ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO, PetitionerVS. MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN, VENANCIA AGUSTIN, MARCELINA AGUSTIN, PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL A. DALALO, GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO AGUSTIN, rESPONDENTS(G.R. No. 152364 April 15, 2010, 3rd Division)PERALTA, J.:

TOPIC: Proof of notarial documentsFACTS:On November 4, 1998, herein petitioners filed against herein respondents a Complaint for partition with the MTCC of Laoag City. The MTCC ruled, among others, that no evidentiary value could be given to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand, such that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay. Moreover, the MTCC held that two credible witnesses testified in plain, simple and straightforward manner that at the time the affidavit was supposed to have been signed and sworn to before the notary public, Basilisa was already bedridden and an invalid who could not even raise her hand to feed herself. In addition, the MTCC also gave credence to the testimony of the notary public, before whom the document was supposedly signed and sworn to, that the said affidavit was already complete and thumb marked when the same was presented to him by a person who claimed to be Basilisa.Petitioners contend that Basilisa's sworn statement which recognizes her siblings' share in the disputed property is a declaration against interest which is one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Petitioners argue that since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in court without further proof of its due execution and authenticity; that the testimonies of Basilisa's nurse and physician cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence which could overthrow such notarized document; that the notary public cannot impugn the same document which he notarized for to do so would render notarized documents worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the public.

ISSUEWhether or not the sworn statement can be heavily relied upon.

HELDNO. Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Moreover, not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. However, a question involving the regularity of notarization as well as the due execution of the subject sworn statement of Basilisa would require an inquiry into the appreciation of evidence by the trial court. It is not the function of this Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized documents. While indeed, a notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case because the regularity in the execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly executed, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as well as on the physical condition of the signatory, at the time the questioned document was supposedly executed. The trial and appellate courts were unanimous in giving credence to the testimonies of these witnesses.

PAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC., Petitionervs.COURT OF APPEALS and NICOLASCAPISTRANO, Respondent(G.R. No. 125283 February 10, 2006, 3rd Division)TINGA, J.:TOPIC: Proof of notarial documents

FACTS:Private respondent Nicolas Capistrano filed an Amended Complaint before the RTC of Manila against Severo C. Cruz III, his spouse Lourdes Yap Miranda pleading two causes of action. The first cause of action is for the nullification, or alternatively, for the "rescission," of a Deed of Absolute Sale. The second cause of action is for the rescission of another agreement with an alternative prayer for specific performanceCapistrano executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Cruz to mortgage the subject lot in favor of Associated Bank (the Bank) as security for the latters loan accommodation. Shortly, by virtue of the Special Power of Attorney, Cruz obtained a loan in the amount of P500,000.00 from the Bank. Thus, he executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the subject lot in favor of the Bank. Capistrano and Cruz then executed a letter-agreement. Capistrano executed the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject lot in favor of Cruz. Two days later, Notary Public Vicente J. Benedicto (Benedicto) notarized the deed. However, Capistranos wife, Josefa Borromeo Capistrano, signed the Marital Consent evidencing her conformity in advance to the sale. The Marital Consent was also sworn to before Benedicto. With the mortgage on the subject lot then being in danger of foreclosure by the Bank, Cruz filed a case with the RTC of Manila, Branch to enjoin the foreclosure. Cruz also devised a way to save the subject lot from foreclosure by seeking a buyer for it and eventually arranging for the buyer to pay the mortgage debt. Towards this end, Cruz succeeded in engaging Pan Pacific. Thus, on 22 September 1988, Pan Pacific paid off Cruzs debt. Consequently, the Bank executed a Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage. On even date, Cruz executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject lot in favor of Pan Pacific, attaching thereto the previous Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Capistrano in favor of Cruz.A Decision was rendered by the trial court in favor of Capistrano on both causes of action. Pan Pacific disputes the common conclusion reached by the courts below that the presumption of regularity of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Marital Consent, which in its estimation are both public documents, has been rebutted by Capistranos countervailing evidence.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Marital Consent can be presumedHELD:NO. Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that notarial documents celebrated with all the legal requisites under the safeguard of a notarial certificate is evidence of a high character and to overcome its recitals, it is incumbent upon the party challenging it to prove his claim with clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence. A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and it has in its favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. Absent such, the presumption must be upheld. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution of a notarial document lies on the one contesting the same. Furthermore, an allegation of forgery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same.Capistrano failed to present evidence of the forgery that is enough to overcome the presumption of authenticity. To support the allegation of the spuriousness of his signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale and that of his wife on the Marital Consent, Capistrano relied heavily on his bare denial, at the same time taking sanctuary behind other circumstances which supposedly cast doubt on the authenticity of the documents. Capistrano did not bother to present corroborating witnesses much less an independent expert witness who could declare with authority and objectivity that the challenged signatures are forged.

FELIPA DELFIN, GINA MAALAT, SHIRLEY TAMAYO, RECIO DAOS, and ROBERTO DELFIN, Petitionersvs.PRESENTACION D. BILLONES, ROSARIO D. DEMONARCA, Respondents(G.R. No. 146550 March 17, 2006, 3rd Division)

TINGA, J.:TOPIC: Proof of notarial documentsFACTS:A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Teresa Daos, Esperanza Daradar, Estrella Daradar and Maria Daradar, with the marital consent of Cipriano Degala, husband of Teresa Daos, in favor of the spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa Belo (spouses Delfin). The document, so it appears, bore the signatures of Esperanza and Estrella, as well as the thumb marks of Teresa, Maria, and Cipriano, and was acknowledged before a notary public. The spouses Delfin registered the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds of the Province of Capiz. Thereupon, a new title, was issued in the name of the spouses Delfin. Meanwhile, an Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute Deed of Sale was made between Teresa Daos, Trinidad Degala, Leopoldo Degala, Presentacion Degala, Rosario Degala and Pedro Degala, on one part, and the spouses Delfin, on the other. The deed, bearing either the thumb marks or the signatures of the sellers, was likewise notarized. Said document was registered by the spouses Delfin. Thus, a new one was issued in the names of the spouses Delfin.Respondents, claiming to be the heirs of the former owners filed an action for annulment, reconveyance, recovery of ownership and possession and damages. According to them, it was only in 1989 when they discovered that Teresa Daos, sick and in dire need of money, was constrained to mortgage the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 3414 to the spouses Delfin for P300.00 sometime in 1965. Taking advantage of her condition, the spouses Delfin made her sign a document purporting to be a mortgage, but which turned out to be an extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale.ISSUEWhether or not the Deed of Sale can be presumed.HELD:YES. Fraud may be, and often is, proved by or inferred from circumstances, and the circumstances proved may in some cases raise a presumption of its existence. However, while fraud may be proved by circumstances or presumed from them, it cannot be demonstrated by mere construction, but must be proven in all cases. Respondents indeed failed to prove that fraud attended the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale. Their bare and unsupported allegations are not enough to overthrow the presumption of the validity of said agreement or to raise the presumption of fraud. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Public documents are (i) the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (ii) documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (iii) public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein. Public documents may be proved by the original copy, an official publication thereof, or a certified true copy thereof; and when a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation by the officer having legal custody of the record must state that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. A duly-registered death certificate is considered a public document and the entries found therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence establishing otherwise. Nevertheless, this presumption is disputable and is satisfactory only if uncontradicted, and may be overcome by other evidence to the contrary. The documents presented by respondents were mere certifications and not the certified copies or duly authenticated reproductions of the purported death certificates of Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala. They are not the public documents referred to by the Rules of Court, nor even records of public documents; thus, they do not enjoy the presumption granted by the Rules.

ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent(G.R. No. 164457 April 11, 2012, 1st Division)BERSAMIN, J.:TOPIC: Proof of notarial documents

FACTSPetitioner was charged with estafa under an information filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City. Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of facts was had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The Prosecution then formally offered its documentary exhibits their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencans so-called Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies. After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention to do so, and instead rested its case.

The Trial Court rendered its decision stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted not to present evidence for her defense the Prosecutions evidence remained unrefuted and uncontroverted.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion.

ISSUE:Whether or not Testimonial and documentary evidence, being hearsay, did not prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:NO. In all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. To establish the elements of estafa earlier mentioned, the Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various documents consisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made toSection 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information. In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitionervs.TOMAS COCA JR., RICARDO COCA and RAMIL COCA, Respondents(G.R. No. 133739May 29, 2002, 1st Division)YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

TOPIC: Testimonial Evidence

FACTS:Accused-appelants were found guilty of the crime of murder by the Regional Trial Court. Accused-appellants and the victim, Edilberto Banate, were related by affinity, and all residents of Cabulihan, Guba, Cebu City. Brothers Ricardo Coca and Tomas Coca, Jr. are the first degree cousins of Merolina Banate, the victim's wife; while Ramil Coca is the son of Ricardo Coca. Accused-appellants, on the other hand, raised the defense of denial and alibi. The version of the defense was further corroborated by the testimonies of defense witnesses Pedro Soquib and Mario Rebales. Defense witnesses Sergio Borres and Roel Soquib, who helped bring the victim to the hospital, further narrated that Merolina Banate told them that she was not able to recognize the culprit because it was dark. In their appeal, accused-appellants contend that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the perpetrators. They claimed that at 7:00 in the evening, it was impossible for Merolina Banate to recognize the culprits through a inch gap on the bamboo flooring, considering that the area underneath the house where the gunfire allegedly came from was dark. In the same vein, accused-appellants assert that the testimony of Alexander Singson is fabricated.

ISSUE:Whether or not the prosecution established proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellants based on the testimonies of its witnesses.

HELD:YES. Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness has identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations, be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious. Moreover, it is not amiss to state that "relatives of a victim of a crime have a natural knack for remembering the face of the assailant and they, more than anybody else, would be concerned with obtaining justice for the victim by the malefactor being brought to the face of the law." Indeed, family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants, with more reason therefore that we should believe the positive identification of accused-appellants by Merolina Banate. Being close blood relatives and residents of the same barangay, Merolina would naturally and particularly be familiar with the face and build of accused-appellants. Accused-appellants were likewise positively identified by prosecution witness Alexander Singson as the persons he saw running away from the house of the victim right after he heard the gunshots. But even if we disregard the testimony of Singson, the persuasive and compelling testimony of the victim's wife, juxtaposed with the circumstances which proved feasible the identification of accused-appellants, are enough to prove their culpability beyond any scintilla of doubt.FELICITO G. SANSON, et al.,Petitioners-appellants,versus HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,Respondents-appellees.(G.R. No. 127745, April 22, 2003, 3rd Division)CARPIO MORALES,J.:

TOPIC: Disqualification by Reason of Death or Insanity of Adverse Party

FACTS: Felicito Sanson filed a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Juan See. Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of Php 603, 000.00 and to his sister Caledonia Sanson-Saquin in the amount of Php 320,000.00. also petitioner Eduardo Montinola and his mother filed separate claims against the estate alleging that the deceased owed them Php50,000 and Php 150, 000, respectively. During the trial, Caledonia and Felicito Sanson testified that they had transaction with the deceased evidenced by six checks issued by the deceased before he died and that after his death, Felicito and Caledonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were dishonored due to the closure of the account. The same transaction happened to Eduardo and Angeles Montinola but when they presented the check to the bank, it was dishonored. Demand letters were sent to the heirs of the deceased but the checks remained unsettled.

ISSUE:Whether or not presumption of consideration may be rebutted even if the heirs did not present any evidence to controvert it.

HELD: NO. When the fact was established by a witness that it was the deceased who signed the checks and in fact who entered into the transaction, the genuineness of the deceased signature having been shown, the latter is prima facie presumed to have been a party to the check for value, following Section 24 of NIL which provides that every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.Since the prima facie presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the heirs, it has become conclusive. Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence the checks.

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA,Petitioners,versusLAMBERTO T. CHUA,Respondent.(G.R. No. 143340, August 15, 2001, 3rd Division)GONZAGA-REYES,J.:

TOPIC: Disqualification by Reason of Death or Insanity of Adverse Party

FACTS:Respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, under the name ofJacinto as a sole proprietorship. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, a sister of the wife respondent, ErlindaSy. Upon Jacintos death, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations of Shellite without respondents consent. Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution of his net shares in thepartnership, petitioners failed to comply. Petitioners contend that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC beingtheagencythathasoriginaland exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. In the absence of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto,petitionersarguesthatthesecourtswereproscribesfromhearingthetestimoniesofrespondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" underSection 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render respondent's testimony and that of Josephine inadmissible.

HELD:NO. The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.The testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple reason that she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto.Petitioners insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen.Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.But beforethis rule canbe successfully invoked tobar theintroduction oftestimonial evidence, it is necessary that: The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted; The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind; His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

CECILIA ZULUETA,Petitioner,versusCOURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN,Respondents.(G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996, 2nd Division)MENDOZA,J.:

TOPIC: Privileged Communication Husband and Wife

FACTS:Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

ISSUE:Whether or not thepapers and other materialsobtained from forcible intrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualificationfrom medical practice.

HELD:No.The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wifedo not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

People of the Philippines, Petitioner, versus Honorable Sandiganbayan, Mansueto V. Honrada, Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. and Generoso S. Sansaet, Respondents.(G.R. No. 115439-41, July 16, 1997, En Banc)REGALADO, J:

TOPIC: Attorney and Client (Rule 130, Sec. 24 (b))

FACTS: In 1976, Paredes, applied for and was granted a free patent over a certain lot in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. In 1985, such patent was nullified through a court action instituted by the Director Lands on the ground that Paredes had made fraudulent representations to secure said patent. A case for perjury was subsequently filed against him, though it was later dismissed for having prescribed. However, a preliminary investigation for the violation of the Anti-Graft law was commenced before the Tanod bayan on the ground that Paredes allegedly used his position as Provincial Attorney to secure the patent. The Tanod bayan issued a resolution recommending the filing of charges against Paredes. A criminal case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was filed with the Sandiganbayan, but the same was later dismissed on the ground of prescription. Gelacio, who initiated the perjury and graft charges against Paredes, sought the investigation of Paredes, his counsel, Atty. Sansaet, and one Honrada regarding alleged falsification of public documents, among which are the notice of arraignments and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes in the perjury case previously dismissed. To evade liability, Atty. Sansaet revealed that said falsification was made upon the isntigation and inducement of Paredes, who contrived the scheme to dismiss the anti-graft case. The Ombudsman rejected the governments motion for the discharge of Atty. Sansaet as state witness and caused falsification charges to be filed against all the defendants. Another motion filed with Sandiganbayan for the discharge of Sansaet as state witness was denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the proposed testimony would fall under the Attorney-Client privilege.

ISSUE: Whether or not the projected testimony of Atty. Sansaet covered by the Attorney-Client privilege

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a distinction between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. If the client seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice. In the given case, the testimony sought from Atty. Sansaet as state witness are communications made to him by the physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify or were in the process of falsifying, the documents, which were later filed with the Tanodbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications made by Paredes to Atty. Sansaet were for the purpose of a crime not yet committed, and hence, are not barred by the attorney-client privilege.

People of the Philippines, Petitioner, versus The Honorable Sandiganbayan, Respondent.(G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996, En Banc)KAPUNAN, J:

TOPIC: Attorney and Client (Rule 130, Sec. 24 (b))

FACTS: A complaint was filed by the PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. for the recovery of alleged ill gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in certain corporations. Cojuangcos co-defendants were Teodoro Regala, Edgardo Angara, Avelino Cruz, Jose Concepcion, Rogelio Vinluan, Victor Lazatin, Eduardo Escueta, Paraja Hayudini and private respondent Raul Roco, all then partners of ACCRA Law Firm. They all admitted that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the aforesaid corporations by acting as nominees-stockholders of the same. Due to Rocos promise that he would reveal the identity of the pricipal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder, Roco was taken out of PCGGs amended complaint. The rest of the ACCRA lawyers then insisted that they, too, should be granted the same treatment given to Roco, but the Sandiganbayan denied their exclusion for not acceding to the conditions set by PCGG, which included the disclosure of the identity of its clients and the submission of pertinent documents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ACCRA lawyers are entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege in this case

HELD: Yes. As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be cloaked in mystery. The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. However, there are certain exceptions: 1) where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate said client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice; 2) where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; or 3) where the governments lawyers have no case against the attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. The given case falls under the aforesaid exceptions, and hence, attorney-client privilege may be invoked. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self-incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory.

Carolina Abad Gonzales, Petitioner, versus Court of Appeals, Respondents.(G.R. No. 117740, July 16, 1997, 3rd Division)ROMERO, J:

TOPIC: Physician and Patient (Rule 130 Section 24 (c))

FACTS: Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo. During the special proceedings, they claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo as he died a bachelor leaving no descendants or ascendants. Cecilia Empaynado and Marian Empaynado filed a motion to set aside the special proceedings concerning the estate of Ricardo alleging that Honoria was the common law wife of Ricardo while Cecilia and Marian were their children and that there is still another child named Rosemarie of Ricardo by another woman. The trial court ruled in favor of the Empaynados, declaring Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie as the surviving legal heirs of Ricardo. The CA also ruled in favor of the Empaynados. The Abads contended that the Empaynado children cant be Ricardos since, by means of an affidavit of a physician named Dr. Pedro Arenas, it is alleged that he was at the time infected with gonorrhea and as consequence, is sterile.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Pedro Arenas affidavit is admissible under Section 24 (c) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court declared that the rule on confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case;b) the relation of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician;c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient;d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; ande) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient. The Abads do not disagree that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased. The Abads conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. The Court held that the affidavit is inadmissible in evidence and remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad.

Nelly Lim, Petitioner, versus The Court of Appeals, Respondents.(G.R. No. 91114, September 25, 1992, 3rd Division)DAVIDE, JR., J:TOPIC: Physician and Patient (Rule 130 Section 24 (c))

FACTS: On November 25, 1987, Juan Sim filed with Pangasinan RTC a petition for annulment based on Article36, alleging that Nelly Lim is suffering from schizophrenia before, during and after marriage and until the present. On January 11, 1989, Sim announced he will present Dr Lydia Acampado, who is a psychiatrist, as a witness on January 25, 1989. Petitioner opposed on the grounds that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since Dr Acampado had examined Lim in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her withschizophrenia.Subpoena was issuedon January 12, 1989.On January 24, 1989, petitioner filed urgent motion to quash subpoena and suspend proceedings which was overruled. Respondent claimed that Dr Acampado will be presented as expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner as doctor. On March 3, 1989, petitioner filed with CA petition for certiorari and prohibition but was denied on September 18, 1989 on the ground that petitioner failed to establish the confidential nature of the testimony obtained from Dr Acampado.

ISSUE: Whether or not DrAcampado can be presented as expert witness

HELD: Yes. In order for patient-doctor privilege can beclaimed, the following requisites must concur:1. Privilege claimed is in a civil case2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine3. Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity4. The information was necessary for him to enable him to act in that capacity.

These requisitesmust concur with the 4fundamentalconditions necessary for invoking doctor-patient confidentiality: a. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosedb. Element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the partiesc. The relation must be one which the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fosteredd. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gain for correct disposal of litigation Dr. Acampado was only presented as an expert witness, she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of herexamination, interview and treatment of the petitioner.There is nothing specificor concrete evidence offered to show that the information obtained from Dr Acampado would blacken the petitioners reputation.Lastly, she makes no claimin anyof her proceedings thather counsel had objected to any questions asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the confidentiality privilege

Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, Petitioner, versus Court of Appeals and Edgar Krohn Jr., Respondents.(G.R. No. 108854, June 14, 1994, 1st Division)BELLOSILLO, J:

TOPIC: Physician and Patient (Rule 130 Section 24 (c))

FACTS: Ma. Paz Fernandez underwent psychological testing to ease her mental strain. In 1973, she and her husband, Edgar Krohn, with whom she had three kids, separated. Krohn was able to obtain a copy of the Psychiatric Evaluation Report signed by one Dr. Banaeg and one Dr. Reyes. By virtue of such report, he was able to obtain a decree nullifying his church marriage to Fernandez. A voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership was granted by the Pasig RTC, and in 1990, Krohn filed for the annulment of his marriage with the Makati RTC. Krohn used the contents of the aforesaid Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in his testimony, to which Fernandez objected on the ground of Physician-Patient privilege.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Psychiatric Evaluation Report be prohibited as evidence for being violative of the Physician-Patient privilege?

HELD:No. The person against whom the privilege is being claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics, as he is simply Fernandezs husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. He is therefore not barred by the privilege, and neither can his testimony be deemed a circumvention of the prohibition as his testimony cannot have the same force and effect as a testimony made by a physician who examined the patient and executed the report.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee,vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO,appellant.(G.R. No. 131636, March 5, 2003)DAVIDE, JR.,C.J.:TOPIC: Parental and Filial PrivilegeFACTS:Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape in committed against his 16-year old daughter,Cynthia Inencion. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. One of the witnesses presented by the prosecution was Elven Invencion, Artemios son. Artemio attacked the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.ISSUE:Whether or not Elven is disqualified from testifying against his father pursuant to the filial privilege ruleHELD:No.The filial rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant.The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only to tell the truth.

ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. ROSETE,Petitioners,vs. JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM,Respondents.(G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006)CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:TOPIC: Right against Self-incrimination

FACTS:On December 5, 1995, Respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed a complaint for annulment, specific performance with damages against AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), Espreme Realty and Development Corporation (Espreme Realty), Alfredo Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo, CHito P. Rosete, BPI and Registry of Deeds. Pursuant to which, respondents moved to take the depositions of petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete. However, petitioners opposed the taking of their depositions as two criminal cases against them involving the same facts and issues are pending before the courts, hence would be self-incriminating on their part.

ISSUE:Whether or not the taking of petitioners depositions would be self-incriminating to their prejudice in the pending criminal case filed against them.

HELD:No.The right against self-incrimination can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminating in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to which may incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.As to an accused in a criminal case, it is settled that he can refuse outright to take the stand as a witness. The Court clarified the rights of an accused in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others:1) To be exempt from being a witness against himself, and2) To testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself" signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS,respondents.(G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989)NARVASA,J.:TOPIC: Right against Self-incriminationFACTS:Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. He was found in an investigation to have caused the irregularities in the sales of plane ticket. It turned out, he has been misappropriating the proceeds of his ticket sales. On the day before the investigation, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten notes that he was willing to settle the irregularities in the sales and that he is willing to pay the deficient sales proceeds. No settlement however was reached. Two months thereafter, an information for estafa was filed against Ramos. To prove his guilt, his letter requesting for settlement was offered as evidence which was seasonably objected to by the accused. The evidence was objected on the ground that since it was in the form of confession, it should have been done in the presence of a counsel.ISSUE:Whether or not the letters are admissible in evidence. HELD:YES. The fundamental right against self-incrimination, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding.The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"This right prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions, and not a prohibition of inquiry."It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. Therefore, the right presupposes that the accused has already taken the witness stand and the incriminating question is fire at him. In the case at hand, the evidence objected to on the ground of self-incrimination is not a testimonial evidence but a documentary evidence hence admissible.

JOSE P. DANS, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.(G.R. No. 127073, January 29, 1998)IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.(G.R. No. 126995, January 29, 1998)ROMERO, J.:TOPIC: Role of Court in examination of witnessesFACTS:Imelda Marcos (Imelda) and Jose Dans, Jr. were charged for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA). The information which were one in contents, although some are differently worded, provided that petitioners entered on behalf of the LRTA, a government corporation, into an agreement for the development of the areas adjacent to the LRTA stations and the management and operation of the concession areas therein, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.Before trial could commence, Dans moved for the advance examination of defense witness Ramon F. Cuervo, Jr., a real estate broker, appraiser and friend of Dans who, as an expert witness, was in a position to inform court that the agreed lease prices stated in the subject agreements were fair based on standard industry valuation standards. The court a quo granted said motion, and Cuervo was allowed to testify. In short, Marcos and Dans were separately charged under two criminal cases for accepting employment in and/or acting as Chairman and Director, respectively, of the PGHFI while the latter had pending business (the lease agreements) with the LRTA, which they both also headed. With regard to the other cases, the accusations against both of them stemmed from the contracts they signed in representation of the LRTA and of the PGHFI which were allegedly entered into under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.Sandiganbayan (First Division) subsequently rendered a decision acquitting petitioners on three criminal cases but convicting them on two criminal cases. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied, hence petitioners separately filed their petition for review before the Supreme Court. Among others, petitioners point out that the limitations on the right of judges to ask questions during the trial were not observed by the Sandiganbayan. They accuse Justice Garchitorena of acting more of a prosecutor than the impartial judge he is supposed to be, particularly during the examination of Cuervo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the manner of questioning made by Justice Garchitorena, as the presiding judge, during the examination of Cuervo caused prejudice to petitioners which would cast much doubt on Garchitorenas impartiality.

HELD: NO. Petitioners were never prejudiced by such questioning.It was precisely for the reason that Mr. Cuervo was merely asked by Engr. Dans' lawyer as to the fair and reasonable rentals of the leased premises as without improvements, without the LRT stations being adjacent thereto, and no parts of commercial centers, that the Court, through Presiding Justice Garchitorena, was constrained to propound questions on the fair and reasonable rentals of the leased areas by considering them as not ordinary parcels of land.The Court notes that while petitioners have been making such an outcry since the promulgation of the questioned judgment regarding the line of questioning followed by respondent court, none of them ever objected to such queries during the trial. Neither did they attempt to salvage the situation by asking questions on re-direct examination if they harbored the impression that the court's cross-examination seriously prejudiced their case. It is too late in the day to object to the alleged leading, misleading, and badgering questions of the Presiding Justice Garchitorena and to ask (the court) to expunge the answers thereto from the record. Needless to say, Engr. Dans (and Marcos, for that matter) should have done so when the supposed objectionable nature of the questions and/or answers were propounded or given. As it happened, petitioners did not even raise their objections at the close of the testimony of Mr. Cuervo. They did not also ask re-direct questions to correct whatever mistakes or misimpressions allegedly crept into Mr. Cuervo's testimony. Instead, Dans formally offered the entire testimony without making any exceptions or reservations.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs. ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADOalias"Tonying," ROBERTO DESCARTIN y PASICARANalias"Ruby" and JOELITO (JULITO), DESCARTIN y PASICARAN,accused-appellants.(G.R. No. 90198, November 7, 1995)VITUG,J.:TOPIC: Additional rules on examination of witness (Memorandum)FACTS:Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery with homicide. When arraigned, all the accused entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge. The accused interposed the defense of alibi. The Regional Trial Courtdid not give credence to the defense ofalibi. It convicted the three accused of murder (punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code), instead of robbery with homicide, explaining that the term "homicide" was used in the information in its generic sense. Finding conspiracy, the trial court ruled that the killing was qualified by both treachery and abuse of superior strength with the latter, however, being absorbed by the former.Appellant Roberto Descartin, likewise challenging Francisca Espina's credibility because of her alleged inconsistencies, faults the trial court for allowing the witness to glance at the notes written on her palm while testifying.ISSUE:Whether or not the use of memory aids while giving a testimony on court is prohibited.HELD:NO.The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court allows a witness to memory aids. Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court.In this case, the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.

ROSELLA D. CANQUE,petitioner,vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,respondents.G.R. No. 96202 April 13, 1999MENDOZA,JTOPIC: Rule on examination of witness (memorandum)FACTS: Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name of RDC Construction. At the time material to this case, petitioner entered into two contracts with private respondent Socor Construction Corporation, whereby the latter agreed to supply the petitioner materials and services needed for its projects. Sometime thereafter, private respondent sent petitioner a bill but the latter refused to pay the amount. Consequently, private respondent brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Subsequently, Petitioner Canque was ordered by the trial court to pay private respondent the sum of P 299,717.75 plus interest and costs in its decision on June 22, 1988. During the trial, private respondent's book of collectible account was presented as evidence. The detailed account of all the transaction was made by Dolores Aday, private respondent's bookkeeper. In the course of her testimony, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her, which bills were supervised by the company's engineer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's reliance on private respondent's book of collectible accounts on the basis of Rule 130, Sec. 37 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner now contends that the respondent court erred in admitting in evidence entries in the course of business of private respondent's book of collectible accounts considering that the person who made the entries had no personal knowledge of the said entries and that the decision should be reversed as it has only inadmissible evidence to support it.ISSUE: Whether or not evidence presented by a person who made the entries but had no personal knowledge about it is admissible in court.HELD:No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following conditions: (1) the person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; (3) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (4) the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. As petitioner points out, the business entries in question do not meet the first and third requisites. First, Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on the account of RDC Construction. It was in the course of her testimony that the entries were presented and marked in evidence. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court. Second, whether or not the bills given to Aday correctly reflected the deliveries made was a fact that could be established by the project engineer alone, who, however, was not presented during trial.

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA,petitioner,vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,respondent.G.R. No. 146710-15March 2, 2001----------------------------------------JOSEPH E. ESTRADA,petitioner,vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,respondent. G.R. No. 146738March 2, 2001PUNO,J.:TOPIC: Adoptive AdmissionFACTS: Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Angara Diary is inadmissible for being violative of the rules on evidence regarding admissions.

HELD: No. The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath. A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not.

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party. Even if the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, it is binding on him under the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land Registration Authority,Petitioner, vs. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Respondent.G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006CORONA,J.:TOPIC: Adoptive AdmissionFACTS: This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In particular, the legislative investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606. During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondents former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondents answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion 8 to declare respondent in default,predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republics motion. The Republic presented its evidenceex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its evidence. Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied it.Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination.ISSUE: Whether or not theCourt of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order which declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer.HELD: Yes, it did. A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify anothers statement.Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible against him.This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.By adoptive admission, a third persons statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:(a) Expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;(b) Hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;(c) Utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;(d) Replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or she has heard the other makeor(e) Reads and signs a written statement made by another.Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsels statements. Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos statements as its own. Respondents adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it. Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos statements as its own. Respondents adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appelleevs. ROLENDO GAUDIA @ "LENDOY" or "DODO",appellant. G.R. No. 146111 February 23, 2004PUNO,J.:TOPIC: Res Inter Alios ActaFACTS: on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, the accused raped Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and prejudice. The prosecution presented Remelyns mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia testified that testified that on 24 March 1997, At about 4:00 in the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any information. On her way home, she shouted and called out Remelyns name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, "Ma, I am here," from a grove ofipil-ipiltrees. Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30) meters from their house.She found Remelyn crying, naked,nagbakaang(walking with her legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed her. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyns private organ.The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and parents of the appellant.The quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in Remelyns vagina, and told Amalia, "Hoy!Amalia, your daughter was being (sic)raped." At this point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, "Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle this, we are willing to pay the amount ofP15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed."Police officers came and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads)to the police precinct of Hagonoy for investigation. Amalias statement was taken. In his part, The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the National Elections. The trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict appellant for the crime of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven years of age.ISSUE: Whether or not the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court.HELD: Yes, the offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyolas husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer,and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception.The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimonyof Amalia. However, following the principle ofres inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs. SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE,accused.SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL,accused-appellants.G.R. No. 119005 December 2, 1996REGALADO,J.:

TOPIC: Res Inter Alios ActaFACTS: The aforementioned accused in this case were indicted for robbery with homicide allegedly committed on July 4, 1986 in Barangay Osias of the Municipality of Kabacan. The records of the case states that At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband's lifeless (sic) while a man took her husband's gun and left hurriedly. She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away. George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim's house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station. Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting incident. Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions.Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however, and before he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail. The trial court, rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.ISSUE: Whether or not that the trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime.HELD: Yes. The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused.That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.Theres inter aliosrule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

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