collaborative orchestration in polycentric global governance for the fight against corruption ·...

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Journal of International Cooperation Studies, Vol.26, No.1（2018.7）

Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption

NISHITANI Makiko*

Abstract

With an increasing number of regime complexes experienced in thepast decade,

a seriousquestionhasarisenas tohowtocreateconsistencyandharmonyoutofpotential

discordance among diverse goals, interests, and norms in a congested regime complex.

Internationalorganizations’orchestrationmayprovideananswer to thisquestion.Theglobal

anti-corruptiongovernance isa transnationalpolycentricregimecomplex,withregulationsand

frameworkscreatedandpromotedbymultipleactorsatmultiplelevels,inmulti-sectoralsettings

andovermultipleissues.TheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime（UNODC）isoneofthe

majororchestrators forcounteringcorruptionandhasmanypartnershipswithpublic,private

andcivil sectors.Thispaperdiscussessomeproblemsof theorchestration theorydeveloped

byKennethW.Abbott,DuncanSnidal andothers, andproposesaconceptof “collaborative

orchestration”asapromisingmodelforpolycentricgovernance.Thenitexaminesconditionsfor

UNODC’sorchestrationandacaseofcollaborativeorchestrationinenhancingtheeffectivenessof

theUnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruption（UNCAC）.

＊ AssociateProfessor,GraduateSchoolofInternationalCooperationStudies,KobeUniversity.　 Earlierversionswerepresentedat the InternationalStudiesAssociationAnnualConvention,Atlanta,March 16–19, 2016 and at theworkshop “Orchestration inPolycentricGovernance: Possibilities andChallenges,”Kobe,June23–24,2017.MydeepappreciationgoestoKennethW.Abbott,PeterM.Haas,DuncanSnidal,YaacovVertzberger,andAtsushiYamadafortheirhelpfulcomments.Thispaperislargelybasedonthechapter“OrchestrationinPolycentricGovernance:InternationalOrganization’sRoleinImplementationofAnti-CorruptionNorms,”inMakikoNishitanied.,How are International Norms Realized: Dynamic Process of Complex Global Governance,MinervaShobo,2017（inJapanese）,butthetheoreticalpartwassubstantiallyrevisedandoneof thecasestudiesweredeleted,basedonthe feedbackat theworkshop.ThisworkwassupportedbyJSPSKAKENHI（B）（GrantNo.15H03321）.

42 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

Keywords:GlobalGovernance;Orchestration;Polycentricity;RegimeComplex;FightagainstCorruption;

UnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruption（UNCAC）;UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsand

Crime（UNODC）;UNCACCoalition

１．�Introduction:�How�can�governance�actors�create� synergy� in�decentralized�

global�governance?

Since themid-1990s,we have seen an increasing number of global polycentric

governance systemscharacterizedbydecentralized structures inwhich therearemultiple

centersof authorityoperatingatmultiple scales1withadiversityof stakeholders, including

civil societyorganizations（CSOs）,private sectororganizations, internationalgovernmental

organizations（IGOs）,and states.Thesegovernance systemsare oftenobserved in regime

complexes,definedas“anarrayofpartiallyoverlappingandnonhierarchicalinstitutionsgoverning

aparticular issue-area,”2 situatedonacontinuumbetweenhighly integratedandhierarchical

regulationsatoneextremeand fragmented,decentralized institutionswith feworno linkages

amongthemontheother.3

Manyscholarsof theregimecomplextheoryarguethatdecentralizedor fragmented

structurescould result in inefficienciesdue to inconsistencies,duplications, andgapsamong

diverseinstitutionsandineffectivenessduetobehaviorslikeforum-shoppingandregime-shifting.4

Scholarsworkingon institutional interplayhavepointedout,morepositively, thatsynergistic

institutional interactionsareratherprevalent inglobalenvironmentalgovernance.5Stillothers

havearguedinamorenuancedwaythattheflexibilityandadaptabilityofregimecomplexesare

preferred,undercertainconditions,fortheirpoliticalfeasibility.6

Whilewehavenodefinitiveansweras tohow to solve theproblemof inefficiency

and ineffectiveness,especially inacongestedregimecomplex,7KennethW.Abbottemphasizes

benefitsofdecentralizedandfragmentedregimecomplexes,includingcomplementaryregulations,

multifacetedapproachesandsolutionstoproblems,andabroaderrangeofchoicesforactors.He

arguesthatthesebenefitsarelikelytobeenhancedwhilethecostsoffragmentationareminimized,

if localactivitiesarecoordinatedbypublicauthorities inamannerthatmaintainsthecoherence

andconsistencyofapolycentricgovernancesystem.8Thisspecificmodeofgovernance iscalled

“orchestration,”whichheseesaskeyforeffectivemanagementofadecentralizedregimecomplex.

43Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption

Furthermore,wehavetocopewitha legitimacyproblemintermsof input legitimacy

（democraticprocedures）andoutput legitimacy（efficientmanagementandeffectiveproblem-

solving） inglobalgovernance.9AsMichaelZürnargues, the traditionalmodeof international

governance ledby theUSand international financial institutions,whichhe terms “executive

multilateralism,”hasbeenseriouslychallengedby transnationalprotestsagainst their lackof

legitimacyandaccountability,asdecision-makersofIGOsandWesternpowershavenotbeenheld

accountableforwrongdecisionstheyhavemadeattheinternationallevel.10Ontheotherhand,

theUNsystemasawholehas facedproblemsof legitimacy,causedbya lackof transparency

andfrequentoccurrencesofseriouscorruption.However,therecouldbeatradeoffbetweeninput

andoutput legitimacies,asaplethoraof incompetentparticipantsandcumbersomeprocedures

could lowerperformance.11Therefore,wehave to find away to enhance input legitimacy

withoutdamagingoutputlegitimacy.Orchestrationmightmitigatetheselegitimacyproblemsby

facilitatingparticipationbydiverseactors.

Orchestrationhasbeenobserved invarious fields, fromenvironmentalmanagement,

development, commerce,health, andhumanrights to security.12 Itmayalsobeseen inanti-

corruptionefforts, asglobalgovernance in the fight against corruption is characterizedby

ahighly fragmented regime complex consisting ofmulti-level andmulti-sectornormsand

initiativescreatedbydiverseactors, includingstates,governmentalagencies, IGOs,CSOs,and

businessorganizations.Wearguethatgovernanceactorsprefertoengage inaspecifictypeof

orchestrationtopromotetheimplementationofanti-corruptionnormsbypromotingcoordination

andsynergyamongdiverseactors.

Thepaperproceedsasfollows.Itfirstreviewstheconceptandtheoryoforchestration,

andcriticizes someof thehypotheses thathavebeenadvanced.Subsequently, itproposesa

specific typeof orchestration that is assumed tobeprevalentandpreferred inpolycentric

governance: “collaborativeorchestration”. ItalsodiscussesconditionsunderwhichIGOsprefer

collaborativeorchestrationandexaminestheminthecaseoftheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugs

andCrime（UNODC）,ananti-corruptionorchestrator.

２．Orchestration:�A�soft�and�indirect�governance�mode

（1）O-I-T Model The concept of orchestrationwas recently introduced in the field of international

44 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

relations byKennethW.Abbott andDuncan Snidal as an essential component ofNew

Governance,which ischaracterizedbyparticipationof “decentralized”actors,betheypublicor

private;aregulator’srelianceontheirregulatoryexpertise;andtheregulator’spreferenceforthe

usageoforchestrationandsoftlaw.13Anorchestratorsetsagovernancegoal,convenes,supports

andsteersrelevantstakeholderstowardachievingthegoal.14

Thisdefinitionhasgraduallychanged; inaneditedvolume,International Organizations

as Orchestrators （hereafter,“AGSZ”）,orchestrationgenerallyreferstotheorchestrator’sworking

throughintermediariestoindirectlygoverntargets（theO-I-Tmodel）,15emphasizinganindirect

andsoftaspect.Insomecases,O,I,andTaremutuallyoverlapping:theorchestratorcanserveas

asecretariatfortheintermediary,ortargetmemberscanserveasmembersoftheintermediary.

Thereareother formsof indirectgovernance, including trusteeship,delegation, and

cooptation,but theyaredifferent fromorchestration in termsof thegovernor’sauthoritative

control over intermediaries.16 In orchestration, intermediariesvoluntarily cooperatewithout

beingcontrolledbytheorchestratorwithhardmeasures.Thiskindofsoftgovernanceisusually

considered ineffectivecompared to thehierarchicalmodeofgovernance,andacademicsand

practitioners tendtodismiss its impact.However,orchestration is indeedobserved indiverse

issue-areasandcanenhancecapabilities, legitimacy, and the focalityof actors involved ina

dynamicprocesswhilestrengtheningaregimecomplexasasystem.17

（2）Conditions under which IGOs are likely to orchestrate Whilegovernments canwork throughdiverseactors indomesticgovernancewith

“directiveorchestration,”which involvesmandatoryrules,publicregulators（statesandIGOs）

in theglobal arena tend to rely on “facilitative orchestration,” or enlisting and supporting

diverseactorswithsoftinstrumentstoengageinregulatoryactivities.Facilitativeorchestration

is expected to reinforcecapabilities and legitimacyof orchestrators and intermediaries, and

simultaneouslyenhanceTransnationalNewGovernance（TNG）asasystembyreducinggaps

Source:KennethW.Abbott,PhilippGenschel,DuncanSnidal,andBernhardZangl, eds., International Organizations as Orchestrators,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015,p.4.

Figure 1: Simple orchestration: O-I-T model


andoverlapsamongmultipleregulations, resolvingcollectiveactionproblems,reducing forum-

shoppingandforum-shiftingbehaviors,andpromoting learningand innovation.18 IGOspreferto

use facilitativeorchestration,as theycanachieveregulatorygoalswithin theircapacitiesand

competenceoutsideofmemberstates’controloverIGOmandates.19

However, given that theTNGsuffers froman “orchestrationdeficit” compared to

domesticgovernance,20underwhat conditionsare IGOs likely toorchestrate?TheAGSZ is

dedicatedtopursuingthisquestion. Itarguesthatgovernanceactorsare likely toorchestrate

under the following conditions:First, if they lack certain capabilities, such as regulatory

competence, operational capacity, or legitimacy, they tend to orchestrate（orchestrator

capabilitieshypothesis）.Whereasagovernanceactorwithnocapabilitiescouldnotorchestrate,

anactorwithextensivecapabilitieswouldnotneedorchestration.Second,orchestrationislikely

ifanactor is focal in the issue-area, inasenseofhaving“singleanduncontestedgovernance

leadership”（focality hypothesis）.21Major sources of focality include authority, legitimacy,

operational competence, available resources, expertise, path-dependence, and charismatic

organizationalleaders.Third,iftheactorhasanentrepreneurialculturethatfavorscollaboration

withdiverseactorsandexperimentationwith innovativeapproaches, there isamotivation to

orchestrate（entrepreneurshiphypothesis）.22Inaddition,orchestrationsarelikelywhenmultiple

intermediaries that share the orchestrator’s goal andhave complementary capabilities are

available（intermediaryavailabilityhypothesis）.Whenthereisonlyonepotentialintermediary,a

governanceactorwouldberatherreluctanttoorchestrateit.However,thishypothesisisrather

weak,becauseanorchestratorcouldcatalyzeanewinstitutionquiteeasilyintheeventthatan

intermediaryisunavailable.

WhentheorchestratorisanIGOasanagentsubjecttocontrolbyprincipals（member

states）, the divergence of goals amongmember states or between the IGOandmember

states andweak institutional oversightbymember states arehypothesized to increase the

possibilityofIGOorchestrations（thegoaldivergencehypothesisandstateoversighthypothesis,

respectively）.23

Thesehypotheseshavebeenexaminedandbroadlycorroboratedwithsomerevisionsin

casestudiesoftheEuropeanUnion（EU）,theWorldTradeOrganization（WTO）,theGroupof

Twenty（G20）,theGlobalEnvironmentFacility（GEF）,theWorldHealthOrganization（WHO）,

theUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme（UNEP）, the InternationalLaborOrganization

（ILO）,andotherorganizations.

46 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

（3）Challenges of orchestration theory While thiscollaborativestudyprovides insightfulhypothesesaboutconditions forIGO

orchestration,therearesometheoreticalandempiricalshortcomings,assomecase-studychapters

pointout.First,focalityco-varieswithcapabilities,makingtheimpactofrespectiveindependent

variablesaswellasthevalueofthedependentvariableindeterminate.IfanIGOhasextensive

capabilities, itsperformanceand focalitywill improve,but its likelihoodoforchestrationwill

decreaseaccordingtothecapabilitieshypothesis.Ontheotherhand,anIGO’sshortageofcertain

capabilities（capabilitydeficit）mayloweritsfocalitybutincreasethelikelihoodoforchestration.

Thispresumptioncontradictswiththe focalityhypothesis thatargues focalitywill increasethe

likelihoodoforchestration.Thus,thevalueofdependentvariable（likelihoodoforchestration）can

beindeterminateduetothecontradictorypredictions.

Second,thedivergenceofgoalsco-varieswiththetightnessofstateoversight,especially

whenissuesalienceishigh;thisalsomakesthevalueofthedependentvariableindeterminate,as

thereisapossibilitythattheeffectofonevariable（goaldivergence）couldbecounterbalanced

by theeffectofanothervariable（stateoversight）.Divergenceofgoalsmay lead to tighter

oversightthatnegativelyaffectsIGOorchestration,eventhoughthehypothesisassumesthatgoal

divergencemotivatesIGOstoorchestrate.Theinteractioneffectsbetweengoaldivergenceand

stateoversight isdiscussedintheconcludingchapteraswellas inthecaseoftheWTO,24and

chaptersonUNEPandtheILOpointoutthatissuesaliencecanincreasestateoversightwhen

goalsaredivergent.25

Although the covariation of state oversight and goal divergence is rather an

empiricalquestion, itcouldbesaid that the indeterminaciesdiscussedabove isderived from

inappropriatelydefiningthedependentvariable.Therefore,wearguethatdependentvariables

shouldbedifferentiatedaccordingto independentvariables.As isdiscussed inacasestudyon

EUregulation,goaldivergenceseems to illuminatevariationsoforchestrationordesignsof

intermediaries（loose/closenetworks）ratherthanexplainthelikelihoodoforchestration,whereas

thecapabilitieshypothesisexplainswhyactorsorchestrate.26Weputitinanotherway:whereas

capabilitydeficitexplainswhy, focalityandgoaldivergencecombinedwithstateoversightare

more likelytodeterminehowactorsorchestrate,morespecifically,how deep theyengagewith

theintermediary.Whenfocalityishigh,orchestratorsareabletodeeplyengageinorchestration.

IfIGO’sgoalisdivergentfromthatofmemberstatesoveracontroversialissue,itwillbedifficult

fortheIGOtoorchestratedeeplyagainstthewillofthestates.


Lastbutnot least, there isanotherempiricalproblem:thefocalitydefinedashavinga

single,uncontestedleadershipisnotcommonintoday’sregimecomplexes.Asaregimecomplex

comprisesmultiple issue-areasand institutions,eachofwhich involvesagoverningbodyasa

centerofauthority,weoftenseemulti-centersystems.Forinstance,severalIGOstogetherplay

a leadingrole ineachareaof theMillenniumDevelopmentGoals（MDGs）: theWorldBank,

UNICEF, andUNESCO inprimaryeducation; theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

（UNDP）,theWorldBank,theUNWomen,UNESCOintheempowermentofwomen;andsoon.27

EspeciallyinregimecomplexescrowdedwithpowerfulIGOs,states（orstateagencies）,andnon-

stateactors,diffusedfocalityisnotanexception;itprevails.Apotentialorchestratorcanbefocal

inaspecific,differentiatedarea,but itusuallycooperateswithotherpotentialorchestratorsto

copewithcomplexissues.Therefore,itisrealistictothinkthatmultipleorchestratorsthatshare

focalitycoexist,compete,orcollaboratewitheachotherinacongestedregimecomplex.

Takingtheabovepoints intoaccount, inthefollowingsection,wediscussvariationsof

orchestrationthatpromotecoordinationandsynergyinfragmentedpolycentricgovernance.

３．Orchestration�models�in�a�polycentric�governance�system

（1）Orchestration under diffused focality: Collaborative orchestration Inacongestedregimecomplex,focalitytendstobediffusedamongmultiplegovernors,

andcoordinationproblemsaccompaniedbyhighuncertaintyeasily come to the surface.As

the low focalitywill lower thedepthoforchestration,potentialorchestratorsare tempted to

cooperatewitheachother to complement respective lackof focality andcapabilities.Even

UNEP,oftenreferredtoasatypicalorchestratorthathaspioneeredtheTNG,28co-orchestrates

withanothergovernanceactorwhen focality is low, suchas in the fieldofCorporateSocial

Responsibility（CSR）.Asdiscussed inthecaseofUNEP’sco-orchestrationwiththeUNGlobal

Compact（UNGC）ofthePrinciples forResponsibleInvestment（PRI）,“…orchestrationmaybe

more likely incrowded issueareas…where focality is lessobvious,where issue-linkage is the

normandwheretherealitiesofcomplexinterdependencemayverywellrequireco-orchestration

bytwoormoreIGOs.”29LowfocalitymotivatesanIGOtoorchestratewithanotherorchestrator

instead of orchestrating alone.While the originalO-I-Tmodel focuses onvertical synergy

betweenorchestratorand intermediary, thecollaborativeorchestrationmodelshedsmore light

onhorizontalcollaborationbetweenorchestrators.

48 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

Co-orchestration and multi-orchestration

TheAGSZconceptualizesthatO, I,andTcaneachbeasetofactorsrespectively.30

When two ormore actorswork as an orchestrator jointly as a set,we call this type of

collaborationbetweenorchestrators “co-orchestration.” In theabovePRIcase,UNEPandthe

UNGCjointlyorchestratedfromthesameorchestratingpositionduringthesameperiodoftime;

theyjointlyengagedinconvening,assisting,endorsing,andcoordinatingthroughoutthecourseof

preparing,launching,andexpandingthePRI.

Ontheotherhand,wesuggestanotherformofcollaborationbymultipleorchestrators:

multi-orchestration. Contrary to co-orchestration,multiple orchestrators orchestrate the

intermediary fromdifferentorchestratingpositionsbyusingdifferentorchestration techniques.

The simplest formofmulti-orchestration isdual-orchestration: for instance,OrchestratorA

（CSO）convenesandcoordinatesacivilsocietynetworkasanumbrellanetworkorganization,

Figure 2: Collaborative orchestration


whereasOrchestratorB（IGO）givesofficialendorsementandmaterialsupporttotheumbrella

organization toapplypressure tomemberstates.Amorecomplicatedcase is thatof triple-

orchestration, as in the casewhereOrchestratorA（abusiness association）organizes a

privateregulatorystandardschemethat isendorsedbyOrchestratorB（CSO）andfundedby

OrchestratorC（IGO）.

Thefirstfeatureofmulti-orchestrationisthatorchestratorscollaboratethroughaclear

divisionof laborwithoutahigh levelofcoordinationbetweendifferentsectors, inwhichcivil

societyactorscoordinate thecivil societynetwork, IGOscoordinateamong internationaland

statebodies,nationalgovernmentscoordinatedomesticnetworks,andbusinessactorscoordinate

private sector regulation. In thisway, orchestrators can facilitate efficient coordinationand

networkingamongdifferentsectorswhilemaximizingtheautonomyofeachsector.Themulti-

orchestrationmodelillustratesthemechanismofpolycentricgovernancewherediverseactors,be

theypublicorprivate,workasorchestratorssimultaneously.

The second feature is different degrees of engagements by orchestrators. In the

abovecaseofdual-orchestration,OrchestratorA isdeeplycommittedtoorchestratingthecivil

societynetwork,whereasOrchestratorBorchestrates thatnetworkonlyshallowly fromthe

outside.Here,deeporchestrationrequiressubstantial,continuous,anddirectmanagementofan

intermediarythroughmobilizing,initiating,coordinating/steering,andgivingcostlyendorsement,

whereasshalloworchestration involvesonlysupplementaryandexternalsupport, includingthe

provisionofopportunities foradvocacy,materialassistance,and low-costendorsement. Inother

words,deeporchestrationrequiresamorecostlycommitmentthandoesshalloworchestration.

Weshouldnote,however,depthoforchestration isarelativeconcept,andcannotbe

measured inabsoluteterms.Exactlywhichtechniquesshouldbeperceivedasshallowordeep

isdependentondegreesofrelevantactors’andpublicawarenessonthesalienceof the issue,

privateorcivilsector’sinfluence,institutionalcongestion,availablefinancialresources,etc.,allof

whichaffectorchestrators’focalityandcapabilities.31

Difference between co- and multi- orchestrations

Themulti-orchestration can be differentiated from co-orchestration in terms of

orchestrators’orchestratingpositionsandtheirengagementwithajointproject;moreprecisely,

withregardstoasenseofownershipandadegreeofcoordination.Whengovernanceactorsco-

orchestrate, theysharenotonlya jointgoalbutalsoownershipof theproject fromthesame

50 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

orchestratingposition.Theyhavetobeinvolvedinhighdegreeofcoordinationamongconflicting

interests andof integratedpolicyandagreeon such termsof contract asmemorandumof

understandingoverthejointproject.

Whengovernanceactorsare involved inmulti-orchestration, on theotherhand, they

don’tsharethesame levelofownershipandresponsibilities.Neitherdotheynecessarilyshare

thesamesetofgoals; respectiveorchestratorsusuallyhave theirownagendaaside fromthe

overallgoalof theproject.Theyorchestrate fromdifferentorchestratingpositionsatdifferent

distance from the intermediary; therefore, eachorchestratorwouldbe involved indifferent

depthoforchestration.Asonlyalittlecoordinationisrequired,multi-orchestrationcanbeeasily

performedandprovideawiderangeofoptionsfororchestrators.

In short,whereas co-orchestration takesplacewhenorchestrators are involved in

jointlyplannedanddesignedprojectasacollectivegovernororonthebasisofagreeddivisionof

labor,multi-orchestration ischaracterizedbythe lackof jointownershipanddifferentdepthof

engagements fromdifferentorchestratingpositions.However, therecanbecontinuitybetween

bothtypesofcollaborativeorchestration;multi-orchestrationcanchangeintoco-orchestrationand

viceversa,accordingtochangingrelationships,goals,anddegreeofcoordination.

（2）Conditions for collaborative orchestration Theantecedentcondition forcollaborativeorchestration is theavailabilityofmultiple

potential orchestratorswith complementary capabilities and awillingness to collaborate;

“orchestratoravailability,”sotospeak.Asthemultiplicityofcentersofauthorityischaracteristic

ofpolycentricgovernance,weposit that thereshouldbemultipleorchestrators inpolycentric

system,thoughthemultiplicityaswellasdiversityoforchestratorsisnotwelldiscussedinthe

AGSZ.Furthermore,powerfulactorsthathaveenoughcapabilitiestoserveasintermediariescan

turnintoanorchestratoroverthecourseoforchestration;orchestrationbyex-intermediariesis

oftenobserved,asthechapterontheWHOorchestrationdemonstrates.32

Theroleoforchestratorisnot limitedtoIGOsandstates.CSOs,businessentities,and

localgovernmentscanpotentiallyplaytheroleoforchestrator.Accordingtoastudyconducted

byGlobalSolutionNetworks,whereasalmosthalfoforchestratorsareIGOs,statesaccount for

one-third,andCSOsaccountforabout15percentofthetotalnumberoforchestrators.33Asnon-

stateactorstrytomakeupashortageoflegitimacyandcapabilities,theyareinclinedtorelyon

orchestrationonadailybasis.Thus,anincreasingnumberofIGOsencouragepowerfulCSOsto


orchestratecivilsocietycoalitionsandfacilitatepublic-privatepartnershipsandmulti-stakeholder

initiatives.

Ingeneral,agovernanceactorwouldbemotivatedtoorchestratecollaborativelywith

otherorchestrators,ifitlackedcertaincapabilitiescombinedwithfocalitytosteerintermediaries

single-handedly.Furthermore,whenanorchestrator is an IGO, a combinationofhighgoal

divergenceandtightstateoversightwouldincreasethelikelihoodoftheIGOtoengageinshallow

orchestrationinamulti-orchestrationsetting,whereasacombinationofhighgoaldivergenceand

loosestateoversightwouldlikelyresultintheIGO’ssingle-orco-orchestration.34Forexample,an

IGOthataimstofacilitatecivilsocietyinvolvementundertightoversightbysomememberstates

attempting toexcludecivil societyactors fromdecision-makingprocesswouldbe tempted to

restrainfromdeeporchestrationofcivilsociety,soastoavertex-postsanctionsbythemember

states.Bykeepingdistance fromcivilsocietyandengaging inshalloworchestration, IGOscan

legitimately facilitatetheparticipationofcivilsocietyactorswithintheirowncompetence,and

at thesametime,mobilize suchcivil societyactorsefficiently, allowingcivil orchestrators to

engageindeeporchestrationofcivilsociety.Itcouldbesaidthatmulti-orchestrationisawayof

facilitatingmulti-sector involvementevenundergoaldivergencebetweentheIGOandmember

statesaccompaniedbytightstateoversight.

Theconceptofcollaborativeorchestrationquestionssomeofthehypothesesdiscussed

intheAGSZ,namely, thehypothesesconcerning focality,goaldivergence,andstateoversight.

First,contraryto thehypothesis that lowfocalitywouldnot induceorchestration, lowfocality

wouldencourageorchestratorstobeinvolvedincollaborativeorchestration.Second,despitethe

AGSZ’sfindingthathighgoaldivergencecombinedwithtightstateoversightwoulddecreasethe

likelihoodof IGOorchestration,35 thiscombinationcould increaseanIGO’spreference formulti-

orchestration,usingshalloworchestrationtechniques.Thesetwovariablesco-varywhentheissue

issalient,andgoaldivergencedeterminesthedepthoforchestrationratherthan likelihood,as

wasmentionedintheprevioussection.Consideringthecovariationunderissuesalience,itwould

bemoreaccuratetotreatstateoversightasaninterveningvariable.

52 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

４．Overview�of�the�global�anti-corruption�governance

（1）Decentralized regime complex for the fight against corruption Theglobalgovernanceforthefightagainstcorruptionischaracterizedbyapolycentric

systemwithdiversityofactors,multi-levelinstitutions,anddiverseregulationswithhardandsoft

instruments.Multi-levelpublicregimesoperatedbytheUN,regionalorganizations,international

clubssuchasG20,andnationalaswellassub-nationalgovernments,co-existwithprivateor

multi-stakeholderregimesinitiatedbytheInternationalChamberofCommerce（ICC）,theUNGC,

andsoon.

Inaddition, institutions linkwitheachother in “embedded,” “nested,” “clustered,”and

“overlapping”relations inadenseregimecomplex,asshown inFigure3.36TheUnitedNations

ConventionagainstCorruption（UNCAC）is firmlyembedded in theprinciplesofsovereignty

andnon-interventionindomesticaffairs.Institutions insub-fieldsofUNCAC,suchastheStolen

AssetRecoveryinitiative（StAR）,aspecialinstitutionforassistingtherecoveryofstolenasset,

arenested in theUNCACregime.Furthermore,ascorruptionproblemsrelate tomany issue-

areasincludingcrimes,development,environment,security,etc.,institutionsdealingwithdifferent

topicshavebeenclusteredandeasilyoverlapwithotherissue-areas.Thus,theregimecomplex

includesthematicschemessuchastheExtractiveIndustryTransparencyInitiative（EITI）,and

multi-issueinstitutionsincludingtheFinancialActionTaskForce（FATF）40Recommendations,

aimingtoregulatemoneylaunderingandcorruption.

（2）Multi-level and diverse regulations Corrupt practices had come to the fore as a serious issueby the 1970s.TheUS

adopted in1977theForeignCorruptPracticesAct（FCPA）,whichwouldbeextraterritorially

applied.AsUSbusinesses lobbied for internationalregulationto level theplayingfield, theUS

led international legalizationat theUnitedNationsEconomicandSocialCouncil（ECOSOC）.

However, legalizationefforts at theUN faileddue todisagreementsbetween industrialized

countries,whichwereinpursuitofregulationsforalevelplayingfield,anddevelopingcountries,

whichwerewaryof interference in theirdomesticaffairsandprioritizedeconomicgrowthby

invitingforeigninvestmentwithlooseregulations.

In the1990s,scandals involvinggrandcorruptioncommittedbymajorpoliticiansand

corporationswerefrequentlyreportedonandattractedattentionworldwide.Majordevelopment


Figure 3: Regime Complex for the Fight against Corruption （Major Elements）

Note:Ellipsesindicateissue-areasandboxesindicateinstitutionalelements（normsorschemes）.Boxeswithdarkshadowsdenotehardlegalinstruments,andthosewithlightershadowsdenotesoftinstitutions.IGOsasagents,includingregimeorschemesecretariats,arenotincludedinthisfigure.

54 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

organizationsincludingtheWorldBankbegantodeclaretheirresolvetocombatcorruption.The

USpushed the issue forwardat theOrganizationofEconomicCooperationandDevelopment

（OECD）insteadof theUN,andunder its leadership, theOECDadopteda recommendation

against bribery（hereafter, theOECDRecommendation）, followed by theConvention on

CombatingBriberyofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusinessTransactions（hereafter,

theOECDConvention）in1997.Sincethen, theOECDConventionregimehasbeenoneof the

core institutions intheanti-corruptionregimecomplex.Theperiodfromthe1990sthroughthe

earlytwenty-firstcenturysawtheproliferationofregional legal instrumentsagainstcorruption

inEurope,37 theAmericas,38Africa,39andtheMiddleEast.40 InAsia-Pacific, theAnti-Corruption

ActionPlanforAsiaandthePacific（hereafter,ADB-OECDActionPlan）jointlypromulgatedby

theAsianDevelopmentBank（ADB）andtheOECDhasservedasaregionallegalframework.

At theglobal level,corruptpracticescommittedbypublicofficialswerecriminalized

in theUnitedNationsConvention againstOrganizedCrime（UNTOC） in 2000.During the

negotiationofUNTOC,aninternationalconsensuswasbuiltonthenegotiationofacomprehensive

treatydirectlypertaining to corruption,41 and consequently,UNCACwas adopted in 2003.

UNCACistheonlyuniversalandcomprehensivetreatyagainstcorruption.Torecap,therewasa

geographicalexpansionofpublicregulationsfromnationaltoregionalandfromregionaltoglobal

legalization.

Ontheotherhand,asthedefinitionofcorruptionandthescopeofcriminalizedpractices

significantlyvary fromcountry tocountry, there isalsoademand forsoft regulations,which

areexpectedtoreducesovereigntycosts,buildanormativeconsensus,andlaythegroundwork

forhard institutions.42 Inparallelwith thegeographicalexpansionofpublic legislation,private

andmulti-stakeholderregulationstofightagainstcorruptionwerealsoexpandedandenhanced

in the2000s.CombatingExtortionandBribery: ICCRulesofConductandRecommendations,

issuedby the ICC in1977（hereafter, the ICCRules）,was substantiallyupdated.Theanti-

corruptionprinciplewas incorporated inthe10thPrincipleoftheUNGC,acentral institution in

thetransnationalregimeontheCorporateSocialResponsibility（CSR）.Inaddition,theBusiness

PrinciplesforCounteringBribery（hereafter,BusinessPrinciples）werecreatedin2013througha

multi-stakeholderprocessorchestratedbyTransparencyInternational（TI）.43

Theprivate regulationsdescribed aboveweredesigned togenerate a synergistic

effect.The first ICCRuleswerecreated for thepurposeof complementing theprospective

UNConvention,whichwasnot adopted at that time. Subsequently, theywereupdated in


1996and1999tocorrespondwiththeOECDConvention, followedbyacoupleofamendments

correspondingtokeylegalinstrumentsincludingUNCAC,in2005and2011.44AstheICChasa

longhistoryofadvocacyrelationswiththeOECD,UN,andCoE,theICCRuleswerepurposefully

designedtocomplementpubliclegislationbypromotingself-regulationbybusiness.45TheUNGC

10thPrinciplewasalso intentionally introduced inorder tocorrespondwithUNCAC.These

privateregulationsareexpectedtoimprovetheeffectivenessofhardlaw.

（3）Diverse actors and diffused focality Due to a decentralized governance structure, focality is diffused amongmajor

organizations.TheprimaryIGOsworkingagainstcorruptionincludetheUNODC,theUNDP,the

WorldBankGroupanditsinstitutes,theUNGC,theOECD,theEuropeanCommission（EC）,CoE,

andsoon.SinceUNCACwasadopted,theUNODChasledglobalanti-corruptionactivitiesasthe

SecretariatforUNCACandUNTOC.Inadditiontopromotingtheratificationandimplementation

of these twoconventions, itworksasacoordinatorofglobalcampaigns,an informationhub

oncorruption,andanorganizerofconferencesandglobaleventssuchas InternationalAnti-

CorruptionDay.TheUNDPhastackledcorruptionsincetheearly1990sfromtheperspectiveof

humanandsustainabledevelopment.AsoneofmajorpartnersoftheUNODC,ithasco-organized

globalcampaignsagainstcorruptionsince2004.Inthefieldofdevelopment,theWorldBankalso

hasbeenaneminentleaderforthefightagainstcorruption,havingplacedtheissueofcorruption

atthetopofitsagendainthemid-1990s.46TheOECDalsohasledinternationalanti-corruption

activities,sinceitadoptedtheOECDConventionandrelevantrecommendations.

In addition to IGOs, anumberof influentialCSOshaveworkedonanti-corruption

measures;amongsuchCSOs,TI,theBaselInstituteonGovernance,theICC,TransparentAgents

andContractingEntities International（TRACE）,andtheControlRisksGrouparerecognized

asthemostinfluential.WhereasTIisaleadingNGOintheanti-corruptionmovement,theICC,

TRACE,andControlRisksareallbusinessorganizationsworkingmainlyfortheprivatesector.

There are also large-scale, activemulti-stakeholder and non-state initiatives and

networks,includingtheEITI,themostpromisingpublic-privateinitiativeforincreasingrevenue

transparencyinextractiveindustries;theWorldEconomicForumPartneringagainstCorruption

Initiative（WEF-PACI）,across-industryplatform foranti-corruptionand transparency in the

private sector; theGlobalOrganizationofParliamentariansAgainstCorruption（GOPAC）,a

globalnetworkofparliamentarians;theUNICORNInternationalNetworkLimited（UNICORN）,

56 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

aglobalmulti-sectornetworkof tradeunions;PublishWhatYouPay（PWYP）,acivil society

networkaimingatenhancingrevenue transparency inextractive industries; and theUNCAC

Coalition,acivilsocietynetworkforpromotingUNCACimplementation,whichwillbedetailed

laterinthispaper.

Theabovementionedorganizationsandinitiativesallfunctionasindependentauthorities

and network hubs, though their actions have beenmoderately coordinated by forming

transnationalpolycentricnetworks.47Itcouldbesaidthatfocalityinanti-corruptiongovernanceis

highlydiffusedunderadecentralizedandcongestedregimecomplex.

（4）Challenges in coordination of the regime complex Although international legal instrumentswork in a relativelyharmoniousmanner,

domesticlawaswellaslawininternationalorganizationshasnotyetbeensufficientlyharmonized

withinternational law.UNCAC,asthesoleuniversalandcomprehensivehardlaw,mayappear

tositon the topof the legalhierarchyandalignother legal instruments. Inreality,however,

therearedifficultiesinthedomesticimplementationofUNCAC,asUNCACisembeddedinthe

principlesofsovereignequality,territorialintegrity,andnon-interventionindomesticaffairs.

ManyprovisionsofUNCACarenon-mandatory,vague,orqualified, asa resultofa

compromisebetweentheprinciplesofnon-interventionandanti-corruption. In fact,more than

half of criminalizationprovisionsarenon-mandatoryandmostprovisionsonpreventionand

internationalcooperationarequalifiedwithwordingssuchas “asappropriate,” “asnecessary,”

and“subjecttothebasicconceptsofitslegalsystem.”Thus,statespartiesareallowedtoreferto

theirreconcilabilityofdomesticlegalsystemswithsomecontroversialprovisions,suchas“public

reporting”（Article10）, “participationofsociety”（Article13）andthecriminalizationof “illicit

enrichment,”“tradingininfluence,”and“abuseoffunction”（Articles17to19）asjustificationsfor

non-implementation.48Theycomplywithprovisionswhilenotactuallyimplementingthem.49Even

theprovisionsonmutual legalassistanceand lawenforcementcooperationnecessary forasset

recovery,whicharethebiggestcharacteristicsofUNCAC,allowmemberstatesnottocooperate

whentheseprovisionsareirreconcilablewithdomesticlaw.Oneofthereasonswhymorethan

180countriesratifiedtheConventionmightbethesesoftprovisions.

In addition, the international reviewmechanism（IRM）has remainweak since its

inceptionsixyearsafterUNCACwassigned,comparedwithreviewmechanismsofotheranti-

corruptionregimessuchastheOECDConventionandCoEConventions:countryvisitsbyreview


teams,cooperationwithsocietyinthepreparationofandduringthereviewprocess,andmaking

fullcountryreportspublicareallnon-mandatory.50

SincetheConventionreflectscompromisesduringtoughnegotiationsand isregarded

asanendproductintheformofacomprehensiveandbindingtreaty,thereisnopoliticalwillto

makeweakprovisionsmandatoryor tonegotiateanew,stronger treaty.Theevolutionof the

Conventioncanbesaidtobealready“frozen.”51Inthissense,itcouldbesaidthatdisagreements

overthebalancebetweenanti-corruptionandnon-interventionprinciples,andovercontroversial

issues,arealreadyinstitutionalizedinUNCAC.

Furthermore, in the field of technical assistance, aplethora of programsoperated

bymore than50major organizationswithout coordination caused terrible congestion, and

thenecessityofaidcoordinationandharmonizationtoreduceduplicationsandgapshasbeen

repeatedlypointedoutsincetheearlytwenty-firstcentury.52Moreover,asstatesareregulatedby

multipleregimes,theyareoverburdenedbythemonitoringrequirementsofeveryreviewregime,

causingaproblemcalled“monitoringfatigue.”53Therewerealsomountingcriticismsagainstthe

overallanti-corruptionindustryforitsmushroomingbudget.54Thus,therehasbeenanincreasing

demandforcoordinationtoreduceinefficienciesamonganti-corruptionprogramsandamongthe

implementationmechanismsofdifferentregimes;theUNODCwasdesignatedtocopewiththese

difficulttasks.

５．Conditions�for�orchestration�by�the�UNODC

TheUNODCisperceivedasoneofthecentersofglobalauthorityforthefightagainst

corruptionas theSecretariat forUNCACandUNTOC. Itsprimaryanti-corruptionmandate

is topromotetheratificationand implementationofUNCACandUNTOC; it is theCorruption

andEconomicCrimeBranchthat ispredominantlytaskedwiththis job.Toachievethisgoal,

theOfficemanagestheConferenceofStatesParties（CoSP）anditssubsidiarybodies,including

theImplementationReviewGroup（IRG）andworkinggroups;providestechnicalassistanceto

memberstates;andcreatesandmanagesanti-corruptionknowledge. Itsmandatesalso include

the facilitationofcoordinationamongdiverse institutionsandcollaborationwithprivatesector

andcivil society,whichencouragetheOffice toengage incollaborativeorchestration. In this

section,weanalyzetheconditionsthatenabletheUNODC’sorchestration.

58 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

（1）Focality TheUNODC’s focality in theanti-corruptionregimecomplexwasnotvery strong,

partlydueto its institutionaloriginandmandates.TheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugControl

andCrimePrevention（UNODCCP）,thepredecessoroftheUNODC,wasestablishedbymerging

theUnitedNationsDrugControlProgrammeandtheCenterforInternationalCrimePrevention

（CICP）oftheUnitedNationsCrimePreventionandCriminalJusticeProgrammein1997.The

governingbody is theCommissiononCrimePreventionandCriminalJusticeunderECOSOC,

whichwascreatedin1992.

TheCICP launched threeGlobalProgrammes against criminal activities in 1999,

including theGlobalProgrammeagainstCorruption（GPAC）,whichprovidedand facilitated

technical assistance, researchandpolicy formulation, interagencycoordination, and judicial

integrity.55Asmajoranti-corruptionprogramshadcomeintobeingbytheendofthe1990s,the

launchofGPACwasratherlateandtheCICPwasforcedtocompetewithpowerfulorganizations

like theWorldBank, theUnitedStatesAgency for InternationalDevelopment（USAID）, the

OECD, theUNDP, andTI, all ofwhichalreadyhadamuch strongerpresence in theanti-

corruptionindustrypriortotheCICP’sinvolvement.

Furthermore, theUNODCCP,whichwas taskedwith theprogramsrelated todrug

andcrime,was initiallyplaced inadisadvantageousposition in the fightagainstcorruption,

ascorruptionhadbeenaddressedmainly in thecontextofdevelopment.Majordevelopment

organizationshadalreadysubstantially incorporatedanti-corruptionpolicies in theirprograms

throughoutthe1990s.TheOfficehadonlyweak focalityandoperationalcapabilitiesoveranti-

corruption issuesexcept forthoserelatedtocrimepreventionandcriminal justice. Ithad less

experienceondevelopmentissuesthandiddevelopmentagencies.Infact,theCICPhadtocarve

outanicheintheanti-corruptionindustryinordertogetanadvantagefromitsexpertise,which

resultedinthecreationofprogramsspecializinginjudicialintegrity.56

However, theUNODC’s focality has been strengthened since the early twenty-

firstcentury,as the focusofanti-corruption industrygraduallyshiftedaway fromawareness-

raisingandcapacity-andinstitution-buildingledbymajordevelopmentagenciesandTItoward

internationalcooperationamonglawenforcementandjudicialagencies.57Thistrendboostedthe

focalityoftheOffice,whichalreadyhadsufficientexpertiseandconnectionswithlawenforcement

and judicialagenciesaround theworld toworkasanauthoritativehubofnetworksofboth

governmentalandnon-governmentalexpertsand institutes.CoSPandsubsidiarybodiesalso


provideopportunitiesfornetworkingamongofficialsandhavereinforcedtheUNODC’sroleasa

hubofexpertnetworks.Inaddition,theOfficefrequentlyorganizessymposiaandworkshopsfor

networking,informationsharing,andmutuallearning,whichalsostrengthenitsfocality.

Nevertheless,whileactorsandinstitutionshavecontinuedtoexpandanddiversify,the

UNODChasonlyamoderateinfluenceintheprivatesectorandcivilsocietyintheareaofanti-

corruption.Therefore, itcouldbe fair tosaythat theUNODC’s focality ishigh in theareaof

crimepreventionandcriminaljustice,whereasitsfocalityincivilsociety,theprivatesector,and

developmentissuesisrelativelylow.

（2）Capabilities TheUNODC’sexpertiseishighlyevaluatedbybothpublicsectorandcivilsociety.With

thishighlevelofexpertise,theOfficeinitiatesmanyprojectsforstandardsettingandpromotion,

technicalassistance,andknowledgemanagementandcreation. It facilitatesthe implementation

of theConventionsbyproducingspecialized tools, including legislativeandpracticalguides,

guidelinesandguidingprinciples,model lawsandprovisions, thematicreports,computer-based

self-assessmentandwritingtools.

Nevertheless,theUNODChasconstantlysufferedfromalackoffunding.TheOfficeisa

middle-sizedagencywithabout1,500personnelandanannualbudgetofapproximatelyUS$300

milliononaveragesince2012.58Thesizeofitsbudgetisrelativelysmallcomparedtothatofthe

UNDP,whichwasearmarkedmorethanUS$5billionforfiscalyear2015.59Thenumberofstaff

isinsufficientformeetingeverydemandfrommemberstatesfortechnicalassistance.

Inaddition,over thepastdecade, therehasbeenasteadydecline ingeneralpurpose

funds thatcouldbeused for thecoreactivitiesofexecutivemanagementandbasicresearch.

AlthoughtheOfficehasmadeeffortstostreamline,expanditsdonorbase,anddiversifyfinancial

sources, “UNODCeffectiveness is underminedbyanunsustainable fundingmodel.”60Tight

budgetaryconstraintscoupledwitha shortageofhumanresourceshaveapparently induced

theorganization to relyoncollaborations includingco- andmulti-orchestrationwithpartner

organizationstomakeupforshortagesoffocalityandcapabilities.

（3）Entrepreneurship TheUNODC’spreferenceforpartnershipisattributednotonlytoitsmoderatefocality

and fiscal constraintsbut also to an entrepreneurial culture that stressespartnershipand

60 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

intellectualendeavors.TheDrugsProgrammeandtheCrimePreventionandCriminalJustice

Programmebothhaveemphasizedpartnershipsincetheirinception,andhaveactivelyengagedin

inter-branchcollaborationsaswellasclosecooperationbetweentheheadquartersandfieldoffices.

Staffmembershavealsoregularlyattendedmeetingsasobserversofmajorpartnerorganizations,

including theOECDWorkingGrouponBribery（WGB）, theUNGCAnti-CorruptionWorking

Group,theTaskForceonImprovingTransparencyandAnti-CorruptionoftheBusiness20.

Ithasactivelycollaboratedwithcivil societyaswell, includingwithNGOs,experts,

academics,grassrootsmovements, tradeunions, andcommunitygroups, as their abilities to

investigate,advise,raiseawareness,empower,andeducatearehighlyvaluedinthefightagainst

drugsandorganizedcrime.Inparticular,theDrugsProgrammehasbeeneagertoengagewith

civil society; theCrimePreventionandCriminalJusticeProgrammehas followedsuit.61Thus,

civilsocietyactorsareofficiallyinvolvedintheimplementationreviewmechanismofUNTOCby

participatinginthereviewprocessaswellasattendingCoSPsubsidiarybodiesasobservers.

Furthermore, itdevelopedonlineplatforms fordisseminationofknowledge:TRACK

（Tools andResources forAnti-CorruptionKnowledge） for anti-corruption andSHERLOC

（SharingElectronicResourcesandLawsonCrime）forcrimeprevention.Bothoftheseplatforms

provide information on convention implementation, comprehensivedatabases of legislation

（legal libraries）, analyticalmaterials and tools, bibliographies, anddirectories of competent

nationalauthorities. Inadditiontoprovidingthis information, theTRACKportal is intendedto

be“acommunityofpractice forpartner institutionsandpractitioners,”62andcontainstoolsand

resourcesco-developedwithpartnerinstitutionsincludingtheUNDP,theOECD,theUNGC,the

StolenAssetRecoveryinitiative（StAR）,andtheGroupofStatesagainstCorruption（GRECO）.

TRACKwasthuscreatedthroughacombinationofpartnershipandknowledgecreation.

It couldbe said that orchestrationmethods that promotepartnership, knowledge

buildingand innovationhavebeendeeplyembedded in theOffice’sbasicstrategyandaction

repertoires.Suchastrongpropensity forentrepreneurshipmightoffset thenegative impactof

tightstateoversightonorchestration.

（4）Goal divergence and tight state oversight Asmentionedabove, theUNODChasbeenconstrainedby its tightbudged,mostof

whicharecontributedbymajordonorcountries forspecialpurposes.Nearly90percentof the

UNODCbudgetcomes fromvoluntarycontributions,and90percentof this isearmarked for


specialpurposes,leavinglittleroomfortheOfficetoeffectivelyundertaketaskssuchasresearch

andanalysis,advocacy,humanresourcemanagement,independentevaluation,andauditing.63This

meansthattheuseandamountoffundsislargelycontrolledbythewillofmajormemberstate

donors,includingColombia,theEU,theUS,theNetherlands,Sweden,theUK,Japan,Brazil,and

Mexico.64Therefore,ingeneral,thereremainslittleroomfortheOfficetoexpanditsactivitiesat

itsdiscretionbeyondmemberstates’expectations.

ThedivergenceofgoalsamongmemberstatesandbetweentheUNODCandmember

statesover specific issuesalsoaffects theOffice’s inclination fororchestration.Asstated in

theprevioussection,disagreementsamongStatesPartiesconcerningthepriorityof theanti-

corruptionprincipleoverthenon-interventionprinciple inadditiontoothercontroversial issues

are legitimatelyallowed in thecurrentUNCACregime. Inotherwords,goaldivergenceover

salient issuesamongmemberstates is institutionalized in theUNCACregime,makingstate

oversight tightoverspecific issues. Inparticular, if the issue isdirectlyrelatedtothestability

ofpoliticalregimeandcultureofthecountry—forexample,theissuerelatedtoparticipationof

society（Article13）or theprincipleof transparencyandaccountability（Article10onpublic

reporting）—acountrycanstronglyresistanyattempts to facilitate intervention indomestic

affairs.TheUNODC,therefore, isassumedtoprefershalloworchestrationincollaborationwith

socialactorsonthesesensitiveissues.

（5）Intermediary and orchestrator availability Anumberofcompetentandcooperativeactorsworkingascentersofauthorityseemto

enablecollaborativeorchestrationinthefightagainstcorruption.Therearemanycollaborations

betweencivil societyandthepublicsector,asexemplifiedbytheprocessofdrafting theAU

ConventioninwhichtheAfricanUnion（AU）invitedcivilsocietytoactivelyparticipate.65Multi-

stakeholder initiatives like theEITIandtheUNGCalso illuminate thevalueofpublic-private

partnerships.Certainpowerfulprivateactorsserveaseither intermediariesororchestrators,

dependingon their focality, capabilities, andavailabilityof intermediaries/orchestrators.They

can sometimesplay a role of intermediary and orchestrator simultaneously in a chain of

orchestrations.AcaseinpointisTI.

TIhasbeenworkingasahubofdiverseanti-corruptionnetworksandhaspositioned

itselfasanexpertactivistorganizationoperating inpartnershipwithbothpublicandprivate

organizations aswell as individual experts andacademics.66TI servesasanetworkhubof

62 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

expertsondevelopmenteconomics,internationalcommerce,criminallaw,humanrights,business

management,etc.,andlaunchedtheAnti-corruptionSolutionsandKnowledge（ASK）network,a

poolofrecognizedexpertsandpractitionersaroundtheworld.67Inaddition,moststaffmembers

ofTIhaveenoughexpertiseandnetworks in theareasmentionedabovetobeaffiliatedwith

multipleinstitutions.

TI’sfunctionasamulti-networkhubisillustratedbyitsroleastheSecretariatforthe

InternationalAnti-CorruptionConference（IACC）,aglobalmulti-stakeholderconference that

bringstogetherCSOs,privatesector,publicagencies,andindividualsfightingagainstcorruption

allovertheworld.TheIACCservesas“thepremierglobalforumforthenetworkingandcross-

fertilisation”68andasaniconicconferencethatsymbolizesthesolidarityoftheglobalcommunity

against corruption.69 In addition,TI co-orchestrated amulti-stakeholderprocess involving

businesses,tradeunions,civilsociety,andacademicstocreatetheBusinessPrinciples,together

withtheSocialAccountabilityInternational（SAI）.

Highly focal and capable organizations likeTI can be orchestrators aswell as

intermediaries, but cannot dominate the focality in a congested system.Furthermore, the

credibilityofmajororganizations like theWorldBank, the IMF,USAID, andTIcame into

questionfortheirprincipallyneoliberalpolicies.Thus,theseorchestratorshavefoundacommon

interest incollaborativeorchestrationtomutuallycomplementtheirpartial lackof focalityand

capabilities.

６．Collaborative�orchestration�by�the�UNODC

（1）Inclination for collaborative orchestration TheUNODChas orchestrated a number of intermediaries for various functions,

includingsettingandpromotingnormsandstandards;providingtechnicalassistance for legal

support,policydevelopment,and institution-andcapacity-building;andcreatingandmanaging

knowledge,asshowninthetablebelow.

While theUNODC single-handedly orchestrates networks and groups related to

crimepreventionandcriminal justice, includingtheUNCrimePreventionandCriminalJustice

ProgrammeNetworkofInstitutes（PNI）andtheJudicialIntegrityGroup（JIG）,italsofrequently

engages incollaborativeorchestration inareaswith low focality, including theStolenAsset

Recovery initiative（StAR）, theRegionalWorkingGrouponBusiness Integrity inASEAN


（WGBI）,theAnti-CorruptionAcademicInitiative（ACAD）,andtheInternationalAnti-Corruption

Academy（IACA）.

Asdiscussed in theprevious section, acombinationofhighexpertise, a shortageof

resources, a relative lackof focality, strongentrepreneurship, andorchestrator/intermediary

availabilityisassumedtohaveencouragedtheOfficetoengageincollaborativeorchestration.In

addition,highgoaldivergenceoversensitive issues isassumedtohavemotivatedtheOfficeto

engageinmulti-orchestrationwithshalloworchestrationtechniques.

However, it isnotgood forapublicagencytocollaboratewithaprivateorganization

whosecredibility is somewhat indoubt.Throughcooperationwithanumbrellaorganization

consistingofmultipleorganizations,thiscriticismcanbeavoided.Therehadbeenalreadymany

umbrellanetworksofnon-stateorganizations in thefieldofanti-corruption, includingGOPAC,

UNICORN,thePWYP,andtheUNCACCoalition.Therefore,theUNODCpreferstoworkclosely

withumbrellaorganizations, including theViennaNon-GovernmentalOrganizationCommittee

（VNGOC）, theNGOAlliance onCrimePrevention andCriminal Justice, and theUNCAC

Coalition.80 Itspartnershipswithumbrellaorganizationshave laid thegroundwork formulti-

orchestration.

（2）Multi-orchestration: The UNCAC Coalition TheUNODCintendedtoorchestrateanintermediarytoensureinputfromcivilsociety

in thedeliberationsofCoSPsubsidiarybodies,but itwashardlyable to initiateorcoordinate

Table 1: UNODC’s orchestration for the fight against corruption （intermediaries）

functionscale

Standardsettingandpromotion

Technicalassistance Knowledgemanagement

Macro（Regimecomplex;Globallevel）

IGAC70

RoLCRG71IGACPNI72

IACAACAD73

IGACPNIIACAACAD

Meso（Thematicinstitutions;Regionallevel）

UNCACCoalitionICCWC74

JIG75

WGBI76

UNCACCoalitionStAR77

ARAC78

IAACA79

StARJIGARAC

Micro（Programs/projects;Locallevel）

Programs/projectsfortechnicalandfinancialassistance

64 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

civilsocietyintermediariesduetoalackoffocalityincivilsociety;theOffice’spartnershipwith

civilsocietyintheareaofanti-corruptionwasnotstrongcomparedtoitspartnershipoverdrug

issues.

Furthermore, itwas under tight oversight by someStatesParties.Civil society

actorsarenotallowed toparticipate in themeetingsof the IRGandworkinggroups, even

though theOfficeofLegalAffairsof theUNSecretariat recommended IRGto takepositive

stepsonthis issue81andtheUNSpecialRapporteuronFreedomofAssemblyandAssociation

publiclycriticized theexclusionofcivil society fromthe IRG.82The issueof thecivil society’s

observer status in theCoSPsubsidiarybodieshasbeenhighlycontroversial andhasnot to

datebeensettled.SomecivilsocietyactorscriticizedtheUNODCforitsbarringofcivilsociety

representatives fromthemeetingsof subsidiarybodies,havingyielded topressure fromthe

StatesParties,“withoutputtingthequestiontothemembersofthosebodiesasrequiredbythe

rulesofprocedure.”83ThisillustratesthefactthattightstateoversightconstrainedtheOfficeso

muchthatitwasunabletosteercivilsocietytopressureStatesPartiesfortheparticipationof

CSOsinthesubsidiarybodies.

TI,ontheotherhand,hasbroad influenceovercivilsociety,andwith itshighfocality

andcapabilities, itwasabletomobilizeandconvenecivilsocietyactorsto initiatetheUNCAC

Coalition.Itwaslaunchedin2006byGillianDellofTIandKirstineDrewofUNICORN,primarily

for thepurposeof coordinating inputs fromcivil society toStatesParties’deliberations.To

betterpursueadvocacyactivities,theCoalitionwasregisteredasanindependentNPOinVienna,

Austria, inOctober2016.TIhasbeendeeply involved in theorchestrationof theCoalition,

andhas servedas theSecretariatand thepermanentmemberof theCoalitionCoordination

Figure 4: Multi-orchestration through UNCAC Coalition


Committee（CCC）sincetheCoalition’sinception.

Approximately120members（asofJanuary2018）participateinthecoalition,including

majorCSOsandumbrellaorganizationsthathavealongcooperativepartnershipwithTIsuchas

ChristianAid,GlobalWitness,theBaselInstituteonGovernance,andtheTaxJusticeNetwork,

aswell asparliamentariansandacademics.Themembersof theCoalitionare fromdiverse

fields, includinggovernance,development,humanrights, laborrights,environment,andpeace

andsecurity.Themembers’countriesoforiginarealsodiverse:about20%arefromSub-Sahara

Africa,about35%fromEurope,about10%fromSouthAsia,6%fromAsia-Pacific,8%fromthe

Americas,6%fromtheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,andabout10%actonaglobalbasis.

Despitediversebackgrounds,membersare fairlyunifiedforthepurposeofpromoting

theratificationandimplementationofUNCAC.84CoalitionpolicyiscoordinatedbytheCCC,which

consistsofeightregionalseats, two internationalseats,one individualseat,andtheSecretariat,

whichisservedbyTI.85Throughgeographicallyequalrepresentation, itcanadjustforregional

differencesand facilitateglobal solidaritybeyondregions.TheCCCsetsgoalsandorganizes

collectiveactivities, includingadvocacyactivitiesatCoSPandparticipation insideeventsand

trainings.WhiletheCCCinvitesmemberstojoinsuchactivities,doingsoisvoluntary.

For theUNODC, theCoalitionwasa convenientpartner in termsof legitimacy; it

appearsneutralasanumbrellaorganizationofawiderangeofcivilsocietyactors,andtheplan

to launch theCoalitionwasendorsedatameetingof theUN inter-agencycoordinationbody

foranti-corruptionprograms.86TheCivilSocietyTeamof theUNODChasengaged inshallow

orchestrationoftheCoalitionduetoitslackoffocalityincivilsocietyandtightstateoversight.

First, itgives legitimacytotheCoalitionasacivilsocietyrepresentativebyendorsing itasan

officialpartner.Second, itgrantsfinancialsupport totheCoalition,whichhasnostable funding

source.

Third, as theSecretariat forCoSP, theOfficehosts side events on themargins of

CoSPmeetingsandbriefingsessionson themarginsof IRG. Inboth, theCoalition isallowed

topresentviewsandexchangeopinionswithdelegates.Sideeventson themarginsofCoSP

meetingsconsistofpanelsessionsorganizedbystates, IGOs,branchesofUNODC,CSOs,and

multi-stakeholdergroups.Thenumberofsessionshas increasedwitheachmeeting,with5-10

sessionsheldperday,totaling33sessionsduringCoSP6in2015.Somesessions,includingthose

onSustainableDevelopmentGoals（SDGs）,wereheldaspartofhigh-levelmeetings,providing

some input into the formaldecision-makingprocess.Briefingsessionson themarginsof IRG

66 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

provideanopportunityfortheCoalitiontoorganizepanelsessionsaccompaniedbyQ&Asessions

withdelegates.At the first IRGbriefing in2012,almost40civil societyrepresentativesand

100delegatesattendedandactivelytookthefloor.WhereassomedelegatescriticizedCSOsby

questioning theirqualifications, including theirprofessional capabilitiesandneutrality, others

considereditanopportunitytohaveaconstructivedialogue.Somecivilsocietyrepresentatives

have felt trustbeingbuiltbetweengovernmentsandcivil societyasaresultof thesebriefing

sessions.87

Fourth, theOfficeandtheCoalitionhave jointlyorganizedtrainings forCSOstobuild

professional capabilities toparticipate in thepreparationof andduring theUNCACreview

process.88Nearly150CSOs in totalwere trained inAustria,SouthAfrica, andSenegal from

2012 to 2013.89These trainingswerehighlyevaluatedby the IndependentEvaluationUnit,

andso, a three-yearextension for theprojectwasapproved.90The trainingswereorganized

throughadivisionoflabor:theOfficeconvenedthetrainingsessionsandprovidedfinancialand

administrativesupportwhile theCoalitionwassubstantively taskedwith training.91Fifth, the

CoalitionandtheUNODCco-organizedmulti-stakeholderworkshopsonUNCACanditsreview

mechanism forgovernments, civil society,and theprivatesector from2014 to2016.92These

workshopswerehighlypraisedasservingasaplatformfortrustbuildingandmutuallearning.93

Thus, theUNODChasbeenmakingefforts tobridge thegapbetweengovernment

andcivil societyandto facilitate theparticipationofcivil societybyusingmulti-orchestration

techniquesundertightstateoversightandalackoffocality.Thecapabilitiesandfocalityofboth

organizationshavebeenstrengthened throughmulti-orchestration.For instance, someCSOs

participatinginthetrainingslaterjoinedtheCoalitionasactivemembers,suchasIWATCH,a

TunisianNGO,whichbecameanewCCCmemberin2015.94TheUNODC’sconnectionsincivil

societyandtheprivatesectorhavebeensignificantly increasedcomparedtothoseintheearly

twenty-firstcentury.95

７．Conclusion

Theultimatequestionthispaperseekstoanswer ishowto improvecoordinationand

synergyinadecentralizedandcongestedregimecomplex,inwhichthefocalityofgovernanceis

diffusedamongmultipleactors,aplethoraofprogramsorschemesoperateinanuncoordinated

fashion, and issue-linkages frequently occur.This paper attempts to answer thequestion


byproposing the collaborative orchestrationmodel, including co-orchestration andmulti-

orchestration,whichcouldenhance the focality, capability,and legitimacyoforchestratorsas

wellas intermediariesunderdiffused focality.Evenunderhighgoaldivergencecoupledwith

tight state oversight,multi-orchestration, inwhichmultiple orchestrators engagewith the

same intermediaries fromdifferentorchestratingpositions,may improve input legitimacyby

promotingtheparticipationofdiversestakeholderswithoutinvolvingtoomuchcost.Itmayalso

promoteproblemsolvingbyfacilitatingthespontaneousandefficientdevelopmentofnetworksin

respectivesectors,yieldinganincreaseinmultifacetedapproachesandawiderrangeofoptions

forgovernance actors.This analysisdemonstratedwhyandhow theUNODCstrategically

orchestratedintermediariestocreatesynergyamongmajorgovernanceactorswhilefacilitating

theparticipationofabroadrangeofstakeholdersthroughmulti-orchestration.

Theoretical implications

Thispapergivesanewinsightintothetheoreticalhypothesesconcerningfocality,goal

divergence,andstateoversight.First,contrarytothefocalityhypothesis,orchestrationtechniques

are likely tobe chosenunder low focality,which is often the case in a congested regime

complex,inacollaborativeformoforchestration.Ingeneral,governanceactorsaremotivatedto

orchestratecollaborativelywhenanorchestrator lacksacombinationofcertaincapabilitiesand

the focalitytoorchestratean intermediarythatcouldbeorchestratedbyanotherorchestrator.

Inaddition,wesuggest“orchestratoravailability,”i.e.,availabilityofmultipleorchestrators,asan

antecedentconditionforcollaborativeorchestration.

Second,itisthecombinationofgoaldivergenceandstateoversightthatdeterminesthe

depthoforchestration,ratherthanlikelihood.ContrarytotheAGSZ’sfindings,thepaperargues

IGOsprefershalloworchestrationundertheconditionofhighgoaldivergenceaccompaniedby

tightstateoversightovercontroversial issues,as in thecaseof theUNODC’sengagement in

shalloworchestrationinamulti-orchestrationsettingwithTIasanotherorchestrator,concerning

theissueofcivilsocietyparticipationinCoSPsubsidiarybodies.

Effectiveness of orchestration

Thispapereschewsdiscussionof theeffectivenessoforchestration,whichshouldbe

investigatedinfutureresearch.Here,wetouchonthreethingstobeconsideredwhendiscussing

effectiveness:dynamicprocess, organizational interest, andpossiblecombinationswithother

68 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

modesofgovernance.

Considering the dynamic process of orchestration, an orchestrator’s focality and

capabilitieswouldbeunderminedovertimeifintermediariesandotherorchestratorsareableto

strengthentheirfocalityandcapabilitiesthroughcompetition,andchallengetheorchestrator.To

ensurethatorchestrationissustainable,effectivecoordinationamongcompetitiveintermediaries

andorchestrators is thought tobe indispensable.Thismightbeoneof thereasonswhy the

UNODCorchestrates theUNCACCoalition, as theCoalition iswell coordinatedbyTIasan

orchestratorofcivilsociety.Hence,itisessentialtoassessdynamiceffectivenessoverthecourse

oforchestrationinthelongrun.

Second,conflictbetweenpublicinterestsandorganizationalinterestsmustbeconsidered.

IGOs use orchestration to serve their own organizational interests, including expanding

resourceswhilereducingcosts,enhancingfocalityandlegitimacy,andenhancingautonomyfrom

memberstates’ control.Orchestration ishelpfulalso formissioncreep（expansion intoother

areas）,because IGOscangainexperienceandexpertise throughorchestrationwithoutheavy

organizational investments.96Whenanorchestrator’sorganizational interestsare incompatible

withcertainpublicinterests,itsorchestrationmayloseitseffectiveness.

Finally,itwouldbeinappropriatetoassesstheeffectivenessoforchestrationseparately

fromother factors,especially ina “Prisoners’Dilemma”situation,which inducesopportunistic

behaviors.Consideringthepossibilityofgrowingconflictsofinterestsamongorganizations,itmay

bebettertocomplementthesoftmodeofgovernancewiththehardmodeofgovernanceinorder

toenhancetheeffectivenessofcoordination.Itisworthdiscussingwhichtypesoforchestration

andmodesofgovernanceshouldbecombinedforachievingspecificgoals.

Notes1 　ElinorOstrom, “Polycentric Systems for CopingwithCollectiveAction andGlobal

EnvironmentalChange,”Global Environmental Change20,2010,pp.550-557.2 　KalRaustialaandDavidG.Victor, “TheRegimeComplex forPlantGeneticResources,”

International Organization58（2）,2004,p.279.3 　RobertO.KeohaneandDavidVictor,“TheRegimeComplexforClimateChange,”Perspectives

on Politics9（1）,2011,p.7,p.8.Theyuseamorerelaxeddefinition:“non-hierarchicalbut looselycoupled systemsof institutions”without an overall umbrella structure that controls theinstitutions.

4 　RaustialaandVictor,op.cit,pp.277-309;LaurenceR.Helfer, “RegimeShifting:TheTRIPsAgreementandNewDynamicsofInternationalIntellectualPropertyLawmaking,”Yale Journal of International Law29,2004,pp.1-83;MarcL.Busch,“OverlappingInstitutions,ForumShoppingandDisputeSettlement in InternationalTrade,” International Organization 61（4）,2007,pp.735-


761;KarenJ.AlterandSophieMeunier, “ThePoliticsof InternationalRegimeComplexity,”Perspectives on Politics7（1）,2009,pp.13-24.

5 　ThomasGehringandSebastianOberthür,“ComparativeEmpiricalAnalysisandIdealTypesof Institutional Interaction,” inSebastianOberthürandThomasGehringeds., Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies,Cambridge:MITPress,2006,p.318;SebastianOberthürandOlavSchramStokkeeds.,Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change,Cambridge:MITPress,2011;ThomasGehringandBenjaminFaude,“TheDynamicsofRegimeComplexes:MicrofoundationsandSystemicEffects,”Global Governance19（1）,2013,pp.119-130.

6 　KeohaneandVictor,op.cit.,esp.,p.9,pp.13-16.7 　Fortheinefficiencyproblemincongestedenvironmentalgovernance,seeEdithBrownWeiss,

“InternationalEnvironmentalLaw:ContemporaryIssuesandtheEmergenceofaNewWorldOrder,”Georgetown Law Journal81,1993,p.697.

8 　KennethW.Abbott, “TransnationalRegimeComplex forClimateChange,”Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy30（4）,2012,pp.571-590,esp.,p.582,pp.586-587;ElinorOstrom,“PolycentricSystems forCopingwithCollectiveActionandGlobalEnvironmentalChange,”Global Environmental Change20,2010,pp.550-557.

9 　FritzW.Sharpf, “Introduction:TheProblem-SolvingCapacityofMulti-LevelGovernance,”Journal of European Public Policy4,1997,pp.520-538.

10　MichaelZürn,“GlobalGovernanceandLegitimacyProblems,”Government and Opposition,39（2）,2004,pp.260-287.

11　TanjaA.BörzelandThomasRisse, “Public-PrivatePartnerships:EffectiveandLegitimateTools ofTransnationalGovernance?” inEdgarGrande andLouisW.Pauly eds.,Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-first Century,Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,2005,pp.195-216,esp.,pp.208-213.

12　KennethW.AbbottandThomasHale,“OrchestratingGlobalSolutionNetworks:AGuideforOrganizationalEntrepreneurs,”GlobalSolutionNetworks,2014,p.5;KennethA.Abbott,PhilippeGenschel,DuncanSnidal, andBernhardZangl, eds., International Organizations as Orchestrators, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015,p.355.

13　KennethW.AbbottandDuncanSnidal, “Strengthening InternationalRegulation throughTransnationalGovernance:Overcoming theOrchestrationDeficit,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law42,2009,pp.501-578.

14　Ibid.,p.510.15　Abbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,p.4.16　Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal and Bernhard Zangl, “The

Governor’sDilemma:ManagingtheVarietiesofIndirectGovernance,”apaperpresentedattheInternationalStudiesAssociationannualmeeting,Atlanta,March19,2016.

17　KennethA.Abbott,PhilippeGenschel,DuncanSnidal,andBernhardZangl, “Orchestratingglobalgovernance: fromempirical findings to theoretical implications,” inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.349-379.

18　AbbottandSnidal,op.cit.,pp.558-559.19　Ibid.,p.564.20　Ibid.21　Abbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,p.24.22　Ibid.,p.2523　Thesehypothesesaresummarized inthe frameworkchapter:KennethW.Abbott,Philipp

Genschel,DuncanSnidal, andBernhardZangl, “Orchestration:Globalgovernance throughintermediaries,”inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.3-36.

24　ManfredElsig,“Orchestrationonatightleash:StateoversightofWTO,”inAbbott,Genschel,

70 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.65-87.25　CornisvanderLugtandKlausDingwerth,“Governingwherefocalityislow:UNEPandthe

PrinciplesofResponsibleInvestment,”inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.237-261,esp.,p.259;LucioBaccaro,“Orchestrationforthe ‘socialpartners’only:InternalconstraintsontheILO,”inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,p.281.

26　MichaelBlaubergerandBertholdRittberger, “Orchestratingpolicy implementation:EUgovernancethroughregulatorynetworks,”inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.39-64,esp.,p.64.

27　HelmutReisen, “TheMultilateralDonorNon-System:TowardsAccountabilityandEfficientRoleAssignment,”Economics:TheOpen-Access,Open-AssessmentE-Journal4（5）,2010,pp.1-24.

28　KennethW.Abbott andDuncanSnidal, “International regulationwithout internationalgovernment: Improving IOperformance through orchestration,”Reviewof InternationalOrganization,5,2010,pp.315-344,esp.,p.334.

29　CornisvanderLugtandKlausDingwerth,“Governingwherefocalityislow:UNEPandthePrinciplesofResponsibleInvestment,”inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.237-261,esp.,p.258.

30　Abbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,p.4.31　Inparticular, theeffectofendorsementmaysignificantlydifferdependingon thedegree

ofcongestioncausedbyanumberofprivateauthorities.For instance, in the issue-areaofenvironmentalmanagement,crowdedwithprivateregulatoryschemes,anofficialendorsementbythepublicsector issupposedtohaveabig influence,whereas inothercaseswith fewerprivateauthorities,officialendorsementmaynotbesocrucial,thoughendorsementagainstthewillofmemberstateswouldbecostly.

32　Hanrieder,op.cit.,pp.191-213.33　AbbottandHale,op.cit.,pp.4-5.Amongothers,UNEP, theWorldBank, theWorldHealth

Organization,theUSgovernment,theUKgovernment,andtheWorldWildlifeFund（WWF）havebeenpredominantlyinvolvedintheorchestratedinitiativesidentifiedinthestudy.Ontheotherhand,approximatelyone-thirdof intermediariesarecorporations,andstatesandCSOsaccountfor20percenteach.

34　Forfindingsthatacombinationofhighgoaldivergenceand loosestateoversight inducesIGO-initiatedorchestration,whereas lowgoaldivergencecoupledwith tightstateoversighttendstoresultinstate-initiatedorchestration,seeAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,Zangl,op.cit.,p.372.

35　Ibid.,pp.372-373.36　OranYoung, “InstitutionalLinkages in InternationalSociety:PolarPerspectives,” Global

Governance 2（1）, 1996, pp.1-23.An institution can be “embedded” in basic principles ofinternational society such as the respect for sovereignty; “nested” in a superior andcomprehensivenormaccordingtoa legalhierarchy;“clustered”with institutionsdealingwithothertopics;and“overlapping”withdifferentissue-areas.

37　Forexample, theCouncil ofEurope（CoE）theCriminal andCivilLawConventionsonCorruption（hereafter,theCoEConventions）

38　For example, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption（hereafter, OASConvention）.

39　Forexample,theAUConventiononPreventingandCombatingCorruption（hereafter,AUConvention）.

40　Forexample,theArabConventionagainstCorruption（hereafter,ArabConvention）41　A/54/128“Actionagainstcorruption”;A/55/383“Reportof theAdHocCommitteeonthe

ElaborationofaConventionagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrimeontheWorkofItsFirsttoEleventhSessions.”


42　KennethW.AbbottandDuncanSnidal,“HardandSoftLawinInternationalGovernance,”inInternational Organization54（3）,pp.421-456.

43　Business Principles for Countering Bribery: A Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Led by Transparency International,Berlin:TransparencyInternational,2013.

44　InternationalChamberofCommerce,The ICC Rules on Combating Corruption,2011edition.45　FritzHeimanandFrançoisVincke,Fighting Corruption: International Corporate Integrity Handbook,

2008edition.,InternationalChamberofCommerce,2008,p.8.46　In1995, then-Presidentof theWorldBankJamesWolfensohnaddressed “thecancerof

corruption”at theannualmeetingsof theWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFund;since then, the issueof corruptionhasbeenat the forefrontof internationaldevelopmentassistance.Voice for the World’s Poor: Selected Speeches and Writings of World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn, 1995-2005, Washington:WorldBank,p.50.

47　MakikoNishitani, “TheCoordinationof theGlobalAnti-CorruptionGovernanceviaHybridPolycentricNetworks,”inThe Study of Global Governance,2,2015,pp.48-67.

48　CecilyRose, International Anti-Corruption Norms: The Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal Systems,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015,pp.97-132.

49　Ibid.,p.127.50　Only40percentofStatesPartieshavepublishedtheir fullreviewreportsonline,sincethe

implementationreviewmechanismwaslaunchedin2009.51　Rose,op.cit.,p.116.52　ODCCP,Report on the Second United Nations Interagency Anti-Corruption Co-ordination Meeting,

Vienna,July1-2,2002,p.4;UNODC,Report on the Fifth Meeting of the International Group on Anti-Corruption Coordination （ IGAC）,Merida,December11,2003,p.5.

53　UNODCandAsianDevelopmentBank（ADB）,Report on the Seventh Meeting of the International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination （ IGAC）,Bangkok,April21-22,2005,p.13.

54　According to theestimatesofBryaneMichaelsandDonaldBowser, thesizeof theanti-corruption industrywasapproximately$100million in2003andmushroomedtoalmost$5billionby2009.BryaneMichaelsandDonaldBowser, “Theevolutionof theanti-corruptionindustry in the thirdwaveofanti-corruptionwork,” inSebastianWolfandDianaSchmidt-Pfister, eds., International Anti-Corruption Regimes in Europe: Between Corruption, Integration, and Culture,Baden-Baden:Nomos,2010,p.161.

55　CICP,Value Added of Partnership in the Fight against Corruption,conferencepaper,Vienna,March2001,p.21.

56　UNODC, Report on the Fourth United Nations Interagency Anti-Corruption Coordination Meeting,Vienna,July24-25,2003,p.12.

57　MichaelsandBowser,op.cit.,pp.164-166.58　UNODC,Annual Report 2014, p.120; “Staff”http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/

employment.html?ref=menutop; “Fieldoffices”http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/field-offices.html?ref=menutop（accessedJune1,2017）

59　“Ourprojects,”http://open.undp.org/#2015（accessedJune1,2017）60　UNODC,Annual Report 2014,p.66.61　UNODC,Annual Report 2010,p.38.62　CorruptionandEconomicCrimeBranchofUNODC,Anti-Corruption Update,Issue1,February

2012,p.2.63　UNODC,Annual Report 2010,p.63.64　UNODC,Annual Report 2014,p.122.65　GillianDell, Anti-Corruption Conventions in Africa: What Civil Society Can Do to Make Them Work,

Berlin:TransparencyInternational,2006.66　TI has formal partnerships with 35 public or private organizations. “Institutional

72 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

Relationship,”https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/accountability/governance/0/（accessedJune1,2017）

67　“NetworkofExperts,”http://www.transparency.org/experts_network（accessedAugust30,2015）

68　http://iacconference.org/en/about/about_iacc（AccessedMarch1,2014）69　CommentsontheIACCgivenbyMs.GillianDell,whohasservedontheSecretariatfora

longtime.Author’sinterviewwithMs.GillianDell,July23,2012.70　InternationalGroupforAnti-CorruptionCoordination71　RuleofLawCoordinationandResourceGroup72　UNCrimePreventionandCriminalJusticeProgramNetworkofInstitutes73　Anti-CorruptionAcademicInitiative74　InternationalConsortiumonCombatingWildlifeCrime75　JudicialIntegrityGroup76　RegionalWorkingGrouponBusinessIntegrityinASEAN77　StolenAssetRecoveryInitiative78　AcademiaRegionalAnticorrupciónparaCentroaméricayelCaribe79　InternationalAssociationofAnti-CorruptionAuthorities80　Ms.MirellaDummar-Frahi, theCivilSocietyOfficer,and theLeaderof theCivilSociety

Teamof theCorruptionandEconomicCrimeBranch,emphasizedthat theOfficecooperateswithumbrellaorganizations fromtheperspectiveof legitimacy.Author’s interviewwithMs.FrahiinVienna,June24,2016.

　　In fact, at the first IRGbriefing, somedelegatesquestionedTI’sprofessionalcapability,neutrality,andotherqualifications.Matti Joutsen, “CivilSocietyOrganizationsandUNCAC:DoCSOsHaveaSeatat theTable?”presentationmaterialdistributedat theCivilSocietyOrganizationsFightingCorruption:TheoryandPracticeWorkshop,heldat theUniversityofSurrey,UK,July9-10,2012.

81　CAC/COSP/IRG/2010/9“LegalOpinionfromtheOfficeofLegalAffairs,”para16.82　A/69/365“Rightstofreedomofpeacefulassemblyandofassociation.”83　UNCAC Newsletter10,November2013,p.6.84　InterviewwithMs.Dell,July23,2012.Sheremarkedthattheyhadnothadmajorconflicts

withinthenetwork.Indeed,accordingtotheminutesofCCCmeetings,internalconflictswerenotontheagenda.

85　“CoalitionGovernance,” http://uncaccoalition.org/en_US/about-us/coalition-governance（accessedAugust 30, 2015）. Its responsibilities includepolicycoordination, promoting theactivitiesof theCoalition,communicatingtotheexternalaudiences,approvingandexcludingmembers,andgivingassistancetomembersthatareunderattack.

86　UNODC,Report of the Ninth Meeting of the International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination （ IGAC）,DeadSea,Jordan,December15,2006,p.5.87　MattiJoutsen,“CivilSocietyOrganizationsandUNCAC:DoCSOsHaveaSeatattheTable?”,

presentationmaterial distributedat theCivil SocietyOrganizationsFightingCorruption:TheoryandPracticeWorkshop,heldat theUniversityofSurrey,UK,July9-10,2012.Also,author’sSkypeinterviewwithMs.Dell,August12,2016.

88　Thetrainingswereconductedaspartofacivilsocietyproject launched in2010: “LookingBeyond:TowardsaStrategicEngagementwithCivilSocietyonAnti-Corruption,andDrugsandCrimePrevention”（GLOU68）.

89　“EmpoweringCSOstoBetterFightCorruption throughtheUNCAC,”http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN9-Empowering-CSOs-to-better-fight-corruption-through-the-UNCAC.html（accessedAugust30,2015）

90　UNODCIndependentEvaluationUnit, Independent Project Evaluation of the “Strengthening the


Capacity of Civil Society Organizations in Africa to Combat Corruption and Contribute to the UNCAC Review Process,”July2013.

91　Author’sinterviewwithMr.ManzoorHasan,ChairoftheUNCACCoalition,inPanamaCity,December3,2016.

92　“AfricanGovernmentsandCivilSocietyComeTogethertoWorkagainstCorruption,”　http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN18-African-Governments-and-civil-society-come-

together-to-work-against-corruption.html（accessedOctober10,2016）　　“AfricanCivilSocietyandGovernmentsWorkingTogetheronAnti-CorruptionIssues,”　http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN14-African-civil-society-and-governments-working-

together-on-anti-corruption-issues.html（accessedOctober10,2016）　　“BringingGovernmentsandCivilSocietyTogethertoBetterFightCorruptioninAsia,”　http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN13-Bringing-governments-and-civil-society-together-

to-better-fight-corruption-in-Asia.html（accessedOctober10,2016）　　“EmpoweringCSOstoBetterFightCorruptionthroughtheUNCAC,”　http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN9-Empowering-CSOs-to-better-fight-corruption-

through-the-UNCAC.html（accessedOctober10,2016）　　“TheFirstMulti-StakeholderWorkshopon theUNCACSecondCycleReviewCreated

SynergiesBetweenAfricaandSoutheastEurope,”　http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/cn22_african-and-see-gov-and-cso-learning-and-

cooperating-together-for-the-preparation-of-the-uncac-second-cycle-review.html（accessedOctober10,2016）

93　ThisobservationwasconfirmedbyMr.Hasan, intheauthor’semail inquiry,December23,2016.

　　Especially theregionalworkshopheld inMalaysia in2014washighlyevaluated,andasa result, thePresidentialUNCACInter-AgencyCommitteewasestablished inPhilippines.UNODC,Annual Report 2014,p.78.

94　UNCAC Newsletter13,July2015,p.10.95　AnobservationbyMs.FrahimadeduringaninterviewinVienna,June24,2016.96　Abbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,p.356.

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