 October, Lt.Col. John C. Knox, the FTS liaison officerwith the JRC, pointed out that "AmericanService Chiefs would have a better feelingin the matter if the constant pressing andneedling for training of services, whetherunits, cadres or nuclei of future organiza-tions, originated from the French HighCommand." He then emphasized thatAmerican officials were only too ready toexamine any reasonable French counterpro-posals on the matter.29

25 Memo, Leyer for JRC, 8 Sep 43, JRC 370/003Employment of Sv Units; Memo, CG NATOUSAfor Comdr U.S. Naval Forces North African Waters,24 Sep 43, JRC 353/002 Training Fr Army Units(1943).

26 Memo, Kingman for JRC, 6 Oct 43, JRC353/002 Training Fr Army Units (1943).

27 Memo, Kingman for CG NATOUSA, 12 Oct43, in same file.

28 Memo, Carpentier for Leyer, 21 Oct 43, insame file.

29 Memo, Knox for Kingman, 30 Oct 43, in samefile.


By November 1943 the French had or-ganized two types of training centers oftheir own. At the recruit training center(centre d'instruction), only basic trainingwas given, lasting approximately threemonths. Recruits were then sent to thenearest replacement training center (centred'organisation). The replacement trainingcenters prepared replacement battalions tobe fed into the regiments of the expedi-tionary forces. Obviously, instruction inthese centers could not go beyond trainingof the battalion as a unit, and seldom wentfarther than that of the company. All to-gether, the French organized some fortyreplacement training centers, as well as anumber of miscellaneous replacement de-pots. They also opened several schools, in-cluding one military preparatory school forsons of officers (known as the Prytanée),one officers' training school for sons of titlednatives, one officer candidate school forFrench personnel, and a General StaffSchool.30 Whenever the French militaryauthorities so requested, General Kingmanand members of his staff visited the trainingcenters and schools. At the end of thesevisits, if individual school commanders de-sired, General Kingman placed availableAmerican officers at their disposal. In thismanner complete co-ordination was ef-fected between training conducted by theFrench themselves and instruction carriedout under the FTS program.

Simultaneously, an increasing number ofschools or courses of instruction had beenor were being opened by the Americans toFrench personnel. Parachutists were beingtrained at the Airborne Training Centerrun by Fifth Army. At L'Arba (Algeria),

Air Force personnel were being instructed inthe installation, operation, and mainte-nance of equipment and facilities requiredfor fighter control and fighter defense. AtMeknès (French Morocco), the Americanshad established a school to train ordnancepersonnel. Numerous courses in chemicalwarfare were being offered. Generally thestudents attending these various courseswere reported to be capable, industrious,and eager to learn.31

Throughout January, February, andMarch 1944, the reports which GeneralKingman submitted to the JRC at the endof inspections of French divisions had incommon one major feature: training wasstill being impeded by important shortages.32

The lack of training ammunition being par-ticularly acute, the theater requested andobtained from the War Department, inearly January, the shipment of 4,275,000rounds of .22-caliber long ammunition forthe 7,000-odd rifles and 900 machine gunsof that caliber in the possession of theFrench.33 Other much needed items, suchas spare parts, cleaning materials, and train-ing manuals in French, were obtainedeither from French stocks at the urging ofthe JRC or through requisitions submittedby the JRC to the War Department.

In early March AFHQ requested theFrench High Command to forward, eachmonth, a report on the state of training ofunits likely to be employed at a later date aspart of an Allied force. Such informationwould enable the Supreme Allied Com-mander to know what units would be avail-

30 Memo for Rcd, JRC, 25 Nov 43, and OfficeMemo 4, JRC, 26 Nov 43, JRC 320/004 Orgn ofFr Army.

31 JRC 353/002 Training Fr Army Units (1943).32 Rpts, Kingman to Loomis, 26 Jan, 23 Feb, 1

Mar, 7 Mar, and 30 Mar 44, JRC 333/002 In-spections by Gen Kingman.

33 Memo, Loomis for G-4 NATOUSA, 6 Jan 44,and Msg 7280, Somervell to Eisenhower, 15 Jan44, JRC 471/002 Ammunition for Training.


able for employment.34 By the end of themonth General Kingman and his mixedteams had inspected all major units. Gen-eral Leyer expressed to General Loomis hisdeep appreciation of the assistance renderedthus far by FTS and requested that the sec-tion inspect other organizations such ascorps and army supporting units, units thenin combat, and training centers.35 GeneralKingman immediately arranged for thenecessary inspections.

French Air Force training schools, mean-while, were receiving assistance fromAmerican and British air commanders. Aclose inspection of these schools by GeneralEaker in April revealed that they were doingexcellent work. To assist them further,Eaker requested and obtained the assign-ment in May, June, and July of additionaltraining planes and equipment.36

In late April General Kingman accom-panied by his French deputy, ColonelL'Huillier, visited the French Expedition-ary Corps in Italy to determine on the spothow the units were doing and what furtherassistance they needed. By agreement withtheir commanders, he detached to the di-visions a number of single instructors orteams no longer required for the trainingprogram in North Africa. The teams, atreduced strength, usually accompanied thedivisions in combat, at least during the earlyphase of their engagement in operations.The valuable information which GeneralKingman collected during his visit enabledhim, upon his return to North Africa, toimprove further the training of the unitsstill in that area.37

In May and June, at the request of theFrench General Staff, practically all Frenchtraining establishments were inspected byFTS. Meanwhile, more personnel werebeing detailed for short periods of instruc-tion to American training schools located inthe United States or in the theater, such asthe Floating Bailey Bridge School which inJune was transferred to French control.Eight officers were attending a special coursein sound ranging for artillery at Fort Sill.38

A tire repair company consisting of approxi-mately 200 officers and enlisted men fromMartinique was completing its training inordnance schools in the United States.39

Training, although generally satisfactory,was lagging in some fields. Instruction insignal communications at regiment levelwas rendered ineffective by lack of co-ordi-nation. To effect the unification of thevarious programs, General Leyer, on 14June, ordered a centralization of all train-ing facilities.40 With respect to chemicalwarfare, the program had completelybogged down. This was due to lack of in-terest on the part of the French military au-thorities who assumed that chemicals wouldnot be used. An inspection tour conductedbetween 12 May and 28 June revealed thatpractically no chemical warfare instructionwas given in the replacement trainingcenters.41

An important development took place inmid-May with the establishment in Italy ofthree training centers to serve the CEF.These centers, one Algerian-Tunisian, one

34 Ltr, Gammell to Devinck, 8 Mar 44, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres.

35 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 3 Apr 44, JRC 353/002Training Fr Army Units (1944).

36 See p. 210, above.37 Interv with Kingman, Jul 50.

38 Msg W-49831, Maj Gen James A. Ulio toDevers, 13 Jun 44, JRC Cable Log.

39 Msg W-45342, Ulio to Devers, 3 Jun 44, JRCCable Log.

40 Instruction 835 EMGG/3-T, Leyer, 14 Jun 44,JRC 353/002 Training Fr Army Units (1944).

41 Memos, CWS for G-3 Training Sec AFHQ,22 Apr 44, and CWS for Kingman, 4 Jul 44, insame file.


Moroccan, and one Colonial, were consti-tuted by utilizing the personnel from theformer divisional technical schools, now dis-continued, of the divisions engaged in Italy.Their function was threefold: to supplycadres and enlisted personnel to the CEF byusing replacements coming from NorthAfrica and men released from hospitals inItaly; to take charge of replacements com-ing from rear areas and medical patients re-leased from forward areas until such timeas they were reassigned to a unit of theCEF; finally, to train personnel designatedfor combat units.42

With an expeditionary force of nearlyfive divisions and corps troops engaged inoperations, one of the main concerns of theFrench military authorities was to recruitand train, in North Africa, sufficient per-sonnel replacements. To assist them in thistask, and to effect a saving in the amount oftraining equipment required, General Dev-ers suggested, in late June, that a U.S.camp, preferably situated near Oran andwith a capacity of 8,000 to 10,000 men, beturned over to the French complete withhousing and utilities. General Larkin hav-ing approved the proposal, the Americancamp located at Chanzy was officially trans-ferred to the French on 30 June.43

By this time training activities were beingdirected more and more toward the ready-ing of the units designated for ANVIL. On7 July, as these units passed under the con-trol of Force 163, General Patch, Com-manding General, U.S. Seventh Army, whowas to command them in the initial phaseof the operation, assumed the general direc-tion of their training. During the follow-

ing three weeks Seventh Army inspected theunits to determine their state of readiness.

On 14 July the War Department in-formed General Wilson that the CCS hadauthorized the issue of a minimum amountof equipment to French replacement cen-ters to be used solely for instructing replace-ments for the expeditionary forces.44 Innotifying the French of this action, GeneralWilson requested them to give assurancesthat the housekeeping and training equip-ment thus authorized would be used for thepurpose for which it was intended. He alsourged them to take steps to put into effect,immediately after the landing in France, asound replacement program to sustain theexpeditionary forces in combat.45 TheFrench had already considered the matteras evidenced by their request, submittedonly a few days before, that the permanentcadres of the three infantry training centersthen operating in Italy and the ArmoredForce Training Center still in North Africabe made officially part of the ANVIL trooplist.46

On 4 August, with the launching of AN-VIL only ten days away, Headquarters, Sev-enth Army, reported to General Wilson onthe status of training of the French partici-pating units. Inspections had revealed in-sufficient technical training owing to short-ages of equipment. The remaining basicproblem, therefore, was to make sure thatsuch shortages would be filled in time to per-mit training before the units were engagedin operations. The report then recom-mended that Seventh Army be relieved of

42 Admin Memo 5997 EMGG/1, Leyer, 9 Jun44, in same file.

43 Msgs F-64566, Devers to Larkin, 26 Jun 44,and LX-29481, Larkin to CG MBS, 30 Jun 44,JRC Cable Log.

44 Msg WX-64781, AGWAR to Devers, 14 Jul44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A.

45 Ltr, Gammell (for Wilson) to Béthouart, 30Jul 44, AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters,Vol. IV, Jan-Jul 44.

46 Ltr. Béthouart to Wilson, 26 Jul 44, JRC400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat.


all further responsibility in connection withinspections of French units still in NorthAfrica.47 The question was examined at aconference on 8 August between GeneralNoce, G-3, AFHQ, and General Loomis.The two conferees agreed to stand fast onthe established policy under which SeventhArmy was responsible for determining, bymeans of inspections, the condition of train-ing of the French ANVIL units, and FTS forproviding the necessary assistance.48

As ANVIL was launched, on 15 August,training operations were going ahead at anincreased tempo. In the case of serviceunits instruction still lagged considerablybehind schedule. Unable to form all theunits in North Africa, the French militaryauthorities were already contemplating theiractivation from personnel expected to be-come available in France. As the inspec-tion tour conducted by FTS was coming toan end, General Leyer, with an eye on thefuture, seized the opportunity to express hisgratitude for the valuable assistance Gen-eral Kingman and his section had been ren-dering for several months.49

On 10 September General Patchbroached the question of the responsibilityfor the training of French replacements.He pointed out to General Wilson that thesupervision of this training was not consid-ered the proper function of Seventh Armyas personnel was not available and in anycase such control would be "resented" bythe French. He recommended that the re-sponsibility be turned over to the Frenchthemselves with some measure of supervisioneffected by General Kingman's section.

General Wilson approved the recommenda-tion and advised the French that, thereafter,they were fully responsible for carrying outthe training of replacements with the as-sistance of FTS. Three training centershaving already moved with their equipmentto southern France in late September, andthe fourth being about to follow, personnelfrom FTS was dispatched to the Continentto assist them in their work. A forwardechelon of FTS began operating at DeltaBase Section in Marseille on 12 October.The rear echelon continued to function atMBS until about 15 November when all re-maining FTS activities were transferred toFrance.50

On 22 October NATOUSA learned withconsiderable surprise that SHAEF was con-templating recruiting French personnel inFrance and moving them to North Africato be equipped and trained as replace-ments for the 1st French Army. NA-TOUSA objected that it could not un-dertake such a commitment inasmuch asinstructors, facilities, and equipment wouldnot be available, and pointed out that planshad been made for the resumption, in con-tinental France, of all training activities.Such activities, in fact, were already wellunder way.

The training of French troops in NorthAfrica under American guidance was nowover. Like the rearmament operations, ithad been effected on the basis of a programestablished piecemeal as the situation de-manded. On the whole it had been mosteffective. Collaboration between theFrench and the Americans had been par-

47 Memo, CG Seventh Army for SACMED, 4Aug 44, AFHQ AG 400-1 (Fr ) Sups.

48 Memo, Foster for G-3 (Orgn), 8 Aug 44,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.

49 Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 27 Aug 44, JRC320/005 Replacement Troops.

50 Ltr, Gammell to Béthouart, 20 Sep 44, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres; Msgs CP-13330, Patch to Wilson, 10 Sep 44, FX-24103,SACMED to Seventh Army, 12 Sep 44, JRC/235,CG NATOUSA to G-3 AFHQ, 20 Sep 44, JRCCable Log.


MAJ. GEN. ALEXANDER M. PATCH, Commanding General, U.S. Seventh Army,inspecting men of the French Forces of the Interior, August 1944.

ticularly fruitful. French cadres and per-sonnel had almost without exception ap-peared to be genuinely eager to receive theassistance of their American comrades ofFTS. Relations with French commandershad been most cordial.51 All signs now

pointed to continued mutual respect and un-derstanding during the next phase of re-armament and training activities about toopen in continental France.

51 Intervs with Kingman, Jul 50, Tiers, Jul 50,and L'Huillier, Sep 50.

CHAPTER XV

Controversy Over Substitute Weapons

The ANFA Agreement had stipulated thatthe French were to receive equipmentmade up of the most modern matériel.When, in the course of the ensuing months,AFHQ officials undertook to effect certainsubstitutions, a serious controversy arose be-tween French and AFHQ staffs concerningthe legitimacy and desirability of such acourse of action. The French, whose atti-tude in the matter was only human, tendedto consider substitutions as meaning inferiorequipment and, when applied to weapons,a lowering of fire power. As late as May1944 they warned that the substitutions im-posed on them were "adversely affectingcombat efficiency."1

In cases where American industrial pro-duction was insufficient to fill the needs ofboth French and U.S. troops, the Frenchresigned themselves, although reluctantly,to receiving substitutes. On the other hand,they reacted strongly when, in the fall of1943, AFHQ proposed that certain equip-ment items no longer standard but still serv-iceable be assigned, because of their avail-ability in theater stocks, against Frenchrearmament requirements in lieu of thestandard items. The proposal was made ata time when large stocks had become excessowing to the departure for the United King-dom of a number of U.S. troops. The

Munitions Assignments Board had ruledthat some of these stocks would be utilizedtoward the partial implementation of theFrench program. The measure, whichGeneral Larkin, Commanding General,SOS, NATOUSA, had strongly urged,was primarily intended to economize ship-ping.

As the French were showing signs thatthey would not readily agree to the provisionof substitutes for standard issue items, Gen-eral Loomis sought from the War Depart-ment a definite expression of policy. Select-ing one standard ordnance item as a testcase, the chairman of the JRC, on 4 No-vember, requested Washington officials toindicate whether or not they would au-thorize the issue to the French of a weaponthen available in theater stocks as a sub-stitute for the standard item concerned.2

Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, Chief of Staff,Army Service Forces, replied that since thephrase "equipment of the most modernkind" was interpreted by the War Depart-ment as meaning "equipment that had beenstandard issue in the current war," the sub-stitution proposed was authorized. Thisand similar substitutions, explained GeneralStyer, could be effected in the case of equip-ment either still to be assigned from theUnited States or already assigned but as yetunshipped.3

1 Ltr, de Saint-Didier to Marshall, 6 May 44,OPD 400 France, Sec IV; Ltr, Marshall to deSaint-Didier, 24 May 44, OCS A-48-11 France091, Sec I.

2 Msg W-4267, Loomis to AGWAR, 4 Nov 43,JRC 400.1/007 Substituting From Theater Stocks.

3 Msg 2627, Styer to Eisenhower, 16 Nov 43, insame file.


TANK DESTROYER FOR THE FRENCH. This 3-in. gun motor carnage M10 bearsthe marking of red, white, and blue stripes stenciled on all equipment for the French.

Guided by this clarification, GeneralLarkin prepared a report of all equipmentin the theater suitable for transfer under therearmament program. In the case of itemsnot currently standard for U.S. troops, thereport included recommendations as to thestandard items they might replace.4 On thebasis of these recommendations, substitu-tions considered desirable by AFHQ weresuggested to the War Department, which,in turn, invariably gave its approval. Mostimportant among substitutions effectedeither as a result of production shortages orbecause of surplus stocks in the theater were

certain types of artillery guns, tanks, andinfantry weapons.

Artillery

The test case selected by General Loomisconcerned a proposal to substitute 75-mm.gun motor carriages M3 for the 3-inch M10guns authorized under the rearmament pro-gram for three French tank destroyer bat-talions. The M3 guns were readily avail-able in theater stocks, whereas the M10'swere obtainable only by shipment from theUnited States.

Apprised of the proposed substitutionsome weeks before, the French had already

4 Memo, Hq NATOUSA for CG SOS, 22 Nov43, in same file.

CONTROVERSY OVER SUBSTITUTE WEAPONS 243

ruled it out as unacceptable "in view of theinferior quality of the M3 gun." In theface of their strong opposition, the variousAFHQ sections concerned debated for sev-eral months on the advisability of carryingout the proposal. In March 1944, stillwithout information as to the intentions ofAFHQ regarding the matter, the Frenchasked that a re-examination of the questionbe undertaken and a decision reached forth-with. Intervening personally in the matter,General Giraud, in a letter to General Wil-son, Supreme Allied Commander in theMediterranean, restated the French posi-tion, namely, that the proposed substitutionwas not acceptable "as much because of theinferior quality of the M3 as because of thecomplications resulting from the disparityof the matériel placed in the hands of Frenchunits."5

Although AFHQ officials regarded theM3 gun as only slightly inferior in combatefficiency to the M10 and, therefore, quiteacceptable as a modern weapon, they finallygave in to General Giraud's plea, for theyhad just learned that M10 guns would soonbe available in sufficient quantity to takecare of both French and American needs.After five months of debate, French tenacityand American production had settled thecase. By 13 May, SOS, NATOUSA, haddelivered all 115 M10 guns authorized forthe three tank destroyer battalions.6

In another instance, a substitution waseffected over French objection. On 18March 1944 General Leyer informed theJRC that he could not agree to the replace-

ment of eight 75-mm. howitzer motor car-riages M8 by eight 75-mm. howitzer motorcarriages T30 as then proposed by AFHQfor the last of the ten armored reconnais-sance battalions to be re-equipped under theprogram. The substitution had just beenauthorized by the War Department. Gen-eral Leyer warned that the replacementwould only result in decreasing the combatefficiency of the unit involved. GeneralLoomis replied that AFHQ regarded theT30 as a satisfactory substitute for the M8and that, in view of the necessity of savingcritical shipping space, it did not consider itadvisable to recommend that the War De-partment change its decision.7

Once again General Giraud intervenedpersonally in the controversy. He pressedGeneral Wilson for a reversal of the posi-tion taken by AFHQ. In addition to low-ering the effectiveness of the unit involved,he declared, the proposed substitutionwould have the serious disadvantage ofmultiplying needlessly the types of matérielin the hands of the reconnaissance battal-ions.8 This last point was a telling one inthe eyes of the French who were alreadyplagued with serious maintenance and sup-ply problems. However, their efforts tobring about a reversal of the decision provedfutile. On 20 April the theater commanderclosed the issue by informing GeneralBéthouart, then Chief of Staff of NationalDefense, that the French request was dis-approved. He explained that the T30 wasregarded as a "strictly modern weapon . . .superior, in some respects, to the M8."Since, moreover, the T30 was available in

5 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 28 Oct 43, and Reg-nault for Loomis, 13 Mar 44, and Ltr, Giraud toWilson, 22 Mar 44, JRC 470/002 Substituting 75-mm. for TD's.

6 Ltrs, Devers to Giraud, 30 Mar, 5 Apr 44, andMemos, Loomis for Leyer, 10 Apr, 13 May 44,JRC 470/002.

7 Msg 1039, AGWAR to NATOUSA, 29 Feb 44,JRC 400.1/007 Excess Stocks (Mar 44) ; Ltr, Leyerto Loomis, 18 Mar 44, JRC 472/003 Self-propelledArtillery; Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 27 Mar 44, JRC472/003.

8 Ltr, Giraud to Wilson, 5 Apr 44, JRC 472/003.


FRENCH TANK CREW WITH U.S. LIGHT TANK M5, one of the vehicles issuedfor training purposes, July 1943.

North Africa in ample quantity, the theaterconsidered it inadvisable to add to the ship-ping burden by ordering from the UnitedStates a large tonnage of M8 carriages.9

Tanks

During the Tunisian campaign the Brit-ish First Army had turned over to theFrench as an emergency measure sixtysurplus Valentine tanks.10 These vehicles,the first to be issued to the North Africanforces, subsequently were transferred bythe French High Command to Sovereignty

troops charged with the defense of theterritory. In April 1943, as rearmamentoperations got under way, the French be-gan receiving American tanks of the samemodels as those then currently issued U.S.troops—M4A2 and M4A4 medium, andM3A3 light tanks. In the course of thefollowing months, while U.S. forces inthe theater were drawing the newer M5A1light tank, the French continued to receivethe M3A3.11 The M3A3 and M5A1 werequite similar in design. Although theM5A1 provided more armor protection,both had practically the same turret, arma-ment, and hull. The principal difference9 Memo, Theater Comdr for Béthouart, 20 Apr

44, in same file.10 Background material for this section is located

in JRC 470/003 Tanks and Tank Transporters.

11 Msg 6162, Somervell to Eisenhower, 27 Aug43, in same file.


between them was in their engines andpower trains. Yet operation and mainte-nance were sufficiently different to requirespecial training.12 Anticipating that theFrench would eventually be issued M5A1's,the Americans gave them a few of these ve-hicles for training purposes. Later, as pro-duction .of the M5A1 increased, the WarDepartment authorized its issue to theFrench not in replacement of, but in addi-tion to, the M3A3 toward the fulfillment ofthe over-all light tank requirements of therearmament program. As a result theFrench received tanks of both designs and,incidentally, in approximately the same pro-portion.

By June 1944 the French had been is-sued 368 M4A2 and 268 M4A4 mediumtanks, and 273 M3A3 and 230 M5A1 lighttanks, or a total of 1,139 vehicles.13 AFHQregarded this number as sufficient, not onlyto equip the units on the approved trooplist (3 armored divisions, 5 infantry divi-sion reconnaissance battalions, and 2 non-divisional reconnaissance battalions), but inaddition to provide for combat replace-ments. In fact some 200 vehicles wereconsidered excess. A number of these werecurrently being used for training replace-ment personnel. Others were still in thehands of the 3d Armored Division, an or-ganization in nucleus only which the FrenchHigh Command still hoped to raise to thestatus of a fourth armored division. Toconstitute an adequate replacement reservefor the three authorized divisions, theFrench in August were requested to releaseapproximately 120 vehicles to Mediter-ranean Base Section.14 It was not until

mid-October, after considerable proddingon the part of AFHQ officials, that theFrench completed the release of all 120vehicles. The tanks in the hands of the3d DB had by then all been withdrawnfor this purpose.

The French had distributed tanks as thevehicles themselves had become available;as a result, units were not equipped in auniform manner. The 2d DB enjoyedcomplete homogeneity of matériel as ithad been issued tanks from the earliestshipments, all M3A3's, and M4A2's. Inthe case of the 1st DB and 5th DB, on theother hand, uniformity had been achievedwithin individual component units, but notwithin the divisions as a whole. AFHQhad strongly urged the French militaryauthorities to regroup equipment withinthe two organizations. Judging that sucha step would involve a substantial move-ment of matériel, an additional period oftraining for crews, and a readaptation ofradio equipment, the French chose not tomodify the existing distribution. In theiropinion, the advantages offered by a re-grouping, such as the simplification of spareparts and maintenance problems, would notoffset the considerable difficulties in-volved.15

Thus, because of the tank substitutionimposed on them, when the 1st and 5thArmored Divisions landed in southernFrance they were equipped with light vehi-cles which differed in type from one com-ponent unit to another.16 Yet there is noevidence to indicate that the combat effi-ciency of these organizations was in anyway jeopardized. Nor does it appear thatunits which received no M5's, such as the12 Memo, Maj Conrad L. Christensen for Reg-

nault, 21 Aug 43, in same file.13 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 29 Jul 44, in same file.14 Memos, Loomis for Leyer, 5, 9 Aug 44, and

Msg JRC-73, Loomis to AGWAR, 8 Aug 44, insame file.

15 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 16 Apr, 29 Jul 44,in same file.

16 See ibid., for exact distribution of tanks in thehands of all French armored units.


2d DB and four reconnaissance battalions,were put to a disadvantage for lack of suchvehicles.17 It must be noted that tanks is-sued later in the campaign to French ar-mored units included vehicles of newer de-signs such as were furnished to U.S. units.

Small Infantry Weapons

It was with respect to small infantryweapons, such as rifles, carbines, and auto-matic arms, that the question of the use ofsubstitutes became an issue of particularseriousness.18 The French who, by tradi-tion, attached the utmost importance to in-fantry action were eager to ensure that theirinfantry units would be provided with ade-quate fire power.

Rifles and Carbines

The first small arms which the Frenchobtained from Allied sources consisted, itwill be recalled, of the 8,000 rifles assignedin November 1942 and delivered to themfrom the United Kingdom in mid-January1943.19 These were .30-caliber M1917(Enfield) rifles. At the time, French unitsengaged in Tunisia were equipped withsmall arms of all descriptions and calibers,particularly of French manufacture, suchas the 8-mm. level spring loading rifle(Lebel), and the 8-mm. model 1912-16mousqueton or carbine. One unit, the 1stFree French Division (later renamed the 1stDMI), was using .303-inch rifles of British

manufacture. Meanwhile, training centersand Sovereignty forces charged with the de-fense of the territory were using, in additionto arms of French manufacture, some19,000 German rifles of the Mauser andHerstal models, both 7.92-mm., and a num-ber of Italian rifles generally in poor condi-tion, all of which had been collected onbattlefields in Tunisia. In May 1943, withmore American rifles reaching North Afri-can ports, French authorities turned the re-maining stocks of French manufacture overto nonprogram units (Moroccan tabors,Commandos, Spahis, and the like).20

In addition to the M1917 rifle, whichthey received throughout the year 1943, theFrench were also given large quantities ofthe M1903 (Springfield), likewise .30 cali-ber. The continued issue to them of thesetwo weapons was being made at a time whenthe M1903 rifles in the hands of U.S. troopswere gradually being replaced by newer andmore efficient arms, the .30-caliber M1 rifleand M1 carbine. The French who werenot being issued these weapons feared thattheir units would be less fit than the U.S.troops fighting along with them. Ameri-can officials, on the other hand, acted onthe principle that the M1 rifles and carbines,being scarce at the time, could be madeavailable only at the expense of U.S. troops.They felt justified, as a result, in prescribingacceptable substitute weapons of standardissue during the current war. As both theM1903 and M1917 fell in that category,the former being still used by U.S. troopsand the latter by the British, the two weap-ons became standard issue for the NorthAfrican program units.

Deliveries were made at a slow and ir-regular pace because of the over-all short-

Two of the five infantry division reconnaissancebattalions, as well as the two nondivisional recon-naissance battalions (the 1st and 2d Algerian SpahisRegiments) were equipped with M3A3's ex-clusively. Ibid.

18 This section draws upon these files: JRC474/001 Small Arms—Misc, JRC 474/002 .30-calRifles, JRC 474/003 Automatic Weapons, and JRC474/004 Spare Parts for Small Arms.

10 See pp. 27, 28, above.

20 Msg 1926, FLAMBO to 15th Army Gp, 19 Dec43, JRC 474/001 Small Arms—Misc.


age of rifles and in a somewhat erratic fash-ion as to type depending on availability inthe United Kingdom, from where theywere shipped to the French. As a resultmany combat units received both magazine-type rifles. This fact seriously increasedspare-part and maintenance difficulties, foralthough the Enfield and Springfield usedthe same ammunition their parts were notinterchangeable. The French would havepreferred to equip all of their combat unitswith the M1903. This was not possiblesince the larger part of the rifles issued tothem, approximately two thirds, consistedof M1917's. At any rate, they attempted,in the interests of economy and simplicity inthe distribution of spare parts and main-tenance, to standardize the type of rifle usedin each unit. This they were not able todo until January 1944 because they had notbeen issued grenade launchers for theM1917 rifle and therefore had been forcedto retain a number of M1903's in unitsequipped with the other rifle.21

Further aggravating maintenance prob-lems was the fact that a considerable propor-tion of the rifles (estimated by the Frenchas 10 percent, especially the M1917's)were found to be of a low order of service-ability. This was not surprising for theweapons involved were old. In fact theywere part of the stocks shipped by theUnited States to the British after the evacu-ation of Dunkerque in 1940 and had servedthe Home Guard for over two years beforebeing turned over to the French. Thelatter were forced to effect repairs madepossible only by the receipt, in July 1943,of a substantial allocation of spare partsand maintenance materials.22

By the end of January 1944 programunits engaged on the Italian front wereequipped with pistols in lieu of carbines,and with M1903 and M1917 magazinerifles in lieu of semiautomatic rifles such asthe M1. The Moroccan tabors and othernonprogram units, on the other hand, werefiring their French weapons, thus adding tothe complexity of the supply problem andin some instances causing undue hardshipon personnel. A U.S. adviser told of thelosses sustained by a Moroccan goumwhen, having exhausted the ammunitionfor their French weapons, the men wereunable to borrow any from adjoiningunits.23

Throughout 1943 American authoritiesin the theater had recognized the desira-bility of providing French infantry unitswith additional arms to compensate for thereduced fire power resulting from the riflesubstitutions imposed on them. With thisin view they took a number of steps, mostimportant of which consisted in raising theallowance of automatic weapons per in-fantry regiment.24 In addition, GeneralDevers recommended, in March 1944, thata portion of the M1 carbines then beingearmarked for U.S. service troops in thetheater be diverted to French combat units.His proposal was approved and the MABauthorized the lend-lease transfer to theFrench from U.S. theater stocks of 13,000carbines.25 These were to be issued to sevendivisions at the rate of 2,000 per infantry

21 Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 30 Oct 43, JRC474/002 .30-cal Rifles.

22 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 16 Jun 44, and ColVillaret for International Div ASF, 31 Mar 44,

JRC 474/002 .30-cal Rifles; Memo, Loomis forLeyer, 28 Oct 43, JRC 474/004 Spare Parts forSmall Arms.


24 See pp. 250-51, below.25 Msgs W-4323, Devers to AGWAR, 5 Mar 44,

and 1971, Somervell to Devers, 12 Mar 44, JRC474/002 .30-cal Rifles.


division and 1,500 per armored division.26

Priority of issue was to be "above U.S. serv-ice troops but below U.S. combat units." 27

It was then that the publication of a pes-simistic report on the fire power of theFrench infantry, drafted at the end ofMarch 1944 by an ASF officer sent on aninspection tour in the theater, aroused con-siderable speculation both in Washingtonand in Algiers and forced a re-examinationof the French rifle situation. The reportimplied that, since the French had beendenied M1 carbines and semiautomaticrifles and were using magazine rifles in poorcondition, the fire power of their infantrywas inferior to that of the enemy and tothat of the adjoining U.S. infantry. Inconsequence, the personnel casualty rate was"prohibitively high" and the functions ofthe U.S. command were "unnecessarilycomplicated."

Subsequent investigation revealed thatthe serious implications contained in theASF report were grossly exaggerated.G-3, AFHQ, definitely established, on thebasis of information furnished by GeneralJuin himself, that the French advances inItaly had been accomplished without unduelosses. It was more likely—and the facthas been confirmed since the war—thatwhatever difficulties French infantry unitswere, and would later be, experiencing withregard to rifles were not the result of infer-ior equipment but rather of diversity ofequipment. Standardization could havebeen achieved only by providing all theunits concerned with M1 rifles and carbines.

Since the rate of production of these weap-ons made this impossible, AFHQ decidednot to pursue the matter any further.28

In July 1944, answering a query fromthe War Department, General Loomis re-viewed the French rifle situation as it stoodon the eve of ANVIL. He estimated that theFrench had received a total of approxi-mately 215,000 rifles including 167,000M1917's, 47,000 M1903's, 740 M1's, and13,400 M1 carbines. Of the total, 4,000rifles and carbines had gone to the FrenchAir Force, and all the M1 rifles to the 1stParachute Regiment (1st RCP). Theover-all figure was considered adequate tocover the needs of the expeditionary forcesas well as those of replacements and train-ing centers. To ensure adequacy of firepower during the subsequent months, Gen-eral Loomis obtained from the War Depart-ment the additional supply of 8,000 M1carbines monthly for the last five months of1944. This measure was considered all themore necessary since the United Kingdomhad just requested that the British obligationto furnish an additional 20,000 M1917 riflesbe canceled. The carbines, once assigned,were shipped to Coastal Base Sectionin Marseille for issue as maintenance toFrench units operating with U.S. forces.29

Subsequent efforts by the French to ob-tain additional M1 carbines in exchangefor M1917 rifles proved unsuccessful.

26 Instead of 6,500 per infantry division and6,000 per armored division according to the U.S.tables of organization. Memo, Artamonoff forACofS G-4 AFHQ, 9 Jul 43, JRC 474/003 Auto-matic Weapons.

27 Msg 64439, Devers to Larkin, 14 Mar 44, JRC474/002 .30-cal Rifles.

28 Memo, Col Villaret for ACofS G-3 WD,31 Mar 44, JRC 474/002 .30-cal. Rifles. Anotherreport by the same officer concerning Franco-Amer-ican relations also was regarded as largely un-founded. See p. 154, above.

Memo, Noce for JRC, 22 May 44, JRC 474/002.30-cal Rifles; Interv with Brig Gen Jean Piatte,former CO 5th Moroccan Tirailleurs Regt, Sep 51.

29 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 20 Jul 44, Msgs JRC/72, Loomis to AGWAR, 7 Aug 44, and W-51930,Somervell to Devers, 17 Jun 44, and Memo, Loomisfor CofS Fr Ground Forces, 18 Sep 44, JRC 474/002.30-cal. Rifles.


NATOUSA maintained that French re-quests to exchange major substitute itemsof ordnance equipment previously allo-cated to them by the War Department forstandard equipment available in U.S.stocks could be approved only when theitems involved were "clearly surplus" to theneeds of U.S. troops in the theater. Nosuch surplus stocks existed in the case of theM1 carbine.30

The rifle issue was raised again in lateAugust 1944 in connection with battle-lossreplacements for the troops engaged inANVIL. As U.S. stocks of M1917's wererapidly becoming negligible, it was urgentto determine some policy in anticipation ofFrench demands for replacement rifles.NATOUSA ruled, as it had a month earlier,that M1903 rifles would be used as battle-loss replacements for either M1903 orM1917 rifles, but that there would be nowholesale exchange of M1903 with M1917rifles.31

The last discussion concerning rifles tookplace in mid-September. French militaryauthorities having estimated their over-allrequirements at 17,500 rifles and carbinesmore than the figure established by theJRC, General Loomis asked them to fur-nish detailed justification for their estimate.He seized this opportunity to request themto withdraw all M1903 and M1917 riflesfrom units not on the approved troop list.Finally, he informed them that recentrequisitions submitted by them for M1 rifleswere disapproved, adding a reminder thatit was the War Department policy to sup-

ply the M1903 and M1917 rifles as substi-tutes for M1 rifles. He then enjoined themto make no further demands on U.S. sup-ply agencies for M1 rifles, a request whichwas duly acknowledged, on 27 October,by Brig. Gen. Antoine Poydenot.32

To sum up, the French North Africanforces engaged in the campaign of Italy andlater in the campaign of France fought withthe M1917 rifle and to a lesser extent withthe M1903 rifle and the M1 carbine, inaddition to some old rifles of French manu-facture. Except for the carbine, they wereforced to use substitute weapons as a re-sult of production shortages of the stand-ard items.

Automatic Weapons

As in the case of rifles and carbines, theFrench used in the Tunisian campaign andfor some time afterward the automatic andsemiautomatic weapons of French manu-facture originally available to them in NorthAfrica.38 Among these were the 7.5-mm.model 1924-29 (Chauchat) fusil-mitrail-leur, or automatic rifle,34 to which theywere particularly attached as they consid-ered it far superior to any similar weapon offoreign manufacture, the 7.65-mm. auto-matic pistol, and the 8-mm. revolver. TheBritish-equipped 1st DFL, meanwhile, con-tinued to use its .303-caliber Bren guns.

As the rearmament operations got underway, program units began receiving Ameri-can automatic and semiautomatic arms.

30 Msg FX-83584, CG NATOUSA to Larkin,16 Aug 44, JRC 474/002 .30-cal Rifles.

31 Msgs L-39826, JRC to NATOUSA, 31 Aug44, and F-79431, CG NATOUSA to SOSNATOUSA, 5 Aug 44, quoted in Msg F-91987,CG NATOUSA to SOS NATOUSA, 4 Sep 44,JRC 474/002 .30-cal Rifles.

32 Memo, Loomis for CofS Fr Ground Forces,18 Sep 44, JRC 474/002 .30-cal Rifles.

General Poydenot was the successor to GeneralBlanc as Assistant Chief of Staff, French GroundForces in North Africa. Memo, Poydenot forJRC, 27 Oct 44, JRC 474/002 .30-cal Rifles.

33 Background material for this section is in thefile JRC 474/003 Automatic Weapons.

34 More exactly, machine rifle.


However, deliveries in some cases being con-siderably delayed by production shortages,a few units retained their French or Britishweapons with the result that their finalequipment included a mixture of arma-ment. In general, program units used, inItaly as well as later in France, Americanautomatic arms, while nonprogram andSovereignty units used the remaining stocksof French weapons.

In principle, the issue of American auto-matic rifles and pistols as well as of lightand heavy machine guns was to be made inthe same ratio as to corresponding U.S.troops. As already pointed out, to compen-sate for the rifle substitutions additional au-tomatic weapons were added to the Frenchtables of equipment. Thus an allocation ofsome 900 Thompson .45-caliber subma-chine guns was authorized in early 1943.In July of the same year, feeling that thisallocation was insufficient, the French re-quested a further issue of 3,500 Thompsonsas substitutes for a like number of M1 riflesand carbines. The request was disap-proved by Ordnance, AFHQ, on theground that the proper substitute for theseweapons, as used by U.S. troops themselves,was the M1903 rifle.35

By August of the same year AFHQ offi-cials themselves became aware of the criticalsituation of the three divisions already re-armed with respect to automatic weapons.As they explained to the War Department,of the 1,769 Browning automatic rifles(BAR's) authorized for these divisionsunder the approved French Table of Organ-ization of 18 January 1943, only 253 hadbeen made available for shipment due to

shortages of that weapon in the UnitedStates.30 This was a serious matter for, inthe opinion of the French, no weapon couldadequately take the place of an automaticrifle, much less of their own version of thatweapon, the fusil-mitrailleur. Their wholeconception of minor tactics was predicatedon the use of the automatic rifle as the basicweapon of the combat group. To deprivea combat group of such a weapon was tanta-mount to destroying its effectiveness in ac-tion. The substitution previously offeredby the War Department, namely, theprovision of 724 light machine gunsM1919A4, was termed inadequate, theweapon being considered unsatisfactory be-cause of weight. Theater officials fearedthat divisions, if equipped with M1903 andM1917 rifles instead of M1 rifles and car-bines, and largely with M1919A4 machineguns instead of BAR's, would have con-siderably reduced combat efficiency. Theyurged, on 29 August 1943, the early assign-ment of additional automatic rifles or satis-factory substitutes to bring the units up toauthorized table of organization.37 Threedays later they also requested the immediateallocation of 200 additional submachineguns, preferably Thompsons, per infantryregiment, the request being based on the factthat in each regiment 2,728 M1903 rifleshad been substituted for 1,128 M1 carbinesand 1,600 M1 rifles. They also asked fora further allocation of submachine guns, 972for the Moroccan goumiers, then num-

35 Ltr, Blanc to Artamonoff, 4 Jul 43, Memo fromOrdnance Office appended to draft cable from JRCto AGWAR, 9 Jul 43, and Memo, Artamonoff forBlanc, 9 Jul 43, JRC 474/003 Automatic Weapons.

36 The French Table of Organization referred towas T.E.G. (Tableau d'Effectifs de Guerre) 48,established on the basis of the old U.S. Table ofOrganization of 1 August 1942. On 21 November1943 the French adopted a new table, T.E.G.5465, based on the U.S. Table of Organization7-11 of 1 March 1943.

37 Msg W-8568, Spalding to AGWAR, 29 Aug 43,JRC 474/003 Automatic Weapons.


bering 12,000 men, and 125 for the 1,100commandos.38

On 8 September the War Departmentinformed AFHQ that the Thompson sub-machine guns could be made available with-out delay as requested. A subsequentmessage advised that since BAR's were stillin short supply only 1,000 could be fur-nished. To compensate for this deficiency,additional Thompsons were being offered"in some ratio greater than one for one" ifdesired. To this, the theater replied thatthe deficiency could be best met tentativelyby additional Thompsons in a ratio of oneto one, with the supply of BAR's to be com-pleted as rapidly as production would allow.Such was the line of action taken. InNovember, the French military authoritieshaving reduced the allowance of BAR's perinfantry regiment from 189 to 81 to con-form with the new U.S. table of organiza-tion, 39 it was expected that sufficient BAR'scould soon be made available to them underthe reduced ratio.40

In December 1943, as the first division(the 2d Moroccan Infantry) reached theItalian front, each of its infantry regimentswas equipped with the following automaticweapons: 81 BAR's, 150 Thompson sub-machine guns, 31 light and 24 heavy.30-caliber machine guns, and 34 .50-calibermachine guns.41 Except for the Thomp-sons, which were intended to make up forrifle deficiencies, the number and types ofautomatic weapons in the hands of the divi-

sion corresponded almost exactly to thosefurnished similar U.S. organizations. Inci-dentally, the division had received its BAR'sonly five days before leaving North Africawith the result that instruction in the use ofthat weapon had been practically nil. TheBAR being much more complicated thanthe fusil-mitrailleur, the natives were re-ported to be experiencing considerable tech-nical difficulties in handling and maintain-ing the rifle; in particular they were said tobe consistently mislaying the bipod.42

Later divisions to reach Italy were sim-ilarly equipped, although their armamentstill included some non-U.S. automaticweapons. Thus the 3d Algerian and the4th Moroccan Mountain arrived with 335and 686 French automatic rifles, respec-tively, and the 1st Motorized Infantry Divi-sion with its full load of Brens. Ammuni-tion for the latter was provided entirely bythe British forces in Italy. As for Moroc-can tabors, they, like other nonprogramunits then in process of organization, wereusing their 7.5-mm. fusils-mitrailleurs, 8-mm. carbines and revolvers, and 7.65-mm.automatic pistols. In March 1944 theFrench General Staff undertook the gradualreplacement of these weapons with U.S.arms, since the supply of spare parts andammunition for the French calibers wasrapidly diminishing. An earlier Frenchproposal that the United States undertakethe manufacture of 115 million rounds of7.5-mm. ammunition for the 1,600-oddfusils-mitrailleurs still in active service hadbeen turned down, in December, as im-practicable. In the opinion of the FrenchGeneral Staff, therefore, it was urgent to re-ceive as speedily as possible the number of

38 Msg W-8954, Spalding to AGWAR, 2 Sep 43,in same file.

39 Table of Organization 7-11, Mar 43.40 Msgs, Somervell to Eisenhower, 7149, 8 Sep 43,

and 7258, 9 Sep 43, and W-681, Spalding toAGWAR, 22 Sep 43, JRC 474/003 AutomaticWeapons.

41 Memo, Leyer for Rearmament Sec Fr GenStaff, 13 Jan 44, in same file.



BAR's assigned under the rearmament pro-gram as well as the repayment of U.S. armsloaned to equip nonprogram units.43

In April the War Department offered foruse by the French some 10,500 Johnsonsemiautomatic rifles, and 1,500 Johnsonlight machine guns, both .30 caliber, re-maining undelivered from old Netherlandscontracts taken over by the United StatesGovernment in 1942. The French re-quested the rifles for the Sovereignty troops.No favorable action appears to have beentaken by the MAB in this connection.44

Throughout the spring of 1944 and rightup to the time of the launching of ANVIL,the French concentrated their efforts ontrying to obtain an increase in the allocationof BAR's for their combat units. On 19June General Leyer informed the JRC thathe wished to effect the replacement of 1,155fusils-mitrailleurs still in use by an equalnumber of BAR's. In the absence of a de-cision on the matter, he submitted, fourweeks later, a request for the immediate al-location of 117 additional BAR's for the4th Moroccan Mountain Division, this inspite of the fact that, by this time, theFrench had received enough BAR's to raisethe allowance of that weapon per infantryregiment from 81 to 93 and in some casesto 110. The request, General Leyerpointed out, was motivated by tactical con-siderations and the fact that the 4th DMMpossessed characteristics of a special nature.NATOUSA turned down the proposal andadvised General Leyer to redistribute theBAR's already in the hands of the other

divisions if he wished to carry out his in-tentions with regard to the 4th DMM.45

Another attempt made later by theFrench met with a similar fate. On 18 Julythey offered 200 fusils-mitrailleurs for use bythe Resistance forces in France, in exchangefor a like number of BAR's for issue to expe-ditionary units. After a lengthy examina-tion of the various problems involved, theJRC advised them that no BAR's would bemade available for such an exchange.46

By this time it was obvious that AFHQwould not consent to an increase of BAR's,the opinion being that the total number ofthese weapons furnished both as initialequipment and as maintenance was suffi-cient to fill all needs including those of non-program units.47 The matter could now beconsidered closed.

In September the French General Staffrequested that nonprogram units be issued1,500 .45-caliber Colt automatic pistols inexchange for a like number of 7.65-mm.automatic pistols and 8-mm. revolvers intheir possession, for which the supply of am-munition was now nearly exhausted. Onceagain their request was denied because ofthe current shortage of Colt pistols, but theJRC submitted a requisition to the LondonMunitions Assignments Board for the allo-cation of 8-mm. and 7.65-mm. ammuni-tion then available in the Middle East. Inview of the more limited supply of 7.65-mm.ammunition, however, the French wereurged to replace the 7.65-mm. pistols in thehands of combat units with 8-mm. revolversfor which ammunition was available in suf-

43 Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 10 Mar 44, JRC474/004 Ammunition for 1st Exp Corps; Memos,Leyer for Loomis, 16 Nov, 7 Dec 43, JRC 471/001Ammunition—Misc.

44 Msg W-21454, Somervell to Devers, 11 Apr44, and Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 7 Jun 44, JRC474/003 Automatic Weapons.

45 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 19 Jun 44, Loomisfor Devers, 20 May 44, and Loomis for Leyer, 24Jul 44, JRC 474/003 Automatic Weapons.

46 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 18 Jul 44, andLoomis for Leyer, 31 Aug 44, in same file.

47 Memo, Loomis for G-4 AFHQ, 21 Jun 44, insame file.


ficient quantity. The French chose towithdraw from stocks reserved for Sov-ereignty forces the 7.65-mm. pistol ammu-nition needed by expeditionary troops.48

Considering that French infantry regi-ments received the normal complement ofother standard U.S. weapons,49 the few sub-

stitutions imposed on them, while increasingtheir supply and maintenance problems, didnot impair in any appreciable manner theirfire power. It can reasonably be said thatthey were really at no disadvantage whencompared with corresponding U.S. units.50

48 Memos, Poydenot for Loomis, 2 Sep 44, Loomisfor Poydenot, 30 Sep 44, and Crump for JRC Ad-vance, 20 Oct 44, in same file.

49 Such as hand and rifle grenades, 27 60-mm.

mortars, 18 81-mm. mortars, 18 57-mm. antitankguns, and 6 105-mm. howitzers.

50 Intervs with Loomis, Jun and Jul 50, andPiatte, Sep 51.

CHAPTER XVI

Other Material Problems

Food

It will be recalled that General Devers,in a letter of 13 February 1944 to GeneralMarshall discussing Franco-American rela-tions, referred to the inadequacy of the ra-tions served to the troops righting in Italy asan important French grievance.1

The food problem had long been a majorpreoccupation of both Allied and Frenchmilitary authorities. From November1942 to the fall of 1943, the French had as-sumed the entire responsibility for feedingtheir own forces; with the exception of someminor food items procured from U.S.sources, French troops had subsisted on lo-cally produced foodstuffs. With the forth-coming departure of the first expeditionaryunits for overseas operations, the question ofthe responsibility for their subsistence wasre-examined.

It was then agreed that the French mili-tary authorities would make available toSOS, NATOUSA, as in the case of othersupplies, all food items needed for such oftheir forces as would operate under U.S.command. SOS would then issue, throughthe appropriate U.S. command, to the unitsin operation rations based on a predeter-mined menu. Since a large percentage ofthe troops was made up of Moslems (50percent by March 1944),2 two types of ra-tions were established, the Moslem ration

differing from the French menu largely inthat it included no pork products.3

French authorities then promised tofurnish the items peculiar to the Frenchdiet, such as brandy, wine, and cookingoil, as well as all items produced in Northand West Africa: dried vegetables, driedfruit, lentils, sardines, flour, macaroni, andcoffee. To build up a large reserve of thesefoodstuffs, the JRC, it will be recalled, hadurged General Leyer in September andOctober 1943 to proceed at once with theestablishment of a comprehensive foodprogram. It was agreed that what theFrench could not procure from local sourcesthey were to obtain by requisitioning on theUnited States through the JRC.4

In anticipation of the huge demand fornonperishable foods likely to result from theexpected increase in the size of the expedi-tionary forces, the French submitted inSeptember an initial requisition for suchtypes of food since these were not availablefrom local sources. This led to a re-exam-ination of French capabilities and to a re-statement by AFHQ of the policy withregard to the division of responsibility be-tween the Americans and the French. On12 October NATOUSA reiterated that theFrench were to furnish an agreed list ofitems, the U.S. Army being responsible for

1 See pp. 153-55, above.2 32 percent in armored units; 54 percent in other

units. Msg F-24631, Devers to AGWAR, 29 Mar44, JRC Cable Log.

3 Memo 493, Leyer for Spalding, 19 Aug 43, andMemo, Hq NATOUSA for SOS NATOUSA, 15Sep 43, JRC 400.1/061 Subsistence for Fr Army.

4 Memo, Hq NATOUSA for SOS NATOUSA,12 Oct 43, in same file. See pp. 142-43, above.

OTHER MATERIAL PROBLEMS 255

providing all other components necessaryto complete the agreed ration scale. Inaddition, the U.S. Army was to supply allemergency rations.5

Such were the arrangements made inOctober with respect to the subsistence ofFrench troops. Barely two or three monthslater, at a time when the first units of theCEF were reaching the battle line in Italy,the JRC reported that the French militaryauthorities were submitting requisitions forflour, macaroni, fruit juice, and cannedfruit, all items which they previously hadagreed to furnish in full. Their inabilityto keep to their agreement was ascribed toa variety of reasons. With respect to someitems, the food-raising and -collecting pro-gram had not been pursued with sufficientenergy. In other cases, physical causesbeyond their control had prevented theFrench from accumulating the requiredreserves. Some harvests had not yieldedthe expected returns. Materials neededfor canning, storing, packaging, and trans-porting perishable foodstuffs had been un-obtainable. A request submitted by Gen-eral Leyer on 13 October for an allocationof 10,000 sacks was expected to relieve thesituation with respect to the packing offlour.6

The French, meanwhile, had given seri-ous consideration to the shipment to NorthAfrican ports of the foodstuffs reported tobe available in substantial quantities inother French territories, especially in Mada-gascar. Quartermaster, NATOUSA, hadsupported their attempts in this directionon the ground that such shipments wouldsave like amounts of tonnage from the

United States. But the North AfricanShipping Board declined to make the nec-essary shipping available and the Frenchwere advised to requisition, through theNorth African Economic Board, the itemswhich they would otherwise have obtainedfrom Madagascar. General Giraud's per-sonal appeal to General Eisenhower in De-cember was likewise fruitless. Nor did thespecial conference called on 5 February1944 produce any satisfactory arrangement.The necessary shipping was not available.Furthermore, the bulk of the food produc-tion of Madagascar was being absorbed bythe Allies for the supply of other theatersof operations.7

These and other factors had, by the endof 1943, precipitated a serious food crisiswith the result that a larger share of theresponsibility for feeding French combattroops was now being thrown in the lap ofAmerican supply agencies. On 16 January1944 General Devers advised both SOS,NATOUSA, and the Commanding Gen-eral, Fifth Army, that the U.S. Armywould not furnish any of the ration itemswhich the French had agreed to providewholly from their own sources. Only inthe case of items listed for partial supplyfrom French sources would deficiencies bemet from U.S. stocks. The French Armywould then be required to replace the itemsso furnished.8

In addition to the difficulties encounteredby the French in fulfilling their part of thesubsistence program, it soon developed thatthe rations as currently fed the units of the

5 Memos, Hq NATOUSA for SOS NATOUSA,12 Oct 43, and for Gen Leyer, 28 Oct 43, in samefile.

6 JRC 400.1/051 S.A.A. of QM Items—Gen-Misc.

7 Memos, QM for M and Tn NATOUSA, 6 Oct43, Loomis for Leyer, 6 Nov 43, and Ltrs, Giraud toEisenhower, 9 Dec 43, Leyer to Loomis, 4 Mar 44,JRC 400.1/062 Food From Madagascar and WestAfrica.

8 Msg 29668, CG NATOUSA to CG SOSNATOUSA, 16 Jan 44, JRC 400.1/061 Subsistencefor Fr Army.


2D MOROCCAN INFANTRY DIVISION MEN UNLOADING AMERICANRATIONS from a mule train on the slopes of Mount Pantano, Italy, December 1943.

CEF were not only insufficient in quantitybut seriously deficient in nutritive elements,sugar and fats especially. The FrenchHigh Command strongly suspected that ra-tion deficiencies were partly responsible forthe abnormal number of cases of frozenfeet (440 in the 2d Moroccan Division alonein December). In a memorandum to Gen-eral Clark, General Juin pointed out thatthe present ration inadequacy was prejudi-cial to the physical condition of his troops.It was necessary, he urged, to provide CEFunits with a diet similar to the U.S. rationbecause of the severe climate conditions.The double standard was also affectingtheir morale. They felt "less well treatedthan their American comrades-in-arms."Simultaneously, General Giraud appealedto General Wilson with a request that CEF

troops be issued rations similar to the Amer-ican B ration with some minor differences,such as French bread instead of U.S. breadand French tinned meat for natives insteadof U.S. tinned foods containing pork.9

That the French and Moslem rationswere low by American standards was madeapparent in a study conducted by Head-quarters, Fifth Army. Comparative figuresindicating the number of pounds of dailyration per man were given as follows:

American______________ 4. 89French_____________ 3. 61Moslem______________ 3.09

The modification requested by the Frenchwas designed to increase the French ration

9 Ltr, Devinck to CG AFHQ, 12 Jan 44, Memo,Juin for Clark, 12 Jan 44, and Ltr, Devinck toWilson, 12 Jan 44, AFHQ Liaison Sec 420 France.


to 4.77 pounds and the Moslem ration to3.68 pounds. Fifth Army recognized thatCEF troops were not getting enough foodand urged AFHQ to take immediate actionto bring about an adjustment which wouldbe satisfactory to them.10

The food crisis came to a head when, on22 January, General Leyer disclosed thatsupplying foodstuffs to the French armedforces was now encountering insurmount-able difficulties. These had been aggra-vated by a recent SOS decision whereby theFrench Quartermaster was to stock up inItaly a 90-day reserve of foodstuffs for theCEF. Considering that, in addition, theFrench Quartermaster had been directedto constitute stocks for the units designatedfor participation in ANVIL, the huge amountof supplies thus to be assembled within athree-month period was much more thanavailable resources permitted. GeneralLeyer flatly stated that, thereafter, the sub-sistence of the CEF could be assured onlyon condition that the Allied commandwould undertake the responsibility "eitherwithout compensation in kind from theFrench or with repayment in kind withinthe limitations of French stocks underReciprocal Aid procedure." 11

The serious implications contained inGeneral Leyer's announcement were madethe object of a detailed study by the JRC.In a memorandum to G-4, AFHQ, Gen-eral Loomis described the unsatisfactoryfeatures of the existing arrangement gov-erning the supply of rations to French unitsoperating as part of a U.S. force. He rec-ommended, in the interests of simplicityand of assuring proper subsistence for thetroops involved, a modification of the ar-

rangement closely akin to General Leyer'sown proposal. He suggested that SOS req-uisition the entire ration, substituting addi-tional flour for certain components deemedunnecessary; that the French furnish the ad-ditional components which they requiredbut which were not part of the U.S. ration;finally, that the French replace in U.S.stocks such food items as SOS would makeavailable to their forces.12

While General Loomis' recommenda-tions were being studied, General Giraud,on 9 March, pointed out to General Wilsonthat the diet as then served to the CEF wasso monotonous as to result in a markedlack of appetite among the troops. Heurged that French units be "admitted tothe benefits of the substitution of fresh orfrozen meat," such as were enjoyed byAmerican troops of the Fifth Army. Fourdays later General Leyer also referred to themonotony factor, which he blamed on thefact that the French and Moslem diets werebased primarily on canned foods. Hewarned that the reduction of the cookingoil rations as then contemplated by SOSwould be most unfortunate since Frenchunits were receiving neither butter nor mar-garine, and oil was the only fat componentof their diet. At the time, cooking oil wasscarce in the United States. Since olive oilwas available in North Africa, the War De-partment asked the theater to provide sal-vage containers in sufficient quantity fortransporting this oil to Italy. Subse-quently, the theater made available to theFrench 25,000 five-gallon water cans for useas cooking oil containers.13

10 Memo, Hq Fifth Army for CinC AFHQ, 26Feb 44, JRC 400.1/061 Subsistence for Fr Army.

11 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 22 Jan 44, in same file.

12 Memos, Loomis for G-4 AFHQ, 7 Feb 44, andfor Leyer, 7 Mar 44, in same file.

13 Ltr, Giraud to Wilson, 9 Mar 44, and Memo,Leyer for Loomis, 13 Mar 44, in same file; Msgs2653, Somervell to Devers, 19 Mar 44, andL-27933, Larkin to Devers, 22 Jun 44, JRC CableLog.


General Giraud's proposal concerningfresh meat, of which troops of the CEF re-ceived none, was taken up by NATOUSA.Quartermaster officials reported that nosuch meat could be furnished the French,as the only source of supply was the UnitedStates, and the number of available reeferships was limited. However, in April theFrench authorities and NATOUSA wereable to arrange for the shipment to Italy of5,000 live sheep from local sources, orenough for one month's supply of freshmeat. Soon after, General Leyer informedthe JRC that shipments of this nature couldnot be continued without disrupting thesupply for civilians and for Territorialtroops. Quartermaster, NATOUSA, thenpointed out that General Leyer's statementwas greatly at variance with the definite as-surance given earlier by French civil au-thorities that sufficient sheep could be foundin North Africa to fulfill all French com-mitments. Incidentally, the same authori-ties were reported to have informally offeredto sell fresh meat from North Africa to theU.S. Army. In addition, they were said tohave requested the return of cold-storage fa-cilities then used by Allied forces, thus indi-cating a desire to provide a greater supplyof fresh-frozen meat. The question of thefurther provision of fresh meat to the CEFwas finally dropped, especially when it be-came known that the French command inItaly had made arrangements to purchasefresh meat locally and no longer needed livesheep from North Africa.14

On 19 April General Devers informedGeneral Clark that to improve French ra-

tions authority had been secured from theCCS to furnish the entire French andMoslem rations with the exception of wineand brandy. Yet it was not until 1 June,after final agreement between AFHQ, theWar Department, and the CFLN, that theSOS assumed full responsibility for feed-ing the French forces fighting with theFifth Army. The change-over did notaffect the composition of the French andMoslem rations, which remained the same.Simultaneously, the MAB in Washing-ton allocated to the French Army 4,800 tonsof canned corned beef, and 12,000 tons offrozen meat then available in Madagascar.15

From the time the new subsistence policybecame effective, food ceased to be a prob-lem. Thereafter, the units of the FrenchExpeditionary Corps in Italy received ade-quate rations. The policy was subsequentlyextended to the French forces participatingin ANVIL.

Clothing

Soon after the start of the rearmamentoperations, it became known that theFrench were unable to use a considerableproportion, in some instances as high as25 percent, of the clothing items of U.S.manufacture delivered to them. This wasbecause of size differences, the average stat-ure of the French soldier being smaller thanthat of the American soldier. The differ-ences were particularly notable in the caseof overcoats, coats, trousers, shirts, cover-alls, and service shoes.16 In order to clothe

14 Memos, QM for JRC, 26 Mar, 27 Apr 44,Leyer for Loomis, 23 Apr 44, and G-4 for QM,26 Apr 44, JRC 400.1/061 Subsistence for FrArmy; Msgs F-57630, Devers to Clark, 10 Jun 44,and 4904, Clark to Devers, 22 Jun 44, JRC CableLog.

15 Memos, Devers for CG Fifth Army, 19 Apr44, Hq NATOUSA for CG Fifth Army, 12 May44, and Msg F-48500, Devers to Fifth Army, 20May 44, JRC 400.1/061 Subsistence for Fr Army;Memo for Rcd, Office of CofS, 28 Apr 44, andMemo, QM AFHQ for AG OPS, 16 May 44,AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters, Vol IV.

16 Size differences were not limited to items of


their men properly, French unit com-manders were compelled to arrange locallywith U.S. supply organizations or with theFrench Quartermaster for the exchange ofunusable items. The seriousness of the sit-uation can be best appreciated when it isrealized that in the case of one unit of 1,600men (the 1st Parachute Regiment), nofewer than 600 pairs of service shoes, 110parachute boots, 1,250 coveralls, and 1,200pairs of woolen trousers had to be ex-changed. In November 1943 the FrenchMilitary Mission in Washington requestedthe War Department to lower the U.S. tariffby one size when assigning clothing toFrench troops. Later, in June 1944, theFrench military authorities supplied theWar Department with their own size tariffto be used in the case of all subsequent ship-ments of clothing.17

Something should be said of the manyproblems raised in connection with the pro-vision of clothing for the women serving inthe French armed forces.18

By the end of 1943 the African Army in-cluded 3,100 women in uniform, all volun-teers. A few of these were employed astechnicians in the Signal Corps or as nursesin the Medical Corps. The rest were serv-ing as secretaries, social workers, interpret-ers, drivers, and the like. Mobilization of

women having been decreed, another 1,700women were in process of induction. Ex-pecting that more would be recruited withinthe first few months of 1944, the FrenchHigh Command set the goal at approxi-mately 11,000. This number never wasreached, partly because AFHQ urged thatconscription of the numerous women al-ready employed in Allied services through-out North Africa be deferred. SOS,NATOUSA, in particular, was eager to re-tain its civilian female employees so as notto disturb the progress of its activities. TheFrench High Command agreed to place allsuch personnel on special assignment to theAllied agencies concerned.

So far the French Supply Services hadreceived 5,800 sets of women's clothing orenough for the effectives then in active serv-ice. The uniforms and clothing itemswere of the type issued members of the U.S.Women's Army Corps (WAC). It wasunderstood that uniforms were to be wornwith French buttons and insignia. Whenit was reported that a number of Frenchnurses were wearing WAC uniforms withU.S. buttons and insignia, the theater com-mander directed the JRC to inform theFrench that the practice must be stopped atonce.19

The wearing by French Army women ofthe WAC cap with visor, an item which hadbeen issued to them along with the rest ofthe uniform, precipitated a minor crisis.American officials in the theater decidedthat, because of its style, the cap was a dis-tinctive article of the U.S. uniform, andthat its wearing even with French insigniawould result in confusion. WhereuponNATOUSA requested the War Depart-ment to discontinue further shipments of theitem to the French, and at the same time

clothing for troops. In the case of animals, dif-ferences in shoe size caused considerable difficulty.In June 1944 AFHQ requested the War Depart-ment to discontinue all further shipments of horseand mule shoes to the French Army as the con-version of U.S. shoes to conform to French re-quirements resulted in excessive waste. Thereafter,metal only would be requested, if needed, for fab-rication of shoes locally. Msg F-54092, AFHQ toAGWAR, 2 Jun 44, ASF International Div Files,A-45-192 Cables, Vol. X.

17 Memo, Bouscat for Loomis, 18 Nov 43, JRC360/002 Items Common to Ground and Air; Memo,NATOUSA for WD, 21 Jun 44, OPD 400 France,Sec IV.

18 JRC 400.1/076 Women's Clothing. 19 Memo, Loomis to Leyer, 30 Nov 43, in same file.


asked the French to return to U.S. stocksthe caps already delivered to them.20 SoonFrench Army women were observed in thestreets of Algiers without any hat at all, noprovision having been made for a substitute.The JRC then hurriedly submitted a requisi-tion for 5,000 garrison caps which SOS sub-sequently was authorized to deliver fromstocks in the theater. Much to theirchagrin, the French women returned thecap with visor and donned the less elegantgarrison headgear.

On the assumption that mobilizationwould achieve the expected goal, the FrenchMilitary Mission in Washington, in Febru-ary 1944, obtained the assignment ofanother 6,500 sets of women's clothing. Bythis time the French had received all to-gether 11,500 sets (8,000 U.S. WAC uni-forms and 3,500 U.S. Army Nurse Corpsobsolete blue uniforms). This was overtwice as many as they needed, for even byAugust 1944 no more than 4,815 womenhad actually been recruited (3,465 in theArmy and 1,350 in the Air Force). Ofthese, 1,745 were serving with the expedi-tionary forces. Out of an expected total of1,335 nurses, only 635 had been recruited.The French, as a result, lacked 100 nursesfor their expeditionary forces, and 500 forthe Territorial forces.

On 26 April 1944 the French Armywomen were reorganized as the AuxiliairesFéminines de l'Armée de Terre, or AFAT.Shortly after, their Director, Maj. H. Terré,submitted to AFHQ a request for 3,000 setsof British clothing "on sentimental as well aspractical grounds." She explained that thefirst women to be recruited had been or-ganized in the United Kingdom where theyhad been issued the uniform worn by the

women of the British Army (Auxiliary Ter-ritorial Service). She now wished to haveall AFAT units dressed in that fashion. Inher opinion the British uniform was moresuitable for the heavy duties which theFrench women were performing as driversand mechanics. Moreover, the British al-lotment included "under-garments unob-tainable in North Africa and not included inthe American equipment." 21 The requestwas rejected on the general principle thatthe provision of clothing to the AFAT wasjust as much an American responsibility aswas the equipping of other French person-nel. Throughout the war, except for thefew women still stationed in the UnitedKingdom, the AFAT continued to be sup-plied from American sources.

Special Supplies

One problem closely related to the foodration question caused considerable diffi-culties and endless confusion, particularlythroughout Phase IV of the rearmamentprogram. It concerned the distribution toFrench troops of special supplies consideredessential from the standpoint of health,morale, and combat efficiency.

These supplies fell into three categories:(1) "gratuitous components," items suchas candy, cigarettes, and the like, which inthe U.S. Army are normally issued free tothe troops in the forward zone; (2) "postexchange" supplies, also called "resale ar-ticles," such as candy, toilet articles, smok-ing components, clothing, and other itemshandled by Army Exchange Service andsold in post exchange stores to militarypersonnel for cash usually on a ration sched-ule; and (3) "Special Services" supplies,

20 Msg W-6706, JRC to AGWAR, 1 Dec 43, insame file.

21 Ltr, Maj Terré to Maj Gen Beaumont-Nesbitt,Liaison Sec AFHQ, 8 Jun 44, in same file.


FRENCH WACS ASSEMBLING ON THE BEACH after landing at St. Tropez,France, 17 August 1944.

such as athletic kits, libraries, and otherrecreational items, distributed to units bySpecial Services Division, ASF.

In the summer of 1943, as the first ex-peditionary units were getting ready forcombat duty outside of northwest Africa,the French military authorities gave seriousconsideration to the question of specialsupplies. AFHQ urged them to stockpilethe necessary items, first by drawing to themaximum extent possible on local Frenchsources, then by lend-lease cash purchaseseffected on the basis of requisitions sub-mitted to, and screened by, the JRC, andfinally, when necessary, by direct cash pur-chases in the United States through theFrench Military Mission in Washington.The last procedure was to be followed par-ticularly in the case of Special Services sup-

plies." When, in mid-October, the Frenchrequested for their expeditionary units anallocation of boxing gloves, rugby balls, andbasketballs, all items then unavailable inNorth Africa, they were advised to buythem in the United States on a cash basis.

Later, on 21 October, the theater ap-proved an initial global requisition cover-ing post exchange supplies for 125,000French Army and Air Force troops, plus90 days' maintenance. Distribution of theresale items was to be effected by the FrenchHigh Command through military co-op-eratives set up on the pattern of the Ameri-can post exchange stores. In a subsequent

22 Memos, Spalding for Leyer, 20 Aug 43, andLoomis for Leyer, 23 Oct 43, and Msg 2034,Somervell to Eisenhower, 9 Nov 43, JRC 400.1/051PX Sups.


message to the War Department dated 24December, AFHQ recommended that theFrench be required to make cash paymentin the United States for the supplies in-volved, and that shipment of the items beincluded in the 25,000 tons allocatedmonthly to the French military. The WarDepartment approved the recommendationwith the proviso that the French MilitaryMission would arrange for the shipment ofsupplies through the War Shipping Admin-istration.23

Such was the situation at the opening ofPhase IV in February 1944. The Frenchwere still eagerly awaiting the supplies or-dered in October. Anticipating that theirneeds would increase as their expeditionaryforces grew, they submitted new requisi-tions. These, although approved at first bythe JRC, were rejected as excessive by theNorth African Economic Board. TheFrench were then asked to scale down theirdemands and resubmit requisitions, thistime with appropriate justification and theassurance that the items involved could notbe obtained locally.24

In an effort to ward off any possible mis-understanding on the part of the Frenchwith respect to the transfer to them of postexchange supplies shipped from the UnitedStates, General Loomis, on 10 February1944, reiterated the policy as determinedearlier by the War Department, namely,that the transaction was to be "on a cashbasis outside of Lend-Lease procedure" andthat payment was to be effected in theUnited States. To establish a definite pro-

curement procedure, General Loomis thenasked General Leyer to agree that Frenchrequests for post exchange supplies wouldbe submitted by French representatives inthe United States directly to the appropri-ate U.S. agency.25

Pending arrival of the first supplies or-dered from the United States in the fallof 1943, AFHQ authorized and later com-pleted several cash transactions in thetheater. These concerned items then con-sidered theater excess stocks, such as pipetobacco available in large quantities inBritish depots and substantial amounts ofAmerican "off-brand" cigarettes not desiredby U.S. troops. These sporadic transac-tions were not sufficient to improve the situ-ation greatly. By April the French mili-tary authorities were still forced to rationstringently the post exchange type of sup-plies which they were distributing to theirtroops.

In a memorandum to the Joint Air Com-mission dated 14 April, General Bouscat,Commanding General, French Air Force,described the plight of the air squadronsthen stationed in Sardinia and operatingunder U.S. command. Personnel of theunits were limited to the following rations:10 ounces monthly of soap of poor quality,one package of cigarettes daily, and someshoe polish at irregular intervals. No otheritems were provided. Considering that themen of these units were forbidden by theAllied command to buy from the local shopsand were not allowed the use of Amer-ican post exchange stores, they had no wayof supplementing their meager rations.This, General Bouscat stressed, was badfrom the standpoint of morale as it created

23 Memo, Hq NATOUSA for CG SOSNATOUSA, 21 Oct 43, in same file; MsgsW-8440, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 24 Dec 43, and6188, Somervell to Eisenhower, 2 Jan 44, JRCCable Log.

24 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 3 Feb 44, JRC400.1/051 PX Sups.

25 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 10 Feb 44, in samefile.


among the men the regrettable feeling thatthey were less well treated than their Amer-ican comrades. Couldn't access to the U.S.post exchange stores be extended to thetroops concerned? General Bouscat's re-quest, opposed at first by G-4, NATOUSA,on the ground that the responsibility forproviding post exchange supplies rested en-tirely with the French High Command, wassubsequently granted by order of GeneralDevers. This action was not to be takenas a policy but as an emergency measure.Meanwhile, the supplies ordered in Novem-ber were still under procurement in theUnited States. It was not until 30 April1944 that they were finally shipped. Theybegan reaching North African ports inJune.26

The entire question of special suppliescame up again for discussion apropos ofthe gratuitous components then turned overto the units in Italy. On 23 May the WarDepartment reminded AFHQ that suchsupplies were to be paid for in cash by theFrench. A month later the French advisedthe theater that they were unable to paycash and requested that the issue to them ofthe items be made under the Lend-LeaseAct as in the case of all other supplies ofU.S. source. Queried on the matter byAFHQ, the War Department replied thatit was up to the State Department and theForeign Economic Administration to deter-mine whether supplies furnished the Frenchby the War Department were for cash or oncredit. Pending final arrangements on thematter, the issue of gratuitous components

as currently made to CEF units in Italy wasapproved.27

It was not until 20 July that the Frenchfinally answered General Loomis' letter of10 February concerning the question ofpost exchange "resale items." GeneralLeyer's reply disclosed that, as in the caseof the gratuitous components, the FinanceCommissioner was now unable to providethe necessary funds in dollars for cash pay-ment in the United States of the resaleitems. Nor, he added, could the Commis-sioner pay in French francs each time suchsupplies were procured. This was becausereceipts from post exchange sales remainedin unit treasuries and did not return to anygeneral post exchange fund, as was thepractice in the U.S. Army, thus making itimpossible to purchase additional resalearticles. He then proposed that the sup-ply of such items to the forces whose main-tenance was a U.S. responsibility be author-ized as a lend-lease transaction. All itemsso obtained would be sold on a cash basisto the troops concerned.28 NATOUSAendorsed the proposal and, with theagreement of the International Division,established, on 12 August, a policy to governthe provision of post exchange resale itemsand gratuitous components to the French.Thereafter SOS issued gratuitous compo-nents to such Army and Air Force troopsas were serving with the U.S. forces out-side the continental limits of Africa, andreported the transfers to InternationalDivision for financial accounting. SOSalso made available to the same troops,

26 Memos, Gardiner for Loomis, 20 Apr 44,Adcock for CofS NATOUSA, 10 May 44, andLoomis for G-4 AFHQ, 7 May 44, and MsgsF-46396, CG NATOUSA to Brig Gen Robert M.Webster, 16 May 44, and WX-43037, Somervellto Devers, 29 May 44, in same file.

27 Msgs WX-40295, Somervell to Devers, 23May 44, and FX-62567, Devers to AGWAR,21 Jun 44, JRC Cable Log; Msg WX-57756,Somervell to Devers, 29 Jun 44, JRC 140Accounting.

28 Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 20 Jul 44, JRC400.1/051 PX Sups.


stocks permitting, a limited number ofpost exchange resale items to be sold forcash only. The War Department andNATOUSA determined together, on thebasis of availability, what quantities of theapproved items could be delivered withoutjeopardizing the welfare of Americantroops.29

In mid-August, SOS turned over to theFrench approximately 40,000,000 books orboxes of matches and 6,500,000 packagesof pipe tobacco then available in theaterstocks. In the case of cigarettes, War De-partment officials informed NATOUSAthat because of the current severe shortageof tobacco in the United States, cigarettescould be supplied up to 50 percent of theU.S. allowance and only if off-brands wereacceptable to the French.30

On 8 October SOS urged the War De-partment to secure the items requisitionedin August as most were necessary to main-tain the health and morale of the Frenchtroops serving with the U.S. Army. Fifty-percent of the normal allowance was con-sidered a minimum requirement. In thecase of cigarettes, General Larkin sug-gested that off-brand cigarettes be suppliedto the French before being offered for saleto prisoners of war.31

As the equipment responsibility for theFrench forces passed from NATOUSA toETOUSA in the fall of 1944, the samegeneral policy continued to apply withrespect to special supplies. French troopson the Continent kept receiving, as theyhad in the Mediterranean theater, a min-

imum of items which could not be increasedbecause of U.S. production limitations.

Miscellaneous Equipment

The French in North Africa also werealmost destitute with respect to a numberof articles of common use, especially manu-factured goods, generally available inhealthy national economies and indispen-sable for the efficient running of a largemilitary establishment. The critical situ-ation which French military authorities hadfaced in this connection during the year1943 became more acute as their troopswere being committed to combat in Italyat the close of that year.

In late December 1943 the Surgeon,AFHQ, reported that a large percentage ofthe CEF troops engaged on the Italianfront were infested with lice, apparentlybecause they lacked the necessary sanitaryfacilities and supplies. Since it was essen-tial that troops be kept free from lice ifepidemics of typhus fever were to be pre-vented, AFHQ requested the War De-partment to provide the French armedforces with 1½ million cans of body insectpowder, 750,000 ampoules of methylbromide, and 6,000 ethocel fumigation bags.The requisition was established on the basisof 300,000 troops. The methyl bromidebeing available in U.S. stocks in the theater,SOS delivered 750,000 ampoules at theend of January 1944. At the urging ofthe War Department, the requisition forinsect powder was reduced to 645,000cans. These were subsequently assignedand their shipment arranged at the rate of215,000 monthly for the three months ofMarch, April, and May 1944. To assistfurther the French High Command in tak-ing proper sanitary measures, various cir-

29 Msg FX-82228, Devers to International Div,12 Aug 44, JRC Cable Log.

30 Msg 41292, AGWAR to NATOUSA, 16 Sep44, in same file.

31 Msg LX-45177, Larkin to Pembark, 2 Oct44, in same file.


culars and pamphlets issued by the Sur-geon's Office, NATOUSA, were translatedinto French, and in February 1944 lecturesand demonstrations on typhus control weregiven to French personnel under the direc-tion of American medical officers.

From 1944 on, miscellaneous French re-quests increased sharply in number. InFebruary, General Leyer asked for 200 bar-ber kits. The requisition, at first rejectedby MAC (G) , was finally granted in March.A first shipment of 100 kits was authorized,with the rest to follow at a later date. Alsoapproved during the same month were re-quests for 6,000 canteen covers to be usedby combat troops as grenade carriers, andfor needles for the shoe-stitching machineswhich had been delivered earlier with an in-sufficient number of replacement needles.

In April the French asked for a specialallocation of 6,000 to 9,000 canteens to beused by the Senegalese troops of the 9th Co-lonial Infantry Division. The request wasbased on the fact that such troops requiredapproximately four liters of water per day,or double the normal ration, to maintaintheir efficiency. On 28 April SOS,NATOUSA, effected the lend-lease transferof 7,000 canteens.

Again in April the French requested,through their Military Mission in Washing-ton, the issue of 60,000 packages of driedblood plasma for use by their expeditionaryforces engaged in Italy. This quantity wasto tide them over until the opening of ablood collection center in North Africawhich they then had under consideration.32

On 29 April the War Department author-ized the issue of blood plasma to all Frenchtroops operating as part of a U.S.force outside of North Africa with the un-

derstanding that U.S. Army stocks in thetheater would be replenished by the Frenchthemselves through purchases in the UnitedStates of commercially procured plasma.This procedure was intended to prevent aconflict with the American Red Cross blooddonor program.33

The question of the issue of penicillin toFrench hospitals in North Africa came upfor discussion at about the same time.French troops operating with and suppliedby the U.S. Army were issued penicillin onthe same basis as U.S. personnel. How-ever, many casualties were evacuated toFrench hospitals in North Africa where pen-icillin was not available. For the benefit ofthese hospitals, the theater requested theshipment without delay of a first allocationof 1,000 ampoules. The War Depart-ment promptly granted the request and di-rected the theater to prepare thereaftermonthly requisitions for submission to theWar Production Board.34

For the printing of identification tags fur-nished to them under the rearmament pro-gram, the French had been authorized, inMarch 1944, to use an electric embossingmachine then available at Peninsular BaseSection. When it was realized that this pro-cedure overtaxed the limited U.S. facilities,General Devers, in July, requested the WarDepartment to furnish the French with twosuch machines. The War Department re-plied that no electric equipment could bemade available at the time, but offered todeliver a hand-operated machine instead.This machine was shipped in October 1944

32 Msg W-20933, Somervell to Devers, 9 Apr 44,JRC 400.1/033 Plasma, Human Normal, Dried.

33 Msgs, Somervell to Devers, 2667, 20 Mar 44,and W-29823, 29 Apr 44, and Ltr, Loomis toLeyer, 1 2 May 44, in same file.

34 Msgs WX-47401, Somervell to Devers, 7 Jun44, F-64807, Devers to AGWAR, 26 June 44, andW-59483, Somervell to Devers, 3 Jul 44, JRC400.1/030 Medical Sups and Equip.


to Base 901 in Marseille, the base thenserving 1st French Army.

The problem of the protection of cloth-ing in storage was one which the French haddifficulty in solving for they lacked antimothproducts. In the fall of 1944 they requestedan allocation of twenty tons of naphthalene.The War Department promptly arrangedto have 42,200 pounds of naphthalene de-livered through the Foreign Economic Ad-ministration.

Throughout the year 1943, some equip-ment had been turned over piecemeal to theFrench Army Geographic Service in NorthAfrica for which no provision was madeunder the rearmament program. Thisequipment was wholly inadequate and theservice was unable to perform any valuablework. On its behalf, General Leyer sub-mitted, from February 1944 on, a series ofrequisitions for materials and machinery ofall types, such as overlay paper, maps, paperand equipment for printing maps, presses,photographic supplies, and even common-use items such as glue. In practically allcases, NATOUSA authorized the lend-leasetransfer, from U.S. Army theater stocks, ofthe materials requested. As a result theGeographic Service gradually improved itsefficiency and in the pre-ANVIL period suc-ceeded in doing much valuable work.

One last problem of some importanceshould be mentioned. It concerns the ina-bility of the North African authorities tosecure from local sources the chemicalsneeded for the treatment of malaria, a dis-ease prevalent in many areas of FrenchNorth and West Africa and the source ofconsiderable annoyance to the troops sta-tioned in these territories. Atabrine, themedication used by the U.S. Army for thispurpose, was then in great demand for Al-lied troops operating in the various theaters

of operations. In 1943 the French had al-ready requisitioned and obtained from theUnited States an adequate supply of theprecious curative, or approximately 12 mil-lion tablets, on the basis of a troop strengthof 270,000 men. This had enabled themto control the disease during and until theend of the malarial season (November).In January 1944 they estimated their re-quirements for the coming year at about 25million tablets, a figure which U.S. theaterauthorities reduced to 20 million. A firstshipment of 15 million tablets was made inJune and the rest shipped soon after. Con-tending that their West African forces hadnot been included in the over-all 1944 requi-sition, the French requested an additionalallocation of 4 million tablets whichNATOUSA reduced to 1,250,000. Thislatter quantity was subsequently approvedin Washington and assigned for shipmentin July. Thanks to the substantial ship-ments of atabrine from the United Statesand the energetic prophylactic measurestaken by all theater medical agencies con-cerned, malaria failed to cause any unduehardship on the North African forces.

Accounting

No attempt is made in this volume toexamine the many legal and financial as-pects of the North African lend-lease opera-tions owing, in part, to the fact that theimportant matter of the supply of the civil-ian population has been entirely left out asbeing irrelevant. Nor is a study made ofthe problems peculiar to "reverse" lend-lease, such as the procurement by the U.S.forces of goods and services available inNorth Africa (a matter involving, inci-dentally, the thorny tax issue) and the sign-ing of an agreement with the French on re-


ciprocal aid. These and other similar prob-lems are matters for lend-lease historians.35

One question, however, requires some treat-ment at this juncture, not only because ofits close connection with the rearmamentoperations, but also because the issue in-volved was the source of a serious contro-versy lasting some two and one half years,as a result of which insuperable difficultieswere added to the already heavy burden ofsupplying the French with munitions of war.It concerns the manner in which transfersof American equipment were recorded andcharged against the French for payment un-der the Lend-Lease Act.

Under the terms of the Lend-Lease Actof 11 March 1941, the War Departmentwas required to maintain complete recordsof all defense articles, facilities, information,or services transferred to foreign govern-ments. In the case of the French, mate-rials were transferred to them either in theUnited States or in the theater.

Transfers effected in the United Statesinvolved largely the issue of initial equip-ment under the approved rearmament pro-grams. They were reported and chargedagainst the French lend-lease account in theUnited States. Such accounting, in itself asimple procedure, should have been whollyadequate had it not been for the fact thatshipments to the French were made, not di-rectly to them, but to the American com-manding general in the theater for subse-quent transfer, hence their designation ofCommanding General Shipments. Thuswas the responsibility of the commander in-volved since he was given control overFrench matériel to the extent that he could,if he so wished, divert part or all of it for

purposes other than French rearmament.As a result the theater was placed in a posi-tion where it had to keep strict accountingof the deliveries it made to the French ofinitial equipment obtained through Com-manding General Shipments.36

Responsibility for the accounting oftheater transfers, that is, transfers effectedat the direction of the U.S. commandinggeneral in the theater or at the order ofU.S. commanders in the field, obviouslywas that of the theater itself. Such ac-counting was effected in accordance withdirectives issued from time to time by thetheater on the basis of policies establishedby the War Department. Transfers wererecorded at the time of issue on shippingtickets signed by duly authorized Frenchofficers. The tickets were then priced interms of dollars and, until September 1944,consolidated by the base section or AirForces service command concerned. After30 September 1944 they were consolidatedby the Special Staff section concerned inHeadquarters, MTOUSA, for ground forceitems, and the Air Forces service commandfor air force technical items. In this man-ner more uniformity in pricing and report-ing could be achieved. Finally, the reports,once consolidated, were forwarded to thetheater fiscal director for inclusion in thebimonthly report to the War Department.37

To lessen the burden of lend-lease ac-counting which it was required to assumeand for which it had insufficient personnel,NATOUSA sought to obtain at least a

35 See, for example, Leighton and Coakley, GlobalLogistics and Strategy: 1940-1943.

36 Msgs 7162, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 17 Mar 43,and 4663, Somervell to Eisenhower, 26 Mar 43,JRC Cable Log.

37 Admin Memo 12, Hq NATOUSA, 19 Sep 43,MTOUSA 400.114 Misc Aug-Nov 43; Cir 5,AFHQ, 10 Jan 43, JRC 400.2/001 Admin ofSup—Gen; Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 369.


simplification of the procedure with respectto Commanding General Shipments. Ina message to the War Department dated30 March 1943, NATOUSA stronglyurged that receipts be signed by the Frenchin Washington and not in North Africa,with the understanding that any diversionof equipment subsequently made in thetheater would promptly be reported.38

War Department officials having turneddown the proposal, the theater then soughtways and means to lighten the task of SOS,NATOUSA. To make it unnecessary, inparticular, to open thousands of packagesin order to inventory their contents, theFrench military authorities in Algiers wereasked if they would be willing to sign re-ceipts based on ships' manifests. This theyagreed to do. Thereupon, those Americanbase sections expecting large shipments ofFrench lend-lease equipment issued a stand-ing operating procedure setting forth themanner in which shipping tickets were tobe prepared and receipted.39

The issue was reopened in late August1943 in connection with a new directivefrom the War Department redefining thepolicy with regard to lend-lease transfers.The directive stipulated that all transferswere to be recorded and reported, exceptin the case of Commanding General Ship-ments when only diversions from the latterneeded to be reported.40

In the belief that this provision at lastexempted the theater from receipting ship-

ments which were definitely consigned fortransfer to the French, NATOUSA an-nounced its intention of discontinuing thepractice. Whereupon the War Depart-ment directed that the theater was to con-tinue to obtain signed receipts from theFrench upon transfer of matériel eitherfrom theater stocks or from CommandingGeneral Shipments.41

Meanwhile, accounting of theater trans-fers was running into considerable difficul-ties for a number of reasons. The theaterwas unable to obtain complete price cata-logues to cover the wide variety of parts andsupplies released to the French. Shipping,handling, and other miscellaneous costs ac-cruing to supplies furnished could not al-ways be computed with accuracy. Soonafter the entry of French troops on the Ital-ian front, many of the large number oftransactions made necessary for their main-tenance were taking place in forward areasthus often precluding the possibility of ob-taining and pricing itemized signed receiptsfor all transfers. In addition, it was fre-quently impossible to distinguish betweeninitial and maintenance issues.42 From De-cember 1943 on to July 1944 new difficul-ties were experienced. The accountingpolicies established by the War Departmentfor each category of transfers, such as sub-sistence, battle-loss replacements, petroleum,ammunition, were frequently changed.Piecemeal emergency transfers from theaterstocks to fill large shortages of initial equip-ment, as well as attempts to recapture U.S.equipment from French stocks, complicatedthe situation further.

38 Msg 173. Eisenhower to AGWAR, 30 Mar43. JRC Spalding Cable Log.

39 Msg 5032, Somervell to Eisenhower (EyesOnly), 31 Mar 43, JRC Spalding Cable Log;Msgs L-1595, MBS to Gardiner, 3 Apr 43, and1548, Eisenhower to MBS, 4 Apr 43, JRC CableLog: Admin Memo 47, Atlantic Base Sec, 8 Apr43, JRC 402 Sup Policy.

40 Memo W5-12-43, WD, 30 Aug 43, JRC 140Accounting.

41 Msgs W-944, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 25Sep 43, and 8890, AGWAR to Eisenhower, 29Sep 43, JRC 140 Accounting.

42 Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA.pp. 373-76.


By July 1944 accounting of theater trans-fers had reached such a state of confusionthat SOS officials recommended a radicalchange in procedure for the sake of simpli-fication "even at the sacrifice of a certaindegree of accuracy." They proposed thatthe French be charged for all supplies andservices furnished by the theater on a "perman per diem" basis, with the charge madeeffective at a date to be agreed upon be-tween the French and SOS. General Dev-ers endorsed the proposal and stronglyurged the War Department to approve itsimmediate adoption. Meanwhile, SOSproceeded to determine the amount to becharged per man per diem, on the basis ofthe average cost of maintaining one U.S.soldier for one day in the North Africantheater. To this average cost, 25 percentwould be added for overhead, transporta-tion, and accessorial charges, the percentagehaving been tentatively set, on 29 August,by War Department authorities themselves.On 11 September 1944 ASF accepted theprinciple of the per man per diem account-ing procedure, but directed that, pendingthe approval of a definite rate, accountingbe continued in accordance with existingpolicies. A month later, SOS, NATOUSA,forwarded to Washington all pertinent datalikely to assist the War Department in es-tablishing a final rate and, on 16 November,recommended a charge of $8.54 per manper day.43

As the supply responsibility for theFrench forces passed from NATOUSA to

ETOUSA, the War Department, on 18 No-vember, informed ETOUSA of the ac-counting policy to be followed thereafter.The policy resembled closely the one estab-lished earlier under War DepartmentMemorandum 35-44 of 22 September1944. and made no reference to the perman per diem proposal. Throughout themonths of December 1944 and January1945. the War Department kept insistingthat the existing policy be strictly adheredto. But the policy was not workable; it hadnot produced records "even approachingreasonable accuracy" on which futurecharges could be made. On 15 JanuaryGeneral Somervell, then on a visit on theContinent, was made aware of the difficul-ties in complying with the complicated sys-tem prescribed by the War Department,especially in view of the lack of qualifiedpersonnel in the theater. Recognizing thedesirability of adopting a simpler method,he urged the War Department by cable toput into effect the per man per diemmethod.44

Discussions on the per man per diem pro-cedure continued for several months. InApril 1945 the War Department dispatcheda special committee to study the status oflend-lease accounting in both the Mediter-ranean and European theaters. It was notuntil the end of May, after the cessation ofhostilities in Europe and, incidentally, afterten months of correspondence between thetwo theaters and the War Department, thatthe latter, acting on the recommendationsof the special committee, established a firm

43 Ltr, SOS NATOUSA to AG WD, 29 Jul 44,and Msgs FX 85245, Devers to AGWAR, 20 Aug44, and LX-47559, Larkin to AGWAR, 16 Oct 44,JRC 140 Accounting: Ltr, Hq ASF, APLIC CO8Accounting (3 Aug 44), 11 Sep 44, and 3d Ind,Hq MTOUSA. AG 400.3295/414 D-O, 16 Nov 44,quoted in Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 379.

44 Msg WX-66076, Somervell to Eisenhower, 18Nov 44, ASF International Div A-45-192 CableLog, France-Out: Msgs E-90834, Lee to AGWAR,26 Jan 45. and E-86634, Somervell to AGWAR,15 Jan 45, SS and P Planning Div Files.


accounting policy.45 All prior charges andcredits were to be canceled and, in theirplace, the French were to be charged: (1)for the complete equipment of all units in-cluded in the approved rearmament pro-grams on the basis of tables of organizationand equipment for similar U.S. units; (2)for the supply and maintenance of theirexpeditionary units at the per man per diemrates of $6.56 (for MTOUSA) and $6.67(for ETOUSA), retroactive to the datewhen such units had become part of aU.S. force and terminating on 31 May

1945; and (3) for ammunition, petroleumand lubricants, and other special items notcovered in the above per man per diemrates.46

Thus a simple accounting procedure hadfinally been adopted, a method not as ac-curate, to be sure, as the item per itemsystem which the War Department hadvainly tried to enforce, but one consideredfair enough to all concerned. Such wasthe basis on which the cost of equipping andmaintaining the French was estimated atthe time of the final settlement of lend-lease obligations.

45 Msgs WX-88427, AGWAR to MTOUSA, 26May 45, and WX-38215, AGWAR to ETOUSA,26 Jul 45, quoted in Logistical History ofNATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 380-81.

46 International Div, Lend-Lease as of Sep-tember 30, 1945, II, 1212-14, MS copy inOCMH; Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 379-81.

CHAPTER XVII

Agencies Handling Rearmament

The various wheels of the machinery setup to initiate, implement, and supervise therearming and training of the French NorthAfrican forces have been introduced in thepreceding chapters. The justification forthe creation of the JRC, JAC, SCAMA,Stock Control Section, and French TrainingSection, the directives responsible for theirestablishment, the functions assigned toeach, their successes or failures — allthese matters have been related at somelength as they arose. It remains to out-line briefly the composition and internalorganization of these agencies, their re-spective position in the theater staff struc-ture, their operational practices, the toolsat their disposal as well as those which theyforged.

The Joint Rearmament Committee

Composition and Position in theTheater Staff Structure

When, in early December 1942, creationof an agency to supervise the rearmamentof the French North African forces was firstenvisaged, the most directly concernedAFHQ staff sections—namely, the G-4and Liaison Sections—made the followingrecommendations. The contemplatedagency should be established as a specialstaff section of AFHQ; it should be com-posed of American representatives fromG-1, G-3, G-4, the Air and Naval Sections

of AFHQ, and of representatives from theFrench General Staff; finally, its functionsshould be so set forth as to require it torefer matters of policy to the Chief of Staff,AFHQ, for instructions, and other mattersto the particular staff sections concerned forboth discussion and action.1

These and other recommendations wereembodied in AFHQ Staff Memorandum52, issued on 16 December 1942, institutingofficially the Joint Rearmament Committee.The memorandum set forth in detail the re-sponsibilities and functions of the newagency. In addition it made the JRC di-rectly responsible to the Chief of Staff,AFHQ. This arrangement was of funda-mental importance to the committee for itdetermined the nature of its internal organ-ization, of its activities, and of its dealingswith other agencies.2

That the committee had not been placedunder the control of Liaison Section, theagency previously set up to serve as an in-termediary between AFHQ and the French,is not surprising. The technical nature aswell as the scope of the assignment requiredthe establishment of a separate agency witha permanent membership responsible for its

1 Memo, Col Julius C. Holmes for CofS AFHQ,5 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC; Memo,Holmes for CofS AFHQ, 11 Dec 42, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.

2 AFHQ Staff Memo 52, 16 Dec 42, AFHQ0100/12 G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip; see p. 25, above.


own internal organization. As such, it felldefinitely into the special staff category.3

The JRC having no power of decision, itsauthority was limited. It managed, how-ever, to circumvent this intrinsic handicapby establishing personal friendly relationswith outside officials and agencies most in-terested in its activities such as the deputychief of staff, G-3, G-4, Ordnance, andother technical and administrative services,both American and British.4

The eight original appointees to the com-mittee assembled for their first meeting on23 December 1942 at the Hotel St. Georgesin Algiers. The four U.S. members andthe AFHQ sections they represented wereCol. William Tudor Gardiner (G-3 andAir), Col. John Morrow (G-4), Capt. Jer-auld Wright (Naval Staff), and Maj.George L. Artamonoff (Ordnance). Thefour French delegates were Maj. JeanMorel (Army), Capt. Fernand Rébillon(Air), Capt. Roland de Beaumont (Army),and Lt. Comdr. R. Poincelet (Navy) .5

In accordance with the 16 Decembermemorandum, the senior officer represent-ing AFHQ, in this case Colonel Gardiner,took over the chairmanship of the commit-tee. The posts of vice chairman, executivesecretary, and vice secretary went to MajorMorel, Major Artamonoff, and Captain deBeaumont, respectively, thus giving the ap-pearance of a truly "joint" (in the sense ofinter-Allied) agency.

Of the four U.S. members, two, ColonelGardiner and Major Artamonoff, weredestined to play a major role in the subse-quent activities of the committee. ColonelGardiner, a pilot on loan from the AirForces, was highly qualified for his new as-signment. His experience with militarymatters accrued from two years' servicein World War I, during which he hadserved as interpreter because of his excel-lent knowledge of French. During theyears 1929 to 1933, he had been governorof the State of Maine. He was to remainwith the committee as chairman until 2June 1943.6 Major Artamonoff, also aveteran of World War I, served first as ex-ecutive secretary, later as chairman, replac-ing Colonel Gardiner. His fluency in theFrench language and an excellent back-ground in organization and supply problemsqualified him admirably for the dischargeof his important functions.7

Membership in the JRC varied from timeto time. Already by mid-February 1943there had been a number of changes.Colonel Morrow had been replaced by Lt.Col. Douglas N. Lawley. Comdr. AndréStourm of the French Navy had replacedCommander Poincelet, who had been trans-ferred to other duties. Earlier, in lateDecember, the advisability of appointing tothe committee a British ordnance repre-sentative had been given serious consid-

3 Memo, R. G. Lewis for Director of OrdnanceSvs (Br) , 22 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC;Gen Crane and Col William S. Biddle, discussion ofCofS Mtg, 24 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC;Memo, Gen Rooks for Col Gardiner, 30 Dec 42,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops, Ser 623.

4 Notes from Col Artamonoff, Dec 51 ; Intervwith Gen Loomis, Jun 50.

5 Min, JRC Conf, 23 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgnof JRC; AFHQ SO 86, 26 Dec 42, copy inGardiner's private files.

6 For his contribution to the success of the NorthAfrican rearmament operations, the French awardedhim, in July 1943, the Order of the Legion ofHonor (Chevalier), a singularly fine gesture towardthe United States considering that, a few monthsearlier, the American Army had awarded him theSilver Star for meritorious service in the course ofthe 8-10 November 1942 operations against theopposing French forces.

7 Order of the Legion of Honor (Chevalier) andCroix de Guerre (with Palm and Gold Star),June 1945.

AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT 273

MEMBERS OF THE JOINT REARMAMENT COMMITTEE, Algiers, April1943. Left to right: Maj. Jean Morel, Col. Clement Blanc, Capt. Roland de Beaumont, par-tially visible behind Col. William Tudor Gardiner, Lt. Col. George L. Artamonoff, Capt.François Rébillon, Capt. Jerauld Wright, Comdr. André Stourm. The officer behind CaptainRébillon is not identified.

eration, since French troops then fighting inTunisia were receiving equipment fromBritish as well as U.S. sources. However,after the Casablanca Conference in January1943, when it became clear that the rearma-ment of the French Ground Forces was to bea wholly American commitment, the pres-ence of a British Army representative hardlyseemed necessary. It became even less soas time went on for, with the fusion of thede Gaulle and Giraud forces in late July1943, the two British-equipped divisions(the 1st and 2d DFL) were re-equipped

with American matériel. The Royal Navy,on the other hand, had been represented onthe committee since January by Capt.Geoffrey Barnard. In practice, neither henor the U.S. naval representative was a full-time member. They were called in onlywhen naval matters had to be discussed andacted upon. For all practical purposes,therefore, the JRC could be regarded as aFranco-American committee with only oc-casional British participation.

The position of the JRC in the theaterstaff structure was altered three times. The


first change, which occurred on 5 June1943, was brought about by a number ofimportant considerations. With the battleof Tunisia ended and the considerableamount of equipment brought over on theApril convoy sorted out and distributed, thevarious Allied agencies responsible for re-arming the French were turning their at-tention to the task of developing the NorthAfrican Army into an efficient fighting force.As it was anticipated that AFHQ wouldsome day move from northwest Africa,leaving the rearmament operations the ex-clusive responsibility of NATOUSA, it ap-peared necessary to review the relationshipof these two agencies with the French. Li-aison Section, AFHQ-NATOUSA, voicedthe opinion that the time was opportune forcentralizing under a single authority thehandling of all French problems arising bothwithin the lines of communications and inthe forward zone. Its chief, Col. Julius C.Holmes, recommended that a specialFrench section be set up within LiaisonSection to handle, for both AFHQ andNATOUSA, all policy, organizational, andtechnical questions concerning the Frencharmed forces, including rearmament. Onthe assumption (an erroneous one, as dem-onstrated by later developments) that thework of the JRC was becoming "more andmore a routine G-4 problem," ColonelHolmes further recommended that the com-mittee be consolidated, at least for the pres-ent, into this proposed French section.8

Only part of his proposals was accepted;no separate section was constituted, but, on5 June 1943, the JRC passed under thecontrol of Liaison Section.9

Concurrently with the transfer of JRC

from the control of the Chief of Staff,AFHQ, to that of Liaison Section, ColonelGardiner was replaced by Lt. Col. GeorgeL. Artamonoff as chairman.10 A few weekslater, on 19 July, General Spalding, whohad recently arrived in the theater to under-take a survey of the French supply situation,was appointed both chief of Liaison Sectionand chairman of the JRC, with ColonelArtamonoff reverting to the post of execu-tive secretary of the committee.11

JRC's position in the staff structure un-derwent a second change in August 1943.By that time supervision by Liaison Sectionhad proved inadequate. The various tasksperformed by the committee had turned out,after all, to be more than G-4 routine work.The technical aspects of the problems in-volved were unfamiliar to the members ofLiaison Section who, in addition, were toobusy with matters of their own. Consider-ing, furthermore, that the rearmament ofthe French had become an almost exclusiveAmerican responsibility, it appeared logicalto transfer the committee to the jurisdictionof NATOUSA. Action to this effect wastaken on 7 August 1943.12 JRC was maderesponsible to the Deputy Theater Com-mander, NATOUSA, then GeneralHughes.

The added responsibility which the JRCbegan assuming with respect to the train-ing and supply of the French expeditionaryforces quickly brought about changes aswell as increases in personnel. Chairman-ship changed hands once again when Gen-eral Loomis replaced General Spalding on10 October. As of 15 October, member-

8 Memo, Holmes for CofS AFHQ, 24 May 43,JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC.

9 AFHQ Staff Memo 45, 5 Jun 43, in same file.

10 Colonel Gardiner was recalled to duty with theAir Forces.

11 AFHQ GO 42, 19 Jul 43, in same file.12 NATOUSA Staff Memo 74, 7 Aug 43, in same

file.


ship of the committee was approximatelyas follows:

JOINT REARMAMENT COMMITTEE

(Asterisk denotes officers who remained with theJRC until the end of rearmament operations inNorth Africa)

Chairman: Brig. Gen. Harold F. Loomis*Executive Officer: Lt. Col. George L.

Artamonoff (1)

Policy Section

U.S. Army member: Col. Ira A. Crump* (2)U.S. Air member: Brig. Gen. Gordon P.

Saville (3)U.S. Navy member: Capt. Francis P. Old

(4)Royal Navy member: Capt. Geoffrey Barnard

(5)Executive Section(all U.S. officers)

Lt. Col. John C. Knox* (representing FTS),Training

Maj. E. S. De Long,* Quartermaster andMedical

Maj. Conrad L. Christensen,* Ordnance,Engineer, and Chemical Warfare Service

Maj. J. R. Quails, OrdnanceLt. John L. Dexter,* Engineer and OrdnanceLt. Atlas L. Cheek, Jr.,* StatisticsLt. John W. Buckley,* TrainingLt. John S. Edmonston,* EngineerLt. Gordon H. Buter,* Office AdministrationMaj. John W. Ames,* Liaison with French

for AirLt. (jg) J. Lodge, Liaison with French for

Navy

French Section

Chief: Col. Jean Regnault*Army member: Capt. Roland de Beaumont

(6)Air member: Maj. Gilbert MondinNaval member: Comdr. André Stourm*Two interpreters

(1) Left the committee on 5 November 1943.Shortly after, he was transferred to the U.S. FifthArmy in Italy where he took over the command of

the 53d Ordnance Group which included oneFrench ordnance battalion supporting the CEF.

(2) Replaced Colonel Artamonoff as executiveofficer on 5 November 1943.

(3) Also chairman of the Joint Air Commission.See pp. 203, above, 285-86, below.

(4) Replaced Captain Wright on 7 October1943. Was replaced by Capt. D. D. Dupre, USN,in June 1944.

(5) Replaced by Capt. M. B. Laing, RN, inJanuary 1944.

(6) Left for Italy on 1 January 1944.

NOTE.—Other officers were subsequently as-signed to the committee. Among the French mem-bers so assigned, three (Maj. Plat, Lt. René Leh-man and Lt. Guy de Biran) remained to the endof the JRC's existence.

The committee had now under its juris-diction both the French Training Sectionsince the end of August and Stock ControlSection since the beginning of October. Ithad become a sizable organization with atotal strength of approximately 600 officersand men.

The third and last change in the com-mittee's position in the staff structure cameabout in February 1944. (Charts 2 and 3)Simultaneously with the command reorgan-ization then effected in the theater, the JRCwas transferred from the jurisdiction of theDeputy Theater Commander, NATOUSA,an office which had just been abolished,to that of the Commanding General,NATOUSA, now General Devers.13

In July, with the arrival in North Africaof the first elements of the Brazilian Expe-ditionary Force, NATOUSA directed theJRC to provide assistance in the training ofthese troops before their departure for Italy.The committee set up a Brazilian TrainingSection similar to the section organized forthe French and placed it under the com-mand of Lt. Col. Robert J. Shaw, himself

13 History of Allied Force Headquarters andHeadquarters NATOUSA: Part Three, Decem-ber 1943-July 1944, Sec. 1, pp. 697-99, copy inOCMH.


BRIG. GEN. HAROLD F. LOOMIS,center, and two of his associates of the JRC,Brig. Gen. Alien F. Kingman, left, chief ofFrench Training Section, and Brig. Gen. JeanRegnault (then a Colonel), chief of FrenchSection.

an officer from French Training Sectionwho had served more than a year with the3d DIA as its senior instructor. Such wasthe extent of the responsibility assumed bythe JRC with regard to the Brazilian Expe-ditionary Force.34

At the end of the same month, with thedeparture, of NATOUSA headquartersfrom North Africa and the gradual closingdown of U.S. installations, the chairman ofthe JRC, General Loomis, was designatedrepresentative of the theater commander inthe Algiers area, as well as CommandingGeneral, Headquarters, North African Dis-trict, the successor to NATOUSA. As this

meant a broadening of the committee's re-sponsibilities and functions, these were re-defined by Headquarters, NATOUSA, on14 August.15

Meanwhile, a field echelon of the com-mittee (JRC Advance) had gone to Italy toassist in the last-minute preparations of theFrench units designated for ANVIL and tokeep the committee informed of the latestdevelopments in this connection.

After the launching of ANVIL on 15 Au-gust 1944, the JRC continued to operatebut its strength gradually decreased as itsvarious activities diminished in importance.

In late August, with Paris and a largepart of France liberated, the French pro-posed and Allied authorities agreed that anagency to supervise the rearmament of theMetropolitan forces should be set up in theFrench capital. By agreement betweenGenerals Eisenhower and Devers, it was de-cided to use for the purpose selected mem-bers of the personnel heretofore assigned tothe JRC. On 9 September orders were is-sued directing the transfer to SupremeHeadquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force,of General Loomis and four or five officers ofhis choosing, requests for the remaining per-sonnel to be made after General Loomis hadreached Paris. Leaving a rear echelon inNorth Africa, General Loomis and his partyarrived at SHAEF on 3 October and wereassigned for duty with Rearmament Divi-sion, SHAEF Mission to France, thesuccessor to the JRC on the Continent.16

With some of its members now in Italy

14 Interv with Loomis, Sep 51.

15 Headquarters, NATOUSA, AFHQ, and otherAllied Headquarters moved to Caserta, Italy, on 20July 1944. Ltr AG-370.5 A-0, Hq NATOUSA,7 Jul 44, and Memo, NATOUSA for CGSOS NATOUSA, 28 Jul 44, and Staff Memo 32,Hq NATOUSA, 14 Aug 44, JRC 320/001 Orgn ofJRC.

19 Msg 12547, Loomis to JRC, 5 Oct 44, in samefile.


CHART 3—INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT REARMAMENT COMMITTEE: 1 APRIL 1944

or France as part of JRC Advance andsome transferred to other duties, the JRChad, by this time, been reduced to a skele-ton organization. The responsibility forthe remaining rearmament activities havingbeen assigned, on 10 October, to Head-quarters, Communications Zone,NATOUSA, JRC Rear was officially dis-banded on 1 November, although it con-tinued to operate one week longer.17

French Participation

All available organizational charts givean erroneous impression that the Frenchenjoyed equal representation on the JRC.

They did not, either in authority or innumbers.

That the French representatives werenever considered as copartners in the full-est sense of the term is not surprising.Their position reflected the fact that theNorth African army was not integratedwith the Anglo-American military estab-lishment. Having neither the right to casta vote nor the power to exercise controlover U.S. or British personnel, Frenchrepresentatives could act only as liaison of-ficers. In addition, it seems certain that,had equal participation been originallypossible, it would have been ruled out asinopportune on the ground that the Frenchwere customers for, not producers of, warmatériel. For this reason possibly morethan any other, American supremacy in thecommittee was firmly established from the

17 Hq NATOUSA, GO 104, 11 Oct 44, in samefile; Memo, Capt Graham for Loomis, 14 Nov 44,SHAEF Mission to France, Rearmt Div 320-1Orgn and Function of Rearmt Div.


outset with the provision of the 16 Decem-ber 1942 directive that the senior U.S.member of the committee was to be thechairman.

Surprisingly, the French military author-ities themselves did not seem eager to ob-tain equal participation in the JRC, atleast during the first year of its existence.Possibly that was because, discounting thevalue of the JRC, they were content thattheir representatives should remain with-out real authority. General Giraud, it willbe recalled, had banked heavily on theBéthouart Military Mission, which he haddispatched to the United States in lateDecember 1942. In the apparent beliefthat the mission would adequately repre-sent him in Washington, the fountain ofall supply, and from there expedite theflow of rearmament matériel, he hadtended to attach little importance to nego-tiations at theater level. It was his opinion,not an unreasonable one considering thelimitations placed on the JRC, that itwas little more than a liaison agency. Indetailing officers to represent him on thecommittee, he expected them simply to in-terpret for the benefit of the American andFrench commands the views of each re-garding rearmament matters. It must benoted here in passing that the MilitaryMission in Washington established and sub-sequently maintained close relations withthe French members of the JRC, throughthe channel of the Rearmament and Tech-nical Studies Section of the French Gen-eral Staff.

Unequal representation on the JRC wasmade more apparent by the fact that theFrench members were, particularly duringthe first eight months, of a rank not com-mensurate with their responsibilities andduties and inferior to that of their Ameri-

can colleagues. Possibly because of theiraloofness toward the committee, Frenchauthorities were content to let the situationcontinue for some time, any change beingmade difficult by the fact that promotionswere more or less frozen. In spite of theirlower status, however, at no time did theFrench members feel subjected to undueinconvenience and embarrassment exceptpossibly in their dealings with other Alliedagencies. Within the committee, theywere treated on the basis of function, notof rank. The feeling of inferiority whichthey suffered occasionally was due solely tothe limited authority vested in them by theirown superiors.18

The French Section remained smalllargely because qualified men were hard tofind. The demands for officers with lin-guistic skill and technical knowledge wereso pressing from the field and from theservices that the section never had a chanceto expand. Even such officers as were ap-pointed from time to time were subject toinstant recall for duty elsewhere.

Their American colleagues have spokenhighly of Major Morel and Captain deBeaumont, emphasizing that, in the earlyperiod of the rearmament operations, thesetwo officers were among the few Frenchmenwho appeared to understand thoroughlythe problems involved. Before the NorthAfrican landings, Major Morel had gainedconsiderable ordnance experience by serv-ing as assistant to General R. Poupinel thenin charge of matériel; in particular he hadplayed an important part in the Frenchefforts to hide equipment from the Axis.Although technically he ceased to be a mem-ber of the committee in August 1943, he

18 Intervs with de Beaumont, Jul 50, Arta-monoff, Dec 49, Gardiner, Apr 50, and Loomis,Sep 51 ; Notes from Gardiner.


continued to handle rearmament problemsat G-4, French Headquarters.

Before his appointment to the JRC,Captain de Beaumont had been called toAlgiers on 20 November 1942 by GeneralLeyer to serve as assistant in charge of re-armament. Considering that he remainedat JRC's headquarters, whereas his col-league Morel operated largely from G-4,French Headquarters, it can be said of Cap-tain de Beaumont that he assumed thegreater part of the burden of representingthe French High Command at JRC, a taskwhich he appears to have filled with com-plete satisfaction. He was relieved of thisresponsibility at the time of the appointmentof his successor in August 1943, but he con-tinued to serve on the committee in a differ-ent capacity until January 1944 when, athis request, he was transferred to activeservice with the CEF in Italy.

The work of both Major Morel and Cap-tain de Beaumont was immensely facilitatedby the cordial relations established early be-tween the JRC and members of the FrenchGeneral Staff, Col. Clement Blanc in par-ticular. The latter, then serving as bothG-1 and G-4, although not a member dejure of the committee, kept in constanttouch with it. His frequent ex officio pres-ence at JRC meetings, which he attended atthe invitation of the American members,and his informal, almost daily contacts withthe various members of the committee, madeit possible for much constructive action to betaken which otherwise would have been de-layed because of the lack of authority vestedin the French members. At one time aclassmate of General Loomis at the Ecole deGuerre, Colonel Blanc was highly esteemedby American rearmament officers who re-garded him as the top French authority inthe field of equipment and training. He

was promoted to the rank of brigadier gen-eral in April 1944. By then his superior,General Leyer, Chief of General Staff, haddelegated much of his authority to him indealing with Allied staffs.

The arrangement by which the chairmanof the JRC or his representative directlyapproached Colonel Blanc or General Leyerworked admirably. It was maintainedeven after the CFLN vainly attempted tovest in the Commissioner of War the respon-sibility for handling rearmament problems.Both General Leyer and Colonel Blanc con-tinued to work closely with the JRC to thevery end of the North African rearmamentoperations. Another French official, Mr.Jean Monnet, contributed much to the goodrelations between the French and the JRC.The MAB, it will be recalled, had ar-ranged for his dispatch from Washington toNorth Africa in early 1943 to assist GeneralGiraud on financial and armament matters.

By the summer of 1943 the French mili-tary authorities had come to recognize inthe JRC the only effective machinerythrough which their demands could be met.Feeling the need for more substantial rep-resentation on the committee, they ap-pointed on 13 August a higher-ranking offi-cer, Col. Jean Regnault, to the post of chiefof the French Section, held until then byMajor Morel.

Colonel Regnault's appointment provedto be a most fortunate one. A combat offi-cer who, a few months before, was leadingan infantry regiment in Tunisia, he had hadno prior training in armament matters.Yet, thanks to his qualities of adaptabilityand open-mindedness, his thoroughness inhandling technical details, an excellentknowledge of English, and a genuine friend-ship for Americans, he soon succeeded instrengthening further the co-operation be-


tween the French and American elements ofthe JRC, and between the latter and theFrench General Staff.19

It must be noted that the amount of au-thority vested in Colonel Regnault otherthan the power which his rank carried didnot exceed that enjoyed by his predecessors.Officers of the French High Command con-tinued to feel that, as long as the aim andscope of the rearmament program werestill to be determined, they alone could ef-fectively deal with such matters. Mean-while, the American position with respectto French participation in the committee re-mained unchanged.

Together with the French officers subse-quently appointed to assist him, such as Lt.René Lehman who displayed an especiallykeen understanding of rearmament prob-lems, Colonel Regnault carried out theduties assigned to the French Section withthe utmost efficiency. He remained withthe JRC until its disbandment in September1944. He was then transferred to Paris tooccupy a similar post in the newly createdRearmament Division of SHAEF Missionto France.20

Internal Organization

From the moment it was activated, theJRC was left free to develop its own struc-ture.21 During the initial phase, little inter-nal organization was needed. The com-mittee was then devoting its entire attentionto the emergency provision of equipment tothe units engaged in Tunisia. Not that the16 December directive establishing the com-

mittee restricted the latter's functions tosuch duty. On the contrary, the directivespecifically empowered the JRC, in addi-tion, to develop an over-all rearmamentprogram. The French members hadbrought with them such a program based onthe Mast Plan. Their American colleagues,however, had come with "no plan at all,merely an idea of rearmament." 22 In theabsence of clear instructions from AFHQas to what a program should consist of andas to how far the Allied command was pre-pared to go, the U.S. members strongly feltthat the committee's most immediate taskwas to assist the units in Tunisia in gettingthe equipment they needed so urgently.They maintained this position even after theCasablanca Conference, pending the receiptof definite instructions regarding the long-range program. During this entire stopgapperiod the members worked as a group, eachspecializing in one particular field and theexecutive secretary keeping the necessaryrecords and statistics.

It was when the French submitted theirfirst requisitions, in the spring of 1943, thatthe question of the division of responsibilityarose which soon led to a functional organi-zation of the committee. The requisitions,before being transmitted to the responsibleAFHQ staff sections, required considerableprocessing and redrafting, for the French,unfamiliar with the U.S. classification sys-tem and tables of organization and equip-ment, or with technical nomenclature inEnglish, were submitting them according totheir own classification system and in theirown language. To present these requests inproper form, the JRC obtained the assign-ment of several assistants qualified in arma-ment matters. The requests were screened

19 Interv with Loomis, Sep 51.20 Just before his transfer to Paris, Colonel Reg-

nault was awarded the Legion of Merit with therank of Officer.

21 Memo for Rcd, JRC, 27 Dec 42, JRC 320/001Orgn of JRC.

22 Intervs with Artamonoff, Dec 49, and Gardiner,Apr 50.


and broken down according to service andtype of item, then translated into English.

As the scope of its activities increased, theJRC secured other assistants whose duty itbecame to disseminate technical informa-tion to the French, supervise the delivery tothem of equipment, and establish liaisonwith the several AFHQ staff sections in-volved in the rearmament operations.

Soon the JRC began grouping these as-sistants into sections. The Statistics Sec-tion collected and assimilated informationon the amount of matériel furnished. TheAdministration Section handled reports andcorrespondence passing through the U.S.members of the committee. The Opera-tions Liaison Section controlled all liaisonmatters with the French.

The successive transfers of the JRC, firstto the control of Liaison Section, AFHQ, inJune 1943 and later to that of NATOUSAin August of the same year, brought no sub-stantial changes in internal organization.In the fall of 1943, however, as the com-mittee became involved with the supply,maintenance, and training of the first ex-peditionary units about to depart for com-bat overseas, the number of sections had tobe increased. The Supply Section was cre-ated to handle technical matters pertainingto all services and to act as liaison with theStock Control Section when the latterpassed under the control of the committee.Similarly, when the JRC extended its juris-diction over the French Training Section, aspecial Training Section was set up to actas intermediary.

By February 1944, the beginning of thefourth and last phase of the North Afri-can rearmament program, the Joint Re-armament Committee had reached its fullgrowth. Its internal organization, estab-lished piecemeal as conditions had war-

ranted, was now completed. It must benoted that, with the creation of the JointAir Commission in September 1943, thecommittee was no longer concerned withair matters except in the case of items ofequipment common to both air and groundforces. It was, on the other hand, stillhandling a number of problems arising inconnection with the rehabilitation of theFrench Navy. The three naval repre-sentatives were responsible for initiatingplans for miscellaneous projects, and forscreening requests for new ships, majoroverhaul of ships, and increases in arma-ment. Other naval matters were handledthrough other theater channels.

Operating Procedures

In order to achieve maximum efficiencyand to keep abreast of the changing situa-tion, JRC, from the outset, adopted,flexible methods of work. Most of thebusiness at hand was handled throughindividual action, and only a few formalplenary meetings were held.

During the stopgap period, no systemexisted that would provide the committeewith accurate information on what equip-ment the French needed most and on whatcould be made available to them from Al-lied sources. For lack of such a system,the committee as a whole agreed that indi-vidual members should, whenever possible,go after this information, using their owndevices and means.

A few isolated examples, gleaned at ran-dom, are given of this individual effort to"go and get things done." Early in Jan-uary 1943, two members, Major Artam-onoff and Captain de Beaumont, visitedthe units engaged on the Tunisian front todetermine for themselves what items of


equipment were most urgently needed.Meanwhile, the chairman discussed withU.S., British, and French officials the pos-sible emergency release of equipment.During the winter months, various mem-bers toured Allied agencies and establish-ments throughout northwest Africa with aview to locating matériel likely to be of useto the French. Some of these trips weremade by air, the necessary aircraft beingborrowed for the purpose from Americanor even French sources.

In April, when arrangements were be-ing made with Colonel Suttles for the settingup of the vehicle assembly line at Algiers,the chairman again borrowed an airplanefrom the Northwest African Troop CarrierCommand and flew to Rabat to pick up anadvance party of twenty mechanics fromthe U.S. 2d Armored Division for employ-ment on the new project.23

Later, after the fall of Tunis in May, thechairman rushed to Tunisia to survey theavailability of captured enemy equipment.The venture, incidentally, proved un-profitable, for what little matériel the Ger-mans had not destroyed the theater plannedto distribute not only to the French but toother Allied forces as well. It was alsothrough individual action that the necessarytechnical troops were gradually secured andassigned for duty with the JRC. When helearned of a surplus of French-speakingG-2 officers at General Patton's headquar-ters in Casablanca, Colonel Gardiner im-mediately approached the responsibleauthorities and obtained the assignment oftwo.24

After the cessation of hostilities inTunisia, the committee faced a multitude

of new problems arising from the imple-mentation of the long-range rearmamentprogram. It was then that Colonel Artam-onoff conducted a survey of French ord-nance units to determine how they werehandling their newly acquired equipment.Without such information no sound reha-bilitation program could be pursued.Later, in August, when the French Train-ing Section passed under the operationalcontrol of the committee, its chief, GeneralKingman, undertook at JRC's request toinspect certain units and report on the com-pleteness of their equipment and training.Thus the committee was able to inform withaccuracy both French and Allied commandson the state of readiness and the degree ofefficiency of these units.

Again, when in the late summer of 1943it became obvious that the French supplysystem was totally inadequate, the JRC in-structed a special party headed by ColonelGeraghty to make a thorough investigationof the situation. Colonel Geraghty's re-port, it will be remembered, led to the estab-lishment of Stock Control Section, theagency which so successfully assisted theFrench in overhauling their supply system.

Although the committee was not empow-ered to make decisions affecting policy, itsmembers, especially the chairman and theexecutive secretary, frequently participatedin conferences, some called at their own ini-tiative, with representatives from the policy-making echelons. It was at such a con-ference held at the end of March 1943 in theoffice of the Deputy Theater Commander,NATOUSA, that the chairman discussedwith General Clark the advisability of bring-ing the Fifth Army into the rearmamentpicture, as well as the procedure to be fol-lowed in case this was done. Conferenceswere also held with staff sections or indi-

23 Statement in Notes on Fr Rearmt by Gard-iner, 10 Apr 50, copy in OCMH files.

24 Ibid.


viduals of the French High Command. On31 March Colonel Artamonoff discussedwith General Leyer and Colonel Blanc plansfor the forthcoming reception of the firstlarge-scale shipment. Two days earlierColonel Gardiner, together with other Alliedofficials including Brig. Gen. William F.Tompkins from Operations Division, hadexamined the problem with General Giraud,General Leyer, and Mr. Monnet. Meetingswith the French were for the most partinformal and, as already stated, held asoften as necessary.25

To deal effectively with the more techni-cal problems, the JRC frequently borrowedcivilian and military experts from otherheadquarters. One of the first experts tobe called in was Lt. Col. Howard J. Lowry.Because of his thorough knowledge of en-emy equipment, he was assigned to the JRCfrom May to October 1943 for the purposeof handling the various problems connectedwith the transfer of such equipment to theFrench.26 Civilian technicians on loanfrom American industrial plants gave theJRC the benefit of their firsthand knowl-edge of U.S. equipment. They conductedinspections of French base shops and main-tenance and combat units, and reported tothe JRC the degree of technical efficiencyof these units. In addition, they organizedclasses for the benefit of French personnelin which they taught the correct use andmaintenance of American equipment, espe-cially vehicles. Among the civilian techni-cal observers called upon to assist the JRCwere William E. Burnett and Charles F.

Dye, Jr., representing respectively the Cad-illac Motor Car and the Fisher Tank Divi-sions of General Motors, and Thomas A.Demetry of the Chrysler Tank Corpora-tion.27

A word should be said about the reportsissued by the JRC. When the initial allo-cations of matériel arrived in North Africaat the end of January 1943, AFHQ directedthe JRC to maintain an up-to-date scheduleshowing how the French authorities wereassigning the items received and how theyintended to make future assignments.28

The committee then began issuing a semi-monthly report to keep the Chief of Staff,AFHQ, informed of the quantity of maté-riel turned over to the French in response toemergency and training requirements. Si-multaneously the JRC issued a weekly rec-ord of its day-to-day activities. With thearrival of the first large-scale convoy inApril, the semimonthly report was replacedby a progress report designed especially togive accurate information regarding the dis-tribution of equipment among units. Thisinformation was obtained largely throughpersonal contact with the French GeneralStaff, through visits to units by either regu-lar JRC members or temporarily attachedpersonnel, and through the exchange ofcommunications between the JRC andColonel Blanc. It included valuable dataon the equipment status of units, reasons fordelaying their rearmament, changes in ta-bles of organization and equipment as ef-fected by the French, exact tonnage ofequipment arriving on the various convoys,and so forth. Copies of the progress reportwere sent to the responsible AFHQ staff sec-tions including the chief of staff himself,

25 Memo, Hughes for Clark, 26 Mar 43, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt; Memo,Artamonoff for CofS SOS NATOUSA, 1 Apr 43,JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan; Weekly Rpt No. 1,JRC, 27 Mar 43, AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec319.1/1 (Fr-B) Ser 93.

26 SO 99, Hq NATOUSA, 15 May 43, JRC 210.3Assignment and Transfer of Officers.

27 JRC 353/001 Training Rpts, Tech Observers.28 AFHQ Ltr AG 400/322 A. M., 31 Jan 43,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.


NATOUSA headquarters, American andBritish Ordnance Sections, the U.S. FifthArmy, and the lend-lease representatives inthe theater. The last of such reports wasissued in September 1943.

There is no question of attributing to theJRC the entire credit for the success of therehabilitation of the French North Africanforces. The role played by other Alliedagencies cannot be minimized, nor can theimpressive achievements on the part of theFrench themselves in setting up an arma-ment machinery of their own be underesti-mated. In addition to establishingSCAMA, the French High Command or-ganized two special staff sections to dealwith rearmament problems. The first ofthese was the Rearmament and TechnicalStudies Section, headed by Lt. Col. CharlesChanson. This section, with the assistanceof 1st and 2d Bureaux (G-1 and G-2) andunder the general direction of ColonelBlanc, prepared the over-all rearmamentprograms and determined the compositionof the successive phases, as well as the gen-eral plans of distribution of equipment.The other section was the Poste de Statis-tique, created in March 1943 for the pur-pose of working out the details for the dis-tribution of U.S. equipment to the unitsdesignated for activation in first priority.29

Yet there is little doubt that the JRC didrepresent the driving force which ralliedand co-ordinated all individual efforts andguided them to a sound and fruitful accom-plishment. It is likely that when they firstmet in December 1942 the original mem-bers of the committee did not grasp the fullsignificance of the undertaking they wereembarking upon, or foresee the scope of the

task that lay ahead. Neither could theyvisualize the ultimate, impressive resultsof the rearmament operations. From astopgap committee with no plan but onlyan idea, the JRC, in spite of its limitations,had become in early 1944 a real power ex-tending its arm into many fields of en-deavor. Together with the other relatedrearmament agencies, it had built up anefficient and indispensable machinery readyto undertake and, as later events amplyproved, quite able to effect the final forg-ing of the North African forces. Both theFrench and the Americans would long begrateful to the JRC for the major role it hadplayed in making it possible for these forcesto assume their rightful share of the strug-gle against the common foe and, inci-dentally, in strengthening Franco-Ameri-can friendship. They would also, in thefall of 1944, draw from the record of itsexperience valuable lessons on which tobase their plans for the second chapter,then opening, in the rehabilitation of theFrench forces in World War II: the re-armament of the Metropolitan forces.

The Joint Air Commission

Shortly after he was appointed Air mem-ber of the Joint Rearmament Committee on24 August 1943, General Saville, Chief ofStaff, Mediterranean Air Command, cameto recognize two important points. First,the establishment of a separate committeeto handle French air matters independentlyof the JRC must be expedited. Such acommittee, in fact, was already in processof organization.30 Second, sufficient au-thority must be vested in the air committeeto enable it to function from the start withthe maximum efficiency. To ensure that29 Marey, "Le Réarmement français en Afrique

du Nord (1942-1944)," Revue Politique et Par-lementaire (November, 1947), pp. 139-40.



the agency when established would enjoysuch authority, General Eaker, Command-ing General, Mediterranean Air Command,decided to make its relationship with hisown command the closest possible one.Consequently, he delegated his chief of staff,General Saville, to represent Mediterran-ean Air Command on the Joint Air Com-mission when the latter was officially estab-lished on 6 September 1943.31 No betterkinship between the two organizations couldhave been devised. The assignment of akey staff officer to a staff section would, aslater events amply proved, make for effici-ency and speed in the carrying out ofimportant business.

JAC's position in the staff structure re-mained unchanged throughout the commis-sion's existence. When, in mid-January1944, Mediterranean Air Command andNorthwest African Air Forces were jointlyreplaced by Mediterranean Allied AirForces, the JAC merely passed under thecontrol of the latter.

The orders establishing the JAC had stip-ulated that it was to be composed of threeair officers: one American, as chairman,one British, and one French. Initially, thethree members were General Saville, chair-man, Col. André Hartemann, representingthe French Air Force, and Group Capt. J.Rock de Besombes, representing the RoyalAir Force. The French and British mem-bership remained unchanged throughoutthe commission's existence. G e n e r a lSaville left the JAC on 3 January 1944, toassume the command of XII Tactical AirCommand, and turned the chairmanshipover to Brig. Gen. Patrick W. Timberlakewho incidentally had already succeeded himas Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Air Com-

mand, three months earlier. General Tim-berlake remained on the commission onlyone month, until 9 February when he wasreplaced by Colonel Gardiner.32 After tworequests for Colonel Gardiner's serviceswith G-5, SHAEF, in London, GeneralsEaker and Devers consented in mid-April1944 to relieve him but only after he hadindoctrinated Colonel Ervin, who hadcome from the United Kingdom with Gen-eral Eaker and was to become the fourthand last chairman of the JAC. ColonelErvin officially replaced Colonel Gardineron 4 May 1944 and remained on the com-mission up to its disbandment in September1944.33

Assisting the JAC was, initially, one sec-retary whose duty it was to prepare actionon the basis of agreements reached by thethree members. The first officer to serve inthat capacity was Flight Lt. A. L. W. R.Henry (RAF), himself a staff officer of theEstablishment Section of the MediterraneanAir Command. He was replaced, in No-vember 1943, by Lt. Paul C. Sheeline(U.S.) who remained on the commission tothe end of its operations. For severalmonths it was felt that nothing more thanthe one-man executive staff was required.When in need of assistance, the chairmanmerely drew from personnel resources avail-able to Mediterranean Air Command.Thus American and British instructors,liaison officers, and technicians were as-signed, from time to time, to the French AirForce. As JAC's activities increased, espe-cially in the spring of 1944, it was deemednecessary to enlarge the executive staff. Atthe time of the dissolution of the commis-

31 GO 9, Hq Mediterranean Air Comd, 6 Sep43, JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt.

32 Since his departure from the JRC, ColonelGardiner had been serving as A-2 with the 51stTroop Carrier Wing in Sicily.

33 Statements in Notes on Rearmt of FAF byGardiner, 6 Jul 51, copy in OCMH.


sion, the staff had reached a strength ofeleven officers and enlisted men, Americansfor the most part. Meanwhile the practiceof using personnel from MAAF as instruc-tors and technicians had continued.

The wide scope of the activities carriedout by the JAC can be best estimated byexamining the journal kept by one of thechairmen.34 In the field of training, theycovered such problems as the allocation oftraining planes, material assistance andvisits to training centers, the sending ofpilots and mechanics to schools in theUnited States. In the field of supply, JAChandled such questions as the issue of postexchange items, the issue of the Nordenbombsight, the inadequacy of the food ra-tion, at one time reported to be a factor inthe high rate of accidents, the supply ofequipment to the Naval Air Arm.Among the administrative problems han-dled by the JAC were the operational as-signment of squadrons, the assignment ofU.S. liaison officers to FAF units and ofFrench staff officers to Allied air com-mands, finally, the advisability of makingavailable to the French the air intelligenceweekly summaries.35

In the course of their meetings which theyheld at regular intervals, the three membersof the commission, having obtained before-hand the views of their respective com-mands, discussed the plans to be establishedor the measures to be taken. As each mem-ber enjoyed the double advantage of havingthe full confidence of his two colleagues andsufficient authority from his own superiors,the JAC as a whole could reach decisions

promptly and take proper action withouthaving to refer constantly to higher com-mand echelons. In this connection, theAmerican member was in a most enviableposition. General Saville, as well as hissuccessor General Timberlake, could, byvirtue of the fact that they served in the dualcapacity of Chief of Staff, MediterraneanAir Command, and chairman of the JAC,obtain the speedy implementation of the de-cisions reached by the commission. Forthem it was merely a matter of "pickingup one's hat in one place and putting itdown in another."36 The pattern was some-what altered with the arrival of ColonelGardiner. But the latter immediately es-tablished the policy, in agreement with Brig.Gen. Charles C. Chauncey, the new Chiefof Staff, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,that the JAC would have authority to makeall minor decisions, submitting for approvalmatters of importance or affecting policy.37

With the last chairman, Colonel Ervin, whodirectly represented General Eaker on thecommission and therefore enjoyed fuller au-thority than his predecessor, the originalpattern was re-established.

In contrast with his compatriots on theJRC, the French member of the JAC wasin a most favorable position. He enjoyeda considerable degree of authority, for Gen-eral Bouscat, Chief of Staff, FAF, had madehim his personal representative on the JACwith full power to speak for him. As aresult, his American and British colleaguesregarded him as a partner member of equalstanding. Yet it would be inaccurate todescribe the commission as being entirelytripartite in character, for policy mattersremained an exclusive Anglo-Americanresponsibility. When such matters needed

34 Gardiner, Journal, 9 Feb-4 May 44, in Gar-diner's private files.

35 The British appear to have objected stronglyto making these reports available to the French.At the insistence of the Americans, they finallyrelented.

36 Interv with Saville, Jul 51.37 Statement in Corres from Col Gardiner, 1951.


to be cleared with higher French author-ities, they were brought directly to theattention of General Bouscat who, fre-quently, was invited to come and present hisviews in person before the commission.The bonds of friendship established earlybetween him and the members of the JACmade possible the speedy conclusion ofagreements. The co-operation which theFrench Chief of Air Staff extended so will-ingly proved especially useful in the initialperiod. After three days of frank andthorough discussions regarding the capabil-ities and needs of the FAF, GeneralsSaville and Bouscat came to a completeunderstanding as to the goal to be achieved:"not a lot of squadrons but an efficient airforce."38 This meeting of minds betweenthe two Chiefs of Staff, each stating freelywhat his respective command was in a posi-tion to contribute, got the JAC off to anexcellent start.

Relations between General Bouscat andGeneral Saville's successors continued onthe same cordial and fruitful plane. Bythe time of Colonel Ervin's chairmanship,collaboration between French air commandand JAC was so firmly established that thecommission could reach most decisions onColonel Hartemann's sole recommenda-tions without further reference to GeneralBouscat. The several American membersconsulted since the war on the matter havehighly commended the manner in whichColonel Hartemann acquitted himself ofhis functions. Likewise they have beenunanimous in their praise of the co-operativespirit displayed by all responsible Frenchair authorities.39 Within the commissionitself, perfect teamwork on the part of men

naturally endowed with widely divergentnational idiosyncrasies and representingthree different air forces resulted in greaterefficiency and prevented dissipation of ef-fort.

Co-operation with the JRC was estab-lished from the outset. This was essentialconsidering the role which the JRCwas expected to play in relation to theJAC. With the JRC rested the responsi-bility for ensuring the shipment from theUnited States of the air equipment orderedby the JAC, and for requisitioning allitems common to air and ground forcesrequested by the commission. The neces-sary co-operation was achieved simply bymaking the chairman of the JAC the exofficio air member of the JRC. Co-oper-ation was further strengthened by the factthat the JRC liaison officer with the FrenchAir Force, Maj. John W. Ames—who, inci-dentally, had a desk at General Bouscat'sheadquarters—also worked closely with theJAC.

SCAMA and Stock Control Section

Both SCAMA and Stock Control Sec-tion, JRC, worked toward the same goal,the establishment of a French central sup-ply authority similar to the American SOS.It is fitting therefore that, after a briefstudy of the organization and evolution ofeach, an account be given of their commonoperating procedures.40

Organization of SCAMA

In establishing SCAMA the directive of15 October 1943 made the agency directly

38 Interv with Saville, Jul 51.39 Intervs with Saville and Ervin, Jul 51; Corres

from Gardiner, 1951.

40 For the background of their establishmentand an account of their achievements, see pp.132-38, 174-76, above.


responsible to 4e Bureau (G-4) of theFrench General Staff. In this mannerSCAMA was to enjoy a status equal to thatof the services. Its high position in thechain of command was expected to enableit to deal authoritatively with other agen-cies. Such would have been the case hadthe services extended their full co-oper-ation. As pointed out earlier, it was notuntil SCAMA's authority had beenredefined in stronger terms, especially bythe 9 January 1944 directive, that thenecessary co-operation was graduallyeffected.41

The 9 January 1944 directive also pre-scribed the internal organization ofSCAMA, although, by a curious contra-diction, it empowered the director to setforth its composition, internal co-ordina-tion, and functioning.42 The director,Col. Emile Charpentier, himself ap-pointed by General Leyer, had no alter-native but to follow the pattern establishedin the directive.

When its organization was completed,SCAMA included a central agency andfield echelons. (Chart 4) At the headof the entire system was the director, sta-tioned in the headquarters of the centralagency set up in Oran in proximity withSOS, NATOUSA. The central agencywas composed of a clerical staff, a co-ordinating group, four bureaus whosefunctions corresponded approximately tothose of a general staff in the AmericanArmy, and five sections each representingone of the French services, namely, Ord-nance, Engineers, Medical, Signal, andQuartermaster. A sixth section was

eventually added to handle air matters.Also considered operationally part of thecentral agency was the Stock ControlSection.

The field echelons comprised the mili-tary bases in the ports of embarkation anddebarkation, a liaison detachment withSOS, a mobile group for technical liaisonwith depots and warehouses, and variousrepresentatives with the services and theGeneral Staff. Over all of these echelonsSCAMA had exclusive authority. Inaddition its jurisdiction extended, but onlyinsofar as the movement of matériel andsupplies and the keeping of records wereconcerned, to all service establishments.

Thanks to this intricate but necessaryorganization, SCAMA was able to keepa finger on the pulse of the entire Frenchsupply system.

Organization of StockControl Section

Stock Control Section, JRC, was organ-ized on 5 November 1943 under the com-mand of Colonel Geraghty.43 As SOS,NATOUSA, had given him no instructionsas to what specific duties his section was tofulfill, Colonel Geraghty merely set outto meet problems as they were presentedby the French and to "assume responsibili-ties growing out of these problems as amatter of course."44

When he had recruited enough special-ists to begin operations, Colonel Geraghtyorganized them into five branches corre-sponding to the five sections of SCAMA—

41 See p. 137, above.42 Dir 3751-3 EMGG/4, 15 Oct 43; Dir 5499-3

EMGG/4, 25 Nov 43; Dir 340 EMGG/9, 9 Jan44, JRC 400.2/002 Stock Control Section.

43 Unless otherwise indicated, this section isbased upon Col Michael Geraghty, The Historyof the Stock Control Section, JRC, copy in JRCFiles.

44 Memo, Geraghty for Larkin, 8 Jul 44,JRC 400.2/002 Stock Control System, SCAMA.


Engineer, Ordnance, Medical, Signal, andQuartermaster. Each branch was thensubdivided into four groups—requisition,stock control, technical, and warehousing.Assisting the commanding officer was anexecutive officer and the AdministrativeBranch. Close liaison with the JRC wasmaintained through Colonel Crump, amember of the committee.

Finding sufficient trained personnelconstituted one of the major problems fac-ing Colonel Geraghty. During the firstfour months his section hardly increased innumerical strength because U.S. Army re-placement depots could furnish few officersand enlisted men with adequate supplyexperience. It was not until February1944, with the arrival from the UnitedStates of a substantial number of personneldispatched at the request of Colonel Ger-aghty, that the situation began to improve.Eventually the section grew to a strengthof some 50 officers and 100 enlisted men.45

Another major difficulty confronting thesection was its inability, in spite of repeatedefforts, to secure official status and to obtaina table of organization. For this reasonthe officers and men employed by the sec-tion were "loaned" from replacement cen-ters and placed on detached service with,or assigned as overstrength to, FrenchTraining Section, or more accurately,2674th Headquarters Company, JRC(Provisional). They were attached to theservice company of Mediterranean BaseSection for rations and quarters, with theunderstanding, however, that they were tobe employed by Stock Control Section.Lack of official recognition made each ad-ministrative detail a major problem for thesolution of which various commands had tobe approached. The section found it par-

ticularly difficult to obtain the vehicleswhich it needed to carry out its duties.Thus efficiency and progress were frequentlyretarded.

The function of the officers and men ofeach of the five technical branches was toassist their French counterparts in SCAMAby imparting to them their knowledge ofsupply. This method of placing U.S. per-sonnel side by side with correspondingFrench personnel proved to be the most ad-vantageous way of giving maximum on-the-spot assistance and advice to the French.In spite of its inherent limitations, StockControl Section succeeded in reaching itsgoal. There is little doubt that without itsfine performance, the "SCAMA system"might well never have been firmly estab-lished.

Stock Control Section ceased to functionin late July 1944.

Operating Procedures

SCAMA and Stock Control Section fol-lowed three basic principles in carrying outtheir operations. These principles, whichcorresponded to three major goals to bereached, were embodied in Colonel Char-pentier's operational instruction dated 26January 1944.46

First, and to quote from the instruction,all records maintained by SCAMA were tobe based on the actual existence of stocks inwarehouses. To apply this principle re-quired that a complete physical inventorybe conducted of all matériel and suppliesin French hands. As already stated, suchan inventory proved impracticable for manymonths owing especially to lack of sufficient

45 Ibid.

46 Gen Instruction on Functioning of SCAMA,26 Jan 44, in Geraghty, History of Stock ControlSection, App B, JRC Files.


trained personnel in French establishments.In fact it did not take place until 15 May1944. Only then did SCAMA have, for thefirst time, a fairly complete and accuratepicture of stocks on hand throughout NorthAfrica.

Second, a "common language" had tobe established. The 26 January instruc-tion itself provided a number of definitionsfor words currently used in French andAmerican services. This was a welcomestep, for misunderstandings had frequentlyresulted from differences in French andAmerican definitions of the same words. Inusing the term requisition, for instance, theFrench meant a delivery order given to adepot by a qualified authority, or an ap-proved requisition. The Americans, on theother hand, were using it to mean a requestsubmitted by a unit within the limits of itsrights of allowances. For this and othersimilar terms, definitions in simple and clearlanguage were established once and for all.Thus a common technical vocabulary, in-cluding such English words as tally-in,tally-out, bin cards and French terms suchas gestion, demande de réquisition, réserved'entretien, was compiled for compulsoryuse by all personnel concerned, French aswell as American. Much later, in 1944,SCAMA published a complete French-Eng-lish technical dictionary which was madeavailable throughout the various interestedagencies and armies.

Third, information as collected withinthe SCAMA system was to be given on con-venient, thoroughly understood, standardforms for use by all concerned. To achievethis objective, Colonels Geraghty andCharpentier first proceeded to eliminatesome of the thirty-odd forms and cards thenin use throughout the French services.They finally adopted six standard forms,

three stock cards, and one stock identifi-cation tag, or ten in all.

Obviously the common aim of theseprinciples was to achieve standardization.To make it as nearly 100-percent completeas possible, Colonels Geraghty and Char-pentier took other steps. They agreed thatevery article, whether it be a unit contain-ing minor items, an assembly of variousparts, or a part detached and consideredseparately, was to be designated by theAmerican stock number and nomencla-ture.47 They also prescribed a method fortagging and identifying U.S. equipment atall echelons and made its application com-pulsory. Finally, they issued definite in-structions illustrated by charts on theprocedure for the reception and handlingof American matériel from debarkationbase to warehouses and on to units in processof re-equipping. Briefly the procedure wasas follows. Upon the arrival of the cargoship, the base commandant checked theFrench shipment against the ship's manifest,separated the matériel according to service,and forwarded it to the designated place ofstorage. He then sent a detailed report ofthis phase of his activities to SCAMA. Atthe storage plant, boxes and bales wereturned over to the services where they wereclassified and inventoried. The entry ofevery item into magasins (warehouses) wasrecorded on a tally-in card. A bin carddescribing the item, its location, and stocknumber was then made and filed in thewarehouse office, and a bin tag giving thedescription as well as the English andFrench name of the item was prepared foridentification in the warehouse. A tally-out card was filled after an item had lefta warehouse. All officers in charge werewarned that periodic inspections by French

47 Ibid.


and U.S. officers would be made to de-termine the accuracy of all information sorecorded.

As a result of the application of these vari-ous measures and procedures, SCAMA, indue time, was placed in a position where ithad an accurate record of (1) arrivals ofequipment at the port, (2) actual receiptsof items in warehouses, (3) actual issues ofitems from warehouses, and (4) physicalinventories. Thus could SCAMA fulfillone of its main missions, that of keepingthe French High Command informed at alltimes of the exact status of American ma-tériel available in French hands.

French Training Section

The formal activation of French Train-ing Section as an agency of the U.S. FifthArmy occurred on 13 May 1943, concur-rently with the appointment of GeneralKingman as its chief.48 The section wasthe successor to the Rearmament AdvisorySection established earlier in April. Sta-tioned at first at Oudjda, French Morocco,FTS moved in August to Oran, Algeria,where General Kingman set up headquar-ters and remained for the following fourteenmonths.49

FTS retained close contact with the vari-ous agencies which, before its own activa-tion, had taken part in the French trainingprogram, such as G-3 and G-4, AFHQ,SOS, NATOUSA, and to a limited extent,the JRC. As these agencies continued to

maintain an interest in certain aspects ofthe program, General Kingman reportedfrequently to them on the progress of hisown activities. The JRC, however, grad-ually assumed a more extensive role of co-ordination and, within a short time, gavemore attention to the activities of the FTSthan the other agencies. General King-man and the JRC began working in closerassociation. They exchanged informationon their day-to-day activities, and togetherplanned the over-all training program, JRCoften acting as intermediary between FTSand the French High Command.

Soon after the distribution of the firstsubstantial allocations of American equip-ment in May-June 1943, the JRC recog-nized the need of giving units immediateinstruction in the proper use and mainte-nance of their newly acquired matériel. Asthe official clearinghouse for all rearma-ment matters, the committee felt that itsown activities and those of FTS must beintegrated to provide maximum assistance.By August, with the equipment ordered aspart of Phase II then on its way, integrationof JRC and FTS seemed so logical to Gen-eral Kingman himself that he suggested thetransfer of his section from the control ofFifth Army to that of NATOUSA, andrecommended that his personnel be madeavailable for use under the general super-vision of the JRC.50 General Kingman'sproposal was accepted, and on or about 14August his section passed under the controlof the JRC. Thereafter it was known of-ficially as the French Training Section, JRC.

A few days later, on 25 August 1943, byNATOUSA order, the personnel of FTSwas organized into the 2674th Headquar-ters Company, JRC (Provisional). The

48 This section draws upon the JRC Files: 330/001 Inspections—Misc, 330/002 Inspections byGen Kingman, 330/003 Rpts of FTS, 350/001Training Rpts of Observers, 350/002 Training FrArmy Units, 350/003 (Continuation of 350/002);and SHAEF Mission to France, Rearmt Div Files:320-1 Orgn and Function, 353-1 Training.

49 See pp. 231 ff., above.

50 Ltr, Kingman to Spalding, 9 Aug 43, JRC353/003 Training Fr Army Personnel.


company, which enjoyed the unique dis-tinction of being commanded by a brigadiergeneral, was placed under the administra-tive control of Headquarters, Mediter-ranean Base Section, and assigned for oper-ational duty with the JRC. Shortly after,in September, the personnel of ArmoredForce Detachment, which had beenbrought over in June from the MiddleEast to instruct French armored units, wasorganized into the 6704th Armored ForceTraining Company and placed under theadministrative control first of MBS and inMay 1944 of SOS, NATOUSA. The twounits merged, later in the year, as the 2674thRegiment, JRC, the administrative unit forthe FTS. By this time, FTS had reached astrength of some 50 officers and 400 en-listed men. Because of the highly technicalnature of the armored force training pro-gram, and the fact that a large number ofarmored units were still to be trained, FTSunderwent another change in organizationjust before the end of training operationsin North Africa. It was split into the twooriginal component organizations, namely,the 2674th Company, JRC, and the 6704thArmored Force Training Company. InOctober 1944 the two components, with atotal strength of 643 officers and men,moved to Marseille. Soon after, the 2674thCompany, JRC, was disbanded and, on 1November, the remaining unit was reorgan-ized as the 6834th Training Regiment,JRC.51

The arrangement by which FTS hadbeen placed under the control of JRC wasnot designed to decrease the authority ofthe former or to subordinate it in any way

to the JRC, rather to obtain the greatestco-operation possible between the twoagencies. Although the chairman of theJoint Rearmament Committee issued ordersto the FTS, these were usually initiated atthe instigation and always with the completeconcurrence of General Kingman. Liaisonwas effected by Colonel Knox who servedas the FTS representative on the JRC.Colonel Knox continued in this capacityuntil the end of the North African rearma-ment operations.52 Possibly because of thetechnical requirements involved and of theneed for continuity in the program, the keypersonnel of FTS changed very little. Gen-eral Kingman and his American and Frenchassistants carried on this assignment duringalmost the entire period.

General Kingman's selection as directorof FTS appears to have been due to hisknowledge of U.S. equipment, especiallyarmor, his knowledge of the French lan-guage and of the French Army, which hegreatly improved while attending the Centred'Etude des Chars de Combat at Versaillesin 1923-24, and the fact that as a generalofficer he held a rank commensurate withthe functions involved. French officers in-terviewed since the war have been unan-imous in their praise of General King-man's keen understanding of the trainingand material problems then facing theFrench Army, and of his ability in develop-ing a sound and effective program.53

General Kingman's deputy was ColonelL'Huillier of the French Army. His official

51 Much later, on 11 January 1945, the regiment,renamed 6834th Rearmament Regiment, served asthe training organization for the Rearmament Divi-sion, SHEAF Mission to France. See pp. 386, 387,below.

52 As a vice consul in Algiers, Colonel Knox hadtaken an active part in the secret preparations forthe Allied landings of November 1942.

53 Intervs with L'Huillier, Tiers, Devinck, Reg-nault. In recognition of General Kingman's workin training the North African forces, the FrenchArmy awarded him the Order of the Legion ofHonor (Chevalier) in September 1944. See alsop. 388n, below.


title was Chief, French Liaison Section withFTS. Before his appointment to that poston 18 August 1943, he had been assistantto his predecessors, Col. Raoul Bonvalot andlater Lt. Col. René Préclaire, each of whomserved only a short term. ColonelL'Huillier's main responsibility consisted ineffecting the necessary spadework beforeeach inspection conducted by the FTS. As-sisting the deputy were several French of-ficers, among them Lt. Claude Tiers, whoparticipated in the activities of FTS fromJuly 1943 to the end of the North Africanrearmament operations.54

The officers whom General Kingman de-tailed as senior advisers to the divisions con-tributed greatly to the success of FTS. Notonly did their daily presence among thetroops help the latter considerably duringthe training phase, but their gallant con-duct under fire, in the case of those who ac-companied the divisions to Italy, drew fromthe French no small degree of admiration.These senior advisers were: 1st DB, Capt.Henry Jacobson, later, Lt. Col. Everett A.Luckenbach; 2d DB, Maj. Robert M.Luminaski; 5th DB, Lt. Col. Robert W.Burke; 1st DMI, Lt. Col. W. C. Parnell(in North Africa only) and Lt. C. S. Camp-bell (who accompanied the ReconnaisanceRegiment in Italy); 2d DIM, Lt. Col. RoyStephens; 3d DIA, Lt. Col. Robert J. Shaw;4th DMM, Maj. Archibald W. Green; 9thDIC, Lt. Col. C. H. Cheatham. No ad-visers were attached to the Moroccantabors, only teams, none of which, however,accompanied them to Italy.

The success of the program instituted bythe FTS, attested to frequently by Frenchand U.S. military authorities both dur-

ing and after World War II, is due largelyto the manner in which the section it-self was organized and the way it oper-ated. Having sensed that the closestco-operation between his staff and theFrench must be effected in arranging forthe instruction and inspection of units, Gen-eral Kingman resolved to make of theFTS a mixed French-U.S. organiza-tion. Not only did he see to it that theteams sent to inspect units were bipartite innationality, but, in addition, he requestedand obtained the assignment to the sectionof French officers and made the Frenchsenior officer his own deputy. This systemhad many obvious advantages. Not onlydid Colonel L'Huillier participate in theplanning and implementation of the train-ing and inspection programs, therebyensuring that these would be consonantwith French capabilities and desires, but hewas able to act as liaison between FTS andFrench unit commanders. In addition, ifit became necessary to consult the FrenchHigh Command before reaching a decisionaffecting policy, he could judiciously adviseGeneral Kingman on how best to approachthe responsible officials, General Leyer andColonel Blanc in particular.

The responsibility for making all neces-sary arrangements with French command-ers regarding the training and inspectionof their respective units rested largely withthe deputy. To him also fell the task ofpreparing, on the basis of individual after-inspection reports submitted by the variousteams, the synthesis which General King-man used for the drafting of his final reportto the Joint Rearmament Committee.

In June, July, and August 1944, FrenchTraining Section inspected nearly allFrench training establishments to deter-mine the degree of efficiency of the training

54 Lieutenant Tiers was awarded the Bronze StarMedal in December 1945.


program and to check on the state of pre-paredness of units being trained. At theend of August, as the North African pro-gram was drawing to an end and theFrench themselves were assuming theresponsibility for the training of replace-ment troops, plans were made for movingFTS to the Continent. On 25 Septemberan advance party consisting of a few officersand enlisted men reached Marseille.Another party arrived soon after, GeneralKingman meanwhile remaining in NorthAfrica to instruct and inspect the last pro-gram units. On 8 October General King-man and Colonel L'Huillier left Oran forMarseille, turning over the supervision of

the remaining FTS activities in NorthAfrica to Col. Richard F. Fairchild. Shortlyafter his arrival in France and while atHeadquarters, 6th Army Group, en routeto 1st French Army, General Kingman,Colonel L'Huillier, and personal staff wereordered to Paris to establish a FrenchTraining Section there. The rear echeloncommanded by Colonel Fairchild was com-posed of about six officers and fifteenenlisted men. As these men also movedto France on or about 15 November, allFTS activities ceased in North Africa.55

55 Msg LX-46516, Larkin to CG MBS, 11 Oct44, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC.

PART TWO

THE METROPOLITAN FORCES

CHAPTER XVIII

Initial Assistance

Even while they were supplying arms tothe North African ground, air, and navalforces, Allied officials as well as the FrenchHigh Command gave considerable attentionto two other important logistical problemsconnected with French participation in thewar. One was the continuance of materialassistance to the increasing number ofpatriots engaged in subversive operationsagainst the German forces occupying themother country. The other was the even-tual provision of equipment to the forceslikely to be raised upon the liberation of anypart of France.

Supplying arms to the French Resistancebegan before the North African rearma-ment operations and continued simultane-ously with them. Until the cross-Channeloperation (OVERLORD), the commitmentwas largely a British one. From OVERLORDon, the United States, which by that timewas assuming an increasing share of theburden, was more seriously concerned, aswas Britain, with the larger aspect ofthe problem, namely, the equipping ofFrench liberated manpower. Indeed, plansas formulated by SHAEF contemplatedthat, as fast as Resistance groups wereoverrun by advancing Allied armies, theywere to be incorporated, as all otherliberated manpower recruited for service,into regular Army or labor units. It ap-pears logical, therefore, in view of the U.S.role in the matter, to consider the two prob-lems—material assistance to the Resistanceand provision of equipment to liberated

manpower—as part of one single undertak-ing, the rearmament of the Metropolitanforces.

Supply of the Resistance Forces

Organization

In the fall of 1940 two agencies were es-tablished in London for the purpose of main-taining in France a will to resist the enemy,and of providing patriots with materialmeans for conducting subversive operationsagainst the occupying forces. One of theseagencies was a staff section of General deGaulle's headquarters, known first asService de Renseignements (SR), later asBureau Central de Renseignements et d'Ac-tion (Militaire) (BCRA). The other was aBritish organization, known as the FrenchSection of Special Operations Executive(SOE), the latter being responsible to theMinistry of Economic Warfare.1

Although the BCRA enjoyed a substan-tial measure of autonomy, it was, neverthe-less, entirely dependent upon SOE forobtaining the material means with which tocarry out its operations. As a result thebrunt of the task of assisting the Resistancerested on SOE and the other British agencies(the Ministry of Economic Warfare, theWar Office, the Admiralty) upon whichSOE itself was dependent for support. Be-

1 The French Forces of the Interior, MS, I, 3,copy in OCMH. See Bibliographical Note.


ginning with the spring of 1941, SOE, to-gether with BCRA, infiltrated into FranceBritish as well as British-trained Frenchleaders, agents, radio operators, intelligenceofficers, and saboteurs. Most weredropped by parachute, although some wentby sea. SOE also dropped such smallamounts of equipment and supplies as werepermitted by meager air transport facilities.Working in collaboration with SOE, from1942 on, was a special Committee on Equip-ment for Patriot Forces appointed by theBritish Chiefs of Staff to consider the prob-lems of equipment for Resistance groupsand liberated manpower.

In the summer of 1942 a Special Oper-ations branch of the American Office ofStrategic Services (OSS) was set up inLondon, bringing into being an Americancounterpart of SOE which, although inde-pendent of the British organization,worked in close collaboration with it.This co-operation led to the unification ofthe operational control of the Londongroup of SOE and the Special Operationsbranch of OSS-London, and to the estab-lishment, during the last months of 1943,of a single headquarters known first asSOE/SO and later, on 1 May 1944, asSpecial Force Headquarters (SFHQ).Such activities of SOE/SO as fell withinthe sphere of the Supreme Commander forwestern Europe were placed under the op-erational control of his chief of staff.2

Determined that fuller assistance shouldbe given to the French Resistance, PrimeMinister Churchill organized, in Jan-uary 1944, a special informal committeeheaded by Lord Selborne, Minister of Eco-nomic Warfare, and composed of represent-atives of SOE, OSS, BCRA, and the Air

Ministry. The committee was instructedto devise ways and means of increasing theflow of military equipment, because airliftrather than availability of matériel was stillthe limiting factor in supplying Resistancegroups.3

Finally, to complete the organization ofassistance to the Resistance, a Mediter-ranean counterpart of SFHQ was estab-lished on 14 May 1944 under the name ofSpecial Project Operations Center(SPOC). Its function was to implementSHAEF's control over Resistance groups insouthern France.4

Meanwhile, the BCRA was continuing itsrelatively independent existence. Withthe approach of the cross-Channel oper-ation, the need was felt for more co-ordina-tion, not only between the Resistancegroups and Allied agencies engaged in theirsupport, but also between the activitiesthemselves of the various agencies involved.As a preliminary step, on 6 June the Resist-ance forces, renamed officially Forces Fran-çaises de l'Intérieur (FFI), or FrenchForces of the Interior, were placed underthe command of Lt. Gen. Pierre Koenig,who was to operate directly under the com-mand of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Ex-peditionary Force. Two weeks later, at theinsistence of the French, SHAEF approvedthe constitution of a tripartite headquartersand staff to co-ordinate all Allied activitiesin support of the FFI. The staff, calledEtat-Major des Forces Françaises de l'In-térieur (EMFFI), with headquarters inLondon and commanded by General Koe-nig, was composed of representatives fromSFHQ, BCRA, SOE, OSS, and other

2 SHAEF G-3 Ops C 322-7 (2 and 3) SFHQOrgn and Terms of Reference.

3 Msg B-270, Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 Mar44, ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 2-A.

4 Memo, Wilson To All Concerned, 14 May 44,AFHQ History of Special Operations, Medi-terranean Theater, 1944-45, DRB AGO.

INITIAL ASSISTANCE 301

agencies. Finally on 8 July, in anticipationof the launching of ANVIL, the command ofthe FFI in southern France was vested inMaj. Gen. Gabriel Cochet under the su-preme command of General Wilson.5

American Contribution

Before the establishment of SOE/SO(hereafter referred to as SFHQ) in the fallof 1943, the effort to arm the French Re-sistance had been solely British. Even for ashort period afterward, the effort continuedto be largely British. Except for threeplanes operating from North Africa, U.S.air force commands were reported to beunable to place the necessary aircraft andspecially trained crews at the disposal ofSFHQ. The sum total of Anglo-Americanassistance was still inadequate, this at a timewhen some 50,000 Frenchmen who had fledto mountainous and wooded areas were saidto be organizing into Maquis, or guerrillagroups. With many thousands more ex-pected to join, it was imperative that Alliedeffort to supply them with arms and equip-ment be sharply increased. Already themen in the Maquis were reported to begrowing impatient, even indignant at whatthey regarded as Allied unwillingness tokeep promises. U.S. political representa-tives in Algiers were warning that the situ-ation was fraught with military, psychologi-cal, and political dangers.6

It was not until January 1944 that, at thedirection of the British Prime Minister, who

had just discussed the matter with Generalde Gaulle, substantial additional temporaryBritish airlift was made available to SFHQ.By February the British were carrying outtheir commitment with the utmost vigor andwere reported to be giving very high priorityto the undertaking.7

In the meantime, the first Americantransport planes to be permanently assignedto SFHQ for operation from the UnitedKingdom had, in January 1944, begun tofly supply missions over northern France.Attempts by the chief of OSS, Brig. Gen.William J. Donovan, to get an increasedallotment of American aircraft were unsuc-cessful. As the Combined Chiefs of Staffwere informed in February, the U.S. ArmyAir Forces warned that it could not for thepresent divert any more airplanes to SFHQ.It could only authorize local air command-ers to use such aircraft as in their opinioncould be spared for the purpose.8

By March the disproportion between theBritish and the American efforts was sogreat (approximately ten to one) that theimpression was reported to be gainingcredence among French officials in NorthAfrica and in the United Kingdom that,not only was the undertaking an entirelyBritish one, but the United States was evenopposed to arming the French undergroundfor political reasons.9 Eager to counteractthe unjustified comment being directedagainst the U.S. Government, the Secretaryof State, Cordell Hull, sought the views ofthe U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the matter. On17 April General Marshall furnished Hull

5 The French Forces of the Interior, II, 425, copyin OCMH; Memo, Wilson To All Concerned, 8 Jul44, AFHQ History of Special Operations,Mediterranean Theater, 1944-45, DRB AGO.

6 Msgs, Edwin C. Wilson to Cordell Hull, 110,11 Jan 44, and 129, 12 Jan 44, and Memo, McCloyfor OPD, 27 Jan 44, ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43),Sec 2-A.

7 Msg ML-382, Donovan, OSS, to Eaker, 11 Feb44, AFHQ 0100/12A G-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr.

8 Min, CCS 145th Mtg, 11 Feb 44; Memo, JPSfor JCS, 13 Apr 44, ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43),Sec 2-A.

9 Memo, Cordell Hull for Leahy, 20 Mar 44, insame file.


with information which, he hoped, wouldhelp in dispelling "any impression that mayexist that the U.S. is less aware than theBritish of the potential importance of theFrench Resistance groups, and less willingthan the British to utilize the very valuableaid the underground can render to our oper-ations." Marshall explained, first of all,that the committee organized in London bythe Prime Minister was, according to Gen-eral Eisenhower himself, working "in fullcooperation with and under the generalsupervision of" the Supreme Commander.As for the supplies dropped to French Re-sistance groups, they were, in a large part,furnished by the United States. GeneralMarshall then reminded Secretary Hull thatthe United States had been engaged forsome twelve months in equipping a Frenchexpeditionary force "comparable in size toour own peace-time army," an undertaking,he added, to which the British had made nosubstantial contribution.10

At the same time the French Committeeof National Liberation had approachedboth the American and British Governmentswith the suggestion that a special confer-ence be held in London for the purpose ofincreasing further the flow of militaryequipment into France. The U.S. Chiefsof Staff seized the occasion to clarify theAmerican position on the matter by point-ing out to the CCS that the special com-mittee already functioning in London ren-dered the French suggestion inopportune.Such was the substance of a message which,at the request of the JCS, the CCS ad-dressed to General Eisenhower on 24 April1944.11

It was then that a disquieting reportreached Secretary Hull which quoted Gen-eral de Gaulle as having expressed, in thecourse of a press conference given in Algierson 21 April, his satisfaction at British ef-forts to supply the Resistance, efforts which,he implied, were solely British.12 Such astatement, in the opinion of the Secretary ofState, could not remain unanswered.13 Ap-prised of the incident, the JCS agreed withHull's suggestion to draw the matter to theimmediate attention of the responsibleAmerican military and civil authorities inAlgiers and in London. In the belief thatit could be more effectively handled at CCSlevel, JCS drafted a message for General deGaulle and proposed to the representativesof the British Chiefs of Staff in Washingtonthat it be delivered to him via GeneralWilson.14 The communication, intended toclarify the apparent misunderstanding indi-cated by General de Gaulle's statement tothe press, pointed out that the arming ofthe Resistance had, for some three monthspast, been a joint U.S.-British effort, notan exclusive one of either nation; that thematériel dropped in France was being drawnfrom a common pool; finally, that the entireoperation itself was under the control ofboth the Supreme Commander, Allied Ex-peditionary Force, and the Supreme AlliedCommander in the Mediterranean. Thismessage, incidentally, never was sent. TheBritish Chiefs of Staff having subsequentlyindicated informally that they did not in-

10 Memo, Marshall for Hull, 17 Apr 44, in samefile.

11 Msg FACS 18, CCS to Eisenhower, 24 Apr 44,in same file.

12 The exact words of General de Gaulle were:"Je puis vous dire avec beaucoup de satisfactionque, depuis trois mois, les efforts de nos alliésbritanniques—car ce sont eux qui en ont le mérite—pour armer la Résistance française ont été grandset couronnés de succès." Text in de Gaulle, Dis-cours et Messages, p. 434.

13 Memo, Hull for Marshall, 26 Apr 44, ABC400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 2-A.

14 Memo, JCS for Hull, 29 May 44, in same file.


tend to take any action on the issue, theJCS decided, in August, to withdraw theiroriginal proposal.15

General Eisenhower, meanwhile, hadtaken the matter in his own hands. In amessage to the JCS dated 1 May, supple-mented by a personal letter to GeneralMarshall, he reviewed the situation withrespect to American material assistance tothe Resistance forces. He recognized that,in the past, the effort had been predomi-nantly British since no U.S. aircraft hadbeen made available for airlift to Franceuntil 1 January 1944, and only a very fewthereafter. But the situation had changedconsiderably in recent weeks. Exclusiveof aircraft operating from North Africa,the number of planes as then perma-nently allotted to SFHQ in the UnitedKingdom was 32 American as against 22British. The British, it was true, hadmade available to SFHQ supplementaryairlift averaging approximately 65 aircraftper month since February. Plans wereafoot to increase the permanent U.S. allot-ment by 25 aircraft. In addition. U.S.supplies were being drawn upon by SFHQat an increasing rate. Given adequatepersonnel and means both in the UnitedKingdom and in North Africa, the UnitedStates would shortly be in a position to"equalize" its effort with that of theBritish.16

A few days later, General Devers, com-manding general of the U.S. forces in NorthAfrica, likewise reported on the situationas it related to his theater. Judging fromthe figures he quoted in a message to Gen-eral Marshall, the American contribution

in terms of tonnage of supplies deliveredwas still greatly inferior to that of the Brit-ish. But an improvement was in sight, for9 U.S. aircraft had just been added to the3 operating from that theater.17

A compilation of the data contained inthe messages from Generals Eisenhowerand Devers was immediately forwarded byGeneral Marshall to President Roosevelt.The memorandum assured the Presidentthat the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had the matter"under continuing review" and that Gen-eral Eisenhower had advised that he wouldexplain fully to the French in London theposition of the U.S. Government in thematter.18

By mid-May the American effort hadsharply increased and General Eisenhowerwas able to report that, under the currentallotment of aircraft to SFHQ, the Ameri-cans could now deliver 160 tons a month asagainst 132 tons from the British. Fur-thermore, an additional allotment of U.S.aircraft, just granted, would make it pos-sible to raise the figure for the Americaneffort to 280 tons by 1 July 1944.19 Thatthis was not wishful thinking, but a firmintent to expand American participationin the combined commitment, was amplysubstantiated by later events.

Meanwhile, units of the French Forcesof the Interior, particularly active since thebeginning of the year, were redoublingpreparations in anticipation of the forth-coming Allied landings. From 6 June,when OVERLORD was launched, to the endof July, the period of the battle in Nor-mandy, they embarked on large-scale

15 CCS 492/4, 29 May 44, JCS Memo, 3 Jul 44,and other papers, in same file.

16 Msgs S-51066, Eisenhower to JCS, 1 May 44,and S-51396, Eisenhower to Marshall, 6 May 44,in same file.

17 Msg, Devers to Marshall, 5 May 44, CM-IN3917.

18 Memo, Actg CofS for President, 8 May 44,ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 2-A.

19 Msg S-52023, Eisenhower to Marshall, 17May 44, SHAEF SGS 475/1, Vol. I, Policy.


guerrilla and sabotage operations. Toco-ordinate their effort with that of theassaulting Allied forces, assist further intheir organization and supply, andstrengthen their fighting potential, EMFFIdispatched to them by parachute, from theUnited Kingdom and North Africa, sev-eral thousand American, British, andFrench Commandos, liaison officers, andother troops. The Commandos included11 U.S. Operations Groups, each com-posed of 4 officers and 30 men, and theBritish Special Air Service (SAS) Brigade,of which two battalions were French—the2d and 3d Parachute Regiments. Theliaison troops comprised some 90 three-men teams (called "Jedburgh" from thename of the small town in southern Scot-land), each composed of 1 American orBritish officer, 1 French officer, and 1 non-commissioned officer acting as signalman.Other personnel included individual agents(organizers, leaders, sabotage experts) andmissions (command staffs, medical teams),all drawn from the ranks of the threenations.

In some areas, the FFI acted spon-taneously and without sufficient co-ordina-tion with the Allied High Command. Insouthern France the revolt against the Ger-man forces gathered too much momentumto be checked. General Donovan fearedthat failure to support the FFI troops inthat area on a sufficient scale to preventtheir liquidation by the enemy would notonly destroy a valuable military asset butproduce unfavorable political repercus-sions.20 With this in view, OSS arrangedto have additional U.S. aircraft assignedfor a mass daylight supply drop, the firstsuch undertaking in the European Theater

of Operations. The venture, which tookplace on 25 June, was highly successful.Five combat wings of the 3d BombardmentDivision, U.S. Eighth Air Force, represent-ing 180 bombers, delivered to some 20,000guerrillas scattered over four separate areasin southern France more than 300 tons ofsupplies, mostly American, all packed insome 2,000 American containers by per-sonnel in OSS packing stations. It hadbeen a "100-percent-American show" andthe Prime Minister was then urged to puton a similar British performance. A weeklater, General Donovan, writing to Gen-eral Marshall, prefaced his account of theoperation as follows: "It is now possible topublicize our aid to the French Resistanceand thus to cultivate for the U.S. the goodwill of the French people." The chief ofOSS then voiced the belief that the daylightoperation had been "a tremendous moralebuilder" and had generated gratitude fromthe FFI. One Maquis leader had ex-pressed his feelings in these words: "TheMaquis' thanks to the U.S. Air Force fordamned good show! When is the next?" 21

The next was to follow soon; in fact it tookplace on 14 July, Bastille Day. It, too,was a 100-percent-American operation.

On 22 July General Donovan summed upfor the benefit of the U.S. Chiefs of Staffthe American effort expended since 1 Jan-uary to assist the French Resistance. Inaddition to infiltrating about 70 U.S. agents,American planes had dropped all togethersome 6,000 containers and 2,000 packagespacked by OSS, representing 1,000 tonsgross weight of arms and equipment.22

By then, the FFI had grown by leaps and

20 Memo, Donovan for Marshall, 9 Jul 44, ABC400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 2-A.

21 Ibid.; Rpt, OSS Opn ZEBRA, 24 Jul 44, in samefile.

22 Memo, Donovan for JCS, 22 Jul 44, in samefile.


FRENCH FORCES OF THE INTERIOR at a staging area in southern England,about to receive American clothing and equipment before returning to duty in France, October1944.

bounds to an approximate strength of 200,-000 men. Even with the limited arma-ment at their disposal, these men wererendering considerable assistance to theadvancing Allied armies by fighting theenemy behind his own lines. They wereblowing up bridges, cutting rail lines andwire communications, and setting up road-blocks and ambushes, all so effectively thatenemy units, even armored divisions, werehopelessly cut off and, in the case of some,unable to reach the battle area in time orin a condition to fight. As both the WarDepartment and the War Office were hav-ing difficulty in supplying equipment on a

scale much larger than originally contem-plated, General Eisenhower requested andobtained from the CCS the authorization toissue to Resistance forces on a temporarybasis captured enemy matériel, largely smallarms.23

Throughout the summer, areas contain-ing the scattered groups of FFI were, one byone, overrun by the victorious Allied troops.By October, with most of France liberated,some 60,000-75,000 Maquis were still ac-tively engaged against the German pockets

23 Msgs, SCAF 59, Eisenhower to CCS, 2 Aug44, and FACS 56, CCS to Eisenhower, 15 Aug44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5.


entrenched on the Atlantic coast, or werebehind the front lines in eastern France.Supply of these groups continued to comefrom the United Kingdom until Novemberwhen EMFFI, the Resistance headquartersin London, closed down. Meanwhile, theother "liberated" groups of FFI had for themost part chosen to continue the fight along-side the Allied armies and were being incor-porated either in the 1st French Army or inunits organized by the French High Com-mand at the direction of SHAEF. Fromthat point on, their rearming was but oneaspect of the larger problem of equippingFrench liberated manpower.24 For the partthey had played in the liberation of theircountry, the FFI had .paid heavily. Thenumber of men and women killed in actionor executed by the enemy up to October1944 has been estimated at 24,000.25

Employment of French LiberatedManpower

The question of employing French liber-ated manpower against the Axis had comeup for brief discussion just before the land-ings in North Africa. In October 1942first General de Gaulle, then GeneralGiraud, anticipating an early Allied assaulton continental France, had submitted pro-posals for raising troops on French soil andrequests for armament. The Allies havingchosen instead to land in North Africa, deGaulle and Giraud devoted their effortsthereafter to rearming the forces availablein that territory. For months afterward theAllies carefully avoided making any com-

mitments with respect to equipping aFrench continental army either upon theliberation of France or after victory waswon. But as time passed it became evidentthat, sooner or later, they would have to facethe problem of employing liberated man-power once an assault had been successfullylaunched on continental France.26

In August 1943 the U.S. Joint StaffPlanners submitted a report on the generalquestion of "equipping Allies, liberatedforces and friendly neutrals." With regardto France, they pointed out that, for purelymilitary and logistical reasons, no unitsformed from liberated manpower could beemployed for from ten to thirteen monthsafter an initial assault on continentalFrance. They recommended that theequipping of liberated manpower be con-fined to forces required for garrison orguard duties and that no attempt be madeto organize assault forces. Endorsing theserecommendations, the CCS agreed that, forthe present, the re-equipping of army unitswould be limited to the obligations of theNorth African rearmament program.27

Meanwhile, the Committee on Equip-ment for Patriot Forces had submitted amemorandum to the Combined Staff Plan-ners for examination and report to the CCS.The committee recommended that theequipment ordered for both Resistancegroups and Patriot forces (the latter beingdefined as "forces which may be embodiedin areas liberated by Allied armies to fighton the side of the UN") be pooled for allo-cation among countries in accordance withthe strategic situation. The committee thenpointed out that equipment requirements

24 For partial list of equipment delivered by OSSto the French Resistance, see Table 4.

25 Lt. Col. P. Santini, "Etude statistique sur lespertes au cours de la guerre 1939-1945," Revuedu Corps de Santé Militaire, X, No. 1 (March,1954).

26 Rpt, JPS to JCS, JCS 201/1, 20 Mar 43. Seepp. 12-13, above.

27 Rpt, JPS to JCS, CCS 317, 18 Aug 43,QUADRANT Conf; Min, CCS 115th Mtg, 23 Aug43, QUADRANT Conf.


TABLE 4—QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT PACKAGED BY OSS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM ANDAIRDROPPED INTO FRANCE: JANUARY-OCTOBER 1944 a

a Excludes equipment dropped into France by OSS-Algiers.Source: Statistics furnished by OSS-Paris, Nov 45, to Fr Gp, Hist Sec, ETOUSA. Copy in OCMH.


for European countries had been formulatedin London and that action had already beentaken to allocate matériel for Patriot forceswhile continuous deliveries were beingmade to Resistance groups.28

Reviewing the various aspects of theproblem on the basis of the findings andrecommendations of the JPS and the Com-mittee on Equipment for Patriot Forces,the British Chiefs of Staff pointed out to theCCS that, in their opinion, there were threeseparate commitments to be considered:equipment to Allied forces and neutrals,equipment for forces useful in winning thewar (Resistance groups and Patriot forces),equipment for postwar armed forces. Thelast of these commitments, they explained,was being made the object of a study by thePost-Hostilities Planning Committee, alsoestablished in London.29 There the matterrested for several months.

In the meantime, French military au-thorities in North Africa were giving in-creased attention to the question of liberatedmanpower. Hampered as they were intheir efforts to organize service and special-ized units by the lack of technicians in NorthAfrica, they were heavily counting on thisnew source of manpower, which they ex-pected to be large, for the fulfillment oftheir commitments. Actually, they were re-lying on it also for the discharge of otherobligations which they had set for them-selves : "to fight the Axis powers in Europeto the finish, to contribute to the occupa-tion of Axis territories and the maintenanceof security in Europe, to assist in the waragainst Japan, and to restore French sover-

eignty to all territories of the FrenchUnion." In the belief that they could notcarry out these commitments without addi-tional forces, they were contemplating avast conscription program for the years1944 to 1946. In a memorandum ad-dressed to the War Department on 16 Octo-ber 1943, the National Defense Committeeestimated that sufficient liberated man-power could be found to extend the 11-division North African program by the endof 1945 to 36 divisions (23 infantry, 10armored, and 3 airborne) with reserves andservices, and to expand the air force to2,800 first-line aircraft. The committeethen urged the War Department to considerwithout delay the assignment of the equip-ment necessary for the additional forces andfor the rehabilitation of military establish-ments in France.30

On 20 October General Leyer for-warded, for inclusion in the U.S. ArmySupply Program for 1944-45, requisitionsfor the 25 divisions to be raised from liber-ated manpower. A few days later, Gen-eral Bouscat, chief of staff of the FrenchAir Force, submitted a detailed plan call-ing for the equipping of new air combatand auxiliary units during 1944, 1945, andthe beginning of 1946. If the new pro-gram was much larger than the originalANFA Plan, General Béthouart explainedto General Marshall, it was because of thewill of the French people to make the maxi-mum contribution to the liberation oftheir country.31

The proposal was received by WarDepartment officials with considerable

28 Rpt, Committee on Equipment for PatriotForces and Resistance Groups, 31 Aug 43, ABC400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A.

29 Memo, COS for CCS, 12 Oct 43, ABC 400.-3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A.

30 Memo, National Defense Committee, 16 Oct43, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 1-A.

31 Memos, Bouscat for JAC and JRC, 2 Nov 43,and Leyer for JRC, 20 Oct 43, JRC Misc Doc,Item 5-b, Fr Liaison 5; Memo, Béthouart forMarshall, 30 Oct 43, ASF Planning Div Files.


skepticism, even some hostility,32 for it wasbeing made at a time when the NorthAfrican program itself appeared unattain-able in its entirety for lack of adequate man-power and was about to be re-examinedwith a view to scaling it downward.Moreover, AFHQ officials definitely feltthat the CFLN was empowered to concernitself only with the North African forcesand that some sort of an agreement must bereached at government level before plansfor Metropolitan French forces could beconsidered. Both Generals Leyer andBouscat had been aware of this fact whenthey submitted their respective requisitions.They pointed out that neither the JointRearmament Committee nor the Joint AirCommission was in position to take anyaction until a decision of principle wasreached on a governmental level. Wash-ington held the same view. Discussingthe French proposal in a memorandum tothe U.S. JCS, General Marshall expressedthe opinion that the question of armingthe French over and above the ANFA com-mitment was one of national policy. Itinvolved such issues as the attitude of theU.S. Government toward the CFLNinsofar as matters outside North Africawere concerned, the attitude of the U.S.Government toward the rearmament ofFrench units to be used in the present war,and, finally, the American policy on theestablishment and maintenance of militaryforces by France after the war. Thesematters clearly were for the decision of thePresident.33 At General Marshall's sug-

gestion, the French proposal was referredto the Joint Strategic Survey Committeefor study and appropriate recommenda-tions to the JCS on which the latter mightadvise the President.

In their report, the members of the JointStrategic Survey Committee expressed thebelief that the current North African re-armament program would enable theFrench to assist in the war against Germanyto the full extent of their capabilities. Theyconsidered it undesirable at this time topromise an increase in armament for pur-poses other than winning the war in Europe.They recommended therefore that no ad-ditional U.S. military assistance and equip-ment be offered to the French beyond thatalready contemplated.34 Endorsing this rec-ommendation, the JCS agreed that "gen-erally, except for minor readjustments fromtime to time to utilize trained French per-sonnel," the current program would not beextended.

Theater officials greatly doubted that sub-stantial forces could be raised on Frenchsoil, as the Germans were draining the coun-try of able-bodied men for employment inGermany. They felt that no great expan-sion of the French forces could be contem-plated before the capitulation of theenemy.35

At the end of December 1943 the Frenchmilitary authorities, who had received noanswer to their October proposal, instructedthe chief of their Military Mission in Wash-ington, General Beynet, to query the WarDepartment as to the intentions of theAmerican Government on the matter.General Marshall could only assure General

32 From the chairman of the MAC (G) the pro-posal elicited a curt "Nuts," which he penciled inthe margin of a report on the proposed Frenchplan addressed to him by the secretary. Memo,Secy MAC (G) for Chmn MAC (G) , 27 Dec 43,ASF Planning Div Files.

33 Memo, Marshall for JCS, 2 Nov 43, ABC091.711 (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A.

34 Memo, JSSC for JCS, 8 Nov 43, in same file.35 Memo, Timberlake Med Air Comd for Deputy

Theater Comdr, 7 Nov 43, JRC 907 Rearmt Plan,1944-45.


Beynet that the desire of the French to par-ticipate in all phases of the operations intheir homeland was fully appreciated andthat it was planned to make the fullest pos-sible use of the French forces in this crucialphase of the war.36

Meanwhile, the CCS had referred to theCombined Staff Planners for study both theJPS 18 August memorandum recommend-ing that no attempt be made to organizeassault forces from French liberated man-power and the British memorandum of 12October regarding the equipping of Resist-ance and Patriot forces. To enable theCPS to formulate plans for arming liberatedmanpower, the CCS requested GeneralEisenhower to determine the total numberand breakdown by nationalities of theliberated manpower which he desired tohave equipped.37 On 9 March GeneralSmith communicated to the CCS, on be-half of the Supreme Commander, a pro-posal for the employment of French andother western European liberated man-power. It was now assumed that a largereservoir of manpower, estimated for theFrench alone at five and a half million men,would become available. A study of whatproportion of this manpower should beequipped had led to the following conclu-sions. Since a French task force was beingequipped and trained in North Africa totake part in the defeat of the German landforces, the Supreme Commander's opera-tional requirement in liberated manpowerdid not extend beyond troops to relieveBritish and U.S. fighting forces from linesof communications duties and to gar-rison liberated territory for internal security

reasons. The need was for units no largerthan battalions, 175 (a total of 140,000men) to be raised by France, 40 by Hollandand Belgium. It was essential that thearming of these battalions be completed byD plus 300. The figure of 140,000 menfor France did not include members of Re-sistance groups whose equipment was theconcern of SFHQ in London. Nor did itinclude mobile labor elements for whichclothing was to be provided by the armygroup headquarters concerned, or staticlabor elements to be used for military andcivil affairs purposes and whose equipmentwas to be furnished under a civil affairsplan.38

On 14 April the Combined Chiefs ap-proved General Eisenhower's proposal.They reached no decision, however, on thequestion of tables of organization and equip-ment, nor did they stipulate from whatsource, how, and when the necessary equip-ment was to be furnished.39

The plan reckoned without French views.These were made clear in May when Brig.Gen. Charles Noiret, chief of the FrenchMilitary Mission in London, told SHAEFthat the French military authorities weredetermined to reconstitute the metropolitanarmy, using members of the Resistanceforces as cadres, and the existing territorialsystem for mobilization and administration.Their plan was first to muster available Re-sistance personnel into battalions or regi-ments for immediate participation in oper-ations alongside the Allied armies, later toconvert these units into larger organizations.In the meantime they would mobilize andtrain several classes of young men and as-sign Territorial units made up of older

36 Ltrs, Beynet to Marshall, 27 Dec 43, and Mar-shall to Beynet, 7 Jan 44, OPD 400 France, Sec III.

37 JSM 1426, CCS to Eisenhower, 16 Jan 44,ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A.

38 Ltr, Smith to CCS, 9 Mar 44, in same file.39 Min, CCS 155th Mtg, 14 Apr 44; Msg WX-

25272, Marshall to Eisenhower, 19 Apr 44, ABC400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A.


classes to lines of communications and in-ternal security duties. For reasons ofmorale, they considered it highly desirablethat all this personnel be suitably equippedand armed as soon as practicable. GeneralNoiret then proffered this warning—to useResistance groups merely in the role pres-ently contemplated for them by Allied au-thorities and not as combatants was to riskserious repercussions.40

That the French were determined to re-build their metropolitan army was substan-tiated to some degree by reports receivedfrom North Africa. General Loomis, thenchief of the JRC, had just expressed hissuspicion that the unduly large requisitionscurrently being submitted to the JRC bythe French military authorities in Algierswere intended for purposes other than theNorth African forces. It was quite possiblethat the French were desirous of buildingup stocks for use in continental Franceeither for the civilian population or for newunits to be organized there.41 On the as-sumption that Allied planning included ade-quate provision for these purposes, GeneralLoomis recommended that the French beadvised accordingly so as to put an end totheir "futile attempts" to obtain sup-plies which the JRC had no authority toprovide.42

On 6 June the Anglo-American Alliesentered France in the great OVERLORD at-tack still without any firm policy on the useof liberated manpower. A step towardcompromise with the French desire for com-batant troops had been made in late Mayby a SHAEF suggestion to train FrenchCommando and Ranger units soon after the

beginning of operations. These would useonly a small number of men and wouldrequire only light equipment.43 TheFrench, however, had not agreed to thisproposal. No concrete plan meanwhilehad been made to provide equipment forthe security and labor units authorized bythe CCS. The Supreme Commander hadonly the assurance of the British Chiefs ofStaff, given on 11 May, that they wouldmake every effort to place at his disposalBritish and U.S. equipment in sufficientquantities.44

General Eisenhower, on 13 June, urgentlyasked the CCS for a policy decision. Hepointed out that western European Allieswere contemplating the reconstitution oftheir national armies and submitting re-quirements ranging, in some instances,"from musical instruments to heavy equip-ment." It was "not impossible," he ex-plained, "that Governments of the U.N.might cloak their desire for large post-wararmies by pleading that they want to givemaximum assistance to OVERLORD." Froman operational point of view, he did notconsider it necessary to arm and equip anyforces beyond those already authorized forsecurity and garrison duties, and the forcesrequired for various types of labor. None-theless, it might be necessary, in order tosatisfy the French, to equip a few Com-mando-type units for immediate action. Itmight also be desirable to form Frenchtraining centers in the United Kingdomwhere liberated manpower might train,under French arrangements, to become re-inforcements for the units raised in North

40 Min, Confs with Fr Military Mission, 2 and 9May 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I.

41 See p. 173, above.42 Memo, Loomis for CofS NATOUSA, 17 Apr

44, JRC 902/1 Rearmt Plan.

43 Memos, Lt Gen A. E. Grasett for SHAEF G-3,21 May 44, and Lt Col M. D. Molloy for ChiefPlans and Opns Sec G-3, 25 May 44, SHAEF G-3091 France, Vol. I.

44 Memo, COS for SAC, 11 May 44, SHAEF SGS475/1, Vol. I, Policy.


Africa. SHAEF needed an early statementof policy on which to base its answer to theproposals submitted by the various militarymissions concerned.45

It soon became evident that the conces-sion which General Eisenhower was willingto make to the French would not satisfytheir ambitions. Writing to General Mar-shall on 14 June, General Béthouart, thenChief of Staff of National Defense, reaf-firmed the desire of his government to enlistin the Army, once they had been clearedand screened, all able-bodied men, whetheror not they had been enrolled in the Re-sistance forces. This, he explained, was thebest way to avoid internal disorder and toprovide the strongest possible support toAllied m i l i t a r y action.46 GeneralBéthouart's memorandum having beencommunicated to the CCS, the latter re-ferred it to General Eisenhower for com-ment on which to base a reply. Speakingfor the Supreme Commander, GeneralSmith pointed out on 27 June that GeneralEisenhower, while fully conscious of thevaluable assistance rendered to his opera-tions by the Resistance forces, had made itclear to the French that his operationalneeds must take priority over any reconsti-tution of the French Army. In this con-nection, General Eisenhower wished to re-mind the CCS that he had referred to themfor decision the whole question of the re-constitution and arming of national armiesof liberated Allies. Lack of guidance fromthem was proving embarrassing to him inhis discussions with the various Allied mili-tary missions. A firm decision on the mat-ter was urgently required.47

On 8 July General Béthouart, who hadaccompanied General de Gaulle to Wash-ington, called on a number of War Depart-ment officials. The purpose of these visitswas to renew the requests submitted somenine months earlier by the National DefenseCommittee for equipment to arm an addi-tional 25 divisions and to expand the airforce before the end of 1945. With theliberation of France under way, the govern-ment, he declared to General Marshall,wished to increase the size of the Army inproportion to the liberation of the territoryitself. Béthouart then handed the directorof the International Division, ASF, an ar-mament program calling for the equipping,initially, of 30 infantry battalions, 72 artil-lery batteries, 3 tank battalions, and othermiscellaneous units. All these units wouldbe formed with some 100,000 men from theResistance and would constitute the nucleusof 1 armored, 1 airborne, and 3 infantrydivisions. On the same date GeneralBéthouart requested of General Arnold,chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, the equip-ment to arm 25 combat squadrons in addi-tion to the units already re-equipped underthe North African program.48

Both proposals were immediately ex-amined in the light of equipment availabilityand of other commitments. After a pre-liminary conference between officers of theFrench Military Mission and representativesof International Division, ASF, Maj. Gen.LeRoy Lutes, director of Plans and Opera-tions, ASF, expressed the belief that the

45 Msg SCAF 51, Eisenhower to CCS, 13 Jun 44,OPD Cable Files.

46 Memo, Béthouart for Marshall, 14 Jun 44,SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I.

47 Ltr, Smith to CCS, 27 Jun 44, ABC 091.711France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5.

48 Memo, National Defense Committee, 16 Oct43, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 1-A;Memo, Béthouart for Marshall, 6 Jul 44, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5; Memo, FrMilitary Mission for Director International DivASF, 8 Jul 44, ASF Planning Div Files; and MsgWX-62001, Arnold to Eaker, 8 Jul 44, JRC CableLog.


matériel for the 5 divisions could be madeavailable with some exceptions.49 Beforetaking any action, both Generals Arnoldand Marshall sought the views of theaterofficials on the matter.

General Eaker promptly informed Gen-eral Arnold that, in his opinion, it would bea grave error to allow the French in Wash-ington to present an air rearmament planand obtain its approval without full theaterconcurrence. He doubted that the FrenchHigh Command could furnish at an earlydate the men to form the contemplatedunits. "We must insist that they show usdefinitely a manpower capacity for anotherunit before we authorize and equip it."50

General Eaker's skepticism confirmed theimpression which General Marshall had al-ready gathered from information availableto him. In asking Generals Devers andEisenhower to comment on the latest Frenchproposals, Marshall expressed his own views.It was doubtful whether French Resistancegroups and other liberated personnel wouldprovide sufficient effectives to furnish re-placements for 1st French Army, to makeup for shortages of supporting troops, toactivate security and lines of communica-tions battalions, and to organize new com-bat units as well. However, since the Re-sistance forces were reported to be effectivenot only in guerrilla action but in large-scale operations as well, it might be desirableto consider the possibility of organizing themforthwith into combat units. Meanwhile,other available liberated personnel would beutilized to form replacements, security bat-talions, and noncombat units. It might bepracticable to start with a program of mod-est proportions and build up toward the

total indicated in the French proposals, de-pending on manpower availability and op-erational developments. Such a course ofaction would mean greater strength forOVERLORD and would help to eliminate anyshortage of combat troops on the WesternFront which might occur should the warcontinue to the middle of 1945. The mat-ter of equipment would depend on whetheror not the decision was made to form addi-tional U.S. divisions and on operational re-quirements as currently estimated. Maté-riel for new French units would be drawnfrom the strategic reserve. On the presentcommitments, it would be possible to equipat least some of the five divisions proposedby the French for activation in 1944. Thearming of these units would, of course, behandled in the same way as that of the di-visions re-equipped under the NorthAfrican program.51

The first to answer General Marshall'squery was General Devers. The French,he explained, had shown a marked aptitudefor organizing and training combat unitsand had demonstrated their "outstandingability in combat." But, because of theirslowness in organizing supporting combatand service units, it had been necessary toplace U.S. troops of this type at their dis-posal on an appreciable scale to ensure theirsuccess. The French proposal thereforewas not consonant with current policy.The rearmament program was designed toequip an expeditionary force for operationson the Continent and not to furnish sup-plies for liberated areas in France nor tobuild up a postwar French army.52 Yet,Devers admitted, a true appreciation ofFrench capabilities and limitations "dic-

49 Memo, Lutes for ACofS OPD WD, 8 Jul 44,OPD Exec 10, Item 52-E.

50 Msg M-23957, Eaker to Arnold, 8 Jul 44, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A.

51 Msg WX-62685, Marshall to Eisenhower andDevers, 9 Jul 44, OPD Cable Files.

52 Msg FX-70274, Devers to Marshall, 9 Jul 44,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.


tated" that Resistance troops be organizedand equipped by the most expeditiousmeans possible into small combat units,ultimately divisions, so as to enable them tocontinue to fight in a more efficient manner.Such a course of action would necessitatethat supporting combat and service require-ments be met from other sources, mostlikely American. Furthermore, to reducesupply problems, it would probably be ad-visable to equip and maintain the new unitsthrough U.S. base sections. In conclusion,General Devers recommended that the150,000-200,000 Frenchmen expected tobecome available in AFHQ's zone of re-sponsibility be employed, in order of prior-ity: (1) to establish a replacement poolsufficient to carry the North African unitsthrough the rest of 1944, (2) to make upfor the existing shortages of French support-ing combat and service troops currentlyestimated at 60,000 men, (3) then and onlythen, to organize one infantry division (thesixth on the North African program butnever activated) and one armored division(the fourth likewise on the program butdeferred indefinitely).53

General Eisenhower, in his answer toGeneral Marshall's query, first restated hisown requirements in French liberated man-power, namely, essential labor units andinternal security and lines of communica-tions troops. The Supreme Commanderthen recommended that manpower avail-able over and above his requirements beused in combat units on the assumption thatthe war in Europe "might continue wellinto 1945" and in the light of the fact thatthe French themselves were eager to have

units fighting alongside British and U.S.troops in northern France. He did notconsider it advisable, as suggested by Gen-eral Marshall, to organize the Resistanceforces into combat units. While excellentin a guerrilla role in their own native area,they were likely to be ineffective if engagedin combat alongside U.S. or French regularunits in a strange territory. In fact theycould become an administrative encum-brance. The most advantageous mannerof using this "prolific and first-rate sourceof manpower" was to take the best of themfor recruits and form the remainder, al-ready armed, into internal security and linesof communications units. In conclusionhe recommended that French liberatedmanpower be employed, in order of pri-ority: (1) to fill requirements of the Su-preme Commander, Allied ExpeditionaryForce; (2) to fill requirements of the Su-preme Allied Commander, Mediterranean;(3) to activate three divisions, two in south-ern France and one in northern France,complete with administrative and serviceelements, for use in European operations in1945; and (4) to form a limited numberof Ranger or Commando-type units to bequickly trained in the United Kingdom.The organization of these smaller unitswould, he believed, satisfy French eagernessto participate fully in the Europeancampaign.54

By this time War Department officialswere convinced that the question of the useof French liberated manpower was becom-ing entirely too complex and, as pointed outin a memorandum from OPD to the JointLogistics Committee (JLC), "would haveto be tied together in order to be handled

53 Memo, Devers for Marshall, 11 Jul 44, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. II; MsgBX-13549, Devers to Marshall, 11 Jul 44, OPDExec. 10, Item 52-E.

54 Msg FWD 12414, Eisenhower to Marshall, 18Jul 44, AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec LX 320, Orderof Battle.


intelligently." The recent communicationsfrom Generals Eisenhower, Devers, andEaker, letters from Generals Béthouart andde Gaulle, a talk by General Donovan be-fore the JLC in which he had urged thatResistance groups be issued heavy equip-ment, each had stressed one phase oranother of the problem and often expressedconflicting views. To arrive at some soundsolution, General Marshall directed that allpapers, radios, and letters be turned over tothe JLC for a comprehensive study of themost effective use of liberated manpower.He emphasized that the committee was togive no consideration to the development ofa postwar French army but was to proceedon the assumption that only those troopsshould be equipped and armed which couldparticipate in the war at an early date.55

Most eager to see some sort of a decisionreached on the matter were, of course, theFrench themselves. On the ground that the"reorganization of the metropolitan army"was already raising a considerable numberof problems, General Noiret proposed, on 1August, to attach to SHAEF the Rearma-ment Section of his staff headed by ColonelChanson, who in the past had dealt withsimilar problems in connection with theNorth African rearmament operations. Afew days later General Noiret and represent-atives of SHAEF reached an agreement onthe division of responsibility betweenSHAEF and French headquarters in theUnited Kingdom for handling problemsarising in connection with liberated man-power, such as availability and allocationof personnel, submission of requisitions, anddistribution of matériel.56

On 2 August 1944 the CCS finally tookaction on the matter of the reconstitutionand equipping of armies of liberated na-tions. They communicated to GeneralEisenhower, who had been waiting since13 June, a policy statement to guide him inhis discussions with Allied military missions.The statement merely confirmed theirearlier decision authorizing the formation ofsecurity units totaling not more than 172,-000 men for western Europe (140,000 forthe French).57 It shed no light on thesubject of labor units (not included in the172,000-man ceiling) or of French combatunits. It simply directed the SupremeCommander to inform Allied military mis-sions that any requests from them con-sidered by him to include, in effect, require-ments for postwar armies, should be takenup "as between governments and not on themilitary level." Moreover, the statementprovided no clue on the question of theprovision of equipment.

With operations in progress on the Con-tinent, the Supreme Commander was eagerto proceed with the organization of the laborand security units necessary for the conductof the war. The question of the provisionof equipment needed to be settled withoutfurther delay. Yet the CCS still had notgiven any indication as to what proportionof the equipment required was to come fromU.S. and what from British sources. In amemorandum to the British Chiefs of Staff,dated 8 August, General Smith urged that,pending a CCS decision on the matter, therequirements of the British 21 Army Groupfor mobile labor units and internal securityunits, as well as the requirements of the U.S.forces for internal security up to D plus 90,be met from British sources, that is, from

55 Memo, Brig Gen Patrick H. Tansey for JLC,20 Jul 44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec2-A.

56 Memos, Noiret for SHAEF, 1 Aug 44, andWhiteley for Noiret, 9 Aug 44, SHAEF G-3 091France, Vol. II.

57 Msg FACS 49, CCS to Eisenhower, 2 Aug 44,ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A.


stocks held by the War Office for liberatedmanpower. The War Office replied thatthe equipment requested would be releasedat once except for some items that were un-available. However, the release would bemade on the assumption that the figure of172,000 (140,000 for the French) repre-sented both security and labor units. Ifthe Supreme Commander wished to in-crease the total beyond 172,000 in order toinclude labor units, he was advised to putthe necessary proposals up to the CCS.58

On 9 August General Eisenhower in-formed the War Department that his com-bined requirements for static and mobileFrench civilian labor units were estimatedat between 140,000 by D plus 60 and 468,-000 by D plus 240. These units were overand above the 175 French battalions au-thorized earlier in April by the CCS forassignment to internal security and lines ofcommunications duties. New, additionalrequirements were for the Garde Mobile(about 6,000 men), abolished by Vichy butwhose reorganization he considered neces-sary, the Gendarmerie (approximately 10,-000 men), and fire-fighting personnel(2,500 men). Also, it was intended toform another French Special Air Service(SAS) parachute battalion (in addition tothe two activated earlier in the UnitedKingdom) for service behind enemy lines,and two Ranger battalions. The formationof these three units was essential in view ofthe attitude of the French. "While they areanxious to assist us to the greatest degree,they must for morale reasons be given anopportunity to fight." These several re-quirements concerned only the French.There were other Allies to consider. It was

imperative, then, that an early decision bereached on the question of allocation ofresponsibility for equipping all the units in-volved. Most of these were operationallyrequired and none could be raised in theabsence of a directive from the CCS.59

Such was the situation as ANVIL got underway on 15 August. Already large groupsof Frenchmen, including Resistance units,had been liberated as a result of the prog-ress of OVERLORD. No commitment hadyet been made regarding their employmentother than the formation of security andlines of communications units. Even forthese, the question of equipment had notbeen settled.

It was difficult to see how the French lib-erated manpower question could be solvedto the satisfaction of the three allies con-cerned considering the conclusions each hadreached on the matter after months of ne-gotiations.

For the French military authorities inAlgiers, liberated manpower could be bestused by enrolling it without delay in newcombat units. They had already completedplans to this effect and were about to sub-mit appropriate requisitions. On 16 Au-gust, just as the first North African divisionswere landing on the beaches near St. Tro-pez, General Leyer asked the JRC whatAllied agency would examine and processthe requisitions. General Loomis couldonly reply that the CCS had the whole ques-tion of employment of Allied liberated man-power under consideration.60

For the British Chiefs of Staff, the ques-tion involved not only the immediate ful-fillment of the Supreme Commander's re-

58 Memos, Smith for COS, 8 Aug 44, and COS1425/4, Office of War Cabinet for CofS SHAEF,15 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I.

59 Msg FWD 12731, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 9Aug 44, OPD Exec 10, Item 52-E.

60 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 16 Aug 44, andLoomis for Leyer, 18 Aug 44, JRC 320/001 Orgnof JRC.


quirements, but, in view of the French posi-tion on the matter, the early building up ofa nucleus of forces to assist in the occupationof Germany. Such a concession would, intheir opinion, make the French more"amenable" to the wishes of the SupremeCommander and appease their understand-able desire to organize more than internalsecurity troops and Commandos.61 On 22August they broached the subject in a mem-orandum to the CCS. The British, theyexplained, desired strongly that the westernEuropean Allies have forces available foruse in the period immediately following thecessation of hostilities in Europe and afterthe resumption of effective control by in-digenous governments. Such forces wouldbe required for the maintenance of internalsecurity within the Allied territories con-cerned. In addition, by contributing to theoccupation of Germany, they would assist inalleviating the British manpower situationand permit the United Kingdom to play agreater role in the war against Japan. Asfor their equipping, the British Chiefs ofStaff considered it highly undesirable thatthe French or any other European Alliesadopt a policy of accepting arms of enemymake as this could lead to a continued de-mand for spare parts, replacements, andammunition. In their opinion, the respon-sibility for arming the forces in questionshould be divided as follows: pending there-establishment of French industry, a"clearly military desirable" objective in it-self, the United States would undertake tofurnish the French with the needed equip-ment; the equipping of other western Allieswould remain a British commitment.These proposals, they emphasized, were putforward on "purely military grounds," their

belief being that it was "in the vital strate-gic interest of both the U.S. and U.K. thatthe forces of our Western Allies should beclosely integrated with our own." Theyestimated that the size of the French con-tingents required for the occupation of Ger-many would be eight divisions at the end oftwenty-four months.62

For the Americans, the urgent question,as emphasized by a report just published bythe JLC, was not the organization of post-armistice armies, but the best and most ex-peditious possible employment of liberatedmanpower during the current hostilities inEurope. Armed forces formed from liber-ated manpower in excess of those authorizedfor operations in the sphere of the SupremeCommander were, in effect, postwar armieswhich should be the subject of agreementbetween the governments concerned.63

Commenting on the British Chiefs of Staffmemorandum of 22 August to the CCS,General Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff,OPD, voiced the opinion that their pro-posal was a purely postwar matter and urgedthe U.S. Chiefs of Staff to approach it care-fully and to make no commitment withoutthe approval of the President.64

On 29 August the U.S. Chiefs of Staffsubmitted to the CCS a long memorandum(CCS 661) setting forth their latest viewsand recommendations. Ruling out the or-ganization of forces over and above the re-quirements of the Supreme Commander asbeing postwar armies, they proposed thatboth he and General Wilson, the SupremeAllied Commander in the Mediterranean,

61 Memo Washington COS (W) 180, COS forJSM, 19 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I.

62 Memo, COS for CCS, CCS 653, 22 Aug 44,ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A.

63 Rpt, JLC 140/3, 16 Aug 44, ARC 091.711France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B.

64 Note, Handy, 23 Aug 44, ABC 400.3295 (2Aug 43), Sec 1-A.


be asked to determine, on the basis of op-erational considerations, the priorities forthe use of French liberated manpowerwithin their respective areas. Any newcombat units organized by them would beequipped by the United States. Internalsecurity battalions, on the other hand, wouldbe equipped by the United Kingdom. Tak-ing into consideration the desire of theFrench for a more active part in the fight-ing, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff then recom-mended the formation of new combat unitsnot exceeding, for both theaters, 27 infan-try battalions, 9 105-mm. artillery battal-ions, and three engineer combat battalions,all to be put in action as speedily as possible.Only such units should be re-equippedwhich were "essential to the completion ofapproved operations" and which were

"likely to be trained and equipped in timeto take part in operations." 65

Thus was the American position madequite clear. In essence it had not variedsince 18 July when General Eisenhower hadproposed that the formation of new Frenchcombat units be restricted to three infantrydivisions (or the equivalent of the battalionsnow recommended by the U.S. Chiefs ofStaff), in addition to a limited number ofRanger or Commando-type units for im-mediate participation in operations.

By the end of August, as the CCS wereexamining the latest U.S. proposal, theFrench still were without a clear statementas to what material assistance they couldexpect from the Allies in equipping theirliberated manpower.

65 Memo, JCS for CCS, CCS 661, 29 Aug 44, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 44), Sec 2-B.

CHAPTER XIX

Arming Liberated Manpower

Interim Organization and Equipping ofLabor and Internal Security Units

The spectacular speed with which theliberation of France progressed from thebeginning of August through September1944, as a result of the lightning advanceof the Allied armies from both west andsouth, raised for the French military au-thorities insuperable problems of person-nel and equipment. With more of theterritory freed from enemy forces eachpassing day, larger numbers of Resistancetroops, reservists, volunteers, and liberatedprisoners of war became available. TheFrench High Command was faced withone of two alternatives: to incorporate thesemen into regularly constituted units or togive them immediate employment in thecivilian economy. With national resourcesexhausted, industry and commerce at astandstill, communications and transporta-tion paralyzed, and a territorial militaryestablishment completely disorganized, theconstitution of new units was in itself a dif-ficult task. It was made more troublesomeas a result of the natural desire of a largepart of the liberated men to resume thefight against the enemy rather than serve aslaborers or guards in rear areas. Addingto the confusion was the absence of a clearindication of Anglo-American intentionswith regard to the ultimate employment ofliberated manpower, thus forcing the

French High Command to take piecemealmeasures in an effort to solve at least theshort-term aspect of the problem.

The most serious question was what to dowith the former FFI forces. Immediatelyafter the liberation of Paris on 26 August,the irresponsible behavior of some of theunits in the capital and vicinity became thesource of grave concern to French andAllied authorities, as it constituted a threatto the security of the rear. In an attemptto regain control of the situation General deGaulle decided to weed out and disarm thedisaffected elements and to put the rest intouniform without delay. With this in view,he requested and obtained from GeneralEisenhower the emergency issue of 15,000sets of clothing and some armament.Another request from General Koenig, thenmilitary governor of Paris, for arms andequipment to enable the Paris Gendarmerieto maintain order in the capital was like-wise granted.1 The situation quickly de-teriorated, however. Armed, undisciplinedgroups were reported wandering throughParis and country towns, seriously threaten-ing order. General Koenig, technically stillthe commander in chief of all FFI, esti-mated that, by this time, some 200,000armed men and boys, and possibly another

1 Memo, Smith for G-4 SHAEF, 28 Aug 44,SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I; Msg (unnum-bered), SHAEF Mission Paris to SHAEF FWD,5 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II.


200,000 unarmed but organized into bands,were at large in the liberated areas. Re-sponsible French authorities were said to bereluctant to disarm or disband them in viewof the services they had rendered. Further-more, it was unlikely that they could be ab-sorbed into civilian life for several months.In General Koenig's opinion, serious troublewould be forestalled only if 100,000 of themwere promptly mustered into the Army orgiven employment.2

It was largely in an attempt to reducethe FFI problem that the French militaryauthorities then launched their mobiliza-tion program. As a first step, they beganorganizing two infantry divisions, one inthe north, one in the south. In WashingtonGeneral de Saint-Didier, chief of the FrenchMilitary Mission, explained to GeneralMarshall that the new units were two ofthe three divisions whose organization Gen-erals Eisenhower and Devers had "ap-proved." Anticipating that their statuswould be debated for some time, Generalde Saint-Didier urged that, in the interim,consideration be given forthwith to the sup-ply of clothing and equipment for the 30,-000 men involved. Such a step would helpto speed up their employment and therebymaintain their morale. In referring thematter to Eisenhower and Devers for ad-vice, Marshall pointed out that since theU.S. Chiefs of Staff had approved as a gen-eral principle the equipping of "such Frenchunits as could be used at an early dateagainst the enemy," the Supreme Com-mander might wish to consider the desira-bility of granting the request. Pending areply from the theater, General Marshalladvised General de Saint-Didier that the

present plan as approved by the U.S. Chiefsof Staff did not contemplate equipping com-plete additional divisions but "permitted acharge for clothing and equipment to bemade against the plan should it prove de-sirable." 3

Meanwhile, the organization of securitybattalions and labor units was getting underway. In Brittany, ten battalions formedfrom FFI personnel were being employed inmopping-up operations. They were beingissued fuel and food, as well as capturedGerman weapons and ammunition. Simi-lar measures were being taken to equip thesecurity battalions being organized in south-ern France also from FFI personnel.4

To meet SHAEF's requirements for se-curity battalions and labor units, the FrenchHigh Command agreed on 23 August tomake available at once, as a first increment,100,000 men distributed as follows: 53,000in the U.S. zone of communications, 26,000in the British zone, and 21,000 in their ownzone. SHAEF promptly initiated action toobtain from the War Department and theWar Office the matériel necessary to equipthese men. Without waiting for the CCSto determine the source of equipment forliberated manpower, the British Chiefs ofStaff agreed to the immediate release of theequipment needed for the security unitsbeing activated within both the British andthe U.S. zones. Simultaneously, GeneralMarshall assured the Supreme Commanderthat War Department officials were makingevery effort to meet the requirements for

2 Msg FWD 14014, SHAEF to State Dept, 6Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II.

3 Memos, de Saint-Didier for Marshall, 2 Sep44, and, Marshall for de Saint-Didier, 6 Sep 44,OCS A-48-11, 091 France, Sec I; Msg WX-25757,Marshall to Eisenhower and Devers, 5 Sep 44, OPDExec 10, Item 52-E.

4 Msg FWD 13729, Eisenhower to Somervell,4 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I; Memo,Gammell for CofS Fr Ground Forces, 8 Sep 44,AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.

THE LIBERATED MANPOWER QUESTION 321

civilian labor in support of the U.S. forces.5

By early September plans had been com-pleted for activation of the units requiredby SHAEF. Tables of organization andequipment had been determined for eachcategory: military mobile labor companies,civilian mobile and static labor units, andsecurity battalions. Pending a CCS deci-sion regarding the responsibility for the pro-curement of equipment, the War Office hadoffered to provide an initial 40,250 indi-vidual sets of clothing and equipment fromthe pool of equipment for 172,000 menwhich it was holding.6

At the request of the French, plans alsowere made to rehabilitate the TerritorialCommand, the organization normallycharged with recruitment and administra-tion. The nineteen military regions andninety subregions comprising this commandbeing completely depleted of material re-sources, arrangements were made to pro-vide them with a minimum of equipmentdrawn from British, Canadian, and U.S.sources.7

In the belief that a decision on the long-term aspect of the liberated manpower ques-tion could be postponed no longer, GeneralJuin, Chief of Staff of National Defense

since his return from Italy in early August,appealed directly to General Marshall on7 September. Liberated effectives, he ex-plained, were now available in large num-bers. Their immediate absorption into theArmy, most desirable at this time, could beeffected only under strict military disciplineand by integration into divisional units. Onthe hypothesis, which he considered "plausi-ble," of a very rapidly approaching cessa-tion of hostilities, it would be sufficient toorganize, as already started, security unitsequipped with light matériel. Later, as thenecessary heavier matériel was made avail-able, these units could be formed into di-visions to be used as a "supplementary se-curity force" for maintaining order withinthe country. General Juin "assumed" thatthe principle of arming five such new divi-sions had been accepted by War Depart-ment officials as a result of their conver-sations with Generals Béthouart and deGaulle in July. He hoped that the U.S.Chiefs of Staff would approve his proposal,since the French military authorities neededtheir agreement to guide them in planningthe reorganization of the metropolitanarmy.8

General Juin's conviction about the needof building up a large security force of thesize of five divisions was not shared by Gen-eral Devers. The latter, in fact, was nowreversing his earlier stand with respect tothe use of French liberated manpower inthe light of the current operational situa-tion. Answering General Marshall's mes-sage of 5 September, he not only questioned,from a military viewpoint, the necessity oforganizing the 175 security battalions forwhich equipment had been requested, butdeclared himself no longer in favor, as he

5 Msg FWD 14795, Eisenhower to SHAEF Mis-sion to France, 14 Sep 44, SHAEF G-3 091 France,Vol. III; Msg FWD 13217, FWD SHAEF to CGCOMZONE and CG 12th Army Gp, 24 Aug 44,SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. II; Msg EX-45523,CG ETOUSA to WD, 28 Aug 44, OPD 400 France,Sec 4; Memo, SHAEF for CG COMZONEETOUSA, 30 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France,Vol. I; Msg WX-23756, Marshall to Eisenhower,30 Aug 44, ASF International Div File Cable LogOUT A-45-192, France, Aug-Nov 44.

6 Memo, SHAEF for CG COMZONE, 6 Sep 44,SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. III.

7 Memos, Bull for CofS SHAEF, 18 Aug 44, andSmith for CG COMZONE ETOUSA, 21 Aug 44,SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I; Ltr, Noce to Direc-tor Liaison and Munitions WO, 18 Sep 44, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.

8 Ltr, Juin to Marshall, 7 Sep 44, ABC 091.711France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B.


had been in July, of activating new divisionson the ground that they would not be readybefore the spring of 1945. He recom-mended instead the formation of a maxi-mum of five infantry regiments, amountingto approximately 15,000 men, for use asreplacements for the existing North Africandivisions currently engaged in operations.The maintenance of these divisions at effec-tive combat strength was, in his opinion,the most urgent problem to be considered.9

The British Chiefs of Staff, on the otherhand, were more convinced than ever, alsoin the light of the current operational situa-tion, that discussions on the employment ofFrench liberated manpower should not berestricted to the period preceding the cessa-tion of hostilities. Elaborating on theirearlier statement of 22 August, they urgedthe CCS, on 10 September, to examine thelong-term aspect of the problem and to doso "in a realistic manner." While agreeingwith the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that SHAEFmust have priority in calling French man-power for immediate essential duties, theypointed to the "very real need of encourag-ing the creation of substantial French forcesto assist in the occupation of Germany."They felt that what was required was theestablishment of a broad plan to equipforces of all western European Allies in-cluding the French, in which due considera-tion would be given to the employment ofmanpower during the earlier posthostilitiesstage as well as before the cessation ofhostilities.10

The stand taken by the British Chiefs hadalready been made the subject of a study bythe U.S. Joint Logistics Committee upon

the receipt of their first memorandum. TheJLC had come to the conclusion that anydiscussion concerning the build-up of post-hostilities internal security armies must betripartite, that is, it must include the USSR.This course of action was indispensable inorder to promote the confidence of thatcountry and to avoid strained relationslikely to result from any steps toward theestablishment of a military bloc in whosecreation the USSR had not been consulted.11

No solution appeared yet in sight whichwould reconcile the divergent positions nowtaken by the British, Americans, andFrench.

On 22 September General Marshall,answering General Juin's proposal of 7 Sep-tember, informed him that because of thescope and importance of the question, it wasone to be ultimately decided by the CCS.No action could be taken by them until theBritish Chiefs of Staff had been heard from.General Marshall then referred to what hecalled General Béthouart's "apparent mis-understanding" on the question of addi-tional divisions. The present intention ofthe U.S. Chiefs of Staff was to equip 3, not5, new infantry divisions thereby bring theoriginal ANFA commitment of 11 divisionsto completion.12

In the theater, the equipping of securityand labor units was proceeding at a muchslower pace than originally contemplated.The French military authorities were re-ported to be showing "great unwillingness"to meet the requirements for labor units.Concerned over the situation, SHAEF re-minded them of their agreement of 23 Au-gust to place a specific number of men atthe disposal of the Allied command and

9 Msg BX-16065, Devers to Marshall, 9 Sep 44,OPD Cable Files.

10 Memo, COS for CCS, CCS 653/1, 10 Sep 44,ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-B.

11 Rpt, JCS 1039, JLC to JCS, 6 Sep 44, in samefile.

12 Ltr, Marshall to Juin, 22 Sep 44, OCS A-48-11, 091 France, Sec 1.


warned that if the agreement was not car-ried out the Supreme Commander wouldbe compelled to revise the commitmentsalready undertaken to equip the men.13

All things considered, it appeared to benot so much a case of unwillingness on thepart of the French military authorities as ofquasi impossibility for them to requirethe former members of the Resistance todrop their rifles in exchange for shovels.14

Already large numbers of the FFI (40,000by 20 September) were swelling the ranksof 1st French Army, meanwhile raising, forthe latter, considerable equipment andmaintenance problems. To the FrenchGeneral Staff it was clear that the labor andinternal security program was not, in itself,sufficient to solve satisfactorily the liberatedmanpower problem.

Eager to co-operate with the SupremeCommander, General Juin immediatelycontacted the responsible Allied headquar-ters only to be told that the 40,000-odd in-dividual sets of clothing and equipmentpromised by the War Office as a first allo-cation for labor and security units were stillin the United Kingdom. Earlier messagesfrom Communications Zone, ETOUSA, tothe War Office requesting information onwhere and when to obtain the matériel hadnot yet been answered. Thus the alreadydifficult task of forming the required unitsbecame even more troublesome, as the U.S.and British Armies could make only piece-meal emergency issues pending the replace-ment of matériel from War Office stocks.15

Partly as a result of the slowness with

which the labor and security program wasprogressing, but mainly because of the cur-rently favorable operational situation,SHAEF authorities were gradually revers-ing their earlier stand in favor of activatingadditional French divisions. In spite ofFrench pressure, it appeared no longer de-sirable or feasible, as it did in July and earlyAugust, to form any unit larger than a bat-talion from liberated manpower. It was nolonger to be assumed that the war wouldlast well into 1945. The total number ofFrench nationals suitable for full militaryservice had not reached the expected figures.Shipping commitments w e r e severelystrained. Furthermore, if French divisionswere formed, a large portion of availablemanpower would thus be lost for immediateand direct assistance to the Allied Expedi-tionary Force, thereby greatly aggravatingthe labor and internal security problems.On 22 September General Eisenhower in-formed General Marshall that he desiredto form only internal security units (includ-ing the Gendarmerie), labor units, tenRanger-type battalions, and certain admin-istrative units, for all of which plans weregoing forward and full details were beingcommunicated to the CCS for decision. Hestressed that no unit larger than a battalionwas required at that time. With this pro-nouncement, the issue with respect to ad-ditional French divisions was to rest forsome weeks to come.16

To co-ordinate the various equipmentproblems then involving the French, such asthe continued maintenance of their expedi-tionary forces engaged in combat and theimplementation of the current labor andsecurity program, as well as of any future

13 Msg FWD 14795, Eisenhower to SHAEF Mis-sion to France, 14 Sep 44, SHAEF G-3 091France, Vol. III.

14 Interv with Regnault, Sep 50.15 Ltr, Juin to Smith, 17 Sep 44, and Memo,

SHAEF Mission to France for Smith, 19 Sep 44,SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I.

16 Memo, Bull for CofS, 14 Sep 44, SHAEF SGSFrance 475/2, Vol. I; Msg FWD 15331, Eisen-hower to Marshall, 22 Sep 44, OPD Cable Files.


armament program, the decision wasreached, at the urging of the French them-selves and of Allied authorities in the Medi-terranean theater, to establish a central ar-mament authority similar to the North Afri-can JRC. Soon after the organization, on15 September, of the SHAEF Mission toFrance to act as a channel through whichthe French Provisional Government couldraise matters with SHAEF, the latter au-thorized the setting up of a RearmamentDivision within the mission. SelectedAmerican, French, and British personnelfrom the various agencies heretoforecharged with supervising the rearmamentand training of the North African forcesgradually were transferred to the Continentfor the purpose of staffing the division.By 16 October Rearmament Division,SHAEF Mission to France, headed by Gen-eral Loomis, was in full operation.17

Meanwhile, the question of the disposi-tion of former Resistance personnel was be-coming increasingly acute. Within thearea of 1st French Army, sufficient elementshad become available to form twenty secur-ity battalions over and above those whichthe French authorities were organizing forcombat. Equipping the security battalionsoffered no great problem since the necessarymatériel was provided by the War Office oncall. It was with respect to combat bat-talions that difficulties were being experi-enced. Neither 1st French Army nor U.S.6th Army Group had excess stocks availablefor the purpose. The French General Staffthen turned to SHAEF for assistance and

submitted a request for equipment.SHAEF replied that if General Devers,Commanding General, 6th Army Group,wished to employ FFI combat battalions aspart of 1st French Army, their equipmentwould have to be drawn from captured warmatériel, at least temporarily, or from other6th Army Group resources. WhereuponGeneral Devers pointed to the considerableconfusion which existed regarding the mat-ter and urged that the responsibility forequipping and maintaining FFI combatbattalions be made to rest solely with theFrench High Command. Pending finalsettlement of the question, the SupremeCommander authorized Devers, on 2 Oc-tober, to equip at his discretion such unitsas he considered necessary to assist in mili-tary operations, using for the purpose cap-tured war matériel and local Frenchresources.18

By then the situation had reached a criti-cal point. General Devers reported on 7October that some 52,000 former FFI troopshad enlisted in the French Army for theduration of the war. Of this number, ap-proximately 12,000 were already in com-bat. To provide them with adequateequipment was beyond the means of 6thArmy Group. With respect to weapons,the French authorities expected to havesufficient German, Italian, British, andFrench rifles to meet the requirements.But no clothing was available. Because ofthis, there was danger of these men return-ing to their homes where their presencemight result in public disturbances. It was

17 Ltr, Juin to Smith, 20 Sep 44, SHAEF Mis-sion to France 091.711-3 (Fr ) ; Msg NAF 783,Wilson to CCS, 16 Sep 44, OPD Cable Files; Msg14930 SCAF 83, SCAEF to CCS, 15 Sep 44, JRCCable Log. For additional information on theRearmament Division, see Chapter XXIII, below.

18 Msgs, Eisenhower to Devers, FWD 15582, 24Sep 44, and FWD 15887, 26 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS475 France, Vol. I; Msg BX-16780, Devers toSHAEF FWD, 27 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France,Vol. I; Msg FWD 16836, Eisenhower to Devers, 3Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II.


essential that the clothing problem be set-tled without delay.19

General Smith promptly advised GeneralDevers to submit a request to the CCS,through SHAEF, for the necessary clothingand equipment for the 52,000 men if hewished to use them. He then requestedGeneral Devers to remind the French in hisarea that the size and composition of theFrench Army was a matter for the decisionof the CCS. SHAEF itself was not in aposition to authorize the French High Com-mand to enlist personnel for the nationalarmy in excess of units provided for underthe current approved programs.20

The next day, 12 October, Mr. AndréDiethelm, Minister of War, whose previousrequests had been turned down and whohad been advised by General de Saint-Didier in Washington not to entertain thehope that combat units drawn from FFIpersonnel might be equipped, appealed di-rectly to General Eisenhower. It was es-sential, he urged, that for military, moral,and political reasons a few at least of theFFI units then engaged in operations beissued a minimum amount of modernequipment. The f o r c e s in questionamounted to some 112,000 men, 52,000 ofwhom were fighting as part of 1st FrenchArmy and the rest, or 60,000, were engagedin operations on the Atlantic coast. Theconditioning of these forces would inter-fere in no way with the labor and securityprogram. Mr. Diethelm's request was nomore fortunate than his earlier proposals.The S u p r e m e Commander directedSHAEF to inform him that no considera-tion would be given French requests until

SHAEF's requirements in labor and securityunits had been met.21

Answering General Smith's letter of 11October, General Devers submitted his planfor the employment of the 52,000 FFI per-sonnel now incorporated in 1st FrenchArmy. It contemplated the organizationof 1 infantry regiment, 2 infantry battalions,and 3 armored battalions; the activation ofrelief and rest battalions for each of the ex-isting infantry regiments, or a total of 19battalions; the building up of a replacementpool of 12,000 men for 1st French Army;finally, with the coming of cold weather,the replacement of all Negro troops in the9th Colonial Infantry Division (9th DIC)and 1st March Infantry Division (1stDMI).22 These Negro elements, largelyfrom Senegal and amounting to approxi-mately 15,000 men, were already beingwithdrawn and m o v e d to southernFrance.23

With the approach of winter the problemof clothing liberated effectives swelling theranks of the French armed forces was be-coming serious. The Allies were providingclothing only for the security battalions,none for the ill-clad FFI troops currentlyengaged in operations. To those FFI unitsfighting on the Atlantic coast, the FrenchHigh Command was able to allocate 72,000French uniforms recovered in a depot at

19 Msg B-17326, Devers to SHAEF FWD, 7 Oct44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II.

20 Memo, Smith for Devers, 11 Oct 44, in samefile.

21 Ltr, Diethelm to Eisenhower, 12 Oct 44,SHAEF Mission to France 421-1 Combined; Memo,SCAEF for SHAEF Mission to France, 19 Oct 44,SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. III.

22 This was the former 1st Motorized InfantryDivision, known before September 1943 as the 1stFree French Division.

23 Memo, G-3 SHAEF for CofS, 21 Oct 44,and Msg S-63760, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 24 Oct44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II; Msg S-65011, SCAEF to AFHQ, 1 Nov 44, SHAEF Mis-sion to France 091.711-1 (Fr) ; Msg SCAF 130,Eisenhower to CCS, 13 Nov 44, ABC 380 France,Sec 1-A.


Troyes after the withdrawal of the Germans.But for those in 1st French Army area, itcould only provide 25,000 sets from Cana-dian clothing stocks then in Algiers. Thisquantity was woefully insufficient.24

In an effort to solve the problem of cloth-ing and equipment for FFI personnel, rep-resentatives of SHAEF, CommunicationsZone, Rearmament Division, and otheragencies met on 25 October. They agreedthat changes in liberated manpower re-quirements brought about by new condi-tions on the Continent necessitated reviewand a fresh approach to the CCS for thepurpose of obtaining both an increase of theequipment allotments to SHAEF and acovering authority for equipment commit-ments entered into without previous sanc-tion of the Combined Chiefs. The latestsuch commitment concerned the variousAllied Resistance forces currently estimated,for the French alone, at 105,000 men, forwhom neither clothing nor equipment wasavailable. It was essential that the provi-sion of matériel to them be fitted into a long-term program for equipping liberatedmanpower.23

Organization and equipping of labor andinternal security units, meanwhile, werelagging behind schedule. The Frenchmilitary authorities were not making avail-able all the manpower necessary to meetSHAEF's requirements. In addition, maté-riel was slow in coming from the United

Kingdom because of the very limited portand shipping facilities and the fact that ship-ment of the equipment was competing withthat of other matériel considered essential tothe further advance of the Allied armies.The French themselves were responsible foractivating the units, for distributing to themmatériel issued through army groups orCommunications Zone channels, and fortheir training which was conducted with theassistance of Inspection Group, the Rearma-ment Division's training section headed byGeneral Kingman. Once ready, the unitspassed under Allied operational control, theFrench High Command retaining full dis-ciplinary powers.26

While the launching of the labor andsecurity program was making some head-way, the issue with respect to additionalcombat forces was no nearer solution. Theonly new development in the controversywas that the British had given up, in theface of American opposition, their earlierproposal to equip liberated manpowerunits for posthostilities occupation duties.In late September the Joint Strategic Sur-vey Committee had advised against armingsuch forces because at that juncture theywould be of no advantage to the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom. The com-mittee urged the JCS to adhere to the posi-tion that any discussion of the British pro-posal must be held at government level inorder to include the USSR, since it was notan appropriate subject for consideration bythe CCS.27 The JCS promptly informedthe CCS that, in their opinion, the subject

24 The 25,000 were part of 100,000 sets originallyintended for Territorial forces in North Africa. Inlate October the Canadian Government offered afurther 100,000 sets and 20,000 greatcoats. MsgsWX-47757, Somervell to SHAEF, 17 Oct 44, andS-64381, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 27 Oct 44, andMemo, SHAEF Mission to France for SCAEF, 8Oct 44, SHAEF Mission to France 421-1 Com-bined.

25 Min, Mtg at SHAEF Main, 25 Oct 44, SHAEFMission to France 091.4 Liberated People.

26 Memo, Smith for Juin, 27 Sep 44, SHAEFSGS 475 France, Vol. I; Memo, SHAEF AG-400-1(Fr) , 4 Oct 44, SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. III;Ltr, Hq COMZONE to Sec Comdrs, 27 Oct 44,SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-1 (Fr).

27 Rpt, JSSC to JCS, JCS 1039/1, 28 Sep 44,ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-B.


of re-equipping postwar forces must bedivorced from the question of equippingadditional French forces for early partici-pation in active operations against Germany.They urged the British Chiefs of Staff toapprove their 29 August proposal withoutdelay so as to permit its early implementa-tion. Ten days later, in the absence of areply from the British Chiefs of Staff, theJCS submitted a second memorandum tothe CCS, reiterating their belief that theBritish counterproposals involved long-termmatters of policy requiring decision andagreement not at CCS but at governmentlevel. They were therefore referring thematter to the U.S. Government and recom-mending that an agreement be reached ona governmental level or through the Euro-pean Advisory Commission "since it wouldappear that tripartite control of occupa-tion of Germany is involved." A few dayslater, on 21 October, the British Chiefshaving decided to pursue the matter nofurther, the controversial proposal was re-moved from the CCS agenda by secre-tarial action.28

The French of course had not given uphope for the equipping of new combat units.Told on several occasions that the matterwas one to be taken up directly with Wash-ington on a governmental level, General deGaulle had, in early October, consideredsending General Juin to Washington withfull authority to explain the French pointof view to General Marshall and the CCS.Informed of the proposed visit, OPD offi-cials urged General Marshall to tell theFrench that matters would be expedited ifconcrete proposals, cleared beforehand with

General Eisenhower, were submitted byGeneral Juin to the CCS before he arrivedin Washington. General Juin's trip did notmaterialize, for in the meantime GeneralMarshall had flown to the Continent wherehe had an opportunity to discuss the re-armament issue with General Juin. On hisreturn to Washington, he was handed amemorandum from General de Saint-Didierrestating the position of the ProvisionalGovernment. The French recognized thatGeneral Eisenhower was above all justlyconcerned with the conduct of operationsnow in progress and the security of hisarmies, but they were "under obligation"to take into account requirements of na-tional import, such as the incorporation ofFFI units into the army to enable them tofight in a normal way as an integral part oflarge units. France owed it to herself tohave more than 8 divisions in action topursue the war and at the same time to"satisfy her domestic needs and those ofoccupation." The French hoped that theequipment necessary for the 5 divisionsrequested by General Juin, or at least forthe remaining 3 on the ANFA program,would be authorized.29

At that very moment SHAEF was sub-mitting to the French in Paris for their con-currence the draft of an agreement betweentheir government and the Supreme Com-mander to regulate the command of labor,internal security, and other units raised forservice with the Allied Expeditionary Force.Examination of the document promptedGeneral Juin, on 31 October, to make twoimportant observations. To achieve therapid success of future operations as well

28 Memos, JCS for CCS, CCS 653/2, 11 Oct 44,and Leahy for Hull, 11 Oct 44, ABC 400.3295 (2Aug 43), Sec 1-B; Memo, JCS for CCS, CCS661/1, 29 Sep 44, ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec2-B.

29 Ltr, de Saint-Didier to Marshall, 24 Oct 44.ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B; Ltr,de Saint-Didier to Marshall, 6 Oct 44, ABC 091.711France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5; Memo, OPD for Mar-shall, 19 Oct 44, in same file.


as to permit the French to play the partwhich they desired to play, it was necessarythat the Allies facilitate the development ofthe French Army. The Provisional Gov-ernment, moreover, could not envisage thecreation of auxiliary units as required bySHAEF except within the framework of areconstituted army requiring, first of all, theequipping of a certain number of largeunits.30

The situation was reaching an impasse.Ten weeks after the launching of ANVIL,the CCS were no nearer a decision on theFrench liberated manpower question. TheBritish Chiefs of Staff still had not answeredthe U.S. proposal of 29 August calling forthe equipping of some additional Frenchcombat battalions. Now the French wererenewing their demands for the reconstitu-tion of their metropolitan army.

Yet, in the course of the preceding weeks,some progress had been noted in the re-habilitation of the French war machine.Arrangements had been made for the sup-ply of French ports not under immediateU.S. or British control. At the request ofthe French, SHAEF had authorized the or-ganization of a French tactical air commandto give air support to 1st French Army.Particularly noteworthy had been the effortsof the French to rehabilitate part of theirarmament industry. The manufacture ofautomatic pistols and rifles was under way,and it was expected that within a fewmonths production could be expanded con-siderably to include machine guns, mortars,vehicles, and other items. The Frenchwere also planning to reopen shortly theirordnance depots for the repair of Frenchordnance matériel, including vehicles.31

The Liberated Manpower and MetropolitanPrograms

Bridging the gap between the respectivepositions taken by the three allies on thematter of French liberated manpower camerather suddenly as a result, not of the weak-ening of any of the stands taken, but becauseof the unexpected turn of military events.

The summer dash of the Allied armiesthrough France, which had brought with ithigh hopes for a not-too-distant cessation ofhostilities, had slackened toward the end ofSeptember. The slowing-down period, infact, had just begun at the time of theSupreme Commander's intimation, givenon 22 September, that he desired no newFrench combat units larger than a bat-talion.32 The Germans had managed tostop their hasty retreat and appeared deter-mined to dig in for a prolonged defense.In a message to the CCS dated 31 October,General Eisenhower disclosed that events ofthe past few weeks were causing him toreview the situation with respect to the em-ployment of French liberated manpower.He believed that, in addition to the currentlabor and security program for which hewas sending final recommendations in aseparate communication, some divisionscould be made ready in time to be of useprovided the necessary equipment and ship-ping were made available. The unitsraised in North Africa had fought well inItaly and France, he explained. Armingthem with U.S. matériel had resulted insaving thousands of American and Britishlives. After the long campaigns in whichthey had been involved, some of themneeded to be withdrawn and replaced. Inlieu of the ten Ranger battalions recom-mended earlier, Eisenhower now proposedthe activation and equipping of two addi-

30 Ltr, Juin to SHAEF Mission to France, 31 Oct44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B.

31 SHAEF Mission to France, Appendix to Fort-nightly Rpt 15-31 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 475/3France.

32 Msg FWD 15331, Eisenhower to Marshall, 22Sep 44, OPD Cable Files.


tional infantry divisions to be used as re-placements. He believed that the Frenchcould provide the necessary personnel andorganize and train the two units to be readyfor combat by 1 March 1945.33

In a second message of the same date,the Supreme Commander reviewed for theCCS the whole question of SHAEF's re-quirements in Allied liberated manpowerand recommended that, in the light of theexperience gained to date and of the cur-rent operational situation, the ceiling beraised from 172,000 men (as estimated inMarch of the same year and approved bythe CCS on 9 July) to 460,000 men. Forthe French, this meant an increase from140,000 to 243,000 men. This revisionupward was essential to take care of addi-tional commitments, such as TerritorialCommand headquarters, Gendarmerie, andGarde Mobile, which, in the absence of spe-cific authority, SHAEF had undertaken toassume for operational reasons. Therewere, in addition, 48,000 FFI troops which6th Army Group desired to equip andorganize in light infantry battalions. Ma-tériel for these various additional require-ments had been drawn from the WarOffice pool of equipment for 172,000 men.This pool was now nearly exhausted. Sofar, the supplies released from Britishsources had been sufficient to equip 108,000men out of the authorized 140,000. Gen-eral Eisenhower then broached the questionof the division of responsibility between theUnited States and the United Kingdomfor providing the matériel to outfit the460,000 men required under the revisedprogram. He proposed that the UnitedStates be asked to furnish all vehicles andother types of equipment which the

British normally obtained f r o m theAmericans.34

The Supreme Commander's views, to-gether with General Juin's communicationof 31 October on the reconstitution of theFrench Army, were transmitted to the CCSby General Loomis, then on a short visitin Washington. In a personal memoran-dum, the chief of the Rearmament Divi-sion informed the CCS that General Juin'sletter had filled Supreme Headquarterswith considerable apprehension. Theletter appeared to be in effect a declarationby the French that they considered the re-constitution of their Army as taking preced-ence over aid to the Allies in winning thewar. Such a proposal was inacceptable toSHAEF. In fact General Smith's first re-action had been to consider the withdrawalof the recommendations already made foradditional equipment and the cancellationof orders. This course of action had nowbeen ruled out in favor of immediate dis-cussions with the French. In the forthcom-ing negotiations with them, the SupremeCommander's hand would be greatlystrengthened if he had the authority of theCCS to furnish equipment for such unitsas could be agreed upon to fill SHAEF's re-quirements. The authority, if granted,would be used only if the French agreed toprovide units of a type and priority requiredby SHAEF for current operations. Shouldno such agreement be reached, it might thenbe desirable to stop further issues of equip-ment to the French and utilize Polish,Czechoslovakian, and other sources ofAllied manpower.35

33 Ltr, Eisenhower to CCS, CCS 661/2, 31 Oct 44,ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B.

34 Ltr, Smith to CCS, CCS 627/4, 31 Oct 44, insame file.

35 Memo, Loomis for CCS, 6 Nov 44, ABC 091.-711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B; Memo for Rcd,SHAEF G-3, 13 Nov 44, and Memo, SHAEF G-3for CofS, 14 Nov 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France,Vol. II.


During this time the two communicationsof 31 October from the Supreme Com-mander had been referred to OPD and theJLC with a view to weighing his proposalsin the light of availability of equipment andshipping space. On the recommendationof the JLC, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in-formed the CCS on 23 November that as faras France was concerned, General Eisen-hower's requirements could be met in gen-eral under the provisions of their earliermemorandum of 29 August (CCS 661)which, incidentally, was still awaitingBritish action.36

To settle the liberated manpower issue,General Smith, at a meeting held at Su-preme Headquarters on 18 November, in-vited Generals Juin and Leyer to presentthe French point of view. The discussionresulted in complete agreement. Afterpaying tribute to the efforts exerted bySHAEF to equip the French armed forces,General Juin outlined the progress ofFrench action in meeting the SupremeCommander's requirements. He pointedout that a number of labor units as well as120 security battalions had already beenactivated. His recommendations on thecontrol, functions, and equipping of thesecurity battalions appeared satisfactory toGeneral Smith and his associates, who, aftersome discussion, expressed their completeapproval. General Juin then turned to thesubject which his government had most atheart, the reorganization of the metropoli-tan army. The French, he explained, weremost anxious to participate in the war withmore than 8 divisions in the line. Theywanted, in fact, 8 more divisions—6 infan-try, 1 mountain, and 1 armored—grouped

in 2 army corps. Even if there could beno guarantee of equipment, the militaryauthorities were determined to proceed withthe organization of these new units and toequip them progressively. At the invitationof General Smith, General Leyer then ex-plained how the French General Staffhoped to equip these 8 new divisions.

The proposed plan, entirely separatefrom, and in addition to, the current secur-ity and labor program, contemplated threephases, as follows: Phase I, 1 mountain and2 infantry divisions, equipped largely withFrench matériel in order to save on ship-ping; Phase II, 1 infantry and 1 armoreddivision, equipped entirely with matériel ofAllied source; Phase III, 3 infantry divisionsequipped also with French matériel.

General Smith pointed out that the pro-gram was an excellent one but that the pos-sibility of its implementation would bedetermined by two factors: the fulfillmentof other priority commitments and availa-bility of equipment and shipping. Aftersome discussion, the conferees agreed uponthe following armament priorities: (1)completion of the security and labor pro-gram, (2) Allied equipment to completePhase I of the proposed French plan,(3) instructional equipment for Phase II.They further agreed that the FFI would becompletely absorbed in the plan and thatall details of implementation would beworked out between the French militaryauthorities, the Rearmament Division, andother responsible SHAEF staff sections.37

One factor apparently not discussed atthe meeting but bound to condition thespeed of implementation of the plan wasthat of manpower. Figures which theMinistry of War had just released on 10

36 Memos, OPD for Col George A. Lincoln, 9Nov 44, and Hull for Marshall, 14 Dec 44, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 1-B.

37 Min, Rearmt Conf, 18 Nov 44, SHAEF 388.3/3Fr Rearmt.


November indicated that 382,000 liberatedmen were then available. Of these, 52,000were at the disposal of 1st French Army and36,000 were engaged in operations on theAtlantic c o a s t , leaving approximately294,000 men. SHAEF's own requirementsbeing estimated at 216,000, the net excessnumbered only 78,000 men. Since the 8-division proposal required over 200,000men, it was apparent that its implementa-tion could be effected only very graduallyas the units of the labor and security pro-gram reverted to French control. Themobilization of additional effectives couldhardly be considered at this juncture as allcivilian manpower was urgently needed forthe rehabilitation of the national economyand the maintenance of existing publicservices.38

Two days after the French had outlinedtheir intentions, they held a conference withBritish military authorities to determine theextent to which the United Kingdom couldassist in providing equipment for the pro-posed new divisions. Lt. Gen. Sir RonaldWeeks, representing the Imperial GeneralStaff, informed General Leyer that somesurplus stocks of equipment in the UnitedKingdom could be made available. At hissuggestion, the French Chief of Staff agreedto send a team to tour British depots anddetermine what items would be acceptableand in what quantities. It was then de-cided that all subsequent negotiations on thematter would be channeled through the Re-armament Division.39

To ensure closer co-ordination withSHAEF on armament matters, in anticipa-tion especially of an approval of their newprogram, the French military authorities

merged their Armament Liaison Section,currently attached to G-3, SHAEF Missionto France, with the French Section alreadyoperating with General Loomis' Rearma-ment Division. They placed the new sec-tion, called French Group of the Rearma-ment Division, SHAEF Mission to France,under the command of Colonel Regnaultand gave it full authority to represent themat SHAEF.40 Meanwhile, SHAEF under-took to determine the procedure and re-sponsibilities for processing the detailed planwhich the French General Staff was pre-paring in pursuance of General Juin's pro-posal.41

The final plan was submitted by Mr.Diethelm on 30 November. Known there-after as the 30 November Plan, it consistedof three separate projects: Liberated Man-power (or SHAEF) Program, Far EastProgram, and Metropolitan Program. TheLiberated Manpower Program, to be com-pleted at a pace to be determined bySHAEF, consisted of 120 security battalionsgrouped in 40 regiments, 34 labor groups of4 companies each, Gendarmerie and GardeMobile units, and 10 Ranger battalions.The Far East Program, which had alreadybeen submitted to General Marshall on 1October, contemplated the activation ofunits amounting to 18,000 men. TheMetropolitan Program envisaged the con-stitution of 8 divisions and 213 supportingarmy corps and general reserve units, witha combined total strength of 207,000 men.Its implementation, according to Mr. Diet-helm, was conditioned, not by availabilityof manpower which, he stressed, was ade-quate, but to a great extent by the outputof French industry, as 6 of the divisions were

38 Rpt, Fr War Ministry, 10 Nov 44, SHAEFMission to France 091.711-1 (Fr).

39 Min, Mtg on Fr Rearmt, 20 Nov 44, SHAEFMission to France 091.711-3 (Fr).

40 See p. 386, below.41 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France for G-3

SHAEF Main, 24 Nov 44, SHAEF G-3 091 France,Vol. IV.


to be equipped largely from French sources.The 5 divisions of Phase I and Phase II, ofwhich 3 were already activated, were to bemade ready by 1 May 1945, and the 3 divi-sions of Phase II by 1 August of the sameyear.42

Apprised of the French intentions, theBritish Chiefs of Staff expressed the fearthat the proposed Metropolitan Programwas in conflict with the recommendationssubmitted on 29 August (CCS 661), recom-mendations which, incidentally, were stillawaiting British concurrence. GeneralLoomis assured General Weeks that therewas no conflict between the two proposals.CCS 661 had urged the equipping of a num-ber of infantry, artillery, and engineerbattalions equivalent to three of the infantrydivisions now requested by the French.These could be considered as representingthe balance of the old ANFA program.43

After a careful study of the 30 NovemberPlan, SHAEF concluded that it containedimplications requiring further examination.In particular, the Metropolitan Program, asit stood, did not include sufficient servicetroops. It contemplated the activation ofdivisions on the basis of a 25,000-man divi-sion slice, a much lower figure than thecorresponding U.S. slice of 40,000 and evenlower than the current 1st French Armyslice of 32,500.44

In transmitting a copy of the plan to theCCS on 18 December, General Smithlimited his comments to the MetropolitanProgram since the Liberated ManpowerProgram was already before the CCS fortheir consideration, and the Far East Pro-

gram was obviously not the concern of theSupreme Commander in western Europe.He explained that the French planned toequip six of the new divisions largely fromtheir own sources, either from stocks alreadyon hand, or from local manufacture pro-vided they obtained raw materials and othercommercial products from the outside. Itwas the opinion of SHAEF officials that theMetropolitan Program or any portionthereof would be of great value to the Alliedforces. The program was a reasonable one,although it would require considerable re-visions. Smith then urged the CCS to ap-prove it without delay.45

The British Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile,had finally taken action on CCS 661 nearlyfour months after its submission. On 16December their representatives in Wash-ington informed the CCS that they wereprepared to agree to the issue to the Su-preme Commander of authority to proceedwith the program recommended by the JCSon 29 August. They were doing so on theunderstanding that such authority would inno way prejudice the reconsideration of thewhole question of French rearmament uponthe receipt of the Supreme Commander'slatest proposal, which, they understood,was shortly to be submitted. The BritishChiefs of Staff had also taken simultaneousaction on the over-all liberated manpowerprogram submitted by General Eisenhoweron 31 October. While agreeing to thehigher ceiling proposed by the SupremeCommander, they considered that the equip-ment load should in the future be shared ona "more equitable basis." To this end theyproposed that the War Department be madeto assume the responsibility for procuring

42 Ltr, Diethelm to Eisenhower, 30 Nov 44,SHAEF Mission to France 091.711 (Fr).

43 Memo, Loomis for SHAEF G-3, 5 Dec 44,SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr).

44 Memo, Hull for Smith, 15 Dec 44, SHAEF SGS475 France, Vol. II.

45 Ltr, Smith to CCS, CCS 752/1, 18 Dec 44,SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II.


equipment required by the liberated man-power controlled by the U.S. forces.46

British approval of CCS 661, in practice,merely formalized the action already initi-ated by the War Department to beginequipping the 27 infantry, 9 artillery, and3 engineer battalions recommended by theJCS. In proceeding with shipments,American officials had acted on the justifi-cation that the battalions in question repre-sented the completion of the old ANFAprogram.

Apparently warned that U.S. industrialoutput was currently falling far short ofrequirements in a number of items, WarMinister Diethelm advised General Eisen-hower of the" steps contemplated by theFrench High Command to reduce to a mini-mum the requirement for U.S. matériel.The survey just completed of depots in theUnited Kingdom had revealed the existenceof excess British stocks probably sufficientfor six divisions. Although much of thematériel was in poor condition, the Frenchwould accept it and use it as "transitionequipment" pending its ultimate replace-ment. In this manner, the United Stateswould be called upon, for the present atleast, to furnish only a comparatively smallbut essential amount of equipment unob-tainable from either British or Frenchsources.47

The equipment situation of the Resist-ance forces fighting on the Atlantic coastand to a lesser degree of those forces ab-sorbed by 1st French Army had, by thistime, dangerously deteriorated. Returningfrom an inspection tour through eastern

and southern France, a representative ofG-3, SHAEF, reported that these forceswere in general poorly equipped and usingwhatever clothing and arms were available.The disparity between their equipment andthat of 1st French Army was causing con-siderable ill feeling among the men. Withthe unusually cold weather then prevailing,it was urgent to furnish them at least bootsor shoes and overcoats or jackets. To im-prove their lot, the Supreme Commanderdirected, on 16 December, that, pendingtheir absorption into civilian life or intoauthorized military units, they were, whenemployed on operationally necessary duties,the responsibility of SHAEF with respectto maintenance, clothing, and, if need be,equipment. He urged, however, that allsteps be taken to expedite their earlydisbandment.48

As the French military authorities hadreceived no reply to their 30 November pro-posal, they instructed their representative inWashington to try to obtain a decision fromthe CCS. In a preliminary conference heldon 18 December with General Marshall,General de Saint-Didier outlined the aimsand implications of the proposed Metropoli-tan Program and pointed out that GeneralEisenhower himself had "seemed interested"in its operational possibilities. He thenlisted the heavy matériel and the technicalitems of lighter equipment which would berequired from the United States. TheFrench, on their side, would provide fromtheir own resources the necessary light in-fantry weapons, mortars, machine guns,most of the engineer equipment, and other46 Memo, COS for CCS, CCS, 661/3, 16 Dec 44,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 44), Sec 2-C; Memo,COS for CCS, CCS 627/6, 16 Dec 44, ABC400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-B.

47 Ltr, Diethelm to Eisenhower, 17 Dec 44, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C.

48 Memo, Lt Col D. K. Griffith for ACofS G-3SHAEF, 16 Dec 44, SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol.IV; Ltr, SCAEF to Comdrs Concerned, 16 Dec 44,SHAEF SGS 475/1, Vol. I.


miscellaneous items.49 General de Saint-Didier then communicated to the CCS, inadvance of his appearance before them, amemorandum setting forth the backgroundand aims of the Metropolitan Program. Itwas not a postwar plan, but one designed toincrease to the maximum France's wareffort. General Eisenhower had notreached a decision but "seemed to have beengreatly impressed." 50

On 19 December the Supreme Com-mander, postponing his comments on the 30November plan until further study, proposedto the CCS that, in the event a rearma-ment program was implemented for anycountry in western Europe, his headquartersbe made the co-ordinating authority and,where necessary, the responsible agency forprocessing, formulating, and implementingthe program, subject of course to CCS ap-proval. Such a procedure would tend toavoid any conflict likely to result from thefact that present demands for rearmamentwere diverse and might compete withSHAEF's operational requirements for per-sonnel and equipment. Simultaneously,he requested that the scale of equipment forliberated manpower be increased, as he nowconsidered it inadequate. Finally, his dep-uty chief of staff for air, Air Marshal JamesM. Robb, transmitted a proposal callingfor an extension of the French Air Force.The plan envisaged the activation of newair and ground units and, if approved, wasto go into effect on 1 January and be com-pleted by 30 June.51

In the hope of prodding SHAEF intoquick action, Mr. Diethelm called on Gen-eral Smith on 20 December and urged himto take steps for the speedy issue of thematériel that would have to be deliveredfrom the United States under the new eight-division program. He explained thatPrime Minister Churchill had agreed in thecourse of his recent visit to France that someobsolete equipment then in the UnitedKingdom would be turned over to six of theinfantry divisions awaiting equipment.52

This would be a makeshift solution pendingreception of the modern U.S. equipment"promised" earlier by General Smith. Hethen requested that SHAEF approve thetransfer to the French forces of the cap-tured war matériel then stocked up at Trunin Normandy.53

The scheduled appearance of General deSaint-Didier before the CCS took place on22 December. The French representativebriefly outlined the details of the Metropoli-tan Program. The French High Commandexpected to complete it by 1 May 1945, forthe British had just given assurances thatsufficient used British matériel would bemade available earlier than originally antici-pated. Admiral Leahy, after payingtribute to the combat record of the Frenchforces in Italy and France, assured Generalde Saint-Didier that the CCS would con-sider the proposed program with sympathybut warned him that the recent operationalevents on the western European front hadincreased the difficulties of delivering mili-tary equipment even to the U.S. armies in49 Min Conf, Marshall and de Saint-Didier, 18

Dec 44, and Memo, Marshall for Hull, Somervell,and Handy, 18 Dec 44, OCS A-48-11 091 France,Sec I.

50 Memo, de Saint-Didier for CCS, CCS 752, 19Dec 44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C.

51 Msg SCAF 148, Eisenhower to CCS, 19 Dec44, OPD Cable Files; Msg SCAF 147, Eisenhowerto CCS, 19 Dec 44, ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43),

Sec 1-B; Ltr, Robb to CCS, 19 Dec 44, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C. See dis-cussion in Chapter XXII, below.

52 The Prime Minister visited France in Octoberand again on 11 November.

53 Min Conf, Smith and Diethelm, 20 Dec 44,SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II.


France. After the meeting, the CCS re-ferred the matter to the Combined Admin-istrative Committee for comment andrecommendation.54

In Paris, examination of the MetropolitanProgram was continuing. As an interimmeasure, G-3, SHAEF, on 24 Decemberrecommended that the Supreme Com-mander approve the French proposal to useBritish matériel available in the UnitedKingdom and acceptable to them, and thatthe CCS be urged to approve the transfer.Meanwhile, 43,000 FFI personnel had beenissued equipment from sources in thetheater. In addition, matériel for eleveninfantry battalions had been received or wasen route to the Continent as a result of theaction initiated by the War Department.55

The impatiently awaited comments of theSupreme Commander finally reached theCCS on 28 December. Clearly, they re-flected the operational developments of thepreceding few days. The situation on thewestern front had taken a sudden turn forthe worse. The Ardennes offensivelaunched by the Germans on 16 Decem-ber had met with considerable initial suc-cess. Within ten days the enemy had ad-vanced over fifty miles. Although themomentum of the German drive had slowedby 26 December, the situation was stillcritical. Under the circumstances, Eisen-hower was now eager to make the maxi-mum use of liberated manpower—Belgian,Polish, but more especially French. Noquicker, more economical, or more effec-tive way to increase Allied fighting powercould be found, he explained to the CCS,

than by furnishing the equipment for atleast 5 of the proposed 8 divisions. Headded that it would be a great help if 2divisions equipped with excess British ma-tériel apparently acceptable to the Frenchcould be placed at the disposal of FieldMarshal Montgomery, then in command ofthe British 21 Army Group. The SupremeCommander then turned to the labor andsecurity program. The War Office pool ofequipment was exhausted. Some 43,000FFI troops were fighting on the Atlanticcoast, for whom SHAEF was unable to pro-vide anything. Although sympathetic totheir plight, the War Office was hamperedby lack of authority from the CCS. It wasessential that the Liberated Manpower Pro-gram be given prompt approval.56

The CCS lost no time in taking action.With the prospect of a longer war, the real-ization that the Germans were stronger thanit was thought earlier and the knowledgethat the dearth of U.S. infantry replace-ments, already felt before the Ardennes of-fensive, was critical, the CCS quickly en-dorsed General Eisenhower's recommenda-tions. Within twenty-four hours, they ap-proved the eight-division Metropolitan Pro-gram, the Liberated Manpower Program,and the French Air Force Program. Theythen directed the Combined Administra-tive Committee to determine the responsi-bility for the provision of the necessaryequipment.57

The question of the employment ofFrench metropolitan manpower was at lastsolved in a manner which, it was hoped,would satisfy the wishes of all concerned.

54 Min, CCS 180th Mtg, 22 Dec 44, ABC 091.711France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-G; Memo for Rcd, MISWD, 27 Dec 44, OCS A-48-1 091 France.

55 Memo, Hull for Smith, 24 Dec 44, SHAEF SGS475 France, Vol. II; Memo, Hull for Smith, 27 Dec44, OCS A-48-11 091 France, Sec I.

56 Msg SCAF 159, Eisenhower to CCS, 28 Dec 44,OPD Cable Files.

57 Min, CCS 181st Mtg, 29 Dec 44, ABC 091.711France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5; Msg FACS 120, CCS toEisenhower, 29 Dec 44, ABC 091.711 (6 Oct 43),Sec 2-C.


The Liberated Manpower Program pro-vided, for the Supreme Commander, a suf-ficient force to maintain the security of therear and a labor force to assist in thephysical support of his armies. The Metro-politan and Air Programs would give him,by the spring of 1945, a substantial increaseof his fighting force and, at the same time,would satisfy the long-felt desire of theFrench to reorganize their national army.To some French authorities, on the otherhand, the Metropolitan Program as it stoodwas only a beginning. In General deGaulle's opinion, France could do muchmore than activate eight divisions from herliberated manpower. Apparently im-pressed by the speed with which the CCShad acted on the eight-division program(barely a month had elapsed since the sub-mission of the program on 30 November),and in the belief that he must strike whilethe iron was hot, the French leader wastedno time in trying for a much larger program.

In a personal letter to President Roose-velt, dated 1 January 1945, de Gaulle, afterexpressing his gratefulness for the agree-ment reached three days earlier to rearm8 divisions, declared that his governmentcould have before the end of 1945 "aboutfifty good divisions" if it had the means toequip them. Should the President give afavorable reply in principle, he would sendGeneral Juin to Washington at once to dis-cuss all technical arrangements. Generalde Gaulle's letter did not clearly indicatewhether the 50 divisions were to be in addi-tion to the 8 already equipped under theNorth African program and the 8 to berearmed under the recently approved pro-gram. Even assuming that these 16 unitswere included in the total, this meant afurther increase of 34 divisions by the endof 1945, still a sizable figure. The pro-

posal at any rate was referred immediatelyto the JCS and the JLC for examination andrecommendations, and three weeks later toGeneral Eisenhower for comment. Mean-while the State Department dispatched anoncommittal reply to the U.S. Ambassadorin Paris for delivery to the Minister ofForeign Affairs.58

General Somervell, then in Paris, wasdiscussing with Supreme Headquarters thedetails and implications of the new 8-divi-sion program. He and theater officials hadalready agreed that the program would re-quire considerable revisions in view of itsinsufficiency in service units. In fact,SHAEF's Rearmament Division was busydrafting a revised program in which thenecessary service units would be placed ona higher priority than most of the divisionsthemselves. On 30 January General Eisen-hower informed General Marshall that inhis opinion the recently approved programrepresented "the maximum effort which theFrench could make in time to be of use inoperations" in his theater. French rearma-ment industry, he explained, was stilldirectly dependent upon import of rawmaterials largely from U.S. sources. As formanpower, it was doubtful that enough ofit could be made available to fulfill allexisting commitments including the 8 newdivisions, much less the activation of 34additional divisions as proposed by Generalde Gaulle.59

A few days later the JLC reported thatexisting and expected shortages of essentialequipment, present requirements placed onU.S. production which exceeded produc-

58 Ltr, de Gaulle to President, 1 Jan 45, and Msg,Grew to U.S. Ambassador Paris, 27 Jan 45, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C.

59 Msgs CM-OUT 26436, Marshall to Eisen-hower, 25 Jan 45, and S-77124, Eisenhower toMarshall, 30 Jan 45, in same file.


tion capabilities, and a strained shippingsituation ruled out the provision, in 1945,of further equipment to meet General deGaulle's request. On the basis of this con-clusion and of the recommendations of theSupreme Commander, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff decided that, since the French couldnot provide the necessary personnel and theUnited States could not furnish the neces-sary equipment, the commitment to rearmthe French should be limited to the 16 divi-sions and supporting troops approved underthe North African and Metropolitan Pro-grams. Such was the tenor of the letterwhich President Roosevelt himself ad-dressed to de Gaulle on 24 March. "Inview of all the factors involved," he con-cluded, "you will appreciate the fact thatattempts at French rearmament beyond thecommitments which can clearly be met byFrance and the U.S. would interfere withthe prosecution of the war." 60

Any implication that the American rejec-tion of the de Gaulle proposal was basedon a veiled desire to crush French ambitionfor the future, as then rumored among theFrench, must be dismissed if one considersthe position which American officials hadtaken with respect to French military power.This position had been made unmistakablyclear only a few weeks before by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, thehighest American policy-making agency.In briefing President Roosevelt on the pro-posal made earlier by the British to reorgan-ize the French and other Allied postwararmies, the committee had this to say:

Our present policy toward the French isbased on the belief that it is in the best in-

terests of the U.S. that France resume hertraditional position as a principal powercapable of playing a part in the occupationof Germany and in maintaining peace inEurope. The recruiting and equipping ofFrench land forces would be a natural corol-lary of this policy, and politically such a movecould be portrayed as a further evidence ofAmerican friendship for France and a proofof our desire to see her as a strong nation.61

That, in the light of such a statement, theU.S. Chiefs of Staff had now come to rejectthe latest French proposal could be ex-plained only by motives of a sound, prac-tical, military nature such as were given inthe reply to General de Gaulle. Shortagesof U.S. matériel were known to exist, a factwhich the JLC had emphasized in their9 February report. But more serious wasthe situation with respect to French man-power availability itself.

As matters stood, 1st French Army, witha reported strength of 241,000 men, wasalready short some 58,000 supportingtroops—lines of communications personnelfor the most part—thus throwing a con-siderable burden on the U.S. forces. Inaddition, its regiments were short from 700to 800 white effectives each. They had infact received no replacements from liberatedFrance. Without wishing to prejudice theplans currently being made for the activa-tion of new divisions, largely from theformer FFI, General de Lattre, Command-ing General, 1st French Army, had urgedGeneral de Gaulle on 18 December to placeat his disposal without delay the 8,000 to10,000 young Frenchmen needed to restoreto his Army "its initial moral equilibrium"and "fighting qualities." 62 The new 8-

60 Memos, JLC for JCS, 9 Feb 45, and Leahy forSecy War and Secy Navy, 2 Mar 45, in same file;Ltr, President to de Gaulle, 24 Mar 44, ABC091.711 (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D. See also Memo,Daly for Craig, 11 May 45, OPD 336.2 France,Sec V.

61 Memo, State-War-Navy Coordinating Com-mittee for President, 28 Dec 44, ABC 091.711 (6Oct 43), Sec 2-D.

62 Ltr, de Lattre to de Gaulle, 18 Dec 44, quotedin de Lattre, Histoire de la Première Armée Fran-çaise, p. 337.


division program as planned by the Frenchcalled for a total of 205,000 men with adivision slice of only 25,600 men, alevel regarded by SHAEF as totally inade-quate. The Liberated Manpower Pro-gram, meanwhile, was still in process of im-plementation and absorbing considerableeffectives. It was difficult to see how theFrench could raise, in addition to these vari-ous commitments, 1,275,000 men for 34new divisions before the return and rehabili-tation of prisoners of war then detained inGermany, or without extensive mobiliza-tion. So far only the class of young mentwenty-one years of age had been called tothe colors. Even if the necessary effectiveswere raised, General Eisenhower did notconsider it likely that they could beequipped and trained in time to participatein operations. His skepticism regarding thede Gaulle proposal was shared by those who,at Supreme Headquarters, were grapplingwith the armament problem. The Ameri-cans regarded it as an example of "utterfolly." Their French colleagues, when ap-prised of it, registered considerable em-barrassment.63

The action taken by the CCS at the end

of December had firmly established theprinciple of two separate armament com-mitments (if one considers the new AirForce Program as part of the MetropolitanProgram) involving French liberated man-power, with one, at least in the eyes of theAllied command, having priority over theother. The French, while agreeing to thisdistinction, regarded the Liberated Man-power Program rather as a transition pro-gram, one forced upon them and one inwhich they saw no advantage to themselvesother than the formation of units to be ab-sorbed as speedily as possible in the Metro-politan Program. Judging from the en-thusiasm they had shown consistently sinceNovember 1942 for the activation of com-bat divisions at the expense of service units,it was to be expected that they would nowlikewise throw all their energy into expe-diting a program from which they were togain additional combat units, meanwhiledevoting less attention to the organizationof labor and security troops.

63 Msg S-77124, Eisenhower to Marshall, 30Jan 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C;Intervs with Loomis, Jun 50, with Regnault.Sep 50.

CHAPTER XX

The Liberated Manpower andMetropolitan Programs in Operation

Implementing the Liberated ManpowerProgram

Implementation of the Liberated Man-power Program, begun long before the CCSapproval on 29 December, had already pro-duced some tangible results. By 15 Januarythe French had activated or were in processof activating approximately 45 securitybattalions, as well as 23 transport and 13labor units.1 Equipping of these units waseffected as follows. First G-3, SHAEF,indicated to G-4 the priorities in whichequipment was to be released and to whatunits it was to be allocated. G-4 then ob-tained the release of equipment from U.S.or U.K. sources. Shipments involvedquestions of over-all priority as they tendedto compete with the maintenance andbuild-up requirements of armies in the field.Equipment arriving on the Continent wasunloaded at either Le Havre or Rouen. Asthere were no depots available in these twoports, the matériel was transported to theFrench reception center at Caen where itwas held until distributed to the units.Once equipped, the units were inspected byGeneral Kingman's Inspection Group forthe purpose of determining completeness ofequipment. After this inspection, they

were subjected to an initial training periodby the military region commands, at theend of which the latter informed SHAEFMission to France that the units were readyfor operational employment. SHAEFMission then notified the appropriate head-quarters and co-ordinated the issue of in-structions placing the units under the com-mand or at the disposal of British or U.S.forces. As Inspection Group and theFrench War Ministry did not always agreeon dates of readiness, the Rearmament Divi-sion acted as a check on statements by theseauthorities. One of the principal difficultiesencountered appeared to be insufficientliaison between the War Ministry and themilitary regions. Another resulted from thefact that the French were simultaneouslyreorganizing Metropolitan Program units,a process which involved a constant re-shuffling of units. Thus within 6th ArmyGroup area, it was not always too clearwhich battalions were security battalionsand which were units intended for theMetropolitan Program.2

Adding to the difficulties in setting upthe units required under the LiberatedManpower Program was the fact that theprogram itself included no service troops.Logistical support of these units, especiallythe security battalions, could not be im-

1 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France G-3 forSHAEF Main, 15 Jan 45, SHAEF Mission to France320-2-NA Orgn of Fr Army.

2 Min, Conf at SHAEF Main, 16 Jan 45, SHAEFMission to France 091.4 Liberated People.


posed upon U.S. service troops and installa-tions as these were already working tocapacity and in any case were not organizedto service British equipment. Arrange-ments were finally made in mid-Januarywith commanders of the military regionsand of the battalions themselves for theactivation of French service units. Equip-ment for these was drawn from that issuedto the battalions or from other Frenchsources.3

In Washington, the question of the divi-sion of responsibility between the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom for provid-ing equipment for labor and security unitswas still unsolved. The U.S. members ofthe Combined Administrative Committeewere now recommending that the Britishbe asked to supply all the requirements andthat they be urged to indicate specificallywhat they could or could not do so that theUnited States would know the extent of itsobligation.4

By the end of January, the equipmentsituation of Liberated Manpower Programunits had become critical. Already threemonths had elapsed since the submission ofthe original request to the CCS and thelatter had so far given only an approval inprinciple. Resources were dwindling rap-idly while demands for liberated manpowerhad risen. Equipment could be obtainedonly for certain limited and specific require-ments approved by the War Office. It wastherefore not possible for the theater tokeep any phased program to meet require-ments for the Allied Expeditionary Forceas a whole. Lack of approval of the pro-

posed increased scale of equipment addedto the seriousness of the situation. Unitswere being employed under the most exact-ing weather conditions and many were re-ported to be suffering serious sickness rates.Additional equipment, especially clothing,was urgently needed. SHAEF was in aposition neither to provide adequately forexisting units nor to meet further require-ments.5

In a message dated 30 January the Su-preme Commander brought these facts be-fore the CCS. He urged them to approveforthwith an increase in the scales of equip-ment, such as a second pair of boots, afourth blanket, and a second set of battledress. These increases were particularlyessential where units were serving with U.S.or U.K. forces, as they had no facilities forthe rapid replacement of soiled or damagedclothing. Resources were exhausted,warned the Supreme Commander, and theBritish War Office was unwilling to makefurther issues pending the decision of theCCS. The whole program had come to astandstill thus "tying up" U.S. and Britishcombat troops.6

When, on 2 February, the CCS met todiscuss General Eisenhower's recommenda-tions, they were faced with a difficult deci-sion. The operational situation had greatlychanged for the better in the past few days.The Allied drive eastward, resumed afterthe Ardennes setback, was gaining momen-tum. On the Eastern Front, the Russianoffensive launched on 12 January hadbrought the Red Army deep into the Reich.These successes were reviving hopes for anearly end of hostilities. Preferring not toreach a decision on the provision of equip-3 Msg EX-80374, Lee to Base Secs, 31 Dec 44,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-1 (Fr) ; Memo,Loomis for Regnault, 5 Jan 45, SHAEF Missionto France 091.4 Liberated People.

4 Memo for Info, CAdC, 25 Jan 45, ABC 091.711France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C.

5 Memo, Bull for Smith, 27 Jan 45, SHAEF SGS475 France, Vol III.

6 Msg SCAF 193, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Jan 45,OPD Cable Files.

THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN PROGRAMS 341

ment for the Liberated Manpower Programuntil they had received the report they wereexpecting from the Combined Administra-tive Committee, the CCS merely ordered,in the interim, a reduction of the over-allprogram from 460,000 to 400,000 men.7

This forced a revision downward of theFrench part of the program. The 20,000-odd effectives of the military regions, Gen-darmerie, and Garde Mobile, who had beenissued only a small fraction of the equip-ment initially promised them, were strickenoff the program. The number of securitybattalions and labor units was reduced to103 and 30 respectively.

On 21 February the Supreme Com-mander and the French Provisional Gov-ernment reached an agreement on thegeneral subject of the command and em-ployment of the units raised under theLiberated Manpower Program. Theagreement formalized an earlier informalunderstanding reached on 18 November1944. Signed by Maj. Gen. John T. Lewis,Chief, SHAEF Mission to France, andGeneral Juin, it stipulated that when em-ployed within French territory the unitsconcerned were commanded by the mili-tary region commanders who in turn re-ceived their missions from army and armygroup commanders in the zone of armies,or from the Commanding General, Com-munications Zone, in the zone of interior.When operating in Germany, the units wereto be organized in task forces consisting ofa minimum of five to ten battalions andcommanded by French officers, the latter inturn receiving their missions from the armyand army group commanders concerned.8

Finally, the agreement authorized thelimited transfer of men, but for replacementpurposes only, from Liberated ManpowerProgram to Metropolitan Program units.On 24 March General Lewis remindedGeneral Juin that men so transferred wereto leave behind clothing and individualequipment so as to prevent the loss of thismatériel to labor and security units.9

Pursuant to the agreement, the Frenchwere requested to organize 7 headquartersto command a corresponding number oftask forces for operation in Germany. Theheadquarters were tentatively allocated onthe basis of 1 to 12th Army Group, 4 to 6thArmy Group, and 2 to CommunicationsZone. Each task force was to include sixbattalions and some service units, a list ofwhich was subsequently forwarded to theFrench military authorities.10

The Combined Administrative Commit-tee finally submitted on 24 March its over-all study of the rearmament programs forwestern European Allies. The committeerecommended in part that the United King-dom be made to assume the equipmentresponsibility for the 400,000 labor and se-curity troops required by SHAEF 11 "with-out upward revision of the present U.K. re-quirements against the War Department."It also offered an important recommenda-tion affecting all western European rearma-ment programs, namely, that any unitswhich had not been equipped by the timeactive hostilities with Germany ceasedshould not be equipped.12 Two weeks later,

7 Min, CCS 185th Mtg, 2 Feb 45, ABC 400.3295(2 Aug 43), Sec 1-C.

8 Text of Agreement in Memo AG 091.711-5(Fr) GCT-AGM, SCAEF To All Concerned, 2Mar 45, SHAEF G-3 091, Vol. VI.

9 Memo, Lewis for Juin, 24 Mar 45, SHAEF Mis-sion to France 421-1 Combined.

10 Msgs EX-21116 and EX-22400, SCAEF toSHAEF FWD, 15 and 18 Mar 45, SHAEF G-3 091France, Vol. VI; Ltr, Lewis to Juin, 30 Mar 45,SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-1 (Fr).

11 As well as for six Belgian infantry brigades.12 Rpt, CAdC to CCS, CCS 768/7, 24 Mar 45,

ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-C.


on 6 April, the CCS, by informal action,approved the recommendations of the com-mittee and advised the Supreme Com-mander accordingly.

By the beginning of April implementationof the Liberated Manpower Program hadmade but little progress. Of the 103French security battalions required underthe revised program, 49 only were equippedand operational or about to become oper-ational—18 in Communications Zone area,24 in 6th Army Group area (of which 12were administered by 1st French Army),none in 12th Army Group area, and 7 inthe British zone. Fifty-four battalions hadnot yet been activated or, if activated, hadnot been equipped. As for labor groups,of the 30 units required, no more than 6were operational, all in the British zone,leaving 24 still to be formed and equipped.13

The program, obviously, had boggeddown. The reasons ranged from lack ofpersonnel, suitable clothing, and organiza-tional equipment to lack of interest by keyFrench officers. In some instances, it wasreported that battalion commanders hadnot inspected or visited companies undertheir command for periods of three to sixweeks.14 In addition, considerable confu-sion appeared to exist in 6th Army Grouparea in connection with security battalions.General Devers reported that the 24 bat-talions assigned to his command had "got-ten out of hand" and were being absorbedby the French for employment in other thanlines of communications duties. SHAEFimmediately took steps to recover the controlof these units so that they could be used as

originally contemplated and not forcombat.15

It was then that the French, by injectinga political note into the matter, precipitateda crisis which brought the implementationof the program to a sudden end. In lateMarch General Juin had been requested bySHAEF to assign additional security bat-talions for service with Allied armies oper-ating in Germany. Writing to GeneralLewis on 5 April, he announced that, withthe exception of the 12 battalions then atthe disposal of 1st French Army, no otherbattalions would be assigned to the AlliedExpeditionary Force in Germany until theFrench zone of occupation had been deter-mined. An additional 45 battalions wouldthen be made available but for employmentin that zone only.16

This announcement could not fail tobring forth a violent reaction from SHAEF.Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, Assistant Chiefof Staff, G-3, considered that the restric-tions proposed by the French were in viola-tion of the understanding reached betweenGenerals Smith and Juin on 18 Novemberand the formal agreement signed on 21 Feb-ruary. He recommended that if theFrench remained adamant in their position,the Supreme Commander should be askedto order a suspension of the Liberated Man-power Program.17

In an attempt to ward off such drasticaction, General Smith requested the FrenchChief of Staff to clarify his earlier statementas well as French intentions. "As this head-quarters," he went on to explain, "is con-cerned only with operations for the defeat

13 Tab D to Memo, Bull for CofS, 7 Apr 45,SHAEF SGS 474 France, Vol. III.

14 Memo, Theater Comdr ETOUSA for Lewis,18 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-13(Fr).

15 Memo, Bull for Chief Orgn and Equip SecSHAEF, 6 Apr 45, SHAEF G-3 091 France,Vol. VI.

16 Ltr, Juin to Lewis, 5 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS 475France, Vol. III.

17 Memo, Bull for Smith, 7 Apr 45, in same file.


of Germany and has nothing to do withpolitical questions such as the delimitationof the French zone of occupation, it is diffi-cult for me to understand the connectionbetween the two matters. ... It is possi-ble that I have misinterpreted yourmeaning." 18

On 9 April, as no word had been receivedfrom General Juin, then on a tour of in-spection of the troops engaged on theAtlantic coast, the Supreme Commanderdirected that initial issues of equipment toFrench security and labor units be sus-pended pending clarification of the condi-tions under which the units were to be em-ployed in Germany.19 This action, taken,ironically enough, only three days after theCCS had approved the program itself,brought immediate response from theFrench. The agreement of 21 February,General Juin assured General Smith, wasnot questioned at all by the French militaryauthorities; what was involved at the mo-ment, he explained, was a discussion of the"specific arrangements." In support of thiscontention he referred to a paragraph ofthe agreement which, as quoted by him,stipulated that "separate and specific ar-rangements must be made with respect tothe place and time of employment of thesecurity battalions." He urged that thematter be discussed at once between Gen-eral Smith and himself.20

In the course of a meeting held on 11April, General Smith pointed out that theparagraph quoted in General Juin's letterreferred, as worded in the agreement, onlyto the organization and not to the employ-ment of the units. It was not clear, he

added, why the French authorities consid-ered that any discussion was justified at thisjuncture. General Juin replied that hisgovernment was concerned with the politi-cal aspects of the question. The employ-ment of the French forces in Germany wastied up with basic political questions, suchas the ultimate problem of occupation andof French security. The French Govern-ment was being "kept in the dark" concern-ing the attribution of a zone of occupationto France and could not be expected toagree to the use of its forces as mere "colo-nial auxiliaries." French authorities, Gen-eral Juin stated flatly, had no part in thedirection of the war although they remainedat all times ready to contribute within thefull limits of their resources to the defeat ofGermany.

Replying to these and other arguments,General Smith emphasized that he was con-cerned with and must be guided by strictlymilitary considerations. If no other solu-tion could be found, SHAEF would, how-ever reluctantly, have to dispense with theFrench battalions. These would be re-placed by U.S. troops and additional unitsnow being offered by the Belgian andNetherlands Governments. Having madeunmistakably clear SHAEF's position in thematter, General Smith then, on a concilia-tory note, asked General Juin to considerthe following solution: the employmentunder Allied control of French battalions upto a total of 52 for lines of communicationsduties in the area west of the Rhine, withthe understanding that no rigid restrictionswould be placed on their employment laterin other areas should this become necessary.In return, three Metropolitan Programdivisions, the 1st, 10th, and 36th Infantry,would be placed at the disposal of theFrench High Command; the first two would

18 Ltr, Smith to Juin, 7 Apr 45, in same file.19 Msg FWD 18819, SCAEF to COMZONE, 9

Apr 45, in same file.20 Ltr, Juin to Smith, 10 Apr 45, in same file.


be assigned to the maintenance of securityin the Strasbourg and Saar areas, and thethird would be moved to the Franco-Italianborder to replace the 1st DMI. The latterwould then become available for employ-ment with 1st French Army.21

After he had consulted General deGaulle, the French Chief of Staff announcedthat the plan proposed by General Smithwas satisfactory. The French Governmentconsented, for the time being, to placing atSHAEF's disposal initially 24 battalions or-ganized in 8 regiments and later, other units,all under the command of a French generalofficer, Lt. Gen. Henri Préaud, providedthey be employed in the territory lying be-tween the 1939 French border, the Rhine,and a line running from Aachen to Cologneboth inclusive.22 Two weeks later, on 30April, with the issuance of equipment stillsuspended, the French authorities reiteratedthat they were prepared to place 24 bat-talions (10 at once, 14 after they had beenequipped) at the disposal of the Allied com-mand but only during the period of activeoperations against organized Germanforces.23 Thereafter their employmentwould be made the subject of a new agree-ment.

This latest French note brought to thefore a question already under considerationfor some time, namely, the employment ofLiberated Manpower Program units afterthe signing of an armistice in Europe. TheSupreme Commander, anticipating an earlyend of hostilities, had requested the CCS,on 24 April, to authorize him to continueto equip, for employment in Germany, such

units as would be required for up to a maxi-mum of one year.24 His requirement inFrench security troops was estimated at 47battalions (13 for the British zone and 34for the U.S. zone), of which 22 only werecurrently equipped and available. With-out waiting for a reply from the CCS, Gen-eral Smith informed the French on 7 Maythat the issue of further equipment to secu-rity and labor units was not justified unlessthese units could be operationally employedunder Allied Expeditionary Force com-mand for a period of six months.25

On the same day the German forces weresurrendering to the Western Allies and tothe USSR. In pursuance of the directivefrom the CCS, all rearmament programs inwestern Europe were to terminate. Yet theend of hostilities brought no change in thestatus of the French programs. Implemen-tation of the Liberated Manpower Programalready had been suspended and the ques-tion of its resumption was now before theCCS. The Metropolitan Program had suf-fered a similar fate a week before the cessa-tion of hostilities.

Implementing the Metropolitan Program

By the time the Metropolitan Programhad been approved on 29 December 1944,its implementation had made some head-way as a result of action taken in anticipa-tion of a favorable CCS decision. It will berecalled that the War Department had al-ready shipped equipment for eleven infantrybattalions, that the British War Office wasprepared to deliver stocks of old matérielacceptable to the French, and that the

21 Min Conf, Smith and Juin, 11 Apr 45, in samefile.

22 Ltr, Juin to Smith, 14 Apr 45, in same file.23 Ltr, Sevez to Smith, 30 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS

France 475/2, Vol. II.

24 Msg SCAF 304, Eisenhower to CCS, 24 Apr45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D.

25 Ltr, Smith to Sevez, 7 May 45, SHAEF G-3091 France, Vol. VII.


French themselves had activated several ofthe eight divisions scheduled to be re-equipped.

As the CCS signified approval, imple-mentation went into high gear. Yet theprospects of success did not look too encour-aging. Considering the implications of theprogram itself and, in the light of experiencegained in North Africa, the factors on whichit was dependent for its progress, it appearedalmost certain that the undertaking wouldface serious obstacles and might well makeno more than a limited start.

From the standpoint of matériel, therewere a number of unfavorable factors, suchas the multiplicity of sources from whichequipment was to come—British, American,Canadian, French, and enemy-captured;the fact that French industry was experi-encing considerable difficulties, not likely tobe solved for some time, in reaching produc-tion goals especially with respect to clothingrequirements; finally, the current and an-ticipated shortages of U.S. equipment.From the manpower standpoint, two prob-lems had to be considered: the competitiverequirements of the two French programsand the possibility of insufficient numbersof trained men for the required service units.

Finally, there were psychological and po-litical factors. Should the tempo of opera-tions be stepped up again and the cessationof hostilities appear closer at hand, as inAugust of 1944, a corresponding slacken-ing of interest in the program on the partof the Allies would probably result. Should,in addition, political complications arise be-tween Allied and French authorities, as theyhad on occasions during the North Africanrearmament operations with regard to com-mand or employment of troops, the pro-gram might well be dealt a death blow.Fewer such complications, it was hoped,

were likely to arise as a result of a politicalstep taken by the Allies a few months back.On 23 October 1944 they had finally rec-ognized the Provisional Government of theFrench Republic, headed by General deGaulle.26 On 1 January 1945 Mr. HenriBonnet presented to President Roosevelt hiscredentials as French Ambassador to theUnited States and signed the United NationsDeclaration in the name of his government.France had now joined officially the fra-ternity of nations aligned against the Axis.

On 6 January 1945 the CCS approvedthe transfer of British equipment requestedby the French for their new divisions.They stipulated that all items of U.S. lend-lease origin were to be turned over to thetheater commander and by him transferredto the French on behalf of the United States.The transaction involved a much smallervolume than the amount initially offered bythe British, for the matériel available waslargely obsolescent. Items transferred in-cluded machine guns (light, medium, andheavy), automatic rifles, ammunition, mis-cellaneous vehicles, all to be used for train-ing purposes and as part of the equipmentfor the six divisions of Phases I and III.27

Further French-British conversations led tonew French demands for other British items,such as 150 Cromwell tanks, armored cars,and a number of miscellaneous trucks notin running order but repairable. TheFrench wished to use the tanks and armored

26 The United States and the French ProvisionalGovernment signed, on 28 February 1945, the Lend-Lease and Reciprocal Aid Agreement which, inpractice, continued in force the agreements reachedearlier with the former French Committee of Na-tional Liberation. Twentieth Report to Congresson Lend-Lease Operations, August 30, 1945.

27 Msgs SCAF 162, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Dec44, and FACS 122, CCS to Eisenhower, 6 Jan 45,OPD Cable Files.


cars to equip the six reconnaissance regi-ments of the six infantry divisions.28

In the opinion of Allied officials, the onefactor likely to determine the success of thenew program more than any other wasavailability of manpower. On 31 Decem-ber they had requested General Juin tosubmit an estimate of effectives availablefor the following purposes: replacementsfor the divisions of 1st French Army thenreported to be considerably understrength,the Liberated Manpower Program, theMetropolitan Program, and "any other pro-gram which the French might be consider-ing and about which SHAEF had not beeninformed." 29 In his reply, General Juinassured Supreme Headquarters that whileno estimate, even approximate, could possi-bly be made at the moment of the man-power available for each of the various com-mitments, there would be no difficulty inobtaining the needed personnel. Theessential problem that remained was maté-riel. The Allies should "stick firmly" tothe program as it stood, not depart from it,and bend all efforts to provide forthwith asmuch of the necessary equipment aspossible.30

An important conference, meanwhile,had been held in Washington at which somethirty representatives from the InternationalDivision, Ordnance, Operations Division,and Army Air Forces discussed the twoproblems of supply and accounting for theMetropolitan Program. They agreed that,because the program involved many differ-ent sources of equipment and the time

schedule was short, the commanding gen-eral in the theater should have the maxi-mum amount of latitude in equipping thenew units. With this in view, they set fortha new method of effecting supply and ac-counting to replace the existing Command-ing General Shipments system.31

Under the new procedure, in which bothSHAEF and the French subsequently con-curred, matériel shipped thereafter to theFrench from the United States was sentthrough U.S. Army supply channels to U.S.supply depots in the theater. Co-ordina-tion between the theater and the Interna-tional Division was assumed by GeneralLoomis' Rearmament Division. The lat-ter and other SHAEF agencies concernedwere responsible for determining whatunits should be activated and the time atwhich it would be possible to do so. Inaddition they surveyed the various sourcesof supply to determine the amount of equip-ment needed to be furnished from theUnited States. The War Department for-warded the necessary requisitions to theMAB which allocated the matériel to theU.S. Army on the basis of operationalurgency. All accounting was, of necessity,accomplished in the theater.

The new system represented a completedeparture from the one followed formerlyin North Africa. Whereas equipment usedto be shipped to the French even beforetheir units were organized, now it was de-livered to them only after theater officialswere satisfied that units were ready to re-ceive it. Thus the theater was given com-plete control over the rearmament opera-tions. Under this system it would feel noreluctance in pushing any program whichit deemed reasonable and necessary. As a

28 Memo, Leyer for Eisenhower, 5 Jan 45, SHAEFSGS 475 France, Vol. III.

29 Memo, Lewis for Juin, 29 Dec 44, SHAEFMission to France 091.711-13 ( F r ) ; Memo, Lewisfor Juin, 31 Dec 44, SHAEF Mission to France091.711-3 (Fr).

30 Ltr, Juin to Lewis, 7 Jan 45, SHAEF Missionto France 091.711-3 (Fr).

31 Min Conf, 4 Jan 45, ABC 091.711 France (6Oct 43), Sec 2-C.


result of the change in procedure, the Re-armament Division became, more than everbefore, the central authority and the sourceof all information with respect to Frenchrearmament.32

By 5 January Army Service Forces hadalready completed a detailed analysis of re-quirements of U.S. matériel for the Metro-politan Program. Of the entire 1,600-odditems needed, nearly 1,400 could be fur-nished in accordance with the desired sched-ule without significant interference withother estimated demands and without majoradditional encroachments upon existing de-ficiencies, if any, in stock levels in the UnitedStates. Of the remainder, only fifty criticalitems, including artillery, ammunition,tanks, and certain categories of trucks, couldnot be furnished from the United Statesexcept at the expense of U.S. demands inthe theater. To fill the French program ascompletely as possible, Army Service Forcestook immediate steps to increase Americanproduction in all cases where necessary.On 8 January ASF informed the theaterthat the War Department had authorizedthe shipment of available items. Simul-taneously, General Marshall urged thetheater to consider the use of availableenemy-captured equipment.33

The first shipment of matériel was due

to leave U.S. ports within a few days in twoships bound for Marseille. It containedfirst-priority items, such as clothing andindividual equipment, and matériel for thefirst three divisions and supporting units.Deliveries were being made on the basis ofthe phasing established for the divisions bythe Supreme Commander in his letter of 15December, and for the supporting units bythe French Military Mission in Washing-ton.34 General Loomis then informed theFrench that the shipment of availableequipment for Phase I would be substan-tially completed by 1 May. He also advisedthem that revisions of the troop basis of theprogram and of the shipping schedule werein progress and would be discussed withthem soon.35

Meanwhile, the first of the new divisions,the 10th Infantry (or Paris) Division,assembled and organized in September pri-marily from FFI troops in the Paris areaand commanded by Brig. Gen. Pierre Bil-lotte, was being moved to 6th Army Grouparea. Its strength was approximately14,000 men. Its matériel, consisting largelyof enemy-captured equipment of assortedtypes, was wholly inadequate. Americaninspecting officers considered that the unitwould not be in a condition to be used in anoffensive role until it had received suitableequipment and had been trained for aperiod of not less than four months.36 Thedivision was one of the several units whichGeneral Juin had offered, on 30 December,to put into the Strasbourg area in an effort

32 Interv with Loomis, Jun 50; Memo, Inter-national Div ASF for Col Delalande, 30 Jan 45,SHAEF Mission to France 475-10 Equip of TroopsMetropolitan Program; Msg S-75501, EisenhowerPersonal to Marshall, 18 Jan 45, SS and P PlanningDiv Files.

33 Memo, Maj Gen W. A. Wood for Somervell,5 Jan 45, sub: Analysis of Requirements for FrRearmt Program, SHAEF Mission to France 091.-711 (75) Analysis; Memo, Styer for Chiefs of TechServs, 12 Jan 45, SS and P Planning Div FilesA-46-371; Msg W-88550, Styer to Eisenhower,8 Jan 45, SS and P Planning Div Files, Fr Rearmt,A-46-371, Dr 2407; Msg W-89078, Marshall toSomervell, 9 Jan 45, SS and P Planning Div Files.

34 Msg WX-20034, Styer to Lee, 12 Jan 45, In-ternational Div Cable Log, A-45-192.

35 Memo, Loomis for Regnault, 16 Jan 45,SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr ) .

36 Msg BX-22426, Devers to SHAEF MainCOMZONE, 6 Jan 45, SHAEF Mission to France091.711-2 (F r ) ; Memo, Hinton for DACofS G-3,SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. V.


to retain control of that city at a time whenthe Supreme Commander was contemplat-ing the possibility of its abandonment.37

French authorities, incidentally, were plan-ning to move other units into 6th ArmyGroup area, such as six infantry regimentsof two other newly activated divisions, ap-parently without prior consultation witheither SHAEF, SHAEF Mission to France,or 6th Army Group itself. Fearful that theunauthorized movement of these units wouldplace an unbearable burden on his alreadystrained supply facilities and resources,General Devers urged SHAEF to warn theFrench against such action.38

By mid-January the only equipmentreadily available in the theater for Metro-politan Program units was captured enemymatériel and a limited number of Frenchitems. Considering that British and Amer-ican matériel would not arrive for someweeks to come, SHAEF officials revisedtheir estimates as to the dates of readiness ofthe new divisions. They came to the con-clusion that only three would be ready sometime in June (and not 15 April as originallycontemplated), the rest in July and Au-gust.39 The French were naturally gettingimpatient. The Office of War Informa-tion was reporting a growing bitterness inFrance over the alleged inability of theUnited States to equip French divisions withAmerican arms, and a tendency among theFrench to believe that the United States didnot want France to become a strongpower.40 To dissipate such misgivings,

SHAEF considered the possibility of hold-ing a press conference at which informationon the American effort to rearm the Frenchwould be released. The conference waspostponed pending the drafting of pertinentreports by the Rearmament Division andother responsible agencies.

Revising the Metropolitan Program

It will be recalled that the MetropolitanProgram consisted initially of 8 divisions and213 supporting combat and service units.In submitting the program to the CCS on18 December, General Smith had warnedthat it would require revisions as it con-tained no base service or lines of communi-cations units. If implemented in its originalform, it was feared that it would place anunbearable burden on the U.S. Army. Thelatter was already heavily committed to thesupport of 1st French Army. As GeneralSomervell, then in the theater, pointed outin a message to the War Department, Com-munications Zone did not have enoughAmerican service units for the U.S. forces,much less to support the French. By build-ing up some extra French service units, heexplained, "we will be doing ourselves afavor." 41 In line with this contention, thetheater drew up for addition to the programa list of 915 supporting combat and serviceunits for both the 1st French Army and thenew divisions, thus increasing the Metro-politan Program to a total of 8 divisions and1,128 supporting units. In submitting therevised program to Washington on 17 Janu-ary, the theater recommended an entirelynew phasing in which the supporting units

37 Memo, Whiteley for G-4 SHAEF, 30 Dec 44,SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. IV; Pogue, TheSupreme Command, pp. 398-402.

38 Msg BX-22565, Devers to SHAEF Main, 8Jan 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-2 (Fr) .

39 Memo, Col H. A. Twitchell for Chief Plans SecG-3 SHAEF, 12 Jan 45, SHAEF G-3 091 France,Vol. V.

40 Memo, Director Bureau of Public Relations

WD for Asst Secy War, 10 Jan 45, OPD 336.2France, Sec V.

41 Statement by Somervell in telephone conversa-tion with Gen Wood, 23 Jan 45, SS and P PlanningDiv Files.


would be given first priority over the divi-sions. The perennial issue over servicetroops had, once again, come to the fore.42

Apprised on 27 January of the contem-plated revisions, the French military au-thorities promptly objected that "in spite oftheir insistence" they had not been given anopportunity to discuss the matter withAmerican officials. They pointed out that,since the plan as originally submitted bythem had been accepted by the CCS, theyhad gone ahead with their activation pro-gram and they could not at this junctureaccept any changes likely to delay the equip-ping of the larger units.43

War Department officials meanwhile hadinformed the theater that the complete re-vision of the phasing as now proposed woulddisrupt the procurement program and causedelays in the shipment of available maté-riel.44 They recommended that the phas-ing suggested by General Somervell on 5January be adhered to with only such modi-fications as would be required for the incor-poration of additional supporting units.The recommendation was endorsed by thetheater. Pending a conference which heplanned to hold with General Leyer in thenear future, General Loomis outlined theplan now under consideration for theFrench Chief of Staff. The War Depart-ment, he explained, would ship the equip-ment already set up except that the maté-riel for the last five infantry divisions wouldbe withheld to the extent that this could bedone without disrupting the schedule. Thenext phase would then consist of the equip-ment for such additional supporting units

as would be considered necessary for boththe 1st French Army and the first corps ofthree divisions of the new program, plussupporting corps troops as well as an appro-priate share of army and base units. Onlywhen substantial progress had been made inthe equipping, organization, and training ofthese units would SHAEF authorize thearming of further divisions.45

By this time the French had designatedthe units to be activated under the program.They included 2 new corps (3d and 4th),6 infantry divisions (the 10th DI, 1st DI,36th DI, 19th DI, 14th DI, and 25th DI),1 mountain or Alpine division (the 27thDIA), and 1 armored division (the 3dDB).46 The first three units scheduled toreceive U.S. and British equipment underthe program were the 10th DI, 1st DI, and27th DIA. The 10th DI, although poorlyequipped, had been operational since 7January. It was to be withdrawn as soonas practicable into the zone of interiorwhere it would receive its new matériel.The 27th DIA, commanded by Col. JeanVallette d'Osia, had a strength of 20,500men comprising mostly former FFI troopsfrom the Alps area and some North Afri-cans. It was equipped almost entirely withFrench matériel. So was the 1st DI (notto be confused with the 1st March Division,or 1st DMI, then part of 1st French Army),activated on 1 February from various FFIgroups and commanded by Brig. Gen. JeanCallies.

Toward the end of January the SupremeCommander came to the conclusion that itwould be inadvisable, as he had recom-

42 Msg S-75390, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 17 Jan45, SS and P Planning Div Files.

43 Memo, Leyer for Regnault, 28 Jan 45, SHAEFMission to France 091.711-3 (Fr).

44 Msg W-23517, Styer to Eisenhower, 19 Jan45, SS and P Planning Div Files.

45 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 31 Jan 45, SHAEFMission to France 091.711-3 (Fr) .

46 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France for SCAEF,23 Jan 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-1(Fr) .


mended earlier, to place 2 of the 8 new divi-sions at the disposal of the British 21 ArmyGroup, largely because of the supply com-plications likely to result. He felt, and sorecommended to the CCS, that it wouldbe better both tactically and logistically tocombine the 16 French divisions in twoFrench armies operating alongside eachother in the American sector.47 On thebasis of this and other considerations, theU.S. members of the Combined Adminis-trative Committee recommended, on 25January, that the United States be askedto underwrite the entire MetropolitanProgram.48

While the French were studying the pro-posed revision of the program, implementa-tion of Phase I had begun and, by the endof the first month, had made substantialprogress. American equipment for 2 infan-try divisions and 46 supporting units wascurrently leaving U.S. ports and due toarrive in Marseille at the end of February.A second shipment consisting of matériel forthe mountain division and its supportingunits was scheduled to leave in early March.

British training equipment as well as ma-tériel for 3 divisions was about to be shippedto Cherbourg. Deliveries were to include.30-caliber M1917 rifles, Browning auto-matic rifles (BAR's), .30-caliber machineguns, 40-mm. and 3.7-inch antiaircraft ar-tillery, 57-mm. antitank guns, and variousother items all available from British sourcesand therefore not required from the UnitedStates.

The French themselves were to furnish,depending on their ability to manufacturethem, 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars, some155-mm. howitzers, pistols, and other equip-

ment. To enable their war industries toresume production, a military import pro-gram had been set up, supplementary andparallel to a civilian import program,through which they obtained raw materialsfrom the United States. All requirementsfor the purposes were channeled to the WarDepartment for appropriate action.49 Pro-duction of a number of items being slowerthan originally contemplated, it was ex-pected that these would now have to befurnished from Allied sources.

Stocks of captured enemy matériel offeredmany items but, because of the maintenanceand replacement problems involved, theycould only be used for training purposes.As for Canadian equipment, only a fewitems were readily available. The French,with an eye on the second phase of the pro-gram, proposed to submit to the CanadianGovernment a request for the entire equip-ment for two infantry divisions. Apprisedof this intention, the Canadian Chiefs ofStaff, on 22 January, approached the CCSon the matter. When, on 6 April, the CCSfinally acknowledged the Canadian inquiry,it was too late for action to be initiated.50

After a detailed study of the contem-plated revision of the program, the Frenchmilitary authorities notified General Loomison 7 February that only about one half ofthe supporting combat and service unitsnewly proposed by SHAEF were acceptableto them. SHAEF officials promptly ex-pressed their disappointment. "This is thesame old story as in North Africa," GeneralSmith pointed out. "French officers whohave participated in modern battle realize

47 Msg SCAF 186, Eisenhower to CCS, 24 Jan45, OPD Cable Files.

48 Memo cited n. 4.

49 Msgs E-92846, Eisenhower to Somervell, 31 Jan45, SS and P Planning Div Files.

50 Ltr, Maj Gen H. F. G. Letson to CCS, 22 Jan45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C;Memo, CCS for Letson, 6 Apr 45, ABC 400.3295(2 Aug 43), Sec 1-C.


the necessity for these services and mainte-nance units, but such officers are few. Theremainder are perfectly naive and cannotcomprehend the necessity." The chief ad-ministrative officer, Lt. Gen. Sir HumfreyM. Gale, urged that SHAEF insist on theFrench providing adequate service troopsof their own. "Why should the U.S. do allthe housemaiding for the French due to thefaulty organization of the latter?" 51

In an attempt to reconcile the French andSHAEF's points of view, General Leyersubmitted a counterproposal listing the max-imum supporting units which the Frenchmilitary authorities could organize withinthe time limits established in the originalprogram. The reduction, which amountedto one half of the units proposed by SHAEF,was legitimate, explained General Leyer,since the French forces were not in the situa-tion of an expeditionary corps fighting over-seas but, on the contrary, were "supportedto an ever-increasing extent by a territorialorganization whose effectiveness was ex-pected to grow daily." Judging from Gen-eral Leyer's statement, the French were as-suming that the CCS, in approving theMetropolitan Program, had prescribed atime limit for its implementation. TheCCS, in fact, had done no such thing; theirapproval had been one in principle only.In submitting to the CCS the troop list andshipment priorities as now revised bySHAEF, General Smith urged them, on 15February, to consider a new course of action.The French being unable to activate moresupporting units than the number indicatedin their counterproposal, he recommendedthat only such combat divisions for which

they could provide adequate support beequipped by the Allies.52

In notifying the French of this recom-mendation, SHAEF emphasized that theSupreme Commander reserved the right todefer the provision of equipment for combatunits which could not be furnished adequatesupport and which therefore could not beemployed in the prosecution of the waragainst Germany. Thus were the prospectsof an early build-up of a second army ofeight divisions greatly reduced. SHAEFwas now inclined to believe that no newdivisions could possibly be equipped andtrained before June, and their employmenteven at this date might well be impractica-ble for lack of adequate supporting troops.53

Meanwhile, SHAEF was seriously con-cerned over the fact that 1st French Armywas still considerably understrength. Theslow push toward Colmar throughoutJanuary had whittled down its effectives.The replacement program instituted with aview to maintaining the divisions at strengthappeared to have broken down in its initialphase. Under the program, 10,000 menrecruited in France were to be moved to1st French Army training centers in Janu-ary and 4,500 monthly thereafter.54

By 5 February only 2,500 men had re-ported for instruction. In addition theprogram was short 1,600 North African

51 Memo, Lutes for Crawford, 7 Feb 45, andNotes by Smith and Gale, 8 Feb 45, SHAEF SGS475 France, Vol. III.

52 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 9 Feb 45, SHAEF Mis-sion to France 091.711-3 (Fr ) ; Memo, Bull forSmith, 15 Feb 45, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol.III; Ltr, Smith to CCS, CCS 752/3, 15 Feb 45,ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D; MsgS-79317, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 16 Feb 45, SSand P Planning Div Files.

53 Memo, Lewis for Leyer, 19 Feb 45, SHAEFMission to France 091.711-3 ( F r ) ; Rpt, SHAEFMain G-3, 16 Feb 45, SHAEF SGS 475/2 France,Vol. II.

54 Ltr, Leyer to Lewis, 24 Jan 45, SHAEF Missionto France 091.711-13 (Fr).


INSIGNIA OF 1ST FRENCH ARMY AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS,15 February 1945, except for the 27th DIA and the 1st DI.

natives. The situation greatly worriedGeneral Devers who was constantly beinginformed by French division commandersof personnel shortages in their units. Tomaintain 1st French Army at strength, Gen-eral Devers estimated that a pool of no lessthan 12,000 reinforcements (80 percentinfantry) must be maintained at all timesin the training centers. In his estimation,efforts by the French High Command tocarry out a satisfactory replacement pro-gram were not energetic enough. He con-sidered that proper support of 1st FrenchArmy should be secured before any Frenchmanpower was allocated to future rearma-ment programs. His views were upheldby the Supreme Commander, who on 14

February directed SHAEF Mission toFrance to inform the French that it was notsound policy to form and equip new unitswhen at the same time operational forceswere becoming inefficient due to lack ofreinforcements.55

The French War Ministry attempted toremedy the situation by establishing a re-placement program based on GeneralDevers' recommendations.56 But the pro-gram was not put into effect until 1 Aprilwith the result that the personnel situationof 1st French Army did not materially im-

55 Msg BX-23931, Devers to SHAEF, 5 Feb 45,and Memo, SCAEF for Lewis, 14 Feb 45, in samefile.

56 Ltr, Leyer to SHAEF, 17 Mar 45, in same file.


prove during the remaining weeks of hostili-ties. The deficiency in divisional personnelwas partially offset by the gradual additionto the Army reserves of light infantry bat-talions and of Metropolitan Programdivisions.

The 1st French Army as of 15 February1945 comprised the following corps anddivisions:

Commanding General: General Jean deLattre de Tassigny

*1st Corps Lt. Gen. Emile Béthouart,from 6 September 1944

*2d Corps Lt. Gen. de Goislard deMonsabert, from 2 September1944

* 1st DMI (1re Division de Marched'Infanterie)Brig. Gen. Pierre Garbay,from 21 November 1944, inreplacement of General Bros-set killed in line of duty on20 November 1944

*2d DIM (2e Division d'InfanterieMarocaine)Maj. Gen. Marcel Carpentier,from 25 November 1944, inreplacement of General Dody;replaced by Brig. Gen. Fran-çois de Linarès on 12 April1945

*3d DIA (3e Division d'InfanterieAlgérienne)Maj. Gen. Augustin Guil-laume, from 2 September1944, in replacement ofGeneral de Monsabert

*4th DMM (4e Division Marocaine deMontagne)Maj. Gen. René de Hesdin,from 13 December 1944, inreplacement of General Sevez

*9th DIC (9e Division d'InfanterieColoniale)Maj. Gen. Louis Morlière,from 26 December 1944, in

replacement of General Mag-nan; replaced by Brig. Gen.Jean Valluy on 10 March1945

*1st DB (1re Division Blindée)Brig. Gen. Aimé Sudre, from6 December 1944, in replace-ment of General du Vigier

*2d DB (2e Division Blindée) (as-signed to 1st French Armyfrom 5 to 31 December 1944and from 20 January to 21February 1945)Maj. Gen. Jacques Leclerc

*5th DB (5e Division Blindée)Brig. Gen. Jacques de Verne-joul, replaced by Brig. Gen.Guy Schlesser, 23 April 1945

**10th DI (10e Division d'Infanterie)(activated 30 September1944)Brig. Gen. Pierre Billotte

**27th DIA (27e Division d'Infanterie Al-pine) (activated 17 Novem-ber 1944; under control of 1stFrench Army until 1 March1945; thereafter part of Dé-tachement d'Armée des Alpesunder the control of U.S. 6thArmy Group)Col. Jean Vallette d'Osia

Two other divisions activated in Febru-ary 1945 were assigned to 1st French Armyin early April:

**1st DI (1re Division d'Infanterie)Brig. Gen. Jean Callies

** 14th DI (14e Division d'Infanterie)Brig. Gen. Raoul Salan

Note: Five U.S. divisions were assigned to 1stFrench Army at one time or another during opera-tions on the Western Front: 3d Infantry, 28th In-fantry, 36th Infantry, 75th Infantry, and 12thArmored Divisions.

*Equipped under the North African RearmamentProgram.

**Equipped under the Metropolitan Program.


Carrying Out the Revised Program

The progress of the Metropolitan Pro-gram by the end of February 1945 can besummarized as follows. The revisions pre-pared by SHAEF and submitted to Wash-ington were awaiting CCS action. TheFrench had raised a total of five infantrydivisions, largely from FFI personnel. The1st DI and 10th DI were being moved tothe Châteauroux area where they were toreceive their new equipment and undergotraining. The intention of the French HighCommand was to use these two units to-gether with the 2d Armored Division (2dDB) to form a third army corps. The 27thAlpine Division was still being employed ina defensive capacity on the Alps front. The36th and 14th Infantry Divisions were thelatest units to the activated, the latter fromFFI battalions in 1st French Army area.57

Considering that FFI troops had, in addi-tion to being absorbed in these divisions,been used also to form security battalions,to replace Negro personnel in the 1st DMIand 9th DIC, and to organize replacementinfantry regiments for the battle-wearyNorth African program divisions (at. therate of one per North African division), itwas expected that they shortly would becompletely liquidated. Liquidation of theFFI in the 1st French Army area hadstrongly been urged by General Devers, whowanted all troops in that area to be placedon a "recognized status" and be maintainedadequately.58

The first shipment of U.S. matériel hadreached Marseille on 21 February. It wasconsigned to Communications Zone withspecial markings to indicate the intent ofASF in shipping the equipment. From ar-rival at quayside to final distribution, thematériel was processed according to a rela-tively simple method. All items, with theexception of boxed vehicles and ammuni-tion, were loaded directly in rail cars on thepier and moved over U.S. lines of communi-cations to a depot located at Lyon. Boxedvehicles were taken on trucks to a motorvehicle assembly area two miles away fromthe pier where they were assembled beforebeing convoyed to Lyon. Ammunition wastaken directly from shipside to U.S. am-munition depots where it was held ear-marked for the French. Assisting in thehandling of equipment at Marseille wereseveral French service units organized forthe purpose and for which CommunicationsZone had furnished equipment andclothing.59

The depot at Lyon, called Delta BaseSection Depot for Rearmament, was, intheory, an integrated French-American or-ganization. Actually it was a U.S. depotmaintaining stock records and the equip-ment was part of U.S. theater stocks untilissued to the French. Lend-lease account-ing was, as a result, based on shippingtickets issued by the depot. This arrange-ment necessitated the use of American cleri-cal, technical, and supervisory personneluntil French personnel could be trained andtaught sufficient familiarity with Americanequipment to take over their share of thework. The French service units at the Lyondepot formed a base called Base du Sud.Their activation being too slow, only very

57 Memo, Regnault for Loomis, 21 Feb 45,SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-1 (Fr); Ltr,Juin to Eisenhower, 21 Feb 45, SHAEF SGS 475/2France, Vol. II; Memos, SHAEF Mission to Francefor Juin, 6 Feb 45, and Juin for SHAEF Mission toFrance, 9 Mar 45, SHAEF Mission to France091.711-13 (Fr).

58 Msg BX-23958, Devers to SHAEF, 5 Feb 45,SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. VI.

59 Memo, Loomis for Regnault, 19 Jan 45, SHAEFMission to France 091.711-1 (Fr).


few had been made available to the depotby the end of February.

The entire plan for the receipt, storage,and distribution of matériel was consideredadequate except for the shortage of Frenchpersonnel. It was a much simpler systemthan the one used in North Africa underwhich the equipment was turned over atshipside to French supply agencies for issueto units. More important, it marked thebeginning of a new era during which Amer-ican management assumed the entire re-sponsibility for distributing U.S. equipment,since Communications Zone controlledrigidly both priorities and flow of equip-ment.60

British equipment also had begun to ar-rive. A first shipment consisting of train-ing matériel had reached Cherbourg on 8February. Three other shipments, with thefirst to arrive 8 March, were scheduled tobring matériel for the initial three divisions.Shipments would then be postponed untilfurther advice from SHAEF. The Britishwere placing a Port Ordnance and Work-shop Detachment at the disposal of theFrench to assist in handling equipment bothin Cherbourg and at the French depot inLe Mans. They were particularly con-cerned over the risk of damage to vehicles atthe hands of the "Paris taxi driver" type ofFrench workman currently taking them overon discharge from the ships. The Britishwere also offering training teams to instructthe French in the proper use of Britishequipment.61

All things considered, the responsibilityfor the implementation of the MetropolitanProgram was divided generally betweenthe Americans and the French. TheFrench were charged with the provisionand issue of French and British items, whilethe U.S. Army was responsible for the pro-vision and issue of Canadian and capturedenemy items as well as matériel of U.S.source. Co-ordinating all activities was theRearmament Division which obtained fromthe French themselves reports of initialissues of equipment not provided by theUnited States.

In spite of the abundance of sources ofequipment, some shortages were anticipatedor already being felt which, it was feared,would threaten the combat effectiveness ofthe new units. General-purpose vehicles,for the most part, were reported to be un-available. In addition, a number of itemswhich the French had agreed to furnishimmediately could not be produced by theirindustry. The Rearmament Division suc-ceeded in obtaining from the United Statesa number of the missing items. In the caseof clothing, however, its efforts wereunsuccessful.

A serious shortage of clothing was ham-pering the efforts of the French High Com-mand in calling up classes of recruits for theMetropolitan Program. General Juin cur-rently estimated the immediate require-ments at 130,000 sets of uniforms. As nonew clothing was provided for recruits in-ducted under the program, SHAEF di-rected Communications Zone to survey theavailability of worn surplus or salvaged U.S.clothing. Communications Zone reportedthat all available stocks of such clothingwere required to meet "anticipated needsfor prisoners of war expected to be taken inthe near future" and for other commit-

60 For additional information, see Rpt with illus-trations, SHAEF G-4 FWD to Loomis, 11 Mar 45,SHAEF Mission to France, Rearmament.

61 Msg, SHAEF G-4 to Crawford, 1 Mar 45,SHAEF Mission to France 475-10 Equip of TroopsMetropolitan Program; Memos, Weeks for Loomis,26 Feb 45, and Loomis for Weeks, 4 Mar 45,SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr) .


merits.62 With this source of supply closedto the French, the latter would have to turnelsewhere for assistance.

On the basis of the progress achieved intwo months and on the premise that itwould continue unabated, General Loomisestimated that two infantry divisions shouldbe ready for operations in a secondary rolesometime in April and a third sometime inMay. All three should be ready for offen-sive operations as part of a corps, with ade-quate supporting and service troops, late inAugust or early in September.63

As the third month of implementationopened, the French, while declaring them-selves in agreement with the prioritiesrecommended by SHAEF on 15 February,urged the Allied authorities to speed up thedistribution of matériel to the units of thefirst phase, and not to delay the launchingof the second phase. Only complete unityof action, General Leyer wrote to SHAEFon 3 March, would make it possible tosecure, within the desired time limit, thebenefits of the efforts agreed to by allconcerned.64

During the four weeks of March matérielcontinued to arrive from the United King-dom and the United States. By the end ofthe month, the British had delivered train-ing equipment, maintenance supplies, andreplacement items for the whole eight-divi-sion program, as well as matériel for the

first three infantry divisions. Subsequentshipments were being held up in order tophase the arrival of British equipment withthat of American matériel for later prioritydivisions. It was expected that shipmentswould be resumed in June.

General-purpose vehicles and clothing stillremained the most critical items. Some im-provement in the vehicle situation was insight as the British now were offering 5,200trucks which, if found serviceable, mightreplace corresponding U.S. vehicles then inshort supply. With regard to the provisionof clothing for newly inducted men, littleprogress had been made. Efforts to obtainsurplus uniforms from the British WarOffice had been unsuccessful. The WarDepartment, also approached on the mat-ter, had given no encouragement other thanpromising to ship to France the rest of the200,000 sets of Canadian clothing originallyintended for Sovereignty troops in NorthAfrica.65 In answer to their repeated ap-peals, including a formal request for 130,-000 sets submitted directly to the War De-partment, SHAEF reminded the Frenchthat critical shortages in both British andU.S. stocks were so acute, in the case ofwoolen clothing, shoes, and blankets, thatthe initial issue of these items to Metropoli-tan Program units would be made only withthe greatest difficulty. SHAEF then ex-plained to them that their requirementswith respect to newly inducted men couldbe filled only by taking every advantage ofexisting French stocks, Canadian clothing,French manufacture, and materials sup-

62 In informing Colonel Regnault of the substanceof Communications Zone's report, General Loomiswisely refrained from making any reference to the"anticipated needs for POW's," a statement whichmight well have angered the French. Memos,Loomis for Regnault, 4 Mar 45, Lewis for CGCOMZONE, 21 Feb 45, and CG COMZONE forLewis, 1 Mar 45, SHAEF Mission to France 421-1Combined.

63 Memo, Loomis for SCAEF, 8 Mar 45, SHAEFMission to France 091.711-3 (Fr).

64 Ltr, Leyer to SHAEF, 3 Mar 45, in same file.

65 French industry was reported to be currentlyproducing, since January, not more than 45,000 setsmonthly. These sets were incomplete and adequateonly for men in training. Furthermore, productionwas not expected to continue after April. Memo,Regnault for Loomis, SHAEF Mission to France421-1 Combined.


plied under the civilian import program.66

Incidentally, American officials also urgedthem, as they had once in connection withthe North African Rearmament Program,to replace all U.S. buttons and insignia byFrench ones on American clothing turnedover to program units "so as to permit readyidentification and in the interest of espritde corps." 67

In Washington, War Department officialswere still examining the revised program ofeight divisions and 1,128 supporting units.ASF had undertaken an analysis of avail-ability of equipment and, on 13 March, re-ported that, with the exception of someitems, the program could generally be met.The Combined Administrative Committeemeanwhile had pursued its study of the di-vision of responsibility between the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom for the pro-vision of matériel to meet the various west-ern European rearmament programs. Inthe report which it finally submitted to theCCS on 24 March, the committee made nocommitment with respect to the Metropoli-tan Program as the latter was still not firm.It merely recommended that unfilled por-tions of the Metropolitan Program and of allother rearmament programs be canceledeffective V-E Day.68

The same recommendation, it will berecalled, had been made earlier, in August1944, by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in a mem-

orandum to the CCS (CCS 661). It hadalready led ASF to develop a procurementschedule in which no provision was madefor the shipment of the rest of the equip-ment required to complete the MetropolitanProgram upon the cessation of hostilities.Such action was based on the premise thatthe program itself would then become post-war in character.69 Incidentally, it was thesame stand which had guided the U.S.Government, only four days before the pub-lication of the Combined AdministrativeCommittee's report, in its decision to rejecta certain request from the British. Thelatter had, earlier in February, approachedthe State Department regarding a proposalthey had received from the French for themanufacture in France of aircraft of theBritish Mosquito type. The matter in-volved an immediate U.S. commitment forthe allocation of certain materials. Decid-ing that the proposal was in the nature of apostwar enterprise, the State Departmentinformed the British, on 20 March, that theUnited States Government could not concurin it.70

At the end of March the War Ministryannounced a reorganization of the Frenchrearmament services. SCAMA was beingabolished and its work taken over by a newarmy headquarters section called Missionde Réarmement. Simultaneously, a Re-armament Inspection Section was createdwhose function was generally to ascertain,in co-operation with Inspection Group ofSHAEF's Rearmament Division, the com-pleteness of equipment of the units beingrearmed.71 Both organizations were placed

66 Msg WX-57738, Somervell to Eisenhower, 22Mar 45, ASF International Div Cable Log A-45-192; Ltr, Lewis to Juin, 21 Mar 45, SHAEF Mis-sion to France 421-1 Combined.

67 Memos, Theater Comdr for SHAEF Mission toFrance, 17 Mar 45, and Lewis for Juin, 12 Apr 45,SHAEF Mission to France 421-1 Combined.

68 Rpt, Availability Study of Fr Rearmt Program,13 Mar 45, and Memo, Lutes to SCAEF for Loomis,22 Mar 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711,File 92, Analysis of Availability; Rpt, CAdC toCCS, CCS 768/7, 24 Mar 45, ABC 400.3295 (2Aug 43), Sec 1-C.

69 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 25 Mar 45,OPD 336.2 France, Sec IV-A.

70 Aide Mémoire, Secy State to Br Ambassador,20 Mar 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec2-D.

71 Dir 1756/EMA/CAB, 26 Mar 45, SHAEFMission to France 091.711-9 Combined.


under the command of General Granierwho, it will be recalled, had been serving ascommanding general of Base 901, support-ing 1st French Army, and was now beingreplaced in that capacity by Col. HenriCoudraux. Assisting General Granier wasLt. Col. Maurice Labarbarie who had beenassociated with SCAMA for over a year andin recent months had served as SCAMA'sdeputy director.72

The equipment status of MetropolitanProgram units was then as follows. Pur-suant to a decision which, for operationalreasons, SHAEF had made in mid-Marchin agreement with the French, three infan-try divisions, the 1st, 10th, and 36th, werenow scheduled to be re-equipped in firstpriority. Detachments from the first twowere currently being ordered to the Lyondepot where they were to receive U.S. initialequipment beginning on or about 4 April.Very little organizational equipment wasavailable for the 36th DI as shipments fromthe United States of matériel for a mountaindivision had started before the action hadbeen taken to replace the 27th Alpine (27thDIA) by an infantry division. Except forBritish training matériel, the remainingdivisions, being second and third priorityunits, were not scheduled to receive equip-ment until the Supreme Commander gavehis approval. Two of them, the 19th and25th Infantry, were currently employed onthe Atlantic coast, and two others, the 3dArmored and 14th Infantry, although acti-vated, were not expected to be fit for em-ployment for a long time.73

The French military authorities werealso in process of organizing the service unitsrequired in first priority. These includedboth the units needed for employment withBase du Sud operating in support of 1stFrench Army and those necessary for thesupport of the first three Metropolitan Pro-gram divisions. It was the firm intentionof Rearmament Division to continue toexercise rigid control by not authorizingequipment for the next group of divisionsuntil reasonable progress had been made inthe organization of all first priority serviceunits.74

By the end of March the operationalsituation on the Western Front was mostfavorable. General Eisenhower's armieswere already deep in German territory.With the prospect of an early cessation ofhostilities and in view of the relatively smallprogress of the Metropolitan Program,SHAEF re-examined the question of em-ployment of the new units. Both the U.S.6th Army Group and U.S. 12th ArmyGroup were requesting two or three Frenchdivisions each for occupational duties undertheir control with a view to relieving U.S.divisions for employment elsewhere. Inthe belief that the presence of partiallyequipped and insufficiently trained divisionsamong units of 1st French Army might re-sult in considerable confusion, SHAEFtemporarily ruled out the employment ofnew divisions under 6th Army Group.SHAEF, on the other hand, approved therequest from 12th Army Group and askedGeneral Juin to nominate the 1st and 36th

72 In November, Labarbarie had replaced ColonelCharpentier, who had become gravely ill and whosedeath took place in early 1945. Colonel Charpen-tier was posthumously awarded the Legion of Merit(degree of Officer) in April 1945.

73 Msg MF-13626, Loomis to AGWAR, 10 Mar45, and Memo, Lutes for Crawford, 2 Apr 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711 Rearmt Planand Policy 900-5; Memo, Bull for Smith, 31 Mar45, SHAEF SGS 475/2 France, Vol. II.

74 Memos, G-4 SHAEF FWD for Crawford, 10Mar 45, and Loomis for Kingman, 17 Mar 45,SHAEF Mission to France 091.711 Rearmt Planand Policy 900-5.


Infantry to serve under U.S. Fifteenth Army(itself part of 12th Army Group) in anoccupational capacity while continuingtheir equipping and training, and to con-sider similar action in connection with the10th DI.75 The latter, incidentally, hadbeen earmarked for operations on the At-lantic coast. The 27th DIA, although stillpoorly equipped, was to be maintained onthe Franco-Italian border.

In early April, pending approval by theCCS of the revised program of eight divi-sions and 1,128 supporting units, the WarDepartment prepared to effect the ship-ments scheduled to take place during thatmonth for the units of the first priority.Simultaneously, the Combined Administra-tive Committee submitted to the CCS a re-port on its study of the revised program.In it, the committee recommended that theprogram be approved in spite of shortagesof equipment, and that the United Statesbe made responsible for the supply of initialequipment as well as replacement and main-tenance supplies. The committee then re-iterated its earlier recommendation, madeon 24 March, that the unfilled portion ofthe program be canceled effective V-EDay.76

Taking immediate action on the report,the CCS, on 6 April, approved its recom-mendations. They formalized, and so no-tified General Eisenhower, the action al-ready taken by the United States to supplythe initial equipment as well as replacementand maintenance items to the first incre-

ment of three divisions and 167 supportingunits. At a later date they would advise theSupreme Commander of the decisions takenwith respect to the size of the program.Finally, they directed, as recommended bythe committee, that any units which had notbeen armed by the time active hostilitieswith Germany had ceased would not beequipped. Four days later, after the WarDepartment had completed its analysis ofthe revised troop list proposed by GeneralSmith on 15 February, the CCS approvedthe list. The action of the CombinedChiefs, it must be noted, was taking placefive weeks after they had approved theFrench Air Force Program. The latter in-cluded the same proviso directing the can-cellation of the incompleted portion of theprogram upon the cessation of hostilities.77

Among the currently reported shortagesof equipment for the new program, the mostimportant was still that of clothing. Inview of the critical situation in the UnitedStates of woolen clothing and of blanketsin particular, the French were urged onceagain to investigate the possibility of manu-facturing these items and to arrange withresponsible American authorities in thetheater for the delivery from the UnitedStates of the necessary raw materials.78

In Washington, ASF estimated that ofthe equipment scheduled to be shipped forthe Metropolitan Program in January, Feb-ruary, and March, 99, 98, and 94 percent,respectively, had been floated. The FrenchMilitary Mission was now pressing for ship-

75 Ltr, Smith to Juin, 4 Apr 45, SHAEF Missionto France 091.711-12 Combined.

76 Msg WX-64492, Somervell to Eisenhower, 5Apr 45, International Div Files Cable Log; Rpt,CAdC to CCS, CCS 768/10, 5 Apr 45, SHAEFMission to France 091.711 Rearmt Plan and PolicyRpt.

77 Msg FACS 172, CCS to Eisenhower, 6 Apr 45,SS and P Planning files; Msg FACS 175, CCS toEisenhower, 10 Apr 45, ABC 091.711 France (6Oct 43), Sec 5; Msg FACS 147, CCS to Eisen-hower, 1 Mar 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43),Sec 2-C. See pp. 374-75, below.

78 Ltr, Loomis to Juin, 10 Apr 45, SHAEF Mis-sion to France 421-1 Combined.


ments due to be made in April and May.79

As three infantry divisions and certaincorps troops had by this time already re-ceived much of their standard combatequipment, most of it American, some of itBritish, plans were made to begin theirtraining. A considerable quantity of Brit-ish matériel, the greater part of which hadnot been accepted as standard equipment,was available for the purpose. A trainingprogram was drafted which contemplatedmaking the best possible use of existing re-sources and of U.S., British, and Frenchtraining personnel, within the shortest pos-sible time.80

On 20 April, with hostilities seeminglyabout to end, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreedthat equipment intended to complete theMetropolitan Program but not likely to beused against the German forces would notbe shipped from the United States. Theythen requested the theater on 26 April toreview the whole rearmament question inthe light of their decision and to submit tothe War Department a list of units for whichinitial equipment need no longer be pro-vided. Their request was consonant with

General Marshall's recommendation madea few days earlier that the choking off of theprogram should not be done automatically,effective V-E Day, but rather should be re-examined by the General Staff in considera-tion of the probable French requirement foroccupation forces.81

In anticipation of the cessation of hostili-ties, SHAEF was preparing a plan to trans-fer the supply responsibility for the Frenchforces from ETOUSA to the French Gov-ernment. The proposed plan envisaged theestablishment of a French Advance Sectioncharged with the supply, maintenance, andmovement of French troops. It also con-templated a new requisitioning procedureunder which the French would submitmonthly requisitions to be forwardedthrough military lend-lease channels to theMAB in Washington.82

It was then, near the end of the monthof April, hardly three weeks after the Lib-erated Manpower Program had been sus-pended by order of the Supreme Com-mander, that a serious political complica-tion subjected the Metropolitan Program toa similar fate.

79 Memo, ASF for Director Plans and Opns, 18Apr 45, SS and P Planning Div Files A-46-371;Msg WX-69225, Somervell to Loomis, 18 Apr 45,SHAEF Mission to France 475-10 Equip of TroopsMetropolitan Program.

80 Memo, Loomis for Regnault, 14 Apr 45,SHAEF Mission to France Training 353-1; Memo,Loomis for Leyer, 19 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission toFrance 091.711-1. Also, see below, p. 390.

81 Memo, JCS for ACofS OPD, 20 Apr 45, OPD336.2 France, Sec IV-A; Msg WX-73760, Mar-shall to Loomis, 26 Apr 45, OPD Cable Files;Memo, Lincoln for Policy Sec OPD, 21 Apr 45,ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D.

82 Memo, SHAEF G-4 FWD for Crawford, 27Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711 RearmtPlan and Policy 900-5.

CHAPTER XXI

The Rearmament Operations End

Suspension of the Metropolitan Program

For a question of national prestige, theFrench unwittingly were about to throw thearmament operations out of gear. On 24and again on 26 April, General Devers haddirected General de Lattre to evacuate thecity of Stuttgart then occupied by units of1st French Army. The city was in the op-erational zone of the U.S. Seventh Armyand was urgently needed as a link in thesupply and communications system support-ing the current military operations of thatarmy. On instructions from General deGaulle, the French commander refused tocomply with General Devers' order.

In a strongly worded letter dated 28April, the text of which was immediatelycommunicated to the CCS, General Eisen-hower called General de Gaulle's action inissuing orders directly to 1st French Army aviolation of existing agreements. Frenchdivisions armed and equipped by the UnitedStates were under the control of the CCSrepresentative in the theater. It was withcomplete faith in this understanding that he,as Supreme Commander acting for theCCS, had "so long and so earnestly" sup-ported the French request for matériel toequip new divisions. In the present cir-cumstances, he had no other alternative butto inform the CCS of the incident and topoint out to them that he could no longercount with certainty upon the operationalemployment of any French forces which

they might contemplate equipping in thefuture.1

On the same date General Eisenhowerinformed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, inline with their suggestion of 26 April, theshipment of any equipment not yet floatedcould be stopped, and that he was revisingthe list of units for which equipment neednot be furnished.2 Simultaneously and ap-parently without prior notification toFrench headquarters, the Supreme Com-mander directed that all issues of equipmentto Metropolitan Program units be sus-pended. In informing the French as wellas the British of this decision, SHAEF madeno reference to the Stuttgart incident, butgave the following reasons for the action.With the approaching end of the campaignin Europe, the need no longer existed forequipping additional French units as theAllies had sufficient divisions on hand toliquidate pockets of resistance and to policeoccupied areas. Furthermore, all Ameri-can matériel in Europe was destined for usein the Far East theaters.3

1 Msg SCAF 319, Eisenhower to CCS, 29 Apr 45,OCS A-48-1 091 France.

2 Msg MF-14139, Eisenhower to Marshall, 28Apr 45, SHAEF SGS 475/1 France, Vol. IV.

3 Msg FWD 20357, Eisenhower to WO, 1 May45, SHAEF SGS 475/1, Vol. II; Ltr, SHAEF toJuin, quoted by de Saint-Didier in Conf withMarshall, 3 May 45, Min Conf, ABC 091.711France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D; Memo, Loomis forLeyer, 30 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France475-10 Equip of Troops Metropolitan Program.


In replying to General Eisenhower's com-munication on the Stuttgart episode, deGaulle used some of the arguments thatGeneral Juin had advanced in connectionwith the controversy over the control of se-curity battalions. The French Command,he pointed out, had no representation in theCCS, and, as a result, decisions reached bythe latter did not take into account French"national requirements," thus forcing himpersonally, although to his "great regret,"to "step in" sometimes either with respect toplans or their execution. He explainedfurther:

You are certainly aware that while agree-ing to placing French operational forces inthe Western Theater under your supremecommand, I have always reserved the rightof the French Government eventually to takethe necessary steps in order that French forcesshould be employed in accordance with thenational interest of France which is the onlyinterest that they should serve. I have, nat-urally, never made any distinction with respectto French forces which have had the benefitof American equipment. I should, more-over, call your attention to the fact that thisarmament has been turned over by the UnitedStates on the basis of Lend-Lease agreementsby virtue of which France and the FrenchUnion provide on their part, and in accord-ance with their means, important services forAmerican forces. On this point, I note withmuch regret that, as of the present moment,no new French division has been completelyequipped by the United States since the be-ginning of operations in Western Europe inspite of all that had appeared to have beenunderstood a long time ago.4

General de Gaulle's letter brought thisbrief acknowledgment from the SupremeCommander. " . . . I understand yourposition, and while I repeat my regret thatyou find it necessary to inject political con-

siderations into a campaign in which myfunctions are purely military, I am gratifiedto know that you understand my situationand attitude." 5

With the issue apparently closed in thetheater, the French immediately took stepsto reopen it in Washington with a view toobtaining a resumption of equipment de-liveries. Calling on General Marshall on3 May, General de Saint-Didier, chief of theFrench Military Mission, sought, in behalfof General Juin who had just advised himof the deadlock, assurances that the UnitedStates would complete the equipping of thefirst three divisions and of certain support-ing units. He pointed out that the actiontaken by the Supreme Commander was "notin accord with the supply agreement of 30December 1944 or with the personal letterof President Roosevelt to General de Gaulledated 24 March 1945." What Generalde Saint-Didier probably meant by the"supply agreement" was the message dis-patched to SHAEF by the CCS on 29 De-cember advising that they had accepted inprinciple the Metropolitan Program. TheCCS, however, had made no further com-mitment. As for the President's letter tode Gaulle, nothing in it implied that apromise had been made to complete theprogram. Replying to General de Saint-Didier, General Marshall explained that hehad not been informed that SHAEF hadordered a stoppage of issues. He wouldlook into the matter at once before discuss-ing it with General Juin on the latter's re-turn from the United Nations conferencethen taking place in San Francisco.6

In the meantime, War Department offi-

4 Ltr, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 1 May 45,SHAEF SGS 094 Stuttgart.

5 Ltr, Eisenhower to de Gaulle, 2 May 45, andMsg SCAF 328, Eisenhower to CCS, 2 May 45,SHAEF SGS 094 Stuttgart. See p. 337, above.

6 Min Conf, Marshall with de Saint-Didier. 3May 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D.

THE REARMAMENT OPERATIONS END 363

cials had informed General Loomis that, inaccordance with the Supreme Com-mander's recommendation, they were can-celing the unshipped balance of initialequipment for both the Metropolitan andAir Force Programs.7 SHAEF then ad-vised the French that the two programs werebeing re-examined to determine what units,if any, could be equipped in time to oper-ate against German forces, and that pend-ing revision issues of matériel were beingsuspended.8 On 6 May the Supreme Com-mander submitted to the War Departmentthe list of some twenty-two organizations,all service units, which the theater con-sidered operationally necessary and desiredto equip fully. He then took this oppor-tunity to discuss the fate of the first threedivisions on the program. Inasmuch as ithad been agreed that they should be em-ployed as soon as they were operational, thequestion now arose, "as a matter of goodfaith," as to whether or not it might bedesirable to complete their equipping. Theunits in question had been issued approxi-mately one third of their authorized U.S.equipment, and had made considerableprogress in training. The rest of theirequipment could be provided from matériellikely to become available at the time ofredeployment following the cessation of hos-tilities. If not contrary to the policy of theU.S. Chiefs of Staff, this course of action,if authorized, would result "in postponing,rather than in entirely eliminating," theequipping of the three divisions.9

The cessation of hostilities on 7 Mayfound 1st French Army deployed in enemy

territory over a wide area which includedparts of western Austria and southwesternGermany. The long dash from the Frenchcoast was now completed. All together thecampaign of France and Germany had costthe French ground forces (excluding theFFI troops before their integration in regu-lar units in October 1944) some 74,000casualties, including nearly 15,000 killed inaction.10

The end of the campaign also found theimplementation of both the Liberated Man-power and Metropolitan Programs alreadysuspended pending a review of the theater'srequirements for the postarmistice period.Fully or partially equipped units were beingfurnished maintenance but no replacementsfor equipment used. This provision wasextended to the units of 1st French Army on8 May, when the Supreme Commander di-rected Communications Zone to discontinueimmediately the issue of initial equipmentand of major replacement items, but notof maintenance.11

By then the status of the MetropolitanProgram was as follows. Three infantrydivisions and only approximately 40 sup-porting units, representing a total of some50,000 men, had been partially equipped.They had received the greater part of theirBritish equipment, almost no French ma-

7 Msg WX-76320, Hull to Loomis, 1 May 45,SS and P Planning Div Files.

8 Msg FWD 20647, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 5May 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C.

9 Msg FWD 20723, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 6May 45, SS and P Planning Div Files.

10 The breakdown of casualties per major groundforce component is estimated as follows:

Source. Lt. Col. P. Santini, "Etude statistique sur les pertesau cours de la guerre 1939-1945," Revue du Corps de Santé Mili-taire, X, No. 1 (March, 1954).

11 Msgs FWD 20723, SCAEF to AGWAR, 6 May45, and FWD 20921, SCAEF to COMZONE, 8May 45, SHAEF SGS 475/1 France, Vol. IV.


tériel as the French themselves had beenunable to provide it, and about one thirdof the U.S. equipment shipped to Francefor them. All together they had been issuedmost of the required individual and house-keeping items, but only one quarter of theirorganizational equipment. Outstandingshortages were in clothing items, signalequipment, and general-purpose vehicles.12

The Joint Logistics Committee mean-while had studied the Supreme Com-mander's request that the equipping of thefirst 3 divisions and of 22 selected supportingunits be completed. In its final report thecommittee approved the proposal as it re-lated to the supporting units, but urged thatthe question of the further issue of equip-ment to the divisions be taken on a govern-mental level as being a postwar armamentproblem. In a review of the Supreme Com-mander's request and of the recommenda-tions contained in the JLC report, Maj.Gen. Howard A. Craig, Deputy AssistantChief of Staff, OPD, urged General Mar-shall to exercise the utmost caution in hisforthcoming meeting with General Juin.He advised him to make no commitmentregarding the rest of the equipment for the3 divisions in view of the probable difficultyin making such equipment available, and tolimit any discussion of supporting units tothe 22 organizations currently under con-sideration. He then furnished some datato enable Marshall to review for GeneralJuin's benefit the extent of military aid pro-vided the French to date.13

Pressed to comment further on the ad-

visability of completing the equipment ofthe three divisions, General Eisenhowerpointed out that, although inadequatelyequipped, the 1st DI and 10th DI had beenused in operations. The 10th DI had beencommitted at the edge of the Colmar Pocketin January and in the Bordeaux area inApril; the 1st DI had served in an occupa-tional role first west of the Rhine duringApril, later in early May east of the Rhine.It was feasible to equip these two divisions,as well as the 36th Infantry which had notyet served under Allied control, up to a scalesuitable for occupational purposes by usingequipment available in the theater. TheSupreme Commander then urged that he beauthorized to carry out his proposal, subjectto operational needs for other theaters andto availability of stocks. Such an under-taking, he declared, would be "an act ofgood will." 14

In the course of his conference with Gen-eral Marshall on 11 May, General Juinspoke of his government's hope that somemeans would be found to complete theequipping of the three divisions. He sug-gested that this be done by using the equip-ment which U.S. divisions would leave be-hind before moving to the Pacific theater.General Marshall replied that, for the mo-ment, it was impossible to promise the defi-nite delivery of specific items by any fixeddate. Feeling certain that some sort of anarrangement could be worked out, herecommended that General Juin on his re-turn to France contact the Supreme Com-mander with a view to arranging the detailsof a possible allocation of matériel. Thefinancial aspects of the problem would ofcourse have to be handled by the civil rather

12 Msg MF-14197, Lewis to SHAEF FWD G-4,6 May 45, SHAEF SGS 475/1 France, Vol. IV;Msg FWD 20888, Eisenhower to Marshall, 7 May45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D.

13 Rpt, JLC 1012/8, 9 May 45, and Memo, Craigfor Marshall, 9 May 45, OPD 336.2 France, SecIV-A.

14 Msg FWD 21192, Eisenhower to Marshall, 11May 45, SHAEF SGS 475/2 France, Vol. II.


than the military agencies of both govern-ments.15

On 12 May the Supreme Commanderinformed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that,in accordance with the policy they had es-tablished on 6 April, he was directingSHAEF as well as the British War Office tostop initial issues of equipment to all unitsof the French air and ground rearmamentprograms with the exception of twenty-twoservice units already partially equipped.He then instructed SHAEF Mission toFrance to notify the French War Ministryof his decision.16 Implementation of theprograms, heretofore suspended, was nowstopped.

At the conference which General Smithheld the next day with Minister of WarDiethelm, the latter sought some indicationconcerning the future of the three partiallyequipped divisions. His governmenteagerly hoped that the equipping of theseunits would be resumed as early as possibleas they would be required for occupationaltasks in Germany. The order to discon-tinue deliveries of equipment had had aharmful effect on the morale of the troopsinvolved. General Smith replied that theprogram, originally conceived as an opera-tional commitment, was no longer so con-sidered now that hostilities had ceased.SHAEF's authority did not extend to theconsideration of the broader problem of therestoration and re-equipment of a Frenchnational army. This was a matter for inter-governmental negotiations. The SupremeCommander, he added, was fully aware of

the French point of view and was urgingthe JCS to authorize delivery of the rest ofthe equipment for the three divisions.17

Meanwhile, the question of the continuedlogistical support of the French forces hadbeen restudied. Because of the anticipatedearly redeployment of U.S. service units andstreamlining of the U.S. lines of communi-cations, it was imperative that the Frenchauthorities be made to assume the adminis-trative support of their forces as soon aspossible. With this in view, on 16 May thetheater submitted to the War Department asupply plan contemplating the transfer tothe French, in two stages, of the responsi-bility for the maintenance of their troops.Under the proposed plan the War Depart-ment was ultimately to furnish the author-ized maintenance on an automatic basiswith the French assuming the complete re-sponsibility for shipment, reception, stor-age, and distribution.18

As the question of the delimitation of aFrench zone of occupation was still pend-ing, War Department officials favored an-other solution of the maintenance problem.They felt that, until the French had formallytaken over their zone of occupation, theissue to them of maintenance supplies shouldbe done on a military lend-lease basis.Thereafter, the issue of such supplies shouldbe regulated under a new program to benegotiated by the French Government andthe appropriate civil agencies of the U.S.Government. The whole matter beingproperly one for decision by the Joint Chiefs,it was referred to them on 22 May.19

The question of whether or not it was15 Min Conf, Marshall with Juin, 11 May 45,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D.16 Msg SCAF 387, Eisenhower to CCS, 12 May

45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C;Msg FWD 21251, Eisenhower to WO, ETOUSA,SHAEF Mission to France, 12 May 45, SHAEFSGS 475/3 France.

17 Min Mtg, Smith with Diethelm, 13 May 45,SHAEF SGS 475/2 France, Vol. II.

18 Msg 21662, SHAEF to AGWAR, 16 May 45,ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C.

19 Memo for Rcd, OPD, 22 May 45, OPD 336.2France, Sec V.


desirable to complete the equipment oftwenty-two supporting units as requestedearlier by the Supreme Commander wasstill under study. There appeared to beconsiderable disagreement among themembers of the JCS as to whether theseunits were essential to the American wareffort and could be properly consideredas a military lend-lease requirement, orwhether they were of "postwar benefit" tothe French and should then be suppliedthrough civilian lend-lease on a govern-mental level. On 25 May the JCS finallyagreed to authorize the Supreme Com-mander to finish equipping the units fromtheater stocks. The decision with respectto the three divisions was being withheldpending further information from thetheater.20

The status of the Liberated ManpowerProgram had not changed to any appre-ciable degree. The question of its re-sumption was still under consideration bythe CCS. It will be recalled that on 24April the Supreme Commander had re-quested that he be authorized to form andequip such security and labor units asmight be required for a period not exceed-ing one year after V-E Day. On 12 MayGeneral Eisenhower reminded the CCS ofthis request and informed them that pend-ing their approval SHAEF planned, to con-tinue the formation of labor and securityunits if the governments concerned agreedto the proposal. Some progress had beenmade toward solving the controversial issueof the control of French units. GeneralSmith and War Minister Diethelm, meet-ing on 13 May, had discussed the matterand come to an agreement. The agree-

ment, confirmed in writing by General Juinon 31 May, stipulated that the SupremeCommander was to continue to control forsix months, beginning 1 June, the 25 se-curity battalions and 6 labor groups thenemployed under Communications Zone and21 Army Group. An additional 20 bat-talions were to be made available to himas soon as they would be equipped. Noneof the units were to be employed outsideFrench territory.21

At the end of May SHAEF was takingsteps to complete the equipping of the 22service units approved by the JCS at leastup to the scale required to accomplish theirassigned mission. These units were alreadybeing employed by Communications Zoneand army groups to release correspondingU.S. units required to support forces underU.S. command. Three additional Frenchunits (2 railway operating battalions and 1railway grand division), proposed bySHAEF in early May as operationally neces-sary, had still not been authorized by theJCS. As for the three divisions, the de-cision to complete their equipping was beingwithheld by the JCS, pending receipt fromthe theater of a detailed list of the itemsrequired. The Lyon depot meanwhile wasbeing maintained in operation and the ma-tériel stocked there for the French was beingheld in reserve, except in the case of itemsin critical short supply required for U.S.troops in process of redeployment.22

20 Msg W-87143, Marshall to Eisenhower, 24May 45, SHAEF SGS 475/1 France, Vol. IV; MsgWX-87996, JCS to Eisenhower, 25 May 45, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D.

21 Msg SCAF 387, SCAEF to CCS, 12 May 45,ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C; Ltr,Juin to Lewis, 31 May 45, SHAEF G-3 091 France,Vol. VII.

22 Msg FWD 22447, Eisenhower to Marshall, 27May 45, OPD Cable Files; Msg FWD 21005,SHAEF to AGWAR, 8 May 45, ABC 091.711France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D; Msg FWD 22658,Eisenhower to COMZONE, 29 May 45, SHAEFSGS 475/1 France, Vol. IV.


Political Developments Doom Rearmament

The hope, which the French still enter-tained, that the first phase at least of theMetropolitan Program would be completedwas suddenly shattered, once again as a re-sult of a political complication arising inthe theater. The incident, more seriousthan any of those preceding, threatened tobring Franco-American co-operation to anend.

In the spring of 1945 German forces stilloccupied a narrow strip of French territorywest of the Franco-Italian border. Facingthem were French units reorganized since1 March as the Détachement d'Armée desAlpes commanded by Lt. Gen. Paul Doyen,who was under the operational control ofthe U.S. 6th Army Group. The detach-ment included then the 27th Alpine In-fantry Division (27th DIA) still poorlyarmed, the U.S.-equipped 1st MarchInfantry Division (1st DMI) temporarilydetached from the 1st French Army, and anumber of units of FFI origin. All togetherit represented a strength of some twenty in-fantry battalions with several artillery andengineer units. The detachment was tolaunch an attack in co-ordination with theplanned offensive of the 15th Army Groupin Italy. By direction of Field Marshal SirHarold R. L. G. Alexander, then SupremeAllied Commander in the Mediterranean,the French units were not to go beyond a lineextending from the Swiss frontier to theLigurian Gulf.

The attack came on 9 April. The Frenchsuccessfully drove the Germans off Frenchterritory, and continued their push east-ward. They had nearly reached the re-straining line when, on 27 April, 15th ArmyGroup informed 6th Army Group that anyfurther advance by the French detachmentcould have no appreciable effect on opera-

tions in Italy. The next day General Deversordered General Doyen to halt and prepareto withdraw to the Franco-Italian border.This border delimited the boundary be-tween the Mediterranean and Europeantheaters. The withdrawal of the Frenchwas necessary as Alexander was establish-ing Allied military government within histheater including all of liberated Italy.Doyen ordered his troops to halt but de-clined to bring them back to the border with-out instructions from his government. Bythe end of May the French detachment hadstill not withdrawn in spite of repeated or-ders from Devers.23

The situation was reminiscent of theStuttgart episode in which another Frenchcommander, General de Lattre, on ordersfrom de Gaulle, had refused to comply withinstructions from his superior. It was allthe more regrettable considering that Gen-eral Juin, on 11 May, had given assurancesto American officials in Washington thatthere would be no recurrence of the Stutt-gart affair.

Allied officials learned that, for reasonsof prestige and honor, the French were notprepared to evacuate the disputed arealargely in the belief that such a move wouldappear to the Italians as a retreat on thepart of France. They learned moreoverthat France was planning to annex part ofthe area. Determined to carry out the es-tablishment of Allied military governmenteven in the territory occupied by Frenchtroops, Field Marshal Alexander urgedSHAEF to make strong representations tothe French Government with a view to ob-taining prompt compliance with GeneralDevers' orders.

23 Hq Fifth Army, "The French-Italian BorderProblem," Sec II, Chronological Summary, DRBAGO.


On 30 May General Doyen wrote to hisimmediate superior, Maj. Gen. Willis Crit-tenberger, Commanding General, U.S. IVCorps, then on his way to assume controlof the area occupied by the French detach-ment. Doyen protested against Allied at-tempts to establish military government inthe Province of Cuneo, which his govern-ment had ordered him to occupy and ad-minister. The installation of any Alliedadministrative agency in that area being in-compatible with his mission, he would becompelled to oppose it. Any insistence inthis direction "would assume a clearly un-friendly, even hostile, character, and couldresult in severe consequences." 24 Two dayslater the French commander informed Gen-eral Crittenberger that General de Gaullehad instructed him to make it as clear aspossible to the Allied Command that he wasto prevent the establishment of Allied mili-tary government in the territories occupiedand administered by French troops "by allnecessary means without exception." 25

Alexander immediately apprised the CCSof the impasse now reached with the FrenchHigh Command and recommended that hebe allowed to complete the occupation ofnorthwestern Italy and establish Allied mili-tary government there, using force if needbe. Informed of the situation, PresidentTruman on 6 June cabled to General deGaulle his deep concern over the action ofthe French Army in ignoring orders issuedby representatives of the CCS. GeneralDoyen's letter of 30 May contained the "un-believable threat" that the French mightfight the Americans. Pointing out that the

American people would be shocked if theywere apprised of this threat, the Presidenturged General de Gaulle to reconsider hisstand in the matter. In the meantime, hehad no alternative but to order the stoppageof issue of military equipment and muni-tions.26

In the belief that, largely as a result of theprompt and effective intervention of GeneralJuin and Foreign Affairs Minister GeorgesBidault, the matter was about to be settledin a satisfactory manner, General Smithrecommended to the War Department thatexecution of the stoppage order be delayeda day or two pending clarification of thesituation. He feared that, if action weretaken at once, the French might give theincident considerable publicity.27 GeneralMarshall replied that the order remainedin effect. Further, it was to apply also tothe labor and security units supplied fromU.S. sources. Excepted from the order wererations and sufficient quantities of gasolineto maintain the normal life of troops andto allow for such movements as might berequired. In anticipation of an acceptableanswer from General de Gaulle, the Su-preme Commander was to prepare for theresumption of the issuance of supplies but"only upon specific instructions" from theWar Department.28 In a second messageof the same date, General Marshall in-formed General McNarney, CommandingGeneral, U.S. Forces in the Mediterranean

24 Ltr, Doyen to Crittenberger, 30 May 45, FifthArmy Files, "The Fr-Ital Border Question," No.20, DRB AGO.

25 Msg 44/CEM, Doyen to Crittenberger, 2 Jun45, in same file.

26 Msg NAF 1002, Alexander to CCS, in samefile; Msg W-12923, Marshall to Eisenhower andMcNarney, 6 Jun 45, Staff Message Center CableLog.

27 Msg FWD 23981, Smith to Handy, 8 Jun 45,SHAEF Cable Log, Fr Forces, A-49-70 TS.

28 Msg W-13700, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 Jun45, SHAEF Cable Log, Fr Forces, A-49-70 TS;Msg WX-14512, AGWAR to ETOUSA andMTOUSA, 8 Jun 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct43), Sec 2-E.


Theater of Operations, that military lend-lease support of the French Sovereignty andTerritorial forces in North Africa was beingterminated forthwith. Only such matérielas had been floated would be delivered.29

This action was being taken on the groundthat support of these forces was no longerjustified militarily now that hostilities hadceased in Europe.30

In compliance with the presidential de-cision, the Supreme Commander orderedthe cessation, as of 9 June, of all issues ofequipment, except rations and some gaso-line, to all French forces, including air,whether in North Africa or in Europe. Thenext day Alexander received word fromGeneral Juin that de Gaulle had consentedto the withdrawal of French troops west ofthe 1939 Franco-Italian border. Frenchand Allied commanders, meeting on 11June, agreed that the relief of all Frenchtroops from the disputed area was to be ac-complished progressively and completed by10 July. No publicity was to be given tothese arrangements and no communique is-sued by any military headquarters con-cerned. The operation was to be referredto as a "normal military relief" and the useof the word "withdrawal" was to beavoided.31

In an attempt to obtain the rapid liftingof the ban on the further issue of equipment,Ambassador Bonnet called on State Depart-ment officials on 13 June and urged thatlend-lease shipments be resumed. He was

told by John J. McCloy that the matterwas in the President's hands and would haveto be taken up with him. The President,in fact, had just been sounded out and hadindicated that he was prepared to lift theban "in a few days." 32 His policy appearedto be that the embargo order would berescinded only after completion of the plan-ned withdrawal of French troops fromnorthwestern Italy. This was made clearin a message from General Marshall re-questing General McNarney to keep him in-formed of French preparations for andprogress in withdrawal, so that he couldrecommend to the President the appropriatetime for the resumption of supply to theFrench forces. General McNarney thenurged that he be authorized to tell GeneralJuin that deliveries would be resumed uponcompletion of the French withdrawal.General Marshall replied that the matterrested entirely with the President, since itwas he who had made the original decisionto stop the supply of equipment.33

While the ban imposed on 9 June con-tinued in force, the War Department ex-amined its implications. On 18 June theInternational Division pointed out thatshould all military lend-lease to the Frenchbe definitely ended, it would mean the stop-page of the further issue of replacementand maintenance supplies to the forcesnow equipped, of rations to approximately

29 Msg WX-14512, AGWAR to McNarney, 8Jun 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-E.

30 Memo, McFarland for de Saint-Didier, 9 Jun45, in same file.

31 Msg FWD 24154, Eisenhower To All Con-cerned, 9 June 45, SHAEF SGS 475/3, Vol. I; MsgNAF 1008, Alexander to CCS, 10 June 45, SHAEFCable Log, Fr Forces, A-49-70 TS; Msgs NAF1009, Alexander to CCS, 11 Jun 45, and NAF 1010,Alexander to CCS, 11 Jun 45.

32 Memo, McCloy for Marshall, 14 Jun 45, ABC380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A.

33 Msgs FX-94233, McNarney to Marshall, 16Jun 45, WX-18779, Marshall to McNarney, 18Jun 45, and FX-13943, McNarney to Marshall, 27Jun 45, AFHQ Cable Log; Msg WX-20076, Mar-shall to McNarney, 21 Jun 45, SHAEF Cable Log;Msg FX-98608, McNarney to AGWAR, 24 Jun 45,Staff Message Center Cable Log; Msg (unnum-bered), Marshall to CG U.S. Armed Forces inMed, 28 Jun 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43),Sec 2-E.


300,000 troops, of matériel to complete thefirst three divisions of the MetropolitanProgram, as well as the nondelivery of 100airplanes then en route to Europe. Itwould also spell the end of the current ne-gotiations regarding the equipping of theforces offered by the French for employ-ment in the Far East. Finally, it wouldhave far-reaching implications with respectto the civilian import program.34

One problem, meanwhile, had come upfor examination, namely, the ultimate dis-position of the units equipped under theLiberated Manpower Program. The ad-visability of maintaining in operation underU.S. control the thirty-five security battal-ions and two labor groups furnished by theFrench was seriously being questioned.Communications Zone, which regarded theunits as "the least efficient of all Alliedliberated manpower units," felt that theirmaintenance placed a heavy load on theU.S. supply system. On 8 June Communi-cations Zone urged that they be released toFrench Government control without delay.35

As new commitments were being thrownin the lap of the U.S. Army, such as thefeeding of large numbers of prisoners ofwar and displaced persons, the supply situ-ation of the theater was being severelystrained. It was becoming increasingly es-sential that national governments be madeto assume the supply responsibility of theirrespective forces at the earliest practicabledate. With this in view, SHAEF advisedthe French High Command on 23 Junethat the requirements of the U.S. forcesfor security and labor units had been re-vised. It was no longer proposed to raise

and equip any new units of this type. Inaddition, ten security battalions were beingreturned forthwith to French control. On29 June SHAEF officials informed the CCSthat they were gradually releasing all liber-ated manpower units except a few truckcompanies. They then proposed, in antic-ipation of the termination of combinedcommand, that thereafter matters connectedwith Liberated Manpower Program unitsbe handled by American and British com-manders—with the War Office for the issueof initial equipment and maintenance, andwith the national governments concernedregarding the employment and movement ofunits.36

By early July all liberated manpowerunits, with the exception of a few truckcompanies, had been returned to Frenchcontrol. As the French military authori-ties were proposing to disband the units nolonger considered necessary, SHAEF wassatisfied that they would have sufficient sur-plus equipment to maintain the others inoperation, including military regions head-quarters, the Gendarmerie, and the GardeMobile.37

The embargo on the issue of equipmentto the French never had a chance of beinglifted. On 5 July President Truman an-nounced in a directive to the Joint Chiefsof Staff that thereafter the issue to Alliedgovernments of lend-lease military equip-ment would be limited to that which wouldbe used in the war against Japan exclu-

34 Memo, Lt Col Don G. Shingler for Asst SecyWar, 18 Jun 45, OCS A-48-1 091 France. SeeCh. XXIV, below.

35 Memo, G-3 COMZONE for CofS, 8 Jun 45,SHAEF G-3 Orgn and Equip Sec 091, Vol. III.

36 Msg EX-59933, COMZONE to SHAEF, 21Jun 45, SHAEF G-3 Orgn and Equip Sec 091, Vol.III; Memo, Lewis for Juin, 23 Jun 45, SHAEFMission to France 091.711-12 (Fr) Combined; MsgS-93960 SCAF 468, Tedder to CCS, 29 Jun 45,ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-E.

37 Memo, Bull for OCofS, 5 Jul 45, SHAEF SGS475/1, Vol. II; Memo, SHAEF for CG COMZONE,USFET, and SHAEF Mission to France, 7 Jul 45,SHAEF Mission to France 091.4 Liberated People.


slvely.38 While leaving the door open tofurther negotiations on the French proposalto equip an expeditionary corps for the Pa-cific, the directive put an end to the possi-bility that at least the first phase of theMetropolitan Program would be completed.The French would find only small comfortin the decision reached by the War Officeon 9 July to resume the delivery of Britishitems of equipment to fill shortages existingat the time of initial shipments, and of sup-plies required for the maintenance of equip-ment currently in the hands of Frenchunits.39

As a result of the presidential decision,the activities of the rearmament depot atLyon came to an end and all equipmentstored there was ordered returned to U.S.theater stocks. All records of the depotwere subsequently moved to Delta BaseSection.40

With the termination of the combinedcommand and SHAEF's dissolution on13-14 July, 1st French Army reverted toFrench control. Simultaneously the re-sponsibility for the remaining U.S. activitiesin connection with French armament andtraining passed to the new U.S. commandin the theater, United States Forces, Euro-pean Theater, the successor to ETOUSA.The British, meanwhile, organized anagency of their own for the purpose ofhandling matters of interest to the WarOffice.41

The presidential directive of 5 July hadhardly been put into effect when it becameapparent that its provisions were too re-strictive. In the case of the French, theiroccupation forces would not long maintaintheir normal life unless the issue to them ofU.S. rations and gasoline was resumed forsome time at least. The matter, which wasof equal concern to the British forces of oc-cupation, was discussed by PresidentTruman and Prime Minister Churchill inthe course of the Potsdam Conference (17July-2 August).42

On 29 July President Truman communi-cated to the JCS an "interpretation" of hisoriginal directive. The continuation oflend-lease aid was authorized when, in theopinion of the JCS, such aid was to be usedin direct support of American or Allied re-deployment in the war against Japan. Alsoauthorized was the issue to U.S.-equippedFrench units, on a military lend-lease basis,of rations until 31 August 1945 and of re-placement and maintenance items (includ-ing lubricants) until 30 September of thesame year. The interpretation authorizedfurther the supply for all other purposes ofmaintenance items for U.S. equipment nowin the possession of Allied armies "againstpayment under such terms and conditionsas may be determined by the State Depart-ment and the Foreign Economic Adminis-tration in accordance with establishedprocedure." 43

Pursuant to this clarification, GeneralEisenhower issued, on 2 August, an instruc-tion to all headquarters under his commanddefining the extent and nature of furthermaterial assistance to the French.44 Thelatter were then advised by United States

38 Directive communicated to CG USFET in MsgW-28135, 6 Jul 45, repeated in WX-41696 of30 Jul 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec2-E.

39 Rearmament Division, Notes for Conference,10 Jul 45, in SHAEF Mission to France RearmtDiv, Misc Papers "Notes for Conferences."

40 Msg EX-73131, Lee to Delta Base Sec, 26 Jul45, SHAEF Mission to France 475-10 Equip ofTroops Metropolitan Program.


42 International Div, ASF, Lend-Lease, I, 315.43 Msg VICTORY 407, 29 Jul 45, CM-IN 29906.44 Msg S-15196, Eisenhower To All Concerned,

2 Aug 45, SHAEF SGS 475/3, Vol. I.


Forces, European Theater, Mission toFrance, of the terminating dates of lend-lease issues as prescribed by the President.

On 5 September, three days after thesurrender of the Japanese forces, PresidentTruman issued a second directive on mili-tary lend-lease to become effective V-J Day.Although virtually ending lend-lease by theWar and Navy Departments, the directivestipulated that aid could be furnished toAllied forces in the form of rations, shelter,medical supplies, and services, where thesecould not be reasonably furnished by theforeign government concerned and wheredenial would work immediate hardship onAllied forces, or on U.S. forces which weredependent upon continued support by ele-ments of Allied forces. Such aid was to beconsidered as a liquidating measure and, in

any case, was to terminate within sixmonths, or in March 1946.45

Except for minor transfers of mainte-nance items, ammunition, and training ma-tériel, effected purely as a liquidating meas-ure, the rearmament operations had cometo an end, much to the chagrin of theFrench. Subsequent efforts on their partto purchase surplus American equipmentproved unsuccessful, the State Departmenthaving established the policy that the saleof combat materials in an undemilitarizedstate was not authorized.46 The matter, inany case, being of a strictly postwar nature,exceeds the scope of the present study.

45 Msg WX-59961, OPD WARCOS to CGUSAFMEDTO, 5 Sep 45, OPD Cable Files.

46 Memo for Rcd, OPD, 30 Nov 45, OPD 400France, Sec 4.

CHAPTER XXII

Re-equipping the French Air Force andFrench Navy

The Air Force

It will be recalled that in October 1943the French military authorities had sub-mitted an extensive rearmament programfor the years 1944, 1945, and 1946 basedon the premise that a large reservoir of man-power would become available as the libera-tion of France was undertaken. The airpart of the program contemplated the ac-tivation by May 1946 of a total of 172squadrons with 2,800 first-line planes andthe corresponding ground and servicetroops. It was to be an extension of PlanVII then being implemented in NorthAfrica. The Allies had declined to ex-amine the program at the time as they con-sidered it premature. Later, a few weeksbefore the launching of ANVIL, the Frenchresubmitted their proposal. General Ar-nold seemed more disposed to consider itprovided that it had General Eaker's ap-proval and that equipment could be fur-nished largely from theater stocks. Therethe matter rested.1

In the fall of 1944, as the liberation ofFrance progressed, the French military au-thorities then established in Paris renewedtheir proposals. Implementation of Plan

VII was virtually completed. Additionaleffectives were available in France. At theend of November the French High Com-mand estimated that 20,000 former avia-tion personnel needing but little refreshertraining could be put to useful employmentprovided they were given the necessaryclothing, equipment, and aircraft. Thenew French Chief of Staff for Air, GeneralValin, approached Allied air officials in thetheater. They in turn instructed the newlycreated Air Section of Rearmament Divi-sion, SHAEF Mission to France, to drawup a second air program.2

In the meantime, the units equippedunder Plan VII were actively pursuing themissions assigned to them as component ele-ments of Allied air pools. They included1st French Air Corps operating under thecontrol of the U.S. First Tactical Air Forceand the seven British-equipped squadronsoperating under the British 2nd TacticalAir Force or under RAF Bomber Com-mand. In addition, other nonprogramsquadrons, equipped by the French in NorthAfrica largely with obsolete matériel, were

1 See pp. 308-09, above. Memo, Bouscat forJAC and JRC, 2 Nov 43, JRC Misc Misc Doc, Item5-b; Msg W-62001, Arnold to Eaker, 8 Jul 44,JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

2 General Valin's predecessor, General Bouscat,was now inspector general of the French Air Force.

Air Section was headed first by Colonel Ervin,former chairman of the Joint Air Commission inNorth Africa, later by Brig. Gen. Jack W. Wood.For details on Air Section and its successor, AirComponent, SHAEF Mission to France, see pp.384-85, below.


operating in the Middle East and in FrenchWest and Equatorial Africa as police andsecurity units. The 1st Parachute Regi-ment, equipped and trained in North Africa,was currently engaged in operations as ageneral reserve infantry regiment of 1stFrench Army. The British-equipped 2dand 3d Parachute Regiments had beenseverely decimated during the summer op-erations. They had returned to their basein the United Kingdom for regrouping, re-fitting, and further training in anticipationof new missions. They would still operateas battalions of the British Special Air Serv-ice Brigade.3

U.S.-equipped squadrons and servicetroops were being maintained throughAmerican supply channels in the same man-ner as corresponding American units, allsupplies furnished being incorporated inmonthly theater lend-lease lists. British-equipped units were maintained by the RAFexcept for clothing and some items ofequipment which were provided from U.S.sources in the interests of uniformity.

To provide an adequate reserve of com-bat crews, French students were still beingsent to schools in the United Kingdom andthe United States. In late September thenumber of students undergoing training inthe United States was approximately 300 of-ficers and 1,600 men.4

Such was the situation of the French AirForce as Air Marshal Robb, Deputy Chiefof Staff for Air, SHAEF, on 19 December

submitted to the CCS details of the pro-gram proposed by Air Section of Rearma-ment Division, SHAEF Mission to France.The program, prepared in collaborationwith the French Air Ministry and con-curred in by Allied air and other officials inthe theater, was in the nature of a "com-plement" or extension of Plan VII. Scar-city of trained aviation specialists in NorthAfrica had prevented the formation of aFrench tactical force as independent andefficiently organized as a comparable U.S.or British force. To fill existing gaps, itwas now proposed to add to Plan VII thefollowing units: (1) 9 combat squadrons(8 to be provided with equipment by theUnited States, 1 by the United Kingdom),thus bringing U.S.-equipped "groups" andBritish-equipped "wings" currently com-posed of 3 squadrons up to the normalcomplement of 4 squadrons as in corre-sponding U.S. and British organizations;(2) a number of headquarters units to en-able the French to operate on their own,as well as service units to ease the load onU.S. and British service facilities. Theplan, if approved, was to go into effect on 1January 1945 and be completed by 30June.5

On 29 December the CCS accepted theprogram in principle and requested theCombined Administrative Committee towork out the responsibility for the provisionof equipment. It was not until 1 Marchthat the CCS, endorsing the recommenda-tions of the committee, announced the policyto be followed with respect to the new pro-gram, thereafter known as Extension ofPlan VII (CCS 350/7). SHAEF wasgiven the entire responsibility for its imple-mentation. It was charged with establish-

3 The 2d and 3d RCP were dispatched to north-ern Holland by parachute in early April 1945 tooperate in support of the 21 Army Group. Chief debataillon Rocolle, L'Arme aéroportée clé de laVictoire (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1948), I,102-15. Memo, Fr Military Mission AFHQ forLiaison Sec AFHQ, 30 Nov 44, sub: FAF Order ofBattle, AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters,Vol. VI. See pp. 182, 211-12, above.

4 International Div, ASF, Lend-Lease, II, 774.

5 Memo, Air Marshal J. M. Robb for CCS, 19Dec 44, ABC 091.711 (6 Oct 43). Sec 2-C.

RE-EQUIPPING THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY 375

ing the priorities for the supply of equipmentstrictly on the basis of operational factorsand in co-ordination with other rearmamentprograms in the theater. It was also toobserve the rule established for all pro-grams: any unit of the new air programwhich had not been equipped by the timeorganized hostilities with Germany ceasedwould be deleted.6

As in the past, Army Air Forces head-quarters was to provide U.S. aircraft anditems peculiar to air, following their assign-ment by the MAB. Organizationalequipment and spare parts were to beshipped directly to U.S. Air Forces depotsin the theater, and their issue to the Frenchwas to be controlled by the United StatesStrategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF).Aircraft were to be shipped directly toFrench depots in Marseille where the FAFhad adequate assembly facilities. Interna-tional Division, ASF, meanwhile, was tohandle and ship items common to air andground in the same manner as for theground rearmament program. Shortageswere to be filled from U.S. theater stockswherever possible. All units, onceequipped, were to be placed under the op-erational control of the Supreme Com-mander and employed in the Allied pool ofair units.7

By the end of March 1945 a priority listof units for which the French could furnishthe necessary personnel had been drawnup jointly by the French Air Ministry,SHAEF Air Staff, and Air Component ofSHAEF Mission to France, the successor

to Air Section of Rearmament Division.The list, submitted to and approved by FirstTactical Air Force, included the units as de-sired by months. The new phasing nolonger corresponded to that originally con-templated. The program was now to startin April with the delivery of equipment forseveral headquarters and four combatsquadrons and terminate in September-October.8

Throughout the month of April a detailedprocedure was worked out under the gen-eral supervision of Air Component ofSHAEF Mission to France for the activa-tion and equipping of units upon the re-ception of matériel due to arrive from theUnited States. By the end of the monthnone had yet reached the Continent, how-ever, and, as the Supreme Commander de-cided on 28 April to suspend all furthershipments of equipment to the French as aresult of the Stuttgart episode, only thematériel for the April phase was on its wayfrom the United States. On 1 May WarDepartment officials informed the theaterthat, in accordance with the Supreme Com-mander's request, shipment of the remain-ing equipment was being canceled with theexception of aircraft which would continueto be delivered until further advice fromthe theater.9

After a rapid re-examination of the pro-gram in the light of the current operationalsituation, the theater informed the War De-partment that a number of units in the Apriland May priorities were being eliminated

6 Msgs FACS 120, CCS to Eisenhower, 29 Dec44, and FACS 147, CCS to Eisenhower, 1 Mar 45,ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C.

7 Memo, Twitchell for Gen Bull, 20 Dec 44,SHAEF Mission to France 091.711 Rearmt (Fr)900-2; Msg FWD 19714, Schlatter to Arnold, 19Apr 45, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. III.

8 Memo, Ervin for Loomis, 28 Mar 45, SHAEFMission to France 091.711 Rearmt (Fr) Air Force900-2.

9 Memo, Ervin to U.S. Component SHAEF AirStaff, 20 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711Rearmt (Fr) 900-2; Msg WX-76320, Maj GenJohn E. Hull to Loomis, 1 May 45, SS and P Plan-ning Div Files. See pp. 361 ff., above.


as no longer required, leaving others, al-ready operational but only partially equip-ped, still on the program. With respect tothese, SHAEF planned to complete theirinitial equipment insofar as possible fromU.S. theater stocks and by using matérielcurrently afloat. No further initial equip-ment was desired from the United States asno other units were to be activated andequipped.10

Throughout the winter 1944-45 and thefollowing spring months, units of the FAFhad continued in operation on variousfronts. The squadrons of 1st French AirCorps acting in co-operation with 1st FrenchArmy and for the benefit of U.S. SeventhArmy had participated, under the controlof First Tactical Air Force, in the liberationof Alsace, the reduction of the ColmarPocket, the crossing of the Rhine, the bomb-ing of German communication centers, andthe final drive eastward through enemy ter-ritory. The British-equipped squadrons,still under either the 2d Tactical Air Forceor the RAF Bomber Command, hadbeen active in support of operations car-ried out by the British and CanadianArmies. Other units had been engagedon the Atlantic coast front and on theFranco-Italian border. The Russian-equipped Normandie Squadron had con-tinued to operate as part of the Red airforces.

By 7 May, as hostilities ended in Europe,the air program was still suspended exceptfor the few units which the theater com-mander wished to be equipped for op-erational reasons. With the embargo or-dered by President Truman on 6 June asa result of the northwest Italy incident,French hopes for a resumption of the pro-

gram fell off sharply. They vanished com-pletely when it became known that theAllied commander in the Pacific, GeneralDouglas MacArthur, on 2 June, had ex-pressed his opposition to the use of Frenchair squadrons in his theater.11

With the dissolution of SHAEF in mid-July, all FAF units reverted to French con-trol as did the rest of the French armedforces. To enable them to carry out theirmission in occupied Germany, U.S.-equipped units continued to be dependenton American supply installations for spareparts and maintenance items. British-equipped units remained dependent on theRAF for almost all their service facilities.12

After President Truman's second directiveof 5 September, virtually ending all lend-lease aid, such U.S. assistance as was stillrequired by the FAF for the maintenanceof its units during the immediate posthos-tilities period was made the subject of ne-gotiations between the French and U.S.Governments.13

As estimated by General Loomis at theend of August 1945, the results of the effortsexpended by the United States betweenDecember 1942 and May 1945 toward therehabilitation of the FAF had been far fromnegligible. All together the French had re-ceived from American sources the completeinitial equipment for 19 combat squadronsand 60 supporting units, representing a per-sonnel strength of some 30,000 men, forwhich the United States had also furnishedthe entire necessary maintenance. The

10 Msg FWD 20564, Eisenhower to Arnold, 4May 45, SS and P Planning Div Files.

11 See pp. 368, above, and 397, below.12 Memo, Loomis for CG USFET, 23 Aug 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 370-1 NA Employ-ment of Units.

13 Transfers of supplies effected after that date,as well as requests by the French submitted in mid-September for a further expansion of the FAF, arepostwar in character and exceed the scope of thepresent study.


supporting units had been used to form anair defense wing, an air depot group, 3 serv-ice groups, as well as suitable commandheadquarters. The British, for their part,had equipped a total of 10 squadrons.14

The Navy

The vast rearmament program for theyears 1944 and 1945 submitted in Algiersby the National Defense Committee in mid-October 1943 envisaged the further build-up not only of the ground and air forces,but of the Navy as well. The entire pro-gram, it will be recalled, was based on theassumption that considerable numbers ofeffectives would become available as a resultof operations in continental France. Thepart relating to the Navy contemplated asubstantial increase in the number of de-stroyers, aircraft carriers, cruisers, sub-marines, and other types of smaller vessels.The request was considered to be a postwarproject and, like the rest of the program, hadbeen turned down as inopportune.15

When, in mid-September 1944, the firstFrench naval vessels re-entered the batteredport of Toulon, the earlier program initiatedin December 1942 for the rehabilitation ofthe French Navy was nearly completed. Afew ships were still being overhauled inNorth African dockyards under the generaldirection of French, British, and Americannaval authorities in the Mediterranean.

The more important problem now wasthat of restoring ports and naval installa-tions in France, some of which had beengreatly damaged before and during thelanding operations. Toward the end of

1944, as the entire French territory passedunder the control of SHAEF, the latter be-came responsible for assisting the Frenchin carrying out this difficult assignment.SHAEF also became responsible for themaintenance and supply of such Frenchships as were operating within its sphere,AFHQ meanwhile maintaining a similarresponsibility for French ships and naval in-stallations in its area. The old supply pol-icy, CCS 358 (Revised), put in force on 4October 1943 and applicable to the FrenchNavy while it was based on North Africa,was no longer adequate. There was needof coordinating the activities between thetwo theaters and between them and theFrench, and of determining the share of re-sponsibility of the United States and theUnited Kingdom.

After some discussion between officials ofboth theaters, the task of co-ordination wasfinally vested in Vice-Adm. Alan G. Kirk,deputy for Navy, SHAEF. Admiral Kirkcarried out this assignment through theNaval Division established for the purposeat SHAEF Mission to France in December1944 and functioning parallel to the Re-armament Division and the Air Compo-nent.16 In this manner, Admiral Kirk andNaval Division, composed of U.S. andBritish officers, were able to deal effectivelywith the French Admiralty in Paris, nowthe sole authority in French naval rearma-ment matters, and to co-ordinate Americanand British responsibilities with respect toFrench naval problems arising in the twotheaters. To achieve further co-ordination,Admiral Fénard, chief of the French NavalMission in the United States, was directedto refer all requests for equipment to be usedin French port operations to SHAEF forconsideration. No action would be taken

14 Memo, Loomis for CG USFET, 23 Aug 45,SHAEF Mission to France 370-1 NA Employmentof Units.

15 Memo, National Defense Committee for WD,16 Oct 43, OCS 45-466 France 1942-43. See pp.308-09, above. 16 See p. 385, below.


BATTLESHIP STRASBOURG, Toulon Harbor, September 1944. Note four lower turretguns, the ends of which were cut off when the French scuttled the ship in November 1942.

in Washington without SHAEF's recom-mendations.17

Thanks to the efforts of Naval Division,the French obtained until the end of thecampaign in Europe substantial amounts ofequipment, such as cranes, derricks, barges,and other materials, for the rehabilitationof their ports, Brest and Cherbourg in par-ticular. French naval vessels continued tooperate throughout the world as part ofthe Allied naval pool. In April 1945 anumber of them were released from Alliedcontrol for participation in the combinedland, air, and sea operations launched,under the direction of Lt. Gen. Edgar de

Larminat, for the purpose of reducing theGerman pockets of resistance on the Atlan-tic coast. Together with a flotilla of Britishmine sweepers, the French vessels, whichincluded the battleship Lorraine, onecruiser, three destroyers, and several escortsand mine sweepers, were grouped into anaval task force commanded by Rear Adm.Joseph Rue.

By the time operations in Europe ended,the French Navy had increased further insize as a result of the acquisition of addi-tional Allied ships and the refitting of sal-vaged French ships. The number of itsvessels was now estimated at 350 includingauxiliary craft, its air arm at 10 squadrons,and its effectives at close to 100,000 men.

17 Msg W-20574, Styer to Loomis, 13 Jan 45,International Div Files, Cable Log, A 45-152.


Its fighting power was regarded as beingnearly equivalent to that of 1939.18

In June 1945 Admiral Fénard submittedto the JCS a detailed list of machinery, tools,and other materials still needed for the res-toration of ports and naval yards. Al-though the French Government was pre-pared to pay for the equipment on the basisof 20 percent cash and the balance within30 years, the CCS turned down the request.Now that hostilities had ended in Europe,the materials involved were needed in othertheaters and could not be spared for Frenchnaval installations.19

Other requests from Admiral Fénard hadlikewise been denied by the CCS. Theyhad been submitted throughout the fall andwinter of 1944 in connection with attemptsby the French military authorities to set upan expeditionary force for participation inoperations in the Pacific. It was not untilJune that the CCS took into considerationsome of Admiral Fénard's proposals. Bythis time it was too late for any constructiveprogram to be put into effect before the ces-sation of hostilities in the Pacific.20

It will be recalled that in the winter of1943-44, the French had unsuccessfully at-tempted to obtain equipment and planes forthe rehabilitation of their Naval Air Arm(Aéronautique Navale). The CCS hadturned down their requests largely becauseof the dearth of trained personnel.21 When,in the fall of 1944, the liberation of part ofFrance produced a substantial increase in

naval effectives, the French renewed theirrequests for equipment.

On 29 September 1944 Admiral Fénardsubmitted to Admiral King a plan for thecomplete rehabilitation of AéronautiqueNavale. The plan contemplated the re-equipping of existing squadrons, the forma-tion and equipping of new units, and therehabilitation of the naval air bases whoseequipment and facilities had been destroyedin the course of operations. The existingnumber of squadrons had been raised from4 in 1943 to 10. They included 2 divebomber, 2 fighter, and 6 coastal commandsquadrons. Except for 2 coastal commandsquadrons equipped with U.S. aircraft andthe 2 fighter squadrons equipped withP-47's and Spitfires and currently engagedin operations as part of the FAF, the unitswere using obsolescent or obsolete Frenchand British equipment. To standardizeequipment and simplify maintenance prob-lems, the program submitted by AdmiralFénard envisaged the utilization of Ameri-can equipment exclusively. It containedalso a request for clothing, tools, groundhandling and ground training equipment,and other miscellaneous materials.22

Admiral Fénard's proposal was immedi-ately referred to the Joint Strategic SurveyCommittee for study. On the recom-mendations of the committee, the JCSurged the CCS, on 31 October, to rejectthe proposal. The French plan, theypointed out, contained no substantial mili-tary advantage in the prosecution of thewar or in the solution of immediate postwarproblems in Europe. In addition it wouldhave an adverse effect on the prosecution ofthe war in the Pacific to the extent that itinvolved the diversion of U.S. resources and

18 Lemonnier, "La Marine Nationale," La Franceet son Empire dans la Guerre.

19 Memos, Fénard for JCS, 22 June 45, and CCSfor Fénard, 17 Jul 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct43) Sec 5.

20 see pp. 393, 395-96, below.21 Min, CCS 147th Mtg, 25 Feb 44; see

pp. 222-24, above.

22 Ltr, Fénard to CinC U.S. Fleet, 29 Sep 44, ABC091.711 France (12 Oct 43).


effort.23 Endorsing this view, the CCS dis-approved Admiral Fénard's request on theground that it contained implications re-

garding postwar rearmament. The issuewas definitely closed and the French wereforced to continue operating their NavalAir Arm with the equipment already onhand.

23 Ltr, JCS to Cordell Hull, 31 Oct 44, in samefile.

CHAPTER XXIII

Rearmament Division, SHAEFMission to France

Membership, Organization, and Operation

When, on 3 October 1944, GeneralLoomis arrived at Supreme Headquarters,Allied Expeditionary Force, he was ap-pointed deputy chief of a special staff sec-tion organized two weeks earlier for thepurpose of handling all matters involvingthe French. The section, known as SHAEFMission to France, was commanded byGeneral Lewis. As problems of Frenchequipment were arising in increasing num-ber, General Loomis was directed to takeover the responsibility for their solution.With the party of officers from the JointRearmament Committee whom he hadbrought along from North Africa, he or-ganized a rearmament division within themission, giving it a structure somewhatsimilar to that of the former JRC. Thedivision began operating at once under thename of Rearmament Division, SHAEFMission to France. Within a short timeSHAEF directed General Loomis to extendthe division's activities to include the re-armament of other western European Alliednations as well, including Belgium, Hol-land, and Denmark. Only the role playedby the division in connection with Frenchrearmament will be presented.

The Rearmament Division's position inthe staff structure and its relationship toother SHAEF agencies and sections con-cerned with French armament matters did

not vary until July 1945 when SHAEF itselfwas disbanded and a reorganization of Al-lied command and headquarters took place.(Chart 5). The transformation which theRearmament Division underwent then andthe role that it played for a short time there-after are matters treated separately at theend of the chapter.

During its relatively short existence thedivision was made responsible, first for thecontinued implementation of the North Af-rican program, later for the initiation, es-tablishment, and implementation of the Lib-erated Manpower and Metropolitan Pro-grams. In carrying out these assignments, iteffected the necessary co-ordination with allFrench and Allied agencies concerned, keptSHAEF informed of the status and progressof the units being re-equipped, directed theoperations of the U.S. instructor personnelassigned to Inspection Group, and co-or-dinated with SHAEF all questions arisingin connection with units not included in ap-proved rearmament programs.1

Membership

The British having assumed most of thecommitment with respect to the Liberated

1 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France for ChiefRearmt Div, 30 Nov 44, and Memo, SHAEF(Brig Gen T. J. Davis, Adj Gen) for SHAEF Mis-sion to France, 22 Dec 44, SHAEF Mission toFrance 320-1.


REARMAMENT DIVISION, SHAEF MISSION TO FRANCE. Seated in center,wearing glasses, is General Loomis; left of him is General Kingman; General Regnault is onthe right.

Manpower Program and a small part ofthat for the Metropolitan Program, the Re-armament Division was made, from theoutset, a U.S.-British agency with Frenchrepresentation. As the work of the divi-sion progressed, the number of U.S. andBritish members varied in proportion to therespective participation or interest of theUnited States and United Kingdom in therearmament operations being carried out.2

The French members, meanwhile, operatedas they had under the JRC—as a liaisongroup.

U.S. Members. The division beganfunctioning with a nucleus organizationconsisting of approximately twelve officers,all Americans and formerly members of boththe JRC and the Joint Air Commission.U.S. membership fluctuated very little. Itsincrease was slowed down as a result ofthe difficulties encountered by SHAEFMission to France in securing from AFHQ,and from agencies controlled by the latter,additional personnel formerly assigned tothe JRC and now needed for service withthe Rearmament Division. It had beenagreed in September 1944 by GeneralsEisenhower, Devers, and Marshall that allJRC personnel was to be held for transfer

2 Memo, Loomis for Lewis, sub: Proposed Planfor Fr Rearmt, 5 Oct 44, SHAEF Mission to France320-1.

REARMAMENT DIVISION, SHAEF MISSION TO FRANCE 383

CHART 5—POSITION OF REARMAMENT DIVISION IN SHAEF: 1 JANUARY 1945

Source: Ltr AG/091.112-2 GCT-AGM, SHAEF To All Concerned, 29 Dec 44, SHAEF Mission to France 320-1 Rearmt Div, Orgn andFunctions, Annex A.

to SHAEF if and when required. Appar-ently fearing an undue reduction of its ownpersonnel strength, AFHQ showed consid-erable reluctance in authorizing the trans-fers requested by General Loomis. Thisproduced an intertheater tug-of-war lastingover a period of four months.3 All togethernot more than six U.S. officers were addedto the initial roster.

British Members. The appointment ofBritish members was not effected as speedilyas it had been hoped, with the result thatBritish membership never reached the ex-pected ratio. The first officer to join thedivision, Lt. Col. R. G. Fullerton, was giventhe post of deputy executive officer shortly

after his appointment in November.4 Later,in March 1945, he was joined by two otherofficers.

Internal Organization

During the period in which the Rearma-ment Division was an agency of SHAEFMission to France (October 1944-July1945), its internal organization wentthrough two different phases. In theinitial period, which lasted to the end ofDecember, the Rearmament Division com-prised an Executive Staff, Ground, Air,and Naval Sections, a French Group, and atraining section known as Inspection Group,

3 Msg S-78109, SHAEF Main to MTOUSA forNelson, 7 Feb 45, in same file.

4 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France Rearmt Div(Lt Col Conrad L. Christensen), 1 Nov 44, in samefile.


CHART 6—THE REARMAMENT DIVISION, SHAEF MISSION TO FRANCE: MARCH 1945

*Officers formerly with the JRC in North Africa.†Attached to Inspection Group.Source: SHAEF Mission to France 320-1 Rearmt Div, Orgn and Functions, Annex A.

all under the command of General Loomis.The arrangement whereby the various sec-tions dealing with French armament mat-ters were consolidated in one single agencyhad been adopted to facilitate the transferto France of personnel and records from theformer North African JRC and JAC, andto speed up the launching of the new or-ganization. However, when the armamentprograms began to crystallize and multiplytoward the end of December 1944, it wasfelt advisable to set the air and naval sec-tions apart from the rest of the division,leaving the latter responsible for groundforce armament matters only. (Chart 6}

Until then, the Naval Section, althoughestablished in principle, had remained un-staffed and inoperative. The Air Section,on the contrary, had done considerable work

in supervising the continued implementa-tion of the North African air rearmamentprogram and in planning for an extensionof that program on the basis of manpowerthen available in continental France. Itwas composed of six U.S. officers, formerlymembers of the North African Joint AirCommission. It was headed, first byColonel Ervin, who, it will be recalled, hadserved as the last chairman of the JAC, laterafter 1 December, by Brig. Gen. Jack W.Wood. In carrying out its mission, the sec-tion co-ordinated all air armament mattersbetween appropriate agencies of the FrenchAir Force, the Royal Air Force, and theU.S. Army Air Forces, recommended ap-proval or disapproval of French requestsfor matériel, made suggestions on the em-ployment of units, and maintained liaison


with U.S. Strategic Air Forces and with the1st French Air Corps created in the fallof 1944.5

When the two sections left the division,on or about 1 January 1945, there werecreated parallel to the Rearmament Divi-sion and under the jurisdiction of SHAEFMission to France an Air Component underthe command of General Wood, and aNaval Division under the command of Capt.D. D. Dupre (USN), the representative ofAdmiral Kirk, Deputy for Navy, SHAEF.The Air Component took over the duties ofAir Section, and the Naval Division wasgiven the task of carrying on the rehabilita-tion of the French Navy under the generaldirection of Admiral Kirk.

In its final stage of organization, the Re-armament Division included three of theoriginal sections, namely Ground Section,French Group, and Inspection Group.

Ground Section. In matters of equip-ment, the Ground Section constituted thecentral authority. Placed under the directcontrol of General Loomis, it was composedof an executive staff, a British EquipmentGroup under the command of Colonel Ful-lerton, and a U.S. Equipment Group underthe command of Maj. Erwin S. Graham, thetwo equipment groups working in close co-ordination. The section was responsiblefor initiating programs and implementingthem once they had been approved by theCCS. In the discharge of this function, itworked in full and constant collaborationwith the French Group.

The problems faced by the Ground Sec-tion and by the division as a whole werefewer than those encountered by the JRCin North Africa. This was largely because

most of the responsibility for the rearma-ment operations was now vested in the di-vision, French agencies no longer being in-volved in the handling and distribution ofequipment. Yet the task of the section wassomewhat complicated by the fact that itwas dealing with three separate programsand that the American commitment was notas clearly defined as under the ANFA pro-gram when the United States had under-taken to furnish all the matériel for theFrench Ground Forces. To expedite ac-tion, General Loomis or members of theGround Section held frequent conferenceswith outside American, British, and Frenchofficials and agencies. They maintainedclose contact with the British War Officeand the London Munitions AssignmentsBoard, both of which, on several occasions,sent representatives to discuss matters ofcommon interest. When, in the fall of1944, it was urgent that the War Depart-ment reach a decision on the MetropolitanProgram, General Loomis flew to Wash-ington to present the case and soon returnedwith a promise of speedy action.

French Group. Shortly after the organi-zation of SHAEF Mission to France, theFrench military authorities in Paris detaileda liaison section, headed by Colonel Chan-son, to work with the G-3 Section of themission on armament problems in whichthey and SHAEF had a common interest.Before his transfer to the French capital,Colonel Chanson had served briefly in Gen-eral Noiret's headquarters in London aschief of the Rearmament Section. Earlierhe had headed the Rearmament and Tech-nical Studies Section at the French GeneralHeadquarters in Algiers. In October an-other French section, composed of ColonelRegnault and several officers formerly asso-ciated with the JRC, began operating as

5 Memo, Air Sec for Loomis, 26 Oct 44, SHAEFMission to France 320-1 Orgn and Function, Re-armt Div.


part of Rearmament Division. To ensurecloser co-ordination on armament problemsand prevent duplication of efforts, theFrench military authorities decided, on 21November, to merge the two sections intoone thereafter known as French Group, Re-armament Division, SHAEF Mission toFrance. The group, placed under the com-mand of Colonel Regnault with ColonelChanson as his deputy, became the officialrepresentative agency of the French HighCommand empowered to deal with SHAEFon matters pertaining to armament.6 Inaddition to Colonels Regnault and Chan-son, the group included approximately tenofficers, most of whom had contributedearlier to the success of the North Africanrearmament operations.

The specific duties of the French Groupwere to work out with Rearmament Divi-sion questions concerning matériel fromU.S., British, enemy-captured, and Frenchsources, as well as problems of activation,organization, maintenance, and training ofFrench units. All such matters, whetherthey involved the National Defense head-quarters, the Ministry of War, the GeneralStaff, or any other commands, were chan-neled through the French Group. Otherquestions were handled directly betweenSHAEF Mission and the French headquar-ters concerned.7

To effect closer liaison with the WarOffice on questions involving the shipmentof British equipment to France, ColonelRegnault detailed one officer to London.Likewise, to keep both SCAMA, then es-tablished in Marseille, and the base in Cher-bourg informed of British deliveries, he dis-patched to London another officer when-

ever required.8 No French Air Force orNavy officers were appointed to the group,as all air and naval rearmament matterswere handled by the appropriate Frenchheadquarters directly with the Air Com-ponent and Naval Division of SHAEFMission to France.

By establishing almost daily contact withGenerals Leyer and Blanc, chief and deputychief of General Staff, Ground Forces, andby holding frequent informal meetings withGeneral Loomis or with individual U.S. orBritish members of Rearmament Division,Colonel Regnault was able to maintain thecordial and fruitful co-operation which hadexisted between French and Allied Head-quarters in North Africa.

Inspection Group. Commanded by Gen-eral Kingman, assisted by his French deputy,Colonel L'Huillier, Inspection Group wascomposed of American and British instruc-tors.9 American instructors were organizedas the 6834th Rearmament Regiment,SHAEF (the former 6834th Training Regi-ment, JRC). The regiment, after beingbased for some months in the Marseille area,was moved near Paris early in 1945. Asmall group of officers headed by GeneralKingman posted themselves in the Frenchcapital in proximity to the other compon-ents of the Rearmament Division. Britishpersonnel did not join Inspection Group forsome months. Initially the War Officeplaced a small number of instructors di-rectly at the disposal of the French soonafter the first deliveries of British matériel.In April 1945 three officers were assignedto Inspection Group for the purpose of set-ting up a training program in the use and

6 Memo 701 EMGG/CAB, 28 Nov 44, SHAEFMission to France 091, 711-9 (Fr) Combined.

7 Ibid.

8 Memo 1396, EMGG/LA, Leyer for Regnault,6 Feb 45, SHAEF Mission to France 320-12.

9 Colonel L'Huillier was awarded the Legion ofMerit with the degree of Officer on 25 January1946.


care of British equipment and of arrangingthe assignment to Inspection Group of adetachment of British instructors. Thedetachment ultimately grew to a size of 100officers and enlisted men.10

During the first few months of its exist-ence, beginning October 1944, InspectionGroup devoted its activities to assisting thetraining centers run by 1st French Army,With the arrival in February 1945 of Britishtraining matériel for the units of the Liber-ated Manpower and Metropolitan Pro-grams, Inspection Group found its responsi-bilities greatly increased. It was given thetask of inspecting all units scheduled to beequipped to make sure that they were fullyactivated and organized on appropriate U.S.tables of organization and equipment, theintent being that any unit failing to meetthe requirements was denied matériel.Once the units were equipped, InspectionGroup assisted them in their technical train-ing. Later it inspected them once again todetermine their fitness for operations.11 In-spection Group also undertook to provideassistance in the form of training teams tothe French troops engaged in operationsalong the Atlantic coast. The trainingteams effected the necessary liaison betweenthe units involved and the U.S. 66th Infan-try Division assigned to their support.

Posthostilities Period

AFHQ officials had long recognized thateven after the termination of the SupremeCommand there would still be French re-armament problems of mutual interest to

the United States and the United Kingdom.As early as April 1945 General Loomis pro-posed that upon the dissolution of SHAEFthe Rearmament Division either remain ajoint British-American unit operating asagent for the CCS, or be split into two sepa-rate sections functioning under their respec-tive chiefs of staff.12 The second of thesesuggestions was accepted by SHAEF andmade the object of a directive.13

On 13-14 July, as SHAEF was dissolvedand ETOUSA became USFET, all Ameri-can responsibilities toward the Frenchpassed from SHAEF Mission to France toUSFET Mission to France. Part of theU.S. personnel of Rearmament Divisionwas then transferred to the new mission asa staff section known as the Rearmamentand Operations Division. This agencysimply took over the work heretofore per-formed by its predecessor except that it con-fined its activities to matters involving theUnited States. It co-ordinated with theBritish such matters as were of common in-terest to both America and the United King-dom. General Loomis headed the divi-sion until 12 September. He was then re-placed by Colonel Christensen. Attachedto the division were a French Group headedby Colonel Regnault, brigadier general sinceMay, and an Inspection Group commandedby General Kingman and composed of per-sonnel of the 6834th Rearmament Regi-ment. The regiment was active until 1November 1945, when it was disbanded.Meanwhile, air and naval matters contin-ued to be handled separately by the air and

10 Informal Routing Slip, SHAEF Mission toFrance (Col Alden K. Sibley, ACofS) to ChiefRearmt Div, SHAEF Mission to France 353-1Training; Interv with Kingman, Jul 50.

11 Interv with Loomis, 51; also International Div,ASF, Lend-Lease, II, 1217.

12 Memo, Loomis for SHAEF G-3, 9 Apr 45,SHAEF Mission to France 320-1-

13 Ltr, SHAEF AG 400-1 (Fr) GCT-AGM toCG ETOUSA, 22 Jun 45, SHAEF Mission toFrance 091.711 Rearmt Plan & Policy 900-5.


naval components of the USFET Missionto France.14

The British also had organized a Rearma-ment Division of their own which includedthe personnel heretofore part of their train-ing teams and ordnance and engineer de-tachments. The division, placed under thedirect control of the War Office, wascharged with completing existing commit-ments with respect to British equipment andtraining.15

Considering the late start of the arma-ment programs enacted and carried out incontinental France, the intricacies of theirimplementation traceable largely to themultiplicity of equipment sources and thefrequent revisions made necessary by thefast-changing operational situation, andfinally the time element involved, the Re-armament Division and its successorsachieved substantial results. These weremade possible, as in North Africa, by theexcellent co-operation between the British,American, and French members of the di-vision, and between the division itself andoutside Allied agencies.

Training Under Inspection Group

When the four French Army training cen-ters which had been operating in NorthAfrica and Italy reached France in the fallof 1944, they began training the replace-ments earmarked for 1st French Army.16

For some weeks thereafter, training opera-tions on French soil were limited largely tothe instruction given in these centers withthe technical assistance of U.S. instructorsdetailed by General Kingman from his In-spection Group. Training in the UnitedStates, meanwhile, was still being offered toselected groups of French students. As of20 September 1944, some 2,100 officers andmen, mostly Air Force personnel, were re-ported to be attending schools in the UnitedStates.17

The inability of the training centers toprovide the number of replacements re-quired to maintain the units of 1st FrenchArmy at authorized strength has alreadybeen related. By the end of Decemberthree of the centers were still furnishing toofew replacements, the fourth none at all.The assignment to them of insufficient num-bers of trainees was not the only reason forthe unsatisfactory situation. The centerswere reported to be lacking adequate matériel largely as a result of the decision of the

French military authorities to reserve whatequipment was still available in North Afri-can training centers for use in centers beingset up in France to train Metropolitan Pro-gram units. In spite of SHAEF's repeatedobjections to such an arrangement, theFrench continued to maintain that they hadno other alternative, at least not until thearrival of equipment expected to be shipped

14 Memo, Rearmt and Opns Div (Christensen)for SGS, 17 Jul 45, SHAEF Mission to France320-1.

In 1945 the French Government conferred onGeneral Loomis the grade of Officer in the Orderof the Legion of Honor, and awarded him theCroix de Guerre (with Palm). The U.S. Gov-ernment conferred on him the Distinguished Serv-ice Medal (May 1945) and the Legion of Merit(October 1945). General Regnault was promotedto the degree of Commander in the Order of theLegion of Merit on 15 June 1945. General King-man was promoted to the grade of Officer in theOrder of the Legion of Honor and simultaneouslyawarded the Croix de Guerre (with Palm) (Oc-tober 1945).

15 Memos, RDB/A/11, Fullerton GSO-1 Br SecRearmt Div SHAEF for Chief Rearmt Div, andFullerton Br Sec Rearmt Div SHAEF for Maj GenHarold Redman, 1 Jul 45, SHAEF Mission toFrance 320-1.

16 For training during the North African re-armament operations, see Ch. XIV, above.

17 International Div, ASF, Lend-Lease, II, 774.


from the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates.18

Within a short time, SHAEF officialscame to the conclusion that the existing re-placement system, by which 1st FrenchArmy itself was charged with the inductionand training of reinforcements for its units,was not satisfactory. They felt that theprovision of replacements was a responsi-bility for the French zone of interior and soadvised the French General Staff. Thelatter replied that the system could not bechanged as the zone of interior lacked ade-quate facilities and personnel to train bothMetropolitan Program units and replace-ments for 1st French Army.19 Until theend of hostilities, 1st French Army retainedits replacement system and, in an attemptto meet requirements, even raised the num-ber of its training centers from four to eight.It must be noted that, in addition to thesearmy centers, there existed divisional train-ing centers, one for each division, consti-tuting pools of personnel from which re-inforcements could be made readily avail-able to the divisions.20

Meanwhile the launching of the Lib-erated Manpower and Metropolitan Pro-grams had sharply increased the scope oftraining activities and raised for the Frenchmany difficult problems. Among thesewere creation of new schools and camps,rehabilitation of those few not utilized by

the Anglo-American forces, provision oftraining personnel and matériel, and es-tablishment of programs of instruction.

The training of security battalions andlabor groups constituted a relatively smallcommitment, so it was made the responsi-bility of military region commanders. Thetraining of personnel recruited under theMetropolitan Program, on the other hand,represented a substantial undertaking. Tocarry it out in an orderly and efficient man-ner, the French War Ministry put into effectin late November 1944 a detailed proce-dure. Infantry, artillery, and armored in-struction was given at basic level by themilitary regions, at advanced level (forspecialists and cadres) in replacement train-ing centers. Training for other branches,(Engineer, Signal, Transportation, Anti-aircraft Defense, Ordnance) was given atrecruit training centers. Initially, instruc-tional matériel used was that then availablein France or in the centers formerly op-erating in North Africa. All centers,whether recruit training or replacementtraining, were under the control of the Min-istry of War. Army training centers, mean-while, remained under the direct controlof the Commanding General, 1st FrenchArmy.21

In early December some considerationwas given by G-3, SHAEF, to the possi-bility of sending FFI personnel sufficientfor two divisions to the United States fortraining. The project was abandoned, forit involved too many difficulties and thescope of the Metropolitan Program had notyet been firmly determined.22 Similarly, inMarch 1945, a proposal to organize courses

18 Memo, Kingman for Loomis, 30 Dec 44,SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-13 (Fr) ; MsgL-18152, SOLOC to Loomis, 22 Dec 44, andMemo, Regnault for Loomis, 21 Feb 45, SHAEFMission to France 400-3 (Fr) .

19 Memo, Lewis for Juin, 25 Feb 45, andLtr, Leyer to SHAEF, 5 Mar 45, SHAEF Missionto France 091.711-13 (Fr) ; Ltr, Lewis to Leyer,26 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France 353-1Training.

20 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France for CGCOMZONE, 16 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France353-1 Training.

21 War Ministry Dir 1782 EMGG/4-1, 29 Nov44, SHAEF Mission to France 320-2 NA Orgn ofFrench Army.

22 Memo, ACofS G-3 for Reber, 18 Dec 44,SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. IV.


in the United Kingdom for training Frenchpersonnel in the use of British equipmentwas abandoned. Instead, the War Officedispatched to France a detachment of in-structors which was placed at the disposalof General Kingman's Inspection Group.

In mid-April 1945, when the first threedivisions (the 1st, 10th, and 36th Infantry)and some corps troops of the MetropolitanProgram had received a proportion of theirstandard equipment, Generals Kingmanand Loomis worked out and put into effecta detailed plan to assist the units in theirtraining. General Kingman arranged,much as he had done in North Africa, todetail to each of the divisions a U.S. senioradviser, initially to serve as liaison betweenInspection Group and the division com-mander, later to determine the number ofinstructors to be assigned to the training ofthe division. The training program was pri-marily the responsibility of French instruc-tors supplemented by U.S. and, where nec-essary, British instructors. It raised no moreproblems than had the program establishedearlier in North Africa since most of the per-sonnel being called to the colors had hadprior military training. Hence, for mostof the troops the object of training was fa-miliarization with new weapons more thanbasic training In addition to detailingteams of instructors to the three divisions,General Kingman also assigned teams tovarious French specialist centers and, in-cidentally, several to other western Euro-pean Allied armies.23

Upon the dissolution of SHAEF in mid-July, the responsibility for assisting theFrench in the technical training of theirforces was split between Inspection Groupof USFET Mission to France and the newlycreated British Rearmament Division.When U.S. deliveries of initial equipment,already suspended since May, came defi-nitely to a stop as a result of the cessation oflend-lease aid, U.S. training assistance simi-larly was cut off. Only the three teams as-signed to French divisions were allowed tocontinue in operation until October, whentheir mission was completed. French airpersonnel no longer could be sent to theUnited States for instruction. Severaltraining projects which the French wishedto continue or initiate, such as the dispatchof students to airborne schools and centersin the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates, were turned down by the theater.For all practical purposes, these were post-war projects and as such were matters to betaken up by the French directly with theWar Department and the War Office.24

By 1 November 1945 all U.S. technicaltraining assistance to the French had beenterminated.

23 Memos, Kingman for Regnault, 5 Mar 45,

Fullerton for Kingman, 14 Apr 45, and Capt DavidH. K. Flagg for Kingman, 6 Apr 45, SHAEF Mis-sion to France 353-1 Training; Memo, Loomis forLeyer, 19 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France091.711-1 (Fr).

24 Ltr, Foreign Liaison Office WD to Maj GenCharles Luguet, 25 May 45, ABC 091.711 France(12 Oct 43) ; Ltr, Juin to Lewis, Incl to Memo,Lewis for CG USFET Main, 31 Aug 45, SHAEFMission to France 320-2 NA Orgn of Fr Army.

CHAPTER XXIV

French Plans for a Far EastExpeditionary Corps

From the earliest days of Franco-Alliedcollaboration in North Africa, the Frenchmilitary authorities entertained a strong de-sire to participate in operations in the FarEast, primarily for the purpose of liberatingIndochina which the Japanese had occupiedsince July 1941. Their desire was legiti-mate, the more so considering they hadAmerican assurances, given in November1942, that French sovereignty would be re-established "as rapidly as possible in all ter-ritories over which the French flag wavedin 1939,"1 and that French forces would"aid the United Nations in restoring in-tegrally the French Union." 2

By the fall of 1943 the French desire hadcrystallized and led to a decision by the Na-tional Defense Committee to organize,equip, and train an expeditionary corps forthe Far East. On 20 October, when Gen-eral Leyer submitted to AFHQ the over-allarmament requirements for the calendaryears 1944-45, he included a tabulation ofthe matériel which he considered necessaryfor the proposed corps.3 The corps, laterdesignated Corps Expéditionnaire Français

d'Extrême-Orient (CEFEO), was to in-clude two brigades—one recruited in Mada-gascar, the other in West Africa—plus navaland air units to be added, all to be ready bythe fall of 1944. Simultaneously, theFrench representative in Washington, Gen-eral Béthouart, handed General Marshalla memorandum indicating the intention ofthe French military authorities to petitionfor representation in the Pacific War Coun-cil as they considered themselves "eminentlyqualified to assist the allies in the prepara-tion of operations with their own counsels." 4

It was becoming increasingly evident thatthe French were going to insist upon a deci-sion both as to the principle and the extentof their participation in the war in the Pa-cific. To determine a policy in this regard,the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 2 November,referred the various French notes on thematter to the Joint Strategic Survey Com-mittee and to the Joint Staff Planners forcollaboration in preparing recommenda-tions.5

If there remained any doubt as to theFrench position and determination, thedoubt was soon dispelled once and for ail asa result of a trivial incident involving a high-1 Ltr, Murphy to Giraud, 2 Nov 42, text in

Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 133.2 Preamble, Clark-Darlan Agreement, 22 Nov 42,

AFHQ 0100/5 CAO/320/1 MAEB.3 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 20 Oct 43, and Memo,

Loomis for CofS AFHQ, 29 Oct 43, JRC Misc Doc,Item 5-b.

4 Ltr and Memo, Béthouart to Marshall, 28 Oct43, ASF Planning Div Files, A-47-192 Theater Br,15-Fr Military NA.

5 Memo, Handy for CofS, 4 Nov 43, OPD 336.2France, Sec II.


ranking figure of the U.S. Government. Ina public statement which he delivered inlate December regarding the war in thePacific, Vice President Henry A. Wallacemade no mention of France when listingthe countries expected to take part in thattheater once Germany had been defeated.Apprised of the fact, the French Committeeof National Liberation promptly directedGeneral Beynet in Washington to expressto General Marshall its "legitimate sur-prise" at an omission which it regardedas "unfair . . . even if it did not representa definite stand." The committee did in-tend to wage war against the Japanese, whonow occupied a part of the French Union,and it intended to do so with all its mightand will. The committee moreover wishedto remind the U.S. Chief of Staff of themeasures already taken by the French HighCommand to organize an expeditionarycorps and of the requests for armament sub-mitted earlier on behalf of the corps. Lack-ing a policy on which to base a firm answerone way or another, General Marshallmerely acknowledged his satisfaction thatthe CFLN was "so keenly aware of the re-quirements for forces in all theaters ofwar." 6

By May 1944 the French still had noword from the War Department. TheBritish War Office, more responsive to theFrench proposals, not only had promisedto help, but were already sending equip-ment, in limited quantities, to the Madagas-car Brigade. The French had none withwhich to outfit the other brigade then inprocess of organization in North Africa.At first they had planned to equip it withBritish matériel withdrawn from the 1st

Motorized Infantry Division (1st DMI),but at the request of AFHQ they were com-pelled to return a considerable part of this toBritish stocks. Faced with a dilemma, theFrench High Command on 4 May urgedGeneral Wilson, the Supreme Allied Com-mander in the Mediterranean, to intervenewith Washington and London with a viewto obtaining the speedy equipping of the twobrigades. Ten weeks later AFHQ in-formed the French that the War Office hadagreed to deliver some additional matérielincluding general-purpose vehicles, as wellas signal and radio equipment for five in-fantry battalions and one artillery group.7

As late as August 1944 no high-level de-cision had yet been communicated to theFrench with respect to the major issue of theproblem, namely, whether or not they wereto participate in Far East operations, es-pecially in Indochina. The fact was thatno decision had been reached because ofthe divergent views held by American andBritish statesmen. President Roosevelt wasreported to be increasingly opposed to areturn of the French in Indochina in thebelief that their administration of the colonyin the past had been a total failure.8 TheBritish Foreign Office, on the contrary,considered French aspirations in the matterwith sympathy. They were prepared infact to grant a recent French request forthe accreditation of a French military mis-sion to Headquarters, Southeast Asia Com-mand, and the establishment in India ofsome of the expeditionary troops already as-sembled in North Africa. Lord Halifaxsounded out the State Department on thesematters; Secretary Hull decided that, al-

6 Ltrs, Beynet to Marshall, 26 Jan 44, and Mar-shall to Beynet, 12 Feb 44, OCS A-48-11 091France, Sec II.

7 Ltr, Béthouart to Wilson, 4 May 44, AFHQ0100/12C G-3 Div Op Corres From the Fr; Memo,Gammell for Béthouart, 14 Jul 44, AFHQ 0100/12CG-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.

8 The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, 1596-1601.

PLANS FOR A FAR EAST EXPEDITIONARY CORPS 393

though ostensibly military in character, theyhad wide political implications. He thenreferred them to President Roosevelt fordecision.9

By the time Paris had been liberated inlate August, the question was still in sus-pense, with the result that no plan was yetin sight for the provision of equipment tothe CEFEO. General Loomis, chief of theJRC, who had long been aware of Frenchefforts to organize their Far East corps,had watched these efforts primarily becauseof the possibility of diversion of U.S. equip-ment, as well as diversion of personnel, atthe expense of the units of the North Africanrearmament program. As far as he hadbeen able to ascertain, the CEFEO wasmade up of a headquarters company, twobrigades, and some supporting elements,with a total actual strength possibly notexceeding 1,300 men.10

No sooner had the French military au-thorities moved to Paris in September thanthey reopened the Far East issue. Thusfar only the British had shown a definiteinterest in their plans to the extent of be-ginning deliveries of matériel, but the at-titude of American officials remained politeand noncommittal. Militarily, Indochina,the Far Eastern territory where the Frenchwith their knowledge of the country couldbe of most assistance, was in the Chinatheater of operations and, as such, in anarea of U.S. strategic responsibility. Amer-ican strategy, however, did not contemplateany operations in that territory. Politically,President Roosevelt's apparent determina-tion to keep French administration fromreturning to Indochina constituted the

major stumbling block in the path of equip-ping a French expeditionary corps.11

As the liberation of France progressedand the victorious outcome of the war inEurope appeared a certainty, the Frenchonce again focused their attention on whatthey regarded as the next commitment oftheir armed forces and renewed their at-tempts to obtain Anglo-American approvalof their participation in the Far East. Firstthey sounded out U.S. officials in Washing-ton. Writing to Admiral King on 19 Sep-tember 1944, Admiral Fénard, chief of theFrench Naval Mission in the United States,urged that serious consideration be given tothe employment of the French Navy in thewar against Japan, a war in which Francewas "anxious to take her part." 12 With-out waiting for a reply, Admiral Fénard, afew days later, submitted a request for fourlong-range submarines, a request promptlyturned down on the ground that no sub-marines were available in excess of U.S.naval requirements.13

The French, meanwhile, were steppingup preparations even to the extent of in-creasing the size of the expeditionary corps.On 13 September the National DefenseCommittee decided to create two divisionsin addition to the light task force (CorpsLeger d'Intervention) and the brigade(Brigade d'Extrême-Orient) already acti-vated. One division was to be of the U.S.Marine Corps type, with a strength of from17,000 to 20,000 men. The other was tobe of the British two-brigade type, with astrength of 26,000 men. On 1 October

9 Memo, State Department for President, 26 Aug44. ABC 380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A.

10 Memo, Loomis for G-3 AFHQ, 22 Sep 44,JRC 370/001 Employment of Units—General.

11 Memo, Gen Hull for Marshall, 14 Dec 44, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C; The Memoirsof Cordell Hull, II, 1596-1601.

12 Memo, Fénard for King, 19 Sep 44, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5.

13 Memos, Fénard for King, 30 Sep 44, and Kingfor Fénard, 7 Oct 44, in same file.


General de Gaulle informed General Eisen-hower that he intended to transfer to thetwo divisions a large part of the 15,000Negro troops then being withdrawn fromthe 1st French Army in anticipation of thecold season. Both new units were to beassembled in southern France. If equipped,they could be made ready by January andMarch 1945 respectively.14 The aug-mented CEFEO was being placed under thecommand of Lt. Gen. Roger Blaizot.

Apparently thinking that a direct ap-proach to the War Department would speedmatters up, de Gaulle instructed the Frenchrepresentative in Washington to broach thesubject to General Marshall. When hecalled on the Chief of Staff on 22 October,General de Saint-Didier submitted a memo-randum outlining in great detail the Na-tional Defense Committee's plan and pressedfor an early decision.15 His memorandumwas then forwarded to the CCS, who inturn handed it over to the Combined StaffPlanners for study and recommendations.

General Eisenhower already had com-municated to the CCS his views regardingthe French proposal. The formation,equipping, and maintenance of additionaldivisions, with the attendant demand onstrained transportation facilities, were likelyto interfere with planned operations inEurope by detracting from the main effortof the 6th Army Group currently being sup-plied from French ports in southern France.For these and other reasons, GeneralEisenhower could not concur in theproposal.16

In a report submitted to the CCS on 29November the Combined Staff Planners,fully supporting the Supreme Com-mander's opinion, recommended that theFrench request be rejected. They couldnot see the value of the proposed divisionsin the light of current Allied strategy in theFar East; nor could they agree to providingthe necessary shipping and equipment atthe expense of U.S. and British forces.17

By then, President Roosevelt had beeninformed that a large French military mis-sion headed by General Blaizot had arrivedin Ceylon where it was said to have receivedAmerican approval and official recognition,with the same status as other Allied missionsto the Southeast Asia Command. In amemorandum to Navy Secretary James V.Forrestal dated 17 November, the Presi-dent directed that no American approvalbe given to any French mission being ac-credited to that command and that no U.S.military or civilian representatives be au-thorized to make decisions on political ques-tions with the mission or with anyone else.18

Six weeks later Roosevelt reiterated his po-sition in a memorandum to the State De-partment. He still did not want to "getmixed up" in any Indochina decision, nordid he want to get mixed up "in any efforttoward the liberation of Indo-China fromthe Japanese." He had made this clear toMr. Churchill. Action at this juncturewas, in his opinion, premature from boththe military and civil point of view.19

With regard to U.S. material assistanceto the Resistance forces, French and native,

14 Ltr, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 1 Oct 44, SHAEFG-3 091 France, Vol. III.

15 Memo, de Saint-Didier for Marshall, 20 Oct44, ABC 380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A.

16 Msgs SCAF 106, Eisenhower to CCS, 16 Oct44, and SCAF 117, Eisenhower to CCS, 1 Nov 44,in same file.

17 Rpt, CPS to CCS, CPS 147/1, 29 Nov 44,ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 44), Sec 2-B.

18 Memo, President for Forrestal, 17 Nov 44, ABC380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A.

19 Memo, Stettinius for Forrestal, 11 Jan 45, ABC384 Indochina (16 Dec 44).


engaged in guerrilla operations against theJapanese on Indochinese territory, thePresident already had ruled out such aid.20

Not until February 1945 would he modifysomewhat his position on the matter andagree to extend help to the undergroundin Indochina. And even then such aidwould be extended provided that it did notinterfere with planned operations in thearea, that it would be limited to what wasnecessary for the defeat of the Japaneseforces, and that it would not be construedas an official U.S. recognition of the Frenchinterests in Indochina.21

In mid-December Admiral Fénard, stillwithout reply to his long communication of19 September, submitted a letter, this timedirectly to the CCS, setting forth the viewsof his government concerning the conditionsunder which French land, sea, and air forcescould bring the maximum possible assistanceto the Allied forces engaged against Japan.Significantly, he made no reference to Indo-china and even emphasized the FrenchGovernment's agreement that whateverFrench forces the Combined Chiefs chose toemploy against Japan would be utilized bythem in whatever way they deemed best.Appended to the letter were five memo-randums, one of which was a copy of Gen-eral de Saint-Didier's communication of 20October, also still unanswered.22

In the replies which they addressed firstto General de Saint-Didier on 4 January1945 and a few days later to Admiral

Fénard, the CCS expressed their deep appre-ciation of the "generous offers" to assignFrench forces to operations in the Far East.But because of considerable logistical com-mitments in Europe, they were compelledto forego the diversion at this juncture ofcritically needed equipment and shippingfor use by such forces. Nor could they de-termine at present the time when it wouldbe feasible to employ them in the Far East.23

In the belief that the operational situationin western Europe had sufficiently improvedduring the month of December to warranta re-examination of the question, AdmiralFénard, on 19 January 1945, again ap-proached the CCS. He requested, as aninitial step toward the program "to whichthe French Government had pledged itself,"the supply of equipment for use in the train-ing of a Marine division to be formed fromcolonial infantry troops. The division couldbe used "under American command in anyoperational theater where Marine forceswere in action." The Joint Logistics Com-mittee examined the proposal and con-cluded that the reasons which had prompteda refusal to equip new French divisions forthe Far East applied equally to the provisionof training matériel. The United States,the JLC pointed out, had just undertaken toequip eight more divisions under the re-cently approved Metropolitan Program andcould accept no further commitments. En-dorsing the recommendations of the com-mittee, the CCS informed Admiral Fénardon 28 March that, as Allied resources hadbeen further taxed by the sharply increasedrequirements of the war against Germany"as evidenced by the new Metropolitan and

20 The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, 1598.21 Memos, Gen Hull for Wedemeyer, 9 Feb 45,

and McFarland for Marshall, 13 Mar 45, Msg WX-55402, Wedemeyer to Chennault, 19 Mar 45, andother papers, in F.I.C. Book I, China TheaterFiles, DRB AGO.

22 Memo, Fénard for CCS, 18 Doc 44, ABC 380France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A.

28 Ltr, CCS to de Saint-Didier, 4 Jan 45, ABC380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A; Ltr, CCS toFénard, 10 Jan 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct43), Sec 5.


Liberated Manpower programs," his re-quest could not be met.24

Still determined to carry out their plans,the French reopened the issue in April, whenthe cessation of hostilities in Europe ap-peared to be near at hand. The FrenchGovernment, Admiral Fénard explained tothe CCS, believed that the time was ripeto reach a decision on the proposal to equiptwo divisions. The units were ready to beput at the disposal of the CCS "to be usedwherever they would think it advisable"against the Japanese.25

No action on the matter had been takenwhen, a week after the armistice in Europe,General Juin, then on a visit to the UnitedStates, called on various officials to discussFrench military problems. In the courseof the interview which he held with Gen-eral Marshall, General Juin raised the ques-tion of France's participation in the waragainst Japan. The U.S. Chief of Staffcould give him no encouragement. Thematter, he explained, would have to be de-cided "on the highest levels." His ownview was that the matériel and shippingnecessary to equip and transport two di-visions to the Pacific war front could notbe spared until after the defeat of Japanwhen it would be too late. The UnitedStates, he pointed out, had sufficient well-trained and battle-tested troops to defeatJapan alone, "although it would prove dif-ficult and costly." Furthermore, it mightwell be that there would be no need to fightin Indochina as it was his opinion that theJapanese would evacuate the area so as to

concentrate their forces in north China tomeet a Red Army advance.26

General Juin's conversation with Ad-miral Leahy offered a slight ray of hope.Leahy first questioned him about the recentStuttgart incident in which a French com-mander had refused to comply with ordersfrom his American superior. General Juinassured him that there would be no repeti-tion of such a situation. In this connectionhe intended to make it clear to General deGaulle that French divisions would be ac-cepted by the Allied command for actionin the Pacific only if their disposition re-mained "wholly a U.S. function." Ad-miral Leahy declared that, under these con-ditions, he was prepared to recommend tothe American members of the CCS thatthey approve the French proposal. Headded that the final decision rested with theheads of governments and that any ultimateagreement would have to be reached be-tween them.27

A week later, on 18 May, Foreign AffairsMinister Georges Bidault, also on a visit tothe United States, called on the President.Mr. Truman signified his acceptance in prin-ciple of French participation in the FarEast, but carefully indicated that the de-termination of whether or not such partici-pation would be practicable and helpfulwould be left to General Douglas Mac-Arthur, the Allied commander in the Pacific.Elaborating on the President's statement,State Department officials made it clear toMr. Bidault that the question was to bejudged on its military merits, and that Gen-eral MacArthur would decide "just howmuch and where" the French contribution24 Ltr, Fénard to CCS, 19 Jan 45, and Memo,

CCS for Fénard, 28 Mar 45, ABC 091.711 France(6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C; Memo, Craig, JLC, forHandy, 6 Feb 45, OCS A-48-1 091 France.

25 Memo, Fénard for CCS, 7 Apr 45, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5.

26 Min Mtg, Marshall with Juin, 11 May 45,ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D.

27 Min Interv, Juin with Leahy, 11 May 45, ABC091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D.


could be best utilized. Such was the tenorof a message which General Marshall ad-dressed to General MacArthur. In it theChief of Staff outlined the French offer offour air squadrons and a corps of two divi-sions with supporting combat and serviceunits to be commanded by General Leclerc."The French," he pointed out in conclusion,"have, when well led and where politicalconsiderations were not involved, foughtwell in this war."28

General MacArthur replied that he hadthe greatest admiration for the fighting qual-ities of the French and would be glad toinclude in his command the corps offeredby them. He felt that because of languageand other difficulties, the French divisions,if used, should be employed with the rein-forcement echelons, just as was contem-plated for the Canadians, and not in theinitial stages of operations. As for the airsquadrons, he considered that the introduc-tion so late in the campaign of units of non-English speaking personnel would runcounter to the intimate co-ordination andteamwork so essential in operations. Forthese reasons, he urged that the offer of airsquadrons be declined.29

General Eisenhower also had been re-quested by General Marshall to submit hisviews on the French proposal. In his re-ply, he first commented on the compositionof the corps. The French were offering the9th Colonial Infantry (9th DIC), com-manded by Brig. Gen. Jean Valluy, and the1st Colonial Infantry (1st DIC), com-manded by Brig. Gen. Georges Nyo, the twodivisions to be placed under General Leclercas corps commander. The Supreme Com-mander pointed out that only the 9th DIC

was suitable, the other division being anewly created organization which had nocombat experience. As a second division hesuggested the 3d Algerian Infantry com-manded by Maj. Gen. Augustin Guillaume,which had distinguished itself in Italy,France, and Germany. He also recom-mended that Maj. Gen. Marcel Carpen-tier 30 be named corps commander. Turn-ing to the more important issue, that of themanner in which the proposed corps shouldbe employed, General Eisenhower urgedthat a detailed written agreement be nego-tiated beforehand with the French Govern-ment covering all major aspects of the ques-tion. He recommended, among the pointsto be agreed upon, that the organizationand equipping of units be made to conformto U.S. tables of organization and equip-ment; that a firm troop list providing a self-sufficient corps be drawn, and a sound re-placement program established; that thecorps be placed under complete operationalcontrol of the U.S. commander; and that itssupply and maintenance be effected on thesame basis as for U.S. forces.31

No more valuable commentary couldhave been furnished those officials of theWar Department then engaged in planningfor the introduction of French forces in thePacific theater. It represented a compre-hensive policy, established on the basis ofexperience, which, if followed, would tendto prevent a recurrence of the often difficultproblems raised in the course of some twoand a half years in connection with the re-armament and deployment of the French.In a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen-eral Smith amplified the Supreme Com-

28 Msg W-10226, Marshall to MacArthur, 1 Jun45, ABC 380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A.

29 Msg C-17621, MacArthur to Marshall, 2 Jun45, in same file.

30 CofS, CEF, in Italy; CofS, 1st French Army,until 15 Sep 44; CG, 2d DIM, from 25 Nov 44 to12 Apr 45.

31 Msg FWD 24298, Eisenhower to Marshall, 9Jun 45, ABC 380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A.


mander's comments, urging in particularthat the detailed written agreement with theFrench be executed on a governmental levelwith copies furnished to the interested com-manders.32 This insistence regarding a firmagreement was no doubt the result of theunfortunate recurrence, in the first days ofJune, of the situation in which a Frenchcommander had refused to comply withorders from his American superior. Atthat time the possibility of a clash betweenFrench and Allied troops in northwesternItaly had caused President Trumanpromptly to order a complete stoppage ofissue of matériel to the French. WhenAmbassador Bonnet called on Assistant Sec-retary of War McCloy on 13 June, his firstwords were to confirm that a satisfactoryagreement had just been reached in thematter. Broaching the question of the ex-peditionary forces for the Far East, he de-clared that French officials were preparedto give "any assurances that were required"that these forces would have no relationshipto Indochina and that they would fightunder an American command wherever de-cided by the latter.33

On 26 June General de Saint-Didier onceagain appealed to the Combined Chiefs andurged them to reach a decision so that prepa-rations and training could get under way.He emphasized that further delay was harm-ful to the morale of the troops, who, with thefull support of the nation, had eagerlyawaited for several months their opportun-ity to participate in the Far East operationsagainst the common enemy. Then on 6July General de Saint-Didier informed Gen-eral Marshall of the steps already beingtaken with regard to the setting up of the ex-

peditionary corps. Without waiting for theAmerican command to make known its de-sires in the matter of supporting units, theWar Ministry, he declared, was in processof activating and training a number of suchunits. The corps, as currently planned,would total 62.000 men, all volunteers andall white.34

President Truman's directive of 5 July,limiting thereafter the issue of war matérielto Allied governments to that which wasto be used in the war against Japan, gavethe French a slight ray of hope that theirproject might still come to realization.What was required was a policy statementfrom the CCS. With events now movingswiftly in the Far East, and with the prospectthat far-reaching decisions would be takenat the Potsdam Conference then opening,the fate of the French proposal was hangingby a thread. On 19 July the CCS finallytook action. They agreed, and so notifiedthe French, that they accepted in principletheir offer of a corps on the understandingthat (1) the corps would serve under U.S.or British command, in an area to be deter-mined later; (2) final acceptance of thecorps would involve an agreement with thegovernments concerned on basic matters in-cluding command, combat efficiency, re-placements, and logistical support; (3)maximum use would be made of equipmentdelivered under the North African andMetropolitan Programs; (4) because ofpressing shipping and other requirements,it would not be possible to commit the corpsto operations before the spring of 1946.35

While pleased with the CCS acceptance

32 Ltr, Smith to JCS, 9 Jun 45, in same file.33 Memo, McCloy for Marshall, 14 Jun 45, in

same file.

34 Memos, de Saint-Didier for Leahy for CCS, 26Jun 45, and de Saint-Didier for Marshall, 6 Jul 45,in same file.

35 Min, CCS 196th Mtg, 19 Jul 45, and Memo,CCS for de Saint-Didier, 19 Jul 45, ABC 380 France(7 Aug 44), Sec 1-B.


in principle, the French, through Generalde Saint-Didier, promptly pointed out thatto equip the corps with matériel in the handsof North African and Metropolitan Pro-gram divisions would not be satisfactory.For one reason, a large part of this equip-ment had deteriorated both during the cam-paigns in Italy, France, and Germany andsince then as a result of the presidentialorder of 8 May stopping the further issue ofmaintenance. In addition, the FrenchArmy needed its present equipment to con-tinue operating in occupied Germany.36

There the matter rested. It had madeno progress by 2 September, the day of theJapanese surrender. With the armistice,

nearly three years of fruitless negotiationswere coming to an end. A few days laterthe CCS informed General de Saint-Didierthat they did not intend to take further ac-tion on his last memorandum, and that mili-tary problems relating to the area of theSoutheast Asia Command thereafter wereto be taken up directly with the BritishChiefs of Staff in London.37 The questionof the return of the French to Indochina,still unsolved, was now clearly a matter forthe decision of the governments. Morethan that, it was a postwar problem.38

36 Memo, de Saint-Didier for CCS, 3 Aug 45, insame file.

37 Memo, CCS for de Saint-Didier, 13 Sep 45, insame file.

38 For an account of the political and militaryproblems arising in Indochina in the immediatepostwar period, see History of U.S. Forces in ChinaTheater, Ch. XV, MS in OCMH Files.

Conclusion

The rehabilitation of the French armedforces in World War II constitutes an un-precedented achievement if one considersthe results attained in relation to the diffi-culties encountered. The undertaking hadone aim—to enable the resurgent militarypower to assume as large a share as possibleof the United Nations' war effort againstthe Axis. On this there was completeagreement between the three parties di-rectly involved: the French themselves,whose position made them entirely de-pendent on outside assistance; the British,who initiated the rehabilitation processwhen they equipped the Free French; andthe Americans, who rearmed the NorthAfrican forces and, along with the British,supplied first the Resistance groups op-erating underground on French soil, thenthe forces of liberated France.

The first major difficulty arose with there-entry of French North Africa into thewar, when the three partners disagreed asto the extent of rehabilitation. The French,understandably, wanted the greatest num-ber of their troops equipped and readiedfor combat and this as speedily as possible.The Americans, while sympathetic withthis ambition, reasoned that only thoseunits should be rearmed that could be madeself-sustaining in combat. The British,while they bore only a small portion of theburden of rearming the French, shared withthe Americans control of allocation of ma-tériel to all United Nations forces, and inthis capacity objected that too large a pro-gram would cut across existing commit-ments—such as those made to the USSRand China—and interfere with the plan-

ned equipping of U.S. and U.K. forces.With both the Americans and the Britishstanding firm on their respective positions,the French had no alternative but to scaledown their initial expectations and let theirrearmament proceed at a pace determinedby global demands for implements of war.Such was the basis on which the successiverearmament programs were established andcarried out. Still the French continued topress for fuller re-establishment of their na-tional military power.

The diversity of the forces re-equipped,each with its respective needs, constituteda serious hindrance. Some were FreeFrench; others, the majority, were the forcesraised in North Africa. A large propor-tion were natives, with distinctive language,habits, and physical constitution. To com-plicate matters, the bulk of the troopsemerged outside their national home baseand therefore lacked the logistical supportnormally provided by a zone of interior.

Difficulties were multiplied by temporaryor permanent deficiencies of one sort oranother. The language barrier was oneproblem. Others arose from differences incustoms, dietary habits, and clothing tariffsizes, especially where non-European troopswere involved. Most acute were shortagesof various kinds: of Allied shipping, of portfacilities for receiving, stocking, and dis-tributing equipment; and of French tech-nical personnel necessary to man depots, re-pair shops, and base units and to providecombat and service support troops. Thenthere was the lack of familiarity on the partof the French with the newer weapons andwith American technology and working

CONCLUSION 401

methods. For these or other reasons theFrench were persistently reluctant to acceptfully the importance of logistics and by thesame token found themselves excessivelydependent on American logistical support incombat. The reluctance was so persistentas to suggest that the French Army hadforgotten, or not learned, the importanceof logistics in a period in which logisticshad become more than ever vital to theeffective conduct of war.

But the difficulties, seemingly insuper-able at first, were overcome, one by one, bydint of good will and mutual respect, hardwork, and an unflagging determination tocomplete the assigned task. In record timea sizable French force was equipped,trained, and put in battle on land, in theair, and on the sea. While this force neversucceeded in becoming self-sustaining andthe U.S. Army was compelled to providea large part of the necessary support, oncein combat it proved to be highly effectiveand its contribution to final victory was im-pressive.

The War Department furnished equip-ment to the French largely through theatertransfers (66 percent) and CommandingGeneral Shipments (33 percent), and asmall proportion (1 percent) through di-rect shipments, that is, by ships flying theFrench tricolor. All items delivered,whether initial equipment, combat main-tenance supplies, or petrol, oil, and lubri-cants, were charged to the French lend-lease account for settlement at the end ofthe war.

At first deliveries were made on the basisof units to be equipped under approved re-armament programs, the French themselvesbeing responsible for distribution as theysaw fit. Later the system was revised togive the U.S. commanding general in the

theater complete control over the distribu-tion process, and units were furnished equip-ment only after they were fully activated.Thus American management followedAmerican matériel. Once the units wereequipped, U.S. personnel provided the nec-essary technical training in the use, care, andmaintenance of matériel.

In terms of units and men, the UnitedStates furnished full initial equipment aswell as complete maintenance for 8 divisionsand 300 supporting units raised in NorthAfrica, a total of 250,000 men. It pro-vided partial equipment (approximatelyone third of the table of organization andequipment) and all the maintenance on theequipment issued for 3 more divisions andsome 40 supporting units activated in con-tinental France and totaling about 50,000men. The United States also furnishedfull equipment for 19 air squadrons and 60supporting units representing another20,000 men. It carried out an extensiverepair and refitting program for the FrenchNavy. To Sovereignty and Territorialforces in North Africa, numbering over200,000 men, it furnished old clothing, con-struction materials and machinery, and cer-tain expendable supplies. Finally, theUnited States provided rations for all effec-tives re-equipped under the various arma-ment programs (approximately 360,000 asof 1 March 1945). All together these com-mitments represented about 3,250,000measurement tons. To draw up a detailedschedule of the myriad individual itemsfurnished by the United States would serveno useful purpose. By way of illustration,however, a list of selected items is given inTable 5.1

1 Memo, Craig for Marshall, 9 May 45, OPD336.2 France, Sec IV-A; Memo, Loomis for CGUSFET, 23 Aug 45, SHEAF Mis Fr 320-NA Orgof Fr Army.


TABLE 5—MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENTFURNISHED BY THE UNITED STATES TOTHE FRENCH FORCES

In terms of dollar value (value at the timeof delivery), the supplies and services fur-nished by the United States to the FrenchArmy, Air Force, and Navy have been esti-mated at about $1,527,000,000, $457,000,-000, and $310,000,000, respectively, or atotal of $2,294,000,000. Of the total, the

War Department furnished $2,039,474,000;the remainder, representing items such asvessels and special supplies, was furnishedby the Foreign Economic Administration;Comparative figures show that France camethird in the list of recipients of War Depart-ment lend-lease shipments and transfers: 2

In addition the United States furnishedthe French civilian economy, up to V-J Day,supplies representing another $548,000,000.Thus, for the period 11 November 1941(when the benefits of lend-lease were firstextended to the French) to 2 September1945 (V-J Day), the total French militaryand civilian lend-lease account amountedto approximately $2,842,000,000.3 Theaccount for the immediate postwar periodof September 1945 to September 1946amounted to a further $391,000,000. TheFrench, in return, made available to theU.S. armed forces as reciprocal aid goodsand services amounting to $868,000,000.

By agreement reached in Washington on

2 Theodore E. Whiting et al., Statistics, a volumein preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMYIN WORLD WAR II. Lend-Lease. MS in OCMH.

3 Unsuccessful efforts were made to obtain fromthe British War Office statistics on the British con-tribution to French rearmament. The only figuresavailable are those published by the French Min-istry of Finance and Economic Affairs in "Le Prêt-Bail et l'Aide Réciproque Franco-Alliée," Notes etEtudes Documentaires (Paris, 2 and 3 November1949), which states that the French received fromthe United Kingdom supplies and services esti-mated at approximately $435,000,000, and fromCanada matériel to the amount of $25,000,000.

CONCLUSION 403

28 May 1946, the governments of theUnited States and France disposed of theaccounts for lend-lease and reciprocal aidand settled all outstanding claims arising outof the conflict. After credit for $232,000,-000 already paid by France during the waryears for goods supplied through lend-leaseprocedures, the settlement figure stood at$420,000,000, subject to some adjustmentto cover additional post-V-J Day transac-tions. Such was the sum which Franceagreed to pay, with interest at 2 percent,beginning 1 July 1951.4

All things considered, America receivedgood value for the money and effort it ex-pended in rearming the French, a valuedifficult to assess in quantitative terms butnone the less real. True, the undertakingposed a host of baffling problems, which ab-sorbed the attention of countless persons.But it made it possible for the United Statesto reduce its outlay of combat manpower inthe Mediterranean and European theatersby eight to ten divisions and nineteen airsquadrons, possibly more, considering thatAmerican troops used in lieu of the Frenchwould have been relatively inexperienced.By the same token, the U.S. forces incurredfewer losses in these two theaters. Therethe French themselves suffered, from thebeginning of the Tunisian campaign to theend of the war in Europe, losses estimated

for the ground forces alone at 23,500 killedand 95,500 wounded in action.5

Without American assistance in WorldWar II, it is unlikely that France wouldhave assumed its present important posi-tion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-zation and the Western European Union,so vital to American policy. American in-sistence on French self-reliance in supplymatters definitely consolidated the Frenchposition. Whereas in 1943-44 this insist-ence was construed by some French militarymen as a manifestation of unreasonableautocracy, in postwar years it was referredto as a blessing in disguise For, it wasthen argued, had the French Army not beencompelled to organize its supply servicesproperly, what would its prospects of sur-vival have been in May 1945 when, withthe cessation of hostilities in Europe, itfound itself suddenly cut off from furtherU.S. assistance and left to its own devices?As it was, it had forged, albeit the hard way,an adequate if not perfect maintenance and

4 Memorandum of Understanding Between theFrench and U.S. Governments, signed by LéonBlum and James F. Byrnes, 28 May 46, in files ofDepartment of State. "French Lend-Lease Settle-ment," Twenty-Third Report to the Congress onLend-Lease Operations, H. Doc. 41, 80th Cong., 1stSess., January 3, 1947. For subsequent revisionsof the settlement figure to cover all post-V-J Daytransactions, see Twenty-Eighth Report to the Con-gress on Lend-Lease Operations, H. Doc. 263, 81stCong., 1st Sess., July 18, 1949, and Thirty-SecondReport to the Congress on Lend-Lease Operations,H. Doc. 227, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., October 3, 1951.

5 Casualties (deaths only) incurred by the Frencharmed forces during the entire 1939-45 period areestimated as follows:

*Excepting the 1,200 casualties suffered by "Armistice Army"units in the course of operations against Allied forces (Syria, Jun-Jul 41; Northwest Africa, Nov 42).

**No breakdown available.

Source: Lt. Col. P. Santini, "Etude statistique sur les pertes aucours de la guerre 1939-1945," Revue du Corps de Santé Militaire, X,No. 1 (March, 1954).


supply machinery. The advantages it hadgained in so doing were such as to make itunlikely it would soon forget the tech-niques, not to mention the "jargon of thetrade," learned from the American Armyin the formative years of 1943-44.6

Far more important, of course, is that theAmerican undertaking made it possible forthe French armed forces to regain the hon-ored position they had long occupied butmomentarily lost. True, the small bandof General de Gaulle's followers had keptthe French flag flying high during the darkmonths which followed the June 1940 armi-stice. But only a large-scale re-entry ofthe French into the common struggle, astook place in mid-November 1942, couldregain for them the esteem of the Alliesand a place among the democratic nationsof the world.

Seen in retrospect, French participationin the major campaigns of northwest Af-rica and Europe underwent definitechanges. In a sense, the Tunisian cam-paign proved to be the testing ground forFrench loyalty and French determinationto fight. Engaged in battle on greatly un-equal terms, French troops achieved only

limited military objectives. But they suc-ceeded in winning American confidence, inovercoming British skepticism, and in re-storing faith in themselves. These intangi-ble gains, more than actual victories, amplyjustified the large investments in matérieland effort then being made on their behalfby the United States.

The Italian campaign was the testingground for French ability to make the full-est use of modern weapons in combat. Thenfighting on equal terms, the French quicklydemonstrated that they possessed this abilityand moreover could match a formidableenemy. Their achievements were such, infact, as to convince the Americans thatthe rearmament program, then in progress,must be completed without delay.

The campaign of France and Germanymarked the end of the testing period andthe beginning of a new phase: the rebirthof France as a military power. The newFrench Army, proud of its equipment andof its skill in the use of modern weapons,and determined to give the full measure ofits will to fight, had reached the stature ofa full-fledged, independent force. Side byside, Americans and French marched for-ward, along with the other Allies, to reapthe fruits of victory. Side by side, today,they stand ready to defend the free world.

6 Interv with Col de Beaumont, Jul 50; with GenRegnault, 50.

Bibliographical Note

Rearming the French is based almost en-tirely on documents now in the possessionof the Department of the Army. Thesesources have been supplemented by docu-ments made available by the French ServiceHistorique de l'Armée, by interviews withAmerican and French officers who partici-pated in the rearmament operations and bydocuments from the latter, by publishedmemoirs and histories, and finally by de-tailed comments on the manuscript by per-sons mentioned in the volume.

Primary Sources

I

The two most important single collec-tions of documents used in the preparationof this volume are those of the Allied ForceHeadquarters (AFHQ) and SupremeHeadquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force(SHAEF). From these collections mustbe singled out, respectively, the files of theJoint Rearmament Committee (JRC) andthose of the Rearmament Division ofSHAEF Mission to France. Both of thesefiles include letters, cables, memorandums,reports, minutes of conferences, plans,drafts of plans, and miscellaneous papers.

Details of high-level planning on Frenchrearmament are based largely on the formalrecord of the wartime proceedings of theCombined Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. JointChiefs of Staff. This record containsminutes of their meetings, together withpapers embodying the proposals which theyformally considered. The record also in-cludes minutes of the plenary conferences

presided over by President Roosevelt andPrime Minister Churchill. War Depart-ment records contain message files of cablesand letters between the CCS and JCS andthe Supreme Commander, between the WarDepartment and the North African andEuropean theaters, and between Alliedcommanders and Allied planners. Supple-menting these are letters and cables ex-changed by General Marshall and GeneralEisenhower.

The author also has drawn on documentsmade available by the Service Historique del'Armée and by French officers who tookan active part in the rearmament opera-tions.

The sources have been supplemented byinterviews conducted by the author withFrench and American officers in the period1948-55. (See list at end of biblio-graphical note.)

II

The principal document collections usedin this volume are as follows:

ABC files. A collection kept by the Strat-egy and Policy Group of OPD (q.v.).

AFHQ files. Records of Allied ForceHeadquarters. The collection consistsof separate files for each of the generaland special staff sections. For the pres-ent work the richest file is that of theJRC, the section most directly concernedwith the rearmament of the North Af-rican forces. The files are held by theDepartmental Records Branch, AdjutantGeneral's Office. (DRB AGO.)


ASF files. Especially important on the sub-ject of French rearmament are the Inter-national Division files, the PlanningDivision files, and the Somervell file.Among the records of the InternationalDivision are the minutes and papers ofthe Munitions Assignments Committee(Ground) and a virtually complete fileof those of the Munitions AssignmentsBoard. Located in DRB AGO.

CCS. Combined Chiefs of Staff papersand minutes of meetings. All of thesemay be found in the OPD collection(q.v.). The collection includes memo-randums, reports, and copies of cables andletters prepared by the British or U.S.Chiefs of Staff or their subordinate agen-cies. Minutes of the meetings are notstenographic. Notes were kept by Britishand U.S. secretaries. The minutes infinal form were specifically and individ-ually approved by each of the CombinedChiefs.

C/S file. Contains documents from war-time files of the Office of the Chief ofStaff, War Department. Now held as aseparate collection by Departmental Rec-ords Branch, AGO.

ETO file. Files of Headquarters, Euro-pean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army(ETOUSA). Now held by Organiza-tional Records Branch, Records Adminis-tration Center, AGO.

JCS. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff papers andminutes of their conferences. Copies ofall JCS documents cited can be foundin OPD files (q.v.). The JCS collec-tion is located in G-3 Records, Depart-ment of the Army.

JPS. Joint Staff Planners (U.S.) papersand minutes of meetings. Copies of JPSdocuments are in OPD ABC files, which

include in most cases not only the plan-ners' final memorandums, but OPDdrafts, discussions, and working papers.

JWPC. Joint War Planning Committee(U.S.) papers, many of which were re-issued as JPS or JCS documents. Alldocuments cited are in OPD files.

NATO USA and MTO USA files. Files ofHeadquarters, North African Theater ofOperations, U.S. Army, and Mediter-ranean Theater of Operations, U.S.Army, respectively. Now held by Or-ganizational Records Branch, RecordsAdministration Center, AGO.

OCMH files. A miscellaneous collectioncontaining documents prepared or col-lected by the author or members of theOffice of the Chief of Military Historystaff. Some of the material cited in thisvolume consists of interviews, answers byformer members of French and U.S. staffsto special questionnaires, and certainFrench documents not found in U.S. files.

OPD files. Collection of cables and papersof the Operations Division, War Depart-ment. The division at present is a partof the G-3 Division.

SHAEF files. Records of the SupremeHeadquarters, Allied ExpeditionaryForce. One of the basic sources for thisvolume. The collection consists of sep-arate files for each of the general andspecial staff sections. For the presentwork the richest file is that of the Rearma-ment Division of the SHAEF Mission toFrance, the division most directly con-cerned with the supply of war matérielto the French Metropolitan Forces. Filesare held by DRB AGO.

WD Cable files. A large collection of cableswhich cleared through the War Depart-

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 407

ment Message Center, filed by date inincoming and outgoing books.

Secondary Sources

Unpublished preliminary historicalstudies by Army, Navy, and Air Forcehistorians:

Hq, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.The History of MAAF: December 1943-1 September 1944; Vol. II. April 1945.AAF Hist Office Archives.

Hq MAAF, The French Air Force inMAAF, A Preliminary History, 1945, copyin AAF Hist Office Archives.

Role joué par les Forces Françhises del'Intérieur pendant l'occupation de laFrance avant et après le débarquement du6 Juin 1944. Commandant Rogé, ServiceHistorique de l'Armée, Section Etudes, 21May 1946. Copy in OCMH.

Fifth Army History (in nine volumes) :5 January-6 October 1943; 1 April-4 June1944: Part I, From Activation to Fall ofNaples; Part V, The Drive to Rome. DRBAGO.

History of Allied Force Headquartersand Headquarters, NATOUSA: PartThree, December 1943-July 1944. Copyin OCMH.

AFHQ Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch.North African Campaign: 1942-1943.Copy in OCMH.

History of Allied Force Headquarters,Mediterranean Theater of Operations.Copy in OCMH.

Resume des Operations de Réarmement.Undated and unsigned. Original providedby Maj. Gen. Paul Devinck. Copy inFrench Records File 218, OCMH.

Hq, Peninsular Base Section, Naples.History of the Peninsular Base Section,

North African Theater of Operations,United States Army: Vol II, Covering thePeriod 28 August 1943 to 31 January 1944.Copy in OCMH.

International Div, ASF. Lend-Lease asof September 30, 1945. Copy in OCMH.

The French Forces of the Interior, a1,500-page history prepared in the Euro-pean Theater of Operations under the di-rection of Col. S. L. A. Marshall by Capt.Lucien Galimand, Capt. Marcel Vigneras,Maj. R. A. Bourne-Paterson, Capt. HarryS. Griffiths, and Lt. Louis Kervran, basedon documents of the French Resistance andthe Allied agencies dealing with these forces.Copy in OCMH.

Dunham, H. H. U.S. Army Transpor-tation and the Conquest of North Africa,1942-43. OCT HB Monograph 9, Jan45, OCT HB.

Mathews, Sidney T. The Drive onRome, a volume in preparation for the se-ries UNITED STATES ARMY INWORLD WAR II.

Published Sources

World War I

Ayres, Col. Leonard P., Chief of StatisticsBranch of the General Staff. The WarWith Germany: A Statistical Summary.Washington: Government Printing Of-fice, 1919.

Chambrun, Col. Jacques de, and Capt.Charles de Marenches. The AmericanArmy in the European Conflict. NewYork: The Macmillan Company, 1919.

Clarkson, Grosvenor B. Industrial Amer-ica in the World War. Boston and NewYork: Houghton Mifflin Company,1923.


Crowell, Benedict. America's Munitions:1917-1918. Washington: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1919.

Crowell, Benedict, and Robert Forrest Wil-som. The Armies of Industry, I, OurNation's Manufacture of Munitions fora World in Arms: 1917-1918 NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1921.

Historical Branch, War Plans Division, Gen-eral Staff. Organization of the Servicesof Supply, American ExpeditionaryForces. Monograph 7. Washington:Government Printing Office, 1921.

Historical Division, Department of theArmy. UNITED STATES ARMY INTHE WORLD WAR: 1917-1919,III,Training and Use of American UnitsWith British and French. Washington:Government Printing Office, 1948.

Historical Division, Department of theArmy. UNITED STATES ARMY INTHE WORLD WAR: 1917-1919,XIV, Reports of Commander-in-Chief,A.E.F., Staff Sections and Services.Washington: Government Printing Of-fice, 1948.

Military Board of Allied Supply. Reportof the Military Board of Allied Supply.Washington: Government PrintingOffice, 1924.

Pershing, John J. My Experiences in theWorld War. New York: Frederick A.Stokes Company, 1931. 2 vols.

————. General Pershing's Story of theAmerican Army in France; Report ofGeneral Pershing to the Secretary of War,November 20, 1918. New York: JohnH. Eggers Company, Inc., 1919.

Réquin, Lt. Col. Edouard. America'sRace to Victory. With Introductionby General Peyton C. March, Chief ofStaff, U.S. Army. New York: FrederickA. Stokes Company, 1919.

World War II

Alexander, Field Marshal Sir HaroldR. L. G. The Allied Armies in ItalyFrom 3rd September 1943, to 12th De-cember 1944. London: His Majesty'sStationery Office, 1950.

Arnold, General H. H. Global Mission.New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.

Bajot, [Admiral] Pierre. Le débarquementdu 8 Novembre 1942 en Afrique du Nord.Paris: J. de Gigord, 1948.

Bouscat, General René. "L'Armée de l'Airfrançaise dans la Campagne d'Italie,"Revue de la Defense Nationale (Febru-ary, 1946.

Butcher, Capt. Harry C. My Three YearsWith Eisenhower. New York: Simonand Schuster, 1946.

Carpentier, General Marcel. Les ForcesAlliées en Italie; la Campagne d'ltalie.Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949.

Clark, General Mark W. CalculatedRisk. New York: Harper & Brothers,1950.

Maj. Gen. Coudraux, [Henri]. La Based'Opérations 901 dans la Bataille pour laLiberation de la France, 1944-1945.Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1947.

Crusoë. Vicissitudes d'une Victoire.Paris: Les Editions de l'Ame Française[1946].

Gaulle, Charles de. Discours et Messages.Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1946.

Giraud, Général [Henri]. Un seul but, laVictoire. Paris: R. Julliard, 1949.

Goutard, Col. [Adolphe]. Le Corps Ex-péditionnaire Français dans la Campagned'ltalie (1943-1944). Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1947.

Howe, George F. Northwest Africa: Seiz-ing the Initiative in the West, UNITEDSTATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.Washington: 1957.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 409

Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of CordellHull. New York: The Macmillan Com-pany, 1948. 2 vols.

Joubert, [Lt. Col.] J. La Liberation de laFrance. Paris: Payot, 1951.

Langer, William L. Our Vichy Gamble.New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1947.

Lattre de Tassigny, General [Jean] de.Histoire de la Premiere Armée Française.Paris: Plon, 1949.

Leahy, Adm. William D. / Was There:The Personal Story of the Chief of Staffto Presidents Roosevelt and TrumanBased on His Notes and Diaries Made atthe Time. New York: Whittlesey House,1950.

Leighton, Richard M., and Robert W.Coakley. Global Logistics and Strategy:1940-1943, UNITED STATES ARMYIN WORLD WAR II. Washington:1955.

Les Forces Aériennes Françaises de 1939 a1945. Ed. Col. Pierre Paquier. Paris:Berger-Levrault, 1949.

Logistical History of NATOUSA - M T O U S A : 11 August 1942 to 30 No-

vember 1945. Ed. Col. Creswell G.Blakeney. Naples, Italy: G. Mon-tanino, 1946.

Marey, Georges. "Le Réarmement fran-çais en Afrique du Nord (1942-1944),"

Revue Politique et Parlementaire (Octo-ber, November, 1947.

Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin M. Snell.Strategic Planning for Coalition War-fare: 1941-1942, UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Wash-ington: 1953.

Ministére des Finances et Affaires Econo-miques. "Le Prêt-Bail et l'Aide Réciproque Franco-Alliée," Notes et

Etudes Documentaires (Paris, 2 and 3November 1949).

Mouilleseaux, Louis, Ed. La France et sonEmpire dans la Guerre. Paris: EditionsLittéraires de France, 1947.

Pogue, Forrest C. The Supreme Com-mand, UNITED STATES ARMY INWORLD WAR II. Washington: 1954.

Richard, René, and Alain de Sérigny.L'Enigme d'Alger. Paris: LibrairieArthème Fayard, 1947.

Rocolle, Chef de bataillon breveté, L'ArmeAeroportée Clé de la Victoire. Paris:Charles-Lavauzelle, 1948. 2 vols.

Santini, Lt. Col. P. "Etude statistique surles pertes au cours de la guerre 1939-1945," Revue du Corps de Santé Mili-taire, X, No. 1 (March, 1954).

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hop-kins: An Intimate History. New York:Harper & Brothers, 1948.

Spillman, Colonel. "L'Armée d'Afrique,"Revue Historique de l'Armée (Decem-ber, 1948).

Suttles, Col. E. A., Ed. A PhotographicStory of the Assembly of T.U.P. MotorVehicles by the New French Army in theNorth African Theater of Operations.

Weygand, Général [Maxime]. Memoires:Rappelé au Service. Paris: Flamma-rion, 1950.

Interviews

Col. George L. ArtamonoffCol. André BeaufreCol. Roland de BeaumontBrig. Gen. Paul DevinckCol. R. Gilpin ErwinCol. William Tudor GardinerGeneral Henri GiraudLt. Gen. Augustin GuillaumeGeneral Alphonse JuinBrig. Gen. Alien F. Kingman


General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny Brig. Gen. Jean PiatteCol. André L'Huillier Brig. Gen. Jean RegnaultBrig. Gen. Harold F. Loomis Brig. Gen. Gordon P. SavilleLt. Gen. Aimé de Goislard de Monsabert Lt. Claude TiersBrig. Gen. Marcel Pénette Lt. Gen. Jean Valluy

List of Abbreviations

AAF Army Air ForcesAAFSC Army Air Forces Service Command (MTO)ACofS Assistant Chief of StaffActg ActingAdmin AdministrationA.E.F. American Expeditionary Forces (World War I)AFAT Auxiliaires Féminines de l'Armée de Terre (French counterpart of

WAC)AFHQ Allied Force HeadquartersAFSC Air Force Service CommandAGWAR Adjutant General, War DepartmentAsdic Antisubmarine direction indicatorASF Army Service ForcesBAR Browning automatic rifleBCRA Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (Militaire)Br BritishCCS Combined Chiefs of StaffCEF Corps Expéditionnaire Français (French Expeditionary Corps)CEFEO Corps Expéditionnaire Français d'Extrême-Orient (French Far East

Expeditionary Corps)CFLN Comité Français de la Liberation Nationale (French Committee of

National Liberation)CG Commanding generalCinC Commander in ChiefCM-IN Classified Message, IncomingCM-OUT Classified Message, OutgoingCofS Chief of StaffComd CommandComdr CommanderConf ConferenceCorres CorrespondenceCOS British Chiefs of StaffCPS Combined Staff PlannersCRMA Centre de Réception des Matériels Américains (Reception Center for

American Equipment)DAD Defense Aid Division (to 1 Oct 41), Defense Aid DirectorDB Division Blindée (Armored Division)DFL Division Franchise Libre (Free French Division)DI Division d'Infanterie (Infantry Division)


DIA Division d'Infanterie Algérienne (Algerian Infantry Division), or Di-vision d'Infanterie Alpine (Alpine Infantry Division)

DIC Division d'Infanterie Coloniale (Colonial Infantry Division)DIM Division d'Infanterie Marocaine (Moroccan Infantry Division)Dir DirectiveDMI Division Motorisée d'Infanterie, or Division de Marche d'Infanterie

(Motorized Infantry Division)DMM Division Marocaine de Montagne (Moroccan Mountain Division)DRB AGO Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's OfficeEMFFI Etat-Major des Forces Françaises de l'IntérieurEMGG Etat-Major General, Guerre (General Staff, War)ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, U.S. ArmyExp ExpeditionaryFAF French Air Force (Armée de l'Air)FFI Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (French Forces of the Interior)Fr FrenchFTS French Training SectionGO General OrderG.O.C. General-officer-commanding (British)GPF Grande Puissance FillouxGTM Groupe de Tabors Marocains (Moroccan Tabor Group)Hq HeadquartersInterv InterviewJAC Joint Air CommissionJCS U.S. Joint Chiefs of StaffJLC Joint Logistics CommitteeJPS Joint Staff PlannersJRC Joint Rearmament CommitteeLMAB Munitions Assignments Board (London)Ltr LetterMAAF Mediterranean Allied Air ForcesMAB Munitions Assignments BoardMAC (G) Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground)MAC (A) (Air)MAC (N) (Navy)MBS Mediterranean Base SectionMLB Metallic link beltMsg MessageMtg MeetingMTOUSA Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. ArmyNAAF Northwest African Air ForcesNAASC Northwest African Air Service CommandNATOUSA North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 413

OCMH Office of the Chief of Military HistoryOCT HB Office of the Chief of Transportation, Historical BranchOPD Operations Division, General StaffOpns, Ops OperationsOSS Office of Strategic ServicesPBS Peninsular Base SectionPETN Pentaerythritol tetranitePOL Petrol (gasoline), oil, and lubricantsPOW Prisoner of warRAF Royal Air ForceRcd RecordRCP Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes (Parachute Regiment)Rearmt RearmamentRTA Régiment de Tirailleurs Algérians (Algerian Tirailleurs Regiment)SACMED Supreme Allied Commander, MediterraneanSAS Special Air ServiceSCAEF Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary ForceSCAMA Service Central des Approvisionnements et Matériels Américains (Cen-

tral Office of American Supplies and Equipment)SFHQ Special Force HeadquartersSHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary ForceSO Special OrderSOLOC Southern Line of CommunicationsSOS Services of SupplySR Service de Renseignements (Intelligence Service)Sup SupplySv ServiceTAC Tactical Air CommandTAG The Adjutant GeneralUSAAF U.S. Army Air ForcesUSSTAF United States Strategic Air ForceWAC Women's Army CorpsWac A member of the Women's Army CorpsWD War DepartmentWO War Office

Glossary of Code Names

AFLOC A trans-Africa supply route for the supply of vehicles and equipment tothe Middle East and east Africa.

ANAKIM A large land operation for the reopening of the Burma Road and anamphibious operation for the recapture of Rangoon.

ANFA Sometimes used by OPD officers as a code name for the CasablancaConference of January 1943.

ANVIL The planned 1944 Allied invasion of southern France in the Toulon-Marseille area. (Later DRAGOON.)

BIGOT Special security procedure for OVERLORD.BOLERO Build-up of troops and supplies in the United Kingdom in preparation

for a cross-Channel attack.BRASSARD Operation to liberate the Island of Elba, June 1944.CAIMAN Proposed operation in support of Resistance forces in central France.

Allies rejected the whole operation as impracticable.EUREKA Tehran Conference, 28 November-1 December 1943.FLAMBO AFHQ Advance Administrative Echelon, established at Naples, October

1943.FREEDOM Code designation for radio station at Algiers.HUSKY Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943.OVERLORD Plan for the Allied invasion of northwest Europe, spring 1944.QUADRANT First Quebec Conference, August 1943.SEXTANT Cairo Conference, 22-26 November and 3-7 December 1943.SYMBOL Conference at Casablanca, January 1943.TORCH Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, November 1942.TRIDENT Washington Conference, May 1943.VESUVIUS Operation to liberate Corsica, September-October 1943.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War DepartmentChief of Staff: Prewar Plans and PreparationsWashington Command Post: The Operations DivisionStrategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945The Army and Economic MobilizationThe Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground ForcesThe Organization of Ground Combat TroopsThe Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service ForcesThe Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western HemisphereThe Framework of Hemisphere DefenseGuarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the PacificThe Fall of the PhilippinesGuadalcanal: The First OffensiveVictory in PapuaCARTWHEEL: The Reduction of RabaulSeizure of the Gilberts and MarshallsCampaign in the MarianasThe Approach to the PhilippinesLeyte: The Return to the PhilippinesTriumph in the PhilippinesOkinawa: The Last BattleStrategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of OperationsNorthwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the WestSicily and the Surrender of ItalySalerno to CassinoCassino to the Alps

The European Theater of OperationsCross-Channel AttackBreakout and PursuitThe Lorraine CampaignThe Siegfried Line CampaignThe Ardennes: Battle of the BulgeThe Last Offensive

The Supreme CommandLogistical Support of the Armies, Volume ILogistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East TheaterThe Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India TheaterStilwell's Mission to ChinaStilwell's Command ProblemsTime Runs Out in CBI

The Technical ServicesThe Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for WarThe Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to FieldThe Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in CombatThe Corps of Engineers: Troops and EquipmentThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against JapanThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against GermanyThe Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United StatesThe Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of InteriorThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

TheatersThe Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for WarThe Ordnance Department: Procurement and SupplyThe Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and BattlefrontThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IIThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against JapanThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against GermanyThe Signal Corps: The EmergencyThe Signal Corps: The TestThe Signal Corps: The OutcomeThe Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and OperationsThe Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and SupplyThe Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special StudiesChronology: 1941-1945Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945Rearming the FrenchThree Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and SchmidtThe Women's Army CorpsCivil Affairs: Soldiers Become GovernorsBuying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air ForcesThe Employment of Negro TroopsManhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial RecordThe War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent AreasThe War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent AreasThe War Against Japan

Index

Aachen, Germany, 344Accounting, 28, 141, 143, 144, 145, 266-70, 346,

354. See also Lend-lease,of British equipment, 63cash payments, 262, 263, 265of Commanding General Shipments, 267, 268per man per diem procedure, 269-70of theater transfers, 267, 268-69

Admiralty (Br.), 222, 299Admiralty (Fr.). See under French Navy.Aéronautique Navale. See under French Navy,

Air Arm.AFLOC, 53nAfrican Army. See under North African Forces.Air Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean.

See Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W.Air forces, Allied tactical

First Tactical Air Force, 212, 373, 375, 3762d Tactical Air Force (Br.), 212, 373

Air forces, U. S. See Eighth Air Force; TwelfthAir Force; U. S. Strategic Air Forces(USSTAF).

Air Ministry (Br.), 300Air Ministry (Fr.), 374, 375Air Service Command (Fr.), 200Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G.,

116, 369on French combat performance, 178, 213nand Franco-Italian border incident, 367, 368

Alexandria, Egypt, 90, 90n, 214, 221Algeria, 11, 14, 194, 195, 196, 233Algiers, 25, 63, 65, 84, 85, 131, 132, 135, 136, 138,

140, 151, 152, 188, 191n, 198, 203, 220, 230,248, 260, 268, 272, 276, 280, 294n, 301, 302,316, 326, 377, 385

Allied landings at, 16celebration at, 59-60French Committee of National Liberation estab-

lished at, 79vehicle assembly line at, 67-69, 67n

Allied Armies in Italy, 116Allied Commander in Chief, 18, 49, 52, 53, 55, 62,

63, 71, 72, 79, 91, 117-18, 119, 120, 125.See also Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) ;Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.

Allied commander in the Pacific. See MacArthur,Gen. Douglas.

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), 123, 142,169, 180, 188, 314, 382, 383. See also AlliedCommander in Chief; Eisenhower, Gen.Dwight D.; Gammell, Lt. Gen. J. A. H.; Med-iterranean theater; Smith, Lt. Gen. WalterBedell; Wilson, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland.

and ANFA Plan, 40and assistance to the French, 65, 67and composition of French expeditionary forces,

87-88, 109, 110, 125-26, 127, 148, 157, 171and control of French forces, 117-18, 119, 120,

149, 150-51, 194, 225and employment of French forces, 108, 111, 112—

13, 116, 117, 159, 212, 259and equipping French expeditionary forces, 140,

141-42, 163-64, 170establishment, 25and French Committee of National Liberation,

149-50and French forces in ANVIL, 163, 164and French High Command, 96, 153, 228and French naval forces, 218, 220, 377and French rearmament, 46n, 62-63, 70, 71, 75-

76, 77, 81-82, 84, 85, 88, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97,101, 109, 110, 111, 113, 120, 121, 125, 126,129, 148, 155, 156, 161, 165, 177, 199, 202,205, 211, 227, 229, 241, 242-43, 244, 245,248, 250, 251, 252, 258n, 260, 261-62, 281,391, 392

and French service troops, 104-05, 107, 108,109-10, 124, 128, 146, 166, 167, 168, 202

and French supply system, 130, 131, 133-34and fusion of French armed forces, 81-82, 86and Giraud, 98, 118-19, 150, 151-52and the JAG, 93and the JRC, 25, 92, 271, 272, 284Liaison Section, 271, 274, 282and maintenance of French expeditionary forces,

139, 145, 155, 254, 257, 258, 261, 262, 263,264

and Metropolitan Forces, 192, 309movement to Caserta, 276nand nonprogram units, 121, 158and training of French troops, 28, 230, 231, 235,

236, 293Allied Military Government, Italy, 367, 368Alps, operations in the, 349, 354, 363n, 367


Alsace, 376American Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.). See

also Pershing, Gen. John J.British assistance to, 2, 3, 6, 6nFrench assistance to, 2-5, 6training of, by the French, 5-6

American Red Cross, 265Ames, Maj. John W., 275, 288Ammunition, 89, 142, 144-45, 251, 252-53Amphibious Forces, Northwest African Waters, 218ANAKIM, 49n, 54Anfa, French Morocco, 38

ANFA Agreements. See under Casablanca Con-ference.

ANFA Plan. See under Rearmament programs.ANVIL (DRAGOON), 122, 145, 252, 301, 328, 373.

See also Force 163.command for, 163French forces in, 119-20, 125, 126, 127, 128,

129, 144, 146, 148, 151, 153, 156, 157, 163,165, 173, 174, 181, 182-83. See also 1stFrench Army.

air units, 211, 212, 213commanded by de Lattre, 125. See also

Lattre dc Tassigny, Gen. Jean de.maintenance, 186, 187, 257, 258. See also

Base 901.naval units, 225shortage of replacements, 183shortage of support troops, 165, 166, 167,

168-69training, 238-39troop list, 156, 157, 159, 164, 171, 182-83,

191, 194, 210, 238launching, 183, 209, 276, 316U. S. forces in, 163U. S. support troops for the French, 167, 168,

169, 187Ardennes, 335, 340Armée B, 183. See also 1st French Army.Armée de l'Air. See French Air Force.Armies, U. S. See Third Army; Fifth Army;

Seventh Army; Fifteenth Army.Armistice Army. See under Metropolitan Forces;

North African Forces, African Army.Armor, 347

British tanks for the French, 60, 244for Sovereignty Forces, 161-62substitutions, 80n, 244-46

Armored divisions, U.S.2d, 28312th, 353

Armored Force Detachment, 294Armored Force Training Company, 6704th, 294

Army Air Forces Service Command (AAFSC),Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 207

Army Air Forces, U. S. See U. S. Army Air Forces(USAAF).

Army Exchange Service, 260

Army Geographic Service (Fr.), 266Army Group, 6th U. S., 188, 212, 296, 347, 348,

358, 394. See also Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.commanded by Devers, 183and Détachement des Alpes, 353, 367-68and FFI, 324-25, 329and French security battalions, 339, 342

Army Group, 12th U. S., 341, 342, 358-59Army Group, 15th, 367Army Group, 21 Br., 315, 335, 350, 366

Army Nurse Corps, U. S., 260

Army Service Forces (ASF). See also Interna-tional Division, ASF; Somervell, Lt. Gen.Brehon B.

Army Supply Program, 22, 56, 122, 205, 308and French rearmament, 22, 31, 45, 47, 48, 56,

78, 99-100, 241, 248, 269, 347, 354, 357, 359Victory Program, 15

Army Supply Program. See under Army ServiceForces (ASF).

Arno River, Italy, 179

Arnold, Gen. Henry H., 197, 199, 202, 209, 223,223n, 312, 313. See also U. S. Army AirForces (USAAF).

and equipping French air units, 15, 35, 83, 196-97, 373

on French contribution to war effort, 213nmember CCS, 10n

Artamonoff, Lt. Col. George L., 104, 131, 132, 202,232, 272, 274, 275, 282, 283, 284. See alsoJoint Rearmament Committee (JRC).

Artillery, 347Canada's offer of guns, 85nsubstitutions, 242-44

Atlantic Base Section, 85

Atlantic coast, operations along, 305-06, 325-26,331, 333, 335, 343, 358, 359, 363n

Auboyneau, Rear Adm. Philippe, 87, 214, 221

Austria, 363Auxiliaires Féminines de l'Armée de Terre. See

Women's Auxiliary Corps (Fr.) (AFAT).

Auxiliary Territorial Service (Br.), 260

INDEX 419

Baker, Newton D., 5Barnard, Capt. Geoffrey, 273, 275Bartron, Brig. Gen. Harold A., 202, 207Base 901 (Fr.), 166, 167, 178, 266, 358. See also

Peninsular Base Section (PBS),difficulties facing, 187, 188, 189establishment, 146movement to Marseille, 187reorganization, 187role and missions, 188strength, 188

Base du Sud, 354-55, 358Battet, Rear Adm. Robert, 225Beaufre, Maj. André, 14, 36n, 82nBeaumont, Capt. Roland de, 272, 275, 279-80, 282Belfort, France, 183Belgium, 310, 341n, 343, 381Bermuda, 220Béthouart, Lt. Gen. Emile, 26, 30, 38n, 41, 75, 82n,

85n, 92, 124n, 196, 217, 279, 308, 391. Seealso French Military Mission in the UnitedStates.

and ANFA Plan, 39-40, 40n, 46, 48Chief of Staff, National Defense, 152, 153, 157,

165, 174, 183n, 244commander, 1st Corps, 183, 353and equipping liberated manpower, 312-13, 315,

321, 322program. See under Rearmament programs.

Beynet, Lt. Gen. Paul, 124, 124n, 309-10, 392.See also French Military Mission in theUnited States.

Bidault, Georges, 368, 396Billotte, Brig. Gen. Pierre, 347, 353Biran, Lt. Guy de, 275Bir Hacheim, Libya, 10Blaizot, Lt. Gen. Roger, 394Blanc, Brig. Gen. Clement, 64, 64n, 128, 134, 189,

249n, 280, 284, 285, 386BOLERO, 49n. See also OVERLORD.Bombardment Division, 3d, 304Bonnet, Henri, 345, 369, 398Bonvalot, Col. Raoul, 295Boston, 220Bouscat, Gen. René, 201, 204, 207, 212, 287, 288,

309appointed Chief of Air Staff, 87appointed Chief of Staff, French Air Force, 211Appointed Inspector General, French Air Force,

373nand equipping French air units, 202, 203, 205,

209, 262-63, 308and JAG, 287-88

Bradley, Lt. Gen. Omar N., 182BRASSARD. See under Elba.Brazilian Expeditionary Force, 275-76

Brest, 378British Chiefs of Staff, 300, 302, 399. See also

Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan F.; Portal,Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles; Pound, Ad-miral Sir Dudley; United Kingdom,

and French rearmament, 40, 49-51, 52-53, 54,57, 161, 332

and liberated manpower, 308, 311, 315, 320,332-33

membership, 10nand North African Forces, 33-34, 35-36and posthostilities forces, 316-17, 322, 326-27,

327, 337British Commonwealth, 402British equipment for the French. See under

United Kingdom.British Far Eastern Fleet. See under Royal Navy.British forces, 143. See also Units, British.British Joint Staff Mission, 10n, 36n, 40nBrittany, 320Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan F., 10n, 34, 36, 57.

See also British Chiefs of Staff; Combined

Chiefs of Staff.Brosset, Brig. Gen. Charles, 117, 178, 353Buckley, Lt. John W., 275Bull, Maj. Gen. Harold R., 342Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action

(BCRA), 9n, 299, 300Burke, Lt. Col. Robert W., 295Burnett, William E., 284Buter, Lt. Gordon H., 275

Caen, 339CAIMAN, 204Cairo Conference, 111, 119Callies, Brig. Gen. Jean, 349, 353Cameroons, 9Camp Hood, Tex., 234Camp Lee, Va., 234Campbell, Lt. C. S., 295Canada, 227, 402, 402n

forces of, 397Giraud's visit to, 85matériel for Metropolitan Forces, 350, 355, 356matériel for North African Forces, 85n, 209-10,

326, 326n


Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 350Cape of Good Hope, 221Carpentier, Maj. Gen. Marcel, 147, 235, 353, 397,

397nCasablanca, 63, 65, 84, 131, 135, 138, 218, 220, 221,

229, 283Allied landings at, 16, 16ncelebration at, 60nconference at. See Casablanca Conference.French base at, 78, 85, 86, 91, 94, 97, 133, 137

Casablanca Conference, 33, 48, 52, 218, 273, 281ANFA Agreements, 36-38, 49-50, 56, 59-60,

125, 152, 241ANFA Plan. See under Rearmament programs.

Caserta, Italy, 276n

Cassino, Italy, 117Casualties, French

all forces, summary, 403, 403nin Corsica, 101in Elba, 182in France and Germany, 363, 363nFree French Forces, 11in Italy, 180Resistance Forces, 306in Tunisia, 32, 57

Centre d'Etude des Chars de Combat, 294Centre de Reception des Matériels Américains

(CRMA), 135, 136Ceylon, 394

Chanson, Lt. Col. Charles, 285, 315, 385-86Chantiers de Jeunesse, 8, 8n, 68n, 230, 230nChanzy, Algeria, 238Charpentier, Col. Emile, 136, 137, 138, 175, 290,

291, 292, 358n. See also Service Central desApprovisionnements et Matériels Américains(SCAMA).

Chateauroux, 354

Chauncey, Brig. Gen. Charles C., 287

Cheatham, Lt. Col. C. H., 295

Cheek, Lt. Atlas L., 275Cherbourg, 350, 355, 378, 386Cherchel, Algeria, 1, 14, 15, 48Chief of Staff, AFHQ, 32, 126, 284. See also

Gammell, Lt. Gen. J. A. H.; Smith, Lt. Gen.Walter Bedell.

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. See Marshall, Gen.George C.

China, 15, 44, 393, 396, 400, 402Christensen, Lt. Col. Conrad L., 275, 387

Churchill, Prime Minister Winston S., 57, 118,334n, 371, 394

and ANFA Agreements, 39, 53, 54at Casablanca Conference, 33, 34, 36nand French rearmament, 51, 334and French Resistance, 300, 301, 302, 304and de Gaulle, 9, 33

Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W., 178. See also FifthArmy.

agreement with Darlan, 16, 16n, 117, 220at Cherchel meeting, 1, 14commands Fifth Army, 111and French Expeditionary Corps, 140, 146, 159,

255, 256and French rearmament, 62-63, 141, 170, 283on French performance in Italy, 179, 179n, 213n

Clothingfor labor and security units, 325, 340for Metropolitan Forces, 355-57, 356n, 359, 364for North African Forces, 82, 82n, 83, 85, 85nproblem of identification, 259, 357problem of sizes, 258-59, 258nfor Resistance Forces, 325, 326, 333for women in the armed forces, 259—60

Coastal Base Section (COSBASE), 186-87, 189,248

Cochet, Maj. Gen. Gabriel, 301Collonges, France, 8nColmar, France, 351, 364, 376Cologne, 344Colonial Forces (Fr.), 194Combined Administrative Committee, 335, 340,

341, 350, 357, 359, 374Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), 23, 36n, 84, 95,

121, 123, 124, 129, 227, 326-27, 334, 365,368, 387. See also British Chiefs of Staff;Joint Chiefs of Staff, U. S. (JCS).

and British equipment for the French, 27on control of French forces, 149-51, 202, 361and controversy over French rearmament, 40-41,

48-51, 52-53, 54-57and employment of French forces, 76, 95-96,

101, 111, 118, 119-20, 171, 361and French High Command, 362and fusion of the de Gaulle and Giraud forces,

86, 87and equipping western European liberated man-

power, 306-08, 310, 311, 312, 315-18, 320,321, 322, 323, 326, 328, 330, 332, 335, 338,340-41, 342, 343, 344, 357, 366, 370

and Munitions Assignments Board (MAB), 22-23

421

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS)—Continuedorganization, 10nand equipping Free French Forces, 10and equipping French air units, 196, 206, 223-

24, 374and equipping French forces for the Far East,

394, 395-96, 398-99and equipping Metropolitan Forces, 322, 325,

327, 329, 332, 333-35, 336, 344-45, 348, 349,350, 351, 354, 359, 362

and equipping French naval and naval air units,217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224,225, 226, 379-80

and equipping nonprogram units, 160, 191and equipping North African Forces, 28, 31,

33-36, 45, 47, 63, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82-83, 94,95-96, 104, 122, 125, 128, 148-49, 155, 156,157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 167, 177, 197, 198,199, 205, 207, 212, 234, 238, 385

and equipping Resistance Forces, 301, 302, 305and equipping Sovereignty Forces, 161-62, 173and equipping Territorial Forces, 123, 128, 173CCS 142/1, 54, 199CCS 350/7, 374CCS 358, 221-22CCS 358 (Revised), 222, 225, 377CCS 661, 317, 330, 332-33, 357

Combined Shipping and Adjustment Board, 57Combined Signal Board, AFHQ, 234Combined Staff Planners (CPS), 306, 310, 394

on French rearmament, 54, 82-83, 155, 197, 199on employment of French naval units, 220-21,

222Comité Français de la Libération Nationale. See

French Committee of National Liberation(CFLN).

Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy. SeeAlexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G.

Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in NorthAfrica, 18, 49, 55. See also Allied Com-mander in Chief; Eisenhower, Gen. DwightD.; Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ).

Commander in Chief, French, 21, 39, 42, 79, 80,87, 94, 98, 117, 118, 119, 134, 150, 151, 174.See also Giraud, Gen. Henri.

Giraud appointed, 16post abolished, 151-52

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, 222. See alsoKing, Adm. Ernest J.

Commanding General Shipments. See underSupply and maintenance.

Commissariat for National Defense. See underFrench Committee of National Liberation(CFLN).

Commissioners (Fr.). See under French Com-mittee of National Liberation (CFLN).

Committee on Equipment for Patriot Forces, 300,306, 308

Communications Zone, ETOUSA, 323, 326, 341342, 348, 354, 355, 356n, 363, 366, 370

Communications Zone, NATOUSA, 278Continental Advance Section (CONAD), 187-88Corps, U. S.

IV, 368VI, 111, 183

Corps Expéditionnaire Français. See French Ex-peditionary Corps (CEF).

Corps Expéditionnaire Français d'Extrême-Orient.See French Far East Expeditionary Corps(CEFEO).

Corsica, 56, 93-94, 111, 113, 142, 159, 172, 183,211

campaign in (VESUVIUS), 101, 181, 224French casualties in, 101, 403npostcampaign defense of, 156, 160

Coudraux, Col. Henri, 358Courbet, battleship, 225nCPS. See Combined Staff Planners (CPS).Craig, Maj. Gen. Howard A., 364Crane, Brig. Gen. William C., 128Crawford, Col. David J., 100Crittenberger, Maj. Gen. Willis, 368Cross-Channel operation. See OVERLORD.Crump, Col. Ira A., 133, 193, 275, 291Cuneo Province, Italy, 368Cunningham, Adm. Sir Andrew B., 10n, 217, 218,

224Curtis, Brig. Gen. Edward P., 202

Dakar, Senegal, 12, 220, 221Darcy, Col. Thomas C., 181Darlan, Adm. Francois

agreement with Clark, 16, 16n, 117and Allied landings in North Africa, 16replaced by Giraud, 21, 78

Deane, Brig. Gen. John R., 49n, 51De Gaulle, Gen. Charles. See Gaulle, Gen.

Charles de.De Lattre de Tassigny, Gen. Jean. See Lattre de

Tassigny, Gen. Jean de.

De Long, Maj. E. S., 275Delta Base Section, 187, 188, 193, 239, 371


Delta Base Section Depot for Rearmament, 354Demetry, Thomas A., 284Denmark, 381Dépot Français de Publications Américains, 175,

229Deputy Theater Commander, NATOUSA, 72-73,

275, 283. See also Hughes, Maj. Gen. Ever-ett S.

Détachement d'Armée de l'Atlantique. See underUnits, French.

Détachement d'Armée des Alpes. See underUnits, French.

Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L., 179, 212, 238, 286, 342,348, 382. See also Army Group, 6th U. S.

commands NATOUSA, 275commands 6th Army Group, 183on Franco-American relations, 153-55, 254and Franco-Italian border incident, 367and French rearmament, 121, 148, 164, 165, 170,

171, 247-48, 265, 269, 276and French service troops, 166-67, 168and nonprogram units, 156, 159-60and rations for French troops, 255, 258, 263and replacements for 1st French Army, 183, 352and Resistance Forces, 303, 324-25, 354and Stuttgart incident, 361on use of liberated manpower, 313, 314, 315,

320, 321-22Devinck, Brig. Gen. Paul, 96, 114-15, 117, 121,

158. See also French High Command (NorthAfrica).

Dexter, Lt. John L., 275

Diethelm, André, 325, 331, 333, 334, 365, 366.See also Ministry of War (Fr.).

Dijon, 183, 187Dill, Field Marshal Sir John, 36, 36n, 53. See

also British Chiefs of Staff.

Division sliceU. S., 168n, 332French, 168, 178, 332, 337-38

Djibouti, French Somaliland, 9

Dody, Maj. Gen. André, 111, 178, 353Donovan, Brig. Gen. William J., 301, 304. See

also Office of Strategic Services (OSS).Doyen, Lt. Gen. Paul, 367, 368Dufourt, Lt. Col. A., 141Dunkerque, 247Dunton, Maj. Gen. Delmar, 200Dupre, Capt. D. D., 275, 385Dye, Charles F. Jr., 284

Eaker, Lt. Gen. Ira C., 285-86, 287. See alsoMediterranean Air Command; MediterraneanAllied Air Forces (MAAF).

on efficiency of French air units, 208-09, 237and employment of French air units, 211and equipping French air units, 206-07, 210, 373on extension of French air program, 313, 315on issue of Norden bombsight to the French, 208

Eastern Front, 340Eastern Task Force, 28Ecole de Guerre, 280Eden, Anthony, 55Edmonston, Lt. John S., 275Eighth Air Force, U. S., 304Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 23, 32, 35, 37n, 44,

45, 49, 50, 55, 59, 60n, 65, 69, 74, 84, 88,129, 136, 153, 205, 212, 276, 331, 348, 382.See also Allied Commander in Chief; AlliedForce Headquarters (AFHQ); Supreme Com-mander, Allied Expeditionary Force; SupremeHeadquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force(SHAEF).

on ANFA Agreement, 73appointed Supreme Commander, Allied Expedi-

tionary Force, 124and arming western European Allies, 334, 342on Canadian equipment for the French, 85ncommands Allied forces in North Africa, 18commands TORCH forces, 15, 16conference with de Gaulle, 124-25, 228conference with de Gaulle and Giraud, 80on control over French forces, 79—80, 117—18,

119-20, 150, 151,on employment of French forces, 40, 56, 71, 76,

94, 108, 125, 236-37, 335, 349-50and employment of liberated manpower, 310, 311,

313, 314, 315-16, 317, 320-21, 322-23, 332,335, 336, 341

and enemy captured equipment, 91-92and equipping the French, 24-25, 26, 27, 28-29,

30-31, 33, 40, 42-43, 45-47, 46n, 48, 62-63,82n, 86, 94, 95, 96, 109, 110, 123, 124-25,197-98, 199, 201, 202, 205-06, 217, 220, 222,223, 335, 347

on French forces for the Far East, 394, 397-98on French missions to the United States, 26-27,

217and French political developments, 80, 80n, 119nand French service troops, 105, 108, 109, 121,

124-25

INDEX 423

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.—Continuedon fusion of French forces, 86, 117, 117nand JRC, 25and labor and security units, 325, 327, 335-36,

337, 340-41, 342-43, 344, 366and maintenance of French forces, 217-18and Mast Plan, 15, 30and raising of Metropolitan units, 314, 318, 320,

323, 327, 328, 329, 333-34, 335, 336, 338, 352,358, 359, 364-65, 366

and Resistance Forces, 302, 303, 305, 319,324-25, 333

and Stuttgart incident, 361-62and suspension of French rearmament, 343,

360-61, 362-63, 368-69, 371-72, 375and tonnage for French rearmament, 41, 42, 51,

53, 74-75, 77-78, 83, 255and training French forces, 28, 101, 231and U. S. service troops for the French, 104, 108,

109, 125El 'Alamein, Egypt, 10Elba, 159

campaign in (BRASSARD), 180-82, 183, 212, 225French casualties in, 182, 403n

Ervin, Col. R. Gilpin, 208, 208n, 286, 287, 288,373n, 384

Etat-Major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur(EMFFI), 300, 304, 306

EUREKA. See Tehran Conference.

European Advisory Commission, 327European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army

(ETOUSA), 270, 304and French rearmament, 25, 193, 264, 269, 360replaced by USFET, 371, 387

Expeditionary forces, French. See also individualcampaigns; French Expeditionary Corps(CEF) ; French Far East Expeditionary Corps(CEFEO) ; Service troops, French; Units,French.

control, 118, 119, 149, 152maintenance, 103, 133, 135, 136-37, 138-39need for self-sufficiency, 100, 105, 107, 108, 109,

110. 113-14, 121, 138, 155organization and equipping, 56-57, 69, 71-72,

75-76, 82, 87-89, 94, 104, 105, 108, 109-11,118n

strength, 194U. S. and British service troops for, 71, 104,

105-07, 124, 125, 166-67

Fairchild, Col. Richard F., 296Far East, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 398. See

also French Far East Expeditionary Corps(CEFEO); Pacific theater.

Far East Program. See under Rearmament pro-grams.

Fénard, Vice Adm. Raymond, 82n. See alsoFrench Naval Mission in the United States.

chief, French Naval Mission in the UnitedStates, 217

and employment of French forces in the FarEast, 393, 395-96

and equipping French naval air units, 223, 223n,379-80

and equipping French naval units, 219, 220, 224,377, 379

15 August (43) Plan. See under Rearmamentprograms.

Fifteenth Army, 358-59Fifth Army, 94, 140, 141, 178, 257. See also

Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W.component French forces, 95-96, 111, 112-13,

116, 146, 159, 258. See also French Expedi-tionary Corps (CEF).

French mule pack companies operating with,113, 159

and French rearmament, 62-63, 283, 285and maintenance of French components, 138-

39, 141-42, 146, 170, 171, 255, 256-57and training French forces, 62-63, 72, 89-90,

231, 293. See also French Training Section,at Airborne Training Center, 211, 236at Invasion Training Center, 235under Rearmament Advisory Section, 293

Fighting France. See Free France.Fighting French Forces. See Free French Forces.1st French Army, 187, 266, 296, 342, 367, 374, 376.

See also Lattre de Tassigny, Gen. Jean de.casualties, 363ncomponent elements, 183, 186, 212, 343-44,

353, 358controlled by 6th Army Group, 183, 212FFI and other liberated manpower enrolled in,

186, 186n, 188, 306, 314, 323, 324, 325, 326,331, 333

logistical support, 186-88, 363. See also Base901.

Negro troops withdrawn from, 325, 354, 394operating initially as Armée B, 183replacements for, 186, 313, 314, 322, 325, 337-

38, 351-53, 354, 388-89


1st French Army—Continuedreverts to French control, 371short of service troops, 186, 188strength, 186, 337-38, 351-53and Stuttgart incident, 361support troops build-up, 348-49, 358training centers of, 351-52, 387, 388, 389U. S. divisions assigned to, 353U. S. support troops for, 186, 188, 313-14, 337,

348Flint, Col. Harry A., 231-32Florence, 179Force 163, 156, 163, 164, 210, 238. See also

ANVIL (DRAGOON); Patch, Maj. Gen. Alex-ander M.

Forces Françaises Combattantes. See Free FrenchForces.

Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur. See FrenchForces of the Interior (FFI).

Forces Françaises Libres. See Free French Forces.Foreign Economic Administration, 263, 266, 371,

402Foreign Office (Br.), 392Forrestal, James V., 394Fort Benning, Ga., 234Fort Dix, N. J., 234Fort Sill, Okla., 237Foster, Air Vice Marshal W. F. MacNeece, 54France, 1, 9, 12n, 13, 14, 115, 150, 152, 173, 192

Armistice Army, 7-8, 11, 17assistance to A.E.F., 1-3, 5-6casualties (1939-45), 403nChantiers de Jeunesse, 8, 8ncivilian import program, 357, 370, 402employment of liberated manpower. See Metro-

politan Forces.French forces in liberation of, 12, 13-14, 119,

144, 194, 308, 309-10, 328-29, 334, 343-44,347-48, 354, 377, 404. See also ANVIL; 1stFrench Army; OVERLORD.

German occupation of, 7, 17, 309and German offensive in the Ardennes, 335and June 1940 armistice with Germany, 7, 11,

404and manufacture of war matériel, 328, 332, 336,

345, 348, 350, 355, 356n, 357, 359military import program, 350and occupation of northwest Italian territory,

367operations in the Alps, 354, 367

France—Continuedoperations on Atlantic coast, 305-06, 325, 343,

358, 359, 378, 387and overseas territories, 391rehabilitation of military establishment, 328, 337Resistance forces of. See French Forces of the

Interior (FFI) ; French Resistance.and reverse lend-lease. See under Lend-lease.and settlement of lend-lease accounts, 402-03slowness of rearmament resented by, 348and zone of occupation in Germany, 342, 343

Franco-Italian border incident, 367-69, 398Free France, 9, 9nFree French Forces, 400. See also Units, French.

air units, 10-11, 195casualties, 11, 403nequipping, 10, 12-13, 81-82, 86, 87ground units, 11incidents involving, 80ninclusion in North African rearmament program,

87, 88-89, 115lend-lease extended to, 10merged with North African Forces, 86-87, 201,

221Military Mission in the United States, 27nnaval units, 214renamed Fighting French Forces, 9nstrength, 9

Free French Military Mission in the United States,27n

Freetown Project, 53nFrench Advance Section, 360French Air Force (FAF), 223. See also Free

French Forces; North African Forces; Train-ing; Units, French.

and Air Component, 385. See also SHAEFMission to France, Air Component.

Armée de l'Air organized, 201casualties, 403nemployment and control, 202, 204-05, 207, 211,

373-74, 375, 376equipping, 200, 201-02, 203, 206, 207-08,

212-13, 248, 334, 375-76, 401, 402. Seealso under Rearmament programs.

ground support organizations, 209, 210issued Norden bombsight, 208, 287and JAC, 286-87. See also Joint Air Commis-

sion (JAC).maintenance and supply, 205-06, 207, 262, 374,

375, 376morale, 201, 208-09

INDEX 425

French Air Force (FAF)—Continuedoperating in ANVIL, 186, 209, 210, 211, 212operating in campaigns of France and Germany,

212, 328, 373-74, 376operating in conquest of Elba, 181—82operating in Mediterranean theater, 178, 181-82,

204, 207, 209, 210, 212, 223-24operating in OVERLORD, 182, 210and Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to

France, 385, 386relation with Allied air forces, 198units for the Far East, 396, 397

French Commander in Chief. See Commander inChief, French.

French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN),119n, 258, 345n. See also Gaulle, Gen. Charlesde; Giraud, Gen. Henri.

Allied missions to, 150Allied recognition of, 79, 96, 98Commissariat of National Defense, 87Commissioner of Armament, Provisioning, and

Reconstruction, 81 nCommissioner of Finance, 263Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, 119, 149.Commissioner of National Defense, 98Commissioner of Navy, 118, 153Commissioner of War and Air, 118, 118n, 147,

149-50, 153, 174, 177, 280and control of forces, 79-81, 86-87, 117-18,

119-20, 149-50, 151and control over military affairs, 98, 118, 150,

151-52, 280, 309Cordell Hull and, 80-81and de Gaulle, 79-80, 98establishment, 79and French participation in Far East opera-

tions, 392and fusion of forces, 86lend-lease agreements with, 345nNational Defense Committee, 98, 151National Defense General Staff, 151Permanent Military Committee, 80, 81, 81n, 87and reorganization of armed forces, 80and reorganization of high command, 151-53,

174and Resistance Forces, 302succeeded by Provisional Government, 191

French Communications Zone, 121-23, 128, 155,158. See also Sovereignty Forces; TerritorialForces.

French Equatorial Africa, 9, 374

French Expeditionary Corps (CEF), 230, 235, 255,280. See also Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W.; FifthArmy; Italy; Juin, Gen. Alphonse; Units,French.

casualties, 180, 256component units, 111, 112-13, 117, 171, 178,

225, 251, 275, 397controversy over 1st DMI assignment to, 116-17performance, 147, 155, 178-79, 179nreplacements, 115—16service troops, 165-67, 178shortages of equipment, 136, 139-40, 147, 170,

171, 264strength, 178supply and maintenance, 133, 138-39, 142,

143-47, 155, 174-75, 186, 254, 255-56, 257-58, 263, 265. See also Base 901; Rations,

training centers, 237-38U. S. advisers and instructors with, 170, 237, 295U. S. support troops for, 168, 186withdrawal from Italy, 179-80, 210

French Far East Expeditionary Corps (CEFEO),122, 370, 371

command and control, 394, 397-98, 399employment, 395, 396-97organization and equipping, 391, 392, 393-94,

395-96, 397-99. See also under Rearmamentprograms.

French Forces of the Interior (FFI). See alsoFrench Resistance,

absorbed in regular forces, 306, 310, 312, 313,314, 316, 319-20, 323, 324-25, 327, 329,330, 333, 337, 347, 349, 354, 363

activities, 182, 303-04, 305-06, 312, 320, 324,325, 335, 367

aircraft allocations to, 301, 303, 304Allied personnel with, 304casualties, 306, 403ncontrol, 300-01, 319dissolution, 333, 354equipment for 252, 299, 301-02, 303, 304,

306-08, 310, 315, 320, 324-26, 333, 335, 400French Air Force units in support of, 211operation to support, 204strength, 301, 304-05, 319-20, 325training, 389

French General Staff. See French High Command(France) ; French High Command (NorthAfrica).


French High Command (France), 8, 17. See alsoJuin, Gen. Alphonse; Leyer, Lt. Gen. Roger,

and employment of liberated manpower, 319-20,321

and forces for the Far East, 393-97, 398, 399General Staff, Paris, 191, 386and labor and security units, 320, 322-23, 326,

327-28, 338, 344, 370and Metropolitan units, 325, 327-28, 331, 332,

333, 334, 336, 349, 350, 354, 373Mission de Réarmement, 357and mobilization program, 320, 338, 355National Defense headquarters, 322, 386and Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to

France, 331, 386Rearmament Inspection Section, 357and rehabilitation of Metropolitan Army, 330relationship with Allied command, 343, 362and replacements for 1st French Army, 351-53and Resistance Forces, 319, 323, 324, 325-26, 327and training of units, 389-90

French High Command (North Africa), 11, 21}

24, 26, 111, 113, 116, 120, 121, 122-23,128-29, 130, 188, 204, 212, 229, 252, 259.See also Béthouart, Lt. Gen. Emile; Blanc,Brig. Gen. Clement; Devinck, Brig. Gen. Paul;French Committee of National Liberation(CFLN) ; Giraud, Gen. Henri; Leyer, Lt. Gen.Roger; National Defense Committee,

and AFHQ, 96, 149-50, 228and ANVIL, 163, 164, 167armament responsibilities, 69, 85, 170, 263and defense of North Africa, 160, 244difficulties facing, 63-65, 237, 255, 264, 266, 281and distribution of U. S. matériel, 245, 251-52,

261-62and equipping of units, 140-42, 144, 156, 166,

223, 225and equipment substitutions, 241, 244, 246-47,

248-49, 250and establishment of SCAMA, 288, 290and establishment of National Defense General

Staff, 151, 153and forces for the Far East, 391, 392, 393and the JRC, 271, 280, 284and liberation of Indochina, 391-92and maintenance of troops, 103, 135, 138-39,

142, 143, 144-45, 207, 254, 258and Metropolitan forces, 165, 306, 308-11, 316and organization of expeditionary forces, 70-72,

105, 113-14, 146-47, 165

French High Command (North Africa)—Cont.position in Allied command structure, 140, 278Poste de Statistique, 166, 166n, 285Rearmament and Technical Studies Section, 279,

285, 385reorganization, 86-87, 118, 151-52, 201and requisitions for U. S. equipment, 63, 142-

43, 144, 145, 154-55, 157-58, 164, 169, 172-74, 255, 281-82, 311

and service units, 94-95, 105, 114-15, 127, 146,165-69, 174, 239. See also Service troops,French.

and supply system, 131-33, 134-36, 137-38and training of units, 233, 234-35, 236, 293,

295French Military Mission in the United Kingdom,

310French Military Mission in the United States, 26-

27, 27n, 92-93, 122, 124, 124n, 128, 196,208, 217, 229-30, 259, 260, 261, 262, 265,279, 309, 347, 359, 362. See also Béthouart,Maj. Gen. Emile; Beynet, Lt. Gen. Paul; Saint-Didier, Brig. Gen. Auguste Brossin de.

French Morocco, 11, 50, 56, 88, 131, 133, 191, 196,202, 203, 231, 232, 233

contribution to war effort, 194pre-TORCH concealment of troops in, 11-12, 12n

French National Committee, 9, 12, 78. See alsoGaulle, Gen. Charles de.

French Naval Air Arm. See under French Navy.French Naval Mission in the United States, 217.

See also Fénard, Vice Adm. Raymond.

French Navy. See also Free French Forces; Le-monnier, Rear Adm. André; North AfricanForces; Rearmament programs; Units, French.

Admiralty (Algiers), 222, 224Admiralty (Paris), 377Air Arm (Aéronautique Navale), rehabilitation,

strength, and employment, 204, 206, 218, 222,287, 379-80

Allied vessels for, 221-22, 224casualties, 403nCCS policies regarding, 221-22, 225-26, 377employment and operations, 181, 182, 221-22,

378, 393fusiliers marins (marines), 225Marine Nationale organized, 221operational control, 222participation in ANVIL, 186, 225participation in OVERLORD, 182, 224-25, 225n

INDEX 427

French Navy—Continuedports and naval installations rehabilitated, 377,

378rehabilitation of vessels, 221-22, 225-26, 282,

377, 401, 402. See also Joint RearmamentCommittee (JRC); SHAEF Mission to France,Naval Division.

repairs in the United States, 221scuttling at Toulon, 17, 17n, 214strength, 221, 222, 224, 378-79

French North Africa, 11, 183, 189, 191, 192, 214,215, 239, 264, 265, 301, 303, 304

Allied landings, opposition to, 16, 16n. See alsoTORCH.

civilian economy, supplies for, 402Clark-Darlan Agreement, 16, 16ncontribution to war effort, 194defense and internal security of, 123, 160-62,

162n, 186effect of political strife on troops, 80, 80nfood production, 142—43forces of. See North African Forces,political developments, 21, 78-79, 80-81, 97-98,

119, 119nre-entry into the war, 1,16

French Provisional Government, 324, 327, 328, 341,345n

movement to Paris, 191recognized by Allies, 345successor to CFLN, 191

French rearmament. See also specific entries suchas Accounting; Nonprogram units; Shipping;Supply and maintenance,

and Allied logistical plans, 31, 108-09, 400British equipment for. See under United King-

dom,captured enemy equipment for, 57, 60, 91-92,

284, 324, 334, 347, 350compared with rearmament of other Allies, 402cost in dollars, 402difficulties encountered, 400-01French equipment for. See under France,hampered by lack of French technical personnel,

71, 94-95, 189, 308, 400hampered by lack of liaison personnel, 227hampered by language barrier, 228, 400justification, 57, 209, 328, 394, 403-04objectives, 43-44, 62, 73, 76, 93, 95-96, 113-14,

129, 146-47, 148, 152-53, 155, 308, 312, 316,318, 400. See also Rearmament programs.

French rearmament—Continuedpayment of French personnel, 217-18political aspects, 24, 32, 33-34, 42, 42n, 43, 84,

86, 348, 362political complications affecting, 80-81, 97-98,

342-43, 361, 367-68procedures and policies, 21-23, 62, 63, 70, 158,

177, 345, 346-47, 354-55, 397, 401terminated, 361, 365, 368-72, 398, 399termination governed by end of hostilities, 341,

357, 359, 360U. S. contribution, summary, 401U. S. responsibility toward, In, 90, 355, 400value to U. S., 111, 155, 178, 403, 404

French ResistanceAllied agencies assisting, 9, 299-300, 302early organization, 8-9, 17and Fighting France, 9nforces of. See French Forces of the Interior

(FFI).Maquis, 301, 304, 305relations with de Gaulle and Giraud, 86—87

French Training Section (FTS), 89, 101, 130,229, 235, 240, 271, 291. See also Kingman,Brig. Gen. Alien F.

creation, 231, 293French Liaison Section with, 295French participation in, 295and inspection of units, 99, 142, 164, 165, 234,

237, 239and JRC, 92, 233-34, 283, 293-94movement to France, 192, 193-94, 239, 296movement to Oran, 233training program, 236. See also Training,under Fifth Army control, 293U. S. advisers with French divisions, 172, 231,

276, 295U. S. instructor teams with French units, 170,

231-33, 237, 295and 2674th JRC Headquarters Company (Pro-

visional), 293-94and 2674th JRC Regiment, 294and 6834th JRC Training Regiment, 294, 294n

French Union, 308, 391, 392French West Africa, 195, 201, 374, 391

contribution to war effort, 194Pre-TORCH build-up of forces, 12

French West Indies, 53, 214, 221Fullerton, Lt. Col. R. G., 383, 385


Gale, Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey M., 81, 351Gammell, Lt. Gen. J. A. H., 126, 148, 152, 158,

168. See also Allied Force Headquarters(AFHQ).

Garbay, Brig. Gen. Pierre, 353Garde Mobile, 316, 329, 331, 341, 370Gardiner, Col. William Tudor, 135, 196, 274, 274n,

283. See also Joint Rearmament Committee(JRG).

chairman, JAC, 208, 286, 287chairman, JRC, 25, 208n, 272and French rearmament, 56, 198, 272n, 284

Gaulle, Gen. Charles de, 11, 39, 39n, 78-79, 80,105, 115, 116, 153, 163, 166, 183, 192, 194,202. 273, 315, 337, 344, 345, 404. See alsoFrench Committee of National Liberation(CFLN); French National Committee; FrenchProvisional Government.

at Casablanca Conference, 33conference with Eisenhower, 124-25, 228and control of French forces, 119and Darlan, 21and equipping French forces, 12-13, 124-25, 157,

203. 221, 306, 327, 336-37, 338excluded from TORCH, 13and forces for the Far East, 393-94, 396and Franco-Italian border incident, 368, 369and Free French Forces, 9, 82, 195, 214and Giraud, 32, 78, 86-87, 98, 125, 151-52and Resistance Forces, 299, 301, 302, 302n, 319and Stuttgart incident, 361-62, 367in Washington, 165, 312, 321

Gendarmerie, 316, 319, 323, 329, 331, 341, 370Geraghty, Col. Michael J., 135, 136, 137, 138, 175,

283, 290, 291, 292. See also Stock ControlSection, JRC.

Gérardot, Brig. Gen. Paul, 212Germany, 1, 9, 309, 338, 340, 392, 395

armistice of June 1940 with, 7, 11, 404armistice with (V-E Day), 341, 344, 358, 359,

360, 363, 366, 369, 376, 396, 402, 403French casualties incurred in, 403nFrench occupation forces in, 317, 322, 327, 337,

359, 365, 399French security units in, 341, 342, 343, 344French units participating in campaign of, 363,

364, 397, 404French zone of occupation, 342, 343, 365operations in, 390, 396, 399

Gibraltar, 13, 78Giles, Maj. Gen. Barney McK., 208

Giraud, Gen. Henri, 1, 16n, 17, 24, 45, 49, 72, 114,115, 123-24, 134, 139, 144, 145, 149, 180-81,195, 196, 214, 220, 228, 231, 233, 255, 256,273, 280, 284. See also Commander in Chief,French; French Committee of National Lib-eration (CFLN); French High Command.

appearances before the CCS, 35-36, 82appointed Commander in Chief, 16, 18appointed Inspector General, 152at Casablanca Conference, 33, 35-36, 48, 218and CFLN, 98, 118, 152-53and conquest of Corsica, 101and control over French forces, 79-80, 86, 98,

116, 117-119, 151-52and de Gaulle, 32, 78-79, 125and employment of French forces, 56-57, 76,

82, 224and equipping of French forces, 29, 32, 43, 46,

48, 58, 65, 65n, 70, 75, 79-80, 82, 94, 107-08, 109, 110, 125, 148, 152-53, 158, 159, 202,203, 211, 219, 221, 257-58, 306

his estimate of French capabilities, 23and Free French Forces, 86-89, 107-08, 110,

117, 117nand French forces in Italy, 113, 116-17, 147,

153, 167and French forces in Tunisia, 18, 27-28and French merchant shipping, 74message to America, 59-60message to Roosevelt, 32messages to Marshall, 86, 97, 124, 126-27, 148misgivings about ANFA Agreement, 39-41negotiations with Roosevelt at Anfa, 36-38, 49n,

52, 53, 152and organization of expeditionary forces, 71, 75,

87, 88-89, 115-16, 126, 155and payment of troops, 217-18Pre-TORCH negotiations with, 13-14, 306relations with AFHQ, 96relieved of command, 152replaces Darlan, 21sends missions to the United States, 26, 27n,

217, 279and service troops, 104-05, 107, 125, 166-67.

See also Service troops, French.and substitutions of equipment, 243-44and U. S. assistance, 69visit to Canada, 85, 85 nvisit to the United States, 77-78, 81, 82-84, 86,

92, 94, 152-53wants four armored divisions, 127, 128, 129,

148-49

INDEX 429

Glassford, Rear Adm. William A., 218Godfrey, Adm. René, 214, 221Goumiers, 12, 12n

employment, 82, 111, 112-13, 113n, 159equipment for, 149, 160, 250-51goum, tabor, and tabor group organization, 112-

13. See also Units, French.Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Fran-

çaise. See French Provisional Government.Graham, Maj. Erwin S., 385Granier, Brig. Gen. Georges, 187, 188, 358. See

also Base 901.Green, Maj. Archibald W., 295Gross, Brig. Gen. Jean, 167, 187. See also Base

901.Gruenther, Maj. Gen. Alfred M., 63Guillaume, Maj. Gen. Augustin, 12n, 113, 178, 353,

397Gustav Line, 178, 179

Halifax, Lord, 392Hall, Rear Adm. John L., 217Hampton Roads, Va., 220Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T., 55, 317. See also

Operations Division, War Department(OPD).

Hartemann, Col. André, 286, 288Henry, Flight Lt. A. L. W. R., 286Hesdin, Maj. Gen. René de, 353Hewitt, Vice Adm. Henry Kent, 225Holland, 310, 374n, 381Holmes, Col. Julius C., 274Home Fleet. See under Royal Navy.Home Guard (Br.), 247Hopkins, Harry L., 36nHughes, Maj. Gen. Everett S., 72-73, 105, 317Hull, Cordell, 80-81, 301-02, 392-93. See also

State Department.Hull, Brig. Gen. John E., 52. See also Opera-

tions Division, War Department (OPD).HUSKY, 54, 54n, 77-78, 77n, 83

Imperial General Staff (Br.), 10n, 331India, 392Indian Ocean, 224Indochina, 391, 398, 399

French desire to liberate resisted by Roosevelt,392, 393, 394

Resistance forces in, 394-95

Infantry Divisions, U. S.3d, 3534th, 18228th, 35336th, 35366th, 38775th, 353

Infantry weapons. See also Ammunition,automatic arms, 89, 247

BAR's, 250, 252for nonprogram units, 250, 252for program units, 249-50, 252for Sovereignty troops, 252fusil-mitrailleur, 249, 249n, 250, 251, 252in hands of forces engaged in Tunisia, 249machine and submachine guns, 249-51pistols and revolvers, 249, 251, 252-53

carbines, 246, 247-48, 248n, 249, 250controversy over French infantry fire power, 248,

253of French manufacture, 246, 249-50, 251, 328rifles

for former Resistance forces, 324in hands of forces engaged in Tunisia, 246for nonprogram units, 246, 247for program units, 45n, 83, 85, 91, 246-47,

248, 249for Sovereignty troops, 246substitutions, 246, 247, 249, 250

Inspection Group, Rearmament Division, SHAEFMission to France, 326, 381, 383-84. Seealso Kingman, Brig. Gen. Alien F.; Training,

activities, 339, 387, 388establishment and composition, 386—87and Metropolitan Forces, 357, 390transferred to USFET Mission to France, 3906834th Rearmament Regiment, 294n, 386, 387

Inspector General (Fr.), 152International Division, ASF, 219, 263, 312. See

also Army Service Forces (ASF).and arming the French, 22, 27, 99, 198, 346,

369-70, 375on Franco-American relations, 154

Italy, 116, 144, 168, 169, 183n, 191, 237, 238,255, 258, 263, 264, 275, 276, 295, 321, 388.See also Fifth Army; Sicily,

campaign in, 72, 117, 399French air units engaged in, 207, 209, 210, 211-

12French casualties in, 403nFrench ground units engaged in. See French

Expeditionary Corps (CEF).


Italy—ContinuedFrench participation in campaign of, 72, 94, 95—

96, 101, 114, 121, 129, 147, 151, 152, 153,155, 159, 166, 167, 171, 174, 178-80, 194, 248,328, 334, 367, 404

incident in northwest Italy, 367-68, 369, 376,398

maintenance of French forces in, 139, 143, 257postcampaign re-equipping of French units, 173,

182-83

Jacobson, Capt. Henry, 295Japan, 317, 398

French participation in war against, 308, 371,391-92, 393, 395, 396

occupation of Indochina by, 391, 394, 395surrender (V-J Day), 372, 399, 402

Jaujard, Rear Adm. Robert, 225Jean Bart, battleship, 220, 221Jedburgh teams, 304Joint Air Commission (JAG), 204, 205, 209, 210,

262, 271, 309, 373n. See also Saville, Brig.Gen. Gordon P.

activities, 286-87chairmen, 203, 208, 286, 287composition, 286—87disbandment, 212, 286establishment, 93, 202-03, 282, 285-86functions, 203, 206and the JRC, 288and MAAF, 286and Mediterranean Air Command, 286movement to France, 212, 382, 384

Joint Chiefs of Staff, U. S. (JCS), 317, 370, 371,379. See also Arnold, Gen. Henry H.; King,Adm. Ernest J.; Leahy, Adm. William D.;Marshall, Gen. George C.

and employment of liberated manpower, 317-18,322, 330

and employment of North African Forces, 84on French participation in Far East operations,

391, 397membership, 10nand organization and equipping of Metropolitan

units, 309, 318, 320, 322, 333, 336-37, 357,360, 361, 363, 365-66

position on French rearmament, 34-36, 48-49,51, 53-54, 55, 55n, 56-57, 82, 95

position on postwar forces, 327, 337, 366and U. S. assistance to French Resistance,

301-03, 304JCS 206/1, 55n

Joint Logistics Committee (JLC), 314-15, 317,322, 330, 336, 337, 364, 395

Joint Rearmament Committee (JRC), 103, 128,139, 208n, 227, 229, 236, 241, 254, 291, 309,311, 316, 324, 382, 385

activities, 282-84, 285and ANFA Plan, 41and Brazilian Expeditionary Force, 275-76chairmen, 25, 92, 107. See also Artamonoff, Lt.

Col. George L.; Gardiner, Col. William Tudor;Loomis, Brig. Gen. Harold F.; Spalding, Brig.Gen. Sidney P.

composition and organization, 271, 281-82disbandment, 278and equipping of French air units, 196, 200, 201,

202, 203, 205-206, 209, 285and equipping of French forces, 65, 70-71, 72-73,

76, 89, 91, 92, 94-96, 100, 104, 120, 122, 126,142, 156, 163-64, 169, 191, 193, 244, 249,252, 260, 281

and equipping of French naval units, 214, 215,222, 282

establishment and functions, 25, 62, 271on Franco-American relations, 154, 159and French ANVIL forces, 164and French forces in Tunisia, 281, 282-83and French High Command, 280, 281, 284and French requisitions, 143, 158, 161, 169, 172-

73, 255French Section, 278-81. See also Regnault,

Brig. Gen. Jean,and French service troops, 105, 106, 107, 108,

109, 189, 235and French supply system, 130, 131, 133, 135,

283and French Tables of Organization and Equip-

ment, 70-71and French Training Section, 92, 275, 282,

293-94, 295. See also French Training Sec-tion.

and JAG, 288JRC Advance, 276-78JRC Rear, 193, 278and maintenance of French troops, 257, 261, 262and Mast Plan, 29membership, 272. 274-75movement to France, 192, 212, 276, 381, 382-83,

385-86position in theater staff structure, 92, 271,

273-74, 275, 282reports issued by, 284-85

INDEX 431

Joint Rearmament Committee (JRC)—Continuedand shortages in French units, 99, 141, 170,

232, 234and Stock Control Section, 135, 137, 234. See

also Stock Control Section, JRC.and U. S. support troops for the French, 71, 104

Joint Staff Planners, U. S. (JPS), 95, 391and French rearmament, 55, 55nand liberated manpower, 306, 308, 310

Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 203, 309, 326,379, 391

Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC), 93Jousse, Lt. Col. Louis, 14

JPS. See Joint Staff Planners, U. S. (JPS).JRC Headquarters Company (Provisional),

2674th, 291, 293, 294. See also FrenchTraining Section, JRC

JRC Regiment, 2674th, 294JRC Training Regiment, 6834th, 294, 294n, 386Juin, Gen. Alphonse, 11, 80, 94, 151, 194, 230, 248,

347, 367, 368, 396chief of staff, French National Defense, 191, 369commander, French forces in Italy, 72, 72n, 117,

141, 146, 147, 167, 178, 179n, 256. See alsoFrench Expeditionary Corps (CEF).

commander, French forces in Tunisia, 27-28and labor and security units, 323, 327-28, 330,

341, 342-44, 362, 366and Metropolitan Forces, 321, 322, 327-28, 329,

330, 331, 346, 355, 358-59, 362, 364Kesselring, Field Marshal Albert, I79nKing, Adm. Ernest J., 34, 379, 393

and French rearmament, 35, 51, 52, 83, 218member CCS, 10n

Kingman, Brig. Gen. Alien F., 92, 107, 130, 131,142, 147, 233, 294, 294n, 388n. See alsoTraining,

chief, French Training Section, 232, 293. Seealso French Training Section (FTS).

chief, Inspection Group, 326, 386, 387, 388.See also Inspection Group,

and inspection of French troops, 170, 234, 236,237, 283, 295, 339

movement to France, 296and training of French troops, 72, 89-90, 101,

231-32, 235, 236, 239, 390Kirk, Vice Adm. Alan G., 225, 377, 385Knox, Frank, 217Knox, Lt. Col. John C., 235, 275, 294, 294n

Koenig, Lt. Gen. Pierre, 87, 320commander, 1st Free French Brigade, 11commander, 1st Free French Division, 10-11commander, FFI, 300, 319Military Governor of Paris, 319

Labarbarie, Lt. Col. Maurice, 358, 358nLafayette Escadrille, 196. See also under Units,

French, Air Force.Laing, Capt. M. B., 275Lake Chad, Africa, 10L'Arba, Algeria, 236Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B., 166, 188, 229, 238.

See also Services of Supply (SOS)NATOUSA,

and equipping French troops, 155, 164, 170, 190,241-42, 264

and French supply system, 132, 133, 136, 137,143, 174

Larminat, Lt. Gen. Edgar de, 80, 81, 378Lattre de Tassigny, Gen. Jean de, 187. See also

1st French Army,commander, Armée B, 183commander, 1st French Army, 183, 337, 353commander-designate, French ANVIL forces,

125, 153, 163, 181and Stuttgart incident, 361, 367

Lawley, Lt. Col. Douglas N., 272Leahy, Adm. William D., 223, 223n, 396. See

also Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) ; JointChiefs of Staff, U. S. (JCS).

and French rearmament, 50, 51, 52-53, 54, 56,334

member CCS, 10n

Le Bel, Lt. Col. Albert, 82nLeclerc, Maj. Gen. Jacques, 10, 182, 353, 397Leclerc Column. See under Units, French.Le Havre, 339Lehman, Lt. René, 275, 281Lemaigre-Dubreuil, Jacques, 26, 31, 32, 37n

Le Mans, 355Lemonnier, Rear Adm. André, 87, 221, 222, 224,

225. See also French Navy.Lend-lease, 25, 103, 146, 262, 285, 345, 360, 366

agreements on, with French authorities, 345n,362

charges against French account, 144, 145, 263,267, 401. See also Accounting,

end of, 361, 365, 368-69, 370-72, 398for Free French Forces, 10, 402


Lend-lease—Continuedfor North African Forces, 21reverse (Reciprocal Aid), 257, 266-67, 345n,

362, 403settlement of French account, 402-03

Lend-Lease Act, 21, 263, 267Le Troquer, André, 118n, 149-50, 177. See also

under French Committee of National Libera-tion (CFLN), Commissioner of War and Air.

Lewis, Maj. Gen. John T., 341, 342, 381Leyer, Lt. Gen. Roger, 64, 64n, 83n, 122, 123, 128,

132, 140, 143, 152, 157, 164, 170, 173, 177,190, 237, 239, 244, 254, 255, 280, 284, 290.See also French High Command (France);French High Command (North Africa).

appointed Army Chief of Staff (Algiers), 87appointed Army Chief of Staff (Paris), 386and employment of liberated manpower, 192, 308,

309, 316and 15 August (43) Plan, 105, 106, 108and forces for the Far East, 391and maintenance of troops, 257, 258, 262, 263,

265and organization and equipping of' Metropolitan

units, 330, 331, 349, 351, 356program. See under Rearmament programs,rearmament requests from, 75-76, 86, 159, 200,

252, 257, 266and reorganization of French supply system, 133and service troops, 146, 166, 174, 351

L'Huillier, Lt. Col. André, 233, 237, 294-95, 296,386, 386n

Liberated manpowerof Belgium, 325, 341nof Czechoslovakia, 329employment and equipping, 299, 306-08, 310,

311, 313-15, 317-18, 319, 326, 329, 332-33,334, 335, 340, 341-42

of France. See under Metropolitan Forces; Re-armament programs, Liberated ManpowerProgram.

of Poland, 329, 335and problem of postwar armies, 313, 315, 317,

337responsibility for equipping, 357SHAEF's program of employment, 310, 313, 314,

315, 316, 329-30Liberated Manpower Program. See under Rearm-

ament programs.Ligurian Gulf, 367Linares, Brig. Gen. François de, 353Liri River, Italy, 178

Lodge, Lt. (jg) J, 275London, 22, 150, 302, 303, 386, 399

agencies in, supporting French Resistance, 9n,299-301, 306, 310

French National Committee at, 9, 12, 78Headquarters, ETOUSA, at, 25Post-Hostilities Planning Committee at, 308

London Munitions Assignments Board. See Mu-nitions Assignments Board, London.

Loomis, Brig. Gen. Harold F., 128, 135, 147, 155,170, 173, 174, 177, 191, 193, 205, 237, 280,311, 376, 388n. See also Joint RearmamentCommittee (JRC) ; Rearmament Division,SHAEF Mission to France,

chairman, JRC, 107, 275, 393chief, Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to

France, 192, 194, 233, 324, 331, 381, 383,385, 386, 387

chief, Rearmament and Operations Division,USFET Mission to France, 387

commands Headquarters, North African Dis-trict, 276

and substitutions of equipment, 241, 242, 244,248

on Franco-American relations, 154and French ANVIL forces, 164, 239and French service troops, 107, 146, 166and maintenance of French forces, 257, 262, 263and Metropolitan Forces, 316, 329, 332, 346,

347, 349, 350, 356, 356n, 363and nonprogram units, 158, 159, 190and rearming the French, 107, 108-09, 121, 122,

126, 241, 249and Sovereignty Forces, 160-61and Territorial Forces, 123and training of the French, 390

Lorraine, battleship, 221, 225, 378Lowry, Lt. Col. Howard J., 284Luckenbach, Lt. Col. Everett A., 295Luminaski, Maj. Robert M., 295Lutes, Gen. LeRoy, 312Lyon, 8, 186, 187, 354, 358, 366, 371

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 376, 396, 397Macmillan, Harold, 119, 149, 152Macready, Lt. Gen. George N., 40, 40n, 50, 52, 54.

See also British Joint Staff Mission.Madagascar, 9, 255, 258, 391, 392Magnan, Brig. Gen. Joseph, 181, 353Maintenance. See Supply and maintenance.Maquis. See under French Resistance.

INDEX 433

Marine Nationale. See under French Navy.Marseille, 183, 347, 350, 354, 375

Base 901 at, 187, 266Coastal Base Section at 186-87, 248Delta Base Section at, 188, 193, 239JRC training personnel operating at, 294, 296,

386SCAM A office at, 188, 386

Marshall, Gen. George C., 15, 26, 27, 30, 31, 38,41-42, 78, 82, 101, 105, 111, 118, 123, 126,127, 129, 148, 155, 158, 179, 183, 203, 212,221, 228, 231, 308, 312, 314, 382. See alsoCombined Chiefs of Staff (CCS); Joint Chiefsof Staff, U. S. (JCS).

and ANFA Agreement, 40n, 43-44, 48, 49non ANFA Plan, 39-40on control of French forces, 150and equipping Metropolitan Forces, 122, 165,

309, 312-13, 320, 321, 322, 327, 333, 336,347, 360, 362, 364

and equipping North African Forces, 34-36, 39-40, 46-47, 48, 50, 55, 56, 75, 83, 84, 85, 86,92, 93, 97, 98, 123-24, 165

and equipping Resistance Forces, 301—02, 303,304

and Franco-American relations, 154, 254and Free French Forces, 13and French forces for the Far East, 331, 391-92,

394, 396-97, 398member CCS, 10nand termination of French rearmament, 368, 369on U. S. service troops for the French, 104-05,

167, 168and use of liberated manpower, 315, 320, 321,

323Martin, Lt. Gen. Henry, 101, 181Martinique, 53, 234, 237Massigli, René, 119, 149Mast, Brig. Gen. Charles

at Cherchel meeting, 1, 14Plan. See under Rearmament programs.

McCloy, John J., 31, 42n, 369, 398McCrea, Capt. John L., 36n

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 53, 368, 369Mediterranean Air Command, 201, 205, 207. See

also Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W.assistance to French Air Force, 287control over French units, 202, 203, 204, 223Establishment Section of, 286and the JAC, 93, 203, 285-86superseded by MAAF, 206, 286

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF), 287.See also Eaker, Lt. Gen. Ira C.

assistance to French Air Force, 209, 210, 212establishment, 207, 286Mediterranean Allied Coastal Command, 207

Mediterranean Base Section (MBS), 67, 174, 189,193, 239, 245, 291, 294

Mediterranean theater, 324, 367. See also indi-vidual campaigns; Allied Force Headquarters(AFHQ) ; French Air Force (FAF).

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U. S. Army(MTOUSA), 193, 267, 270, 368-69

Meknes, French Morocco, 189, 236Mendigal, Gen. Jean, 195, 198, 200Metropolitan Forces, 122, 191-92, 285. See also

French Air Force (FAF) ; French Navy;French rearmament; French Resistance; Re-armament Division, SHAEF Mission toFrance; Training.

Armistice Army, 7-8, 11, 17British equipment for. See under United King-

dom.Canadian equipment for. See under Canada.captured enemy equipment for, 324, 334, 347,

348, 355control of units, 326, 327-28, 341, 362, 366, 370difficulties in arming, 345effectives available for, 323, 330-31equipping as planned by the French, 165, 306,

308, 310-11, 312, 316, 321, 327, 329, 330,336, 373. See also Liberated manpower.

equipping suspended, 342-43, 345, 361, 363-64,365

French equipment for. See under France.large-scale activation resisted by Allies, 308-09,

313. 315, 336-37maintenance, 365, 370, 371-72manpower requirements, 337-38, 346, 351-53organization and equipping of combat units, 313,

314. 317-18, 320, 321-22, 323, 324, 326, 328-29, 331-33, 334-35, 336, 346-47, 348, 351,354-55, 356, 358, 359-60, 362

organization and equipping of labor and securityunits, 310, 311-12, 313, 314, 315-16, 318, 320,321, 322, 323, 324, 326, 329, 330, 331, 336,338, 339, 340-42, 368, 370

postarmistice issue of equipment to, 364, 365,371

problem of postwar forces, 313, 315, 322, 326,357, 364, 365

rehabilitation of military establishment, 328, 330,336, 337


Metropolitan Forces—Continuedresponsibility for equipping units of, 355security units for use in Germany, 342, 343—44support troops for, 313-14, 339-40, 348-49,

350-51, 358, 363units for the Far East. See French Far East Ex-

peditionary Corps (CEFEO).Metropolitan Program. See under Rearmament

programs.Michelier, Vice Adm. François, 214, 215, 217Middle East Command, 82Military Representatives of Associated (Pacific)

Powers, 30nMinister of Defence (Br.). See Churchill, Prime

Minister Winston S.Minister of Economic Warfare (Br.), 299, 300Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (Fr.),

402nMinistry of Foreign Affairs (Fr.), 336, 368, 396Ministry of War (Fr.), 325, 330-31, 339, 352, 357,

365, 386, 389, 398. See also Diethelm, André.Mondin, Maj. Gilbert, 275Monnet, Jean, 44, 81n, 280, 284Monsabert, Lt. Gen. Aimé de Goislard de, 111, 178,

183, 183n, 353Montcalm, cruiser, 82Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L., 111,

335Morel, Maj. Jean, 272, 279, 280Morliere, Maj. Gen. Louis, 353Morrow, Col. John, 272Munitions Assignments Board, London, 22, 45n,

252, 385Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, 26, 44,

47,99, 131, 141, 176, 220, 280assignments to the French, 45, 55, 60, 84, 86, 89,

97, 125, 148, 156, 158, 164, 201, 208, 210, 241,247, 252, 258, 346, 375

responsibilities, 22-23, 40, 48-51, 52, 53-54, 55,79, 103, 360

Munitions Assignments Committee (Air), 22, 197Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground), 22,

45, 85, 101-03, 265, 309nMunitions Assignments Committee (Navy), 22Murmansk, USSR, 224Murphy, Robert D., 36n, 39, 98

on French rearmament, 43Pre-TORCH negotiations with Giraud, 14, 37n

Muselier, Vice Adm. Emile, 214Mutual Aid, Anglo-French. See under United

Kingdom.

Naples, 143, 146, 166, 187National Defense Committee. See also French

High Command (North Africa),establishment and functions, 98, 116n, 118, 153and 1st DMI incident, 116-17and forces for the Far East, 391, 393-94and rearmament program, 105, 122, 126—27,

128, 148, 150, 177, 308, 312, 373, 377National Defense General Staff (Fr.). See under

French High Command (North Africa).Navy Department, 223, 372. See also United

States Navy.Negro troops, French, withdrawn from Western

Front, 325, 354, 394Netherlands, 252, 343New York, 80n, 220New York Port of Embarkation, 144, 219

Noce, Maj. Gen. Daniel, 170, 239Noguès, Gen. Auguste, 11, 12nNoiret, Brig. Gen. Charles, 310, 315, 385Nonprogram units, 72, 190, 191, 191n, 193

equipping, 112-13, 121, 149, 158-60, 169, 246,252

maintenance, 121

Normandy, 182, 303, 334North Africa. See French North Africa.

North African District, 276North African Economic Board, 255, 262North African Forces, 311. See also French re-

armament; Joint Rearmament Committee(JRC) ; Rearmament programs.

African Army, Pre-TORCH rearmament plans,14-15

African Army, status, 11-12, 17-18agencies involved in equipping and training, 271air units. See also French Air Force (FAF).

integration into Allied air forces, 198maintenance and supply, 198, 199-200operational control, 198performance, 199rearming, 30, 54, 55, 57, 61, 76-77, 83, 86,

90, 195-99, 200-01casualties, 403nCCS discussions on equipping, 33-36, 50, 52-53combat performance, 24, 82, 178-79, 179n, 194,

199, 328, 334control, 117-18, 150-51, 152, 309effects and implications of their equipping, 30-

31, 47, 48-49, 50-51, 54, 56, 57, 82, 93n, 124,196-97, 199. See also Shipping.

INDEX 435

North African Forces—Continued

fusion with Free French Forces, 80, 81-82, 86,195, 201, 221, 273

JCS proposals for their equipping, 155

lend-lease extended to, 21

morale affected by equipping, 29, 30, 42, 43, 86,127, 128-29, 159

naval units, 214-15. See also French Navy.Allied aircraft and vessels for, 218desertion of crews to Free French vessels,

80n, 218employment and control, 214, 220-21payment of personnel, 217rehabilitation, 76, 77, 82-83, 90, 214-17,

218-20repairs in the United States, 215, 218, 220

operational employment, 55, 78, 83, 93-94, 94n,95-96, 101, 108, 111, 119

operations. See individual campaigns.

procedure for assigning equipment to, 22-23, 198

re-entry into the war, 16—17

strength, 23-24, 71, 82, 87, 105, 115, 194

units eliminated from rearmament program, 126-27, 128-29, 149

white and native elements in, 23-24, 115, 254

women in, 259, 260. See also Women's ArmyAuxiliary Corps, French (AFAT).

North African Shipping Board, 255North African Theater of Operations, U. S. Army

(NATOUSA), 113, 153, 156, 159, 190, 239,276, 284. See also Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.;Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.; Services of Sup-ply (SOS) NATOUSA,

control over JRC, 275, 282Devers commands, 129Eisenhower commands, 25and equipment for the French, 97, 107, 136, 140,

144, 156, 158, 164, 172, 176, 210, 212, 227,249, 252, 259-60, 266, 267-68, 274

headquarters moved to Caserta, 276nand maintenance of French troops, 103, 138, 141,

142, 144, 205, 254-55, 257-58, 263-64, 265,266

and readying French ANVIL forces, 163, 164, 173responsibility in arming the French, 25, 46, 63,

231, 264, 269and training of French troops, 293

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 403

Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF), 198, 200,204, 205, 207, 286. See also Spaatz, Maj.Gen. Carl.

Northwest African Air Service Command(NAASC), 198, 200, 206

Northwest African Coastal Air Force, 204Northwest African Tactical Air Force, 198, 204Northwest African Troop Carrier Command, 283

Nyo, Brig. Gen. Georges, 397

Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 300, 301, 304.See also Donovan, Brig. Gen. William J.

Office of War Information, 348

Old, Capt. Francis P., 275Operations Division, War Department (OPD), 327

and French armament, 22, 23, 47, 52, 55-56,91, 97, 284, 346, 364

and use of liberated manpower, 314-15, 317, 330Operations Groups, 304Oran, Algeria, 63, 67n, 84, 193, 220, 235, 238

Allied landings at, 16French base at, 135, 157, 166, 229French Training Section at, 233, 293, 296SCAMA established at, 132-33, 134, 290

Ordnance Group, 53d, 275

Ordnance Service, 346Ordnance Training School, French, 189, 236

Organisation de Résistance de l'Armée, 17

Oudjda, French Morocco, 293OVERLORD, 122, 299, 311, 313, 316

French participation in, 119, 125, 127, 129, 150,151, 171, 228

French units in, 182, 210, 224-25Resistance Forces and, 303-04

Overseas Supply Division, New York Port of Em-barkation, 219

Pacific theater, 44, 364. See also Far East.introduction of French forces in, 371, 391, 396,

397. See also French Far East ExpeditionaryCorps (CEFEO).

operations in, 379, 396Pacific War Council, 391

Paris, 86, 125, 157, 171, 192, 226, 336, 347liberated, 182, 191, 276, 319, 393movement of French armed services to, 191, 193,

212, 393movement of French Training Section to, 296,

386Parnell, Lt. Col. W. C., 295


Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M., 163, 183, 238, 239.See also ANVIL; Force 163; Seventh Army.

Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr., 40, 182, 230, 283Pénette, Capt. Marcel, 12nPeninsular Base Section (PBS), 143, 146, 166, 167,

265. See also Base 901 (Fr.)Permanent Military Committee (Fr.). See under

French Committee of National Liberation(CFLN).

Pershing, Gen. John J., 3, 6n. See also AmericanExpeditionary Forces (A.E.F.).

and equipping A.E.F., 2, 5for a unified American force, 2, 5

Pétain, Marshal Henri, 7, 11, 16, 16n, 21, 33. Seealso Vichy Government.

Philadelphia, 220Pianosa Island, 182Plat, Maj., 275Poincelet, Lt. Comdr. R., 272POL, 100n, 109, 369, 371Port-aux-Poules, Algeria, 235Portal, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles, 10n, 36. See

also British Chiefs of Staff; Combined Chiefsof Staff (CCS).

Post exchange supplies. See under Supply andmaintenance.

Poste de Statistique. See under French HighCommand (North Africa).

Post-Hostilities Planning Committee (Br.), 308Potsdam Conference, 371, 398Pound, Adm. Sir Dudley, 10n, 36, 218Poupinel, Gen. R., 279Poydenot, Brig. Gen. Antoine, 249, 249nPréaud, Lt. Gen. Henri, 344Préclaire, Lt. Col. René, 295Première Armée Française. See 1st French Army.Prioux, Lt. Gen. René, 64nProvence, 183Provisional Government of the French Republic.

See French Provisional Government.Prytanée, 236

QUADRANT. See Quebec Conference.Quails, Maj. J. R., 275Quartermaster (Fr.), 257, 258-59Quebec Conference (Aug 1943), 95, 96

Rabat, French Morocco, 283Ramsay, Adm. Sir Bertram H., 224-25

Ratay, Brig. Gen. John P., 187

Rations, 100n, 103, 369, 371considered inadequate, 155, 255-56, 257, 287constitution of food stocks, 142-43, 254-55, 25for expeditionary forces, 89, 143, 144, 145, 187.

207, 254-56, 257-58French and Moslem menus, 255, 256-57, 258

Rearmament Division (Br.), 388, 390Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to France,

294n, 329, 330, 385. See also Loomis, Brig.Gen. Harold F.; Regnault, Brig. Gen. Jean,

activities, 381, 388Air Section, 373, 373n, 374, 375, 384, 385and equipping ex-Resistance Forces, 326establishment, 192, 276, 324, 381, 382-83French Group, 331, 383, 385-86and equipping labor and security units, 339membership, 381-83, 386and equipping Metropolitan units, 331, 336.

346-47, 348, 355, 358mission, 381Naval Section, 384organization, 383-84, 387-88training section. See Inspection Group.

Rearmament and Operations Division, USFETMission to France, 387

French Group in, 387Training Section in. See under Inspection

Group.Rearmament problems. See French rearmament.

Rearmament programsAir programs, 158, 177, 196-97, 199, 202, 308,

373Plan VII, 204-06, 207-09, 210-11, 212,

223, 224, 373Plan VII, Extension of, 335, 359, 363, 374

ANFA Plan, 37-38, 39, 53, 104, 155, 196, 308-09, 385

implications, 38-42, 43-44, 48, 49n, 73, 105implementation, 45, 61, 71, 72-73, 92, 95,

97, 322, 327, 332, 333modifications, 87-89, 109

15 August (43) Plan, 94-97, 103, 105, 107-09,110, 114-15, 126, 146, 148-49

Béthouart Program, 29-30, 31-32, 38, 45, 196-97

Far East Program, 293, 29423 January (44) Plan, 128, 129, 145, 146,-147,

148-49, 155, 156, 157-58, 160, 163, 166, 167,177, 183

Leyer Program, 75-77, 86, 159

INDEX 437

Rearmament programs—ContinuedLiberated Manpower Program, 331, 332, 335,

338, 339-42, 344, 346, 360, 363, 366, 370,381, 387, 389, 396

Mast Plan, 14, 15, 24, 29-30, 38, 281Metropolitan Program, 331-32, 333-35, 336,

337-38, 339, 341, 343, 344-45, 346-51, 354,355, 356-57, 358-60, 361, 362-63, 367,369-70, 371, 381, 382, 387, 389-90, 395, 398,399

Naval programs, 215-17, 218, 224CCS 358 (Revised), 221-22, 225

20 November (43) Plan, 109-10, 114-15, 117,121

30 November (44) Plan, 331, 332, 334proposed by de Gaulle, 12-13, 336-38proposed by Giraud, 13proposed by JCS, 55proposed by National Defense Committee, 308

Rearmament Regiment, 6834th. See under In-spection Group.

Rébillon, Capt. Fernand, 196Reciprocal Aid. See under Lend-lease.Red Army, 340, 396Regnault, Brig. Gen. Jean, 108, 113, 128, 131-32

356n, 386chief, French Section, JRC, 92, 275, 280-81,

281n. See also Joint Rearmament Commit-tee (JRC).

chief, French Group, Rearmament Division,SHAEF Mission to France, 281, 331, 385-86,388n. See also Rearmament Division, SHAEFMission to France.

chief, French Group, Rearmament and Opera-tions Division, USFET Mission to France,387-88

Replacements, 183, 238for 1st French Army, 239, 325, 337, 346, 351-53,

354, 388-89training of. See under Training.

Reunion, 9Resistance. See French Forces of the Interior

(FFI); French Resistance.Rhine River, 343, 344, 364, 376Richelieu, battleship, 80n, 82, 215, 217, 220, 221,

224Robb, Air Marshal James M., 334, 374Robert, Rear Adm. Georges, 53, 214, 221Rock de Besombes, Group Capt. J., 286Rome, 179, 179n, 209Rooks, Maj. Gen. Lowell W., 113-14, 118Roosevelt, Lt. Col. Elliott, 36n

Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 10n, 32, 38-39,43, 54, 57, 77, 82, 110n, 118, 122, 217, 223-24, 303, 309, 317, 336

agreements with Giraud, 36-38, 39-40, 40n, 41,43-44, 49, 49n, 51, 52, 53, 56, 84

at Casablanca Conference, 33, 34, 48and CFLN, 79, 119n, 150and Cherchel meeting, 1, 1n, 14and de Gaulle, 79-80, 337, 362and French political strife, 98and lend-lease to the French, 10, 21message to the French, 59opposed to French return to Indochina, 392, 393,

394-95Rouen, 339Royal Air Force (RAF), 195, 200, 201, 204, 210,

212, 286, 374, 376, 384Royal Air Force Bomber Command, 373, 376SAS Brigade and French components, 182, 211,

304, 316, 3742d Tactical Air Force, 212, 373

Royal Navy, 214, 223, 273, 275Far Eastern Fleet, 224Fleet Air Arm, 223Home Fleet, 224

Rue, Rear Adm. Joseph, 378

Saar, 344Saint-Didier, Brig. Gen. Auguste Brossin de, 128,

320, 327. See also French Military Missionin the United States.

and forces for the Far East, 394, 395, 398, 399and Metropolitan Forces, 325, 333-34, 362

Saint Exupéy, Maj. Antoine de, 209nSt. Tropez, 316Salan, Brig. Gen. Raoul, 353San Francisco, 362Sardinia, 56, 208, 211, 262Saville, Brig. Gen. Gordon P., 288. See also Joint

Air Commission (JAC).chairman, JAC, 203, 275, 285, 286, 287commander, XII Tactical Air Command, 211,

286and equipping French air units, 202, 205member, JRC, 275, 285

Schlesser, Brig. Gen. Guy, 353Scotland, 304Sea Frontier Forces, 217Secretary of State. See Hull, Cordell.Sedan, France, 13Seine River, 182Selborne, Lord, 300


Senegal, 325

Service Central des Approvisionnements et Ma-tériels Américains (SCAMA), 135, 145, 166,172, 176, 212, 227, 271, 295. See also Char-pentier, Col. Emile.

abolished, 357activities, 175-76, 193, 291-93difficulties encountered by, 135-36, 137, 174-75establishes "common language," 292establishment and mission, 132-33, 137, 139, 288forward echelon in Marseille, 189and French ANVIL forces, 164, 189and French supply system, 138, 175growth, 138, 143, 175movement to France, 194, 386organization, 288-90publications depot operated by, 175, 229and Stock Control Section, 135, 138U. S. equipment for, 136

Service de Renseignements (S. R.), 8, 299

Service du Matériel. See under Supply Services,French.

Service troops, French. See also 1st French Army;French Expeditionary Corps (CEF).

controversy over requirements in, 104-08, 109,110, 113-15, 114n, 124-25, 166, 167-69, 189,350-51, 358

and handling of U. S. equipment, 354-55at PBS, 146program of activation, 108, 109-10, 114-15, 153,

156, 168-69, 210, 348-49, 358, 363, 366recruitment difficulties, 23-24, 94-95, 97, 104,

106-07, 110, 124, 126, 129, 130, 165-67, 189,308

short of equipment, 174training. See under Training,white personnel for, 71, 106

Services of Supply (SOS) ETOUSA, 172Services of Supply (SOS) NATOUSA, 130, 170,

188, 207, 241, 259, 290, 293, 294. See alsoLarkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B.

and arming the French, 67-68, 85, 136, 156, 169,172, 190, 205, 211, 244, 260, 264, 265, 268,269

and French ANVIL forces, 164, 173French liaison group with, 134, 137, 145and French service troops, 107, 189and French supply system, 132, 134and maintenance of French forces, 133, 139, 141,

142, 143-44, 145, 146, 173, 186-87, 254, 255,257, 258, 263, 264

Services of Supply (SOS) NATOUSA—Continuedand repossession of U.S. equipment, 176, 190—91and requisitions for the French, 144-45, 172-73and Stock Control Section, 135

Sétif, Algeria, 162nSeventh Army, 163, 183, 361, 376. See also Force

163; Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M.and support of French forces, 169and training of French forces, 238—39

Sevez, Maj. Gen. François, 117, 178, 353SHAEF Mission to France, 341, 348, 381, 382, 385,

386, 387Air Component, 373n, 375, 377, 385, 386and equipping French forces, 339, 352, 365French Armament Liaison Section with, 331Naval Division, 377-78, 384, 386organization, 324Rearmament Division. See Rearmament Di-

vision, SHAEF Mission to France.SHAEF Rearmament Regiment, 6834th, 386, 387

Shaw, Lt. Col. Robert J., 275-76, 295Sheeline, Lt. Paul C., 286Shipments, 145

of British equipment to the French, 339, 350,355, 356

cargo convoy symbols, 47nCommanding General Shipments. See under

Supply and maintenance,distinctive markings for, 46n, 354miscellaneous, 60-61, 71-72, 72n, 77, 84-85, 94,

96, 97, 99-100, 111, 156, 164, 165, 236, 347,350, 356, 359-60

UGS 6½, 47-48, 51, 65-67, 69, 130Shipping

allocations to French rearmament, 41, 42, 47-48,51, 57, 74, 75-76, 77-78, 83, 84, 95, 255

French merchant ships, 35, 38, 42, 51, 53-54,74-75

limiting factor, 30-32, 40, 43-44, 46n, 49, 50-52,53-54, 75-76, 77, 83, 93, 241, 323

Shortages, 356causes of, 159, 169, 171, 189in deliveries from the United States, 89, 99, 148,

156, 174, 189filling of, 172, 176, 190, 375incurred by French units, 99, 113, 164, 190, 355-

56, 359, 364inspections to determine, 170, 238of spare parts, 99, 121, 140-42, 165, 169, 170,

171, 174and substitutions, 89

INDEX 439

Sicilycampaign of, 83, 94, 286nFrench participation in assault on, 72, 94n, 113

Siena, 179Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell, 123, 126, 397-98.

See also Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ);Supreme Headquarters, Allied ExpeditionaryForce (SHAEF).

and employment of French forces, 94, 113, 119,343-44, 366

and French rearmament, 32, 40, 46n, 56, 81, 84,88, 107, 113, 129, 159, 325, 330, 332, 334, 348,351, 359, 365, 368

and French service troops, 350-51on General Juin, 72nand liberated manpower, 310, 312, 315, 330,

342-43, 344and reconstitution of Metropolitan Army, 329

Smolensk, 195nSomervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 33, 35, 38, 44, 48,

82, 84. See also Army Service Forces (ASF).and rearming the French, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 75,

78, 83, 95, 96-97, 269, 336, 348, 349special convoy arranged by, 47

Southeast Asia Command, 392, 394, 399Southeast Training Command. See under U. S.

Army Air Forces (USAAF).Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), 188Sovereignty Forces, 17, 156, 186, 191, 192-93, 356.

See also French Communications Zone.British equipment for, 161, 244employment, 123, 160, 162, 162n.French-made equipment for, 250, 251, 252strength, 123, 194U. S. equipment for, 123, 142, 160-62, 173, 193,

368-69Spaatz, Maj. Gen. Carl, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201,

202. See also Northwest African Air Forces(NAAF).

Spalding, Brig. Gen. Sidney P., 105, 107, 142, 143,202. See also Joint Rearmament Committee(JRC).

chairman, JRC, 92, 104, 274and French supply system, 131-32and equipment shortages in French units, 99

Special Air Service (SAS) Brigade (Br.). See un-der Royal Air Force (RAF).

Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ), 300-301,303, 310

Special Operations branch of OSS, 300Special Operations Executive (SOE), 299, 300,

301

Special Project Operations Center, 300

Special Services Division, ASF, 261

Special Services supplies. See under Supply andmaintenance.

Stalin, Marshal Joseph, 110nStaouelli, Algeria, 191n

State Department, 37n, 150, 263, 336, 357, 369,371, 372, 392, 394, 396. See also Hull, Cordell.

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 337Stephens, Lt. Col. Roy, 295

Stock Control Section, JRC, 164, 172, 271, 282.See also Geraghty, Col. Michael J.

activities, 291-92disbandment, 175, 291organization and functions, 283, 288, 290-291and SCAMA, 135, 137-38, 174, 290, 291

Stourm, Comdr. André, 272, 275Strasbourg, 344, 347

Strength. See under specific commands such asNorth African Forces; French Navy.

Stuttgart incident, 361-62, 367, 375, 396Styer, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D., 241Sudre, Brig. Gen. Aimé, 353

Suez Canal, 221Supply and maintenance, 100-01, 109, 121-22,

146-47, 169, 186-87, 188. See also Expe-ditionary forces; Territorial Forces,

of air units, 198, 207, 262, 374, 375, 376classes of supply, 100n

Class I. See Rations.Class II. See Armor; Artillery; Clothing;

Infantry weapons.Class III. See POL.Class IV, 264-66Class V. See Ammunition.

Commanding General Shipments, 267-68, 346,401

disposal of British equipment, 177emergency transfers, 28, 29, 60, 70, 141, 173,

244, 282-83excess stocks, 176, 190, 191, 193of forces in Germany, 360, 36545-day reserve, 143of naval units, 220of nonprogram units. See under Nonprogram

units.replacements, 99, 145, 170, 171, 183, 249repossession of items, 157, 164, 176-77, 190-91,

193


Supply and maintenance—Continuedrequisitions, 169-70, 186, 192, 281-82. See also

under French High Command (North Africa) ;Joint Rearmament Committee (JRC); Serv-ices of Supply (SOS) NATOUSA

shoes for animals, 258nspare parts, 99-101, 130, 177special supplies, 260

gratuitous components, 260, 263miscellaneous, 265—66post exchange supplies, 144, 207, 260, 261-

64Special Services supplies, 144, 207, 261

substitutions of equipment, 241-42, 249, 253.See also under Artillery; Armor; Infantryweapons.

technical publications in French, 228-30theater transfers, 103, 141, 144-45, 156, 160,

164-65, 172, 174, 210, 241, 243, 247, 257,262, 264-66, 268, 346, 366, 376, 401

unnecessary items, 85Supply services, French, 69, 139, 173, 227, 259.

See also Service Central des Approvisionne-ments et Matériels Américains (SCAMA).

Centre de Reception des Matériels Américains(CRMA), 135, 136

dearth of personnel for, 135-36, 174and French expeditionary forces, 133, 136-37,

145, 147and goal of self-reliance, 134progress in stock recording, 175, 291-93and reorganization of supply system, 130, 131-32,

134, 138, 155, 174-75and stockpiling, 142, 143Service du Matériel, 131shortcomings, 100, 130-31, 133, 136, 143, 144,

147, 169, 174Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, 125,

145, 149, 152, 153, 302, 314. See also Alex-ander, Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G.;Wilson, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland.

and control of French forces, 150-51and French rearmament, 177, 392

Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force,300, 302, 332. See also Eisenhower, Gen.Dwight D.; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Ex-peditionary Force (SHAEF).

and control of French units, 327, 375Eisenhower appointed, 124and liberated manpower, 310, 314, 316-17, 330

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force(SHAEF), 157, 162n, 192, 212, 330, 383.See also Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.; Smith,Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell.

Air Staff and the French, 375and arming the French, 193, 194, 226, 276, 324,

331, 332, 334, 335, 336, 338, 346, 348, 349,350-51, 354, 355-56, 358, 360, 361, 362, 363,365, 366, 385, 386

and control of French forces, 194and control of labor and security units, 327—28,

342, 343-44, 366, 370dissolution, 371, 376, 381, 387, 390and employment of liberated manpower, 239,

299, 306, 311-12, 313, 314-15, 329, 334, 346and employment of Metropolitan units, 358and 1st French Army, 351and French Navy, 377-78, 385and organization and equipping of labor and se-

curity units, 310, 314, 315, 316, 320, 322-23,325, 326, 329, 331, 339, 341, 366, 370

Mission to France. See SHAEF Mission toFrance.

and requirements in French combat units, 313,314, 323, 332, 338, 351

and Resistance forces, 300, 324, 325, 326, 333,389

Suttles, Col. Ernest A., 68, 283Syria, 9

Tableau d'Effectifs de Guerre (T.E.G.). Seeunder Tables of Organization and Equipment.

Tables of Organization and EquipmentFrench tables, 70-71, 140-41, 142, 163, 170-71,

176, 250, 250nfor liberated manpower units, 310, 321Tableau d'Effectifs de Guerre (T.E.G.), 250nU. S. tables and French rearmament, 73, 163-64,

169, 211, 248n, 251, 251n, 281, 387, 397Tabors; tabor groups. See Goumiers; Units,

French.Tanks. See Armor.Technical Training Command. See under U.S.

Army Air Forces (USAAF).Tedder, Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur W., 54, 201,

202, 203, 204, 206-07. See also Mediter-ranean Air Command.

Tehran Conference (EUREKA), 110n, 111

Terré, Major H., 260Territorial Command (Fr.), 321, 329

INDEX 441

Territorial Forces, 17, 109, 186, 192-93, 260,310-11. See also French CommunicationsZone,

equipping, 72, 92, 123, 128, 142, 172-74, 193,258, 326n, 369

strength, 123, 194Third Army, 172, 18230 November (44) Plan. See under Rearmament

programs.Tiers, Lt. Claude, 295, 295nTimberlake, Brig. Gen. Patrick W., 286, 287Tompkins, Brig. Gen. William F., 284TORCH, 14-15, 60

Free French excluded from, 13launching, 16North Africa's resistance to, 16, 16n

Toulon, 17, 183, 214, 377Training, 130. See also French Training Section

(FTS); Inspection Group; Kingman, Brig.Gen. Alien F.

of air personnel, 196, 203-04, 207, 208, 209-10,211, 234, 236-37, 374, 388, 390

in amphibious operations, 235British contribution to, 203, 355, 360, 374,

389-90in continental France, 239, 240, 387, 389difficulties encountered in, 235, 237, 238, 388-

89under Fifth Army, 72, 89-90, 231, 235of labor and security units, 326, 339, 389matériel for, 164-65, 169, 211, 231, 236, 237,

238, 245, 360of naval personnel, 220ordered by Eisenhower, 28, 231policies and procedures, 62—63of replacements, 236, 237-38, 239, 245, 351-52,

388-89schools and centers operated by the French, 233,

236, 237-38, 388, 389scope and purpose, 230-31, 238of service personnel, 107, 231, 234-35, 236, 239in the United States, 30, 196, 197-98, 202, 208,

227, 234, 237, 374, 388, 389, 390under U.S. instructors, 101, 230, 232-33, 235,

236, 237, 284, 387, 388, 390U.S. responsibility toward, 231in use of radar, 234

Treasury Department, 218TRIDENT. See Washington Conference (May

1943).Tripolitania, Africa, 10

Troop Carrier Wing, 51st, 286n

Troubridge, Rear Adm. Thomas H. (RN), 181,225

Troyes, France, 326Truman, President Harry S., 10n

ends lend-lease, 370, 371, 372, 376, 398and Franco-Italian border incident, 368, 369,

398and French forces for the Far East, 396

Trun, France, 334Tunis, 60n, 138, 209, 283Tunisia, 11, 195, 280

campaign of, 17, 56, 56n, 274captured enemy equipment, 91-92, 283equipment for French forces, 29, 60, 70,

92, 244, 246, 249, 273, 281, 282-83French casualties, 32, 58, 403nFrench participation in, 10-11, 18, 24, 27-

28, 31, 42,65, 113, 196, 404Juin commands French forces, 27-28, 72n

contribution to war effort, 194Twelfth Air Force, U. S., 201

XII Air Force Service Command, 198, 205, 206XII Air Force Training and Replacement Com-

mand, 198, 209XII Tactical Air Command, 211, 212, 286

French Section with, 21220 November (43) Plan. See under Rearmament

programs.23 January (44) Plan. See under Rearmament

programs.

Tyrrhenian Sea, 178

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 51,52

forces of, 143. See also Red Army.French squadron in Red Air Force, 11, 195,

195n, 376U.S. equipment for, 15, 44, 400, 402

Unit of fire, 69, 69nUnited Kingdom, 9, 11, 171, 182, 202, 204, 207,

225, 241, 286, 304, 316. See also BritishChiefs of Staff.

Anglo-French Mutual Aid, 177assistance to Resistance forces, 144, 299-300,

301-02, 302n, 303, 335disposal of British equipment, 177, 392and equipping liberated manpower, 311, 315—16,

317, 318, 320, 321, 323, 326, 329, 340, 341


United Kingdom —Continuedand equipping Metropolitan Program units, 331,

333, 334, 335, 344, 345, 350, 355, 356, 358,371, 381-82, 386, 388-89

and equipping North African Forces, 27, 28-29,45n, 60, 177, 195, 196, 198, 201, 208, 210,211, 218-21, 223, 224, 244, 246, 247, 248,250, 251, 260, 302

and Free French Forces, 10and French forces for the Far East, 392, 393over-all assistance to the French, 377, 402nresponsibility toward French rearmament, 10,

81-82, 86, 87, 88, 90, 400and training of French forces, 237, 314, 355, 360,

386-87, 388, 389-90United Nations, 10, 30, 32, 35, 51, 93, 217, 306,

311, 391, 400and CFLN, 96conference of San Francisco, 362and French Provisional Government, 345lend-lease equipment to members of, 22-23

United States Chiefs of Staff. See Joint Chiefs ofStaff, U. S. (JCS).

United States Forces, European Theater (USFET),387

successor to ETOUSA, 371USFET Mission to France, 371-72, 387, 388.

See also Rearmament and Operations Divi-sion, USFET Mission to France.

United States Navy, 223, 223nUnits, British. See also Royal Air Force; Royal

Navy.Army, First, 244Army, Eighth, 10, 88, 111Auxiliary Territorial Service, 260Corps, 10, 80nPort Ordnance and Workshop Detachment, 355

Units, FrenchAir Force

Air Depot Group, 2121st French Air Corps, 212, 373, 376, 385Lafayette Squadron, 196, 199Normandie Fighter Squadron (Normandie-

Niemen Regiment), 11, 195, 195n, 3761st Parachute Regiment (1st RCP), 211-

12, 248, 259, 3742d Parachute Regiment (2d RCP), 182,

211, 304, 374, 374n3d Parachute Regiment (3d RCP), 182,

211, 304, 374, 374n

Units, French—ContinuedArmies and Army Detachments

Armée B, 183Détachement d'Armée des Alpes (Army De-

tachment of the Alps), 353, 363n, 367Détachement d'Armée de l'Atlantique

(Army Detachment of the Atlantic), 363nPremière Armée Française (First French

Army). See 1st French Army.Army Brigades and equivalent

Brigade d'Extrême-Orient, 3931st Free French Brigade, 102d Free French Brigade, 10Leclerc Column, 10, 87, 195Spahis Brigade, 112, 113, 127, 159, 160

Army Corps1st, 181, 183, 183n, 3532d, 183, 183n, 3533d, 3494th, 349Corps Expéditionnaire Français. See

French Expeditionary Corps (CEF).Corps Expéditionnaire Français en Extreme-

Orient. See French Far East Expedi-tionary Corps (CEFEO).

Corps Léger d'Intervention, 393Army Divisions, Armored

1st Armored Division (1st DB), 89, 111,171, 183n, 186, 245, 295, 353

2d Armored Division (2d DB), 88, 111, 171,172. 182, 225, 245, 246, 295, 353, 354,363n

3d Armored Division (3d DB), 127, 128,245, 349, 358

5th Armored Division (5th DB), 88, 89,111, 171, 186, 245, 295, 353

Army Divisions, Infantry1st Colonial Infantry (1st DIC), 3971st Free French Infantry (1st DFL), 10-11,

87, 88-89, 88n, 246, 249, 2731st Infantry (1st DMI), 343, 349, 353, 358-

59, 364, 3901st Motorized (or March) Infantry (1st

DMI), 89, 89n, 97, 108, 110, 116-17,120, 127, 171, 172, 178, 183, 225, 235,246, 251, 295, 325, 325n, 344, 349, 353,354, 367, 392

2d Free French Infantry (2d DFL), 10, 87,88, 273

2d Moroccan Infantry (2d DIM), 70, 89,111, 112, 116, 117, 140, 141, 146, 147,173, 178, 183, 194, 251, 256, 295, 353

INDEX 443

Units, French—ContinuedArmy Divisions, Infantry—Continued

3d Algerian Infantry (3d DIA), 70,89, 111,117, 147, 173, 178, 183, 183n, 251, 295,353, 397

4th Moroccan Mountain Infantry (4thDMM), 70, 72, 89, 101, 111, 117, 178,183, 194, 251, 252, 295, 353

7th Algerian Infantry (7th DIA), 127, 1288th Algerian Infantry (8th DIA), 126, 1279th Colonial Infantry (9th DIC), 89, 111,

116, 127, 172, 181, 183, 265, 295, 325,353, 354, 397

10th Colonial Infantry (10th DIC), 126,128

10th Infantry (10th DI), 343, 347, 349,353, 358, 359, 364, 390

14th Infantry (14th DI) , 349, 353, 354,358

19th Infantry (19th DI) , 349, 35825th Infantry (25th DI), 349, 35827th Alpine Infantry (27th DIA), 349, 353,

354, 358, 359, 36736th Infantry (36th DI), 343, 349, 354,

358-59, 364, 390Army Regiments and equivalents

1st Algerian Spahis Regiment, 246n1st Algerian Tirailleurs Regiment (1st

RTA), 1571st Moroccan Tabor Group (1st GTM),

178, 183-862d Algerian Spahis Regiment, 246n2d Moroccan Tabor Group (2d GTM),

101, 181, 1863d Moroccan Tabor Group (3d GTM), 178,

1864th Moroccan Tabor Group (4th GTM),

111, 178, 1914th Zouaves Regiment, 156, 1605th Moroccan Spahis Regiment, 1137th Chasseurs d'Afrique Regiment, 68n7th Algerian Spahis Regiment, 1139th Zouaves Regiment, 157

Army Units, Miscellaneous. See also Base 901.Bataillon de Commandos (Commando Bat-

talion), 112, 113, 159, 160Bataillon de Choc (Shock Battalion), 72,

101, 112, 113, 159, 160, 181Commandos de France, 191nCorps Franc d'Afrique, 72, 113Groupe de Commandos d'Afrique, 181

Units, French—ContinuedArmy Units, Miscellaneous—Continued

4th Moroccan Tabor, 94nparachute units. See under Units, French,

Air Force.Staouelli Commandos, 191n

Marine and naval units1st Fusiliers Marins (Marines) Regiment,

2251st Fusiliers Marins Commandos (Marine

Commandos) Battalion, 225Groupe de Canonniers Marins (Naval Gun-

ners Group), 225Regiment Blindé de Fusiliers Marins (Ar-

mored Marine Regiment), 225U. S. advisers with French divisions. See under

French Training Section.U. S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), 196, 198, 200,

204, 223n, 301, 312, 346. See also Arnold,Gen. Henry H.

and French rearmament, 22, 205, 375, 384Southeast Training Command, 234Technical Training Command, 234

USFET Mission to France. See under UnitedStates Forces, European Theater (USFET).

U.S. Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF), 375, 385U.S. support troops for the French, 186, 188, 314,

348

Valin, Lt. Gen. Martial, 195, 373Vallette d'Osia, Col. Jean, 349, 353Valluy, Brig. Gen. Jean, 353, 397Van Hecke, Col. Jean, 68nV-E Day. See under Germany.Vehicles, 347

Algiers assembly line, 67-69, 176, 283Casablanca assembly line, 85, 131, 229issues to the French, 356shortages, 176, 189-90, 355

Vernejoul, Brig. Gen. Jacques de, 88, 186, 353

Versailles, 294VESUVIUS. See under Corsica.Vichy Government, 7-8, 9, 12n, 21, 316. See also

Pétain, Marshal Henri.Victory Program. See under Army Service Forces

(ASF).Vigier, Maj. Gen. du Touzet du, 186, 353Virieu, Maj. Charles de, 8nV-J Day. See under Japan.Vitebsk, 195n


Wallace, Vice President Henry A., 392War Department, 63, 109, 121, 126, 128, 227, 228,

231, 248, 308, 309and ANFA Plan, 41, 45and equipping French air and naval air units,

197, 203, 205, 208, 211, 223, 375-76and equipping Metropolitan forces, 335, 344,

347, 349, 356, 357, 359, 360, 385and equipping nonprogram units, 159and equipping North African Forces, 84, 85, 96,

103, 108, 119, 122, 131, 141, 148, 155, 157,158, 164, 172, 176, 193, 229-30, 236, 238,258n, 259, 305, 346, 390

and filling of shortages, 169, 190and French forces for the Far East, 392, 394,

397and French service troops, 104, 108, 167, 168,

348and lend-lease accounting, 267—69and maintenance of French forces, 144, 145-46,

171, 257, 258, 263, 365position on French rearmament, 31, 45-46,

308-09responsibility toward French rearmament, 22, 70and special items for the French, 262, 263, 264-

66and substitute equipment, 241-42, 244, 245, 249,

250, 251, 252and termination of French rearmament, 363,

368, 369-70, 372and use and equipping of liberated manpower,

314-15, 316, 320-21, 332-33, 341War Department Operations Division. See Op-

erations Division, War Department (OPD).War Office (Br.), 201, 299, 305, 371, 392, 402n.

See also United Kingdom,and equipping French combat units, 335, 344,

356, 365, 370, 371, 385, 386, 388and equipping labor and security units, 316, 320,

321, 323, 324, 329, 340and training French forces, 386-87, 390

War Production Board, 265

War Shipping Administration, 52, 262Washington Conference (May 1943), 56, 76

and French participation in operations, 171and French rearmament, 57-58

Wavell, Gen. Sir Archibald P., 50Weeks, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald, 331, 332West Africa. See French West Africa.Western European Union, 403Western Task Force, 28, 217Weygand, Gen. Maxime, 8, 11, 12nWhiteley, Maj. Gen. J. F. M., 76, 107, 134, 139-40,

228Wilson, Maj. Gen. Arthur R., 174, 186, 187, 188.

See also Coastal Base Section (COSBASE);Continental Advance Section (CONAD) ;Mediterranean Base Section (MBS).

Wilson, Edwin, 119, 149, 152Wilson, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland, 151, 152, 153,

158, 192, 211, 239, 301, 302. See also AlliedForce Headquarters (AFHQ) ; Supreme AlliedCommander, Mediterranean,

appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Mediter-ranean, 125

congratulates the French, 194and control over French forces, 149, 150-51and French rearmament, 149, 155, 156-57, 161,

177, 191, 207, 223, 225, 238, 243, 244, 256,392

and French service troops, 166and maintenance of French forces, 257and use of liberated manpower, 317

Wilson, President Woodrow, 5Women's Army Corps, U. S. (WAC), 259, 260Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (Fr.) (AFAT)

clothing for. See under Clothing,organization, 260strength, 259, 260

Wood, Brig. Gen. Jack W., 373n, 385World War I, 1. See also American Expeditionary

Forces (A.E.F.) ; Pershing, Gen. John J.Wright, Capt. Jerauld, 272, 275

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