combat regulation for the military naval fleet
TRANSCRIPT
People’s Commissariat
of the Military–Naval Fleet of the Union of SSR Main Naval Staff of the VMF
COMBAT REGULATION
for the
MILITARY–NAVAL FLEET OF THE UNION OF SSR
(BU-45)
Translated by Major James F. Gebhardt, U.S. Army (Retired)
Directorate of the Naval Publishing House
NKVMF of the Union of the SSR
Moscow 1946 Leningrad
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 2
Table of Contents
Order of the People’s Commissar of the Naval–Military Fleet of the Union of the SSR
Introduction
Chapter 1. General Provisions
Chapter 2. Naval Forces and Their Combat Purpose
Chapter 3. Organization of a Large Maneuver Formation
1. Fundamentals of Organization of a Large Maneuver Formation
2. Selection and Delegation of Forces and Means of a Large Maneuver Formation
3. System of Subordination in a Large Maneuver Formation and Coordination with Adjacent
Forces
4. Organizational Order
Chapter 4. Preparation of a Large Formation for Combat
1. Fundamentals of Preparation for Combat
2. Planning and Organizing for Combat
3. Selection and Organization of Forces and Means
4. Combat Preparation of a Large Formation prior to Battle
5. Preparation of the Region of Actions prior to the Beginning of Combat
6. Occupation by a Large Formation of a Departure Position for Combat
Chapter 5. Command and Control of a Large Formation in Combat
1. Fundamentals of Command and Control of a Large Formation in Combat
2. Organization of Command and Control of Combat
3. Combat and Movement Formations
4. Command and Control of Combat
5. Combat Documents, Instructions, Reports, and Notifications
6. Signal Codes, Codebooks, and Tables
Chapter 6. Support for a Large Formation in Combat
1. Fundamentals of Support
2. Organization and Command and Control of Support
3. Reconnaissance / Intelligence
4. Security
5. Defense (PVO, PLO, PKO, PMO, PKhO)
6. Camouflage and Deception
7. Navigational Support
8. Materiel–Technical Support
Chapter 7. Political Work in Support of the Combat Actions of a Large Formation
Chapter 8. Daily Combat Activity of Large Maneuver Formations
A. Reconnaissance
1. Fundamentals of the Conduct of Reconnaissance
2. Systematic Reconnaissance
3. Episodic Reconnaissance
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 3
B. Patrol Service
1. Fundamentals of Patrol Service
2. Long-Range Patrol
3. Close-in Patrol
4. Reconnaissance Patrol
5. Blockade Patrol
C. Anti-air Defense of a Sea Region
1. Fundamentals of Anti-air Defense of a Region
2. Anti-air Defense of the Coastal Region (Base)
3. Anti-air Defense of a Sea Region Distant from the Base
D. Anti-submarine Defense of a Sea Region
1. Fundamentals of Anti-submarine Defense of a Region
2. Anti-submarine Defense of a Base Region
3. Anti-submarine Defense of a Region Distant from the Base
4. Defense of the Anti-submarine Zone [line]
E. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Region
1. Fundamentals of Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Region
2. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Base Region
3. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Region Distant from the Base
F. Anti-mine Defense of a Sea Region
1. Fundamentals of Anti-mine Defense of a Region
2. Anti-mine Defense of a Base Region
3. Anti-mine Defense of a Region Distant from the Base
4. Penetration of a Mine Obstacle
G. Emplacement of an Obstacle at Sea
1. Fundamentals of Obstacle Emplacement
2. Emplacement of a Positional Obstacle
3. Emplacement of an Active Obstacle
H. Equipping of a Region with Navigational and Hydrographic Means
1. Fundamentals of Equipping a Region
2. Navigational–Hydrographic Equipping in a Coastal Region
3. Navigational–Hydrographic Equipping in a Sea Region Distant from the Base
I. Movement of a Large Formation at Sea
1. Fundamentals of Movement by Sea
2. Movement of a Large Formation of Combat Surface Vessels
3. Convoying of Transports
4. Escorting of Submarines
J. Anchoring a Large Formation in a Roadstead
1. Fundamentals of the Organization of an Anchorage
2. Anchoring in Base
3. Anchoring in a Roadstead Not in the Base
Chapter 9. Combat of a Large Formation in the Open Sea
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 4
A. Offensive Combat at Sea
1. Fundamentals of Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea
2. Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea in Good and Average Visibility Conditions
3. Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea in Poor Visibility Conditions
4. Offensive against an Enemy in a Distant Region of the Sea by a Large Formation
Consisting Primarily of Submarines
5. Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea, Executed by a Large Formation Consisting
Primarily of Aviation
B. Meeting Engagement at Sea
1. Fundamentals of a Meeting Engagement
2. Meeting Engagement at Sea in Good and Average Visibility Conditions
3. Meeting Engagement at Sea in Poor Visibility Conditions
C. Defensive Combat at Sea
1. Fundamentals of a Maneuvering Defense
2. Defensive Actions of a Large Formation at Sea
Chapter 10. Combat of a Large Formation in an Equipped Naval Position
1. Fundamentals of Positional Combat
2. Positional Combat in Daylight
3. Positional Combat in Periods of Darkness
4. Positional Combat in Foggy Conditions
Chapter 11. Combat of a Large Formation in an Enemy Coastal Region
A. Offensive in an Enemy Fortified Region
1. Fundamentals of the Offensive against an Enemy Position
2. Offensive against an Enemy Position [protected by] Mines and Artillery
3. Offensive against an Enemy Anti-submarine Position
B. Raiding Actions
1. Fundamentals of Raiding Actions
2. Attack on an Enemy Anchorage
3. Attack on Coastal Lines of Communication
4. Shelling of a Coastline
5. Amphibious Landing of a Reconnaissance–Diversionary Force
Chapter 12. Combat of a Large Formation for the Landing of an Amphibious Assault Force
on a Coastline
1. Fundamentals of Combat for an Amphibious Landing
2. Combat for Landing of an Amphibious Force on a Sea Coastline
3. Combat for Landing of an Amphibious Force in an Island Region and in Narrows
4. Return Embarkation of an Amphibious Landing Force
Chapter 13. Defeating an Enemy Amphibious Assault Landing
1. Fundamentals of an Anti-amphibious Landing Defense of a Coastline
2. Defeating an Amphibious Landing on a Sea Coastline
3. Defeating an Amphibious Landing in an Island (Skerrie) Region
Chapter 14. Naval Gunfire Cooperation with Ground Forces Operating on the Shore of a
Seacoast
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 5
1. Fundamentals of Naval Gunfire Cooperation
2. Systematic Naval Gunfire Cooperation
3. Episodic Naval Gunfire Cooperation
__________
Under the observation of Captain 1st Rank N.A. Zhukov and editor Captain 3d Rank A.O. Poznazerko
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 6
Abbreviations Encountered in This Document
BO – beregovaya oborona [shore or coast defense]
BSS – boyevoy signalnyy svod [combat signal code, by context, the use of one, two, or three
semaphore flags for ship-to-ship signaling]
BUMS-37 – Boyevoy Ustav Morskikh Sil 1937 [Combat Regulation for Naval Forces–1937]
DOT – dolgovremennaya ognevaya tochka [permanent (concrete and iron) strongpoint (pillbox)]
DZOT – derevo-zemlyanoye ognevoye cooruzheniye [earth and timber strongpoint (pillbox)]
FKP – flagmanskiy komandnyy punkt [senior commander’s command post, at sea or on shore]
KP – komandnyy punkt [command post]
MOR – morskoy oboronitelnoy rayon [naval defensive region, a command one level below fleet,
as well as geographically designated zone]
MTO – materialno–tekhnicheskoye obespecheniye [materiel–technical support]
MTO – minnotorpednaya oborona [mine–torpedo defense]
OV – otravlyayushchiye veshchestva [poisonous substances (hazardous materials in today’s
vernacular)]
OVR – okhrana vodnogo rayona [guard force of the offshore zone]
PDO – protivodesantnaya oborona [anti-amphibious landing defense]
PKO – protivokaternaya oborona [anti-cutter and anti-minelayer defense]
PKhO – protivokhemicheskaya oborona [anti-chemical defense]
PLO – protivolodochnaya oborona [anti-submarine defense]
PMO – protivominnaya oborona [anti-mine defense]
PVO – protivovozdushnaya oborona [anti-aircraft defense]
RKKA – Rabochye-Krestyanstkaya Krasnaya Armiya (Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army)
SNiS – sluzhba nablyudeniya i svyazi (observation and reporting service)
SSSR – soyuz sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik [Union of Soviet Soviet Socialist
Republics]
TsK VKP(b) – tsentralnyy komitet velikoy kommunisticheskoy partiy (Bolshevik) [Central
Committee of the Great Communist Party (Bolshevik)]
TUS – tablitsa uslovnykh signalov [table of encoded signals]
UKV – ultrakorotskiye volny [ultra short wave]
VMB – voyenno-morskaya baza [military–naval base (as opposed to a “commercial–naval
base”)]
VMF – Voyenno-Morskoy Flot [military–naval fleet (as opposed to the “commercial–naval
fleet”]
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 7
VNOS – vozdushoye nablyudeniye, opoveshcheniye i svyazi [air observation, warning, and
communications]
VPU – vspomogatelnyy punkt upravleniya [auxiliary command and control post]
VVS – voyenno-vozdushnyye sila [military air forces]
VZD – “vozdukh” [“air,” a radio-transmitted voice warning of enemy air attack]
ZPS – zvukopodvodnaya signalizatsia [underwater sound signaling]
Translator’s note: In addition to the above list of abbreviations, this document contains several
Russian terms, the definitions of which bear further explanation in the context of their use.
chast’ – unit in English, one level below soyedineniye and one level above podrazdeleniye in the
Russian organizational naming convention. When used in reference to ground forces, it describes
operational-size units (brigade, division); in the naval context, it could describe a sub-element of
a submarine brigade or naval aviation regiment, or a brigade of naval infantry.
front – also “front” in English, but not a cognate. The Russian front was a ground forces formation
equivalent in hierarchy and function to a US or British army group, to which were subordinated in
descending order armies, corps, divisions, regiments or brigades, and so on. As an example, the Karelian
Front controlled the Soviet Army units in the Murmansk area.
dozor, morskoy – naval patrol, a means of guarding vessels and shore-based objects in the
overall system of naval patrol service. It is accomplished by surface vessels, submarines, and
aircraft, on lines of patrol in designated zones, in positions at entrances and exits to anchorages,
straits, and narrows, and in other places where early warning of enemy approach is required.
(Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya [Soviet military encyclopedia], Moscow: Voyenizdat,
SVE, Vol. 3, 1977, p. 223. This 8-volume set will hereinafter be referred to as SVE)
otryad – detachment in English; as used in this text, a permanent or temporary formation of
vessels which has been assigned a specific mission, i.e., for minelaying or mine clearing, for
providing fire support or movement support. The type, size, and number of vessels assigned to
the detachment will vary in accordance with the assigned mission. (SVE, Vol. 6, 1978, pp. 169-
70)
podrazdeleniye – subunit in English, a tactical unit one level below chast’. In ground army or
naval infantry forces, a unit of battalion and below size.
razvedka – reconnaissance or intelligence in English, depending on context. In this document,
the term razvedka is translated as reconnaissance when it refers to the act of gathering
intelligence (by surface vessels, submarines, aircraft, and covert agents), and intelligence when it
refers to high-level organizational or analytical structures, i.e., the intelligence department of
Northern Fleet staff, or to a product of reconnaissance, for example, intelligence data.
rekognostsirovka – This Russian term is used to describe the actual conduct of reconnaissance
by a unit commander, executed by moving to a position that overwatches the terrain (portion of
the sea) in which his forces are expected to engage the enemy. In the naval application, this
activity may be accomplished with a submarine or aircraft sortie, in which the force commander
personally participates, using the on-board technical capabilities (periscope, vision ports, et
cetera) of the combat system in use.
skrytnost’ – in English, concealment, secrecy, or security; the choice being governed by context.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 8
soyedineniye – in English, a large formation comprised of several smaller formations (chasti in
Russian) of various types. In the naval context in the World War II era, this term refers to a
squadron of surface vessels or a brigade submarines, or a large standing formation of aircraft of
the same or mixed types. (SVE, Vol. 7, 1979, pp. 426-27)
upravleniye – consistently translated to English as command and control in this document. The
most common use of this term in this text is upravleniye boya [command and control of combat,
battle, engagement], while contemporary published definitions of this term are normally
associated with command and control of combat assets, including both technical assets and force
assets. The definition of the term as it relates to forces is “the activity of commanders and
leaders, staffs, political organs, services, and other organs of upravleniye, in support of the
combat preparation and combat capability of forces, preparation of operations and combat
actions, and their leadership during the execution of the assigned missions, The process of
upravleniye includes continuous gathering of information, assembly, study, application and
analysis of the data in regard to the situation, making the decision, assigning tasks to subordinate
elements, organization and maintenance of vzaimodeystviya [coordination], preparation of the
forces and staffs for combat actions and their direct supervision, conduct of measures for
political work and all forms of support of combat actions, and organization of control
[monitoring] and assistance to subordinate commanders, staffs, and forces.” (SVE, Vol. 8, 1980,
p. 203).
vzaimodeystviya – consistently translated to English as coordination in this document. The
Russian sense of this term is “agreement in missions (tasks), lines (areas), and time of actions of
subunits [battalion and below], units [brigades and divisions], large formations [above division
level, including large naval maneuver forces], and combined types of armed forces, branches of
forces, naval forces and special forces, in the interests of achieving common goals of combat and
operations; one of the principles of military art.” (SVE, Vol. 2,, 1976, p. 123).
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 9
________________________________________________________________
ORDER
of the People’s Commissar of the Military–Naval Fleet
of the
Union of SSR
1 December 1945 No. 500 Moscow
Contents. Confirmation and implementation of the Combat Regulation of the Military–Naval
Fleet of the Union of SSR (BU-45).
1. Confirm and implement the Combat Regulation of the Military–Naval Fleet of the Union of
USSR (BU-45).
In connection with the fact that the experience of war has still been insufficiently studied,
consider this Regulation in the course of 1946 to be temporary.
2. Commanders of fleets are to require from large formation commanders, the officer component
of large formation staffs, and the commanders of vessels (units) to carefully study the Regulation
in the process of its implementation in the combat preparation and on the basis of on-hand
experience of the war. If necessary, the inclusion of changes and supplements to the Regulation
should be forwarded by their proponents by 1 October 1946.
3. By 1 January 1947, republish the Regulation as a permanent document.
4. The instructions contained in the Regulation should be strictly observed in accordance with
the situation.
5. The Temporary Regulation of the Naval Forces of the RKKA 1937 (BUMS-37) is rescinded.
People’s Commissar of the Military–Naval Fleet of the Union of SSR
Admiral of the Fleet KUZNETSOV
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 10
Introduction
1. The Combat Regulation of the VMF of the Union of SSR is a tactical document, which
examines both various forms of combat of large formations, as well as its daily combat
activity.
Issues of an operational nature, which found significant expression in the Combat Regulation
of the Naval Forces (BYMS-37), are not laid out in this regulation in the examination of combat
actions.
2. The practice of the Great Patriotic War with German fascism established that the basic
provisions of the Combat Regulation of Naval Forces (1937 edition) are correct. In this current
regulation, only several older sections and paragraphs of the previous regulation have been
deleted and, in accordance with the experience of the war, appropriate supplements and changes
have been made in a number of other sections and paragraphs.
3. The present regulation examines contemporary battle first of all as a battle of large
formations of branches of naval forces, in which participate a variety of combat equipment on a
massive scale. This requires strictly executed coordination in combat of all branches of naval
forces. Only the unification of these forces can success be achieved. Therefore, the contents of
this regulation are oriented on the combat activity of large maneuver formations, consisting of
various forces that are coordinated with each other.
4. The officer component of the Military–Naval Fleet should be imbued with the thought of
the unconditional necessity of continuous coordination in battle and in practice have mastery of
its organization, which is provided in this regulation.
5. Combat conditions are varied, and thus this regulation cannot provide exhaustive
instructions for all cases of combat practice. It establishes only the fundamental principles of the
conduct of combat actions and methods of leadership of large formations (of vessels and units)
of naval forces.
6. The instructions of this regulation, which are addressed to the commander of a large
maneuver formation and his staff and to the commanders of the vessels and units which are
assigned to his element have the nature of mandatory requirements and, in the main, respond to
the question – what should be done in corresponding cases of combat activity of the large
formation.
The detailed instructions concerning the methods of actions during execution of this or that
mission, which are developed in the provisions of this regulation, lie in the instructions for
typical forms of combat activity, of both maneuver and homogeneous large formations of the
naval forces.
7. The present regulation is a document for the organization of a large formation for
combat. Therefore, the instructions of the regulation in the chapters which relate to the conduct
of battle and daily combat activity of large maneuver formations are oriented on one scheme,
which encapsulates the fundamental issues of organization and command and control of combat:
organization of a large formation for a given form of combat, its preparation for combat,
command and control in combat, and the support of success.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 11
8. The issues of combat support are laid out in this regulation in the form of requirements for
support of a large formation directly in combat (Chapter 6), organized by the staff of the large
formation.
Combat actions of a supporting nature, on a larger scale, which are organized in the sequence
of execution of a separate mission of the large formation, are examined in the present regulation
(Chapter 8) as self-standing actions of a large maneuver formation for support of the combat
activity of naval forces.
9. Broad use of the Combat Regulation of the VMF by the officer component of the Military–
Naval Fleet and its leadership during the conduct of combat actions will facilitate its access for
study, as a document for service utilization.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 12
Chapter 1
General Provisions
1. The Military–Naval Fleet of the Union of SSR is intended for the defense of the state
interests of the Soviet Union in the naval theaters of military actions.
The Officers, petty officers, and sailors of the Military–Naval Fleet of the USSR are
required firmly to keep in mind their duty before the Socialist Motherland, with all their
efforts to strive to execute their assigned missions and, no matter what the circumstances in
a combat engagement with the enemy, not permit a loss of honor and the military honor of
their large formation (unit).
2. The complex composition of naval forces of the active fleet (including large formations of
surface vessels of various classes, submarines, naval aviation, shore-based artillery, naval
infantry, forces of PVO and other special purpose units, the high mobility and the broad
employment of aviation in combat at sea, the broad use of radio-location [radar] and other means
of detecting the enemy and observation in combat, have led to great intensity of the forces that
are participating in combat and the rapid development, and also decisive nature, of combat
engagements at sea.
This requires from the commanders of large formations and units of naval forces,
which are participating in combat actions, of high skill in the organization of coordination
of various forces and in their command and control in battle. [It also requires] their mutual
support, outstanding training of commanders and of all subunits, careful preparation for
an anticipated battle, and a high level of knowledge of how to use the combat equipment,
the mobility and great intensity of moral and physical forces.
3. Naval forces execute combat missions independently – in combat with the enemy’s naval
forces or during the execution of sea transport – as well as in coordination with ground forces
during combat with the enemy in a coastal region.
The latter condition requires from large formation and unit commanders of the naval forces
special preparation in coordination with the ground forces of the Red Army.
4. Each combat mission is executed by a large formation of naval forces as a part of an
operation at sea, conducted under the leadership of the Commander in Chief of the Fleet or the
MOR (VMB or specially designated operational chief), and should pursue a concrete operational
goal, which flows from the requirements of a given operation.
By its success, each battle should support the success of the operation.
5. The struggle with the enemy at sea is conducted by means of destruction of his forces.
The sole means for achievement of this goal in a naval operation is combat.
The destruction of the enemy’s personnel and materiel means and the morale of his forces
and their capability for resistance is achieved by combat.
6. Modern means of combat possess great power, long range of actions, and mobility.
They create the following possibilities:
in offense – to conduct a strike across the entire depth of an enemy combat formation, to
encircle it, to capture it and to destroy it;
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 13
in defense – to disrupt the enemy’s combat formation and, having blocked his path, bring
his offensive to collapse.
Every battle – offensive and defensive – has the purpose of inflicting defeat on the enemy.
The constant striving to engage in battle with the enemy, for the purpose of his more total
defeat, should lie as the basis for informing also the actions of each commander and sailor of the
VMF. Without any special orders, the enemy should be skillfully and rapidly attacked wherever
he is detected.
This type of striving should be developed in all of our existing forces, in order that they not
place themselves under the strikes of a concentrated enemy which is superior in forces.
Skillfully using the situation at sea in the course of daily combat actions, we must defeat
the enemy piecemeal, leading in this manner to his total defeat.
7. Simultaneously with combat actions for the destruction of the enemy forces, our
naval forces conduct the battle at sea for the use of the sea for the execution of military
transport and for broadening their operational zone (a system of strongpoints).
8. Combat actions which support the use of a given region of the sea for our own forces, or to
prevent its use by the enemy, should be conducted daily, corresponding in scale and intensity
with the requirements for executing operations.
In doing this, our naval forces should be prepared for combat engagements with the enemy
both in the region of our coastline and at sea, on the enemy’s sea lines of communication and
near his shores.
Ongoing vigilance – active reconnaissance in combination with rapid deployment of forces,
should ensure timely participation in combat of both individual combat entities as well as their
large formations, without excessive tiring of our forces.
Complete readiness for repulsing a sudden attack on a base of our fleet and aviation and
readiness to rapidly respond with a powerful strike for strike of the enemy should be supported
even in peacetime.
9. The execution of each combat mission is associated with the overcoming of the
enemy’s counter-actions:
Active nature of actions, envisaged with the anticipated threat from the enemy by our
offensive against it mitigates [removes] this threat; a pre-emptive offensive by a mobile forward
detachment against a powerful enemy detachment threatening our unit will disrupt the systematic
nature of his actions in combat and at the same time enable our forces to achieve their specific
goal of combat. In these efforts, the nature of combat actions depends each time on the actual
composition of our forces and on the ratio of our forces to the enemy forces, as well as the
situation which, in a number of cases, permits the execution of decisive actions against a more
powerful enemy force;
The conduct of a surprise strike on the enemy, who is not suspecting this and not prepared
to repulse the strike, by means of deep penetration into the enemy’s combat formation (with
aviation, light forces, submarines) – deprives him of the time for organizing an effective counter-
action in combat, and by persuading the enemy in the superiority of our audacity, deprives him
of confidence in his own actions.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 14
Preparedness in all circumstances to launch against the enemy with our own, earlier
organized strike and the level of preparedness in the execution of defensive methods make large
formations of naval forces powerful and durable in combat.
The fundamental form of the employment of forces in combat and conditions of enemy
counter-actins is the coordination of various branches of forces. This begins with
coordination between separate tactical entities (vessels – flights of aircraft), which are engaging
the enemy, and ends with coordination between large formations of various branches in a large
battle.
10. During the execution of a given combat mission, combat with the enemy requires the
accumulation of forces and combat means in a quantity sufficient for overcoming his counter-
actions which interfere with the achievement of the operational goal of the combat. However,
when the situation in combat permits (in addition to the achievement of the specific purpose of
the combat), also to destroy all the present enemy forces, the absence of which significantly
facilitates the conduct of subsequent combat at sea (in particular, if the enemy has difficulty
replenishing his forces). Then the commander of the large formation that is conducting the battle
should display daring and initiative, and modify the previous purpose of the combat to a more
general purpose – the destruction of the enemy forces which he has engaged.
11. The intensity of combat actions at sea does not remain constant. Both the enemy, each in
response to the actions of the other, increases the number of forces participating in the combat
and, in this manner, frequent combat engagements can lead to a concentration of forces on one of
the sectors of combat actions and generate a confrontation of much greater scale.
Thus a series of local combat engagements at sea of modes scale can transition into a general,
large naval engagement. In a favorable situation, such combat should be carried to the end, that
is, a decisive defeat should be inflicted on the enemy at sea.
12. When combat actions are occurring daily at sea, the situation is constantly changing. A
complicated complex of all conditions of the situation presents in each given case a series of
difficulties for executing our own missions, and at the same time contains a number of difficult
circumstances for the enemy. These factors can and should be used for the successful
development of combat with him at sea.
Well established reconnaissance provides the possibility of timely detection and evaluation
of the difficult circumstance in which the enemy has fallen. Use this for execution of a strictly
composed, bold and unanticipated by the enemy combat action, which can inflict on even a
powerful enemy significant losses and lead to the successful development of subsequent actions.
13. Carefully observing for changes in the situation, using every available opportunity, we
must at the same time ourselves create a situation which favors the conduct of combat actions
against an enemy who is powerful at sea.
By appropriate deployment of our own forces, gradually equipping the region of actions, by
destruction (piecemeal) of the enemy’s operating forces and holding his forces under constant
pressure, we must contain and weaken the enemy, gradually depriving him of the capability
for executing combat missions at sea, and using this circumstance for development of our
own combat actions.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 15
14. In the course of the development of combat at sea the enemy, preserving his forces,
perhaps will not commit to combat his fleet’s large-scale forces, and may not conduct
engagements with them.
Just the same, we must be prepared for a large battle at sea with powerful enemy forces, both
in regard to deployment of our own forces and means and in regard to their combat and political
preparedness.
15. Combat at sea can be developed in various forms.
The offensive – for achievement of our own goals, and defense – for preventing the enemy in
the achievement of his goals, are fundamental to all forms of combat with the enemy.
Offensive combat is the basic form of combat actions of the naval forces of the VMF
SSSR: only decisive offensive combat can achieve defeat of the enemy.
However, combat actions at sea cannot always and everywhere offensive in nature. Defense
will be necessary every time when an offensive is impossible or inappropriate. The purpose of
defense is to hold back the enemy’s offensive, and in this manner prepare his defeat by
subsequent transition to the offensive.
16. The methods of conducting combat during an engagement with the enemy, both of
modestly large formations and single vessels, batteries, and aircraft which have coordinated
amongst themselves in daily combat actions, and in massively large formations – in decisive
combat with powerful enemy forces – depend in large measure on the on-hand composition of
forces, the utility [appropriateness] of the combat means, and on the level of combat and political
preparedness of the enlisted component.
Combat conditions are multi-varied. Therefore, in combat it is necessary always to select the
method of actions which correspond to the actual situation and avoid well known patterns which
will facilitate the enemy’s conduct of the battle.
17. It is not necessary to be equally strong everywhere. For the support of success in
combat, it is necessary to create decisive superiority in forces and combat means against
the enemy on the main (decisive) axis.
The composition of forces that are conducting the main (decisive) strike (main forces in
combat), depend in each case: on the nature of the mission being executed, on the situation
(including the ratio of forces), and also on the existing composition of the naval forces of a given
sea.
The grouping of forces in battle, their concentration on the axis of the main strike and the
distribution of forces for actions on secondary axes determine the combat formation of the large
formation conducting the battle.
18. For defeat of the enemy, however, it is insufficient simply to concentrate forces and
means for the main strike. It is necessary to accomplish the coordination of all branches of
naval forces which are operating on the main axis, into the entire depth of the enemy
formation, and the agreement of actions of the large formations and units on the secondary
axes.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 16
Modern combat is conducted by unified forces of all branches of the fleet. Their coordination
in combat has decisive significance and is organized, normally, in the interests of surface forces,
which are executing the primary role in naval combat.
19. The organization of coordination should flow from the combat capabilities of individual
branches of the naval forces and their weapons, in accordance with which it is necessary to posit
their combat missions.
The coordination of forces which are participating in battle should be organized and
goal-focused on the basis of achievement of the following data points:
the enemy’s counter-actions;
the massing of our own strikes;
mutual support of the maneuver of attacking forces with a combination of parallel and
successive actions;
designation of the leading role of the forces executing the main mission.
20. The organizational basis of coordination of forces in combat is the large maneuver
formation, which consists of surface vessels, submarines, and air forces, and in a number of
cases also naval infantry, shore-based artillery, and PVO troops, for resolution of a specific
mission.
21. The commander of the large maneuver formation is responsible for execution in
combat of the assigned mission and achievement of the operational goal of the combat.
The large formation commander has the following obligations: within the limits of his
available capabilities, during the execution of his mission to support coordination with him of
other large formations and units, fulfilling their requests for assistance and providing them
suggestions concerning cooperation in battle, and to inform them regarding his own condition
and the situation.
The large formation commander is obligated to familiarize his subordinates in regard to the
situation and assign them combat missions in a timely manner.
The large formation commander is obligated to maintain, among his subordinate units, strict
discipline in combat, to require from them unspoken execution of combat orders and to
demand support from units which are attached for this purpose from other large formations and
are coordinating with his large formation.
22. The overall supervision in combat of a large maneuver formation, as a rule, is
entrusted, depending on the predominant significance in it of these or other forces:
in the open sea and during an attack against an enemy coastline – to the commander of
the large surface vessel formation;
in a remote region of the sea, during prolonged anticipation of the enemy – to the
commander of the large submarine formation;
at sea, when the basic force of the large maneuver formation is aviation – to the
commander of the large aviation formation of the fleet VVS;
in a region of our own coastline – to the commander of the VMB or commander of the
large formation of shore-based artillery (BO sector) or of the naval infantry.
23. Victory in battle is secured by the following:
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 17
a correct, based on calculations, decision of the large formation commander and careful
preparation for the battle;
uncompromising will for victory of all commanders and enlisted men;
well organized, active and uninterrupted reconnaissance actions;
suddenness of actions [surprise];
decisive offensive by superior forces and means on the main axis;
active, skillful, and initiative-based actions of the commanders and enlisted men;
continuous coordination of all branches of naval forces in the battle;
timely and well focused commitment to the battle of available reserves;
skillful use of the conditions of the sea situation and means of equipping the region of
actions;
well laid out command and control;
uninterrupted combat supply of the forces operating in combat.
24. Maneuver is one of the most important conditions of the achievement of success.
Maneuver, executed by large formations in combat, has the purpose of improving or
preserving a favorable circumstance for ourselves relative to the enemy, prior to the infliction on
him of a crushing strike. Maneuver should be rapid and concealed.
Maneuver facilitates surprise for the enemy of the chosen method of conducting strikes on
him, and in this manner supports his inability to resist.
Maskirovaniye1of our combat formation and leading the enemy into confusion in regard to
the concept of the ongoing actions have the same significance.
Maneuver by fire and by combat means – organized and massed use of the large
formation’s weapons against a selected enemy target – is a powerful means for accomplishment
of a surprise strike in combat.
25. Success is always on the side of the one who is bold in combat, constantly maintains
the initiative in his hands, and dictates his will to the enemy.
The commander of a large formation should supervise the combat actions of his large
maneuver formation with initiative.
Judicious initiative is based on a correct understanding of the mission and situation. It
includes the urgency to find the best methods of executing the received mission in a complicated
situation; in use of all developing unanticipated favorable possibilities and timely undertaking of
measures against arising threats.
The display of initiative should not go against the general concept of the higher-standing
command and should enable the best execution of the assigned mission.
In a case of acute change of the situation, the commander should undertake on his own
initiative a decision and quickly report it to his superior and inform adjacent units.
1 This term describes a wide range of “camouflage” measures, ranging at the bottom from simple
camouflage of vessels and objects through tactical and operational measures designed to conceal forces
and maneuvers or to deceive the enemy as to size and composition of forces, direction of main attack, and
so on. It may also include operational security measures, such as false and misleading communications,
which are designed to confuse the enemy.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 18
The readiness to take upon oneself the responsibility for a bold decision and persistently
conduct it to the end is a fundamental action of all commanders in combat.
Bold and judicious actions should always be supervised by the leader and his
subordinates.
The initiative of subordinate commanders should in all measure be encouraged and used for
the achievement of overall success.
26. The purposefulness of the decision and clarity of the missions are the basis of command
and control of combat.
The decision that is made should be firmly and persistently brought to fruition.
An order must be executed with the full intensity of the force.
Subordinate commanders should know and understand their combat missions.
They should be knowledgeable regarding the overall actions of the large formation in each
phase of the battle and with regard for changes in the situation.
The large formation commander should control the preparation and execution of the combat
missions – by his subordinates, and his requirements regarding support – by coordinating units.
27. Combat assets which belong to naval forces, and the methods of combat with the enemy,
are continuously developing and modernizing. Their constant study and mastery of them to
perfection are the primary obligations of all commanders and enlisted men.
The study of the effects of a new weapon in combat and the search for the most effective
method of its employment for achievement of victory are always present.
Upon completion of the battle, the conclusions drawn on the basis of collection and
discussion of observations in combat should be used for subsequent preparation of vessels and
units.
28. The complexity and intensity of modern combat demands from the enlisted component
and commanders enormous intensity of physical and moral efforts.
The large formation commander is required to display in any conditions of the situation
concern in regard to his enlisted personnel and subordinate commanders.
Knowledge of his subordinates, constant discussions with them, attention to their combat
lives, feats, and needs, their inculcation in the spirit of unfettered, self-sacrificing execution of
the combat mission, provide the commander the combat cohesion of his large formation (unit),
his political firmness, the existing combat readiness, and on the whole success in combat.
Commanders and enlisted men should be inculcated in the spirit of hatred toward the enemy
and with the unswerving will toward his destruction in battle.
29. Combat at sea requires a large expenditure of ordnance and fuel. The expenditure of the
combat supply determines the strength of the strikes inflicted on the enemy; the expenditure of
fuel and other means – are a step in the execution of maneuver and combat support of the large
formation’s actions.
Therefore, the organization of the materiel support of combat is a most important obligation
of commanders of all degrees and the staff of a large formation.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 19
In accordance with the decision that has been made, the expenditure of materiel means in
combat in the quantity required for the execution of the planned actions against the enemy, on
the main and secondary axes, should be supported by timely delivery of them. The forecasted
expenditure of ordnance is confirmed [approved] by the large formation commander during the
preparation for combat.
The on-shore expenditure of combat means, in relation to the battle plan, requires its
regulation in the form of command and control of the combat.
It is necessary during the planning for combat to maintain a reserve of materiel resources for
an unanticipated circumstance of combat.
30. In all cases of the combat activity of a large formation, keep in mind that the enemy is
striving to obtain information with the help of espionage, by means of listening to conversations
and transmissions with all communications means. Therefore, constant vigilance and
preservation of military secrecy have special significance both during anchorage at base and as
well in moving out to sea.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 20
Chapter 2
Naval Forces and Their Combat Purpose
31. Combat actions at sea are executed by a variety of branches of naval forces, consisting
of the following components:
surface vessels;
submarines;
naval aviation;
shore-based artillery;
naval infantry;
forces of PVO;
special purpose units.
The combat activity of naval forces of each fleet is supported by the following elements:
service of observation and communications;
hydrographic service;
logistic service;
medical service;
accident and life-saving [rescue] service.
32. Surface vessels are distinguished by large variation in classes in accordance with their
combat purpose. The variety of classes support the best execution of each combat mission by
vessels built for this purpose.
In addition to their fundamental purpose, surface vessels, possessing universality, are used as
well for conditions of the situation for execution of other missions assigned to them
(reconnaissance, mine emplacement, transport of troops, and so on). Such employment of these
vessels is supported by their supplementary armaments and equipment.
Along with that, surface vessels, as an exposed force, are the most often subjected to the
strikes of various enemy naval forces, in particular by aviation, and therefore are in need of
special support requirements.
33. Battleships are intended for the destruction of powerful enemy surface vessels and the
suppression of shore-based batteries, and also for providing to the large formation combat
staying power. They are included primarily in the strike groups of large combat formations as
vessels that possess maximum caliber of naval guns, the greatest defense against enemy strikes,
and great maneuverability.
34. Aircraft carriers have their basis in the armament of combat aircraft, intended for
support of air superiority in the region of battle, the destruction of combat vessels and transports
at sea, and in distant military–naval bases, and also for direct combat support of fleet large
formations (reconnaissance, PVO, PLO).
35. Cruisers have as their purpose support in combat of light forces and the execution of
missions as forward detachments of a large combat formation, possessing powerful naval guns
and defensive armor.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 21
Cruisers are used in combat for execution of reconnaissance and combat security, and also
for support of torpedo attacks of escort destroyers. In addition, they are used for emplacement (in
general) of active mine obstacles.
36. Destroyer escorts have as their primary designation the execution of torpedo attacks at
sea in nighttime conditions. In addition, they are broadly employed for patrol and reconnaissance
service at sea, the conduct of the mission of combat and movement security, and as well for
emplacement of mine obstacles and for artillery support of amphibious landings.
37. Guard vessels have as their purpose the escorting of vessels in crossing by sea and in
combat, and as well during anchorage in their base, the conduct of close-in patrol and convoying
of transports at sea.
38. In addition to basic groups of vessels, vessels of other classes, transport and auxiliary
vessels that in daily combat actions of naval forces execute varied and responsible combat
missions, have great significance in fleet combat actions.
Torpedo cutters are used in combat in large groups for inflicting on the enemy a powerful
torpedo strike, and also for executing surprise torpedo attacks on enemy anchorages of vessels
and base targets in poor visibility conditions.
The vulnerability of torpedo cutters to aviation and gunnery actions of vessels at close
distances requires their coordination with other naval forces (including guidance and lead).
Submarine chasers have as their basic purpose the search for submarines during PLO of a
sea region, and also for convoying transports and escorting submarines.
Surface minelayers are fundamentally charge with emplacement at sea of positional mine
obstacles.
Minesweepers on the whole are employed for minesweeping efforts in base regions and in
channels at sea. Fast minesweepers are used for supporting surface vessels against mines in
combat.
Monitors and gunboats serve the purpose of combined shelling with ground forces
operating along the coastline.
Amphibious assault vessels (landing craft, assault, close-in support, and so on) are intended
for landing amphibious assaults on an unequipped shore.
Transports (military and commercial) serve for hauling and military cargoes at sea.
Auxiliary ships (floating bases [dry docks?], repair shops, hydrographic ships, rescue
vessels, hospital ships, and others) are intended for execution of various fleet requirements.
39. Submarines, possessing the capability for prolonged actions at sea and the launching of
powerful, concealed torpedo strikes, and also for the execution of active and maneuverable mine
emplacements, are used in combat in strike and supporting groups of a large combat formation,
and also in independent actions on enemy sea lines of communication and near bases.
Submarines serve as a reliable means of concealed and prolonged reconnaissance, primarily
near a hostile coastline.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 22
In addition, they are employed for landing reconnaissance–diversionary parties, for
hydrographic support of combat actions of surface vessels and air forces, and as well for delivery
of cargoes to a blockaded base.
The conditions of habitation, especially the provision of materiel components (battery
charging and so on), and the necessity for centralized supply of all forms of material–technical
support of submarines, requires the basing of submarines (on the scale of a division or brigade)2
at special shore or floating bases.
40. Naval aviation, consisting of large formations of mine–torpedo, bomber, fighter, and
low-level attack and reconnaissance aircraft, is a powerful strike force in combat. It possesses
great universality in the employment of various combat means, the capability for maneuver, the
conduct of strikes at great distances, the massing of a strike in a brief time interval, and
prolonged actions against the enemy by a series of successive attacks.
Naval aviation is used for conducting torpedo–bomb and low-level strikes on the vessels of
the enemy fleet at sea and in bases, the destruction of sea lines of communication, and the
activity of enemy naval and air bases, as well as for mine emplacement.
The assigned missions are executed both independently and in coordination with fleet vessels
and aviation of the Red Army.
Naval aviation also is used for execution of reconnaissance and guiding submarines and
surface vessels to the enemy, for the adjustment of naval gunfire and the fires of shore batteries,
the execution of the PLO mission and delivery of smoke screens.
Along with this, the combat employment of aircraft of naval aviation is limited by the short
lingering time of their actions in combat and their lowered survivability in this effort. The
combat activity of naval aviation depends significantly on weather conditions.
41. Mine–torpedo aviation is intended for the destruction of enemy vessels and transports at
sea and in anchorages by means of torpedo attacks and the emplacement of active and
maneuvering mine obstacles.
Mine–torpedo aviation, together with bombers, is the basic strike force of naval aviation.
42. Bomber aviation has as its purpose the destruction of enemy vessels and transports at
sea and in bases, the destruction of other targets on military–naval bases, the destruction of
enemy aviation on his airfields, and the suppression of its activity.
43. Fighter aviation is intended for covering vessels, military–naval bases, and other fleet
targets against strikes by enemy aviation, and as well the support of the combat activity of other
aviation types.
44. Low-level attack aviation has as its purpose the destruction of enemy light forces and
transports in bases and in crossings by sea, the destruction of enemy personnel in amphibious
assault landings, the support of fleet light forces, bombers, and torpedo-carrying aviation during
their actions at sea and in a coastal region, and the suppression of the activity and destruction of
enemy aviation on its coastal airfields.
2 In this era, a submarine division would be six boats of the same class, the brigade a combination of
divisions of submarines of the various classes.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 23
45. Reconnaissance aviation is intended for reconnaissance of the dispositions and
composition of forces of the enemy fleet and the nature of his combat activity, observation for
movement on sea lines of communication, exposure of the airfield network and basing of enemy
aviation, the discovery of the system of defensive fortifications on the coastline; defended targets
on military–naval bases, and the enemy’s logistic and PVO systems.
46. Shore-based [coastal] artillery – stationary and mobile (railroad and with mechanized
prime movers), is used for the defense of military–naval bases and other military targets located
on the coastline, against attack by enemy naval and ground forces, and also for participation in
offensive actions on the coastal flank of the Red Army.
For support of ground defense of its own combat formations, coastal artillery needs
attachment to it naval infantry units or ground forces of the Red Army.
47. Naval infantry is intended for amphibious assault landings, conducted by it both
independently and in the component of a large fleet maneuver formation, and also of large-scale
amphibious landings together with ground forces.
In anti-amphibious landing defense of our coastline, and also in ground defense of shore-
based fleet targets, naval infantry participates along with other forces, occupying entire separate
sectors or executing the mission of a mobile strike group.
In addition, naval infantry can be used for securing [guarding] anchorages for vessels and
naval aviation airfields against air and amphibious assault attacks, and also for serving as mobile
escorting forces for repositioning shore batteries, and for guarding combat formations of
stationary artillery.
48. PVO troops have as their purpose the defense against attack from the air of vessels,
units, and various shore-based targets of the fleet, and are assigned their own anti-aircraft
artillery, and receive attachment of fighter aviation, searchlights, barrage balloons, and special
means of service of air observation, information, and communications [SNiS].
Independent units and subunits of PVO may be attached to a variety of large formation of
naval forces and their separate smaller units.
49. Special purpose units of naval forces consist of rifle–machine gun, machine gun–
artillery units, as well as engineer, technical equipment, and chemical units. The former are
charged with direct and indirect fire defense of a coastline against an enemy amphibious assault
landing from the sea, the reinforcement of the fires of shore-based artillery at close ranges; the
latter have as their purpose the creation of engineer and chemical defense for support of the
combat actions of shore-based artillery, naval infantry, ground forces, and as well the vessels of
the fleet that are standing at anchor in harbors.
50. Service of observation and communications [SNiS] consists of various means of
observation and communications, positioned basically along the coastline, and intended for
support of command and control of the actions of the fleet, its large formations, and of individual
vessels and units.
The use of the assets of the service of observation and communications is based on the
permanent and organized coordination system of shore-based theater equipment (SNiS posts,
communications nodes, technical observation stations) with means of observation and
communications of fleet and aviation large formations.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 24
51. Hydrographic service, including special subunits and systems of theater-level
navigation equipment, is intended for support of the fleet combat actions in the realm of
hydrographic study and equipping of the region of combat actions – by means of attachment to
the component of an actual large formation of special maneuvering subunits. In addition, the
mission of hydrographic service is the deployment and support in use of a system of shore-base
and floating means of navigational equipping of the theater.
52. Logistic service of the fleet is intended for the materiel-technical support of the combat
activity of the naval forces in theater and the establishment of a system of naval and air bases
which support the conduct of combat actions of each large maneuver formation.
53. Medical–sanitary service of the fleet with it subunits supports large formations of naval
forces with immediate at the time of their combat actions services to the wounded, injured by OV
[hazardous substances], and the sick.
54. Accident–rescue service of the fleet is intended for rendering aid to vessels damaged in
battle, the raising of sunken vessels, and the clearing of channels of sunken vessels that hinder
sailing.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 25
Chapter 3
Organization of a Large Maneuver Formation
1. Fundamentals of Organization of a Large Maneuver Formation
55. A large maneuver formation is a temporary large formation, organized for a given
operation from various branches of naval forces, coordinating in the execution of their assigned
combat mission.
The recommended selection of forces and means and the establishment of a precise system of
subordination and coordination between all the units of the large maneuver formation and with
adjacent units lie as the basis for its formation.
56. The organization of command and control of a large maneuver formation should be
constructed in accordance with the requirement of unity and conformity of actions of all the
forces executing the common mission in combat, the concentration of their efforts for inflicting
defeat on the enemy. This is achieved by unification of the leadership in battle into one person
and unity of the tactical concept among the enlisted component of the entire large formation.
57. A large maneuver formation is a complicated large formation with various forms of
subordination to the large formation commander. Depending on the assigned mission, it has in
quality the fundamental to one or another permanent large formation (which which possesses a
staff prepared for command and control of combat). It is reinforced by attached units of other
large formations (or entire large formations), and in combat acts together with units of adjacent
large formations designated for support.
If the limitation of the combat mission does not require a large force for its execution, a
maneuver group is formed in its place, which includes in itself the necessary quantity of various
branches of force.
58. Large maneuver formations are organized simultaneously with the assignment to its
commander of the combat mission.
Large maneuver formations are organized in advance, when this is called for in connection
with the plan of the operation. This enables, before the beginning of its execution, the
organization of the large formation for purposes of its planned preparation.
2. Selection and Delegation of Forces and Means of a Large Maneuver Formation
59. The calculations for selection of the forces and means of a large maneuver formation are
undertaken by the staff of the command that is organizing the operation, based on the
requirements for successful execution of the combat mission assigned to the large formation.
60. The selection of forces and means of the large maneuver formation is carried out on the
basis of a preliminary tactical estimate for the purpose of ensuring the presence in the large
formation of a full-value composition of basic forces, supporting forces, and a reserve.
The regulatory composition of forces and means consist of the following elements:
basic forces – for execution of the actions in direct achievement of the end goal of the
combat;
supporting forces – for inflicting strikes on the enemy with the purpose of disrupting his
counter-actions in combat and supporting tactical deployment;
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 26
reserve – for supporting the forces acting in combat, and also for cover of a forced
withdrawal of our forces.
61. The distribution of forces and means in the composition of the combat formation of a
large maneuver formation, in accordance with the missions assigned to them in battle, is
accomplished by the commander of the large maneuver formation in the process of his reaching
of a decision for execution of the mission assigned to his large formation.
3. System of Subordination in a Large Maneuvering Formation and Coordination with
Adjacent Forces
62. Complete clarity should be established in the system of subordination within the large
maneuver formation and with coordinating adjacent units in combat.
The forces designated in subordination to the large maneuver formation are subordinated to
the commander of the large maneuver formation and his orders.
the forces of the permanent large formation are in total subordination to the commander
of the large maneuver formation, as their permanent commander;
the attached forces are in operational subordination to the commander of the large
maneuver formation, who assigns them their combat mission.
The remaining forces which are acting jointly and executing the common combat mission
and forces designated for support of the units of other large formations coordinate with the
forces of the large maneuver formation and execute the requirements of its commander in regard
to support, having received their combat mission from their own higher level of command
(which is instructed in his combat order).
63. The direct supervisors of the commanders of units being placed in the component of the
large maneuver formation maintain responsibility for the composition, overall combat training,
and combat readiness of their units, the political–morale condition and discipline of the enlisted
personnel, special material–technical support, and condition of ordnance and all combat means
of their units. Control for the condition of the above-mentioned units and organization of the use
of their ordnance, combat means, equipment, and also MTO of attached units in the upcoming
combat lies in the staff of the large maneuver formation.
64. The requirements of the staff and political section of a large maneuver formation are
executed, as a rule, by the staff and political section of the basic large formation.
65. For facilitating the command and control in combat of attached units and supporting
units, as a rule, the former send to the staff of the large formation during the preparatory period
and conduct of battle their representatives – liaison officers: the latter also designate liaison
officers, receiving in turn from the staff of the large formation its representatives.
4. Organizational Order
66. The large maneuver formation organizes in accordance with the order of the Commander-
in-Chief of the Fleet (VVS, MOP, VMB) in regard to organization of forces for executing a given
mission.
67. The organizational order contains the following elements;
the designation of the large maneuver formation commander;
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 27
the composition of forces of the basic large formation;
the orders to the commanders of permanent large formations regarding transfer of
subordination of the latter of the full component or specific parts of them for attachment to
the basic large formation.
instructions in regard to the period of being in attached forces status in the component of
the large maneuver formation;
instructions regarding the time and place of the assembly of forces.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 28
Chapter 4
Preparation of a Large Formation for Combat
1. Fundamentals of Preparation for Combat
68. The commander of a large formation (unit) bears full responsibility for the
condition and combat readiness of the forces subordinated to him.
The commander of the large maneuver formation, which has received the combat mission, is
obligated to the full preparation for the upcoming combat actions of all the forces designated for
its accomplishment, to organize coordination of the forces participating in the combat, to
coordinate his own actions with other large formations and to undertake all necessary measures
of preliminary support.
69. The basis of the preparation of large formation for combat is the decision of its
commander.
This decision determines the starting position of the large maneuver formation, which must
be created by the time of the initiation of combat for its successful conduct, including the
following elements:
the distribution of forces [in a geographic sense] and equipping in the region of actions
by the moment of the initiation of combat;
the training readiness of the enlisted component of the large formation for the upcoming
actions;
the volume of information regarding the formation that is necessary for orientation of
one’s own actions in combat.
70. The central moment in the effort of the large formation commander and starting
point for organizing the preparation of the large formation for battle is the drawing up of
the plan of battle (of combat actions).
In the preparatory period for combat, on the basis of the developed plan of combat actions,
the commander of the large formation complete the following tasks:
organize the forces designated for participation in combat, in the component of the large
maneuver formation, in accordance with the received mission;
organize command and control of the large formation and upcoming combat;
issue the necessary warning orders for combat;
organize coordination of the forces participating in the battle;
reach agreement of [his] actions with other large formations (not participating in the
given battle);
conduct materiel–technical preparation and replenishment [make up manpower and
equipment shortfalls] of the large formation;
conduct political work for support of the upcoming combat;
conduct special training (combat preparation) of the large formation before the battle;
execute measures for preliminary combat support of the large formation;
concentrate [assemble] the forces at the place of battle and occupy the start position for
the initiation of combat.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 29
For the purposes of reducing the overall duration of preparation for combat, the commander
of the large formation should strive to restructure the processes of preparation so as to conduct
them in parallel.
A large portion of the preparation is conducted, as a rule, in base; the remaining on the
movement to the combat region.
71. Only an energetically conducted preparation of the large formation will ensure the
successful conduct of the battle.
The chief of staff is obligated to direct the preparation of the large formation for
combat. The preparation should be planned from the moment of receipt of the combat mission.
The tempo of preparation of the large formation for combat and its detailed steps in
execution depend on the time available.
2. Planning and Organizing for Combat
72. During preparation for battle, the commander of the large formation is obligated in
his effort, while assisting his own staff and the commanders of subordinate and
coordinating units, to support to the greatest degree the systematic nature of the conduct of
the upcoming battle.
A correct and unified understanding by the commander and the chief of staff of the received
mission and role of the large formation in conducting the operation should support a successful
preparation of the large formation for combat.
73. The chief of staff is obligated, on the basis of a detailed analysis of the existing specific
situation, using the multi-faceted necessary estimates [calculations], under his guidance, to
prepare for the large formation commander conclusions from the evaluation of the situation
which specify the following:
in what measure the enemy forces, by their composition, displacement, or condition,
might counteract or interfere with the execution of the mission assigned to the large
formation;
to what degree other conditions of the situation (including as well the condition of one’s
own force) encumber the successful execution of the mission;
by what actions of our own forces and supporting measures can all these difficulties be
overcome or mitigated.
During the evaluation of the situation on the whole, it is crucial to determine for the
commander of the large formation at what is primary and what is secondary that given moment.
74. For preparation of the decision of the commander, in the production of the estimates the
chief of staff brings together his own staff officers, necessary specialists and representatives of
coordinating large formations, and as well the commanders of units and subunits designated for
execution of their individual combat missions.
In the absence of information regarding the situation, it is required to organize the collection
of reports by means of his own reconnaissance (with the large formation commander’s
permission) and the use of data available from higher level staff and other large formations.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 30
The chief of staff should be constantly prepared to give the commander of the large
formation the information necessary to him for preparation of the decision.
The more consequential the mission, the greater is the requirement in personal
rekognostsirovka3 by the commander for study and evaluation of the situation.
75. The large formation commander is obligated to investigate the situation in detail
and undertake a confident decision concerning the methods of action in the upcoming
battle. This decision will serve as the basis for development of the plan of actions and the
preparation of the large formation for combat.
The decision requires the determination of a concept of the upcoming actions in accordance
with the missions established by the senior commander:
first, a clearly expressed idea of the decision, i.e., a selection of the axis of actions in combat:
(1) of the principal action (the main strike), the actions supporting the success of the execution
of the mission assigned to the large formation, and (2) the end goal of the battle, corresponding
to the assigned mission;
second, a precise division of the overall goal of the large formation’s actions in combat by
successive phases (immediate and subsequent missions);
third, the establishment of the combination of forces and actions, and also special measures
which will support the successful execution of the large formation’s mission at each phase of
the combat.
Simultaneous with this, the commander should decide issues of the organization of command
by creating for battle groupings of forces, and on the foundation of his staff develop the
organization of command and control of the large maneuver formation.
The incompleteness of information regarding the situation does not relieve the
commander from the obligation to undertake a timely, specific, and firm decision.
76. Making the decision, the large formation commander is required to confirm the estimate
of the power of the combination of actions chosen by him, in particular on the main axis. He
should be convinced in the sufficiency of the quantity of the following elements for execution of
the mission: time (including that required for preparation for the battle); forces, means, and
personnel; in case of necessity – to request augmentation from his higher commander and appeal
for support by jointly acting large formations, in conformity with the overall situation.
77. Upon making the decision, the commander should conceal the concept of the upcoming
operation with special measures for the purpose of confusing the enemy.
78. On the basis of the large formation commander’s decision, the staff develops the plan of
battle (combat actions), which includes the following elements:
operational goal of the battle;
commander’s concept;
3 This Russian term is used to describe the actual conduct of reconnaissance by a unit commander,
executed by moving to a position that overwatches the terrain (portion of the sea) in which his forces are
expected to engage the enemy. In the naval application, this activity may be accomplished with a
submarine or aircraft sortie, in which the force commander personally participates, using the on-board
technical capabilities (periscope, vision ports, et cetera) of the combat system in use.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 31
overall goals of actions of the large formation in accordance with the intended phases of
combat;
combat tasks of tactical groupings and units of the combat formation and their
coordination;
combat support (reconnaissance, security, all forms of defense, navigational support);
organization of command and control;
materiel–technical support of the battle.
The battle plan is a separate document; it represents in its aggregate the materials for the
above-listed issues.
79. The large formation chief of staff draws into the development of the battle plan the flag-
level specialists. They are required to announce [declare, state] to the chief of staff ahead of time
all their fundamental instructions and intended measures for support of the large formation
commander’s decision.
80. The correct organization of preparation of combat requires the knowledge of
commanders who are participating in the battle, of their tasks, and their understanding of
the concept of the large formation commander. Therefore, the commander should, upon
receipt of the combat mission, provide preliminary warning instructions to the commanders of
subordinated and coordinating units concerning their employment and, after making his decision,
assign to them their combat missions, assuring them the time required for their preparation.
81. Personal discussion of the large formation commander with subordinate commanders
during the assignment to them of their combat missions is the most reliable means to create the
required focus of actions in combat and unity in understanding of the situation.
82. Oral assignment of the mission involves the following elements:
laying out for the subordinate commanders the situation which prompted the given
decision, and informing them concerning the composition of the acting forces;
laying out the idea of the decision of the large formation commander;
distribution of combat tasks among the subordinate commanders (beginning with the
primary forces), the designation to each his goal of actions, orientation regarding the
terrain (the target of the actions), time and forces designated as available; and in relation to
the general goal of actions of the large formation in each phase of the battle;
a determination of the persons who are responsible for the organization of coordination of
forces in separate sectors of the battle and for their supervision in battle, and also – changes
in the standing organization of the large formation in accordance with the decision undertake
for combat (attached or supporting units);
the designation of coded signals for indicating the start or change of axis and cessation of
activities envisaged by the battle plan.
83. By this categorical form of laying out the combat tasks (without instruction as to means
of their execution), the large formation commander should inspire in his subordinates the
necessity that whatever happened, they must execute in the interests of the end goal of battle,
preserving for themselves independence of actions and also responsibility for them.
The oral delivery of the mission has equal weight to the combat order.
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84. In the presence of available time for preparation for combat, the staff develops combat
documents (combat order and so on), formulates them and, upon approval, distributes them to
subordinate and coordinating commanders.
In supplement to an oral delivery of the mission and combat documents, the staff should
develop a table of coded signals for the given battle, which is drawn up on the basis of the large
maneuver formation commander’s decision regarding the special actions in the battle.
85. A decisive moment in the preparation of the large formation for battle is the
organization of effective coordination of all forces participating in the battle – the
agreement of their for the stated goal, in place and time, for achievement of the results
required of them by the battle plan at each stage of the combat.
Coordination in battle depends much on the initiative of the commanders of lower units of
the large formation; it should be organized in the preparatory period for the battle.
86. The large formation commander should, during the assignment of combat missions,
familiarize the designated commander with the given portion of the purpose of actions in relation
to other coordinating units of the large formation by pointing out – who, what is supporting, and
also by instruction of the subsequent actions of units, and so on. These instructions should lie as
the basis for organization of coordination between the lower units of the large formation.
87. The commanders of smaller units of the large maneuver formation are required,
before the battle, by personal confirmation between them to establish the following:
the coordination necessary, on the basis of specific requirements in the battle (support of
attacking – suppression of enemy counter-actions or distraction of his forces to themselves);
the coordination of their own actions (oriented on the actions of other equal-size units at
each stage of the battle or by time, or by local lines);
their coded signals within tactical groups in the combat formation, for command and
control by coordination in combat.
88. The large formation staff, during the development of the battle plan, points out separate
moments of coordination of the large formations component units and, when necessary, develops
a coordination plan for these units (battle planning table).
89. On the basis of decisions made by the subordinate and coordinating component units,
which have been established between them [and provided to] the staff of the large formation, the
latter makes the necessary corrections to the coordination plan and issues corresponding
instructions to the component units.
90. Tight control by the staff of work at the large formation for preparation of the
battle is necessary for timely completion of the organization of the upcoming battle.
Separate moments of personal discussion in coordination between component unit commanders,
in particular those that pertain to actions on the main axis, should be conducted by the chief of
staff. For observation of the preparation of the decisions by the subordinate commanders and for
rendering them assistance, in necessary cases specially instructed staff officers can be sent out to
them. The formulated decisions or copies of the instructions should be quickly delivered to the
staff by the specialists.
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91. In the presence of sufficient time, separate nodes of the upcoming battle should be played
out under the guidance of the large formation commander, with the attendance of commanders
participating in the combat actions.
92. The chief of staff is the first deputy to the commander of the large formation for
command and control; he should be prepared for this role.
Concern for the support of the bringing to life of the large formation commander’s concept is
solely the responsibility of the chief of staff.
Only the chief of staff has the right to issue instructions in the name of the commander.
93. The chief of staff, assisting the large formation commander, in the planning and
organization of the battle, is obligating for the following tasks:
to organize the command and control of combat;
to organize combat support of the actions of the large formation in combat, as well as
during the preparation for combat;
to organize the materiel – technical support of the combat;
to organize control for timely execution of the plan for preparing the large formation;
to prepare his own staff for command and control of the upcoming battle and supervise
the subordinate staffs and their preparation.
3. Selection and Organization of Forces and Means
94. In accordance with the battle plan and completed tactical estimates, the forces and
combat means in the large maneuver formation most appropriate by their capabilities for
the combat requirements of the given mission should be designated for the execution of
each task.
The large formation commander is obligated to supplement fully the designated forces in
order to meet the requirements assigned to them (in regard to quantity and quality), bringing in,
when required, additional forces and means, changing their technical structure, searching for new
combinations of forces and means, or creating combat means specially for the execution of the
given mission in the large formation’s preparatory period.
95. The flag-level specialists of the large formation are obligated to provide instruction and
oversee the special and technical preparation for the large formation in accordance with the
conditions of the conduct of the upcoming combat.
When necessary, they should bring in materiel means and personnel from other units and
large formations for reinforcement.
96. The experience of previous combat actions should be fully exploited. Commanders and
enlisted personnel who have gained this experience should be used as instructors.
97. During the organization of the large maneuver formation, in consonance with the battle
plan that has been made, the commander should distribute his forces and materiel means for their
most effective use in combat.
In doing this, it is necessary to designate a portion of the forces and means as reserves, for
unforeseen circumstances in the battle.
4. Combat Preparation of a Large Formation prior to Battle
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98. Perfected combat preparation of a large formation, of vessels (units) is a daily obligation
of commanders at all levels.
In the period of preparation of a large formation for the execution of the assigned
combat mission, its combat preparation should to a maximum degree provide for the
training of the enlisted component within limits of available time and as well the
preparation of its ordnance and equipment for the execution of the upcoming tasks, i.e., it
should be absolutely specific during this period.
99. The large formation commander is obligated, to the degree of the specificity of the
concept of the large formation’s battle actions, to provide subordinate commanders tasks for
combat preparation of their units and subunits, corresponding to their designation, and also
implement this with coordinating units.
Elementary special and technical routines of the enlisted component and commanders in
execution of their tasks at their battle stations should receive special attention, and as well
between vessels and units – in a tactical situation that mimics reality.
When necessary, in-depth training in the use of weapons and combat means should be
conducted.
100. Commanders at all levels are obligated by personal example and their leadership, by
special exercises and physical preparation, to develop the habits of their personnel component to
the conduct of combat service in a regime that approximates the anticipated situation in combat.
101. The commander should use every opportunity for gradual and positive growth in the
combat situation of the more responsible commanders, of entire subunits and units of his large
formation – by means of directing them during the preparatory period for combat for execution
of individual battle commands.
5. Preparation of the Region of Actions prior to the Beginning of Combat
102. During the period of preparation for the execution of combat actions, in accordance with
the assigned mission, the large formation commander should be concerned that the situation
in the region of the upcoming battle favors the success of its conduct.
A favorable situation is created by the following actions:
appropriate equipping of the region of actions;
preliminary actions against enemy forces;
anticipation of required changes in the situation, on the basis of careful observation of the
region of upcoming actions;
forestalling the enemy in the deployment of his forces.
103. The large formation staff, in accordance with the developed battle plan, should provide
for the equipping of the area of actions: with communications and observation means, with
orientation features – navigational and for employment of weapons, with obstacles that will
encumber enemy actions, with capabilities for vessel (unit) anchorages suitable for temporary
use.
104. The battle plan should envisage actions against enemy forces in the area of the
upcoming battle, which are accomplished during the preparatory period: increasing the pressure
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and fatigue of the enemy force or distracting them to a false axis, confusing the enemy and
weakening his vigilance.
105. A well organized, energetic command and control by the chief of staff, persistent and
active execution of reconnaissance – in the period of the upcoming combat – should ensure for
the large formation commander and his subordinate commanders detailed knowledge of the
actual situation and the enemy’s intentions in the region of combat by the moment of its
initiation.
6. Occupation by a Large Formation of the Departure Position for Combat
106. The disposition of forces of the large maneuver formation at the moment of
initiation of combat should correspond to the decision undertaken by the large formation
commander, and should support the successful conduct of the battle with the methods
specified in the large formation commander’s decision.
The means of command and control of the large formation and flag-level command post
should be deployed by this time and all preparation for combat in the large formation should be
completed.
107. An obligation of the chief of staff is the confirmation of complete concentration of
forces of the large maneuver formation for battle and the organization of continuous monitoring
of the course of their readiness for execution of their missions, in accordance with the battle plan,
for reports to the large formation commander.
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Chapter 5
Command and Control of a Large Formation in Combat
1. Fundamentals of Command and Control of a Large Formation in Combat
108. The commander of a large formation (unit) is fully responsible for the organization
of command and control of combat of a large formation of naval forces and for their
actions in combat.
Executing the received combat mission, the large formation commander is obligated
personally to command and control the conduct of the battle (combat actions) for complete
achievement of the results required by the operational goal of the battle.
109. Command and control of a large formation of naval forces requires the following
actions:
the commander’s timely making of the decision at each stage of the battle;
the determination of the forces, means, and time required for execution of his decision;
the naming of special goals of the actions of the large formation and assigning combat
missions to units in accordance with their forces and the means designated for this purpose;
uninterrupted and results-focused coordination of the actions of units ( large formations)
and branches of naval forces, which are resolving the overall combat mission;
controlling [monitoring, inspecting] the actions of his own forces;
changing and more precisely defining the tasks of his subordinate units in the course of
the battle.
110. At the base of command and control lies the commander’s decision, made by him
during the preparation and at the battle site, in the course of its development, in
accordance with the actual unfolding situation.
These decisions should support the proper focus of actions of all units of the large maneuver
formation and their coordination between themselves for the successful conduct of the battle.
The most important obligation of the commander in combat is making the following
decisions:
in determining the target and moment of conducting the main strike on the enemy;
in determining the overall goal of the actions at the given and subsequent stages of the
battle;
in raising the combat capability and defensive capability of the large formation in the
conditions of the battle situation (secondary strikes and all forms of support);
by organizing powerful groupings of forces for actions in the subsequent stage of the
battle.
111. The command and control of the battle (combat actions) of the large formation
should be accomplished continuously, which is achieved by the following actions:
precise organization of command and control of the battle, with an appropriate concept of
actions in combat;
the construction of the combat or movement formation (disposition at anchorage) on the
basis of tasks designated for units of the large formation;
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permanent mutual information sharing concerning the situation transmitted from lower to
higher and higher to lower, and to adjacent commands.
Among the obligations of the staff are the following requirements:
the organization of reconnaissance and command and control in combat, in accordance
with the decisions and intentions of the commander;
the organization of command posts communications, and observation posts for the large
formation and their command and control in the battle;
the organization of all forms of support;
the assembly, study, development of information regarding the enemy and his forces, and
in regard to weather conditions in the region of actions, and report these things to the
commander;
the drawing up [composition] of the combat instructions on the basis of the commander’s
decision, transmitting it to the forces participating in the battle, monitoring their actions and
timely execution of the instructions;
monitoring for the execution of the coordination plan in battle and command and control
of coordination with the aid of flag-level specialists and liaison officers;
constant vigilance regarding materiel support of the large formation’s units in combat and
the availability of the closest supplies;
the composition of combat reports and their dispatch for confirmation to higher level
staff, and also for informing subordinate and adjacent units.
115. The obligation of flag-level specialists of the large formation and the chiefs of special
services – in accordance with instructions from the chief of staff, is to control the combat
employment and use of ordnance, combat means and equipment for the large formation in
combat. During the course of the battle, they should report to the chief of staff their suggestions
regarding the strengthening of coordination of forces for separate sectors of the combat.
The flag-level specialists and chiefs of services are required to inform the chief of staff
constantly on the expenditure of ordnance, combat means, and supply, and also losses of or
reduction in combat capability of individual combat entities in the process of the battle.
116. The flag-level command post (FKP) is organized on one of the large formation vessels
which has sufficient means of communication (or at an on-shore site prepared for this purpose).
This [command post] will support the command and control of the battle, with direct observation
from it of the region of combat and over the actions of our own forces, which will be on the axis
of the main attack.
A reserve command post of the large formation is organized on another vessel, where the
large formation’s deputy commander will be positioned.
The large formation commander commands and controls the battle, as a rule, from his
command post.
During the command and control of the battle from the FKP on shore, with limited visibility,
the large formation commander for the purposes of personal observation of the actions of the
principal groupings of his forces has the right to move to a specially prepared observation point
or to go out to sea on a special vessel (aircraft) with the minimal number of staff officers. If this
is the case, the FKP continues to fulfill its requirements, supporting reliable communications
with the large formation commander.
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117. The staff, as an organ of combat command and control, should be tightly organized
for work directly in combat in accordance with the battle plan.
The chief of staff is required to distribute his staff personnel to accomplish the following
tasks:
study of the fluid battle situation and development of subsequent actions;
transmission of combat instructions and collection of reports and information;
control [monitoring] for the condition and actions of the large formation’s units in
combat;
tracking combat actions for the drawing of conclusions from the combat experience.
In addition, the organization of the effort of the staff personnel should be constructed in
accordance with the division of the large formation’s combat formation into groups and their
missions, and also with the combat functions of the special services.
118. Command and control of the battle is supported by organized and focused
continuous active observation in the battle region.
Observation is organized by the large formation staff both from the FKP as well as from
vessels and units belonging to the large formation, with the aid of their technical means, and also
means specially designated for this purpose.
Observation should capture both the actions of the enemy and the overall situation in the
battle region, as well as the actions of our own vessels and units in the large formation.
119. For command and control on the scale of a large maneuver formation, command
communications and coordination communications are specially organized in each separate case.
Command communication serves for transmission of combat instructions from the senior
leader to subordinates and for receiving reports from them. It is organized by instruction of the
senior leader in accordance with the battle plan; however, this does not reduce for the
subordinate leaders the requirement of all of them to have the means to maintain
communications with the senior leader.
Coordination communications ensures agreement of actions of individual combat entities
and the large formations of various branches of force, which are operating together during the
execution of the common combat mission. These communications within each group of the
combat formation are organized in accordance with instructions of the commander, who has
responsibility for organizing coordination on a separate sector of the battle, and in the large
formation as a whole – the large formation chief of staff.
120. The continuity of communications is supported by the employment of various means of
communication on each axis and of various methods of transmission (duplicative
communications), and also my avoiding enemy interference.
Radio communications are the fundamental means of command and control for all
branches of naval forces in all forms of combat.
Skillful use by the large formation staff of radio means in conditions of interference
accomplished by the enemy has decisive significance for command and control of battle of a
large maneuver formation. Therefore, the organization of radio communications and their use in
combat should be carefully considered by the large formation staff and should satisfy the concept
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 39
of the decision of the commander and combination of forces and actions at each stage of the
battle.
The chief of staff and flag-level communications officer (chief of communications) of the
large maneuver formation are personally responsible for the organization of continuous
communications. Each officer of the staff is required to confirm receipt of combat instructions
addressed to him that are passed through communications means.
121. In conformity to the commander’s decision, the chief of staff issues to the large
formation communications instructions (with an attached schematic) for a given battle (or
movement) and the procedure for changing it in accordance with the stage of battle.
The means of communication of a large maneuver formation should be organized so that,
coordinating with the permanently acting system of theater communications, together they
comprise a unified system. In the period of the large maneuver formation’s presence in bases
and other locations, all of their exchanges should be accomplished through the permanent theater
communications system.
122. The organization of communications in a large formation should specify the principal
schematics of communication between groups of the combat formation and with adjacent forces
in the course of all stages of the battle.
The following special communication schematics are drawn up for support of the
command’s communications and coordination communications in a complex large maneuver
formation:
a) Common schematic. This includes transmissions “to the fleet,” which everyone receives
and listens to (directly, or from a large formation communications node or through repeater
vessels and stations); lines for communications with the higher command, with adjacent and
basic groups of the combat formation, and also constantly operating schematics (nets, lines of
coordination). This same schematic is used for reconnaissance organized by the command.
b) Detachment internal schematics (in accordance with the number of groups) for
command and control of coordination within each group of the combat formation.
c) Special schematics for command and control of those units which are operating in
specific conditions or are not able to be included in the overall schematic for technical reasons or
by the conditions of the situation (communications with submerged submarines, with amphibious
assaults, fire adjustment parties, and so on).
123. The communications system of the large formation should include active use of radio
interference for the purpose of disrupting enemy command and control. This is especially
important when in contact with enemy reconnaissance forces.
124. Security of command and control should be observed irrespective of the method of
exchange and be supported by the following measures:
cipher (code), by encoding and authenticating tables, and also by tables of coded signals
(TUS), developed for each operation (battle);
by selection of a communications means which will ensure security [secrecy] in a given
concrete situation;
by the use of the unacknowledged receipt method of transmitting;
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 40
by strict communications discipline and possible reduction of its volume to the necessary
minimum.
125. It should be kept in mind that in the conditions of a naval theater, the uses of radio
communications and underwater sound signaling (ZPS) are the most crucial. Therefore, in all
cases, in accordance with the situation, these can be used as means of command and control,
to the greatest degree supporting secrecy, avoiding them in this sequence:
a) personal conversations;
b) callsigns of communications officers;
c) sending of messages with confirmed names;
d) transmissions of encrypted and encoded messages by wire communications;
e) transmission using authentication tables and tables of coded signals by wire;
f) authentications by wire with required change of the encoding charts and tables with the
coded naming of units, positions, and so on;
g) transmissions by encoded messages and text signals by means of visual communications
and UKV;
h) transmission of encoded signals by means of ZPS;
i) transmission of encrypted messages and encoded messages by means of radio
communications;
j) transmission of encoded signals by means of radio communications;
k) transmission of open [“in the clear”] radio texts;
l) open (“clear”) conversations by radio-telephone.
126. In accordance with the contents of the previous paragraph, take the following measures:
- conduct preparation for combat (movement) exclusively by personal discussion and
exchange of documents;
execute command and control before encountering the enemy by means of
communications, the range of which does not exceed the range of the visible horizon;
at the beginning of the deployment, execute by coded signals, given by visual means
or by wire; in doing so, transmission by radio is permitted only in those cases when there is
no other means of communication;
From the moment of encountering the enemy, the use of radio communications is
permitted. However, those units which still have not been detected by the enemy should use
long-range radio exchanges when necessary.
127. Open [clear] transmission with the use of radio communications can be conducted
only in the following cases:
loss of the time necessary for encrypting (encoding), can lead to worse results than open
transmission (reports concerning attacking cutters, detection of a submarine, the appearance
of aircraft, and so on);
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 41
the enemy, intercepting the transmission, is not in a condition to interfere with the
execution of the instructions (adjusting artillery fire, and so on);
128. Mutual recognition signals have special significance for command and control of
combat. Only those will act decisively and confidently in naval combat in complex and dispersed
combat formations, in smoke, in fog, and in nighttime who are firmly convinced that their vessel
(aircraft) will not be mistaken for a vessel (aircraft) of the enemy.
Therefore, one of the critical tasks of the large formation staff and its constant concern still in
peacetime are the organization of mutual recognition of one’s own forces and ensuring the
discipline of mutual recognition.
129. The large formation staff should always have a reserve communications means, and
also periodically confirm the readiness of the communications means for the large formation for
rapid transmission of combat instructions and the receipt of anticipated reports.
130. One of the important methods of command and control in a large maneuver formation is
the use of liaison officers.
The resolution of issues of combat employment of attached and designated [liaison officers]
for support of units should be ensured by the presence in the staff of representatives of these
units and large formations.
Liaison officers that are participating in the staff of large formations in the development of
the organization of the upcoming combat are the best means to ensure command and control of
the attached and supporting units in the battle itself.
3. Combat and Movement Formations
131. During the conduct of battle (combat actions), a large formation of naval forces is
arrayed in a combat formation.
132. The combat formation represents a grouping of all the forces and means that are
participating in the battle and are focused on the combat mission – both permanent elements of
the large formation as well as those attached to them for the duration of the battle or designated
from coordinating large formations for its support.
The construction of the combat formation should correspond to the concept and plan of the
battle and, changing during the course of the battle, should at each stage ensure the following:
infliction on the enemy of a decisive defeat on the chosen axis of the actions by means of
executing concentrated strikes with the principle mass of our own forces and combat means;
the most effective employment of forces in accordance with their capabilities and the
coordination of branches of naval forces;
the best exploitation of the sea situation;
the possibility of fighting off sudden strikes of enemy naval forces from the flanks and
rear of the large formation, and as well from the air, and
the possibility of rapid shifting of large formation efforts to another axis for development
of the success achieved there or for parrying the enemy’s strikes.
133. The groupings of large formation forces in an offensive and in a defensive battle vary;
they are determined by the nature of the combat actions.
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134. The offensive nature of combat actions, in accordance with the decision of the
fundamental issue in the offensive – the selection of the main strike – require the creation of one
or several strike groups (including aviation strike groups), positioned in the second echelon of
the combat formation (aviation group – on airfields in an appropriate degree of readiness) or
echeloned in their own sequence – when it is necessary to conduct repeated strikes on the enemy
main target (the number of echelons corresponds to the number of strikes being made).
The preparation of the main strike in an offensive battle, by exposing the resistance of
separate portions of the enemy’s combat formation and launching preliminary strikes against
them, requires the presence of forward detachments, which are positioned across the front of
the first echelon, which as a rule exceeds the width of the enemy’s front.
Support of the actions of the strike groups in the time frame of the launching of the main
strike on the enemy requires the formation by that moment of supporting groups and their
action on secondary axes for distracting the enemy forces from the main axis by means of
conducting secondary strikes, constraining his maneuver, or covering the forces acting on the
main axis against enemy strikes.
In addition to those listed groups, it is necessary to have reserve forces and means in the
combat formation, which will respond to unforeseen requirements in the battle.
135. The defensive nature of actions, in accordance with the decision for the defense – by
determining the main axis of enemy counter-action to the offensive, requires the creation of
powerful covering groups, which engage in actions on these axes.
The support and reinforcement of the covering group on the main axis, as well as the
development of success of its actions, requires the presence in the combat formation of one or
several strike groups, which have a developed plan of actions for each axis.
In addition, a reserve of forces and means is designated in the combat formation for
replenishing the strike groups [for battle losses] and for unforeseen requirements.
136. Each group of the combat formation of the large formation normally consists of several
tactical groups of varied or single-branch composition, each of which are executing separate
combat tasks and coordinating between themselves during the execution of the overall mission.
The commander of a group of the combat formation is required to establish combat tasks to
the commanders of tactical groups and to organize coordination between them
Each tactical group in the combat formation occupies a concentrated position or is ablt to be
dispersed until the moment of the initiation of execution of its mission.
137. Vessels and units from the component of the large formation or attached to it receive
combat tasks from the group commander; [vessels and units] selected from the coordinating
large formations receive specific support requirements, and also fire missions.
138. Combat formations in all cases should be supported with reconnaissance, combat
security, and all forms of defense.
139. The movement formation of a large maneuver formation is constructed for supporting
the movement of the large formation’s basic forces.
The construction of the movement formation should correspond to the decision for moment
and support the following:
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rapid deployment into combat formation in accordance with the battle plan
rapid change of grouping, depending on the situation during movement;
fending off enemy attacks;
concealed movement.
140. The basic forces of the large formation are constructed in one or several columns with
movement security (the columns are divided into echelons).
For the launching of counter-strikes during enemy attacks, a vessel strike group and an
aviation strike group are created. One or several mobile detachments and patrols are
designated on the axis of the anticipated encounter with the enemy.
The movement formation includes reconnaissance and air coverage.
141. The disposition of a large maneuver formation at anchor is supported by discipline
in the large formation, which has the following purpose: to conceal from possible enemy
observation the disposition of large formation units; for convenience of defense in the event of
enemy attack; the possibility of rapid departure and deployment into a combat formation in
accordance with the battle plan.
The basic forces of the large formation are positioned, concentrated in the positions safest
and most convenient for refitting and rest.
Outpost security is organized in accordance with the defensive plan for the anchorage.
The disposition in the anchorage also envisions the conduct of reconnaissance and air
coverage.
142. The groupings of combat and movement formations, and also the disposition at
anchorages of heterogeneous large formations, including principally surface or submarine, air, or
shore-based forces, differ among themselves by type and disposition of forces. However, these
groupings preserve both their designation and their function.
4. Command and Control of Combat
143. The goal-orientation of the decision made by the commander during the course of the
battle, and the unity of understanding of the mission and situation of the battle by all
commanders in the large formation and in the coordination of units secures the success of the
battle’s conduct.
Making a decision in combat, the commander should – in all circumstances – firmly
recall and correctly clarify the mission assigned by the senior commander, and also
comprehensively and soberly evaluate the actual situation.
144. The commander’s undertaken decision should persistently be brought to life, not
succumbing to the enemy’s actions and secondary moments of the situation.
The chief of staff is required to provide [ensure for] the commander free and uninterrupted
command and control of the battle.
145. By his decisions at each stage of the battle, the commander creates the following:
a common goal-focus of actions of all groups of the large formation’s combat formation.
concentration of efforts of large formation units that are coordinating among themselves
for overcoming the main encumbrance at a given stage of the battle;
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support of success – by selection of the target of a strike, the moment of its launching,
and the execution of appropriate maneuver of the strike and support groups.
The chief of staff supports the reconnaissance necessary for this knowledge of the situation –
in the first place concerning the enemy’s actions in the battle.
146. The establishment in combat of additional tasks of the large formation commander directs separate groups and units of the large formation to overcome enemy counter-actions in
the path of execution of the primary mission, preserving for them the initiative in achieving,
during the course of the battle, the common purpose of the given stage of the battle.
The large formation commander is required in combat to demand the complete intensity of
all efforts from his subordinates.
The staff of the large formation accomplishes control over the actions of the units of its large
formation and observation for the actions of adjacent large formations, and as well ensures
mutual information sharing in combat.
147. In accordance with the results of the actions of units and separate groups of the combat
formation, on the sector of observed success, the commander should concentrate the effort
of his entire large formation and achieve the development of success and total defeat of the
enemy.
The informing of the large formation concerning partial success is a powerful means for
mobilizing the efforts of its enlisted component.
148. Command and control of the large formation in combat should be supported by brief,
quickly broadcasted encoded signals that are designated in the appropriate plan for the given
battle (TUS).
149. Special attention of the large formation staff should be given to accounting for the time
required for transmission of combat instructions and the organization of their execution – for
determination of the moment of their timely dispatch.
150. The tempo of the execution of command and control in combat depends entirely on the
intensity of the combat actions. This requires development of a measurement for making rapid
decisions. The large formation commander must react without any delay to any change in
the combat situation, preserving at the same time his own forces by means of appropriate
organization of effort through the duration of the battle.
The time shift is executed only with the concurrence of the large formation chief of staff.
151. At various moments in the battle, combat actions are not identical by their intensity.
Periods of weakening of the combat intensity are decisive for command and control of the battle.
The commander who does not use this time for analysis of the situation, forecasting, and
organizing the subsequent actions of his large formation, loses an opportunity, which will be
difficult to re-establish in the subsequent conduct of the battle.
152. Upon foreseeing large-scale changes of the situation in the region of combat actions
(changes in visibility, maneuver conditions, and so on), the commander should issue
instructions ahead of time for transition in the actions of the large formation in accordance with
the new battle plan.
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153. Over the course of the entire battle, the commander should preserve a reserve of
forces and means in his hands, renewing them by the degree of expenditure, for preservation of
the constant possibility to command and control by combat and react to changes in the combat
situation.
5. Combat Documents, Instructions, Reports, and Notifications
154. The combat order is the fundamental means of transmitting the decision and
establishing the tasks of large formation units during the its preparation for battle (combat
actions).
Separate instructions in the form of commands (written and oral) are issue in the name of the
large formation commander or chief of staff, depending on their contents. In the latter case, they
are recorded by the chief of staff of the large formation and preserved in one copy [exemplar]
personally by him.
A common mission that has an offensive nature, as a rule, is divided into the immediate and
subsequent mission.
The order is issued for the accomplishment of the large formation’s immediate mission.
150. The order should be brief, sequentially and categorically express the commander’s
decision, and the missions of subordinate large formations (units).
The order should be laid out in the following sequence:
First point – a compressed evaluation of the actions of the enemy grouping which can
influence the course of the battle;
Second point – the immediate mission, assigned to the large formation (unit);
Third point – the immediate mission of direct adjacent forces and instructions regarding
boundary lines with them;
Fourth point – brief outline of the idea of the commander’s decision, of the order being
issued;
Fifth and final point – combat missions of subordinate large formations (units) in the first
stage of the battle (without instructions as to methods of executing the missions), with listed
attached forces and supporting units and indication of the goal of actions of the large formation
in the subsequent stage of the battle.
Beyond in the order of sequence in separate points are indicated the following:
time of readiness of the large formation for execution of the mission (if it has not already
been announced in a separate instructions);
location of the command post of the large formation commander intended displacements
of it, and also the deputy commander of the large formation at the reserve command post;
sequence of submitted reports;
All copies of the order are signed by the commander and chief of staff.
Orders are issued for the battle (combat actions), movement of the large formation, and
anchorage outside the base.
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157. In the preliminary instructions, which advise subordinate commanders and commit
them to prepare their units for the upcoming actions, the secret classification of the combat being
prepared for and the contents of the order cannot be compromised.
158. When it is not possible to determine in advance when and in what conditions the large
formation will execute its mission (various conditions of weather and visibility, varied
composition of the forces and nature of enemy actions), in place of the order the large formation
commander can issue to his subordinate large formations (units) a combat instruction.
The following elements are indicated in the combat instruction:
the overall goal of the actions or mission of the large formation;
the composition and organization of the participating forces;
variants of the anticipated situation and the concept of the commander in regard to them;
individual requirement by the commander of groups of the combat formation for
execution of unit missions, for coordination and the subsequent conduct of the battle;
supplemental general instructions regarding the nature of the actions in combat and in
regard to the organization of command.
The commander and chief of staff sign the combat instruction.
159. In supplement to the development of the combat order, when necessary the staff
develops instructions for combat (or other form of combat actions).
The instructions for combat contain detailed instructions concerning the sequence of
execution of the unit tasks in combat, the execution of the general maneuver, concerning
coordination of the large formation’s units, the organization of support, expenditure of ordnance,
combat assets, and so on.
The instructions for combat are signed by the chief of staff and approved by the large
formation commander.
160. During the preliminary preparation of an offensive battle in a specified region of
actions, the staff of the large formation should be developing a battle planning table, which in
excerpts (or in total) informs those who are conducting coordination for the battle.
The planning table can be general, which encapsulates the entire battle, or partial – for the
offensive actions of the basic strike groups at one stage of the battle.
The planning table contains the following elements:
the sequence of coordination of the large formation’s units by stages of the battle
(successive support of single actions by other and their parallel support for each stage);
re-subordination with the development of the battle of temporarily attached units.
For movement, the planning table lays out the movement sequence of large formation units
for each stage (change of the movement formation, order, route of march, rendezvous).
The planning table should be drawn up in the form of a schematic of coordination with
explanations at the bottom.
The planning table is signed by the chief of staff and approved by the large formation
commander.
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161. For specification of the coordination of special branches of naval forces (aviation) with
the basic forces in combat and the employment of separate forms of weapons (artillery), a plan
of employment in battle for these forces or ordnance is developed.
The indicated plan contains the following elements:
overall mission of the named forces;
the accepted method of their employment in the given battle;
the distribution of portions of the force for separate tasks, at various stages of the battle,
with instruction as to the quantity of ordnance designated for each task;
the designation of a reserve of forces and means at the disposal of the commander of a
given type of force;
the delineation of reserve forces and means for actions in combat upon supplementary
instructions of the large maneuver formation commander.
The plan for employment of special forces (or means) in the battle is signed by the large
formation commander of these forces (aviation group) or the flag-level specialist, and also by the
large maneuver formation chief of staff and approved by the large formation commander.
162. Command and control of a large maneuver formation directly in combat is
accomplished by means of issuing combat instructions.
163. Combat instructions differ in nature from command and control of a large formation in
combat.
In the instruction of general axis of movement of the combat formation – the large
formation commander executes supervision for the execution of the maneuver of the large
formation in combat.
In the declaration of the overall goal of actions – the large formation commander unifies
the efforts of all groups of the combat formation for achievement of the actions of a new stage of
the battle.
In the statement of a unit task to a group of forces – the large formation commander directs
separate groups for the concentration of efforts for overcoming enemy counter-actions.
In the order concerning execution of concrete actions – the large formation commander
adjusts the actions of subordinate large formations (units) in combat.
By an encoded signal – the large formation commander sets in motion [movement] the
combination of forces that were earlier prepared for execution of complex actions in the battle.
The combat instructions are transmitted by all means of communications.
The execution of each combat instruction should be confirmed.
164. The success of combat command and control depends to a significant degree on the
timely receipt of reports and information concerning the combat situation.
Reports (to the [senior] leader) and information (to adjacent and subordinate forces) makes
possible the correct evaluation of the situation and the making of the appropriate decision. This
obligates all commanders and staffs in a battle to not neglect reports and information.
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165. The principal requirements for each report and information are the reliability of
their data, the correctness of the evaluation of their data, the precision of the expression [of
the data], and the timeliness of their dispatch.
166. The procedure for submitting scheduled reports (submitted by a specified time) should
be established by the staff which organized the battle (combat actions): who, in what time period
and concerning what [subject] should be reported.
167. Unscheduled combat reports are submitted on the initiative of a subordinate
commander or staff.
It is necessary to report the following information without delay:
concerning an enemy surprise attack;
concerning the establishment of contact with the enemy or its absence in the place where
it was envisaged;
concerning an acute change in the situation (including weather) and nature of the
enemy’s actions’
concerning the execution of the assigned mission;
concerning the undertaking on personal initiative of a decision in connection with a
changing situation.
168. The first report should be brief and transmitted as quickly as possible so as to
anticipate [forestall] enemy actions. Immediately following that report, submit a more
detailed report.
A report concerning the enemy should briefly comment, as a rule, on the following issues:
detection or not (of the enemy);
when detected;
where detected (quadrant or coordinates);
what kind (of enemy), how many, how disposed;
what is he doing or what did he do (the enemy);
what is he doing or what does the reporting element envisage he will do;
location of the reporting element.
The subsequent explanation should support the transmission initially of the most important
issue.
If the meteorological situation should be brought to attention, then report also the
meteorological conditions in the region of the reconnaissance.
Reports, as a rule, indicate the source of receipt of the information (personal observation,
reports from subordinates, information from adjacent forces, and so on).
The commander (and in large formations also the chief of staff) signs the report.
169. It is necessary to keep in mind that command and control of a large maneuver formation
is conducted not in isolation from other large formations and units, operating in the same region;
mutual information is required in this situation.
Mutual information [exchange] supports the receipt of timely support from adjacent units,
assistance from their command, and attraction of all of their forces for overcoming resistance
being encountered in the battle.
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6. Signal Codes, Codebooks, and Tables
170. The use in the Military–Naval Fleet of signal codes (single-flag, two-flag, and three-
flag) supports the transmission of any instruction, report, and information in combat. However,
they do are not capable of rapid composition, transmission, and decoding of the most required
combat instructions (reports).
The Combat Signal Code (BSS), specially composed for command and control of a large
maneuver formation in combat, on the basis of satisfying the demands of combat command and
control, contains the required combat instructions and reports and should be capable of their
rapid transmission by all existing communications means.
171. For the purposes of facilitating command and control of a large formation, during the
conduct of complex actions of a typical nature (coordinated fires with ground forces, landing of
an amphibious assault, and so on), are developed on the scale of the fleet; special combat codes,
which contain the most necessary and special expressions, are developed on the basis of the
conduct of combat actions, and contain the most demanded and special expressions. The use of
these codes is on a par with the signal codes and TUS for command and control of a large
formation in combat.
Combat codes should be corrected as necessary as a result of the experience of their use in
combat and in combat preparation.
172. The table of coded signals (TUS) is a necessary means in the process of conducting
battle with a large naval force for executing rapid command and control of earlier organized
actions of the large formation’s units.
The TUS is developed by the staff on the basis of the commander’s decision regarding the
possible actions in combat, those undertake in the preparatory period, and organization of the
large formation’s command and control approved by him. As a rule, the TUS contains the
following elements:
variants of the anticipated nature of the actions of the large formation (in accordance with
the preliminary instructions);
the orders concerning the execution of complex or simple actions of the large formation’s
units, organized during the preparation for combat, but executed in combat only upon
decision of the large formation commander;
reports, anticipated during the course of the battle, in accordance with the battle plan, and
the required rapid response to them;
reserve, supplementary signals for their use in addition to orders issued in the course of
the battle.
The TUS is approved by the chief of staff and the commander.
In the absence of time for development of a combat instruction, the TUS can be used to
replace it.
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Chapter 6
Support of a Large Formation in Combat
1. Fundamentals of Support
173. Combat actions at sea require multi-faceted and pre-planned measures of support.
All forms of support of a large formation in combat should be focused on the execution of
the combat mission, and comprise an overall system of measures which have the special purpose
for supporting and improving [raising] the combat capability of the large formation, and creating
the conditions that will encumber the enemy’s combat actions.
174. Forms of support in combat include the following:
reconnaissance has as its purpose the timely detection of the enemy and the
determination of his combat formation for the correct mission-focus of our own actions;
security is organized with the goal of facilitating the defense of the secured force with
timely warning of them concerning the presence of the enemy and fending him off with
forces specially designated for this purpose, and as well to oppose enemy reconnaissance.
defense of the large formation has the mission to fend off all forms of enemy attack with
our own forces and means: PVO, PLO, PKO, PMO, and PKhO are required forms of support
of a large formation in combat;
maskirovaniye [camouflage and deception] of the large formation in combat has the
purpose of providing concealment of the concentration and maneuver of one’s own forces
and the attempt to distract the enemy to a false axis; maskirovaniye is necessary in all cases
of the combat activity of a large formation;
navigational support should ensure the safety of maneuver of one’s own vessels in the
combat region, and complicate the enemy’s sailing in the same region;
materiel–technical support of vessels and units of the large formation in combat
consists in the execution of timely combat resupply for the uninterrupted conduct of combat.
2. Organization and Command and Control of Support
175. The commander conducting the large formation’s battle should envisage measures of
support in his decision, but the commander of each vessel (unit) subordinate to him, resolving
the taskings he has received, is required to undertake measures for his own support.
The chief of staff organizes the combat support of a large formation in accordance with the
decision and the commander’s instructions.
An obligation of the chief of staff is continuous monitoring [control] for the execution of the
combat and materiel–technical support of the large formation in combat.
176. Combat support of a large formation is executed by forces and means specially
designated for this purpose, and also by forces and means of security vessels (units).
The chief of staff, for purposes of economy, should strive to combine the execution of
various support tasks in combat, delegating various forms of support to one or the other forces.
177. Depending on the unfolding conditions of combat, one or another form of combat
support assumes greater significance, or in some cases the commander of a large formation, by
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declaration of the chief of staff, makes a decision on the assignment of vessels and units to new
missions or reduces their missions of support, out of necessity.
The chief of staff should forecast and upon the large formation commander’s decision issue
instructions to the supporting forces in regard to their actions during the changing of the combat
formation at all stages of the battle, and also prepare a commander’s decision concerning the
execution of this or that large formation maneuver for the purposes of its defense.
178. During the preparation for combat, the staff should organize coordination of the
reconnaissance forces with those groups of the combat formation which are directly supporting
reconnaissance, reaching personal agreement between them.
3. Reconnaissance
179. Reconnaissance is the most important form of combat support.
In addition to observation conducted on the enemy across the entire theater; in combat
reconnaissance should be accomplished continuously; it should be focused, active, and
commanded and controlled in the interests of the conduct of combat.
The more complex and dangerous the situation, the greater should be the effort and intensity
of reconnaissance.
Reconnaissance, as a rule, should be conducted in a concealed manner.
180. Reconnaissance in the period of combat should be organized during the large
formation’s preparatory time for the battle.
The staff organizes reconnaissance on the basis of the decisions and instructions of the large
formation commander. The commander should indicate to his staff what he wants to know and
when it wants to know it.
It is the obligation of the chief of staff to develop the reconnaissance plan, which he presents
to the commander for approval.
The large formation chief of staff personally establishes the tasks of the vessels and units in
executing reconnaissance, organizing the combat support.
181. In combat, the requirement may emerge to organize additional reconnaissance.
Each vessel (unit) commander is required independently to conduct reconnaissance and
observation in the region of combat in accordance with the demands of his mission, not
waiting for special instructions to do this.
182. Tactical reconnaissance supports the unleashing and conduct of battle and has as its
own purpose the revealing of the situation for the making by the large formation commander of
correct decisions in the course of the battle.
The tasks of reconnaissance flow from the combat mission of the large formation, in
accordance with which are indicated the following: targets, axes (regions), depth, and the
duration of reconnaissance and observation.
The basic targets of tactical reconnaissance should be enemy forces and their actions.
The primary mission of tactical reconnaissance is the timely revealing of the enemy’s
combat formation.
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The clarification of the situation before the enemy gains us tactical superiority and supports
taking the initiative in our own hands.
Tactical reconnaissance begins before the battle and subsequently transitions in the future to
reconnaissance of the combat region.
Aircraft, surface vessels, technical means, and also submarines are designated to execute
reconnaissance tasks.
The most important means of tactical reconnaissance is aviation.
Reconnaissance tasks are executed, in addition to special designated forces, also by other
units of the combat formation of the large formation, along with their own combat taskings.
183. The commander who is executing reconnaissance should know to whom, at what time,
about what specifically, and by what means and methods to report. If he has not received
instructions or they do not accord with the conditions of a changing situation, the reconnaissance
asset [razvedchik in Russian, which can be a single scout or covert agent; an aircraft, submarine,
or surface vessel commander, and so on – the agent of the reconnoitering action], should transmit
the reconnaissance data for the best resolution of the large formation’s overall mission.
It is an obligation of the large formation staff to inform in a timely manner the participants in
the battle, and higher level staffs and formations of the reconnaissance data.
184. Pre-reconnaissance is organized by the commanders of tactical groups in the course of
deploying their forces, for purposes of confirming date about the enemy, necessary for their
execution of the attack.
As a rule, in combat conditions, pre-reconnaissance grows into direct conduct of the
attacking groups.
185. Reconnaissance by combat is organized both in the preparatory period of a large
formation for combat, as well as in the process of combat itself, when the large formation
commander requires additional data, and a patrol or enemy security is complicating the
penetration of our reconnaissance assets to the principal targets. In this case, additional forces are
committed for reinforcement of the reconnaissance assets.
The large formation commander establishes the mission of the forces designated for
additional reconnaissance by combat, and the senior commander of the force designated to
conduct the reconnaissance exerts direct leadership and commands and controls the combat.
186. Special forms of reconnaissance – mine, artillery, chemical, meteorological, and others
– should always be considered and executed in coordination with tactical reconnaissance. It
should be focused wholly on the basic combat mission.
The tasks of special forms of reconnaissance include the following:
mine – discovery of mine danger in the battle region;
artillery – discovery of enemy firing positions along the coastline;
chemical – discovery of chemical danger in the battle region;
meteorological – determination of meteorological situation in the battle region.
The large formation chief of staff is obligated to organize special reconnaissance of special
forms.
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187. Planning the conduct of reconnaissance in battle, the chief of staff is required to
designate a portion of reconnaissance forces and reserves for the following purposes:
to render assistance to reconnaissance assets [persons, vessels, aircraft – whatever is the
agent of reconnaissance];
replacing disabled reconnaissance assets;
strengthening [reinforcing] reconnaissance upon detection of the enemy;
increasing reconnaissance forces in response to weather conditions.
In conjunction with this, the staff commands and controls the conduct of reconnaissance,
reacting to changes of the situation in combat.
188. Reconnaissance during combat of a large formation in nighttime and in fog should be
conducted and directed at the enemy.
In view of the difficulty of observation, an especially important role in nighttime and in fog
is exercised by various means of technical detection.
4. Guarding [security[
189. Combat guarding [security], which has as its primary mission to defeat enemy
surprise attack on the guarded forces in combat, is organized by the chief of staff on the basis of
the large formation commander’s instructions.
During the organization of combat guarding, the chief of staff is required to establish the
composition, missions of the guarding force, the time and sequence of their deployment, their
transition from one guard task to another, their means of communication with the guarded units
of the large formation, and the procedures of their informing in regard to the situation.
190. The guarding differs from their own designation depending on the danger which they
are assigned to mitigate.
The forces and means designated for guarding are determined by the available data
concerning the enemy, the nature of the upcoming actions, and the composition of the large
formation being guarded, and also the conditions of the region of actions and visibility.
Strictly necessary forces are designated for guarding in combat.
191. The vessels and aircraft of combat guarding are positioned relative to the guarded
vessels and guard screens.
The position of the screen should support the following:
the creation of depth of the defense of the large formation (in combination with
reconnaissance);
coverage on the threatening axes;
the most effective use of ordnance and safety of maneuver for both the guard force itself
as well as the object of guard.
192. Coordination of the combat guard with the guarded vessels, considering the surprise
nature of the attack, should be organized for precise and rapid actions of the guard force.
This organization of coordination should determine the following:
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the distribution of observation of the air, of the water, and of the horizon, with the
assignment of sector responsibilities to each of the vessels of the guard force;
the organization for fending off enemy attacks with guard force weapons and maneuver;
the nature of the maneuvering of guard force vessels during their avoidance from attac,
torpedoes, bombs, mines, and also the nature of their own fires.
193. The commander of the vessels being guarded are obligated to support the guarding
forces with their own fire and maneuver, taking into consideration the overall situation in the
course of the battle.
5. Defense (PVO, PLO, PKO, PMO, PKhO)
194. One of the most important measures for combat support of the large formation in battle
is the organization of all forms of defense, both of the entire formation as a whole, and of its
assigned vessels and units.
PVO, PLO, PKO, PMO, and PKhO should be constructed in accordance with the following
measures:
the organization of observation for the enemy and his actions on vessels and in units of
the large formation;
the organization of avoidance from attacks, and also from torpedoes, bombs, mines, and
other means, used by the enemy for attack;
the organization of the liquidation of the consequences of enemy attack.
195. The chief of staff organizes all forms of defense of the large formation in combat in
accordance with the instructions of the large formation commander.
Declaring his decision to the commander of the large formation, he should consider the
following aspects:
the necessity for agreement of the actions of all forms of defense with combat guarding
and reconnaissance;
the possibility by means of combining all forms of defense and coordination of
supporting forces between each other to economize them for execution of the basic combat
mission.
196. As a rule, when organizing the defense of the large formation in combat, the chief of
staff uses for development of measures for PVO and PKO the flag-level naval gunfire officer of
the large formation, for development of measures for PLO and PMO the flag-level mine officer,
and for PKh the appropriate flag-level chemical officer of the large formation.
6. Maskirovaniye [camouflage and deception]
197. The employment of maskirovka by the large formation in combat has its own special
purpose – to conceal from enemy observation one’s own forces, actions, and intentions. It should
be conducted continuously, actively, in various forms, with the use of the natural environment.
198. The general planned maskirovka measures in combat, developed by the large formation
staff, in accordance with the large formation commander’s concept.
The plan should contain the following elements:
the tasks of maskirovka in individual periods and phases of the battle;
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the nature of the maskirovka measures;
the place and time of their execution, and as well
the supervisory personnel who are responsible for execution of these measures.
199. All measures for maskirovka are executed by the vessels and units themselves,
which should mastery over how to accomplish them. The commanders of vessels and units of
the large formation, which are conducting the combat, are required, without special instructions,
to undertake all measures for partial or complete security of their own forces from visual or
technical observation by the enemy.
The use of smoke screens, demonstration actions, false information, and various methods of
imitation should be in strict alignment with the overall battle plan. Commanders of vessels and
units are required to report to the large formation chief of staff in regard to any deviations from
the plan of maskirovka measures prompted by the changing situation.
7. Navigational Support
200. Measures for navigational support of a large formation in combat are executed, as a rule,
by higher-level staffs (VMB, MOR, fleet) in accordance with the battle plan.
In individual cases, in the period of combat, special subunits of navigational support in the
region of actions are subordinated to the large formation commander. In special conditions of the
situation, the measures of navigational support are executed by the staff of the large formation in
accordance with instructions of its commander, with forces and means designated for this within
the component of the large formation itself.
8. Materiel–Technical Support
201. A modern naval battle, characterized by the rapid flow id ura conduct, by great intensity
of its forces, and rapid expenditure of materiel–technical means, requires timely replenishment of
large formation vessels and units with fuel and ordnance, sufficient to provide for uninterrupted
combat actions.
202. The chief of staff issues instructions for replenishment of ammunition, fuel, and also
other means in the period of preparation of the large formation in the form of preliminary
instructions. After the establishment of combat missions, they are [adjusted] to be in
conformance with the commander’s decision.
203. The expenditure in combat by vessels and units of on-hand ordnance, fuel, and other
means should occur in accordance with the subsequent execution of the combat missions, not
permitting in this the expenditure of ammunition and fuel not called for by the battle situation.
Each vessel and unit commander should be able to concentrate his forces and means at
decisive moments, comparing the expenditure of means with the tempo of combat.
Each commander of a vessels (unit) bears responsibility for the rational expenditure of
ammunition, fuel, and other means which support the resolution of the assigned combat mission.
During pauses in battle, the commanders of vessels and units which are executing the attack
are required to report to the chief of staff in regard to their quantity of ammunition and fuel
remaining.
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Chapter 7
Political Work in Support of the Combat Actions of a Large Formation
204. The instilling of political consciousness, high moral spirit among the sailors, petty
officers, and officers is the main mission of political work.
Political work in large formations is conducted continuously and has the goal to rally the
enlisted component of the Military–Naval Fleet around the party of Lenin–Stalin and the Soviet
state; to inculcate the sailors, petty officers, and officers in the spirit of devotion to the
Motherland, faithfulness to their military oath, and undeviating observation of military
discipline; to strengthen the combat power and political–moral condition of the Military–Naval
Fleet; and to inculcate among the enlisted component the correct understanding of the purpose
and nature of war, the firm and undeviating will for victory over the enemy.
205. The political work of in the VMF is organized on the basis of the decisions of the TsK
VKP(b)4 and Soviet government, the orders and directives of the Supreme Commander in Chief,
of the People’s Commissar of the Military–Naval Fleet of the USSR, and the Main Political
Directorate of the VMF.
The concrete contents of the political work depend on the combat situation and are specified
in the orders of the command and by directives of higher-standing political organs.
All activity of the commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol5 organizations
should be directed at the strengthening of the political–moral condition, the elevation of the
combat power of the large formation, and in the successful execution of the combat missions.
206. The commander of the large formation and commanders of vessels (units) bear
responsibility for the condition of political education in large formations. Political
education of the sailors, petty officers, and officers is the main task of the deputy
commanders for political affairs.
The large formation commander, his deputy commander for political affairs, and under that
person’s leadership the political department of the large formation, vessel and unit commanders,
their deputies for political affairs, and party and Komsomol organizations of vessels and units
directly organize and conduct political work.
Personal discussion of commanders and political workers with their subordinates is the
most important form of political work in the Military–Naval Fleet.
The large formation commander and the political department of that large formation executes
political leadership in large maneuver formations, the command of which is exercising
leadership of the combat (combat actions of the political formations included in the large
maneuver formation for the period of combat actions are subordinated to the political department
large maneuver formation.
4 Tsentralnyy Komitet Velikoy Kommunisticheskoy Partiy (Bolshevik) Central Committee of the Great
Communist Party (Bolshevik)] 5 Komsomol [expansion – Kommunistichiy soyuz molodezhi – Union of Young Communists, the “youth
branch” of the party, which recruited and groomed teenagers and young adults for membership in the
Communist Party. It was a “pass through” step for many young sailors to get to full party membership.]
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 57
207. In all forms of combat activity, political work should always be mission focused,
specific, and operational [active, effective].
Its forms and methods should respond to the tasks and conditions of combat. The more
complex and difficult the combat situation, the more active should be the conduct of the political
work.
The political effort should have the following content in support of the combat actions:
explanation to the enlisted component of the combat mission and the generation of trust
in their own forces;
in offensive combat – the creation among the sailors and commanders of the offensive
upsurge, bold striving to defeat the enemy, and complete dedication to execute the combat
mission;
in defensive combat – maintaining among the enlisted component a special
stubbornness, steadfastness, and preparedness to transition from the defense to the offense.
208. During the preparation of the large formation for combat, the commanders and
political are required to complete the following actions:
create a high political – moral condition of the enlisted component of the large formation,
strengthening in it military discipline, hatred toward the enemy, a striving to mercilessly
destroy him, unwavering preparedness to fight courageously, to stoically face death in the
name of victory;
to strengthen and develop among the enlisted component the political vigilance necessary
to preserve state and military secrets, to conduct a merciless struggle with traitors and panic
mongers;
to inspire the enlisted component to combat feats [acts of bravery], to glorify and
propagandize the heroism of Soviet fighting men, to strengthen faith in the indestructible
power of our weapons and in the victory of the armed forces of the Soviet Union.
to inculcate the sailors, petty officers, and officers with the strong desire to improve their
combat mastery and most complete use in battle of their weaponry and equipment.
209. The commander of a large formation, vessel (unit) should assign to his deputy
commander for political affairs specific tasks for political support of the combat actions.
The deputy commander for political affairs is required to organize measures which support
the unconditional execution of the commander’s decision (his combat order); he should
constantly be involved in the tasks and orders received from the senior leadership.
210. Personal checking by the large formation commander of the condition of units prior to
battle is an important obligation of the commander for raising the combat capability of the large
formation.
211. In battle, the deputy commanders for political affairs, political organs, and political
workers are obligated to take the following actions:
lift up the fighting spirit of the enlisted component, to show examples of bravery,
courage, endurance, and staying power;
to study the political–moral condition, the behavior of people in combat, to report the
results to the commander of the large formation, vessel (unit), to undertake the necessary
measures for correcting deficiencies;
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to take decisive measures in the struggle with cowards and panic mongers;
to inform the fighting men and commanders concerning the course of the battle;
to mobilize the enlisted component for the most rapid repair of damage to weapons and
equipment damaged in combat
to display concern for supplying [also feeding] the fighting men and commanders;
to take measures for timely removal of the wounded from combat posts and command
posts and support their rapid return to duty and a caring attitude toward them.
212. Timely and accurate information regarding the condition of the large formation (unit)
and the combat situation has special significance in political work. All commanders and political
workers, from bottom to top and also from top down, should organize political information.
213. In a large formation, consisting of various branches of forces, support for total
agreement of actions and other efforts of all other forces participating in the battle is the principle
element of support of political work among the officer component.
214. In conditions of combat coordination with ground forces, political organs of the VMF
should establish close communication and mutual information with the political organs of the
Red Army.
The strengthening of the combat bond of the Military–Naval Fleet and the Red Army is one
of the most important tasks of political work.
215. Political organs and political workers are obligated daily to conduct political work in
logistical units and subunits, to expose deficiencies, and take measures such that during
preparation for combat and in combat, logistic units perform their work accurately and
uninterruptedly.
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Chapter 8
Daily Combat Activity of Large Maneuver Formations
A. Reconnaissance
1. Fundamentals of the Conduct of Reconnaissance
216. Reconnaissance includes the aggregate of actions of a large formation in its separate
units directed at obtaining required information regarding the enemy and also the situation in the
region of its actions.
Reconnaissance should be focused in accordance with the mission in the interests of
which it is conducted. This obligates [those who conduct it] to organize observation on
specific targets, and not over the region as a whole.
217. By its duration, reconnaissance is divided into systematic and episodic.
Systematic reconnaissance is executed in the course of a prolonged time for the purpose of
establishing constant observation on the enemy’s actions for timely discovery of his intentions,
and for estimating the situation during the preparation of planned combat actions.
Episodic reconnaissance is conducted in the course of time required for acquiring the
information required for organizing and conducting specific combat actions.
218. Depending on the nature of the mission and on the situation in the area of observation,
reconnaissance undertakes various forms.
Reconnaissance by combat is conducted when, for the gathering of the required information
one has to engage the enemy in battle, in order to penetrate to the target of observation or in
order to force the enemy into a fight in order to observe his force.
Search is executed for the purpose of establishing the location of this or that enemy force.
A reconnaissance patrol is organized for the purpose of detecting and in a timely manner
alerting our own forces concerning the enemy’s departure from base or crossing a subsequent
line.
Observation for a moving enemy is conducted to vector our own striking forces toward the
enemy at sea for exposing the enemy’s intentions.
Landing reconnaissance groups is conducted from sea or air, when the situation on the
enemy’s coastline must be exposed.
219. The organization of reconnaissance should support the reliability, execution,
continuity, conduct, and necessary depth and breadth of reconnaissance.
The reliability of the execution of reconnaissance is achieved by correct selection of the
forces and means, supported by the appropriate persistence for overcoming the enemy’s counter-
actions, and by duplicating the means of reconnaissance and communications. Combat
persistence is supported by the covering of reconnaissance groups with special forces.
Continuity in the conduct of reconnaissance, supported by the timely exposure of the
enemy’s intentions, is achieved by the appropriate calculation of the use of force for observation,
by the organization of their replacement, by consideration for the meteorological situation and
the correct organization of communications.
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The depth and breadth of reconnaissance should enable the exposure of the entire combat
formation of the enemy and be determined based on the reconnaissance mission.
2. Systematic Reconnaissance
220. For the conduct of systematic reconnaissance, various forces and means are selected
with the calculation that the insufficiency of one force as a reconnaissance asset can be made up
by the use of other types of forces. The supervision of reconnaissance is rested on the
commander of the large formation which is executing the basic observation of the enemy.
221. During the selection of the means for reconnaissance, in the first place, where possible,
various types of stationary means of technical observation should be employed.
222. No single means of reconnaissance should act in isolation. The success of
reconnaissance is conditioned by the coordination of all means, which are focused on the
execution of the data-gathering task. For achievement of this goal, the large commander
should take the following steps:
distribute the reconnaissance tasks between individual groups with the calculation of
mutual agreement as to time, place, and method of observation, also considering the enemy’s
counter-actions and maskirovka;
organize the information of the reconnaissance assets concerning the actions of adjacent
reconnaissance units;
organize the exchange of acquired data between reconnaissance assets operating on a
given axes, for preservation of succession and continuity of reconnaissance.
223. Organizing reconnaissance, the large formation commander should consider which
combined actions with his forces could be rendered by the forces of other large formations which
are operating in the same or adjacent regions, and by means of negotiating with the commanders
of these large formations organize the desired coordination in reconnaissance.
224. Reports acquired by reconnaissance should be fully confirmed. This is supported by the
following means:
distribution of tasks between individual reconnaissance groups, for the purpose of
focusing their attention on a narrower circle of observation targets;
establishment of parallel observation by various forces and means on the most important
targets;
organization of time frame of observation by the reconnaissance assets with a view
toward their replacement or reinforcement;
the use of photo-reconnaissance.
Timeliness of the receipt of information by the commander should be supported.
225. The large formation commander and his staff develop a reconnaissance plan and organize
its execution as the basis of reconnaissance.
The reconnaissance plan should contain instructions regarding the following issues:
the reconnaissance tasks (what and by what time is acquisition required);
composition of the reconnaissance groups and distribution between them of tasks (who,
what targets they are reconnoitering, over the course of what time period);
methods, time frame, and recipient of reports;
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replacement of reconnaissance groups;
reserve forces and means.
Simultaneously with the establishment of the plan, the large formation staff, in accordance with
the reconnaissance decision that was made, should develop the TUS.
226. The large formation commander personally assigns reconnaissance missions to subunits.
The instructions that accompany this process follow:
on-hand information regarding the enemy
information concerning our own and adjacent reconnaissance subunits;
the mission of the given subunit: what, where, and time of completion; scale and form of
aerial photography;
with whom will the collection effort be coordinated and how will coordination be
effected;
when will departure occur (takeoff, route of march, when observation will be complete,
to where will asset return, and so on);
degree of secrecy of the reconnaissance.
227. The commanders of the reconnaissance groups should be confirmed in the knowledge of the
reconnaissance asset as to the region of their actions, the reconnaissance targets, tactical methods
of the enemy, methods of reconnaissance, the use of technical means, and on-hand data in regard
to the meteorological conditions in the area of reconnaissance.
228. In accordance with the mission, the location of the reconnaissance region, and the duration,
the reconnaissance should be organized at the base of the forces which are conducting the
reconnaissance. It should satisfy the following requirements:
as close as possible to the reconnaissance targets;
reliable and suitable communications with the large formation in the interests of which
the reconnaissance is being conducted, and between separate reconnaissance groups;
cover and maskirovaniye of the vessels and aircraft from enemy counter-actions and
observation from the sea and air;
the possibility of using force, depending on the weather and time of day.
229. For the execution of uninterrupted command and control of the large formation in the
reconnaissance process, the large formation commander should take the following steps:
establish reliable communications with the vessels and aircraft that are at sea and in the
air;
control the locations of the vessels and aircraft, using radio-reported data and radio-
locating equipment;
rapidly develop the reports of reconnaissance assets with the consideration of
repositioning them in the event of the suitable of new targets;
have in constant readiness a reserve of forces for replacement of disabled reconnaissance
assets or for support of reconnaissance assets in the event of strong enemy counter-actions;
pass along to reconnaissance assets in the air and at sea data that is obtained from other
reconnaissance assets that is useful to them;
for rapid communications use developed TUS and retransmission tables of aircraft.
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230. The precise organization of all forms of special support – navigational (including aircraft
vectoring), communications, aerial photography, and materiel–technical support is an obligation
of the large formation chief of staff.
3. Episodic Reconnaissance
231. The missions of episodic reconnaissance are limited to a circle of issues associated with
given combat actions, for support which reconnaissance is organized. The forces dedicated for
episodic reconnaissance should be selected to that can most fully execute the reconnaissance
tasks (discovering the situation at a given time and region of the upcoming actions, uncovering
the enemy’s combat formation, weather reconnaissance, and so on).
232. The organization of forces for episodic reconnaissance depends on the complexity of the
task and the situation. The forces assigned for the conduct of reconnaissance on specific axes,
which are supported in the group under the command of the senior commander of those forces,
should resolve the basic mission for that given group.
233. For uncovering the enemy’s intentions, it is necessary to determine his combat
formation, to expose [reveal] his main forces, and determine their composition and purpose. This
requires combat persistence of reconnaissance groups, which is achieved by assigning to them
appropriate cover (air and vessel).
234. The starting [baseline] data for the organization of episodic reconnaissance should be
obtained by prior operational reconnaissance reports concerning the enemy in the reconnoitered
region, and also specific questioning of the large formation supporting the reconnaissance.
Command and control of reconnaissance in the process of its conduct is supported by reliable
two-way communication of the large formation staff with the reconnaissance groups and separate
reconnaissance assets, and also with the staff of the large formation that is supporting the given
reconnaissance.
235. The security [secrecy] of episodic reconnaissance should be achieved by
maskirovaniye of the direct actions of the reconnaissance groups, both in parallel execution of
reconnaissance to disorienting enemy axes and also by short-duration observation and
unacknowledged transmission of reports.
236. Interruptions in observation of the enemy should not exceed the time for which a change
in the compositions of forces and his actions can occur, which can strongly influence the
execution of the large formation’s mission, in the interests of which the reconnaissance is being
conducted. The staff of the large formation executing the reconnaissance draws up the
reconnaissance planning table. For support of continuity, the conduct of reconnaissance by
various forces and means should be envisaged, depending on weather conditions.
237. The reduction of time for transmission of reports is achieved by development, in
accordance with the goal of the reconnaissance and situation, a table of encoded signals
238. For the ensuring of the reliability of reconnaissance data, the preliminary preparation of
the enlisted component which is conducting the observation of the enemy (study of the region of
actions, silhouettes, types of formations, and enemy tactical methods) should be organized .
B. Patrol Service
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1. Fundamentals of Patrol Service
239. Patrol service is organized with the purpose of detection of the enemy during his
approach through a specific zone and to warn our own forces of this fact.
In a number of cases, patrol forces are charged with the mission of preventing the penetration
of the enemy beyond the limits of this zone or to delay his movement.
For the execution of this mission, the patrol service should organize the following tasks:
observation, which will support the timely detection of the enemy;
support, imparting to the entire system of patrol service combat stability;
communications between the observing and supporting forces and the fleet command
(MOR, VMP), which is providing timely transmission of reports about the enemy and
receiving instructions of the command.
240. Depending on the mission of the patrol service, it can be differentiated by the following
varieties:
long-range patrol, which has the purpose of supporting the deployment of our own
forces for combat with an attacking enemy on the approaches to base;
close-in patrol, which supports the safety of the anchorage of vessels against enemy
attack from seaward;
reconnaissance patrol, which is organized along the route of the movement of enemy
vessels for the purpose of alerting our own forces about the passage of enemy vessels to an
agreed upon line, for the launching of attacks on him by our fleet forces.
241. The missions of patrol service are resolved in combat with the enemy, and not in
just passive observation. Vessels and aircraft what are conducting patrol service should be
prepared for fending off the enemy’s attempts to intercept a patrol and interfere with its
execution of its mission.
242. Depending on the situation, the patrol service can execute its mission in the following
forms:
permanent screens, when the vessels located at selected locations of the designated
zone, conduct continuous observation within its limits;
patrolling, when the vessels or aircraft periodically monitor a designated region by
moving through it;
observation by shore-based technical means, when the geographic conditions of the
region permit such observation to cover all the possible movement routes of the enemy;
creation of guarded obstacles on possible routes of movement of the enemy, which will
facilitate his detection and delay.
243. Patrol service is organized with consideration for the various conditions of
observation and weather (day, night, fog, snow), which should be envisaged by the patrol
service plan.
2. Long-Range Patrol
244. A long-range patrol has as its purpose the detection of attacking enemy forces, delaying
or weakening them, by this means supporting the deployment of our own guarding forces, and
more favorable conditions for their conduct of battle.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 64
These tasks require a designation of forces capable of conducting observation over a broad
expanse of the ocean surface and in the air, both day and night. Rapid-moving, steadfast in battle
forces, the composition of which is gauged against the possible composition of the attacking
enemy force, should be assigned to this mission. The coordination of the forces of the patrol
should be envisaged with the forces that are conducting reconnaissance in the theater.
245. The positioning of the line of observation of the patrol forces should support detection
of the enemy that is attacking our base and expose his composition and intentions at that distance
from the intended battle site of the guard force, so that the latter can occupy the position pre-
supposed by the battle plan in a timely manner.
246. The supporting forces should be deployed to points of the coastline or at sea at a
distance from the observation line and a level of preparedness that upon detection of the enemy,
it has the possibility of rapidly joining together with the forces which detected him, and which
supports the timely exposure of the composition and intentions of the enemy.
247. Command and control of the overall system of long-range patrol should be exercised in
one person – the senior from among the commanders of the large formations which are executing
patrol service, or a specially designated commander.
248. The large-formation commander who is conducting patrol service should receive from
the large formation guard forces commander instructions in regard to the place selected by him
for the battle; concerning the necessity of providing him a reserve of time for deployment of his
forces for combat; concerning cooperation of the patrol forces upon which the guarding forces
are relying; concerning the actions of the patrol forces during the entry into battle of the large
formation guard forces.
He should also agree with the commanders of the adjacent large formations on the issue of
mutual assistance during the execution of this mission.
249. The preparation of a large formation for patrol service is conducted by the staff of the
VMB (MOR) on the basis of the decision and instructions of the base commander (region
commander-in-chief). It includes the following actions:
planning the patrol service;
preparation of units for execution of the patrol mission;
composition of the combat instruction for patrol service, which defines the methods of
actions of the force in a given concrete situation and including encoded signals;
the organization of basing for the patrol forces.
250. The staff of the VMB (MOR), during the planning of the patrol service, is obligated to
the following:
to calculate [estimate] the deployment of the observation forces and supporting forces
and determine the degree of reliability of detection of the attacking enemy forces;
to calculate [estimate] the necessary equipping of the region with observation and
obstacle means;
to calculate [estimate] the replacement of the patrol forces, considering their autonomy;
to provide for a reserve of forces for replacement of disabled platforms;
to develop a system of mutual recognition for our own vessels and aircraft.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 65
251. The commander of the large formation, which is conducting patrol service, establishes
the missions of the patrol groups. In this process, he should be informed of the following
elements:
data concerning the enemy and his anticipated actions;
reports concerning adjacent patrol groups;
the procedures of executing the tasks with indication of the lines, time of observation,
maneuvering, route of march to the line of observation;
reporting procedures concerning the enemy;
mutual recognition system;
time and place of passage through the patrol line of our own forces;
procedure for summoning supporting force;
procedure for conduct of battle and withdrawal;
actions at night, in fog, and in stormy weather.
252. The commander of the patrol groups, in the procedures of preparation for patrol service,
should confirm the knowledge of the vessel commanders – region of actions, instructions for
patrol service, and also ability to employ technical means of observation.
253. The command and control of patrol service is accomplished in the following manner:
by reliable two-way communications of the commander of the patrol large formation
(using a non-acknowledgement method of transmitting reports) with vessels and aircraft,
which are located at sea, and also from shore-based posts;
by control for the positioning of vessels and aircraft, using, when possible, one’s own
technical means of observation;
by rapid processing of received reports; by re-designating, when the situation requires,
separate groups for observation in new sectors or for rendering support to groups which are
observing the enemy;
by maintaining in readiness for sortie (flight) to sea rapid-moving forces for reinforcing
support, when the situation requires it;
transmission to patrol forces and adjacent forces information necessary to them
concerning the actions of the enemy and our own forces.
254. The crossing of the line of observation of our own patrol forces by our own vessels, in
conditions of low visibility, should be forbidden, with the exception of limited sortie to sea (or
return0 of vessels after a timely alerting of our patrol forces.
255. The commander of the large formation which is conducting patrol service should
envisage all forms of special support: navigational, communications, and materiel–technical.
3. Close-in Patrol
256. Close-in patrols have as their basic purpose the prevention of surprise penetration into
the vessel anchorage region of enemy light forces and submarines, and also of his aircraft.
Guard vessels are used for the execution of these tasks, large and small subchasers and
aircraft, shore-based locating stations, and shore-based batteries.
The overall command of the forces patrolling on the approaches to the base is accomplished
by the commander of the offshore water region (OVR) VMB.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 66
257. Stationary technical means of observation, positioned on the shore and in the water,
should be used first of all for the organization of observation. Mine obstacles, nets, and boom
obstacles are emplaced to reduce the area of possible penetration by the enemy.
In sectors where observation by stationary assets cannot be supported, it should be
accomplished by vectoring surface vessels and aircraft, taking measures for supporting them
against attacks by enemy aircraft and submarines.
258. Shore batteries, aircraft, large and small subchasers, and guard vessels are used for
pursuit of a detected enemy and the launching of strikes on him. These forces should be
maintained in readiness to sortie to sea for active measures after detection of the enemy.
4. Reconnaissance Patrol
259. The basic mission of the reconnaissance patrol is the detection of the enemy’s crossing
of a pre-determined line and the timely reporting of this to the command.
During the execution of this mission, the reconnaissance patrol uses submarines, deployed in
a screen on the patrol line, and aircraft which are conducting systematic searches for the enemy
in the designated zone. The forces conducting reconnaissance in theater cooperate in the
execution of this mission.
As a rule, command of the reconnaissance patrol is entrusted to the large formation
commander (unit) that is conducting the basic observation of the enemy.
260. Upon the presence of a powerful counter-acting enemy, cover is assigned to the patrol
forces (primarily aviation), which will accompany the patrol forces or can be summoned by
them.
The difficulty of supporting the patrol forces with cover requires observation of the
concealment of the line of deployment of the observation forces.
261. As a rule, the forces of the reconnaissance patrol are authorized to attack a detected
enemy only after reporting its movement to the commander; this should be discussed during the
assignment of the mission (with the exception that if necessary, [the attack] of specially agreed-
upon targets).
5. Blockade Patrol
262. Blockade patrol has as its purpose the detection of the enemy and with attacks his
destruction or his delay until the arrival of the main blockading forces.
Depending on the situation, the blockade patrol can be executed by various types of naval
forces.
263. Considering the proximity of the patrol to enemy bases, which facilitate the latter’s
combat with the patrol, and the remoteness of the main blocking forces, and also the strike
mission of the patrol, the blockade patrol should be comprised of adequately powerful forces.
264. As a rule, mine and net obstacles are established in the area of actions of the blockade
patrol for covering the forces of the blockade patrol and for constraining the sortie of enemy
vessels.
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Air coverage of patrol forces is achieved by designation for this purpose of aviation groups,
located at forward airfields at a high level of readiness for takeoff.
C. Anti-air Defense of a Sea Region
1. Fundamentals of Anti-air Defense of a Region
265. Anti-aircraft defense (PVO) of a region has as its purpose the prevention of the combat
activity of enemy aviation in the defended region. Its missions include the following:
timely detection of enemy aviation and provision of warning to forces and means of PVO
and possible targets of attack by the enemy in the defended region;
defeating enemy attacks from the air on targets located in the region;
prevention of other types of combat activity of enemy aviation in the defended region
(reconnaissance, emplacement of mines, adjustment of fires, and so on;
reducing the effectiveness of each raid and rapid liquidation of the consequences of air
attack (liquidation of mine obstacles executed by forces of OVR).
The primary mission of PVO of the region is to support from the air the combat
activity of the fleet and sea lines of communication in the defended region, and as well
to shield from the air the vessels and transports at their anchorages in base.
266. For successful execution of the mission, PVO in the supported region should be
organized in the following manner:
uninterrupted all-around observation for enemy aviation;
the use of all forces and means of PVO in their coordination, which will provide for
reliable defeat of air attack in any conditions of the air and sea situation;
the use of measures which reduce the effectiveness of raids (maskirovka, reducing the
signature of defended targets, their dispersion, creation of false targets, and so on).
267. The nature of PVO, which is executed in coastal regions and in distant regions of the
sea, varies in the following manner:
anti-air defense of the coastal region is characterized by participation in it of various
forces and means both of coastal as well as vessel anti-aircraft artillery, along with
interceptor [fighter] aviation;
anti-air defense of a region of the sea distant from the base is primarily accomplished
by the coverage of vessels from the air by aircraft carrier-based aviation or by aircraft of
long-range capability and firing assets of the vessels themselves.
268. Anti-air defense of a region, as a rule, is conducted in the form of close coordination of
interceptor [fighter] aviation and anti-aircraft artillery. The most powerful form of PVO is the
creation of air superiority over the given region; in separate cases, during the absence of
interceptor aviation, PVO takes the form of only anti-aircraft artillery defense.
2. Anti-air Defense of a Coastal Region (Base)
269. The basic system of PVO of a coastal region (base) is a large PVO formation, which
executes the mission of anti-air defense of a coastal region and consisting mainly of large
formation PVO forces, including attached interceptor aviation, attached in accordance with the
situation Red Army PVO and vessel anti-air artillery. It is coordinated with units of smoke
maskirovka and decontamination, as well as with local anti-air defenses.
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Among all these forces and means of PVO, interceptor aviation is the most active and
primary force in combat.
270. All vessels of the fleet and shore-based units (aviation, shore-based artillery, naval
infantry), irrespective of the presence of special means of PVO, supporting them in base,
should contest enemy aviation with their own means. Uninterrupted observation of the air
space, constant readiness of firing means for defeat of enemy aircraft, timely measures for
defense (maskirovka, dispersion of possible targets of attack, construction of cover, organization
of fire prevention protection and medical assistance) are obligations for vessels and units of the
fleet in any situation.
271. The service for air observation, notification, and communications (VNOS) in the
PVO system has the following missions: timely detection and recognition of aircraft, recognition
concerning the air danger to PVO units of the region (base), to vessels, to defended targets, PVO
of the fleet and PVO units of the Red Army. In addition, the VNOS service conducts observation
of the terrain in a coastal region and reports the appearance of enemy naval and airborne assault
forces.
The service of air observation should be all-around and conduct uninterrupted observation
using special posts, both on shore (PVO forces) as well as on all fleet vessels.
272. Interceptor aviation covers vessels and transports during anchorage and supports the
combat action of naval forces in the defended region.
The selection of the means of action of interceptor aviation depends on its quantity, on the
assigned mission, and on the conditions of the naval and air situation.
273. The service for vectoring interceptor aviation has the mission to guide interceptors to
detected enemy aircraft for the purposes of their attack and destruction. It consists of vectoring
posts, organized on the territory of the region and on vessels (transports), which are being
covered by the interceptors in passage in the coastal region.
274. The fire of anti-air means has the purpose of destruction of enemy aircraft and air
[parachute]-landed assault forces upon their attack on defended targets. Anti-aircraft artillery
batteries of PVO of the region (base) in the first place should defend the vessels (transports) and
other more valuable targets. Anti-air artillery of vessels, while anchored in base, come into the
overall system of anti-air defense of the base.
275. The commander of large formation PVO bears full responsibility for anti-air defense of
the region (base) and commands and controls it from the PVO KP of the region (base).
Interceptors are commanded directly by the large formation commander (unit) of interceptor
aviation from his own KP, located, as a rule, jointly with the region (base) PVO KP.
During accompaniment by interceptors of vessels (transports) in their movement by sea in
the base region, command and control of the interceptors in combat is executed by the
commander of the vectoring post (a fighter pilot), located on one of the covered vessels.
276. The region (base) PVO plan is drawn up by the large PVO formation staff, based on
the missions assigned, by the air and sea situation, and the available forces and means of the
large formation.
The region (base) PVO plan establishes the following parameters:
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what, when, where, and at what time is coverage by PVO forces required;
the system of air observation, recognition, and communications;
the system of air corridors and the organization of recognition for our own aircraft;
the system of vectoring interceptors;
the organization of coordination of PVO forces and means;
the variants of disposition of vessels (transports) in base and procedure of shifting PVO
means for each variant;
the measures for the defense of vessels and shore-based units, which are components of
the base, with their own means;
the organization of coordination with the PVO system of adjacent regions, fleet PVO, and
Red Army PVO;
measures which will reduce the effectiveness of air raids, including the procedures for
smoke-laying of targets and individual sectors of the region.
277. Coordination in combat of the units of a large PVO formation specifies the combat
instruction for PVO of the region (base), by the development by the staff on the basis of the
plan of anti-air defense of the region (base).
278. The signal of air warning is given upon detection of a group of enemy aircraft (not less
than three). An active net of wire communications and radio communications is used for issuing
this warning. The recognition signals concerning aviation danger should be broadcast outside of
any priority. Any type of conversation (exchange), irrespective of their sequence, is ceased upon
the password “Air” (by telephone) or “VZD” [vozdukh – air] by telegraphy.
The password “Air” for other purposes is categorically forbidden.
3. Anti-air Defense of a Sea Region Distant from the Base
279. Anti-air defense of a sea region distant from the base is organized in the course of
preparation and conduct of a separate operation by fleet large formations with the mission to
provide air cover of all forms of combat activity of vessels and units in that region.
280. For accomplishment of PVO in a distant region from base, a PVO group should be
created which is comprised of the following assets:
a PVO unit of the fleet (ZA batteries, ground and air radio-direction finding stations,
barrage balloon subunits);
large formation and unit interceptor aviation (shore- and carrier-based);
vessels designated for PVO;
aviation of the interceptor type, with powerful machine gun–cannon armaments, capable
of executing the PVO mission.
281. One of the commanders of the large formations (of a unit or of the aircraft carrier)
which is concluded in the PVO group is named the PVO group commander and executes the
mission in coordination with the PVO means of the fleet large formation being covered and with
PVO forces of the naval defensive region.
During the conduct of combat actions of a large scale, the command of the group PVO is
exercised by the PVO commander of the fleet.
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282. In the sequence of preparation for execution of the mission and in the course of its
execution, the PVO group commander and his staff have the following obligations:
to carefully study the nature of enemy air actions and determine their focus in the given
region of the sea;
to establish precise organization of the air regime in the region (scheme of recognition
and notification), which excludes the possibility of the sudden appearance of hostile aircraft;
to develop the procedure for coordination of the PVO group with the PVO system of the
covered vessels and units;
to plan for the organization of communications, which will support combat command and
control of the group.
283. The typical organizational documentation for PVO of a sea region distant from a base is
developed by the staff of the PVO group [in the form of] combat instructions for PVO of a sea
region distant from the base.
This documentation should indicate the following:
the general mission of the PVO group;
the distribution of forces and means, their tasks, their command and control of the tasks
and the VNOS system, with consideration for possible variants of the situation;
the system of vectoring interceptor aviation;
the combat readiness of the forces and means belonging to the PVO group.
284. The measures organized by the large formations and vessels that are conducting the
combat actions in a sea region distant from the base for their direct PVO are specified in section
5 of Chapter 6 of this regulation.
D. Anti-submarine Defense of a Sea Region
1. Fundamentals of Anti-submarine Defense of a Region
285. Anti-submarine defense (PLO) of a sea region pursues the goal of supporting the
anchorage and sailing in a region of combat vessels and transports against enemy submarines,
and also the prevention of actions the latter against shore-based targets, their conduct of
reconnaissance, and emplacement of mines in the region.
This requires the creation of barriers, which prevent the penetration of enemy submarines
into the most important sectors and presents a threat for their sailing in the region. It also requires
the organization of the daily struggle with hostile boats with the goal of their systematic
detection, identification regarding them, and destruction of boats which have penetrated into the
region. It involves the taking of measures to encumber the actions of submarines in the region.
286. Depending on the mission and the conditions of the situation in which anti-submarine
defense is being conducted, it can have three fundamental variants:
anti-submarine defense of a base region, organized for a prolonged period, with the
use, in addition to maneuver forces, of various positional obstacle assets and stationary
means of observation, under the cover of the shore-based batteries of the region;
anti-submarine defense of a region distant from base, created for the time of presence
in that region of our own vessels and transports and organized for the assistance of maneuver
forces and means with limited participation of positional and stationary means;
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defense of an anti-submarine zone [line], which has been created in the sea on the
movement path of submarines in the form of a series of strong obstacles, which will not
permit penetration of enemy submarines into the regions of the sea where vessels and
transports, where there are channels for the passage of vessels and transports that are
defending the anti-submarine zone.
287. Anti-submarine defense of a region can be conducted in the form of direct defense
against submarines of valuable targets, as well as in the more active form of search for
submarines in the defended region, then attacking and destroying them.
288. The various elements of the PVO mission in a region require the designation of various
forces and means especially for this purpose: net and boom obstacles; vessels equipped with
hydro-acoustic and radar means of observation and detection; aircraft which have radar
capabilities; and shore-based hydro-acoustic stations.
The basic anti-submarine large formation in a theater is the brigade of guard vessels, which
consists primarily of large and small submarine hunters [subchasers].
Small vessels, aircraft, SNiS posts, radio-direction finding and various other locating stations
located in a region are also used for this purpose.
289. The less enemy submarines are subject to monitoring, the more boldly they
operate. Therefore, it is important that a detected submarine not remain un-attacked by
our anti-submarine forces.
2. Anti-submarine Defense of a Base Region
290. The mission of PLO of a base region is charged to the large formation of the guard
force of the VMB’s offshore region. For executing this mission, this formation is provided with
guard vessels, reconnaissance aircraft, communication and observation posts, and other means.
Shore-based defense batteries and base aviation support it , and long-range patrol vessels
coordinate with it.
291. The PLO OVR VMB is comprised of the following elements:
net and boom obstacles for equipping the region with anti-submarine barriers;
small subchasers for search and pursuit in the closest in sectors of the base region;
large subchasers for execution of the same mission in more distant sectors.
Vessels that are conducting patrol in the system of the OVP VMB are also used for PLO
purposes.
In accordance with the execution of their missions and the division of the region into sectors,
PLO forces are formed into groups, the commanders of which are named from among the senior
commanders of divisions or vessels.
292. The plan for equipping an offshore region of a base for anti-submarine defense
should be developed by the VMB staff in peacetime and approved by the command of the MOR
(of the fleet). It should provide for reliable defense against the penetration of submarines to the
anchorages of vessels and the locations of the most important port infrastructures (docks,
refueling stations, ammunition loading sites, and so on). It should envisage guarding of the
channels and the defense of individual vessels against torpedoes, complicating the penetration of
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submarines into the maneuver area of the base, and detection of submarines which are attempting
to penetrate or have already penetrated into the region.
293. In accordance with the existing equipment and forces and means available at the base,
the staff of the OVR develops a PLO plan for the region, which is in compliance with the OVR
commander’s decision, and then approved by the VMB commander.
The PVO plan of the base region should encompass the following organization:
constant anti-submarine vessel patrolling;
systematic searches for submarines by subchasers and aircraft;
strike groups comprised of subchasers and aircraft for pursuing detected submarines in the region;
recognition forces located in the base region;
a reserve, in the event of the necessity for replacement of aircraft or vessels which have spent
their ordnance or have become disabled;
the establishment of booms, nets, and anti-submarine mine obstacles.
294. The organization of observation for submarines requires the mounting of shore-based hydro-
acoustic stations and other technical means. These stations should have direct communications with strike
groups of subchasers with whom they have designated coordination, as well as with the anchorages of the
latter in readiness at base, and also in the time of their pursuit of submarines in the working area of the
stations.
In a region of passage into the anti-submarine obstacles which does not provide hydro-acoustic
observation coverage, observation from vessels equipped with hydro-acoustic means of observation
should be organized.
Subchasers and aircraft should conduct systematic searches for submarines in the maneuver region of
the VMB and in approaches to the anti-submarine barriers. The searches for submarines should be
conducted not only during the day but also at night, especially in regions where submarines may be
recharging batteries.
295. The limited supply of depth charges requires that vessels present in base and aircraft be in
constant readiness for sortie out to sea, for replacement of vessels and aircraft that are pursuing
submarines which have expended their ordnance.
For support of vessels that are located at sea with the required combat stability, it should be planned
to cover them from the air and, when the situation requires, support in the event of an attack on them by
enemy surface vessels.
The component of the vessels at sea should support a successful encounter with a surfaced submarine.
296. The OVR staff should develop, adapted to the concrete situation, coordination of the vessels in
search and strike groups with aircraft in the PLO system (for day and night).
During the use of our own submarines in the PLO system, special measures should be taken which
will exclude the possibility of mistaken attack of these submarines by our own PLO forces and encounters
of the latter with our submarines.
Concerning the passage through the PLO region of our own submarines, vessels and aircraft that are
at sea, observation posts and various types of locating stations should be informed ahead of time with
instructions as to the time and route the boats will be following.
297. The OVR VMB staff should have concentrated and analyzed all reports regarding detection
of submarines in the base region. Using these data, the staff is required to regulate the movement of
vessels in the region.
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The flag-level destroyer staff of the OVR is responsible for the training and preparation of the enlisted
component to execute attacks during the search for submarines and for timely supply to all PLO forces of
special anti-submarine means. The flag-level communications officer of the OVR is responsible for the
condition of the hydro-acoustic means on all OVR vessels and should be informed regarding the condition
of all posts and stations that are being used for the PLO mission of the base.
3. Anti-submarine Defense of a Region Distant from the Base
298. The anti-submarine defense of a region distant from the base of temporary anchorage of
vessels or their actions near the coastline is the responsibility of the commander of the MOR in
the large formation which has been designated, from the component of the brigade of outpost
vessels, with other vessels attached to it (including guard vessels from the large formation) and
reconnaissance aircraft.
299. In accordance with the mission of the guarded force and the decision of the large
formation commander, the PLO staff develops the PLO plan for the region.
In the first place should be the employment of obstacle means of PLO (if they are available),
for defense of a region where an anchorage is a possibility or low-speed vessels are
maneuvering.
In this same region should be envisaged as well more effective constant observation for
submarines, and searches for submarines should be organized with vessels and aircraft on the
approaches to it.
The monitoring of a region, emplacement of basic obstacles, and organization of observation
for submarines is done in advance, before the arrival of the guarded forces into the region.
Alternatively, the PLO forces which are executing this mission (monitoring the region) should be
included in the first echelon of the supporting large formation.
In distant regions which are closer to enemy airfields, give special attention to covering the
PLO forces from the air.
300. As a rule, rapidly emplaced obstacle and observation means, and also shallow-draught
vessels at anchor, equipped with hydro-acoustic and radar gear, can be used for equipping the
region for submarine detection. Searches for submarines are conducted by vessels (equipped
with hydro-acoustic and radar gear), which are reinforced by the use for the same purpose of
aircraft. A vessel strike group should be designated for pursuing submarines that are detected by
aircraft.
301. The chief of staff of the large formation PLO should be aware of the presence in his
formation of the necessary supply of anti-submarine means (on large vessels and transports).
The staff develops procedures for replenishing of PLO forces which have expended their depth
charges and other anti-submarine means.
4. Defense of the Anti-submarine Zone [line]
302. An anti-submarine zone [line] is created with the aid of a combined utilization of
various positional means, guarded by maneuver forces at a significant segment of the route of
enemy submarines, favorable by geographic conditions for the creation of an anti-submarine
position.
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The command of the forces of the anti-submarine position is given special appointment by
the large formation commander.
303. The basic anti-submarine position has as its purpose to block the penetration of
submarines through it. It is an artificial line, created using anti-submarine nets and mine
obstacles, constantly guarded by vessels and air forces, by shore posts and shore batteries.
It has the purpose to force enemy submarines which are attempting to penetrate through the
zone [line] to expend their energy reserves. Observation and pursuit of these submarines should
be organized for a significant extent of the sea on both sides of the obstacle.
The anti-submarine zone on the enemy side should be covered by anti-surface vessel mine
obstacles which will prohibit raids on it by enemy surface forces.
For protection against enemy aviation, the anti-submarine line should be supported by
powerful anti-air defenses.
304. The basic large formation forces which are defending the anti-submarine position are
subchasers (large and small), and also units of reconnaissance and strike aviation. Strike aviation
groups and interceptor aviation are responsible for support of the designated light surface forces.
The mission of those defending the position is the detection and destruction of enemy
submarines which are attempting to penetrate beyond the anti-submarine line, and to defeat
attacks on the line of enemy surface and air forces.
305. The plan for equipping the anti-submarine position is developed on the basis of the
directive of the MOR (fleet) command and approved by the Fleet Commander-in-Chief. The staff
of the large formation which is defending the anti-submarine line develops the plan for its
defense.
Typical instructional documents include combat instruction for the defense of an anti-
submarine position.
306. The staff of the large formation should prepare a procedure for replenishing expended
anti-submarine means (booms, nets, mines, depth charges) and for re-establishment of emplaced
obstacles.
E. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Sea Region
1. Fundamentals of Anti-cutter and Anti-Minelayer Defense of a Sea Region
307. The mission of anti-cutter and anti-minelayer defense (PKO) of a sea region is the
support of safety of vessels during their anchorage and sailing in the region, and also the
valuable floating and coastal targets (docks, cranes, and so on) against torpedo attacks of cutters
and minelayers, and also from guided torpedoes.
308. Torpedo attacks by cutters and minelayers have a surprise and rapid nature. This
requires that all PKO systems be in constant readiness for fending off surprise attacks, and the
actions of its individual sections be undertaken with precision and initiative.
309. PKO should be included in the overall system of region defense. Its organization
depends on the conditions of the disposition of the guarded region:
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anti-cutter and anti-minelayer defense of the base region is accomplished with the aid
of vessel and air forces of the base, of shore batteries, of locating stations and permanent
boom obstacles;
anti-cutter and anti-minelayer defense distant from a base region, in which
supporting vessels are located temporarily, is organized with the use only of vessels and
aviation.
310. The organization of observation over surface waters on approaches to the defensive
region and in the region itself, delay and destruction of attacking forces, defense of vessels from
torpedo attack, and liquidation of the consequences of an attack all are elements of the general
scheme of construction of PKO.
2. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Base Region
311. The PKO of a base region is one of the missions of the base OVR. The OVR commander
executes this mission using his forces: close-in patrol vessels, special anti-cutter batteries,
locating stations for the detection of vessels, SNiS posts, and aircraft attached for this purpose.
These forces are supported by specially designated coastal artillery batteries and antiaircraft
batteries positioned along the coast with searchlight posts and base aviation.
312. Observation for the purposes of PKO is organized, as a rule, with reconnaissance
aircraft, shore-based observation posts, and vessels of the close-in patrols and as well by locating
stations, which are coordinated at night with the searchlight posts.
The use of light screens comprised of searchlights (suspended, with sights and guides), and
also illumination rockets and aviation illumination bombs, should be organized for blinding
attackers and facilitating the firing at enemy vessels in the conditions of nighttime on approaches
to the booms.
313. The following firing lines [zones] should be created for the purpose of delaying and
destroying enemy cutters and minelayers:
the fire of close-in patrols;
the fire of shore-based batteries of medium caliber, which are supported at night by
guided searchlights and other means;
the fire of anti-cutter batteries and machine guns immediately in front of the booms, and
also supported at night by searchlights.
Passages to the channel should be defended by not less than two rows of anti-cutter booms
and anti-torpedo nets.
In addition, internal guard of the channels should be envisaged, along with individual
shielding of the vessels from torpedoes, which could be launched by torpedo cutters or
minelayers and torpedo-carrying aircraft (low-flying), which penetrate into the place of vessel
anchorages.
The coordination of all these forces and means of defense should be organized in order to
provide for the uninterrupted destruction of attacking cutters and minelayers and to guarantee no
passage beyond the boom line.
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314. Cutters (primarily armored cutters) should be positioned in combat readiness outside the
booms for execution of the counterattack, and low-level attack aircraft, with pilots trained for
night actions, should be on airfields and used for pursuit of enemy cutters.
3. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Region Distant from the Base
315. PKO of a coastal sea region distant from the base, temporarily used for large formation
vessels, is the responsibility of the forces designated by instructions of the MOR commander
(guard vessels, armored cutters, low-flying attack aircraft, and others), in cooperation with the
forces of the patrol and PKO of the vessels themselves being guarded.
Command of the forces which have been assigned the PKO mission for the region is
designated to the senior among the commanders of these forces.
316. The region PKO plan is developed by the staff of the large PKO formation,
simultaneously within the overall complex of other forms of necessary for this defense, with
consideration of prolonged presence of vessels of the guard large formation in the region and the
possible tension [intensity] of the guard forces.
317. Observation across the surface of the sea in the coastal region should be organized
both on shore (observation and searchlight posts), as well as in the open sea (from vessels and
patrol aircraft), and also from the guard vessels themselves.
The staff of the large PKO formation should develop the organization of observation with the
aid of shipboard technical means at night and in fog, and also the organization of the use of
vessel-mounted illumination means.
318. Defeat of the attacks of cutters and minelayers requires the organization of firing lines:
the fire of patrol vessels;
the fire of shore-based batteries (if they are present);
the fire of guard vessels.
All vessels should be issued indicators, within the limits of which sectors they are permitted
to conduct fires.
Counterattacks and pursuit of the enemy should be organized.
319. The disposition of vessels located in the region and supporting the PKO of the region,
should be in agreement with the commander, large PKO formation of the region, in regard to the
greatest degree of safety possible of the anchorages and for the execution of the combat
missions.
F. Anti-mine Defense of a Sea Region
1. Fundamentals of Anti-mine Defense
320. Anti-mine defense (PMO) of the sea region has as its purpose the support of safety of
sailing against mines in the region by vessels and transports.
This mission includes the following elements:
systematic and controlled sweeping of the channels and maneuver regions;
escort of vessels through dangerous regions behind minesweepers;
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 77
observation for enemy vessels, cutters, and submarines, and for emplacement of mines by
hostile aircraft;
observation for floating mines and their destruction;
recognition [identification] of mines observed in the region;
support the safety of sailing against mines by navigational means;
monitoring of the magnetic condition of vessels which are going out to sea.
321. PMO, depending on the conditions of its execution, is divided into the following
varieties:
anti-mine defense of the base region, which is constant and uninterrupted mission of the
VMB and executed under the cover of base forces and means;
anti-mine defense of a region distant from base, organized both for support of the
safety of daily sailing of vessels and transports in the region, and also for support of passages
in the region of combat actions of vessels and large formations;
breach of mine obstacle, with the goal of supporting the possible passage of vessels and
transports through the mine obstacle, which has the nature of a positional obstacle.
322. The basic form of PMO in a region of the sea is systematic, daily sweeping for the
purpose of maintaining the safety of sailing against mines along a selected system of channels.
In individual cases, absent the time and means for preparing channels, PMO is accomplished
in the form of escorting vessels behind minesweepers.
322. The basic large formation that conducts the minesweeping effort in theater (within the
limits of the MOR), is the minesweeper brigade, consisting of minesweepers of various types,
equipped with trawls for sweeping all existing forms of mines.
2. Anti-mine Defense of a Base Region
324. The mission of anti-mine defense of a base region is entrusted to the OVR VMP. The
basic forces used for this mission are the minesweeper divisions. Aircraft, equipped with special
gear, are attached to the OVR large formation for the detection of mines. In addition, patrol
vessels, SNiS posts, and radar and hydro-acoustic stations are employed.
325. The PMO plan of a base region is developed by the OVR VMB staff and approved by
the base commander.
The PMO plan should envisage the following aspects:
a system for sweeping channels and maneuver regions;
procedures for conducting inspection of swept channels;
the organization of anti-mine observation in channel areas for enemy aircraft,
submarines, and cutters;
defense of minesweepers during their work against attacks by enemy aircraft,
submarines, and light forces;
a reserve of minesweepers for escorting with minesweepers vessels that are departing
from and returning to base and for clearing channels in which the enemy has placed
obstacles;
navigational support of sailing through channels and the production of suitable maps,
based on all data, of the mine situation of the region.
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327. In the event of the emplacement of enemy mines in one or two channels, the system of
channels should support the capability for departure and return to base by other channels.
This system should also feed into the plan for clearing channels.
327. Systematic clearing should be accomplished daily in both daylight and darkness, and
prior to and after vessels have arrived or departed from base. Sweeping should be envisaged for
encountering all forms of mines that the enemy might be using in the conditions of the situation.
The system of sweeping and the measures of maskirovka that are implemented should
prevent the enemy’s identification of the location of channels by observation from aircraft and
submarines.
The sector of the sea in which mines are found is to be closed for sailing, and can be opened
only after complete clearing of it from mines and the conduct of controlled sweeping.
328. As a rule, in regions closer to base, irrespective of the conduct of systematic sweeping,
vessels should move after sweeping, even if the sweep was against the most dangerous type of
mine in the given case.
Observation for the emplacement of mines from aircraft is conducted in the following
manner:
establishment in the most critical portions of the region of special floating means for
observation and determining the location of mines delivered by aircraft;
illumination of aircraft from shore-based searchlights;
the use of radar for fixing the dropping of mines by aircraft.
The site of fall of mines dropped by aircraft should be monitored by controlled sweeping.
329. Observation for floating mines should be conducted by all vessels that are sailing in the
base region, and also by all shore posts. The detected floating mines should be destroyed by OVR
means in the shortest possible time.
330. Sailing in a region along swept channels should be supported by navigational means,
without violating the secrecy of the disposition of the channels.
331. Command and control of PMO of a base region is exercised by the OVR commander
through his staff. Leadership of anti-mine defense in separate sectors is delegated to the
commanders of the subunits designated for systematic sweeping in the sector. Fast-moving
minesweepers, which form special subunits, should be designated for escort of vessels behind
minesweepers.
332. The flag-level OVR VMB mine officer (minesweeper brigade), as a rule, is responsible
for the technical preparation, supply, and training of minesweepers and crews.
3. Anti-mine Defense of a Region Distant from the Base
333. PMO in a region distant from base is executed by forces of the minesweeper brigade
and attached guard vessels, and also by the forces of patrols and reconnaissance aviation that are
coordinating with them.
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334. The PMO plan for a region distant from the base is drawn up by the staff of the large
minesweeper formation on the basis of a directive of the commander of the MOR (fleet).
Special attention should be given during the planning, to the provision of cover of the
minesweepers against attacks on them by enemy aviation and surface vessels, for maintenance of
the secrecy of sweeping, and also for navigational–hydrographic equipping of the region.
333. The commander of the large formation, with the goal of preventing surprise enemy
attack on the minesweeping vessels, is required to organize reconnaissance and patrol service on
the approaches to the region being swept.
Air cover should be envisaged for fending off attacks from the air on the sweeping vessels.
4. Penetration of a Mine Obstacle
336. The forcing of a mine obstacle is a mission that requires a great amount of time in its
preparation and execution, and also precision in the conduct of sweeping effort.
Upon the necessity for forcing a mine obstacle for departure of vessels to sea or their return,
in genuine cases [not false minefields], sweeping should be conducted decisively by all available
means.
337. An obstacle breaching detachment should be organized from the large maneuver
formation for the purpose of breaching a mine obstacle, which has in its component the
following basic forces: minesweepers of all categories, special mine breachers, escort cutters and
smoke-laying cutters. Aviation and cutters are attached for the conduct of mine reconnaissance.
The fight against enemy counter-actions is enabled by supporting vessels (cutters) and aviation.
As a rule, the commander of the large maneuver formation designates the minesweeper
brigade commander [to be in charge of this operation].
338. The breach of a mine obstacle in daylight or dark conditions can take the form of
forcing an enemy obstacle that was created and is being defended by them, or the forcing of
one’s own mine obstacle for the passage through it of one’s own vessels, if the situation requires
this.
339. The execution of a breach, depending on the nature of the tasks and local conditions, is
carried out, as a rule, in the form of sweeping and winnowing out a channel to its entire depth,
with subsequent escort of vessels through the channel behind minesweepers or in the form of
forcing the mine obstacle while simultaneously escorting vessels behind minesweepers.
340. The staff of the breaching detachment which is planning the breach of the mine obstacle
should develop a breaching plan, which envisages the following stages:
mine reconnaissance, which has as its purpose to determine the axis of the breach, for
which it is necessary to establish the depth of the obstacle, the density of the obstacle, the
type of mines, and determine the outer boundaries of the obstacle. Mine reconnaissance is
conducted with the aid of aerial photography and minesweepers (with shallow draught)
which are equipped with special hydro-acoustic devices;
sectioning the mine obstacle, producing a breach on the designated axis by means of
bombing the defined area of water from the air and with escort cutters, with required
directionally focused winnowing.
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Forcing the mine obstacle, which is accomplished after sectioning the mine obstacle on
a chosen breach axis by an echeloned formation of special vessels – mine breachers – with
cover for them against shallow mines, and then by [regular] minesweepers.
341. In view of the complexity of coordination of the various groups which comprise the
breaching detachment, and of the maneuvering of a large number of vessels during the breach of
the mine obstacle, close agreement of the actions should be supported by the large formation
staff and the conduct of special table games and tactical training.
During these exercises, personal conversations between the group commanders have special
significance.
342. The actions of the breaching detachment and all the forces that are coordinated with it
during the forcing of the obstacle are specified by the combat instruction, developed by the
staff of the breaching detachment on the basis of its commander’s decision, in accordance with
the mine reconnaissance and the segmentation of the obstacle, and include the following
provisions:
selection of the means for breaching (sweeping, breaching and sweeping vessels for
forcing the obstacle, and escorting vessels behind the minesweepers);
constructing a combat formation for forcing the obstacle;
forming up and maneuver, which will be executed during the sweeping;
the actions taken upon completion of the sweeping effort;
combat support of sweeping;
cessation of sweeping effort.
343. During the period of forcing the obstacle, the commander of the large formation is
located within the combat formation of the large formation, as a rule, between the first and
second echelons of minesweepers. [From this position] he commands and controls the breaching
of the obstacle, directs the movement of the breachers, and of the following columns of
minesweepers depending on the results of the forcing actions.
344. In conditions which permit the possible counter-actions of the enemy from seaward, or
from the shore, the breach of a mine obstacle should be supported by appropriate cover, which is
executed, as a rule, by surface vessels, smoke-laying aircraft, and a strike aviation group.
345. After forcing the mine obstacle with direct escort of vessels (transport) behind the
minesweepers, the cleared channel is widened to an established norm for its systematic use.
G. Emplacement of an Obstacle at Sea
1. Fundamentals of Obstacle Emplacement
346. The emplacement of an obstacle at sea serves the purpose of creating conditions which
facilitate the actions of our naval forces and encumbers the actions of the enemy.
Mines, nets, and booms are used for obstacles. In isolated cases, sunken vessels are used in
narrows.
347. Depending on the purpose and conditions of the situation, the emplacement of obstacles
is divided into the following categories:
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emplacement of positional obstacles, which is executed for the purpose of reinforcing
the stability of the defense of the region in its operational zone, in the system of obstacles in
a mine–artillery position;
emplacement of combined mine–net obstacles of an anti-submarine zone or boom
obstacle in narrows;
emplacement of an active obstacle, which has as its purpose to inflict losses on the
enemy by the sinking of his vessels and transports with temporary constraint of his actions in
the obstacle’s region. As a rule, the emplacement of this obstacle is accomplished within the
limits of the enemy’s operational zone and consists mainly of mines that are emplaced in
lines or banks; nets are not used for this purpose;
sunken vessels in channels and narrows.
348. The emplacement of obstacles by surface vessels and submarines is executed, as a rule,
in secrecy. The emplacement of mines by aircraft is sometimes carried out in the open – in a
demonstration, for limiting the enemy’s actions in the region they use and to distract his forces
from the minesweeping effort.
2. Emplacement of Positional Obstacles
349. As a rule, the commander of the large formation which is executing the mine obstacle
mission is designated as the commander of the vessels which are directly emplacing a positional
obstacle. The vessels and aircraft designated for cover and guarding of the basic forces are
subordinated to him, and depending on the situation in the region, base aviation and shore
batteries support his actions.
The commander of the large formation is obligated to provide communications with the
forces executing the reconnaissance in theater, and to organize with his own forces observation
in the region of emplacement for the purpose of timely receipt of reports concerning the enemy.
350. In accordance with the nature of the tasks, the length of time required for their
completion, and the anticipated enemy counter actions, separate groups of the combat formation
are created, the commanders of which are appointed as senior among the commanders of the
large formation or vessels which are participating in support of the emplacement of the obstacle.
351. On the basis of the large formation commander’s decision, the staff develops an
obstacle emplacement plan.
The plan should contain the following elements:
the conduct of control sweeping of the necessary channels and region of obstacle
emplacement;
the designation of the necessary forces and means directly required for emplacement of
the obstacle;
providing the time required for emplacement of the obstacle, and also for repetitive
delivery of ordnance, passage and return to base, during the emplacement of a positional
obstacle by segments;
measures of combat support of the obstacle emplacement (reconnaissance, patrol,
guarding, maskirovka);
organization of the destruction of floating [as in “un-tethered”] mines;
navigational support for achievement of precision of emplacement;
combat formation of the large formation during the execution of the emplacement;
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organization of command and control of the large formation during the emplacement of
the obstacle;
actions in the event of fog and enemy interference.
352. The large formation commander establishes the tasks of the vessels and units in a
combat order for emplacement of an obstacle (on the basis of the directive of the Fleet
Commander-in-Chief).
The details of the emplacement are indicated in the instruction for emplacement. Tables of
encoded signals should envisage procedures for the actions of vessels participating in the
emplacement during encounters with the enemy at sea.
During the emplacement of a positional obstacle by individual groups of the large formation,
operating separately, the large formation staff, as a rule, draws up a planning table for obstacle
emplacement.
353. The chief of staff of the large formation is obligated to provide timely delivery to the
vessels of required obstacle means and to manage their reception. The flag-level mine officer of
the large formation is obligated to support the special preparation of the enlisted component for
use by the large formation in the emplacement of obstacle means.
3. Emplacement of an Active Obstacle
354. The commander of the large maneuver formation which is executing the emplacement
of an active obstacle is named, as a rule, as the commander of the large formation executing the
basic support of emplacement of the obstacle against enemy counter actions.
For reinforcement of the large formation and for cover from the air, the necessary vessels and
aircraft are attached to him.
355. The emplacement of an obstacle is executed depending on the concrete situation of
surface vessels, submarines and aircraft.
Surface vessels install the most powerful obstacles, and require support from fleet forces.
Submarines install mines covertly in the depth of the enemy’s defense and, as a rule, in
enemy channels which they have previously exposed.
Aircraft are used for emplacement of mines in the depth of the enemy’s defense, all the way
into his internal channels.
356. For inflicting on the enemy the maximum damage, active emplacement of obstacles, as
a rule, is conducted in secret.
Depending on the decision that has been made in regard to the large formation’s components,
the presence of a forward detachment should be considered, by its composition sufficient for
containing or distracting the enemy away from the region of emplacement.
357. On the basis of the large formation commander’s decision, the staff develops the
obstacle emplacement plan.
Special attention in this plan should be given to issues of support of the precision of
knowledge of the site of obstacle emplacement.
A typical instructive document is a combat instruction for emplacement of an obstacle.
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358. In addition to the basic variant of the obstacle emplacement, reserve variants should be
developed in the case of the impossibility of executing the first variant.
H. Equipping a Region with Navigational and Hydrographic Means
1. Fundamentals of Equipping a Region
359. Navigational–hydrographic equipping of a region of actions has as its purpose the
support of the necessary accuracy of sailing of one’s vessels and flights of one’s aircraft during
their execution of combat missions. At the same time, it should be not accessible for use by the
enemy for these same purposes.
Navigational–hydrographic equipping is accomplished by the installation of special
equipment and means (range or alignment markers, radio beacons, searchlights) on shore or in
the water (landmark or survey markers, buoys, floating beacons).
Command and control of the overall system of navigational–hydrographic equipping is
exercised by manipulation detachments and posts.
360. The execution of this mission varies in nature:
the emplacement of navigational–hydrographic equipment in a coastal region,
carried out for the purpose of supporting the safety of sailing in the coastal area over the
course of a long period of time;
the emplacement of navigational–hydrographic equipment in a region of the sea
distant from the base, which is accomplished primarily for support of individual combat
actions of the fleet which is far away from its coastal region.
381. The emplacement of the equipment is accomplished by special hydrograhic vessels, as
well as combat vessels designated for this purpose.
362. As a rule, the emplacement of the equipment is carried out covertly.
Constant control, which ensures the locating of the navigational markers at the site, the
proper work of all means of protection, and conformity with changing conditions of the situation
should be organized during the installation of the equipment.
Provision should be made for removal of the emplaced equipment upon completion of the
combat actions that it is supporting.
2. Navigational–Hydrographic Equipping in a Coastal Region
363. As a rule, equipping in our own coastal region is executed by hydrographic vessels.
Combat support of hydrographic efforts is executed by forces designated by the MOR (VMB).
The command of the maneuver group being formed is given to a specially designated supervisor.
The safety of vessels during the time of installment of the equipment is supported by the
system of patrol service and batteries of shore-based artillery. The group commander is required
to receive instructions for combat support from the MOR (VMB) staff.
364. The group commander develops an emplacement plan on the basis of the directive of
the MOR (VMB) senior commander.
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Special attention in the plan should be given to the secrecy of the emplacement, the
confusing of the enemy, and the provision of safety against enemy attack of slow-moving ships
during their effort in regions far from base.
365. The VMB staff supports the timely readiness and uploading on the ships of the
equipment means to be emplaced.
3. Navigational–Hydrographic Equipping in a Sea Region Distant from the Base
366. The installation of the equipment at a site on the sea distant from one’s own coastline is
accomplished, as a rule, by submarines or fast-moving surface vessels. In individual cases, the
vessels which are supporting the combat actions of fleet vessels and aviation can themselves
serve as beaconing platforms.
367. Leadership of the emplacement of the equipment rests on the commander on the group
of vessels which are executing the installation process.
368. In planning the installation of the equipment, the group commander should envisage
coverage of the equipment emplaced by the vessels in the event of their detection by the enemy
and the measures that will ensure the accuracy of the equipment’s installation.
369. The commander places in a combat instruction for the installation of the equipment
means the tasks for those vessels participating in the emplacement.
A planning table (planning schematic), which indicates the sequence of execution of the
various parts of the mission is provided as a supplement to the combat order.
Dispersal actions for the group during an encounter with the enemy during the execution of
the mission should be envisaged in the table of encoded signals.
I. Movement of a Large Formation at Sea
1. Fundamentals of Movement by Sea
370. The movement of a large maneuver formation is conducted for the execution of a
specified mission. Calculations for the organization of the movement are conducted with account
of the mission and the anticipated situation en route.
The movement should be organized so that the formation arrives at the designated
location by the designated time and in the highest level of readiness for execution of the
assigned mission.
371. In the movement, the large formation is expose to danger from attack by air forces,
submarines, and surface vessels, and as well the threat of ships being blown up on mines. This
calls for the requirement of organizing all forms of defense for the movement, observation of
secrecy in departure, and movement of the large formation in a state of readiness for a swiftly
conducted enemy strike during an encounter with him.
372. The nature of the movement can be varied depending on the composition of the forces
of the large formation executing it.
A movement of a large formation of surface combat vessels is characterized by rapid
movement and flexibility of command and control, thanks to the training and preparation of the
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enlisted component of the vessels in combined sailing, and as well to the great independence of
the units of the large formation in relation to their defense while on the move.
Convoying transports is characterized by limited speed of their movement, the absence of
practice in combined sailing and reforming, and also in the employment of means of intra-
squadron communications. Along with this is the necessity to strengthen the guarding of the
transports.
Escorting submarines is executed by surface vessels and aviation which are supporting the
safety of the movement of a large formation (group) of submarines. Escorting submarines is
conducted only within the limits of regions especially dangerous to them. Submarines that are
under the threat of attacking aircraft or surface vessels have the possibility of submerging. This
creates peculiarities in the calculations and organization for the movement of such a large
formation.
373. The movement can be executed both by the entire large formation simultaneously, in a
common movement formation, as well as separately by following detachments in independent
movements of formations and single vessels.
Movement in a common movement formation is the most often utilized form of
movement. It permits the execution of more fully active defense against attack by all types of
enemy forces, supports greater combat stability for the large formation during an encounter with
the enemy, and simplifies communications with separate vessels (units) in the movement. But
during a common movement of all vessels of a large formation, it is difficult to preserve secrecy
of movement and our own intentions. At the same time, command and control of the large
formation movement becomes complicated.
The movement by several independent detachments permits better maskirovka of one’s
plan, supports great flexibility in command and control within each detachment, but complicates
command and control of the greater large formation. The capability for defense of each
detachment in such a movement is weakened, due to the consequences of lack of close support.
Movement of individual vessels, by various courses or following one after the other, to the
greatest degree masks the very fact itself of the movement of a large formation, and also the
intent of the large formation commander. In as much as the defense of individual vessels and
their combat stability are reduced in comparison to the first two forms of movement, the basis of
supporting such a movement of vessels is the secrecy of it. Command and control of the large
formation on the whole during such a movement is complicated by the dispersion of the vessels
over a significant expanse.
Movement with combat is planned and executed when the requirement exists to overcome
previously known, organized by the enemy, counter actions on the route which our vessels will
follow.
374. The conditions of visibility and weather may change during the movement. This
obligates, during planning of the movement, the consideration of the route segments and
their navigability both at day and night, the forms of the movement formation in fog and
stormy weather, and the maneuvering required for re-forming from one movement
formation to another.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 86
375. Support of the movement is achieved by a number of measures which are undertaken by
both the large formation forces themselves, as well as by the instruction of the fleet (MOR, VMB)
staff.
The measures undertaken by the large formation itself consist in the conduct of
reconnaissance, in organization of guarding, and in self defense by units and vessels of the large
formation.
The fleet (MOR, VMB) staff for support of the movement should organize systematic
observation and combat with the enemy actions that threaten the safety of the large formation
movement being executed, and also informing it concerning these actions by the enemy.
The commander of the large formation should in a timely manner query the higher
commander of the MOR (VMB) concerning all special measures which he requires for support of
the movement.
376. The movement formation of a large formation (including also during movement of
single vessels) is determined by the order establishing the combat tasks of each group of
forces for the movement, in accordance with mutual disposition of the groups.
2. Movement of a Large Formation of Combat Surface Vessels
377. The movement of a large formation of surface vessels is supported by the forces of the
basic large formation and the forces attached to them for direct guarding, by vessels and units,
and also by coordinating forces.
378. The basic forces accompanying [escorting] at sea is the movement guard, the mission
of which is the reinforcement of all forms of defense of the basic forces. Cover from the air to
the basic forces ensures safety against air attack.
If an encounter with the enemy is more likely, as a rule forward detachments or patrols are
designated, with the mission to provide for the basic forces the possibility of reforming into a
battle formation or avoiding combat.
For the purpose of guarding itself against unanticipated enemy actions and to have the
possibility of reacting to his intent in a timely manner, the staff of the large formation organizes
reconnaissance with its own and coordinating forces.
The movement formation of the large formation should be constructed in such a manner
as to ensure rapid occupation of a starting position, the required plan for executing subsequent
tasks for which the movement is being conducted, and as well with consideration for the
necessity measures for the defense of the large formation against all possible forms of enemy
attack.
379. Anti-air defense is accomplished by means of organization of observation and
notification on all vessels of the large formation; by fending off air attacks with anti-aircraft fires
of the vessels and interceptor aviation of direct cover; by strikes of coordinating air assets against
enemy aviation on airfields closest to the movement area and by intercepting them in the air.
380. The movement sequence of each group should support all-around observation of the air
space by technical as well as visual means.
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381. The positioning of vessels of long-range and close-in guard should correspond to
the required creation of the most effective fires of anti-air defense of the guarded vessels.
382. The large formation should be supported by interceptor aviation against strikes from the
air; close to our own shores – fighters from ground-based airfields; in distant regions – fighters
from aircraft carriers. In the absence of aircraft carriers, other forms of aviation which possess
sufficient firepower should be used. A reserve of fighter aviation should be maintained for the
strengthening of PVO upon the detection of a large-scale attacking enemy air force; this reserve
should be maintained in readiness for takeoff from an airfield or aircraft carrier.
The commander of the large formation should constantly know which forces he can rely
on for air cover, and considering this, make a decision upon the changing of the situation.
Separate vessels should be designated for the rescue of the crews of downed aircraft.
383. Anti-submarine defense of a large formation requires the organization of observation
for submarines in dangerous zones; the notification concerning detected submarines; pursuit of
the detected submarines; measures being taken to complicate the attacks of submarines
(increased movement speed, changes of course, movement into shallower depths, and so on).
384. Vessels that have hydro-acoustic and radar sets should be designated for guarding the
basic forces against submarine attacks. As a rule, two anti-submarine screens are formed with
these forces.
The distant guard performs continuous hydro-acoustic observation for submarines within the
limits of the danger sector for submarine attacks.
The vessels of close-in guard should be positioned with consideration for the detection and
attack of enemy submarines at the limit of their torpedo firing from the guard vessels. Their
positioning and maneuvering should not permit the breach of their line by enemy submarines.
385. The structuring of vessels in each group of a movement formation should ensure
freedom of maneuver for avoiding attacks by submarines, aircraft, and torpedoes.
386. The commander of the large formation should utilize reports from MOR (VMB)
concerning mines and the organization of observation for mines, and in especially dangerous
regions, control searches for mines by vessels and aircraft or the passage of basic forces behind
minesweeping.
387. The organization of fending off torpedo cutters and minelayers of the enemy
requires that sectors of observation and defeat of attacking torpedo cutters and minelayers have
been designated for each vessel of long-range and close-in guard, and also of basic forces.
388. During the dark period of the day, special attention of the large formation staff should
be given to the support of the safety against surprise enemy attack, which is achieved by
concealed movement, strict organization of the use of communications means, a well organized
system of observation,, appropriate construct of the movement formation, and the preparedness
of weapons for immediate action.
All-around observation should be organized on all vessels in the movement formation, using
visual and technical means, across the entire horizon, and with the assistance of hydro-acoustic
means in the depth of the water.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 88
389. The large formation staff should take the following steps during the preparation of the
decision for the movement:
conduct an analysis of the large formation movement by movement stages;
envisage the required combat support and appropriate construct of the large formation’s
movement formation
develop a battle plan in the event of an encounter with the enemy;
determine the required materiel support of the movement and, when necessary, the
supplementary replenishment of fuel and ordnance at sea;
envisage the necessary supplementary instructions (in the event of fog, separation of
individual vessels, for reconnaissance, and so on).
390. The commander of the large formation issues the movement order. This document
indicates the following: the anticipated situation in the movement, the end purpose of the
movement, tasks of the vessels and units in the first phase of the movement.
The order is supplemented by instructions for movement, in which are indicated the sectors
of observation for air and the horizon in the [positional] order of the basic group of forces, the
sectors of firing by anti-cutter guns, and other details of the support of the movement.
391. The battle plan that has been developed by the staff and approved by the large formation
commander in the event of an encounter with the enemy is distributed to the commanders of
vessels and units orally or in the form of a separate combat instruction.
392. During the large formation’s movement by several separate following detachments, the
large formation staff should draw up a movement planning table. This document should
designate the route of march by phases of movement, control lines, rendezvous, and so on.
393. In designating a rendezvous [location], the staff should organize it to accommodate the
following instructions:
place of meeting;
time of meeting (in the period of from _____ to);
with whom to rendezvous;
compass bearing [heading or azimuth] of approach;
procedure for notification of approach of each joining group and exchange of recognition
signals;
course and speed after rendezvous.
394. The departure of the large formation from base should be supported by a number of
measures, which are executed by the VMB forces, with attached forces of the large guard
formation.
The large formation plan of departure from base is developed by the large formation
staff, in consonance with the large formation departure support plan for that has been
developed by the VMB staff. It should include the following elements:
the accomplishment of minesweeping;
the organization of observation of the channels after sweeping;
the conduct of searches for submarines;
reinforcement of the air guard in the region;
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 89
the conduct of reconnaissance at sea on the approaches to base and along the route being
followed by the large formation;
escorting the large formation with guard forces within the limits of the most dangerous
[area of the] region.
The organization of the reception by the base of the large formation should encompass
analogous measures and in supplement to them the organization of notification and meeting by
base forces of the large formation as it comes into the base.
3. Convoying of Transports
395. The mission of convoying transports is the support of their safety of movement against
enemy actions.
Convoys include in their composition both transports and the combat vessels that are
escorting them.
396. As a rule, the senior from among the large formation commanders or vessels that have
been designated for convoying the transports is appointed as the convoy commander. The
commander of the convoy detachment is subordinated to him, along with the vessels of
extended and close-in guard. Aircraft (PVO and PLO) assigned for support of the movement,
vessels that are executing reconnaissance in theater, and the posts which are conducting
observation also support him.
The vulnerability of a convoy requires a covering force – vessels and aviation – for
supporting it against enemy attack on the threatening axis.
397. Depending on the nature of the threat to the convoy, its movement route should be
divided into sectors and, in accordance with the type of danger in each of them, special attention
should be given to the movement order [sequence, formation].
398. For the execution of the anti-air defense, all around observation should be organized
with the assistance of radar, in order that the detection of enemy aircraft occurs at a sufficient
distance which will permit timely takeoff of interceptor aviation from aircraft carriers or shore-
based airfields.
The arrangement of the transports and guard vessels should support the most effective
antiaircraft defense of the transports.
399. The low speed of convoy movement requires organization of all around observation for
submerged submarines near the convoy, and for submarines maneuvering surfaced at greater
distances from its zones. This is accomplished by organizing, in addition to observation from the
guard vessels (both close-in and distant) systematic searches for submarines around the convoy
by aircraft, both at day and during the night.
400. The staff of the large formation should develop for the given period of movement
the process of coordination of PLO aviation with the guard vessels for the destruction of
detected boats.
401. Anti-submarine defense should not be weakened upon the onset of darkness. With the
aid of radar, vessels and aircraft should continue to conduct observation for submarines that are
maneuvering on the surface, and with the aid of hydro-acoustic gear – for submarines that are
maneuvering in a submerged condition. The convoy commander is required to give vessels and
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aircraft instructions for illuminating the submarines, which have been detected in surface
condition, and in regard to the use of shipboard artillery against them, and also regarding pursuit
of submarines that are submerging.
402. The large formation staff should develop a procedure for replacement in the positions of
guard vessels which leave the convoy formation in order to pursue detected submarines, and the
organization of the guarding of the remaining transports.
403. The use by the convoy of warnings regarding underwater threats to it requires special
attention. These warnings come in the process of information flow to the fleet developed from
the data of operational reconnaissance.
404. The fending off of the attacks of light forces is executed by the forces of the convoy
itself directly.
The defeat of attacks on the convoy by large enemy vessels is accomplished with the aid of
the convoy covering forces.
405. Special measures should be undertaken for support of the secrecy of convoy movement.
Radio conversations of the transports and vessels should be forbidden, and measures take for
careful darkening, and in daytime, for smokeless movement of vessels and transports.
406. The staff of the large formation, during the preparation of the decision for convoying
transports, should envisage the actions of the transports under various options of the anticipated
enemy attacks (by aircraft, submarines during both daylight and nighttime, surface vessels).
Vessels should be designated for rescue [recovery, aid to] damaged transports.
407. In accordance with the decision made by the convoy commander, the staff develops a
combat instruction for convoying transports for the given situation of the movement and a
table of encoded signals, which contains instructions for actions of the vessels during various
options of engagement with the enemy.
408. The large formation staff should develop and coordinate with the VMB staff or with the
senior naval leader the plan for departure of the convoy from port, its forming up, with a
calculation of the measures of its support.
409. The convoy commander should select for his command post at the time of the
movement at a place where he can best command and control the large formation during its
support for the safety of the convoying of the transports.
4. Escorting of Submarines
410. In the escorting of submarines, the necessity arises when, for some reason or other
(shallow water, mine danger, limited time reserve), they are deprived of the possibility
independently to overcome the resistance in their movement created by the enemy.
The mission of escorting submarines supports the safety of their movement against enemy
actions and their timely arrival at their designated position.
411. Supervision of escorting submarines is assigned by a directive of the Fleet Commander
or of the MOR to the commander of the submarine large formation or the VMB commander.
The escort commander is the senior among the commanders of the large surface vessel
formation which comprises the escort force.
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During the period of escort, the escort commander has in subordination to him the
submarines that are being escorted; he exercises command and control at a place of combat with
the submarine force being escorted, along with the supporting aviation groups. He has liaison
officers at his location from the submarine and aviation forces.
The commander of the large submarine formation, designated to supervise the submarines
being escorted, or the VMB commander, are required to prepare the boats for movement. Their
command post, as a rule, is on shore.
412. In individual cases, during the support of a mass departure or return of submarines, in
addition to direct escorting of submarines, special measures are undertaken to enforce the
passivity at this time of enemy aviation, of his submarines, and of his surface vessels or to
support the safety of sailing against mines (special minesweeping).
413. Using close-in guard, the escort should ensure for the submarines anti-submarine, anti-
cutter, and anti-air defense.
The use of more distant [extended outward] guard should supplement those same types of
defense and support the anti-mine defense of the submarine group and the close-in guard.
Air cover is achieved by the most effective PVO of the escort and the submarines during
movement.
Air patrol supports the warning of the large formation in regard to the approach of enemy
surface vessels.
Surface vessels and aviation strike groups are designated for support of the escort.
414. The staff of the large submarine formation, or the VMB staff, jointly with the escort
commander develops a plan, the combat instruction for escorting submarines, and the table of
encoded signals.
The instruction should contain the following elements:
the start and finish points of escorting;
the system of rendezvous of the submarines with the escorting forces;
the speed of movement in individual phases of the movement, taking into consideration
the possible submergence of the submarines;
the support measures for the movement (reconnaissance, mine sweeping, patrol, guard);
the march order of the large formation during the movement;
the procedures for command and control with surfaced and submerged submarines and
the use of communications means;
actions in the event of fog.
415. The vessel on which the escort commander is positioned should be provided with
reliable means of communication with submerged submarines, and also with aircraft.
416. Rendezvous of the submarines with the escort, as a rule, is designated for daylight
hours. The following measures should be considered:
measures which will exclude the danger of our own boats being attacked by enemy
submarines during prolonged waiting for the arrival of the escort vessels;
measures which reduce the possibility for our surface vessels to place themselves under
attack of hostile boats, which are located in the same region.
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417. The procedures for departure and arrival of submarines at base should be coordinated
ahead of time with the VMB staff, for the conduct of the necessary measures for safety of sailing
of the submarines in the base region. These measures include the following: sweeping of
channels, conduct of a search for enemy submarines, reinforcement of air guard in the region at
the time of passage of the boats, and the conduct of reconnaissance in the base region.
J. Anchoring a Large Formation in a Roadstead
1. Fundamentals of the Organization of an Anchorage
418. While anchored in a roadstead, large formation vessels might be subjected to various
enemy actions. This obligates the commander of the large formation to undertake measures
which will ensure the safety of the vessels against enemy attack, preserving for them the
possibility of their execution of the anchoring task.
419. The conditions of anchoring a large formation can differ acutely between themselves
according to the degree of support from local forces and means.
Anchoring in a base permits the use of the on-hand in a given region organization of anti-
air, anti-submarine, anti-cutter, and anti-mine defense for defense of vessels against enemy
attacks, along with VMB ground defense and sentry units for guarding along the coast. The
reduced combat readiness of the large formation by [others’] performance of these tasks can be
used for the execution by vessels and units of the large formation for other tasks associated with
being anchored in base.
Anchoring in a roadstead outside of a base requires from the commander of the large
formation the organization of the defense using all of his own forces and means. As a
consequence of this, a unit of forces should be designated from the large formation for
organization of watch duty (close-in patrol) and reconnaissance, and the remaining vessels and
units should be at a heightened level of combat readiness.
420. Depending on the conditions of the situation, large formation vessels are either
positioned all together within the limits of an expanse where they can be supported by the most
active defense against enemy attack, or dispersed and camouflaged within the limits of a
significant sector of the coastline, using the outline of the coastal terrain features.
421. The system of defense of anchoring in a roadstead of a large formation should
encompass the following elements:
the organization of observation on the seaward sector for enemy air, surface, and
submarine [elements], and from shoreward – for the possibility of a ground-based enemy;
defeat of all possible, in a given situation, forms of enemy attack, under various
conditions of the situation;
pursuit of the enemy;
liquidation of the consequences of the attack.
2. Anchoring in Base
422. Anchoring a large formation in a base should provide for the best conditions for
execution of the anchoring mission and suitability of defense in the event of an enemy attack,
and also the possible of a rapid departure and assembly into a combat formation for the conduct
of battle when fending off an attack on the base by large enemy surface forces.
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While anchored in a main or rear-area base, priority is given to the requirements of
distribution of vessels (units) for ease in executing the anchoring tasks. Anchoring at a forward
base requires the maintenance of combat readiness.
423. The positioning of the vessels is determined in accordance with the plan of their
execution of the anchoring tasks, approved by the base commander, and with account for
supporting them against unanticipated enemy attack, while at the same time including them in
the VMB defensive plan.
424. Upon approach to a base, the commander of a large formation should receive
instruction from the VMB commander regarding the participation of his formation’s ships
and units in the fending off of an enemy attack on the base and clarify the procedures for
guarding the large formation vessels and units from landward, as well as the presence and
readiness of emergency lifesaving means of the base.
425. The commander of the large formation, upon approach to the base, is required by
separate orders to carry out the following tasks:
inform the large formation vessels and units regarding the combat situation in the base
region;
state the mission of the large formation at anchor;
indicate the place of positioning of vessels and units on the base;
inform [his formation] regarding the base system of defense;
establish tasks for the vessels and units that are participating in base defense;
announce the procedures for actions in the event of a surprise enemy attack;
establish the [standards of] combat readiness, preparedness for sortie, and measures of
maskirovka.
3. Anchoring in a Roadstead Not in the Base
426. The anchorage of a large formation not at a base presents great danger for the vessels of
attack from enemy air forces, submarines, torpedo cutters, and surface vessels, and in isolated
cases also by enemy ground units.
Such an anchorage is permitted only for a short time period and only when the combat
mission requires it, or the situation has forced it (damage to vessels, storms, and so on). In this
case, special attention must be given to the organization of the defense of the large formation and
the maskirovka of the vessels and units.
427. The large formation commander is obligated to request in a timely manner from the fleet
(MOR) staff the necessary assistance for organizing the defense of the large formation during the
time of anchorage.
He should also establish coordination with the local senior naval officer for use of on-hand
and available forces and means for the purpose of reinforcing his own defenses.
428. When in an anchorage not at a base, the large formation commander is required to take
the following measures:
organize the receipt from reconnaissance that is being conducted in theater reports
regarding enemy actions which may threaten his large formation, and to be included in the
system of information flow of the VNOS service;
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organize his own reconnaissance, patrol service on the approaches to the anchorage, and
direct guarding of the basic forces of his large formation, both on the sea axis and from the
air, as well on the landward axis, and also the use of all forms of defense of the large
formation;
organize measures of maskirovka of his vessels and units.
428. While anchored in a roadstead which is not guarded by ground forces, as a rule, naval
infantry units are brought in for ground defense of the anchorage. If ground units of the Red
Army are available, the large formation staff should organize contact with them and facilitate a
mutual exchange of information regarding enemy actions.
430. The large formation commander issues an order for the anchorage of his large formation
not at a base. The anchorage order contains the following elements:
data concerning the enemy that is threatening the large formation anchorage;
the disposition of vessels and units of the large formation in the anchorage;
the composition and tasks of sentry guards (close-in patrol);
reconnaissance tasks;
measures of PVO, PLO, PKO, PMO, and PKhO, and also against shelling from the sea
and shore;
special instructions for ensuring combat readiness and preparedness of the large
formation to sortie to sea;
instructions in the event of a weather change.
431. The staff of the large formation develops the following procedures for support of the
safety of its approach to and departure from the anchorage:
procedures for inspection of the anchorage region during the approach to the roadstead
(controlled sweeping and search for submarines), the deployment of patrol and direct guard
forces;
procedures for departure from the roadstead and forming into a movement formatoion;
the system for recognition of vessels and aircraft by day and by night.
In addition to those indicated, the procedures for movement within the roadstead are
established.
432. The large formation staff should in a timely manner confirm the presence at the
anchorage site of the necessary reserves of fuel and other forms of materiel–technical and
combat supplies, which the large formation might require. In the event of their absence or
insufficiency, the staff is responsible for their acquisition [delivery].
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Chapter 9
Combat of a Large Formation in the Open Sea
A. Offensive Combat at Sea
1. Fundamentals of Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea
433. The primary goal of offensive combat at sea is the complete defeat of the enemy.
This is achieved by decisive maneuver of a large formation, directed at the deploying enemy
forces, by smashing or paralyzing his combat formation with powerful strikes of our weapons
against selected targets and the development of success for the achievement of the established
goal.
Offensive combat is distinguished by decisive and persistent, planned, and prepared actions
of the attacking force.
Those who act with skill and daring are victorious in combat.
434. The nature of offensive combat at sea depends on the execution of tasks, the
composition of forces and means of the attacking force, on the composition of forces and form of
actions of the defending enemy, the visibility conditions, and the remoteness of the combat area
from forward bases and airfields.
Offensive combat at sea is distinguished by an intense battle with a mobile enemy, which in
itself represents the most important element of his maneuver defense.
The offensive requires concentration in battle of superior forces and means on the axis of the
main attack.
435. Offensive combat at sea can be different in various situations.
Offensive against a freely maneuvering enemy, who is defending as a consequence of
seeking to avoid a meeting engagement or as a result of an unfortunate for him outcome of
such an engagement. This form of offensive combat requires decisive paralysis of the
defender’s methods by breaking up his combat formation, enveloping or encircling him, for
the execution of a strike on the enemy’s main forces with the goal of destroying them.
Offensive against an enemy who is defending a moving target (amphibious landing
force, convoy, damaged vessel, and so on).
This variety of offensive combat requires a direct breakthrough by the principal attacking
force to the defending hostile target for its destruction, with simultaneous distraction of the
forces of the defense by means of launching secondary strikes, or preliminary suppression of the
enemy defense, and by that means developing success on the axis of the defended target, for its
destruction of capture.
Offensive against an enemy defending at sea in poor visibility conditions, which is
executed, as a rule, by searching for the enemy in order to inflict on him a powerful torpedo
and naval gunfire strike.
Offensive against an enemy in a distant region of the sea with a large formation,
consisting primarily of submarines, which requires their sailing toward the enemy in order
to break into the depth of the hostile combat formation and inflict on the main enemy target a
series of successive strikes.
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Offensive against a defending enemy at sea executed by a large formation, consisting
primarily of aviation, which requires direct breach of the hostile combat formation by the
main forces of the attackers and the launching of strikes on the enemy’s main target for the
purpose of its destruction, with simultaneous preliminary suppression of the hostile defense.
436. Depending on the level of preparedness, the offensive combat at sea can be:
An offensive prepared in a timely manner against a reconnoitered enemy at sea,
characterized by detailed organization of synchronization and the execution of measures for
the creation of a favorable launching position for the battle;
An organized directly at sea offensive against an enemy, characterized by hasty
preparation and organization of coordination by means of brief combat instructions and
signals.
437. The offensive against an enemy defending at sea, depending on the executed maneuver
of the large formation, can take the form of a breach of the enemy’s combat formation, his
envelopment, the wide encirclement of countervailing forces, and pursuit of the retreating
enemy.
438. A breach provides the possibility of launching decisive actions in the depth of the
enemy’s formation, facilitates the rapid disorganization of the defenders, and destroys the unity
of his actions.
A breach is achieved by means of using offensive methods built on the principle of force,
secrecy, and rapidity of actions of the attacking force.
439. Envelopment of the hostile forces, executed from two axes, complicates the enemy’s
ability to avoid strikes, disrupts his execution of maneuver, and forces him to disperse his
defensive efforts, which in turn facilitates the launching of the main strike at the enemy’s
principal target.
The most complete form of envelopment is encirclement. The execution of encirclement
requires superiority of the attackers in forces and the presence in the construct of his combat
formation of a fast-moving group (light forces, aviation), and as well can be achieved by the
maneuvering of a submarine screen.
440. The wide encirclement of a hostile group of the enemy formation (of a forward
detachment, a flank covering force) that is capable of countering the offensive large formation is
supported by the launching of a strike on the enemy from his most vulnerable axis. The wide
encirclement can be executed with the presence in the large formation of superiority in speed
over the enemy.
441. Pursuit of a retreating enemy, if conducted energetically, gives the possibility of total
destruction of the enemy force damaged in combat or refusing to engage in battle by the actions
of the superior attacking force. It is executed by means of delaying the retreating force or by
parallel pursuit.
442. Preliminary strike is a powerful means by which are achieved the weakening and
disorganization of the enemy’s combat formation, with the goal of ensuring success of the main
strike in combat.
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Preliminary strikes can be executed during the period of approach of the attacking force upon
discovery through reconnaissance of the enemy, and as well at the initial period of the battle,
during the tactical deployment of the large formation.
Preliminary strikes upon closing with the reconnoitered enemy, as a rule, are conducted by
aviation and submarines, and also by surface vessels which are elements of the forward
detachment.
443. The main strike in offensive combat at sea is conducted by decisive means for
paralyzing the hostile counter actions – thus achieving the purpose of the combat. It is executed
simultaneously between our own strike groups, which are conducting their required actions
against the enemy by means of a series of attacks.
444. The basis of the large formation commander’s decision in offensive combat at sea
should be the posture of the actions of the forward detachments, which force the enemy in
place of deploying to reveal the defensive system of his combat formation, and thus expose
his weaker places, which then permits the axis of the main attack to be determined.
An offensive against an enemy defending at sea requires the constructing of a broad front of
forward detachments, which will make possible immediate contact with the enemy and rapid
discernment of the weak spots in his defense for launching of the main attack. This also
facilitates the execution of the envelopment of his combat formation.
Simultaneously with this, the combat formation of the attacking large formation should
be sufficiently deep and echeloned, possess combat stability, and permit the accumulation from
the depth of strikes against the enemy. As a rule, the combat formation for an offensive against
an enemy defending at sea should consist of not less than two echelons.
445. The most important elements for the success of an offensive battle at sea are the
following:
knowledge of the enemy against which the offensive is being organized;
correct selection of the start time for the offensive, with consideration of the duration of
daylight and the weather conditions;
observation of secrecy of preparation of the offensive and approach to the enemy, which
will support the surprise of the strikes that are launched;
careful organization of coordination of the forces participating in the combat in
accordance with the decision undertaken on the basis of the date of pre-reconnaissance of the
enemy;
high level of combat and political preparation of the large maneuver formation;
organization of uninterrupted communications.
The commander of the large formation, upon receipt of the offensive mission, before
departure to sea is required to organize the preparation of his large formation for combat.
446. Preliminary reconnaissance is a necessary element of the preparation for an offensive.
It permits the attacking force to establish the composition of forces and combat (movement)
formation of the enemy, his course, speed, and other data that is necessary for exposing the
strengths and weaknesses of the hostile defense, and the correct construct of the commander’s
intent.
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In deciding the question concerning the organization of pre-reconnaissance, the large
formation commander should consider the possibility of the disruption of surprise of the
offensive, upon detection of this reconnaissance by the enemy.
Tactical reconnaissance in combat, focused on the interests of the identified mission, is a
necessary support of success during the conduct of offensive combat at sea.
2. Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea in Good and Average Visibility Conditions
447. An offensive against a defending enemy at sea, executed by a maneuver formation
consisting of surface vessels, submarines, and aviation, is distinguished by the greatest extent of
actions against the enemy.
The complete defeat of the enemy is achieved by a decisive offensive in combat on the main
axis, supported by bold actions on secondary axes.
448. The large formation commander in an offensive action is obligated to use the most
effective of his forces for disrupting the enemy combat formation and the destruction of his
forces piecemeal, in this manner ensuring the destruction of the enemy’s main force.
The coordination of the large forces necessary for this [outcome] demand coordination of the
various attacking groups between each other and the forces held in reserve for the infliction of
repeated strikes in battle, the development of success, and pursuit of the remaining enemy forces.
The large formation commander should support [ensure] the conduct of the battle in
accordance with the decision that he has made by the construct of the echeloned combat
formation, their distribution along axes in accordance with the chosen form of offensive,
with calculation of the peculiarities of the use in battle of various types of naval forces in
the concrete situation.
449. Offensive combat at sea should be supported by organized tactical reconnaissance,
executed by aviation, submarines, and surface vessels, which duplicate each other, for refining
the data in regard to the enemy (pre-reconnaissance), by continuous observation of the enemy in
battle, and by guiding our own attacking groups to him. The large formation commander is
obligated to dedicate not only reconnaissance in the direction of the detected enemy but also on
adjacent axes for the purpose of detecting in a timely manner the possible appearance there of
hostile groups.
450. Forward detachments of the large formation offensive force, consisting of aviation,
light forces, and submarines, have the following tasks:
launching of preliminary strikes against the enemy for the purpose of weakening him;
forcing the enemy to deploy for a defense, and;
probing for weak spots in his combat formation.
During an offensive against a freely maneuvering enemy, the large formation commander,
when necessary, should envisage reinforcing the forward detachments with heavy cruisers.
The independent role of forward detachments and their critical tasks in the opening period of
the battle require appointment of the most experienced and energetic officers for their leadership
in combat.
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451. Strike groups of the large formation, consisting, as a rule, of surface vessels and strike
aviation, execute the main attack.
The echeloning of forces within each strike group should support coordination between the
tactical groups which comprise the strike groups, permitting each of them to use the attack of
their predecessor or their adjacent group for suppression of enemy resistance and facilitation of
their own penetration into the depth of the enemy combat formation.
452. The reserve during an offensive at sea consists of units used for reinforcing the strike
groups and for development of success. As a rule, the reserve is comprised of strike aviation,
positioned on airfields in readiness for takeoff.
453. Organizing the preparation of offensive combat, the large formation commander should
ensure preliminary development of the coordination of the various forces, for their launching of
strikes in the battle.
Organizing tactical reconnaissance, the large formation commander, having insufficient data
from operational reconnaissance, should envisage a search for the enemy at sea, with the purpose
of refining the enemy’s location and elements of his movement, and also the exposure by
reconnaissance of other enemy groups at sea, which are capable of synchronizing with the enemy
which is the target of the offensive.
During an offensive against an enemy which is defending a mobile target, special
significance should be given to the timely exposure of the location and composition of the hostile
covering force.
Creating a starting position for the initiation of combat which corresponds to his intent, the
commander should designate a time of concentration at the site of combat for surface vessels,
submarines, and aviation; the regions (points) of concentration, the sequence of its execution,
combat tasks, and as well the axes of approach of the individual groups, considering in all of this
the limits of possible changes in the axis of the enemy’s movement and combat stability of the
earlier deployed groups of the combat formation.
Instructions for coordination in offensive combat at sea are issued by the large formation
commander in a combat instruction.
454. Surprise and speed of an offensive stun the defender and complicate his organization
and the execution of counteractions. The rapidity and secrecy of closing with the enemy and
speed of tactical deployment support forewarning to the large formation of the hostile forces’
battle formation, which should facilitate the energetic actions of the forward detachments and on
the whole the conduct of offensive combat.
455. Tactical deployment of the large formation includes pre-reconnaissance of the enemy,
the necessary refinement of the axis and moment of the main strike, the construct of the large
formation’s combat formation, the launching of preliminary strikes, and creation of favorable
conditions for execution of the main strike.
Commanding and controlling a tactical deployment, the commander of the attacking large
formation should envisage timely positioning on the enemy’s course of movement of a
submarine screen, deployed early for participation in the combat. He should summon to the
combat region his strike aviation and torpedo cutters, and also interceptor aviation for gaining air
superiority in the combat region. The large formation commander should direct the maneuver of
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his surface vessels in accordance with the chosen form of offensive (breakthrough, envelopment,
encirclement).
When positioning the submarine screen, the large formation commander should ensure the
subsequent command and control of them in combat, and exclude their mutual interference with
surface forces during the execution of the main strike and the development of success.
456. The ensuring of secrecy of the tactical deployment of a large formation during an
offensive is achieved by suppressing enemy reconnaissance, demonstration actions which create
a false impression of the concept of the offensive, blinding the defender with smoke screens, and
deployment of forces, when necessary, out of view of the enemy.
The forward detachment commanders should support the deployment of the large formation
main forces by their energetic actions, with the goal of eliminating interference with their
deployment and constraining the mobility of the primary hostile target or his main forces. They
provide to the large formation commander reports regarding the course of the combat, changes in
the situation, and the actions and intentions of the enemy.
If submarines are present in the composition of the forward detachments, the commanders of
the latter should facilitate their breakthrough into the combat formation of the enemy or their
occupation of positions on the enemy’s movement course.
457. During the period of the main strike, the large offensive formation executes a series
of parallel and successive attacks, conducted by a variety of tactical groups, echeloned in depth
for overcoming anticipated enemy counteractions. The number of echelons, as a rule,
corresponds to the number of firing lines in the enemy’s defensive system and should ensure the
overcoming of the entire depth of his combat formation.
The target for the main strike during an offensive at sea against an earlier reconnoitered
enemy begins at a favorable time, based on the decision made during the preparation for the
battle, and refined as a result of the pre-reconnaissance of the enemy.
The moment of the launching of the main strike should be determined in combat by an
encoded signal of the large formation commander.
458. During an offensive against an enemy defending a moving target at sea, the main strike
can be directed at a hostile group (escort of covering) which is defending the target, or the
directly on the target itself.
Deciding to launch the main strike on the hostile covering (or escort) group, the commander
should direct strike groups to maneuver decisively and boldly, in consonance with the effects of
their ordnance, to the destruction of the enemy, in this process suppressing every attempt by the
enemy to transition to a counterattack and to contain the mobility of his attacking forces.
For launching the main strike directly against the defending enemy target, the large formation
commander directs strike groups into the breach of the combat formation on the axis of the main
attack, simultaneously supporting them with distracting attacks by supporting groups for the
purpose of facilitating the breach past the cover and through the enemy guard force.
459. When attacking a freely maneuvering enemy, as a rule the target of the main strike is the
hostile main force.
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Using attacks synchronized between his own tactical groups achieves the purpose of limiting
the mobility of the target, supports the success of the inflicted strikes on the whole, and as well
the execution of the required effects – the destruction of the enemy.
460. The attacks which constitute the main strike should be executed decisively and boldly,
with the greatest pressure of the forces and means being used, in this way ensuring the required
results of the effects on the selected target in the enemy’s combat formation.
Organizing the attack, the group commander should undertake the possible measures of its
support for reducing losses among the attackers. However, he should understand that this support
is only a means for facilitating the achievement of the goal of the attack. The attack itself can be
considered successful only when by its result it coincides with the achievement of the required
effects on the enemy during the infliction of the main strike.
The calculation of the combat power of the attacking tactical group, combined with its depth
and axes, and the mutual support of the attackers for suppression of enemy counteractions,
together enable the irresistibility of each of the attacks which constitute a portion of the main
attack.
Precise organization of coordination of the attacking groups with each other should create the
conditions which will deny the enemy the ability to avoid the strike as a whole.
461. The bearing (axis) of the attack is indicated by the strike group commander who is
organizing the coordination. He should accordingly conform the purpose of each attack, in the
process using his ordnance, the nature of the target being attacked, its armaments, and the
enemy’s direction of movement.
462. The commanders of the attacking groups should select positions for naval gunfire
attacks at the most effective ranges of fire and course angles which will permit the full use of
their guns on the axis indicated for the strike group by the commander.
Selecting the position for the attack, it is necessary to consider changing it during the course
of the battle.
The group commanders should attack the weakly armed targets from close ranges.
The position of the attacking torpedo group, as a rule, at the beginning of maneuvering for
attack is selected on enemy bow angles. When attacking transports which are insufficiently
guarded, it is advantageous for the attacking group to penetrate into the enemy combat formation
with hull course angles.
If submarines are participating in the main strike, the common maneuver of the large
formation, by launching or pushing the enemy toward the boats, should support a position for
the submarine attacks upon the initiation of their maneuver on bow course angles of the enemy.
The position of the attacking aviation groups during its selection for the aerial torpedo or
bombing attacks is determined by the axis of the enemy’s movement, by the common maneuver
of the large formation, by the selection of the axis of approach of our own aircraft to the battle
region, and by the light conditions and height of the ceiling.
463. The determination of the results of the main strike should be made by the large
formation commander by means of organizing uninterrupted observation of the target of
the strike and changes in the nature of the actions of the enemy large formation.
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464. The large formation commander executes the development of the success of the main
strike on the axis of pursuit of the target of the offensive battle quickly, not ignoring for a
moment, even though temporarily, the opposition of the attacked enemy.
The large formation commander is required to hold the initiative that was displayed in
combat by individual groups, by his partial success in the opening of a new axis which will lead
to the end goal of the battle.
The development of success in offensive combat at sea is achieved by the infliction of the
enemy of successive strikes, executed by still capable [not having exhausted their ordnance]
groups of the combat formation and by reserve forces, and also by pursuing the retreating enemy,
465. The pursuit of a retreating enemy for concluding an offensive should be conducted
energetically and unhesitatingly – to total destruction of the enemy remnant forces that are trying
to avoid defeat.
For this to be accomplished, uninterrupted contact with the fleeing enemy and rapid breaking
up of his attempts to transition into a counterattack or to break off from the pursuing force must
be accomplished.
The withdrawing enemy should be delayed by a general maneuver of the large formation
which guides the movement of the enemy to a place favorable for deployed or dispatched
forward units of his large formation.
The greatest success is achieved by two-sided, parallel pursuit, which deprives the enemy of
the possibility for executing a defensive maneuver.
A pursuit lacking initiative of a retreating enemy, as a rule, will not lead to a successful
accomplishment of the mission.
3. Offensive against a Defending Enemy in Poor Visibility Conditions
466. An offensive against an enemy at sea defending in poor visibility conditions (in the dark
period of the day or in fog) is executed by a large maneuver formation consisting of surface
vessels, submarines, and aviation. It requires organization of a search for the enemy for the
launching strikes, with the rapid development of their success or subsequent defeat of the enemy
and his total destruction by concentrated large formation forces at dawn or after the fog has
dissipated.
The offensive in foggy conditions is executed by the same methods as an offensive at night,
however the large formation commander should consider that the density and height of the fog is
not constant; in fog it is possible to use illumination means, an also reconnaissance and bomber
aviation (and in thick fog, torpedo carriers).
467. A number of peculiarities influence combat in conditions of low visibility:
the limit of visual perception of the situation and the impossibility of simultaneously
observing it across the entire battle region;
the sporadic [interrupted] nature of combat engagements;
the limited possibility of employing visual communications;
the difficulty of identifying one’s own vessels and aircraft, the heightened danger of their
combat encounters between each other, which place high demands on the commanders of
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vessels and units in regard to rapidity and boldness in actions, in the ability to risk and to
undertake independent decisions.
468. Depending on the concept of the battle in conditions of low visibility, the search for the
enemy can be conducted in various forms:
a search in a combat formation divided by depth and axes consists of a large number of
separate strike groups. This form of search, as a rule, is used for inflicting on the enemy a
series of successive torpedo strikes, executed in darkness (or in fog) by light surface forces,
submarines, and torpedo-bearing aviation, with subsequent development of success during
the offensive in conditions of good visibility.
A search in a compacted combat formation consisting of one or several strike groups,
operating jointly. This form of search is used, as a rule, for launching torpedo and naval
gunfire strikes on enemy surface vessels and immediate transition following the strikes into
the development of success.
469. Squadron minelayers are the principal forces that most appropriately correspond
in their tactical capabilities to the demands of conducting combat at sea in poor visibility,
and the most suitable for execution of the search at sea.
470. Search in a dispersed combat formation of the large formation is organized, as a rule,
in the form of pre-reconnaissance of the enemy forces that are in movement at sea. It is executed
by a sufficient number of search (strike) groups, consisting on the whole of squadron
minelayers.
The number of search groups, their construct and axis to the enemy should be calculated by
the large formation commander and correspond to the situation.
The search (strike) groups of squadron minelayers should be supplemented for increasing the
combat power of repeated strikes on the enemy by groups of torpedo-bearing aviation,
submarines, and torpedo cutters.
471. The large formation commander is obligated to facilitate the search by all means of
reconnaissance of the enemy, using for this purpose all available capabilities, and also by
orienting and directing both the search and the reconnaissance in accordance with the results of
systematic analysis in the FKP of data of evening and nighttime reconnaissance and reports of
the search groups.
472. The large formation commander should envisage the concentration toward an offensive
at dawn (or upon dissipation of the fog) of aviation and surface vessels in the main portion of the
battle region, for conclusion of the success of the separate attacks, which weakened and
disorganized the enemy’s large formation during the period of low visibility.
As a rule, the reserve forces are used for this purpose, and all the combat-capable [not
having exhausted their ordnance] strike groups from the search.
The presence of a reserve is necessary also for covering the reassembly at dawn of the
dispersed strike groups.
473. The organization of coordination of the search groups requires instructions from the
large formation commander during the preparation for the battle:
concerning the purpose of the actions in the search period and targets of the strikes;
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concerning the subsequent conduct of search in the boundary areas between adjoining
participants of the group;
concerning the actions after execution of the attack of each group and regarding the axis
of bypass in avoidance of encounters with our own groups;
concerning the procedure of terminating the search upon the onset of daylight (dissipation
of the fog).
These instructions support the focusing and organizing of the search, and also its secrecy,
with the least use of communications for commanding and controlling it.
474. The starting position for the initiation of an offensive in low visibility conditions should
be prepared in the following aspects: by preliminary deployment of the submarine screen in the
region of the upcoming battle; by the movement of squadron minelayers and torpedo cutters to
forward bases or in regions designated to them for awaiting subsequent deployment in search,
and also by repositioning aviation to forward airfields.
In addition, the large formation commander should determine the start position of the reserve
forces in accordance with his decision regarding its use.
475. Organizing tactical reconnaissance, the large formation commander should support
uninterrupted observation of the enemy and successive reconnaissance as compared to daytime
effort, designating when necessary surface vessels or submarines for the handoff to them of
observation of hostile vessels by air reconnaissance.
476. For ensuring the continuity of effects on the enemy in the search period and maintaining
contact with him after detection by his search group, the commander of the latter is obligated to
direct the remaining groups to the enemy before the launching of the attack by the following
groups.
477. Search in a compact combat formation is constructed on the bases of joining together
several naval gunfire and torpedo strike groups for combined search, with broad use of
technical observation means, utilizing combat guard and reconnaissance.
478. Coordination between the strike groups (naval gunfire and torpedo), and as well
between them and the forward detachments (combat guard vessels), which are determined by the
concept of the battle, should support the execution of a powerful main strike, focused on the
disablement of enemy vessels (deprivation of their mobility), and rapid development of success,
accomplished, as a rule, by light surface forces of the large formation.
479. In a situation during which the offensive battle at nighttime or in fog continues into a
daytime battle, the evening phase of the latter should be used by the large formation for
preparation for the battle in conditions of low visibility. This permits the creation of the required
starting position, provides for the necessary dispersion, and the conduct of deployment for search
in accordance with the latest data on the enemy.
480. Depending on the nature of the decided offensive tasks, the targets of the strikes
inflicted on the enemy in combat are determined by the large formation commander during the
preparation for the battle.
The basic targets of the strikes in offensive combat, in conditions of poor visibility, as a rule,
are hostile large vessels and transports.
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The basic instructional document for offensive combat at sea in poor visibility conditions is
the combat instruction, which includes encoded signals.
During the preparation for the battle, the large formation commander should also determine
the time and place of rendezvous by the onset of daylight, along with the means and procedures
for mutual recognition.
4. Offensive against an Enemy in a Distant Region of the Sea by a Large Formation
Consisting Primarily of Submarines
481. In distant regions of the theater, in which actions of surface vessels are difficult or
altogether impossible, and the actions of aviation are limited, an offensive against an enemy at
sea is executed by a large formation consisting primarily of submarines and attached supporting
aviation units. In individual circumstances, fast-moving vessels located at sea, which have great
sailing range, may also participate.
482. The success of an offensive against an enemy large formation by submarines in distant
sea regions is achieved by the submarines’ breaching of the enemy combat formation for the
launching of powerful torpedo strikes against its basic targets, combined with the actions of
aviation and surface vessels (if such are present), directed for the support of these strikes.
483. The basic form of coordination of aviation with submarines during an offensive in
a distant region of the sea is the execution of an air search for the enemy and vectoring the
submarines to them.
The coordination of surface vessels with submarines is accomplished by the former in
steering the enemy toward the submarines. The weakening and disruption of the hostile PLO can
be achieved by preliminary strikes of aviation and surface vessels for facilitating the submarines’
execution of the main attack.
484. During the preparation of an offensive of a large submarine formation in a distant region
of the sea, the large formation commander (as a rule, the commander of the submarine brigade)
should give special attention to the organization of reliable two radio communications between
submarines and the aviation that is synchronized with them, and also the surface vessels (if the
latter are present), as a necessary condition for the success of their coordination, and to receipt of
reconnaissance date regarding the enemy from the higher level command.
485. The combat formation of the large submarine formation, as a rule, is echeloned in the
direction of the enemy’s movement and dispersed in breadth for the ensuring of tactical
reconnaissance, preliminary weakening of the enemy, and of group maneuver using the
submarines, guided by aviation.
Aviation, as a rule, consists of several search groups and an aviation strike group (if its
radius of actions is sufficient).
In the presence of large formation surface vessels, they form a separate supporting surface
group.
486. Tactical deployment of the large formation is conducted gradually on the basis of
received data regarding the enemy’s movement. It should ensure the shifting of the submarine
screen of submarines required for the initiation of its penetration of the enemy’s PLO.
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Coordination between the search and strike groups is achieved by continuous informing of
the latter in regard to the place, composition of the enemy, and his movement elements.
The shifting of the submarine screen, which is begun in the surface mode, should, as a rule,
be supported with cover of the submarines’ maneuver from the air.
457. Upon the enemy’s closure to the submarine screen, the commander of the boat which
first detected the enemy is required to main continuous contact with the enemy and vector the
remaining submarines toward him. They close with the enemy in the shortest possible time for an
attack and in accordance with the previously developed and published encoded signal for the
scheme of the attack.
488. The main attack of the large submarine formation is executed, as a rule, using the
preliminary effects on the enemy’s PLO by aviation and the first echelon submarines.
The accumulation of strikes in combat is achieved by repeated attacks both by the
submarines that are breaching the enemy combat formation and again reforming – for executing
the breach, and also by attacks by aviation and surface vessels.
In accordance with the execution of the combat tasks, the main strike should be focused, by
the instruction of the large formation commander, directly on the enemy main forces for the
destruction of his anti-submarine guard and aircraft carriers.
489. With the participation in the main attack of aviation, the large formation commander
dispatches to the battle region in a timely manner the aviation group, having established its
mission as attacks on targets of the main strike which are capable of disrupting the actions of the
submarines.
490. The development of success in combat, which is executed by the submarines by means
of successive attacks and by those which have remaining ordnance, and also by reserve aviation
groups, requires the persistence of the strike group and individual submarine commanders, and
also by uninterrupted command and control by the large maneuver formation commander.
491. Command and control of a battle in a remote region of the sea is accomplished by the
large formation commander, as a rule, from a shore-based FKP. The large aviation formation
commander is also located at that same command post.
The flag-level command post, through its communications network, supports the vessels and
units of the large formation by the retransmission of their situation and when necessary –
repeating communications between them.
The basic instructional document for an offensive in a distant sea region is the combat
instruction, which includes encoded signals.
492. The organization of an offensive battle of a large submarine formation in conditions of
poor visibility (at night, in fog) requires special development and instructions in the battle order
regarding the methods of executing the main strike with recognition of their identification by
corresponding encoded signals.
5. Offensive against an Enemy in a Distant Region of the Sea by a Large Formation
Consisting Primarily of Aviation
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 107
493. In conditions when the offensive on the enemy may be conducted by aviation without
participation of surface vessels (for various reasons), an air offensive is executed by a large
formation of naval aviation, independently or with participation of submarines available at sea
and torpedo cutters which may be drawn from nearby coastal [units[.
494. The success of such an offensive depends most of all on the intensity of the use of a
large quantity of aircraft and their correct targeting, as well as on the organization of the
coordination of the aviation with the submarines and torpedo cutters, which by the means of their
repeated attacks complete the destruction of the enemy that was begun by the aviation.
495. Having received the mission of attack on an enemy which is located at sea, the aviation
large formation commander, reinforced by attached units of submarines deployed at sea,
organizes the following in consonance with the battle plan:
pre-reconnaissance of the enemy forces by aviation and appropriate repositioning of the
submarines;
preparation of the first and second echelons of strike aviation for combat;
re-deployment of the screen of attached submarines to the region of the planned battle;
coordination with the forces located at sea and capable of supporting the aviation large
formation in combat;
preparation of a reserve group of aviation.
If sufficient time is available, the large formation commander should conduct a timely
airfield maneuver which will ensure the rapid takeoff of the aviation strike groups and aviation
reserve to the battle region.
Organizing coordination of his units, the large formation commander gives special attention
to the knowledge of the aviation groups of the regions of deployment of our own submarines and
surface vessels (if any are present at sea).
496. The combat formation of the large formation includes the following elements:
tactical reconnaissance, consisting of several aviation search groups and a
reconnaissance patrol of submarines, which have the tasks of pre-reconnaissance of the
enemy and vectoring our aviation toward him;
forward aviation group (first aviation echelon), designated for delivering a preliminary
strike;
main forces (second aviation echelon), which delivers the main strike;
group for development of success, consisting of submarines and other vessels (torpedo
cutters) which are participating in the battle;
aviation reserve.
497. The main strike of the large formation, which consists primarily of aviation, is
executed as a series of successive attacks of aviation strike groups.
The moment of sortie of the strike groups is determined upon signal of the large formation
commander. The targets of the main strike should be determined ahead of time, during the
preparation of the battle.
During an offensive against a freely maneuvering enemy, the target of the main strike, as a
rule, should be the hostile main forces. During an offensive against an enemy defending a
moving target, the target of the main strike, as a rule, is against the latter.
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The large formation commander should try to establish an approximate reduced time interval
between the preliminary and main strikes.
499. Development of success in combat, which is focused on the complete destruction of the
main hostile forces, is achieved by a series of repeated strikes, executed by submarines deployed
to the region, torpedo cutters, and reserve aviation groups, and as well by aviation of the first
echelons that have re-armed.
The large formation commander, as a rule, gives the aviation commander of the first echelon
the right on site to determine by his signal the moment of the initiation of the development of
success, and by this signal quickly supports his actions with the reserve aviation group.
500. Command and control of the battle of a large formation consisting primarily of
aviation is exercised by the commander of the large maneuver formation from a shore-based
command post. With him at this command post are the commander (or chief of staff) of the large
submarine formation and liaison officers from the groups of surface vessels. They are required to
monitor the situation at sea and in the air, inform their own units regarding changes in it in a
timely manner, and report to the large formation commander the situation at sea, their evaluation
of it and their recommendations as to the use of submarines and surface vessels.
The commanders of the aviation groups 9first and subsequent echelons), which are executing
the strikes at sea, should be located together with their groups and guide them to the battle site of
their actions.
The commander of the attached large submarine formation (torpedo cutters) should execute
command and control at sea with submarines (torpedo cutters) on the basis of the tasks assigned
by the aviation large formation commander.
The jointly synchronized surface vessels and the large formation execute the requirements of
the large aviation formation commander in regard to support, pass through their liaison officer.
The staff of the large maneuver formation supports, through its own communications center,
the vessels, units, and large formation participating in the battle by passing to them the situation,
and when necessary also duplication of communications between them.
The basic instructional document for the multi-branch offensive battle is the combat
instruction, which includes the necessary encoded signals.
B. Meeting Engagement at Sea
1. Fundamentals of a Meeting Engagement
501. In a meeting engagement, which is a special form of offensive combat at sea, a
maneuvering large formation conducts an attack on an enemy which also simultaneously
attacking it.
502. The meeting engagement is characterized by an unclear situation in the initial period of
the combat with subsequent acute and rapid changes, transitory conditions at the moment of
combat confrontation with the enemy, an uninterrupted struggle for capturing and holding the
initiative in battle, striving by each of the contesting parties for their own offensive to achieve
the desired outcome, and in doing so with their defensive actions disrupting the causal factors of
the enemy’s offensive.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 109
503. Success in a meeting engagement at sea is ensured by bold, energetic actions of forward
detachments, which has engaged the enemy advance guard in combat; the seizure of the initiative
in one’s own hands and swift maneuver of the large formation, which will lead to encirclement
or isolation of a portion of the hostile force and their destruction by powerful, concentrated
blows of various coordinated forces; by rapid employment of separate groups and large
formations with the goal of presenting in the course of the battle the possibility of achieving the
desired outcome of the battle and total destruction of the enemy.
504. Various distinctive forms of combat actions are used in a meeting engagement:
Initiation of battle, which is the establishment of contact with the enemy in battle, preceding
its subsequent development and influencing, on the whole, the start of combat.
Advance guard battle, which is conducted by large forces of the forward detachments in the
form of rapid attack on the forward enemy units, with the purpose of weakening them and
attracting to ourselves the attention and actions of the main enemy force. This, in turn, facilitates
the deployment of forces for inflicting the main strike in the meeting engagement.
Temporary transition of the large formation to the defense (if the situation requires this)
for weakening by our own counterstrikes an enemy that is superior in forces, to expose his
intentions and by that facilitate the subsequent transition to a decisive offensive against him.
Special attention in a meeting engagement is given to rapid execution of air superiority in
the battle region from its very beginning, which is supported by both tactical reconnaissance in
combat and as well by the defensive capability of the large formation under the effects of enemy
aviation.
505. The organization of the initiation of a meeting engagement and the conduct of the
advance guard battle, in accordance with the large formation commander’s concept, requires the
timely repositioning of forces and the start of combat actions in the movement mode. Therefore,
the combat formation takes on these characteristics even during the movement to the battle site.
The march order leading up to a meeting engagement should, to the greatest possible
degree, approach a battle formation.
506. Typical for a meeting engagement is the designation of a powerful advance guard,
which is formed by the joining of forward detachments and including various other forces,
among them a submarine screen and an advance guard aviation group.
Command and control of the advance guard battle is executed as an independent and critical
mission in the initial period of the battle and is facilitated by the large maneuver formation
commander in combat – by comprehensive coordination of the advance guard with the main
forces. This requires appointment of an experienced and energetic officer as advance guard
commander, who is prepared for this role by the large formation commander.
507. The decision for a meeting engagement does not allow procrastination, despite the
normally confusing situation. The absence of data for selection of the axis of the main strike does
not exclude actions for the creation of favorable conditions for such strike, and itself requires
offensive actions which will clarify the situation.
In a meeting engagement, one must strive for the rapid disorganization of the enemy’s
combat and movement formations, the breaking them into separate, dispersed groups, and to the
defeat of these groups piecemeal.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 110
508. The plan for a meeting engagement (the execution of maneuver) should be as simple as
possible and should be finally taken only upon exposure of the enemy’s intentions in combat.
Therefore, command and control in a meeting engagement requires the skill of rapidly
organizing one’s own actions directly in combat. Preparation of the large formation for a meeting
engagement requires prior development of coordination of tactical and strike groups in
preparatory combinations, identified by encoded signals.
509. A meeting engagement at sea, depending on the conditions of its conduct, can occur in
two forms:
a meeting engagement in good and average visibility conditions, which requires the
combining of offensive and defensive actions of the entire large formation, directed toward
the accomplishment of one’s own mission in combat and the defeat of the hostile offensive
with all the combat power of the various forces that comprise the large formation;
a meeting engagement in poor visibility conditions (at night, in fog, in polar
darkness), which requires offensive actions by large formation units which are executing a
search for the enemy, and simultaneous employment of defensive methods by the main
forces, which in these conditions represent the enemy’s main target for offensive actions.
2. Meeting Engagement at Sea in Good and Average Visibility Conditions
510. In attacking the enemy in a meeting engagement at sea in good and average visibility
conditions, conducted energetically in the enemy’s direction, the commander should with his
actions influence the enemy’s responding actions; in a combination of enveloping or encircling
maneuver, he should break the enemy’s combat formation into disparate groups and defeat them
piecemeal.
At the same time, he should conduct continuous reconnaissance of the battle region and in a
timely manner detect the intentions of the hostile force, his striving to execute a breakthrough,
envelopment, or encirclement, and rapidly parry these attempts by suppression of the activity of
the breaching units, by envelopment of the encircled enemy groups or cutting them off and
destroying them.
511. The basic decision of the large formation commander in a meeting engagement is the
correct understanding by him of the goal of the combat in conditions of the concrete situation
(upon meeting the enemy), which will permit him to determine the methods of actions necessary
for achievement of his own goals in combat and for preventing the enemy from executing his
intentions.
This requires from the large formation commander – from the beginning of the contact, to
orient his decision on the execution of his own offensive and in measured exposure with the
development of the battle of the enemy’s intentions, to input corrections, directed at extending
the enemy’s confusion in connection with his intended outcome of the battle.
512. In anticipation of a meeting engagement, the large formation commander should
organize the preparation of his large formation. This is achieved by the following actions:
orienting the commanders of large formation units concerning the enemy, with whom the
engagement at sea is anticipated;
clarifying for the goals of the upcoming battle and the concept of its initiation;
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instruction as to the possible axes of the main strikes and methods of actions during
various options of the anticipated situation of the engagement.
The large formation commander should organize tactical reconnaissance in combat and
coordination with operational reconnaissance for closing with the enemy and during the battle,
and also determine – by the construct of the large formation’s movement formation – a starting
position for the initiation of combat and issue orders regarding preliminary deployment in the
area of the anticipated meeting with the enemy of individual large formation units.
513. The instructional document which determines the organization of coordination of the
large formation units in a meeting engagement and gives instructions regarding their methods of
action in anticipated variants of the situation is the combat instruction, which includes encoded
signals.
514. With the initiation of the confrontation with the enemy, the large formation
commander should not waste time in refining the situation, and by doing so lose the
initiative in battle.
By maneuver of the large formation for closing with the enemy in the shortest time, by
reconnaissance sightings, and by unleashing combat with the enemy using his own forward
detachments, the large formation commander should arrive at a decision for the large formation’s
offensive tasks, which were prepared during the deployment, and implement them into the
actions of his main forces.
515. Initiating the meeting engagement, as a rule, begins with preliminary aviation strikes,
which are a component of the first echelon of the large formation, on the enemy’s movement
formation, and energetic actions of the forward detachments which are executed upon signal of
the advance guard commander. Additionally, the submarines of the forward screen can attack the
enemy independently.
The initiation of the battle should ensure, by mutual maneuvering of the advance guard and
main forces in accordance with the commander’s concept, a start position of the large formation
for combat (bearing to the enemy, initiation of envelopment, and so on).
516. The basic task of the advance guard, which is supported by the required main
forces, is the imposition of their initiating actions on the hostile advance guard, exposure of
the enemy’s intentions, and support of the deployment of the force for the main strike.
This is achieved by the advance guard battle of the large formation, during which the
advance guards, consisting of various forces which are supported by aviation groups and naval
gunfire of the main forces, attack the enemy decisively.
The seizure of the initiative is supported by the suppression of the activity of the hostile
advance guard in the initial period of the battle and the creation of air superiority in the battle
region, and the attempts by the enemy to launch his main strike are hindered.
The advance guard commander, supported by the deployment of the main force and
suppressing the hostile groupings, continuously reports to the large formation commander
regarding the repositioning of the enemy and the changes in his combat formation.
517. In making the decision regarding the axis of the main strike and its method of execution,
the large formation commander specifies the basic contents of the tactical deployment.
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The combat formation of the large formation in the period of the main strike, in addition to
tactical reconnaissance, and also the advance guard, comprised of various forces (first echelon
of the combat formation) and air cover, consists of strike groups (second echelon of the combat
formation), intended for launching of the main strikes and execution of strikes dispersed in
breadth and depth in accordance with the selected method.
The strike groups, as a rule, are formed from surface vessels and aviation, and in some cases
also from submarines.
518. The transition of the overall large formation or the advance guard to a temporary
defense can be required by the situation or executed in accordance with the battle plan, for the
purpose of weakening and exhausting the enemy and dragging him into encirclement, for
subsequent conclusion of the battle by transition of the large formation to a decisive offensive.
519. The main strike in a meeting engagement, as a rule, is launched against the enemy’s
main forces. The large formation commander should evaluate the significance in battle of that
portion of the enemy’s force which by its actions can influence the outcome of the battle, and
select the target and moment of launching the main strike.
The large formation commander should consider that the situation which favors the initiation
of the main strike, not necessarily awaiting the completion of the deployment of all the groups of
his combat formation.
The presence of several earlier developed variants of execution of the main strike of great
combat power permits their implementation in combat, using encoded signals for the appropriate
deployment of the force.
520. Commanding and controlling the execution of the main strike, the large formation
commander should undertake the necessary measures for reinforcing the power of the effects on
selected hostile targets, supporting continuous actions against the enemy by successive attacks of
strike groups and augmenting efforts by putting into action fresh strike groups from the depth of
his combat formation, and also by repeated attacks by re-armed tactical groups, created from
them for this reserve in combat.
521. The execution of the main strike should be supported by containing the mobility of the
attacking enemy and distracting his attention from the attacking forces, and also by energetic
neutralization by detection of hostile threats, directed against the strike groups. This is achieved,
in the main, by secondary strikes by the advance guard, by limiting the maneuver of the enemy
in accordance with the battle plan, and by requiring the enemy main force to conduct combat in
two vulnerable axes.
522. The development of success in a meeting engagement requires great attention of the large
formation commander to the enemy’s maneuver, which has the possibility of withdrawing from
the battle, using his own mobility for this purpose.
The maintenance of continuous contact with the enemy in combat is the first obligation of the
commander of each tactical group.
The basic form of the development of success in a meeting engagement is destruction of
the encircled units and pursuit of the retreating enemy.
For the beginning of the development of success, if the situation favors it, the large formation
units do not await the general signal.
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 113
523. With the onset of darkness (or fog), the unfinished combat, when decisive results have
not been achieved, should be continued in poor visibility conditions for accomplishing the defeat
of the enemy in a new situation.
524. The FKP of the large formation in a meeting engagement, as a rule, is selected in the
main forces. Command and control of the large formation is executed by means of phased
issuance of combat instructions in accordance with the degree of clarity of the combat situation.
The advance guard commander exercises, as a rule, broad initiative at the initiation of the
battle in accordance with the provisions of the battle instruction, which focus him in regard to the
methods of conducting battle with the large formation in various conditions of the situation.
Until the clarification of the enemy’s intentions in combat, the increase in the activity of
tactical reconnaissance requires reinforced attention to communications for rapid passing of
reports and obligates the staff to provide for this the organization of communications of the large
formation and its command and control.
3. Meeting Engagement at Sea in Poor Visibility Conditions
525. A meeting engagement at sea in poor visibility conditions, which has been initiated as a
result of the movement of the enemy, detected by search, in a meeting engagement from a
movement formation, or also as a result of a search, is distinguished in the contemporaneousness
of the conditions of its decisiveness and the intensity of the strikes that are launched.
526. The search of a large formation, conducted in a dispersed combat formation,
requires revealing (unmasking) the movement of large combat vessels and aircraft carriers,
which are the target of the enemy’s search, and to conduct battle, mainly by torpedo forces, using
for this separate groups of squadron minelayers, torpedo-bearing aircraft, submarines, and
torpedo cutters. A large number of search groups and powerful torpedo strikes most fully
accomplish the task of disabling the enemy’s basic forces.
527. The search of a large formation in a compact combat formation increases the
combat power of the main battle strike, using the naval gunfire of the large vessels. This form of
meeting engagement requires additional support of large combat vessels in opposition to the
offensive actions of the enemy, primarily against his torpedo attacks. Search in a compact battle
formation also requires reinforcement of the means of tactical reconnaissance for detection of the
enemy’s basic forces.
528. The organization of tactical reconnaissance in a meeting engagement in poor
visibility conditions is a decisive moment, which determines the success of the search and
the required attachment for this purpose of a large quantity of aviation with modern
technical means of observation.
529. In night combat, which has arisen as a result of combat which was not terminated
during good visibility, the persistent pursuit of the enemy by a portion of the force and
continuous observation of tactical reconnaissance of him should support the deployment of strike
(search) groups and pre-reconnaissance of the enemy, for the purposes of striking him with the
main attack.
530. Combat which has not been terminated in conditions of poor visibility requires
development of success or renewal of the meeting engagement by the large formation basic
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 114
forces with the onset of dawn and the anticipation by one’s own deployment of the concentration
of enemy forces.
531. The movement formation of the large formation, in anticipation of the possible
encounter at sea with an active enemy in poor visibility conditions and the intention to conduct a
meeting engagement, should support a high level of combat readiness of the large formation and
flexibility of the maneuver of tactical groups, which in return are facilitating the deployment, the
identification of the enemy, and additional combat support.
The advance of the forward detachments, on the whole comprised of squadron minelayers,
which are covering the movement of the main forces, is achieved by rapid execution of
preliminary strikes on the detected enemy and focus on the subsequent maneuver of the large
formation.
The launching of powerful naval gunfire and torpedo strikes is supported by the presence in
the composition of the main force of a powerful torpedo group, primarily of squadron minelayers
or submarines, which have remained in the battle region for completion of the defeat of the
enemy.
532. The deprivation of the hostile ships’ mobility in combat is a basic form of
counteractions against the enemy during the conduct of the main strike in low visibility
conditions.
533. The necessary support for the development of success – maintaining contact with the
attacking enemy forces – should be organized during the preparation for the battle.
C. Defensive Combat at Sea
1. Fundamentals of a Maneuvering Defense
534. A large maneuver formation conducts defensive combat at sea during an encounter with
an enemy when the situation requires it.
The large formation commander, by the organization of a maneuvering defense, by persistent
and decisive actions of the units of his formation directed at the achievement of the safety of his
own basic forces, should force the enemy to back away from initiating an attack.
535. The mission of a large formation in a defensive battle is resolved on the whole by the
following actions:
by maneuver of one’s own large formation or its quick-moving groups, which cut off the
hostile attempts to outflank, encircle, or disperse the defenders’ combat formation;
by counterstrikes on the attacking enemy forces;
by employing measures of maskirovka (using smokescreens, maneuver, by confusing the
enemy).
536. The defensive combat of a large formation is characterized, depending on the situation
of its conduct, can be of the following varieties:
defense of free maneuver of the large formation, most typical during an encounter at
sea with superior enemy forces or as a result of an unfortunate development of a meeting
engagement for the large formation. The defense at sea of a freely maneuvering large
formation is achieved by the infliction of a series of surprise, brief, counterstrikes with
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 115
successive separation from the hostile force, which bear the character of uncompleted combat
engagements, interrupted upon the initiative of the defender;
defense of a large formation associated with the guarding of a target (amphibious
force, convoy, damaged vessel), characterized by the necessity for the large formation to
defend in conditions of restricted movement of the guarded target and to fend off the enemy
attack from multiple axes. This is achieved by head-on maneuver of a fast-moving strike
group of the defender on the axis of a designated threat, for anticipating and capture of
hostile attacking groups, by delaying the attacking enemy with forward detachments and
simultaneous avoidance by the target of enemy strikes;
defense of a large formation in retreat, conducted in conditions of pursuit by a stronger
enemy;
defensive actions of the large formation in limited visibility conditions.
537. The basic decision of the large formation commander in defensive combat at sea is the
striving to cause harm to the enemy and to disrupt his attempts for an attack, by one’s own
maneuver and counterattacks by strike groups.
By constructing the combat formation with reconnaissance and forward detachments
dispatched toward the enemy, with a centralized positioning of strike groups, which will permit
their deployment to the main axis in the shortest time period, achieves support of the exposing
and paralyzing energetic actions of the attacking enemy.
538. During the preparation of a large formation for defensive combat at sea, great
significance is required for the timely development of the organization of the execution of
counterstrikes.
The increased depth of the large formation’s defense by means of the organization of
preliminary strikes, which weaken and disorganize the attacking enemy with aviation strike
groups, deployed for this purpose to forward airfields, plays a special role.
In addition to this, the strengthened air danger at sea requires cover of the large formation
from the air in a defensive battle with counterattacks of interceptor aviation, as a rule, from
aircraft carriers, which are components of the large formation’s combat formation.
The presence in the large formation of submarines facilitates the defense of the large
formation against large enemy surface vessels, by means of vectoring them by maneuver of the
large formation toward the submarines.
2. Defensive Actions of a Large Formation at Sea
539. In good and average visibility conditions, success in defensive combat at sea is
supported by timely revealing of the offensive intent of the enemy, by initiating actions of the
forward detachments, and by rapidly executed counterstrikes, directed at disorganizing the
enemy’s attack.
540. For weakening the surprise of the hostile attack during an encounter with the enemy in
movement, it is necessary for the large formation constantly to be prepared for avoiding
preliminary strikes of the attacking force and for defeating them, and as well for reforming in the
shortest time into a combat formation for closing with the enemy; the latter is achieved by
positioning units in march order that corresponds to the requirements of a start position for the
©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 116
initiation of a defense, and also by timely receipt by the commanders of large formation units of
instructions regarding the methods of actions during the encounter with the enemy.
541. The deployment of the large formation for defense during an encounter with the
enemy during movement or its redeployment with this goal as a result of the unfavorable
outcome of a meeting engagement should support the most complete and focused use of the
various large formation forces, for fending off the enemy’s attack.
The combat formation of a large formation for conducting a defensive battle at sea should
envisage the following:
tactical reconnaissance, which provides timely detection of the enemy and exposure of
his offensive maneuver;
forward detachments, sent out on the axes of anticipated enemy offensive and
coordinated between each other in the gaps that separate them;
a ship-based strike group, which has the task of conducting counterstrikes against the
attacking enemy;
an aviation strike group, which has the nature of conditional support, located in
readiness for takeoff;
aviation cover in the air.
542. The defense of a freely maneuvering large formation requires the creation of
conditions which complicate the enemy’s breach and isolation of individual defending units and
facilitates the massing of one’s own forces on the threatened axes, and as well the execution of
maneuver for avoidance of outflanking and encirclement or to break off from the enemy. This is
achieved, as a rule, by a compacted disposition in the combat formation of tactical groups (in
sight of each other).
The counterstrike is executed in the form of a sudden transition of the defenders to a brief
counterattack, undertaken each time on one’s own initiative and executed for throwing off the
attacking enemy, with the purpose of separating from him and gaining time and space.
The use of smoke screens achieves support for closing with the enemy and breaking free
from him of one’s own attacking groups, and also containing the maneuver of hostile vessels,
which are forced to avoid the smoke screens placed in their movement paths.
542. The commander of a large formation should develop the desired success of the
counterstrike – the transition of his large formation to an offensive with the increased ratio of
forces in favor of the defenders, or, when the situation is more focused, by a decisive separation
from the enemy and the departure of the large formation from the battle toward its own forces or
to a coastline.
544. The defense of a large formation that is tied down to the protection of a target requires the large formation commander to consider the following:
the necessity for shifting the strike group in the shortest possible time from one to another
threatened axis;
mutual support from adjacent forward detachments;
support of the defended target against massive effects of hostile aviation and the group
maneuvering of enemy submarine groups;
avoidance by the defended target from offensive maneuver and enemy strikes.
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During the defense at sea of a moving target, counterattacks, as a rule, bear the nature of a
series of persistent, repeatedly renewed attacks by vessel and aviation strike groups, conducted to
delay the attacking enemy and constrain his movement.
In this, the attacking forces should decisively counteract the enemy’s attempts to draw them
away from the guarded target and constrain their movement with our own constraining actions.
545. The defense of a large formation in withdrawal is conducted, as a rule, by delaying
the lead units of the pursuing enemy and counteracting the cutting off of the withdrawal route
and the outflanking of the lead of the enemy large formation’s combat formation.
Special significance during the withdrawal is given to the dispatch to the rear of the combat
formation of the retreating large formation of a cover group (with submarines, if they are
available), which are a supporting unit of the basic forces and which form a powerful rear
guard. For combating the pursuing enemy groups, an additional forward detachment is
dispatched toward them.
The withdrawal of a slower moving group requires great energy of the rear guard for its
support and more persistent counterattacks, in consonance with the employment of smoke
screens.
In a particularly complex situation, when the successful conduct of a defense by the large
formation is not possible, the large formation commander, for the preservation of the greater
portion of his force, can make the decision to withdraw in a dispersed manner. This type of
withdrawal is executed only upon order of the large formation commander.
540. In poor visibility conditions, defensive actions of a large formation are conducted on
the following bases:
the employment of a special organization of observation by visual and technical means,
which will ensure timely detection of the enemy;
increased readiness of the large formation for fending off an attacking enemy with
powerful torpedo and naval gunfire strikes;
rapid execution of maneuver for avoidance and separation from the hostile force;
use of the necessary measures of maskirovka (observation of maskirovka discipline,
smoke screens, false fires, blinding the enemy).
The initial position for defense at sea in low visibility conditions should be supported by the
restructuring of the large formation before the onset of darkness or before entry into fog, with
dispersion in breadth and echeloning in depth of the march order, to a degree which will enlarge
the maneuver capability of the large formation units, and also support the covering of the basic
forces from the direction of the probable appearance of the enemy.
During a favorable situation, as a rule, a forward-focused search for the enemy by torpedo-
bearing forces which can force him to go over to the defense, and also demonstration actions of
specially designated groups to distract the enemy away from the movement region of the large
formation’s main body can be organized.
The commander should give particular concern to the combined movement of his large
formation when it is being subjected to strikes by attacking enemy groups.
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Having issued instructions for combat, he should ensure the concentration of the large
formation after the encounter with the enemy, and also by dawn (with the dissipation of fog) –
the designation of the rendezvous location.
547. Command and control of a maneuvering defense in conditions of good and average
visibility requires from the large formation commander the pre-designation of initiative in
combat to his forward detachment and rear guard commanders and personal leadership of the
actions of the main strike group.
Command and control of a maneuver defense in poor visibility conditions requires significant
independent actions of the tactical groups and careful organization of coordination of their
execution of the defensive maneuver in battle, with the briefest use of communications for
issuing combat orders.
The instruction for the conduct of a defensive battle at sea is issued in the form of a combat
instruction, which includes the encoded signals required for command and control of the large
formation in battle.
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Chapter 10
Combat of a Large Formation in an Equipped Naval Position
1. Fundamentals of Positional Combat
548. Large formation combat in an equipped naval position is characterized by the
participation of all branches of naval forces and with a special role in it of shore-based artillery
and positional means, the coordination of which has decisive significance in the battle with
enemy forces that are attacking the position.
The initiative of the initiation of combat and the selection of the axis of the strikes are in the
enemy’s hand. The success of the defense depends on the staunchness and obstinacy of the
defending forces, on the effectiveness of the coordination of fires of all types and of the
positional obstacles, on the defenders taking the initiative into their own hands at the decisive
moment in the battle and transition to a decisive offensive, by which will be achieved the end
goal of the defense – the total and complete defeat of the attacking enemy, or the forcing of the
enemy to cease his attack by inflicting significant losses on his basic forces.
549. In combat for an equipped naval position, the large formation should use its significant
tactical advantages over an enemy superior in forces, having received, thanks to the total
concentration in the position of the available forces and means of the fleet, both maneuver
(surface vessels, submarines, aviation) and the positional (shore-based batteries, mine obstacles,
nets, booms), the direct support in combat by its entire logistic system, and in conditions of
limited mobility of the enemy, associated with his own movements in a complex situation of
obstacles and navigational dangers.
550. The positional combat of a large formation, depending on the visibility conditions, can
take on various natures:
Positional combat during daylight hours is characterized by the leading role of
maneuver by fire of the shore-based artillery and air strikes, which are in coordination with
vessels at the in the mine obstacles at the enemy main strike’
Positional combat at nighttime is characterized by the broad use of torpedo cutters and
minelayers and the massed fires of shore-based artillery, which is conducted with the
assistance of radar and aviation illumination means, in combination with mine obstacles in
positions, for the purpose of forcing the enemy to abandon his offensive actions;
Positional combat in foggy conditions complicates the defense by limiting the conduct
of reconnaissance in sectors of the position which are covered by fog, by single cutters and
technical means of observation.
551. The forms of the conduct of battle of a large formation in an equipped naval position
can be varied:
a series of powerful preliminary strikes on the approach of the enemy to the
defensive line of the position for disrupting his combat formation and the accumulation of
strikes with the purpose of forcing the enemy to abandon his attack on the position; these
strikes are launched suddenly, primarily by aviation, submarines, and light forces of the
fleet’s surface vessels;
a concentrated strike by all available forces and means on the enemy, which has
become entangled in a mine obstacle; this form of strike provides the greatest opportunity
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for total defeat of the enemy, which lacks the possibility in this case to terminate his initiated
attack;
combat with enemy forces which have penetrated within the position, which consists
of uninterrupted attacks and counterattacks, and also the creation of obstacles in channels and
maneuver regions within the position, for the purpose of destroying the enemy and depriving
him of the possibility of developing his initial success.
552. The organization of a positional battle envisages the equipping of a region of actions in
accordance with a battle plan.
An equipped naval position includes the following elements:
mine, net, and boom obstacles;
prepared shore-based artillery positions;
engineer equipping of the shoreline positions for the purpose of preventing amphibious
assault landings;
equipped command posts;
observation and communication posts;
technical means of detection and observation;
navigational–hydrographic equipping of the position.
The equipping of the position for combat is conducted in advance and partially reinforced or
reconfigured immediately before the battle. In calculating the equipping of the position, it is
necessary to begin from the basic possible axes of the enemy’s attack.
553. A mine–artillery position, consisting fundamentally of mine obstacles defended by
shore-based artillery, has the purpose to complicate the enemy’s offensive, to contain his
movement, and support the launching against him of decisive strikes by naval forces which are
deployed to the position.
The constructed mine–artillery position, executed in accordance with the necessity of
successive defeat through the entire depth of the enemy’s combat formation, should have the
following features: a) a forward defensive belt, b) a main defensive belt, and c) a
supplementary defensive belt.
Each belt of the defense is adapted to natural defensive lines, either a single or several
artificial lines are created in them; in addition, flanking defensive nodes are created in the
shoreline positions.
The most important requirement for the main defensive belt is that it be impenetrable
by the enemy.
554. The designated force (large maneuver formation) which is deployed in the mine–
artillery position is comprised so it can execute the following tasks:
conduct a stubborn and active defense;
cause the collapse of the enemy attack;
by subsequent transition of the defenders to a decisive attack, achieve total defeat of the
enemy.
The large maneuver formation which has been designated for the positional battle should be
comprised of the following assets: shore-based artillery, naval aviation, naval infantry, and as
well torpedo cutters and submarines.
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Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers are also considered for participation in this combat.
The fire system of the shore-based artillery should be constructed so that in combined strikes
with naval aviation and light forces, it creates for the enemy an insurmountable defensive belt of
positions and inflicts on him the greatest losses, forcing him to withdraw.
555. The forces which are deployed in the forward defensive belt act in the defense as
forward detachments, with the purpose of delaying the enemy attack, disrupting his combat
formation, weakening him and, having re-armed in a timely manner, bought time for the
execution of all of one’s own forces and means for the battle in the main defensive belt.
556. The forces which have deployed for actions in the main defensive belt as part of the
covering group, according to the number of required axes, have as their purpose the halting of
the enemy’s attack and by deployment of the strike groups to launch against him all the
coordinated forces for a decisive defeat.
557. The reserve forces and re-armed units of the strike groups, deployed in the
supplementary defensive belt, act against individual groups of enemy which have penetrated
within the belt, cutting them off from the enemy man body and destroying them.
558. From the moment of the completion of the equipping of the mine–artillery position, by
an organizational order of the MOR (fleet) commander-in-chief, one of the large formation (unit)
commanders of shore-based artillery should be designated the position commandant. For
support of the unity of the position and serviceability of the naval means, its equipping uses the
guard force of the offshore zone (OVR) VMB (MOR).
559. With the deployment of the maneuvering forces for combat into the position, the
commander designated for the defense of the position of the large maneuver formation assumes
command and control of the battle.
The organization of command and control of the battle in a naval position should be
supported by the following assets:
appropriately and reliably defended flag-level command post position;
equipped, in supplement to the FKP, observation points for the large formation
commander on each consequential axis of the position;
prepared and equipped reserve command post;
the organization of reliable, duplicative communications with all groups of the combat
formation.
2. Positional Combat in Periods of Daylight
560. A large maneuver formation of naval forces that has been designated for the defense of
a position, deploying for battle, constructs a combat formation and conducts critical preparation
to meet an enemy attack from any axis to which the enemy may access.
This deployment (“in anticipation”) should include organization of the following elements:
reconnaissance on the approaches to the position;
combat guard in front of the main defensive belt;
covering group on the critical axes;
strike groups for actions on the forward and main defensive belts;
reserve, positioned in a supplementary belt.
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The deployment for combat also includes the following measures:
increase of the combat readiness of the shore-based artillery;
occupation of start positions for mobile artillery;
departure to positions of submarines from the forward detachment;
strengthening of observation and combat guard in all sectors of the combat formation.
The document for organizing the deployment of the large formation for battle is the combat
order for deployment for combat in position, which is issued ahead of time (without
indication of the effective time) and implemented upon encoded signal.
561. The plan for positional combat of a large formation should envisage all possible
variants of an enemy offensive and in response to them—a decision for the defense:
the combat actions of the forward detachments in the forward belt of the defense;
the battle of the covering group in the main defensive belt and the strengthening of it with
the reserve
the launching against the enemy of a decisive counterattack with multiple variants;
a counter-offensive in the development of the achieved success;
re-establishment and reinforcement of the equipping of the position after defeat of the
enemy offensive;
combat for the supplementary defensive belt and liquidation of the enemy breach.
The document for the organization of the conduct of the battle for the position is the combat
instruction, supplemented with the required counter-strike (counteroffensive) planning table
for each separate variant.
562. Command and control of the battle in the period of the struggle the forward defensive
belt, the axis of the strike groups for inflicting preliminary strikes, is conducted, as a rule, by the
direction s of the large formation commander.
All enemy units which are operating against the defensive position should be subjected
to continuous strikes of the defending large formation.
563. The commanders of the covering groups conduct a stubborn defense of their sectors of
the defense independently, receiving reinforcement from the large formation commander and
reporting to him during the course of the battle their correct evaluation of the situation in their
sector.
The decision regarding the direction and moment of the main counterstrike is a
fundamental obligation of the large formation commander.
Precise organization of coordination of all forces participating in the counterstrike, and their
preliminary preparation by means of appropriate training, are required conditions for the success
of the execution of the counterstrike.
Command and control of the main strike is conducted, as a rule, by the large maneuver
formation commander from a forward observation post or from a vessel (aircraft).
564. The deployment for the counterstrike on the main defensive belt should be
developed by the staff in several variants, which correspond to the decision for organization of
the defensive position, and should be executed in a planned manner.
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The main strike should be launched against the enemy with all forces and means at that
moment when the basic enemy attacking forces are tangled up in the mine obstacle.
The strike groups, consisting of various branches of forces and supported by the stubborn
defense of the covering group on the axis of the enemy attack, coordinating with the covering
group forces of adjacent axes, should with rapid, increasing in strength strikes inflict the greatest
losses on the enemy main forces and groups which are supporting them.
The mission of the defending large formation in all of this consists of stubbornly
holding the position, defeating the attackers with powerful, deep fires and decisive,
repeated attacks and counterattacks from various axes, to halt the enemy offensive.
The slightest confusion of the enemy, which has resulted from the inflicted losses (attempt to
cover his withdrawal), should be immediately used for transition of the defenders to a decisive
offensive against the enemy.
565. Immediately after the main strike (or before it), when the enemy, as a consequence of
inflicted losses has halted his attack and begun to withdraw, it is necessary immediately to go
over to the development of success. This is achieved by decisive pursuit of the enemy by strike
groups, covering groups, and reserve groups that have been pre-designated for this purpose.
566. Combat with the enemy which has penetrated into the supplementary defensive
belt is conducted on the whole with the purpose of preventing the enemy’s execution of his
assigned mission.
This is achieved by maximum intensity of artillery, low-level attack aviation and torpedo
attacks by artillery, aviation, and vessels (torpedo cutters submarines) and the emplacement of
maneuverable mine obstacles which to a significant degree will hinder the actions of the enemy
vessels that are breaking through.
The units and large formations participating in the deployment of forces to the supplementary
belt should display the greatest independence in their actions.
567. The receipt of operational reconnaissance data, which determines the increasing
intensity of the situation in the given region of the theater of combat actions, is necessary for
supporting the timely deployment of the forces designated for its defense.
568. Special significance in combat for a position defended by a mine–artillery position, in
which are participating a concentrated variety of fleet forces, is accorded to prior organizational
materiel–technical support of the battle calculated in accordance with the battle plan.
The resources of combat supply should be replenished ahead of time for the conduct of a
prolonged defense, dispersed and covered against enemy effects.
3. Positional Combat in Periods of Darkness
569. In periods of darkness, positional combat of a large formation is characterized by
favorable conditions for the actions of torpedo cutters and torpedo-carrying aircraft in the main
defensive belt, with systematic illumination of the region of their actions by aviation bombs.
Special attention is given to the energetic actions of surface vessels which have torpedo
armaments, and the actions of submarines in the forward defensive belt, for the purpose of total
disorganization of the enemy’s offensive.
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Positional combat in nighttime conditions requires the making of a separate decision
during its preparation and development of a battle plan for the dark period of the day, as
well as special equipping of the position for uninterrupted observation of the enemy in the area
of the position with the aid of technical observation means.
570. The deployment of forces to a position “in anticipation” at nighttime, as opposed to the
same in daylight conditions, requires instructions in this regard, issued in an order for
deployment for combat in the position. The execution should be indicated in a separate encoded
signal.
The nighttime battle plan should specifically address the dividing up of the regions of
anticipation of an enemy night attack and the axes of torpedo attacks for squadron minelayers
and submarines, torpedo cutters, and torpedo-bearing aviation, as well as regions of actions for
shore-based artillery batteries.
571. In nighttime conditions, the development of coordination of various forces, both in the
forward belt and in the main belt, has great significance.
A separate commander should be appointed for the organization of coordination and their
supervision in a nighttime battle at the forward defensive belt. The supervision of the
coordination on the main defensive belt, as a rule, is executed in their own sectors by covering
group commanders.
572. An enemy who has been forced to retreat in nighttime conditions should be pursued to
the limits of the position of the large maneuver formation.
With the onset of first light, the mission of the large formation is to concentrate rapidly the
forces for the final defeat of the enemy forces remaining in the position.
4. Positional Combat in Foggy Conditions
573. The following peculiarities accompany the combat of a large formation in a naval
defensive position in foggy conditions:
the impossibility of using illumination means for search and observation of the enemy;
the possibility of using artillery and torpedo ordnance in positions only with access to
data from technical means of observation;
dependence of combat actions of aviation on the fog condition (thickness, ceiling) in the
region of each airfield;
inadequate visibility conditions, which require the preparedness of the large maneuver
formation for actions in daylight conditions in separate sectors of the position.
Especially important during the preparation for positional combat in foggy conditions,
depending on the areas of fog infiltration, is the calculated distribution of airfields and landing
fields.
In conditions of fog in the position area, the large formation staff should organize the
weather reconnaissance very carefully.
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574. The plan for positional combat in foggy conditions should envisage combat actions
during various types of fog in various sectors of the position – up to total clearing of an area,
which requires a high level of preparedness of the forces and means for actions in conditions
similar to daylight.
Independent actions of the cover and strike group commanders, in accordance with the
situation in combat in foggy conditions, should be considered ahead of time and developed in the
large formation staff.
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Chapter 11
Combat of a Large Formation in an Enemy Coastal Region
A. Offensive in an Enemy Fortified Region
1. Fundamentals of the Offensive against an Enemy Position
575. An offensive against an enemy defending in a position requires prepared actions of the
large formation directed at the suppression of counteractions of a reconnoitered enemy, and as
well superiority of the attacker in forces on the axis of the main strike, their massed employment,
and high morale state of the enlisted component of the large formation.
The defeat of the enemy is achieved by weakening him with preparatory strikes in the period
of preparation for the offensive, and by suppressing his defensive system on the axis of the main
attack in the period immediately prior to execution of the offensive, with a simultaneous and
decisive forward advance of the attacking forces.
576. Depending on the mission of the attacker, the nature of the positions equipping, and the
composition of the defending forces, the offensive against an enemy position can have two basic
forms:
an offensive against an enemy mine–artillery position, with the goal of capturing it or
destroying the enemy forces. This requires the suppression of the nodes of the enemy
defense, their seizure, and breach of his defensive zones.
an offensive against an enemy anti-submarine position, for overcoming the anti-
submarine line created by the enemy, when an independent breach of it by submarines is
associated with high losses. This form of offensive against a position requires weakening of
the hostile positional means and disorganization of the maneuvering forces of the anti-
submarine defenses. This [offensive] is supported by concealed, subsequent breach by
submarines of the enemy’s reconnoitered anti-submarine zone.
577. An offensive against an enemy position can have various forms, depending on the
strength of the equipping of the position and the stubbornness of its defense:
a rushed attack or breach of the position requires simultaneous suppression of the
enemy defense through its entire depth and be supported by surprise [sudden] actions of the
attacker or his overwhelming superiority in forces;
a methodical offensive requires successive actions of the large formation, directed at
overcoming the hostile defense piecemeal;
an outflanking of the position is executed with the goal of launching the main strike on
the enemy in the flank or rear of his combat formation, by which will be achieved the defeat
of the enemy on his most vulnerable axes. Outflanking the position, as a rule, requires the
landing of an assault force (amphibious, airborne, or combination) on the flanks or in the rear
of the enemy.
The most decisive results of the offensive are achieved by simultaneous bypass of both flanks
of the position or by bypassing one flank, with a simultaneous breach of the front of the position.
578. In an offensive against a fortified enemy region, two basic periods are distinct: a) the
period of preparation of the attack and b) the period of execution of the attack.
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Over the period of preparation of the offensive, reconnaissance and approach to the hostile
position are executed, and also discovery by preliminary strikes of the weak places in the enemy
defense is carried out.
The execution of the offensive, which is conducted in close contact with the results of the
combat actions conducted over the course of the preparatory period, requires special deployment
of the forces which are executing the main strike and the development of its success.
579. The basic decision of the large formation commander for an attack on an enemy position
is the selection of the most favorable axis of the main attack and the time of its initiation, and as
well the concentration of the necessary forces and means for suppressing the activity of energetic
enemy forces and the destruction of the position’s equipping. All the reconnaissance data
regarding the system of the hostile defense and the results of preliminary strikes which were
executed during the preparatory period for the offensive should be used.
2. Offensive against an Enemy Mine–Artillery Position
580. In the period of the preparation of the offensive, the large formation commander should
organize the following actions:
a detailed reconnaissance and study of the position’s defense, in addition to data already
in hand;
weakening of the enemy, the forces and means of his defense, using preliminary strikes
and a determination of the weak spots in his combat formation;
development of the attack plan for the position;
departure of the large formation to start positions for the offensive.
The secrecy if this preparation is an indispensable condition for the offensive.
581. The approach to the enemy position n the preparatory period of the operation is
executed by forward detachments, consisting, as a rule, of light forces and powerful aviation
groups. Their mission is the destruction of the enemy guard force and demonstration actions
which will force the enemy to prematurely deploy for combat and thus expose his shore-based
defensive system.
Tactical reconnaissance has the purpose during the preparation of the offensive of
establishing the enemy’s combat formation and the system of his positional equipping (location
of shore artillery batteries, boundaries of mine obstacles, lanes through them, and so on). It
supports the combat actions of the forward detachments.
The approach to the position and combat actions during the preparatory period of the attack
are organized specially for this by issued combat orders (warning orders).
582. Preliminary strikes, over the course of the preparatory period, are launched to weaken
the enemy, to destroy his maneuver forces, to damage his fire systems and positional means, and
also to constrain his actions in the position region and disrupt his command and control and
logistics.
As a rule, preliminary strikes are executed by bomber and low-level attack aviation, and have
the nature of aviation preparation of the offensive. The results of the strikes should be confirmed
by controlled reconnaissance.
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Over the course of this period, the large formation commander should organize the
preliminary weakening of the system of the enemy’s mine defense and [provide] support in the
maneuver region for the actions of naval gunfire of surface vessels. He should also conduct naval
gunfire reconnaissance of the shore-based defense.
583. The large formation commander makes the decision for the offensive against an enemy
mine–artillery position on the basis of discussion and study of all the reconnaissance data and the
results of the combat actions in the offensive’s preparatory period. He takes into consideration
the combat power of his own naval gunfire and aviation, and as well the possibility of
overcoming the mine obstacles and destruction of the enemy’s defensive fortifications.
Base on the concrete mission of the offensive, the large formation commander should
determine the forces that will be required for achievement of the end goal of the offensive, and as
well establish the required composition of the main forces for suppressing the enemy’s
counteractions to the offensive.
Careful organization of coordination of the forces participating in the battle and special
development by them of the chosen methods are necessary conditions for the success of the
offensive.
584. The combat formation of the large formation that is being redeployed for execution of
the breach of the enemy position is built on the base of the plan developed for the offensive and
is echeloned in accordance with subsequent actions in combat:
tactical reconnaissance during the execution of the offensive has as its basic assignment
determination of the timely detection of the defenders’ maneuver, directed at execution of its
counter-strike.
main forces, consisting of several strike groups, acting with fire and maneuver on the
axes selected for the offensive, with the purpose of suppressing the enemy counter-actions to
the breaching of his position;
supporting groups, which by demonstration actions force the enemy to disperse his
defensive efforts;
breakthrough forces, which comprise the echelon of development of success, and
operate on the axis of the end goal of the offensive.
585. Tactical deployment of the large formation in accordance with the developed battle
plan should be executed in the shortest possible time period, by which is achieved forestalling of
the enemy in actions and supports the surprise of the main strike.
For an unanticipated initiation of the offensive, the start position of the attacking large
formation should be camouflaged (selection of dark period of the day, favorable illumination
conditions, use of smokescreens, and so on). The departure of the tactical groups to their
designated locations should be conducted only at the time designated for them.
Preliminary strikes which are executed in the period of tactical deployment have the
character of spontaneous preparation of an attack of defenses, by anticipating and supporting
each other.
The synchronization of mutual supplementary strikes launched against the enemy by
aviation, surface vessels, and assault forces for the gradual paralysis of his resistance has special
significance for the success of the methodical attack.
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588. During the outflanking of the position by the main strike, launched at the flank or rear
of the enemy, the reserve groups should destroy or capture the hostile targets which are resisting
the flanking movement, and as well destroy the enemy mobile reserve groups. This strike, as a
rule, is executed by the landing of a naval or airborne assault (and also a combination) on the
flank or rear of the hostile position and bears the same nature in battle as an amphibious landing.
589. The overall success of the offensive against a mine–artillery position is the
accumulation of a series of partial successes, persistently developed unto the complete defeat of
the enemy.
This is achieved by timely introduction into the battle of the echelon for development of
success and the rapid actions of the forces which are executing the main strike on the axes of the
enemy targets, the destruction and seizure of which lead to the achievement of the end goal of
the battle.
590. An offensive against an enemy mine – artillery position in poor visibility conditions
facilitates the achievement of surprise and weakening of the forces of the defending enemy (by
breaching attacks of light forces and aviation strikes) and also the seizure of individual nodes of
the hostile defense by assault, and the reduction of interference on the part of the enemy’s shore-
based artillery.
Upon making the decision to use poor visibility conditions for the attack on the enemy
position, the large formation commander should be guided by reconnaissance data regarding the
hostile mine defense, with the possibilities of having means of breaching the mine position and
the level of combat preparedness of his units.
591. Command and control of the large formation during an attack on a position should be
conducted in a planned manner. During the period of the execution of the attack, when the
necessity arises, the large formation commander posits additional, called for by the situation,
combat tasks to individual units. During the offensive against an enemy mine–artillery position,
the greatest danger is delay and anticipation of instructions, which permit the enemy to re-
establish his combat capability.
The basic instructional documents for the period of the execution of an offensive against a
position are the following:
planning table, which specifies the sequential actions of the units and their coordination
for each phase of the battle;
plans for the use of aviation and naval gunfire in combat.
The combat order for the attack, when by virtue of the developing situation the combat
actions of the large formation in the preparatory period of the offensive grow directly into
actions for execution of the attack, it is possible to have a form of combat instructions which
contain indicators of the overall goal of the actions of the large formation in the battle, in regard
to the axis of the main attack, in regard to the moment of its initiation, and the positing of
individual missions of the attacking units.
The large formation commander commands and controls the battle located, as a rule, on one
of the surface vessels among the large formation’s main forces.
3. Offensive against an Enemy Anti-submarine Position
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592. An offensive against an enemy anti-submarine position should envisage careful
preparation, in the course of which it is necessary, as a rule, for aviation forces to reconnoiter the
forward and rear boundaries of the anti-submarine zone, the position of the basic obstacle lines
(mines, nets, booms), the system of the hostile guard force, the locations of hydroacoustic and
radar stations, and so on.
Preliminary strikes, which are conducted during the preparation for the breach, should
weaken the enemy’s positional equipping and disorganize the guarding of the position.
The commander of the large submarine formation, as a rule, is designated as the commander
of the maneuver formation which is executing the offensive against an enemy anti-submarine
position
593. The decision for the breach, which is made on the basis of reconnaissance data, is made
over the course of the preparatory period. The large formation commander should determine the
axis of the breach, the moment of its initiation, and the sequence of its execution, as well as the
targets of supporting strikes, the timing of their initiation, their sequence, and the required
results.
The large formation commander also envisages the necessary overall duration of the
supporting strikes, sufficient for overcoming by the submarines of the entire depth of the
obstacle or the sectors of greatest difficulty for them.
594. The construct of the combat formation, which corresponds to the concept of the
offensive against the enemy anti-submarine position, must support the established battle plan in
sequence and duration of the suppression of hostile forces and, along with this, the planned
breach of the submarines.
The combat formation during the breach of an enemy anti-submarine position, as a rule,
consists of the following elements:
tactical reconnaissance;
aviation advance guard, which has the mission of launching preliminary strikes for the
purpose of weakening the enemy’s positional means and disorganizing his guard system.
[These strikes] bear the nature of direct aviation preparation of the offensive.
main forces, which consist of strike groups and of aviation and surface vessels, which
are conducting the suppression of the guard force and maneuver forces of the anti-submarine
defense;
breaching force, consisting of several echelons of submarines, distributed along axes in
accordance with the breaching plan.
595. Tactical deployment of the large formation is conducted, as a rule, gradually, upon
signal of the large formation commander. It should condition the timely sortie of the leading
submarines to the position of the initiation of the maneuver for the breach, and also the
suppression of the enemy anti-submarine actions in the zone of the position guard, by the
moment of the submarines’ contact with it.
Supporting strikes, primarily conducted by aviation, are shifted in a planned manner into
the depth of the hostile combat formation. They are intended to accomplish successive
suppression of enemy counteractions and uninterrupted interference with his observation,
necessary for the support of our submarines’ breach.
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596. Command and control of the battle during an offensive against an enemy anti-
submarine position requires rigid preliminary agreement of the actions of units by time and lines
and should envisage the independence of actions of submarines at the moment of the initiation of
their breach.
The fundamental document for organizing the breach of an anti-submarine position is the
combat instruction for breaching, which envisages basic and alternate variants of the
breakthrough, in accordance with the decision that has been made and the contents of the
necessary encoded signals. The offensive planning table is issued in supplement.
During the execution of the breach, as a rule, the large formation commander is located on a
surface vessel which is an element of the large formation main forces.
B. Raiding Actions
1. Fundamentals of Raiding Actions
597. Raiding actions of naval forces represent an equivalent of offensive combat in the
enemy’s coastal region; they achieve the following objectives:
destruction (piecemeal) of enemy forces;
holding enemy forces under constant pressure;
constraining the enemy’s freedom of action in his operational zone.
The enemy always should experience combat pressure, created by the threat of the
attack of our forces on his coastline and especially on his bases.
Raiding actions are characterized by the following: the suddenness of their execution, the
rapid tempo of the attacks, the speed of the combat, the careful preparation of forces and means
for the suppression and rapid breach of the enemy in execution of the mission.
598. The following are variants of raiding actions:
attack on an anchorage of the fleet;
attack on coastal lines of communication;
shelling of a coastline;
landing of a diversionary assault force.
599. Depending on the equipping of the enemy’s region of actions and the regime which is
supporting him in theater (the enemy’s obstacle system, shore-based defense, patrols, guards, and
reconnaissance), raiding actions are executed with simultaneous distraction of the enemy’s
attention from the main strike, or by breaching with force, overcoming resistance on the main
strike axis.
600. Success is supported by the following elements:
secrecy of preparation;
careful organization of tactical reconnaissance, with discovery of the system of defense
of the attack’s main targets’
distracting the enemy’s attention to a different axis;
special preparation of one’s own forces and means for overcoming enemy obstacles.
Command and control of the battle should be based on independence and the agreed actions
of the various forces of the large maneuver formation, which is executing the raid.
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2. Attack on a Fleet Anchorage
601. An attack on a fleet should be executed by the following forces:
aviation (land- or carrier-based);
torpedo cutters, in coordination with aviation;
vessels of the fleet, together with aviation;
submarines, independently and in coordination with aviation.
602. The organization of a large maneuver formation for an attack on an enemy anchorage
envisages the presence of basic forces which launch the main strikes at the primary targets from
several directions and in an echeloned manner, and a supporting force which is launching
preliminary strikes at the boom obstacles for their destruction, suppressing or complicating the
actions of the shore-based batteries (at the time of combat) and searchlights (which are
interfering in the breach), defeating the enemy patrols, identifying lanes in the booms, and so on.
In addition, the large formation includes reconnaissance, which transitions into vectoring in
the battle.
The combat formation of the large formation that is executing the raid is divided into a
forward detachment and the main forces.
The mission of the forward detachment is to support the main forces’ approach to the fleet
anchorage and to provide reliable orientation for the attack.
603. During the preparation for the raid on the anchorage, the chief of staff, in accordance
with the large formation commander’s concept, should do the following:
organize reconnaissance of the base the enemy’s fleet anchorage defensive system;
develop the plan for the raid;
organize the preparation of the means and forces for the raid.
During the execution of reconnaissance, it is necessary to mask the concept of the raid
itself.
The plan for the raid necessarily envisions a preliminary and a main strike on the place and at
the time, to agree upon the actions of the strike and support groups for the most effective defeat
through the entire depth of the defense on the axis of the main attack, and to determine the
procedure for covering the withdrawal.
604. Deployment for the initiation of the battle during an attack on an enemy anchorage
should be executed secretly, as a rule in the dark period of the day, with consideration for
executing the missions and rolling up of the forces for withdrawal by the onset of daylight and
the concentration of enemy forces capable of inflicting a responding strike on the large
formation.
606. The large formation commander bases his command and control of the battle on close
coordination of the strike and supporting groups which are maintaining contact between them
and the independence of their actions, and as well on the secrecy of the deployment of his forces.
Therefore, command and control of the attacking groups should envisage a modest number of
signals which specify only the basic phases of the raid.
3. Attack on Coastal Lines of Communication
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606. An attack on coastal lines of communication incurs losses, constrains the enemy’s
freedom of actions in his operational zone, and disorganizes hostile transport by sea. The targets
of a raid can be units of the enemy’s combat forces and his transport means.
An attack on coastal lines of communication requires reliable coordination of operational and
tactical reconnaissance, which supports the correct orientation of the forces which are executing
the mission of the attack and the purposes of their strikes.
Systematic change in its forms and methods, and as well the surprise of its execution, which
should complicate the enemy’s organization of counteractions, has special significance for the
success of the attack.
607. An attack on coastal lines of communication, depending on its remoteness from the
attacking force’s base and the visibility conditions, can have several varieties:
an attack on hostile lines of communication located near the attacker’s base; this
form of raid, as a rule, is executed by torpedo cutters and aviation;
an attack on hostile lines of communication located distant from the attacker’s base;
this form or raid, as a rule, is executed by submarines and aviation;
During both the first and second variants, in favorable conditions of the situation, surface
vessels can be used; the effects of which on the enemy can achieve the results of the attack. The
use of surface vessels for raids on enemy coastal lines of communication requires reliable cover
of their actions against hostile air strikes.
An attack in good and average visibility conditions is executed by various forces; among
them, as a rule, aviation has special significance.
An attack in poor visibility conditions is executed primarily by torpedo forces (including
torpedo-bearing aircraft).
608. The combat formation of a large formation during the attack on hostile lines of
communication includes the following elements:
tactical reconnaissance, which executes the tasks of pre-reconnaissance of the enemy
and the vectoring to it of the our own forces;
strike groups, which execute the raid, in the composition of which are groups designated
for support of the actions of the attacking forces by constraining enemy movement,
distracting his attention, emplacement of smokescreens, and so on;
covering group, as a rule consisting of a portion of the air forces, which have their own
assignment to support the withdrawal of the strike groups after the raid on the enemy.
During the use of surface vessels for the attack, the large formation combat formation takes
on the form characteristic for an offensive against an enemy at sea.
In poor visibility conditions, the number of strike groups is increased by reducing the number
of entities in each of them and the combat formation of the large formation is extended in
accordance with the plan for the search for the enemy.
609. During the preparation of the attack, the large formation commander should give special
attention to the following actions:
organization of pre-reconnaissance of the enemy, reducing the time parameters between
the moments of the appearance of the reconnaissance assets within view of the enemy and
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the initiation of the strike, with the impossibility of maintaining the secrecy of the
observation;
maintenance of the secrecy of the executed deployment for creation of start positions and
closing with the enemy;
organization of the struggle with enemy reconnaissance.
610. Tactical deployment for a strike during a raid on hostile lines of communication
located close to the attacker’s base, as a rule, is conducted rapidly, upon encoded signal of the
large formation commander.
The actions of the strike groups, directed at suppression or distraction of the attention of the
enemy’s guard force and constraining the mobility of the basic target of the strike should create
the necessary conditions for execution of the tasks of all the attacking groups.
611. During the attack on the hostile lines of communication, tactical deployment from the
attacker’s base and tactical deployment for strikes launched by submarines are conducted
gradually by conjoining them on the enemy’s movement courses.
612. The main strike during the attack on hostile coastal lines of communication, for the
purpose of reducing the duration of the combat engagement, as a rule is launched directly on the
basic hostile target, the destruction of which is the purpose of the actions. This is achieved by
simultaneous breach of the enemy guard force, which is executed by all the strike groups, which
are supporting each other by their attacks and suppression of the enemy guards or distracting
their attention.
613. The development of success during the raid includes the destruction of the enemy
vessels damaged by the attacks, which should be carried out by attacking units with remaining
ordnance.
The large formation commander, based on the concrete situation, should determine by his
signals the moment of termination of the battle, not subjecting without dire necessity his own
forces to danger of destruction by the hostile cover or enemy reserves brought to the battle scene.
614. The withdrawal of the large formation after executing the raid mission is supported by
covering forces, which by this time the large formation commander should have designated as
their mission.
615. In poor visibility conditions, the execution of the raid mission against enemy coastal
lines of communication require from the large formation commander the organization of a search
for the enemy for launching the main strike against him.
In conditions of a confined or broken up [as regards the terrain] region, the large formation
commander can organize the launching of a strike on the enemy with torpedo cutters or
submarines, which have been deployed in patrol screens on the enemy’s route of movement.
616. The large formation commander exercises command and control of a raid on enemy
coastal lines of communication from a shore-based command post (positioned as close as
possible to the battle region), and in the presence in the composition of the large formation of
surface vessels – from one of them. Liaison officers from the large submarine and aviation
formations should be collocated with the large formation commander.
During the presence of the large formation commander at a shore-based command post or on
one of the surface vessels, which is in the covering force, he commands and controls the actions
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of units by means of issuing instructions regarding the clarification of the situation, and from the
initiation of tactical deployment hands over broad initiative to the strike group commanders.
During the presence of the large formation commander on a surface vessel which is an
element of one of the strike groups, he, as a rule, personally commands the group, executing
command and control of the large formation by issuing combat instructions.
The basic combat document for organization of a raid on enemy coastal lines of
communication is the combat instruction for an attack, which includes encoded signals.
4. Shelling of a Coastline
617. Shelling of an enemy coastline is conducted for the following purposes:
destruction of shore-based enemy infrastructure (plants, warehouses, railroad bridges, and
so on);
reconnaissance of the coastline by fire;
demonstration actions for distracting the enemy’s firing assets and attention to a false
direction;
increasing the pressure on the forces of the enemy coastal defense.
Depending on the nature of the mission and the situation in the region of actions, forces are
designate for the conduct of shelling.
The strike (firing) group, acting against a single target, should not consist of more than two
firing vessels;
The support group contains guard vessels and cutters and aviation, which are executing
tasks of combat support of the strike (firing) group and adjusting the artillery fires.
During the shelling of several shore-based targets, several strike (firing) groups and
supporting groups are created, under the overall leadership of the large formation (division)
commander.
618. During the preparation of the plan for the conduct of shelling, which is being developed
by the large formation staff, the following provisions should be envisaged:
calculations [estimates] and preliminary drawing up of the maneuvering of the strike
groups, in several variants for the anticipated situation;
special combat preparation of the firing vessels for the execution of their assigned tasks;
organization of the summoning of aviation for cover and for support of fire (adjustment
and illumination).
619. The shelling of the coastline should be conducted at the distances [ranges] of fire
most favorable successful accomplishment of the assigned mission.
During the selection of the capabilities and methods of shelling, the large formation
commander should consider that the shelling by vessels of a piece of terrain, as a rule, does not
give satisfactory results and practically can only affect the morale of the enemy. An exception
might be the case of shelling of areas of insignificant size, under conditions of precise knowledge
by the firing vessel, of their locations.
During the execution of our own fire missions, the large formation should conduct
combat with the enemy which is counteracting the shelling. This is achieved by creating
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interference with enemy radar, suppression of his counter-fires, and defeat of his
counterattacking forces, and also by cover which is executed by specially designated forces.
620. During the presence of several strike (firing) groups on each axis (combat sector), the
execution of tasks and coordination with supporting groups is supervised by the strike (firing)
group commander.
The overall leadership of the battle, by its phases, is executed upon signals of the large
maneuver formation commander.
5. Amphibious Landing of a Reconnaissance–Diversionary Force
621. A reconnaissance–diversionary force can be amphibiously landed with the following
missions:
the conduct of reconnaissance and delivery of scouts to an enemy coastline;
the conduct of diversionary actions for the purpose of destroying coastal strongpoints,
shore batteries, SNiS posts, radio transmitters, communication nodes, the demolition of
bridges and other infrastructure, mining the enemy’s road network, and so on;
the capture of live prisoners;
the reception from shore of our own scouts and diversionary parties upon completion by
them of their missions.
622. Reconnaissance–diversionary landings are executed by reconnaissance units of naval
infantry, and in some cases, special teams (sapper–demolitions, engineer–assault).
Depending on the mission and target of diversionary actions, a party [group] can be
designated in composition from reinforced company to, on rare occasion, a battalion, to small
groups of 2–3 men for the reconnaissance–diversionary force.
623. A reconnaissance–diversionary detachment can be delivered to shore in the following
manner:
on combat vessels, both surface and submerged [submarine];
on amphibious assault means (motor boats, cutters, fishing boats, sailboats, and so on);
by aircraft, utilizing parachute insertion.
624. The reconnaissance–diversionary landing should be conducted in secrecy; its
preparation, the landing site, and site of pickup are especially important to conceal. The landing of a reconnaissance–diversionary force should be conducted simultaneously with
other actions of large maneuver formations (shelling of a coastline, attack on a fleet anchorage,
and so on), often as a component of those actions or independently. In this case the commander
of the large maneuver formation organizes demonstration actions at several points
simultaneously to distract the enemy’s attention.
625. During the landing of the reconnaissance–diversionary force, for precise delineation of
the actions on shore, the landing detachment should be divided into the following groups:
for seizure of control of the shoreline in the landing area;
for covering the flanks and rear;
for capture of strongpoints and exploring the terrain;
for demolition of designated targets on shore.
626. The withdrawal to shore for pickup and the pickup itself of the reconnaissance–
diversionary parties, in the case when in the given region such activities are not recommended
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for execution, for the purposes of their best support they can be accomplished with the cover of
naval gunfire and aviation.
627. The preparation of the reconnaissance–diversionary force is conducted on terrain that is
closest to the terrain at the landing site, and requires organization of training in embarkation and
landing.
The preparation should be conducted in daylight as well as in night conditions.
628. The plan for diversion, depending on how it is organized, is developed by the staff of
the large maneuver formation, together with the commander of the reconnaissance–diversionary
detachment (party), and approved by the large formation commander.
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Chapter 12
Combat of a Large Formation for the Landing of an Amphibious Assault Force
1. Fundamentals of Combat for an Amphibious Landing
629. The large formation’s battle for an amphibious landing is a basic phase of the naval
portion of the amphibious assault operation.
The battle for the landing of the assault force includes the approach to a shore under the
enemy’s control that has been designated for the landing of troops, their landing on the shore,
and the securing by them of a landing bridgehead, for the purpose of supporting the subsequent
development of combat actions on the enemy’s coastline.
The landing bridgehead is a portion of the coastline, the capture of which supports the
possibility of landing and deploying for subsequent offensive actions the main forces of the
assault and deprives the enemy of the capability of defeating the vessels and landing forces at
their landing points with rifle, machine gun, and precision artillery and mortar fires, both from
the flanks and from the depths. Depending on the composition of the assault force and the terrain
conditions (forest, hills, and so on), the dimensions of the bridgehead may be varied.
The battle for the landing is considered completed with the landing on shore and deployment
on the coastline of all the troops of the assault force – with their armaments and supplies
necessary for initiating subsequent actions.
630. The following peculiarities pertain to an offensive by ground troops which have been
landed on a defended enemy shore:
successive accumulation of forces and means on the enemy coast that has been seized;
the impossibility of massive introduction into combat of tanks and ground artillery in the
initial period of the battle;
the vulnerability of the troops of the assault force during their approach to the shore from
artillery and mortar fire, attacks from the sea and air, which create the threat of and even the
total prevention of the advancement of the troops and their suppies.
Once initiated, a landing should be conducted until the end with all its energy,
persistence, and decisiveness.
If the landing is unsuccessful at one point or in sector, it should be shifted to a place where
success is being developed.
631. A demonstration landing is a landing of troops on a secondary, but for the enemy still
significant axis, conducted for the purpose of distracting the enemy’s attention from the landing
of troops on the axis of the main attack and requiring the enemy to bring up his tactical reserves
to the site of the demonstration landing.
The vessels and troop units which are conducting the landing for demonstration purposes
should set about their concrete mission in consonance with their forces; they should conduct their
actions energetically and persistently.
632. A false landing can be considered as a landing which only imitates a genuine landing of
troops, at the same time the troop units are actually conducting a landing at another location.
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633. Upon the gaining of success of the landing in a sector or at a point of a demonstration
landing, the forces executing it can develop success, now refocused on the demonstration sector
(point) by the efforts of following echelons and reserves, and shifting the axis of the main strike
of the landing upon a confirmed failed landing to an earlier selected axis.
634. The battle for the landing can occur in various conditions:
the landing of an assault on the shoreline of a sea: in this case, the battle for the
landing has the nature of a surprise deployment of naval forces in front of a chosen sector of
an enemy coastline, supported by the naval gunfire and aviation suppression of enemy
resistance and the occupation by ground forces of a landing bridgehead on the shore.
The landing of an assault in an island (skerrie) region, and also a sea crossing: in this
case, the battle for the landing is initiated with the accumulation of forces on a start line that
is closely located to the enemy coastline, and is supported by powerful fire support of the
crossing of forces by shore-based artillery from firing positions distributed at the start line.
635. The direct landing of the assault can be executed in various forms:
a landing with means specially constructed for that purpose;
a landing from combat surface vessels or from submarines;
a landing from special or equipped for this purpose transport vessels, with transfer of the
assault force [from the transport vessel] to landing assets;
a landing from aircraft by means of dropping the assault forc by parachute or landing on
earlier seized landing fields;
a landing from unit-level crossing means (pontoons of all types, amphibious trucks,
rubber and collapsible boats), and also with at-hand means (fishing boats, seiners, yachts, and
so on).
2. Combat for Landing an Amphibious Force on a Sea Coastline
636. The landing of an assault on a sea coastline can be conducted in both day and night, on
an unequipped coastline and directly into a port, with preliminary artillery [naval gunfire] and
aviation working over of landing points and without it. The senior commander of the landing
operation makes the decision regarding these issues. The large maneuver force commander
(landing detachment) – the landing commander, is responsible for detailed development of the
landing plan and the battle planning, jointly with and the commander of the force being landed –
assault force commander.
637. The selection of the landing region is made by the overall commander of the landing
operation. The designation of the specific landing site of each detachment that is executing in a
sector of the coastline assigned to him is carried out by the commander of the landing
detachment jointly with the commander of the assault force, in regard to the selection of landing
points in his sector.
The selection of landing points demand careful confirmation of the data regarding the
enemy (number of troops, fire means, defensive fortifications, possible bringing forward of
reserves), regarding the terrain in the landing area (relief, vegetation, nature of soil, presence of
docks and piers, roads, potable water, structures), regarding the tidal in- and outflow, the nature
of the sea floor near the shore, the presence of anti-landing obstacles in the water, and the system
of guard forces on the seaward approaches to the landing points.
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These data should be confirmed by photographic and, when possible, navigational, engineer,
and minesweeping reconnaissance.
638. In all cases, during the preparation for combat the landing commander should conduct
a commander’s reconnaissance of the landing sector (from aircraft, surface vessel, or
submarine). The landing commander and assault force commander should personally participate
in the reconnaissance. In addition, when possible, the commandants of the landing points and
commanders of forward detachments, and as well the commanders of vessel support
detachments, of the landing means, the flag-level specialists of the landing detachment, and the
chiefs of branches of troops of the assault force being landed [should participate in this
reconnaissance].
639. The large maneuver formation that has been designated for execution of the battle for
the landing is called the landing detachment, and consists of the following forces:
the ground force large formation of the landing;
units (large formations) of naval infantry with their landing means;
detachments of transports and landing assets;
detachments of vessel support, which have the mission of fire support of the assault
landing;
the forces which are supporting the deployment in battle for the landing and the landing
of the assault on the coast (minesweepers, subchasers, patrol vessels and cutters);
units (large formations) of naval aviation (reconnaissance, interceptor, low-level attack,
and bomber).
640. The coastal belt in the landing sector which is equipped during the landing with docks,
warehouses, trenches, shelters, and defensive fortifications is the landing base and serves the
following purposes:
concentration of the landing forces and their deployment during transition to the
offensive;
the organization of medical treatment and evacuation of the sick and wounded;
the creation in this belt of temporary transit supply dumps and axes of flow of cargoes for
troop units;
the anti-landing defense of the rear area of the landed forces;
cover of a withdrawing landing force.
As a rule, the naval infantry large formation commander is designate as the commandant of
the landing base and its garrison comprises the naval infantry with their accompanying floating
means and special commands.
A landing point commandant is designated for each landing point (as a rule, the
commander of the naval infantry subunit which is occupying the given landing point).
641. Command and control of the battle until the completion of the landing of the assault
force is executed by the landing commander. The assault force commander, who is also his
deputy for ground units, is located together with the landing commander and, from the moment
of the deposit of the assault force on shore, commands and controls their direct actions on shore.
He goes to the shore together with the landing of the main body assault forces. In preparation for
the landed forces to initiate the execution of their subsequent mission on shore, command and
control of the battle is shifted to the assault force commander. This moment is determined by the
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report of the assault force commander in regard to his preparedness for independent actions to
the landing commander.
642. The commander of the large naval infantry formation is the deputy commander of the
landing for command and control of the actions of the naval infantry during their seizure of the
landing base.
With the landing of the first wave of the forward detachments (as a rule, consisting of a
naval infantry unit), the large naval infantry formation commander goes ashore for organize of
the landing base and its defense.
643. The battle for landing the assault force on a sea shore includes two basic periods:
the period of the battle for seizure of the landing base;
the period of the battle for seizure of the landing bridgehead.
The battle for the seizure of the landing base consists of the following elements:
deployment of the landing assets and forces supporting the landing;
breach of the enemy’s guard zone on the water and on shore, by combined actions of the
forces of the first wave and forward detachments, and also by the forces of ship-board
support and aviation;
seizure of the shoreline belt and the organization on it of a landing base.
The battle for seizure of the landing bridgehead consists of the following elements:
pushing the enemy away into the depth of the territory by forward detachments of the
assault with support from the sea and air;
breach of the enemy’s defensive belt by assault forces designated for this purpose, their
departure to the forward edge of the bridgehead, and digging in there.
644. During the organization of the battle for the landing, the landing commander, together
with the assault force commander, is obligated to take the following actions:
foremost of all, to establish the landing bridgehead that is necessary for the support
of success, along with its forward edge (the first task of the assault force on shore), and
as well, together with the large formation (unit) naval infantry commander, establish the line
of cover for the landing base;
determine for the forces at his disposal the sector of coastal frontage of the landing;
establish the quantity and disposition of landing points for the first wave of the forward
detachments in accordance with the selected axis of the attack of the ground forces for
occupation of the landing bridgehead, and also designate alternate landing points;
determine the axis of the main attack on shore and corresponding landing points
designated for execution of the landing of his ground forces;
establish the composition of forces and means of the assault force that will be brought
ashore after the occupation of the landing bridgehead;
organize anti-landing and anti-air defense of his flanks with units of naval infantry, with
attached PVO forces, and also guard from seaward and the air for the landing detachment
forces;
establish the procedure [sequence] of re-embarkation of the force upon completion of the
battle for the coastline or in the event of termination of the operation.
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The selection of the main axis of the landing is determined by the choice of the primary
axis of the actions of the assault forces on shore.
645. The commander of the landing should envisage overcoming by the landing detachment
of the enemy’s mine–artillery position, if such a position is deployed in front of the landing
sector, and also overcoming the enemy guard force at sea, organizing for these general situations
for combat in the enemy coastal zone.
646. When landing forces on transports and assault vessels, the landing commander is
obligated, taking into consideration the use of his forces in battle for the landing, to distribute
them throughout the transports in such a manner as to support at each landing point the rapid
landing of forces and their introduction into the battle.
In addition, during the preparation for the battle, he is obligated to undertake the following
measures:
develop the disposition of the transports in the battle for the landing, with consideration
for possible change in the axis of the main landing;
determine the sequence of offloading of the transports and the site of their [subsequent]
assembly;
distribute the landing assets and determine their grouping, subordination, and formation
of their movement to the landing site;
select the initial line for the landing assets.
647. The battle for the landing, as a rule, is calculated and the landing of the main body of the
assault force is conducted based on the estimate that the battle for the landing bridgehead will be
concluded during daylight hours and, upon its consolidation, the landing of the remaining assault
units will continue during darkness.
648. The battle for the landing envisages the following phases:
reconnaissance of the landing points;
seizure of the landing points and equipping them for the purpose of subsequent landing of
the assault forces;
fire support of the seizure of the landing points, and also for the forces being landed for
the capture of the landing bridgehead;
aviation support of the capture of a base and landing bridgehead by means of conducting
bombing and low-level attacks, the landing of an air assault force, and counter actions against
enemy ground force and aviation counteractions;
support of the landing base against enemy attacks from the sea and air.
649. Reconnaissance of the landing sector should be organized by the landing detachment
commander for the purpose of confirming existing data regarding the depth of the enemy’s
defense, the location of his shore artillery batteries, and the nearest reserves which can mount an
anti-landing defense.
The landing detachment’s reconnaissance is continuous from the initiation of preparation of
the battle for the landing. By the initiation of the landing, it should provide information which
details the enemy’s defense for the ultimate construct of the combat formation of the forces
being landed.
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In the initial period of the battle for the landing, air reconnaissance, reconnaissance and
forward units of naval infantry are gathering data regarding the firing system and obstacles in the
enemy’s anti-landing defense, which are necessary for command and control of the landing, the
rendering of support to the forces, the axis of the landing of forward detachments, and the
landing of the main assault force, and as well the axis of movement of the forces after landing.
650. By the seizure of the landing points, their stubborn occupation, and forward
movement for the purpose of forcing the enemy to withdraw from the water’s edge and to
deprive him of the possibility of using heavy infantry firing means – naval infantry units
should support the movement to shore of the assault’s main forces.
651. The seizure of the landing base, as a rule, is conducted on a broad front with the
execution of a maneuver of supporting and demonstrating groups of the assault force. Mainly for
this purpose naval infantry units are used which have been placed in the composition of the
landing detachments as elements of the first wave of forward detachments and which maneuver
by their own landing assets.
652. The combat formation of the forces of the first wave of a forward detachment during the approach to the landing point should be echeloned in landing means (2–3 waves) and
include the necessary reinforcing units, the landing commands, engineer [sapper] commands for
the construction of temporary piers, and fire-adjustment teams for naval shelling. The following
units of the forward detachments are in landing assets right behind the first wave to the landing
points.
The landing of the forces of the first wave of the forward detachments should follow at a
distance from each other so that they do not come under the enemy’s destructive fires
simultaneously, and preserve the capability of changing the axis of their intended strike.
Coordination between the waves establishes the suppression of enemy resistance which has been
identified by the forward rush of the first wave.
653. The landing of the forces of the first wave, if it is unable to secure a sufficiently
complete surprise, requires reliable suppression of the enemy’s resistance by preliminary
artillery and air preparation. During this action, the shifting of artillery is conducted upon
the approach of the first wave to the shoreline edge, upon signal of the commander of the
first wave.
654. The naval infantry units that have landed on the shore at each landing point should
block and destroy enemy firing points for the purpose of occupying a line for covering the
landing and subsequently to continue the attack into the depth of the enemy’s territory, together
with the field forces of the landing to a distance from the shore of 5–7 kilometers under the
overall command of the forward detachment commander.
From the moment of the departure of the forward detachment beyond the line of cover of the
landing base, the naval infantry, on order of the forward detachment commander, withdraws to
the coastline for direct defense of the landing base or for re-formation and preparation for a new
operation and is again placed in direct subordination to the naval infantry large formation
commander.
655. Following are the basic instructional documents for the battle for the landing:
the order for the battle after the landing, in which the concept of the landing
commander should include “the first task of the assault force on shore”;
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the planning table for the landing battle;
the coordination schematic for the landing of the assault force.
656. Fire support of the seizure of the landing points and the battle of the landing forces for
capture of the landing base consists of the following requirements:
suppression of the fires of shore-based and field artillery batteries, machine guns, and
mortars, positioned both in the open, as well as encased in permanent and semi-permanent
fortifications;
destruction of enemy personnel which are deployed at the forward edge, in the depth of
the defense, and on the flanks of the landing region, and also the suppression of their combat
actions;
prevention of the approach to the landing points of enemy reserves, both infantry and
motorized and armored units;
accompaniment by fire of the first wave of the forward detachments, by the suppression
of targets which were not identified earlier;
placement of barrier fire on the flanks and on armor-threatening axes;
participation in a “fire wall” and the subsequent concentration of fire at nodes of
resistance and accumulations of enemy forces.
657. The landing commander plans the artillery support for the landing, with the attached
senior naval infantry artillery commander and the senior commander of the artillery assault
[force] for organization of the offensive against the shore, with the purpose of seizing the landing
bridgehead on the basis of a common battle plan.
The plan for the employment of artillery in the battle for the landing contains
calculations [estimates] for the planning of artillery support:
a) during the seizure of the landing base;
b) during capture of the landing bridgehead.
658. Command and control of the artillery of the assault force, by degree of its commitment
to action during the landing, is consolidated in the commander of the artillery assault force.
Command and control of the naval gunfire support for the assault during the battle is
executed upon instructions of the flag-level artillery staff of the landing, initially on the basis of
the demand [call] of the naval infantry artillery commander and commanders of the landed
forward detachments, and with the landing on the shore of the senior commander of the artillery
of the assault on the demand [call] of the latter.
Overall supervision of the fires of all vessels and assault force artillery at shore and naval
targets before the conclusion of the battle for the landing remains with the landing commander.
After the landing of the landing force commander and his report to the landing commander that
he is prepared to execute his subsequent mission, target designation for naval gunfire at shore-
based targets is executed by the landing force commander, and for targets at sea – it remains with
the landing force commander.
The vessel supporting detachment, as a rule, continues its shelling support to the landing
force and supports it against attack from seaward.
659. Aviation support of the battle for the landing is based on the following actions:
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reconnaissance of the sea axis during deployment of the landing detachment for combat
and subsequent observation of the landing sector and approaches to it from the sea;
reconnaissance of the land axis, the defensive and rear-area belts of the enemy, of
flanking axes, of ground routes, and of approaches of reserves;
adjustment of the fires of naval vessels;
destruction and suppression of the fire of batteries, firing points, and also of enemy
personnel, both independently and in cooperation with naval gunfire;
delivery of masking smokescreens during the deployment and landing of the assault force
and the isolation of the sector of the landing from neighboring sectors;
direct cover of the landing with interceptor aviation;
the landing, in a favorable situation of parachute assault forces with the mission to seize
landing points, shore batteries, and nodes of communication routes [road intersections].
660. The basic aviation unit designated for supporting the actions of the landing detachment
in the period of the battle for the landing is a combined [mixed] aviation group, the commander
of which, as a rule, is located at the flag-level command post of the landing force commander.
The plan for the use of aviation in the battle for the landing is assembled by the aviation
group commander together with the staff of the landing force and approved by the commander of
the landing force.
Calls for aviation in the conduct of the battle for support to the naval infantry and land-based
forces of the assault force are executed by the aviation group commander upon demand [call] of
the naval infantry large formation commander and the assault force commander.
In the presence of army aviation which is participating in the battle for the landing, its
command and control during the course of the combat is executed through the aviation group
commander of the landing detachment.
3. Combat for Landing an Amphibious Force in an Island (Skerrie) Region
661. The landing of an assault in an island region differs from a landing on an open coastline,
having a number of advantages over it:
the movement across the water expanse (by sea) is significantly shorter and, as a rule,
proceeds under the cover of shore-based means (artillery, both shore and field, shore-based
aviation, and so on);
the attacking force, executing a series of repeated crossings, have the possibility of broad
use of small, river-type crossing assets all the way down to makeshift level.
At the same time, a number of difficulties also are incurred for the landing:
in skerries and island regions, the actions of heavily armed vessels are problematic, as a
rule, due to their large draught and length;
the defending force has the possibility of broad employment in superiority of the defense
in a confined area;
as a rule, the actions of artillery with grazing fires are complicated in cross-
compartmentalized terrain.
662. Combat for the landing of forces in an island region consists of the following phases:
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consolidation in an earlier captured portion of the island region, as a launching position
for the crossings;
seizure of the junctions of channels (in the skerries), and also in the islands which
comprise the basis of the given island region;
exits to the mainland in the island region and the organization of anti-landing defense of
the portion of the landing, for the defense against its return seizure by the enemy’s
countermeasures.
The creation of a launching [starting] position for the crossings is conducted gradually, in
a concealed manner, and its mandatory consolidation, as a rule, by naval infantry units.
663. An earlier captured island or external edge of the skerrie should be equipped with
artillery positions (and heavy mortar positions) for fire support of the forces pushing into the
depth of the island region, with shelters, with piers and equipment for rapid transfer of troop-
required cargoes.
With the movement into the depth of the island region (skerries), the occupied islands should
be equipped with positions for shore-based artillery; channels that are not being used by the
assault force should be barricaded; obstacles should be emplaced in the primary channels.
664. The forward detachment, which as a rule consists of naval infantry units, reinforce
with sappers, chemical reconnaissance units, mortar units, and howitzer artillery, operates along
axes selected by the landing commander with the support of armored cutters.
665. The selection of landing points of the forward detachment and the main axis of the
landing is made on the same fundamentals as in combat for a landing along a coastline of the
open sea, with the calculation of the subsequent exit to the mainland in conditions which are
more favorable for the approach of transports and assault landing assets with troop-required
cargoes and forces.
The landing of the main landing forces begins with the moment of the penetration of the
forward detachment into the depth of the defended region (skerries) to a depth which will ensure
the successful landing of the main forces.
666. Artillery and aviation working over of the enemy’s defense has, in addition to the
tasks that are executed in a battle for the landing on the coastline of an open sea, has tasks for the
isolation by fire of the islands that are not being occupied by the landing force and of channels
that the enemy is not using.
During the crossing of narrows, the width of which permits the use of shore-based and field
artillery, this artillery is assigned the task of working over and suppressing the enemy defense. In
doing this, the field artillery should displace closer to the water’s edge.
667. Islands between shores in narrows (strait, bay) are occupied in the first place for the
deployment on them of field artillery and the creation of a line of accumulation of landing forces,
and also as intermediate supply bases.
668. The landing commander with his staff is located where they can conduct the most
suitable command and control of the landing. This place, as a rule, is a combat vessel, or a shore-
based command post with appropriate equipment.
The flag-level vessel (shore command post) is provided with mobile means of
communication (aircraft, cutters, ground vehicles).
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4. Return Embarkation of an Amphibious Landing Force
669. The return embarkation of a landing force is conducted in the following situations:
upon termination of the operation after the execution of the mission of the assault force
on shore;
upon termination of an initiated assault landing for various causes.
The return embarkation of a landing force can occur in conditions of passive enemy actions
and under direct energetic attacks of the enemy.
670. The commander of the landing detachment, during the decision of the mission for return
embarkation of the landing force, is required to accomplish the following actions:
support the loading site of the force against enemy attack from the sea and air;
support the defense of the points of the return embarkation of the landing force against
enemy vessels and ground forces;
support the re-insertion of the assault detachment [the vessels] into the movement order.
When drawing up the battle plan for the landing, considering the return embarkation,
the landing commander is required, along with the landing force commander, to resolve
the issues of the defense of the withdrawal of ground forces and the landing base, and as
well to establish the procedures of exchange of the ground forces at the forward edge of the
defense of the landing base with naval infantry units.
Special attention should be given to the flanks of the sector of return embarkation of the
assault force.
671. The forces which are supporting the return embarkation prepare in advance a zone of
cover of the re-embarkation.
Engineer fortifications and obstacles with flames and explosives are broadly employed at the
front of the forward edge. In the zone of cover, as a rule, a series of intermediate and intersecting
positions is created, which have the purpose to delay the enemy’s advance.
Naval infantry forces should prepare positions of direct cover of the landing base (re-
embarkation) with the mission to hold off the advancing enemy until complete evacuation of
the ground forces.
672. The fire support vessels, in the event of the evacuation of the assault force, are
redistributed between the cover units and conduct fires on their call.
The positions of direct cover of the landing base are selected with consideration of the most
complete use of naval gunfire support and the ordnance capabilities of the landing force’s naval
infantry.
673. Aviation which is participating in the battle with low-level and bombing attacks,
together with naval gunfire, are required to delay the advance of the enemy, acting against his
personnel, tanks and artillery, on calls of the assault force commander and naval infantry large
formation.
Interceptor aviation and PVO units, and as well the anti-aircraft means of the vessels and
naval infantry, create a powerful PVO for the re-embarkation.
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674. The re-embarkation of the troop units and their cargoes and materiel components for
the landing assets or transports is conducted upon the instructions of the landing base
commander.
The sequence of the withdrawal of the assault force and loading of troops, equipment, and
supplies is determined by order of the landing commander in accordance with the decision made
by him, jointly with the assault force commander, in the battle for the withdrawal of the force.
675. Naval infantry units of the landing detachment are required stubbornly to defend the
landing base during the re-embarkation of the landing force. Only after loading of the ground
forces can they begin their withdrawal to their own landing assets.
The naval infantry landing assets remain for the entire time of the battle at the disposal of the
naval infantry unit commanders. Their use by the commandants of the re-embarkation points for
movement of troops and supplies to the transports is possible only upon the required return of
them to the shore before the beginning of the withdrawal of the naval infantry.
676. Command and control of the re-embarkation is executed by the landing commander,
who is located in a place where he can satisfactorily supervise. Command and control of the
combat of the ground forces unto their withdrawal to the position of direct cover of the landing
base is executed by the landing force commander. Upon movement of the ground forces through
the position of direct cover of the landing base to the shoreline, the naval infantry large
formation commander exercise command.
The senior naval infantry commander at the time of battle is located on shore and departs
with the latter only when the basic portion of naval infantry has been loaded onto their landing
assets.
677. In all cases of a re-embarkation of the landing force, the landing commander is
required to support the re-embarkation of all soldiers [fighting men] and officers, and
foremost of all the wounded.
The landing commander bears responsibility equally with the landing force commander for
any materiel left on shore – ammunition and other military cargoes, which remain in a condition
that the enemy can exploit in their use.
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Chapter 13
Defeating an Enemy Amphibious Assault Landing
1. Fundamentals of an Anti-amphibious Defense of a Coastline
678. The defeat of a hostile amphibious landing is a decisive phase of an anti-landing
operation and is executed in the close coordination of naval forces with the ground forces that are
positioned on the coast, along with their aviation.
Combat with an enemy amphibious assault force that is attempting to land on the coast is conducted by naval forces by means of inflicting on him strikes on the approach of the enemy
assault detachment to the shore, during the offloading of the assault force from the transports
onto the landing assets, and by driving back into the water the assault units that have landed.
This is accomplished by fire and the counter-maneuver of naval infantry and shore defense units.
[These efforts are conducted] with the support of naval forces, ground forces, and their long-
range artillery and aviation, which are executing the defense of the coast.
Combat with an enemy which has landed on the coast and is developing their offensive
for the purpose of seizure of a landing bridgehead that is necessary to him is conducted by means
of execution of counter-strikes by ground-based forces, which have been concentrated quickly
from the depth and flanks to the landing sector, by encirclement and destruction of the assault
force. [This action is] supported by naval forces (shore-based artillery, vessels, naval aviation
and naval infantry.
679. The mission of defending a coastline on the whole lies with the forces of the coastal
front. Overall command during the defeat of an enemy amphibious assault on a sector of
the coast should be unified and laid out [designated or assigned] in preliminary instructions
of the commander-in-chief of the coastal front, depending on the situation, to the naval or
ground forces commander.
As a rule, in the battle for the landing of the assault, the commander of the large formation
naval forces supervised directly the unified actions of naval and ground force units up to the
enemy’s landing on shore.
From the moment of the landing of the enemy’s forward detachments on shore, the
commander who is exercising command and control of the forces reports this by signal. Units of
the fleet transition into his subordination or support him, depending on the procedure which was
defined earlier.
The naval commander bears responsibility for preparation for defeat of the landing of the
assault force on shore. The procedure for the subordination to him [the naval commander] of the
ground force units at the time of the execution of this mission should be determined ahead of
time.
The forces commander is responsible for the preparation for the battle with the assault force
on shore.
680. The defeat of the enemy assault landing on shore can have various forms, depending on
the conditions of the battle.
Defeat of the amphibious assault landing on the sea coast in the area of the VMB makes
possible the use of the fleet forces (both those permanently assigned to the VMB as well as those
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based on the VMB) and aviation, which is placed at the disposal of the fleet (MOR) command for
conducting combined actions with the VMB in anti-amphibious landing defense. In these
conditions, the dedication to the defense of ground force garrisons and the use of [ground] lines
of communications for their maneuver are facilitated.
Defeat of the amphibious assault landing on the sea coast in an area outside the VMB
region requires the organization of a special detachment of anti-landing defense (PDO
detachment) consisting of various branch forces and capable of executing maneuver in an island
region.
681. The defeat of the amphibious landing of the hostile force in combination with ground
forces requires the following actions:
agreement on the plans for reconnaissance of the naval large formation and the ground
forces and uninterrupted exchange by them of reconnaissance data;
agreement on the plans of actions of the naval large formation and ground forces and
organization of mutual information [exchange];
organization of the fire system of the forward edge of the defense of the coastal belt and
the barrier system on the seaward approaches, and also near and on the shore;
organization of the deployment of forces of the naval large formation and the maneuver
groups of the ground forces during the various battle preparations, depending on the
situation;
drawing up of an overall plan for the employment in combat of naval and ground force
aviation, and also vessel, shore-based, and [ground forces] artillery for strikes on the enemy
amphibious assault force at sea, on the approach to the shore, and on shore.
2. Defeating an Amphibious Landing on the Shore of a Seacoast
682. The battle in a sector of the enemy’s amphibious assault landing with the goal of
preventing his force from reaching the shore is conducted successfully when the enemy has been
detected in a timely manner on his approach from the sea, has received a number of strikes on
the water, and is approaching the shore having suffered significant lose of his combat capability.
Therefore, the VMB commander (BO sector commandant) is obligated, regardless of the fact
that reconnaissance of the sea which was organized by the fleet and MOR staff, to conduct
reconnaissance with his own forces and means at sea, in this manner supporting the timely
deployment of his forces for battle.
The reconnaissance should determine the axes of the main, supporting, and demonstrative
enemy landings; the composition, number, and grouping of the transports, landing assets, and
vessel support detachments.
683. The planning for combat for defeat the amphibious assault force on the shore of a
seacoast should envisage the following actions:
organization of combat guard and emplacement of obstacles on the seaward approaches
to the shoreline;
strikes at the transports, both from the sea and air, as well as fire from the shore;
prevention of the trans-loading of the assault forces from the transports to the landing
assets;
prevention of the approach of the landing assets to the shoreline;
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strikes at landing points, if the enemy manages to land, and isolation of the landed forces
from the transports (interrupt further supply);
the conduct of counterstrikes on the landing points and on their flanks with the goal of
disorganizing the landing and the enemy’s actions for capture of a landing base;
neutralization and distraction of enemy fire support;
the battle with enemy aviation, which is supporting the landing of the assault force.
684. The commander of the VMB (BO sector commandant) is obligated to organize
coordination of the forces of the VMB (BO sector) first of all for creation of powerful fire
concentrations against the enemy on the approaches to his shore. In this process, he should
pay special attention to the concentration of all firing means (shore-based and field artillery,
naval gunfire, mortars, machine guns) of the VMB (BO sector) on the most critical portions of the
coastline, in conjunction with the resolution of this same mission of the artillery and mortars of
the ground forces of the Red Army for conducting fires from the depth of the defense.
685. The coordination of the force of the VMB (BO sector) with ground forces which are
participating in the defense of the coastline, during the period of the assault force landing on the
shore, is organized by the VMB commander (BO sector commandant), using for this the fire and
maneuver of infantry and mechanized forces.
686. The preparation of the VMB (BO sector) for defeating the amphibious landing
force consists, as a rule, of the following actions:
combined rekognostsirovka, as a rule, by the commanders of the ground force units,
naval infantry, shore-based artillery, vessels, and aviation in the area of possible enemy
amphibious landing;
combined games and exercises for defeat of an amphibious assault landing;
development of communications and combat command and control;
mine and engineer equipping both in the water and on shore;
deployment of the materiel assets and transport in accordance with the defense plan.
687. Engineer support for the defeat of an amphibious landing consists of the following
measures:
equipping of the approaches from the sea with obstacles against enemy landing assets,
and as well landing forces which are wading ashore;
establishment of engineer obstacles and fire–explosive means on shore;
development and improvement of the quantity of roads for maneuver of mobile reserves
and shore-based mobile artillery;
construction of firing positions for mobile artillery (towed by mechanized tractors, on
self-propelled mountings, and railroad-mounted);
equipping of the most threatened points of the coastal defense with strong points and
permanent firing points;
preparation and equipping of command and observation posts;
creation of permanent fortifications at resistance nodes of the flanking portions of the
coastline and which will permit the accumulation of forces for launching a counterattack on
the landed amphibious assault force.
688. The instructions for the anti-amphibious assault of a defense are expressed, as a rule, in
the form of a combat instruction for the PDO of a VMB (BO sector). In addition, excerpts
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from the table of deployment of PDO forces for various stages of the combat preparation of the
anti-landing defense are distributed.
689. The basic mission of the large naval infantry formation during the defeat of an
enemy amphibious landing on the shore is the decisive resistance to all the enemy’s
attempts to penetrate into the territory of the coastal belt of the defended portion of the
coastline. Therefore, the main efforts of the large formation are directed at the destruction of the
landed amphibious assault forces.
During the enemy’s attempt by individual units to dig in on the shore, the VMB commander
(BO sector commandant) are required to cut off the landed units and their landing assets from the
enemy main forces and with all available means, combined with the actions of the Red Army
ground forces and aviation, destroy this portion of the assault force.
690. If misfortune occurs in the defeat of the landing of enemy assault forward detachments
and the penetration of his units into the coastal belt, the large naval infantry formation, with
energetic attacks on land and on sea, continues to conduct the battle with the landed enemy
forces, launching against him counterstrikes along the shore and cutting him off from the landing
points, along with similar actions by the forces of the Red Army, [thus resulting] in the
destruction of the landed enemy forces.
Simultaneously, naval infantry units with counterattacks from the rear complete the
encirclement of the enemy on the shore.
691. The timely arrival of mobile reserves to the enemy’s landing points has special
significance in the battle for defeat of the assault landing. Therefore, the following measures
are implemented during the deployment of the anti-landing defense:
transport assets are assembled for movement by rail and without rail, and also by water
routes of communication;
march routes for the movement of maneuver groups and mobile reserves are marked and
prepared ahead of time;
graphics [tables showing times and distances] are assembled for the transfer of maneuver
groups and mobile artillery from various points of the coastline;
landing bridgeheads and landing sites are prepared for mobile reserves which may be air-
landed.
692. During the preparation of the PDO, a series of depots [dumps] with ammunition, fuel,
and other forms of supplies is created on the coastline for the most rapid replacement of combat
expenditures.
3. Defeating an Amphibious Landing in an Island (Skerries) Region
693. Combat for the prevention of an enemy amphibious assault landing in skerries or an
island region consists of the following phases:
hindering the enemy’s seizure of the exterior portion of the island or skerrie region by the
launching of strikes on the enemy on the approaches to the area from seaward;
holding under one’s own control the nodes of basic channels and defended islands;
prevention of the enemy’s seizure of the flanking sectors of adjacent islands;
hindering the enemy’s maneuver, his penetration into the skerries region, isolating him
from other enemy forces and subsequently destroying him;
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The battle for the amphibious landing in skerries has a mobile character with broad use of
light infantry units and subunits on cutters, and also low-level attack aviation.
694. A large maneuver formation – an anti-landing defense detachment – is organized for
the battle in skerrie and island regions, which consists of the following assets:
a unit (battalion, regiment) of naval infantry with its own landing assets;
sapper units with river-crossing means and obstacle capabilities;
machine gun and machine gun–artillery units and subunits;
skerrie vessels (armored cutters, gunboats, monitors);
shore-based artillery units and subunits;
means of positional obstacles and shore-based torpedo batteries;
reconnaissance aviation units and, if necessary,
attached ground forces.
Low-level attack aviation units and subunits can also be attached to the PDO detachment.
Depending on the situation, a naval or naval infantry officer is designated as the commander
of the PDO detachment.
695. The anti-landing defense detachment, as a rule, occupies a sector of the islands which
have one or two nodes of basic channels. Its boundaries are determined by the situation, and in
skerrie regions should pass from the exterior edge of the skerries to the mainland.
The channels that lead in from the sea to the mainland cannot be used as boundaries between
detachments.
696. The PDO detachment commander, when organizing the defeat of the landing, is
obligated to accomplish the following actions:
energetically to counteract the enemy in the occupation of a start position for his
offensive into the depth of the region (edge of skeeries, outer islands in an island region,
intermediate islands, and opposite shores of narrows);
to organize a patrol along the exterior perimeter of the islands and on the approaches to
the junctures of channels;
to organize ambushes by torpedo cutters, submarines, and shore-based torpedo batteries;
to organize fire ambushes, both by artillery and mortar batteries as well as by individual
weapons and mortars, machine guns, and rifle fire on the islands;
broadly use naval positional means and the means of engineer ground force obstacles;
for the purposes of deceiving the enemy in the exterior islands an internal boundaries of
the skerries, organize false batteries, imitate the accumulation of forces, and create a false
hydrographic situation.
697. Upon the enemy’s penetration into the depth of the defense, the PDO detachment
commander is required to cut off the breaching enemy unit with all available forces,
prevent his connecting with remaining enemy fleet forces at sea, and broadly employing
counter-landings of naval infantry for encirclement and destruction of the enemy that has
breached.
698. During the preparation of the anti-amphibious landing of the defense of an island
(skerrie) region, the PDO detachment commander is required to conduct commander’s
reconnaissance [rekognostsirovka] of the more dangerous approaches. The commanders of units
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and subunits of naval infantry and ground forces, the commanders of skerrie detachment vessels,
and shore-based artillery units, officers of special services, and also aviation representatives
should participate in his personal reconnaissance.
699. Engineer preparation of the sector of the anti-amphibious landing detachment consists
of the following measures:
equipping of firing positions and observation posts for batteries and individual weapons
on the islands;
construction of DOT and DZOT for machine guns, regimental and anti-tank artillery;
emplacement of obstacles in passages, the capabilities of which the enemy will use, and
preparation of channels for the maneuver of our own vessels and naval infantry units;
erection of false fortifications for the purposes of maskirovka;
emplacement of engineer obstacles on islands and fords between them;
gathering up of crossing means for the maneuver of reserves.
700. The command post of the PDO detachment commander should be equipped with a
sufficient quantity of observation points, which support the most complete observation of the
channels and approaches to it in the defended sector.
The command post should be provided with mobile communications means.
Radio communications, mobile means of communications and, in individual situations,
underwater cable (between strongpoints) are broadly used for command and control of the battle
in skerries and island regions.
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Chapter 14
Naval Gunfire Cooperation with Ground Forces Operating on a Coastline
1. Fundamentals of Naval Gunfire Cooperation
701. Fire cooperation of ground forces which are operating on a coastline in support of their
flank includes direct assistance to them by the fires of naval guns, and as well the fire of shore-
based artillery batteries. To effect this cooperation, proper coordination of vessel and shore-
based batteries with ground force artillery is required, and as well accounting for the special
capabilities of the naval gunfire systems.
702. The basic tasks of the large fleet formation or single vessels (shore batteries) during fire
cooperation with ground forces operating in a coastal environment are the following:
the defeat of enemy units and his other targets which cannot be achieved by the firing
actions of [ground] troop-level artillery;
flanking the enemy’s coastal defensive positions;
penetrating to the rear of the enemy for disrupting them;
in individual cases – reinforcing troop-level artillery of ground force large formations.
During fire cooperation with ground forces, only those firing tasks which in a given situation
cannot be resolved by troop-level artillery can be assigned to vessels and batteries of the fleet.
703. The coordination of vessels (batteries) with the ground forces being supported
ensures reliable command and control and the establishment of concrete firing tasks.
Flexible command and control in battle is achieve by the establishment of special signals for
command and control of fires and for mutual identification of forces and vessels, and also for
mutual exchange of liaison officers with supported forces.
704. The complexity and criticality of the mission of executing in conditions of close
coordination with ground forces and counteracting the enemy demand careful preliminary
preparation of the battle by the commanders who are organizing the coordination.
Preparation of fire cooperation includes the following tasks:
communications with ground-force units in execution of assigned tasks that have been
strengthened and are capable of constant use;
organization of coordination with them (consistent with the plans of actions received in
the refining of the fire missions);
reconnaissance of the sea portion of the region of actions;
artillery reconnaissance of targets and reconnaissance of the ground sector of the battle;
organization of artillery observation and target designation;
special preparation of the materiel units and ammunition;
special equipping of the region of action in the deployment of our own forces for
execution of cooperation;
the organization of combat support of firing cooperation.
As a rule, each departure of a vessel in fire cooperation requires additional measures for
support from its side of the sea and air by forces and means of the MOR (fleet).
705. It is necessary always to combine the conduct of fire cooperation with the creation
of conditions which support the execution of firing tasks against the enemy’s
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counteractions, organized by him on the flanks of his own forces. This is achieved by
appropriate equipping of the region of the firing positions, covering them from seaward and from
the air, the designation to artillery units the means and air forces for combat with enemy shore-
based artillery, and the preparation by units the forces and means to cover the firing vessels with
smokescreens from shoreward.
706. During the preparation and deployment of forces, measures of secrecy and the
maskirovka of our own actions should be implemented, for the achievement of the effects of
tactical surprise, which in significant measure will enable success of the artillery attack.
During the execution of each firing mission, it is necessary to consider the advantage of a
surprise commencement of fires at the target (with pre-registration point) and the use of this
method in all cases when the situation permits.
707. Fire cooperation with ground forces, depending on its duration, has various
characteristics, determined by its two forms:
Systematic fire cooperation, which is called for by ground forces in cooperation over the
course of a prolonged time period and which are being used both in the offense as well as the
defense, and require special preliminary preparation of the region of actions and organization of
combat support over a prolonged period.
Episodic fire cooperation, when it is not possible to execute prolonged fire support
cooperation, but it is necessary even for a short time period. This is characteristic in conditions of
the offense (breach of the enemy’s defense) and calls for, as a rule, the use of naval gunfire with
powerful artillery.
708. The nature of firing tasks and the situation on the flank of the ground forces calls for
employment of the following forms of fire cooperation:
planned conduct of fire, used with the participation of vessels (batteries) in artillery
attacks of large troop formations, which is organized ahead of time and characterized by
specific stages of firing actions against the enemy;
on-call fire responses, used both during participation in combat of ground forces, during
the execution of earlier prepared fire attacks, as well as during the execution of counter-
battery firing;
surprise attack from the sea, associated with the execution by vessels of a maneuver for
increasing the effects of the naval gunfire achieved by this tactic.
2. Systematic Naval Gunfire Cooperation
709. Both vessels (of all classes) which have artillery armaments, and shore-based artillery
on railroad mountings or have mechanical tractors, can be used for systematic fire support of
ground forces. As a rule, vessels with 100–152 mm caliber artillery armaments, primarily
from a number of mobilized ships (cannon boats) or vessels of special construction
(monitors) are brought in for this purpose.
As a consequence of the complexity and criticality of the missions associated with executing
fire cooperation, it is necessary that it be executed from day to day by the permanent crew of the
vessel, batteries, and aircraft.
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710. As a rule, a large maneuver formation – a fire support detachment, the composition
and organization of which is determined by the naval commander depending on the situation and
the established mission, is created for fire support of ground forces.
The fire support detachment consists of a basic core of shipboard artillery or shore-based
batteries, and also aircraft which, as a rule, are incorporated into an aviation group (for tactical
reconnaissance, fire adjustment, laying smokescreens, anti-submarine defense of the vessels);
artillery reconnaissance subunits attached from the shore-based defense, SNiS posts,
hydrographic parties, and also PVO assets that are set aside for support.
Command of the fire support detachment, as a rule, is rested on the commander of the
shipboard (shore battery) artillery group which is executing the basic mission.
711. In the process of preparing the large formation for combat, the staff of the fire support
detachment should implement the following measures:
establish a unified understanding of the tasks and situation in the region of actions (on
sea, on land, and in the air) with the staff of the ground force command;
develop a fire support plan which includes the issues of combat support – on the basis of
elaboration of the firing tasks of the ground forces command and the decision taken by the
XXX plan for use of artillery in combat (during participation in an offensive);
table of prepared fire strikes (during participation in a defense);
communications schematic;
table of encoded and recognition signals.
Special attention should be given to the understanding and development of ground and naval
maps.
An orienting schematic (target schematic) should be given to the ground force as an
appendix.
713. As a rule, the fire cooperation detachment is placed in subordination to the MOR (fleet)
commander-in-chief, from whom it receives combat missions, and renders fire cooperation to
the ground forces on the principle of support, executing fire missions received from the
ground forces command.
In separate cases, when systematic fire cooperation to the flank of the ground forces is
organized without designation by the MOR of cover for support from seaward, the fire
cooperation detachment can be given in operational subordination to the army command. In this
case, the fire cooperation detachment receives combat taskings directly from the army command,
informing the MOR (fleet) regarding them.
In both cases of subordination, the concrete development of the issues of fire coordination
and drawing up of the plan for use naval gunfire and shore-based artillery, on the basis of the
overall coordination plan, is executed by the staff of the fire cooperation detachment.
714. Depending on the situation and the composition of forces, the fire cooperation
detachment commander executes command and control of the large formation from the flagship
vessel of the large formation or from the shore-based command post.
The flag-level artilleryman of the detachment and the ground forces artillery commander
should exchange liaison officers or be located together at the same command post.
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715. Equipping the region of actions, it is necessary for the fire cooperation detachment to
accomplish preparation of the firing positions for vessels (shore batteries), establish the
navigational–hydrographic situation, install orienting markers and construct defensive
fortifications for posts of artillery observation and adjustment, SNiS posts and lines, all of which
is accomplished in accordance with instructions of the MOR or fleet staff.
716. The organization of communications should exclude mutual interference during
command and control by the large formation in combat and command and control of the artillery
fires.
As a rule, the following lines of communication should be established:
command communications – communications with the vessels and units, and also with
the higher level command;
coordination communications – both from the large formation commander with the KP
of the ground forces commander and from the firing vessels (shore batteries) with the directly
supported ground forces unit, and also between the various branches of naval forces;
artillery communications – both from the flag-level artilleryman with the senior
commander of the large artillery formation and from each firing vessel (shore battery) with
its adjusting post (aircraft).
Communications from the firing vessel to shore and from the shore between posts of
observation and communication [SNiS], observation and fire-adjustment posts are supported by
fleet assets.
Communications of the command of the supported ground force units with the shore-battery
communication posts rest with the ground forces command.
717. Artillery reconnaissance, for the most part the gathering of reports concerning the
enemy and also the finding of positions for vessels (batteries) is executed by the forces and
means of the fire cooperation detachment. In this effort, the data that is made available from the
ground forces artillery reconnaissance system should be used.
718. The frequent departure of vessels (batteries) to firing positions or their prolonged
presence in one or the other region associated with execution of fire cooperation missions
increases the danger of enemy attack on them, from both the air and shore (artillery fire), and
also from mine obstacles in their region of actions. The overcoming of enemy counteractions
represents a fundamental difficulty during the execution of the mission of fire cooperation and
requires from the large formation commander the undertaking of corresponding decisions in the
course of combat actions and flexible command and control of his large formation in combat.
3. Episodic Naval Gunfire Cooperation
719. Upon designation of a vessel (shore battery) for one-time fire cooperation against a
selected enemy target, it is necessary to consider the situations in theater and in the region of fire
cooperation:
the operational regime in the given region of the theater;
the capability to develop powerful fires on the enemy targets in a brief time period;
the possibility of rapidly and in a concealed manner executing the movement to the
region of actions;
the capability of executing the mission in the designated time frame.
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720. During the execution of episodic cooperation to the flank of ground forces, as a rule the
fire cooperation detachment is not created. In this case, the execution of the mission of fire
cooperation is assigned to individual vessels or a group of vessels, singled out from one large
vessel formation.
721. The commander of the group of vessels designated for execution of the mission of fire
cooperation organizes the preparation of his group for combat under the guidance of the large
formation commander and combat mission he receives through him.
In the process of preparing the fire cooperation, the large formation staff’s particular
attention should be given to the following tasks:
receipt of the latest reconnaissance data, both regarding the enemy ground force and
regarding the air and naval enemy;
receipt of the data concerning the dispositions of our own ground force units;
elaboration of the firing tasks from the ground force command;
the organization of artillery observation and target designation in the battle region;
the organization of all forms of combat support for the group which is executing the basic
missions.
722. The typical instructional document for the organization of episodic fire cooperation is
the combat order. As a rule, this document contains the ground force’s orientation schematic
(target schematic).
723. The successful execution of the mission during episodic fire cooperation in large
measure depends on the presence of reliable reconnaissance data in regard to the enemy
ground force. When it is impossible to receive ahead of time these data from the ground force
command, the large formation staff is required to obtain it with the assistance of artillery
reconnaissance, organized by the MOR (fleet) staff.
724. During the execution of episodic fire cooperation, reliable coordination with the ground
force units and elaboration of firing tasks should be supported by the obligatory exchange of
liaison officers with the lead artillery commander of the supporting large formation.
725. Support of the firing vessels with observation and adjustment encompasses, as a rule,
the use of a system of observation posts of the ground forces artillery, by sending ahead of time
representatives to ground artillery reconnaissance organs or, in separate cases, the use of artillery
reconnaissance subunits from shore batteries of the defense, and also with one’s own fire-
adjustment aircraft.
726. During episodic fire cooperation, normally there is no possibility for equipping the
firing positions for firing vessels; this, in the presence of limited time for the execution of firing
tasks, requires the use of the most precise methods of firing and orientation of vessels in
their firing positions.
The execution of fire missions in nighttime conditions requires the adjustment of fires using
illumination of the targets for refining the fire support.
727. The expenditure of ordnance during a brief period of fire cooperation against the enemy
depends on the nature of the specific mission and conditions of the situation. Therefore, it can be
limited by any type of norm.
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