ComIand
History,
1969,
Volume
I
Final
 
(Volume I)
promulgated
to
CINCPAC
Instruction
5000. 5B , ..5 October 1969, subject: Historical Reports from Unified Commands in
the Pacific Command.
United States within
the
neaning
of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code Sections 793 and 794. Transmission or
revelation
by law. The
material
contained
within this document is to he treated with the utmost discretion. Under no
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contained therein
be
impal, ed to personnei other than those whose duties specifically require knowledge thereof.
info-iali.)n provided any individual will be the minimum required in the performance of
his
NOT RELEAS-
for in accordance
with instructions
contained in the current edition of the security regulations for handling
class;:ýied
of TOP
the termisalon of
SUBJECT: Promulgation of the USMACV 1969 Command History Volume I
COPY
NUMBER(S)
JCS
DEPT
DEPT
COMMANDANT, USMC 51 thro 55 10 & II
COMMANDANT, USCG
AIR UNIVFR5ITY 78
Volume I
COPY NUMBER(S)
official history of the war in Vietnam see ahead
jungle, inundated
4
report that
during 1969.
Additionally, the
provides
insightful
information
COMUSMACV's
responsibilities.
An
(Fwction and rtesponsilhilty
ot voi;~puonnt
becoining ini-
Div t-1 from IMVN,
$kippoirt tisaie CROOK.,
the Ilentaidivral Agrvecuni,
tauvcvisor
WSAM;
MA J Martha
X. St~anton
ltJMFi; LAJI) Micharel
And ltooert MI. Thornpson
MtStA), asd S11 5
Itobert 3. Cvna %USA).
'this. team of hiptorialls
WtSA);
TS(idst
...........
i.
. .jl3
$t.sterny
(2 4n 4 (unius$........
e
"iit
Herbicidt Oppratiomn. ..................................... .VI- 15
Vii. PACIFICATION AND NATION
. ...............
.. .. ...... ......
........
.... IX- 118
VIRMS
ThOv
.)&hA~4tin. .n . . . . .............. . . . . . ... ,,., l'
. . X11- ~tI
Fuc I
................ XILn-5
PSYOP
Media ...................
1 .
?X
w
s:Strog
44
in
LAO
~ .
,C §
History
(U) No unforeseen crisis occurred in 1969 and the year indeed was marked
by successes
to say there were not setbacks or that
some programs
failed to meet their goals for 1969. Nevertheless even the most skeptical
critic was forced however begrudgingly to admit
there
was
clear evidence of pro-
gress in the attainment of US objectives for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).
(U) The year 1969
marked the fourth year of major US Combat participation in RVN,
though it was a yeai
of transition and changing focus
of US activity. In spite of the changes the
one single static aspect of the war was its fundemental issue: The VC/NVA attempt forcibly to
extend Communist domination over the territory and people of RVN, on the one hand; and the
resolve of the people and Governnient of RVN (GVN) to determine their own
future.
other.
(S ) In the three years prior to 1969, the US had been preoccupied with successful milltarl
operations. Pacification had been, to a degree, left to GVN, and modernization and improve-
- ment to RVN combat power had not
received equal emphasis and effort. The advisory effort of
the
1950s and early 1960s had become in reality US prosecution of
the war. The transition,
then, was to turn the course toward "Vietnamization of the peace" and away from
"American-
ization
of
the war.
" Early in the year, COMUSMACV announced a three-faceted goal for 1969;
. combat operations to defcat the enemy and promote security, increased effort to improve and
""modernize the RVN's Armed Forces (PVNAF), and a further emphasis on pacification
and
building th( inchoate republic into a viable state. Each facet of this "one war" goal was
to, &ad
(U) T'he optimism that was prevalent at the
end of 1968
to orove ill-fcundud as no headway whatever was
made
it could not be stated
ur equivocally that the anti-war movement in the US was responsible for the reluctance of the
* NV N to negotiate, there was ample evIdence that the disproportionate attention gained by the
vocal miinority gave great comfort and
certainly lent propaplnda support to the enemy. As
CC-SVN Resolution o an,, debriefing of the released US prisoners revealed, North Vietnamese
leaders labored und-r the dubious assumption that the American will would soon e broken as
the French had faltered in 1954. The enemy expected a precipitous withdrawal of V3 troops in
response to domestic pressures and a concomitant collapse of the GVN. I
November, Presi-
the "get-out-of-Vie•tnam-at-any-Cos", philoso-
the world, explaining hin
"R ~EVIEW DAME r
DEiCIJASS11-" Oki:
been underway
ýInce March. He called for The support of the "great sLi'-,-it majority" of Aineri-
cans. This was
forthcoming and while
spoke
with much less authority. It
was now evident that the US would disengage from combat in
RVN but it would not be at
the
would it be directed by North
Vietnam or the Lao Dorg Party.
It
prudent action on a carefully conceived
timetable and in consonance with the military situation and the developing strength of
the R'VNAF.
While it was noted that 1969 did not end on the same note of optimism for fruitful
negotiations at
year, it did not seem so necessary
any
longer.
"one war"t con!ýept
were to be
given equal attenticn
and priority, "the most important objective, the one with the highest payoff, was the pacificaticon
program." The success of paciti~atiori
would dictate the degree of improvemnert necessary in
RVNAF to transfer to
speed with which US forces woul~d be withdraw.xn.
(C) The Pacification Program cuuld
only be desc- Ied as highly successful. Key territori-
al security made
was Oper-
Nam
Can
City
in An Xuyen Province and
ed waterways that had been virtually left to the enemy in the past. So spectacular was the suc-
cess that two more hamlete Tran Hung Dar: I ancl
E.. sprung up in the in'mrodiate vicinity. Other
similar projects resulted 'tling or returrning, :o former villages one million
refugees
dur-
ing the year. The inc reas,. i~n the RF/PF
forcýes of 72, 000
nien and their being equipped with the
N416 rifle resulted in marked improvement of those of People's Self-Defense
Force (P-SDF) the assumption of patrol duties by the Navy greatly
increased the
local participation in the cause
and
was a source
of positive psychological impact for the GV N while having a negative effect on the
morale of the enemy f)rceos. VillhgO itnd hamlet elections were hold throul-%out the year and at
year's ond over
90
petuent of the local governments had been duly elected. 71he Chieu
liol
pro-
gram
(S),
With the impositior, of tho 1 Nov 68 bombing halt it had been necessary to shift Inter-
diction of
within
diction emphasit;
tontinuud doaring
programn
o4' the "brown water" Navy
became
basically an interdiction fortee. Tht SE A LORDS forco abaorbod the men and craft which remain-
after disostablishmient of the Mobile Riverine
Force
(CTF 117), and
purely offensivv opotrations
of US ended
in IV CTZ.. Ground combat operation4 were no longer the large multi-battalian
sweeps of thle preceding Years, as they were replaced by smaller unit actions in support of
p~cificatioti.
Enonly high
lessa @evert. primarily due to the
ouccess of into rdiý:tion ojperationm and contiant pressure applied against
the enonmy and hitt
the border* of IIVN. While enemy
activity varied in intet)-lty
and IIIere wore! highpoints in F~ebruary. May, and July;
thiro
had
been
pro-ompted.
P
aenkior MIACV Commainder stated, "!The B~attle of Hlue was fought
this year (1969)
in the A
and upon completion
flurther with-
devolopments Wn
enemny
capabilities
X by 25, 000, to include redeployment of
th.
Team. After completion of the first phase redeployment, the President
announced,
on 15 Sep,
the second phase reduction of 4-0, 500 authorized spaces. Included in Phave TI was the 3d Mar
(-) was engaged in northern along DMZ. That phase be comple-ted
no
later
that date, Phase 4 redeployment having been completed successfully,
the President directed a third phase reduction of 50, 000 spaces prior to 15 Apr 70.
(U) The President regarded "Vietnamization" as both
a goal and a program to achieve that
goal at
three elements as the "one war"
concept: Improvement and Modernizatio-n of the RVNAF, Pacification, and Combat Operations.
The program's genesis can
v.isit to RVN, the
in the
and equipment of RVNAF. In cooper-
ation with the GVN a redeployment of -:onibat troops was begun. The timetable ,.-As
not to
be
announced and was dependent upon RVNAF strength, the level of enemy activity, and progress
which might be made in the talks at Paris.
(V) The three increrne-ats or phases of redeployment were s;.gni~cant measures
of progress
RVNAF
with little
potential.
(U)
For the enemy,
too, 1969 was a year of traýnsition. Having failed' to achicve
success
concentrating on
economy of force operations. A resolution issued by the 9th Conference of the Central Office for
South (COSVN), July
was captured in October. It was the most
important sini'1o docurnent captured in the war, as it outlined the goneral
course along which the
aspects
rocc At past," andi se t forth the mission,
direction,
and
was
throo target areas. The war wapr to be
prosecuted militarily,
of: the cities
atid tho
Niekong Delta.
*(U) In illuding to their po~sitive achievement, COSV.N ;,remiaod that the
US had been defeat-
And
the US who
demnanded an eand to
tht, war in Vietnam. It wa~i Alleged that boing "ckfeated avid weakened, Whe
Americans have boun
forced to dt-oacalato 41 a pausive position. " The greatest Allied
wpkný.ies
between internal coviffi-,
werie not with-Irawn and colaptse
of the GVN it thoy %vro edetployert. And while the VC /NVA
alludked to p'rdat vietorivs of thw ''Genoral Offeniwvc
and Uprising, " tthe COiVN
concludet0 that
they ha d not produceod m.%yeAPLng iviolopmient of docisive lnikne Their
shortcomingS
they
Imlieved to 1), a failureo to prortoto it ste~nag polid~cal
4.Arw, weaknogs In military
wariare.
rtmolt
not 11wontion the prtat losses k4
men and material whike.
had 'jecurrod over the proeaedng years4, the difficulties4 of replaicement and roioipply, nt:rJ dL1id t
mention the offects of paeification %nd Vianami~ation
whi .h ware doing real cianiage
to the
 
(C) The year also had its difficulties. A small hamlet in Quang Ngai PI-ovrince became as
well knowvn as any world capital when stories broke of an alleged massacre at My Lai during
March 1968. Sufficitint evidence of irregularity
in the operations in the Ma y Lai area brought
initiation of courts martieal proceedings against
several US personnel in on-scene
command
"Peers Group"-- wt.s directed
reports c,)ncerning
the My
dures
moral leadership.
'C) "he "Green Bcret" case was another in which "here was nu satisfactory
conclusion.
had been convicted
(U) There
were riany
to effect
had been
the first
major stp
anl w.ar
the conference
table and
the
B-5Z bombing
reciptocate in any manner. Two
uni-
g to change the enemy position.
If any
Thie sugglistion is
supported by the
to repair
(C) In
conclusion, the
year brought
r. practically ev5ry
concept,
side. Ihe enamv
Phase U guerrilla wariare.
the world:
what I
have caid
up
j
Tr-IlS
PAOCMD
action.
from
with our program,
The
US gloLal objective could be stated as: "A free, independent community of nations,
S* living at peace with
each other."
Implicit in this objective has been a US belief that only by pre-
venting
the further spread of Communism would it be possible to prevent the formation of a large
power bloc which
could break the
wars. " This belief led
of
of countries
having Communist
pursued through
a strat';ýgy
which included
the comn-
comnmitmne nts. These strategic
expansion
military
battlegrounds
wvith overt and covert
elements in the LIS curront effort
to sustain its
objectives wevrk related to
the h anve of power i'1 the region, and woere reflected
by US rnomlwrship
in SEATO And
those
Rorean
(C) Since the, late 1950s. externally ouppoirtod Commuinist stibversion andi
aggredsion hlavo
which impacted upon
THIS P'AGE
Rr RAtED
84
t1
Now"-
of Vietnam (GVN)
and its armed
embodied
operations,
ment necessary for the
national
viable nation.
at
the
level in
disruptive and war-making capabilities, through three interrelated undertakings:
1. Destroy Viet
Cong (VC) main forces and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces
in
RV N or,
force the NV A to withdraw and separate the VC main force units from the by
providing
shield of containment through ground, air, and naval offensive operations
against the VC and NVA main forces,
LOCs9,
and
68,
NVN's
the operational
Z. Lstablish a militarily
be extended.
consolidatod, and
sustained. This
against VC
and maintaining suitably balanced
conducted
first operational
goal. The
on NVýN, wa~s beplieved
by Pott' Analyqitz to hadve minluettvod the North
VkV tetnaie s to
phasi% o political
1aoil, Anti NVNI
providing
I9W]. ~tnipharsis
s"thictures
11-2
(C) The "one
war" concept promulgated by COMUSMACV in early 1969 recognized no such
thing as a separate war of big battalions, pacification, or war of territorial
security. Under
neously, in all
visors
on
concept were pacification (including
and each to be kept
abreast of the
Force/Popular
Force
(RF/PF),
Provincial
Reconnaissance
of the conflict,
concept, significant
ated
popular
troops
and Development
The
re-
sponses
counteraction
from
was as follows:
and
aggression
se!f-determina-
accelerate improvement
forces in SVN.
a comprehensive
war was
were
Two documents, the 1969 Pacification and Develop-
ment
the
1969 btrategy.
Coordination with (,VN of the total effort in 1969 was effected by the
newly Lfoan-ed Central Paci-
fication and Development
Council (CPUC), a cabinet commrittee with a full timle staUf of senior
military and civilian
(S) Tthe 196`1
Placification and Deverloptiwot P'lani was the first atwtempt by tho GN N to present
in a s'ingle documenlt the
satrategy,
concet~pts, prioritits, and ubjvectiocs to gutide the total GVN
pacification effort. Altho~ugh k unilateral CN',N plain, it
was cosdrddirect ive
ot the Prime Minitevr and
othsr ministers .0#
CPDGC memibers, the plati prov4tied gusidance to Atl nmitristls, setrvices,0 and t!Clt.Wlon On All
elemenvts of the PW 9 camlpaign. It expre-ssed tas its
has~ic
4nlong iall governnwnat forces 4a1d
the pevojic
the eight primary obetvsfor 19tA9
As tollow.,,
I. Under LA enetral
mantl~e of areai vieurity prrwidvd by the rogulAr ficrces, use local
seccurity forces, reaction focsad police forces at
the hamle-1t Anti 0tllAgc level to control and
Secure 90 porcent a.' the popu1attioft extend the
national
Z. Elimi&nate 1,.000 VCI unider the PHIOENIX P'rogramu and
c~ther jointi operatinon con*-
clucted 6y poli0ý and
airmy units.
3. rit~blisb local governmentm in all village.4 throughýout the coun'rv; elet4. VillAgo
Arlministratlivc
Coimmitice%anW hales-t Managing Iloardo at All tocured iha"1tet aLnd
villages~;
and
organize
THiS
PAGE
y
 
4. Involve additional people in the People's Self-Defense organization to bring it up to
Z million mermbtrs a.ad arm 400, CO O members for
guard, sarveillance, and ?atrol duties.
5. Rally 000 returnees.
at least
300, 000
persons.
7. Increase the information and propaganda effort by Lhe training and proper
use of
Informnation Deputies.
8. Encourage
economy ai.d increase rice production from 5 million to 6
tars.
I of the Plan in
language compatible to Annex
annexes performed a
completion
undoýr Corps supervision
goals
rrrflimum effort.
bilingual documeunt
that provided
The 1949 plan Inattgttrated
as compared
plaits which
wvre prepcired
iocluded in the dofinlilon
plan was
offensive
survoillar•te
and vounserinfittration,
Related tasks were
OF WMrTA01t ,PI IVE C-PE*PAYlONS
*lPRIORIiTY
self-defense (orces;
campaign
plan, except for addee mention of naval air and coastal s3urveillance activities.
The second oD-
and elimination,
and emphasized
ersmy infiltration into
those
units
and similar areas to employ a more dynamic approach to
stcurity.
(S ) A lit oi major goals %%asstated in the plan for use in establishing meastres of progress
* for achieving the objectives. As compared with the 1968 CGP, the 1969 plan was ;oteworthy for
a '-reatly reduced and
reasonably attainabte than w,. re some
of
the in~prosible ttall." or percentile goals of the 1968
plan.
of operations
for the- basic plan was the applit'ation of resourcea to critical
priority areas Figure 11-1), while practicing -coaoinoy of force in other arena*.
The forces
1.
of VC /
NV A
forces and base in RVN.
. Border surveillance 4nd reacciti lorctt4 to -.pttratu alonpg te XiMZ and the Laotian
and Cantoodian border* and in coastal watrs, ;o derect )nd dtr,ý," ne&atiuy incursions into RVN.
3. City protection
forves to vonduct v*pe'atioas ,mn tbt- fridnges ot cittic to prevent
enem"y infiltrate.rr from launching attavks and harass•n town*, provi"n'"al c:apitals, and
eitis.
t•iw GV N pacification program in tdw
(S) Tie militziry effort wasi to mkintain
as4d c'itend the arok wvithiti \ehh the love 0'
security wta adequoto to ptrmit d&struction tif the
VCI, and oalnterrnptcd ltical, ecvnonvc,
iS Thtis
c-nctpt of opoeotion* it A•i 144 w-S a nliwtwct vbaatgc from thAt of
the precedting
r Ova.hrariisr 'lrolvrt~iv# shiltiW ofcntnint
n-
arihd
the
t0 gth 04srike o01'Wit Of 4OereInsuhacanigcn
c(pt nAturally was accompanieod hV, chAlnge ift -1w t4pjPicatonof% fý(orce, The mvost imporwtan
ch-algo
tit intstroctltnts relatedI to tte %pP4C4WtNo of brc# by ARLVNt. The All 144,
in
cnntrAvit
to
I1l 143, dlirected A grAtllnai phase down of AKVS ba4ttalios
In iiupport ol oa<.Ifivation
inti ou
.scurity missions. These two funcilons were ýo tw peorlonwed bty RK.hT'F as their rmoon d'rtrv.
Th,. ;,thsr R.VNAV• roles
acrord with the arta .tgeurti
ty
concept and was
to continuo to rt crvtn 3nksb sit and ibplem• "t•ation.
iS) As f(o the r*WMAF., there was no functional separalion of responibiltibe t•.weeil
them and
m
with
RVNAF
redluve
forces.
RVN.
the RVNAF achieve a
"4. Inflict more losses on the enemy than he can
replace.
control
population centers,
economic areas, and bases.
7. Deny the maximum
number of base area sanctuaries in RVN to the enemy by their
destruction
8. Enhance the
territorial security capability of the RF and PF by proper employment
and deployment, and by comrl : irg
the planned force structure increase and
modernization of
of communication.
10. IncreaE?
the efforts
11. Increase the number of Hoi
Chanb in CY69 in each CTZ.
.2. "I2aximize coordinated intelligence
collection and counter-intelligence activities.
IS) The concept of
1.
The resources of the RVNAF and FWMAF -. ould be applied to
critical
priority
being practiced in
less essential areas.
operations aimed at the destruction
of
the DMZ and
destroy enemy
cities.
program in the provinces.
extend the area within which the level
of security was~ adequate to permit the destruction of
the VC 1
(S) The iollowing
specific w-as provided:
military support paci-
fication programs. These
dinate military and
forct s, cadres, and
order
to
pacification
program
people's wishes and mnotivate
their own
coatinuous,
precedence and good
main and local
forces.
reosponsiblo
In vil-
its assumed akso by W.) cadre
gr~kips. Thc
drpendling On their
areas, tho 101N.-W
mity be useid
th t
Mitional Polict,
and
gaining
to the enemy.
note:
see
Figure
1l-1).
control
6. Special emphasis will
tion of provincial
capitals and cities
enemry units
and ambushes, including
long range patrols
to dis-
concentrations.
Well-timed
enemy at a distance before they
can infiltrate into
launch frequent aurprlse police
oper~ations to destroy
o rlaniVations, and to un- •ver
enemy weapon caches.
:-!.j~
I9
ar e located at
enemy's
avenues
particular,
developing
the
people's
intelligence
operations based
Com-
direct
or
support plans and to combined intelligence and dissemi-
nation.
8.
areas and capture or destruction of his installltions,
supplies, and caches
lization of those base areas directly af.'ecting areas
of
importance.
increased to discover and destroy an/ enemy personnel
and equipment infiltration into- the territory
of
and i-cated where control can be eiercixed on enemy
infiltration corridors, both overlard and by sea.
10. Long
ducied to
I1. The RVNAF', especially
revisions, personnel tnanagement improvements, logis-
ti i
fo r tle Popular For•,ee to become
effectivoe in pacifi.
THItS PAGE RfEGAD,: . LASS ''".
Oidet Sec Ari. , , 'er
including
be
to de-
stroy enemy forces in the area and those which might invade the DMZ and Laotian
border. Operations were also to be conducted to destroy enemy bases, and to protect the areas
of Hue and Danang and the main LOCs, especially Routes
1 and 9. GV N pacification activities
were to the populated
as
destroy enemy forces in the area and those
infiltrating across the Laotian and Cambodian borders. Emphasis was to be
placed on
protect-
ing the populated coastal lowlands, plus the cities of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot, keep-
ing
open the main LOC, and destroying enemy bases. The GV N pacification program was to
place
initial
emphasis
on
destroy enemy forces in
the area and those
infiltrating across the Cambodian
vital Saigon/Gia Dinh areas, to keep
land and water LOCs open, and secure and to expand the area under GVN control,
especially
providing permanent GV N control in
the highly
contiguous to
destroy
"Landand water LOGs were to be cleared and defended, especially
QL-4. Pacification efforts
areas of high population density and economic importance
and areas
OPE•RATIONA
L GUIDANCE
by the annual CCP
144, wao
vomplenuetd by
by
personnel, The gutdance conttained in thc CCP was
ampliied or modified by mniaagri4, when nucessary.
(
S~~~~~~~Order S-6. :",•" " "":
 
(S) Operational guidance at the start of 1969 was established by a January MACV message
published after
the Commanders'
11 Jan. Early 1969 operational
guidance was also based on MACV messages which had been sent in September and October 1968.
As 1969 began,
extremely pleasing. You have kept after the enemy
relentlessly., never letting him relax, and accommo-
dating him any time he wants to fight. The develop-
ment of tactical
demonstrated
to
devise
type enemy
or situation.
there are
to the effect that he is attempting to compensate for
his tactical
adage
soldiers, but as iong as I have my
cadre,
I and II
positions
police, national police.
their province, district,
is that each sen.ior US commander,
in conjunction with
has been removed. Tactical
marily
providing
tactical units may be
not held
necessary in order to
is to be done by those
who will be
RF/PF, police
all
fully
coordinated
between
com-
Zones
eliminate
lages, and
fronts, (You
for the pacification
objectives
discussed
within
Forcou should
get moving on
We
that by
celebrate.
Please
the
5
This
guidance
logistics
system
func-ton
within
taking care of the wounded.
Another
peat one, war. He knows there's no such thing as
a
war
recognize and understand
the one war
the areas of
al l
in a single
the enemy in
his
business.
TACAIR,
ar e to be part of the
plan aimed at the VC/NVA
and the
VC infrastructure. Al l types of operations are to pro-
ceed simultaneously, aggressively,
never
a winter-
objectives. Second,
he will establish hi s axes of advance, al l based on
areas in which guerrillas
caches,
reconnais-
the only manner i.A which he can move, i. e.
, with the
can be def•cted
of perrainel. Simultaneously.
Accord-
ingly,
place more emphasis and attention
(ni how
ttv enemly
their AlkVN counterparts
go after the •nermy's
hiv
his _park plugs,
engine btyond repair
H PAGE
friendly courses of
and additional
operational guidance
identified
as:
1.
Option
south toward Quang
4. Option
threaten #2.
8. Option #8 - Threaten any or all of the above.
(S) friendly
established area
priorities of:
CTZ
protecting
to northern
area
of
':onference was
the
atsi-
to he maint•ainvd
and place.
attacV,
vtllage and hamlet
CIDG,
National
this
headquarters.
optior. they
(S ) Operational
t.o go to adjoining areas and work tor
the.
VC.
There
tv this
aggrression until
roaction to enetmy
Security is vital
to see
follows.
de-
he will realize that any time he assaults a hamlet,
village, resettlement project, or other
community,
a
villages
priority, and each village or hamlet is aware of the
friendly unit to be contacted when
rectution force assist-
ance is required.
e. This operational
of re.sponsive operational procedures presently
in being
IS) In aluImary, beginning-19t9 operational
guidance emphasized
antid relentless
attacks agaista
threzts and advucutvd
onl
structurv. This guidnate rec~ogniAvd that there
was just one war and
the battle was to he
tarriesi
meowor
in
i'Th 1%•.
during the Accelerated PacificatIon
Campaign tAP(C) through contiwued
World Fort•e and
8VN, Pasycho.
logical warfare
op;)r&Ylolt worl to be integrated wvith All actinitivs. Further, it rc-oniphiatlaed
mandatory, promtpt,
and dvcisive
c.iti-
m4asive resiponse from
vided
Develop-
intell4eoce indicators
assat-Ita.
spat¥ty and utdependable
against
installations
techniques are
for detailed
and willingness
to deviate
from established
at~ck.
b. Regardless
uf a
unit's primary
lucr4tive targets
deviceýs.
.Conducting
;:
Ablically pronounced by RVN
President Thiso in his 31 De c 68 speech, wast given additional impetus by SECDEF Lairdi's
August peornulgation An
Forces in SEA" text
for
maintainng and expanding
the total population of the fINN.
9
prepw-tng awl vvamntotniag contingenc~y pla~ns, MACJS ~oniduc~ttd
a
udio4
On A wide vbriety of subjects. A vatalogue tit these studiva is; not within
thoe
of major responsibility wereý
Day
planning.
stratogic or long range0 ptlAnnitig and matttrs ptrtaining to stratcgy At the Paris
T-Day Planning
i$) A*
hostillttt# 0%
and
effort
1
1-Osy
mattekm sytm to the Force and Mate riol {FAMRLP) automatic
data ayvtein pAssed two
die first time.
iarkt.d the f~r*%owe ol PAMRKEP
as; % eelynn toot,
Feb 67
Oct 69
63 C3/15 Ma y 64
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN
64 C7/10 No v 67
COMUSSEASIA
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 41-69
COMUSMACV
OPLAN
COMUSSEASIA
COMUSMACV
20 Jan 69 C 1/13 Jun
69
5 Sep 68
of CINCPAC OPLAN 1-6? tGWP).
The
probability of early redeployment
strategic PACOM locat.oii.
US Army
US Marine dihisions In
the
w•ere
tion)
outbreaks in NVN. The
of direct US intervention.
Phase III - All measures including direct US intervention.
Military and paramilitary forces from RVN and active and passive groups
from
employed.
(TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN Z7-69 was a plan for the reinforcement of the ROK in the event
North Korea should
Ihe redeployment of 3
1/3
and six AF tactical squadrons together with combat support and support elements to
Korlea.
(TS)
under con-
thi.ough direct CHICOM intervention and sup-
ported CINCPAC OPLAN
heightened tension which had long
been bypassed. Phase I1 envisioned
subversive insurgency which had been more than imple-
mented in RVN, but had not been
implemented
tervention and Phase IV with
overt
CHICOM
attack.
The
in 1969
that this oplan called for in Phase IV. The plan had been
overtaken
was a unilateral
US contingency plan for operations to deter, prevent, or cause cessation of CHICOM aggression.
The plan called for assigned forces to conduct limited warfare (pre-emptive offensive and coun-
teroffensive
by
use of air, naval, and ground forces) against Communist China
and NVN in the
the
defense of RVN and Laos against limited (four to six division) CHICOM intervention
in current
operatit.ns. This plan was based on the ground forces in RVN
being reinforced with up to 17
divisions in 120 days and
the availability of 29 tactical fighter squadrons, two Marine Air Wings,
one Marine
(TS)
for do -
fence of mainland SEASIA against overt CHICOM intervention in current combat operations.
Priority was
plan
in RVN being reinforced with up to 20 divisions in
six months, and the availability of 37 AF tacti-
cal fighter squadrons, nine CVAa,
two Marine Air Wings, and one Marine Air Group.
MTS) COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 42-69
intervention in
current combat operations in SEASJA by conducting extensive air and
naval
offensive
operations
cause Communist China
operations would
be conducted concurrently with holding actions by land and ai r forces to contain
the
invading
forces
and
base complexes in SEASIA.
This plan was based on retention of thobe ground forces in HV N and the availability of 63 AF tac-
tical fighter squadrons, 12
B-52s.
•,~TH'IS
PACF•
,-D,
(TS) COMUSMAC.V/COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 43-69 provided for the redeployment of major
combat
of the outbreak of hostilities
there. It involved
from
(S)
COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J65 (Evacuation of Selected Personnel and Equipment) was in
support
Forces (CRSFF)
Exercise
aggression by
a quick
decisive defeat
event of an outbreak
for the establishment of a MACV/MAAGV
or
a
US/FWMAF
RVN indefinitely.
(S)
COMUSMACV
OPLAN
best
The plan provided
for US support
expanding control
actual residual
RVNAF, and
departure for
future planning.
In particular,
to be prepared to deploy one infantry
brigade of three )
THIS PAGE REGRADED
per Sa
battalions with combat and combat service support to include direct
support artillery and genera
CG, I FFORCEV was
airborne infantry brigade
of three battalions,
case,
movement
by the receiving
assume OPCON
of all, or any elements, of an infantry brigade and/or
an airborne brigade from
On order to execute, they were to designate the location
of arrival
airfields
for
the deployment of indicated units. The Commander, wa s tasked to provide
the necessary
airlift on order to execute. The GO, Transportation Management Agency wa s tasked to receive
movement requirements and
as required,
move required. 10
(S)
In support of II CT Z under Operation STEEL CABLE the following forces were avail-
able:
IIj
1.
CG,
1st
Mar
Div
was
to
provide
one
reinforced
infantry
regiment.
2. CG,
23d Inf (Americal) Div was to provide two battalions from one brigade.
3. CG, I FFORCEV was to provide one infantry
brigade and/or one airborne brigade.
Two ARG/SLFs
were available
only when authorized fo r re-insertions. Such authority would be
reque.sted, bu t employment of the SLFs
wa s to be solely
dependent upon the approval of the JCS,
and a readiness
POLITICS - INTERNAL
"• referendum which offered the
Bao Dai, and a republic with
Ngo Dinh Diem as chief of state. In the brief
interval since then,
political
process
of , the executive, legislative,
leaders
common
ground
was being undertaken.
the religious
within the context of
some of the more salient political
currents
to deal had
troops have
At that time,
such a move
and legal government
in An Xuyen
with NFLSVN representatives.
explained that within
presence in the government, could not accept the formation of
a
Communist
of
Communist
doctrine.
in Saigon, 28
past militant Buddhist
against the
GVN, strongly condemned the VC for mass murders of citizens of
Hue during the 1968 Tet
attack.
of
people in Hue and Thua
Thien Province were convinced that it was impossible to live with the Communists. He added
that the people of
but if forced to
Communists,
said that
would agree to participate
years
NV N forces would
the Communists
would not dare cheat in elections, because they would be under
the watchful
remnained the same. No cession of terri-
tory would be
of a legal government dealing with
an opposition party.
GVN ministries to develop a program de-
signed to assist
"political
niobili,'.ation",
/
Solidarity
in the
by Senator
withdraw
the principlI that Thieu should
automati-
cally
be
parties and disclaimed
leadership on the Front. Thieu impressedq
on the politicians that there
would be no
a cohesive mr-jority
The
dis-
organization. Most
past shown considerable electoral strength, and the participants
showed keen awareness
in order
to face
(U) By the
end of the year, the membership of tht .,,arty wcs not
yet stabilized. Factions
the party manifested some tenuous
of
to be done
House failed
National
Budget.
further action. The
IZ8 billion expenditures, and
to debate whether or not the
President had authority
National
plassed
thut
the NA restore thef $V N
1. 3 billion which had been
cut from the budget by the Up.per House. Alter almost four hours
of heated debate, the NA re-
quested a Supreme Court rmling
on the question. The Supreme
Court decided 31
part), but n3t
those portions affecting
the NA. the Judiciary, nor. apparently, the Inspectorate.
(C) The lengthy coilrontation botween the Executive and 1.he NA over the 1969 National
Budget Intensified shartAy Z8 Feb w.aen
President Thieu took the
unexpected step of promulgating
his
amendments.
had acted
(
on the substance of the
matter. The Court said that presidential amendments to NA draft
laws stood unless rejected by
an absolute majority (98) of the total
membership of both houses. However,
since
and did not concern itself with the constitutionality of
any particular the 1969 National Budget would stand as promulgated by the president unless
further challenged.
Aug, completed action on executive amendments .
to the 1969
12 billion.
were cut by $V N 5 billion. Funding
for salary increases for civil servants and soldiers, on the other
hand, was boosted by almost
$V N 2. 5 billion.
Troop Reductions
(S) In a year-end speech on 31 Dec 68, President Thieu had
in 1969 RVNAF
would be prepared
responsibility
he expected NV N
trated
was
becoming
repeated his belief that
if NV N should withdraw its troops the US would gradually do the same,
and that as soon as the security of RV N
was guaranteed by an international military
force, the
relative to replacement of U, troops
by RVNAF touched off waves of
speculation that the figure
uneasiness at the prospect
of US troop with-
most Vietnamese
strong reaffirmation that the US would not permit
any solutions
to tOe confflict which did not allow the RV N people
the right to dottrrnine their
ow n
his 8 May meeting at Midway
Wand
dcclarations were
1
A.
dent Nixon•, rejected
coalition and confirmed support of tho RV N Constitution. The
two presi-
dent, announcVd
been
mont from RVN of
beo
deputies
that
could
Ouccess-
fully 4o earried was a docisiont to forward the minutes of
the session
mild o.epression of NA dlsplvasure
required two rothds.of
necessary,
people of RY'N as a
Mdra UNoatUrio Of contlltnud US COUMitmtent
to the GV;N and
On 19 Sep as
the first guest on a new TV interview program, President Thieu
stressed
village
and 795
and 800 hamlets
political
parties.
Quoc-Dan
Kaomintang, to oppose
which were included in
this list. The faction
in the NSDF.
3, Revolutionary Dai Viet Party
(Dai-Viet
founded in
the 1930's
oppose French rule, which in
1964 split into the RDV and Tan Dai Viet (Tan means "new")
Parties (TDV described
in No. 11).
Deputy
This predomi-
Khanh.
the
and at that time included
as its principal
of smraller organiaation6
which arv not
}iuong, then Secretary
Secretary
Chairman,
Mine.
(No.
7).
9.
Farmor-Wotker
plus a Hoa H o elenwnt
led ty Lv
FWA was ii the Lwtn
Milih (No.
al9a.t_| lo...*nt.t
iP ) (tWhou Trio-Quocta
oukc its ipublti apicarAott until 20 Apr
69.
Its
Chaimian
tb•svitut* ot dnita
UNCLASSIFIED
and its Secretary General -was Professor Nguyen Ngoc Huy, a member of the GVN Paris dulega-
tion and also Secretary General
of
the
11). As
ten provinces and three districts of Saigon. The PNM
published a daily newspaper (Cap Tien), and also a monthly
with articles on
Tan Dai Viet., literally "New Greater Viet-Nani Party"),
one of the t parties formed when the Dai Viet Party split in 1964 (see No. 3). The
leading
figure
in
this
party when it was formed in 1964 was Nguyen Ton
Hoan, who was a Deputy Prime
Minister in the
However, Hoan h~a.d been teaching Vietnamese
in Monterey, California for severp.1
years
and the best~ known active perisonality in the Party was
its Secretary General
Profersor Nguyen Ngoc Huy, who)was also Secretary General of the
gressive Nationalist Movement (see No. 10).
12. National Salvation YranL N'i~ (Mat Tran Nhan £)an Cuu Nguy Dan Toc), often -also
called in
eskablished 10 M~far
68, headee by Senator (former Lt. General) Tran Van Don. The secretary former
Acting Prime Minister,
Professor Nguyen Xuan
(No. 7) but
withdrew.
13. Frecdom Fighterq Association (H-iep HoIi Chieu S' Tu Do). Thi* organization,
basied largely'on
1967. Its platicrm was
democracy, social reform, and Unity
of various forces and religious organizations. The FFA was in
Senator Doll's
retired Maj. ctn.
in the Cabinet
but was not
NSF.
Movemrent (Phong Trao Tati Dan). This politlical party was Orgallised
it- 41968
head o~t one of the C~ o Dali
religioos factions and who placed third
in the 1968 PrcoidetizAl elections, Mr. Sukk~t cloustý%
asaociate Vacufe sor Nguyvn "Thanh
Vinh, a former mvembler
of the Cot tituertt
Assem~b~y 4r.4
a
ViNQID who was not.ascae with an y cf the VNQtDD factions de#rle 1sewhorv in thia
11v~n oo Now. ?,, 17,and
18).
to the publtc at a cororuony 10 Jui
a~t wa g hoaded
by )Ioa
leader Bui Luoug~
itetenciv*.
for petisk
rom thv
Trao Phut H-ung Mien Nami).
Tho Chatirmain waks Nguyen KhAe Tharhi and otler wveil known inom1-rs
wer'e
and
to group young
touthern politie lans.
17 . 'The Vltaisatoai' arty, Sout. qi1 Lae'in Usua lly called thle southernl
VNQI)D, ViVt m Quoc Oanft Dang XU Okng Do
Wion Nami). Led by fortmer
Anti-Fronch (Viet
hlinl rotisfaince
faction groiupod ainioly pertotis%n ti
southern tkar Ot RVN. This tatstidn nwrged with'.he Xihanh 14a~tion (No. Z) trot. April
to July
1969, Wiih Kblatth as Chi asirv of the joint org anistiou.
""NCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
18. Unified Vietnamese Nationalist Party usually called the Unified VNQDD (Viet Na m
Quoc
This faction was formed in
February 1969 and grouped several
smaller factions. Best known personalities in -itwere Secretary General Chu Tu Ky, Chairman
Nguyen
Dinh
Le
Hung, and Phan Ngo, a member of the Saigon City Coun-
cil, plus
a number of Lower House Deputies. this faction was mainly in Central
Vietnamn. (Two other
19. Unified Social Democratic Part (Dan
Chu Xa Ho i Dang
Thong Nhat). The -!Ounde-r
of the
Hoa Hao sect of Buddhism, Huynh Phu So. established the Social Democratic Par-ty in
1945
and was its first leader. When he was assassinated by the Viet Minh in 194?, the parts split into
several factions.
political leaders met and formed the Unified Social Demo-
cratic.
These five were Ba Camr (See No . 15), Trinh Quoc Khanh (Sca' No . 6),
Truong Kim LCuu and
broke up in 1967 when Xhanh
agreed to be-come Npguyen Va n Thieu's Vice Presidential running-mate (Khanh was later replaced
by Nguyen Cao Ky). Thus in A969 the 1-ba Ha o were represented in the
political arena on the one
hand by the Social Democratic Party of
Khanh, which
was in the NSDF, and on the other hand by
the other four political leaders mentioned abov~e. It must
bv made
Hao factions in the
Social Democratic Party, unified or otherwise, were political groups distinct
fromn the two factions con~tending for the leadership of thie Hoa Hat.
religious organization (No.
o9f All
I~elliousa (Mat Tran Gong Dan Ca e To" Ciao, also translated
as the
persan-
the
main religions of Vietnam. When first .formed it called on both the GYN avid
B~uddhists to make concessions to
resolve the GVN-
government be tot up in
consultation wdhl r-titlious, political, andl tabor
proupn. The best lýnown
CatbohW- Father Roanig
Va n Tat of the Cao Wa , au4
Lam
Gia
Tien
Do)
a lawyer who
ticket wa-s
di*41-
lowed. and wh o defended Truohg Dinh Dn u In 1961 when tho Witer wao ixi trial
for
advocatiri
1F istsuod olf 4 Jun.
called for &an meudiate
goveriuuont in ItVN
forces frctn
tour*e of 1969. Uengý
an d a numbor of other tn'.ornboirs 0,
the
denied
22. N44dhill-
Tu
which were the resptctl:v* hnad-
quarters of the
dhists. The An Quang
Buddhists, were strongest
were respected
matters.
The
Tri
Quang,
although
Thien
Minh,
Youth
Commissioner
1969,
having sheltered VC agents and
draft
Center
no
Z
The largest
Cac Huai Sang,
with its impressive
So,
who
was
illuminated
past. few y-arv
thete had Also
or#4nizAattcn.
One Central
Tuong
L-t.; as Saignt |Rpresentative.
Wetrker A4ssociation
(see N1o. 9) so thtn -.omtnitwv- had o link with political
pirtiv%,
Another
sgince the position
for the late
Boa 1-4lo bo•weve
wi r*trwrn •ime
living
Cnrnnl~iivs
had admnnstratlvc
Dolc Province,
the Saigon office
oi ;hc Hoa
"uhaor
tonios
CV T W'At
by fare the
ak
wa# at.
Conlg Nona
Vist Nattr).
-l;ong Buddhist sect.
the
National
Progressive
Force
Trung, Saigon.
Hiep Nghiep
Hung Dao, Saigon. News
of relations with
des Travaillours
du Vietnam).
This con-
with headquarters
at 7
Ly Thai
To. Saigon,
31. General
Tu
,VN. Since universities
to group
DA I MOI, who was
consiiered
porsonalities.
33.
vivwtnaefse
Vetermns
translated
Vietnamest
Vettutrns
Aseciahon).
Thifs
and of the
Chinese ancewtry.
sti"nate#
and along
tho Cambodian
prujnWP Cambodiau
(crmnd
&ýiorgatastion
0te Supreme
Peach 4B a XuycmyProvince
support in Vinh Binh Province, which wac the province with
the heaviest Cam-
areas
Province supported the Saigon
Deputies supported
(Front Unifie de Lutte des
Races
the GVN,
was officially
about as the result of an
agreement in December 1968, between
the GVN and Y Dhe
Adrong, representing
FULRO leader
the GVN agreed to FULRO demands fo r a flag;
for the conversion of
FULRO armed forces into
tions,
vagualy couched terms, a special Highiands Commissariat . When news of
this
the
majority
RVN and were brought to
the Ban Me
their leader,
37. South Vietnamese
Highlands Ethnic Minorities
Mien
cf the GVN-FULRO agreement
Buon,
Krong
Pang
and
EMSM's
avowed
aims
were
basically twofold: cooperation with the GVN in the fight against Communism,
and the continued pursuit
of Montagnard aspirations through
Montagnard population.
Montag-
Senator Ksor Ro t
of
other
Montagnard,
Organizations
39. National Front fo r the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN,
or NL F
NFLSVN
established
on 20 Dec 60; its creation followed from a rmolution adopted
by
The outensible
(Montagnards
The name was
cover name for the
and
front organi-
with the NFLSVN.
on 20 Apr 68.
that
of
the Alliance (No. 41) and the
NFLSVN (No.
than
government of South Vietnam.
agla usI the Commiunist
invasion kept
C(OMJISMAC
to
released
two
of My Tho
11-39
4
year, renewed
US - RKG
alleged US-ARVN
to
13 Jan regretting
this decision
accordance with
its neutral
the
were shot
Local GV N
that the
men were
killed by
Thai Army troops. Thai authorities claimed the men were killed by the VC. The local French
community, including the Consul General, was convinced that the Thais murdered the
men
for
alleged collaboration with the VC . One of the dead employees was the director
of the Binh Son
which was recently closed by Thai troops on
the grounds the
(C) During a press
president said both countries had taken some
actions showing good will and RVN was ready to
push forward if France agreed.
Press reaction from Paris indicated the French
government
was
not willing to
move forward at that time because of its policy of maintaining the status quo
during the Paris peace talks.
The Provisional Revolutionary Government
a "National Congress" was held 6-8 Jun, to establish
the "Provisional Revolutionary
ing
NFLSVN and the Alliance of National, Democratic,
and
religious
and
nationality organizations. The purpose of the new "government" was to unite and
mobilize the people, defeat the US , and overthrow the subservient puppet administration. Most
of the positions in the PRG were held by known members of the NFLSVN or Alliance. The PRO
was recognized promptly by all of the Communist states
and by
Yugoslavia, Algeria, Syria,
Congo (Brazzaville), South Yemen, the United Arab Republic, and Cambodia. (See Chapter III
for additional discussion
8 44
USSR - DR V
(C) The DRV delegation headed by Premier Pham Van Dong ended its visit to Moscow on 18
Oct. During its stay the delegation concluded an economic assistance agreement, as well as a
trade pact for the year 1970. Indications were
that Soviet aid to NVN, programmed for
1970,
surpassed
ENEMY.
predicted
and
expected
a
negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict in 1969. This optimistic view of the 1969 Paris
Talks was
events: the
Nixon administration
ushering out
the Johnson
to
the announcement on
the Paris
The atmosphere for the "new" Paris Talks was thus established
and all parties
were expected to
(U) Four
the Majestic Hotel.
circular
of the Democratic
Republic of Viet-
nam (DRV) and National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
(NFLSVN), led by
side, representing RVN, were delegations froma
the GV N and
Lam and Henry
no visible change
continued to assert its legitimacy and denounce
Communist aggression and atrocities, while the US, denying
any
military
tions in RVN, stated
that the sole purpose of its involvement was to assure self-determination
for the people of RVN
and uphold the US commitment
resultant from the SEATO bloc.
The
satellite forces from RVN, and
claimed itself as the "voice"
of
namese
when
departed.
and
proposals,
no
reciprocal
the
meeting of the National Assembly, as it
opened its regular
the North,
Northern
personnel,
3. Cessation of the use of Cambodia and Laos for subversion,
THIS fP'ACr
t¼ .;',
L" INCLASSIFIED
Order SiC;
UNCLASSIFIED
4. Acceptance of people in the south who act democratically and in
accordance with
means, and
2. All parties
that anyth?.ng
ou r search fo r peace,
I
in
into
will
on the negotiation front.
a major shift in US foreign policy
which I described
Guam on
will
help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential
element of our program prevent future Vietnams.
We Americans are
like to do it ourselves and this trait has
been carried over into our foreign policy.
In
furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and
most
of
Asian country expressed
private
policy
for therm.
1. The United
States will keep
power threatens the freedom of a nation alliod with us
or of a nation whose
survival we considetr
we shall furnish military and
veconmic assistance when
requested in a5 , ordancv with
our treaty on•nmitme nts.
Bu t we shall look to the nationi direellt threatened to
assume the primary responsibility of providing the man-
power
for
Americanized the war in
peace. The
in our assuming
the primary responsibility
not
ade-
namese so that they could
defend themselves when we
the plan, I ordered
* * * * *
We havn now begun to see the results of this
long overdue change in American
policy in
men home...
combat responsibilities from our American troops...
(U)
Aftvr
mntwh.%
offered a 10-point
plan at Paris
on 8 May,
by
Klein, were as
fundamental
1954 Geneva Agreements
troops, military
the other
liquidate all
by the
should settle their ow n affairs without foreign interference andI
establish
the restoration of peace and the holding of
general elections, neither
party should impose its political regime on the people of RVN.
b.
a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, and establish diplo-
matic, economic,
conditions attached.I
through discussions
foreign and reach
8. RVN and NY N would refrain from joining any
military alliance foreign coun-
or personnel on their
the protection
soldiers captured in war
full responsibility for the losses and
devastations it
zones.
on an international supervision
and war
other foreign countries
of the American
replaced Tran Kiem as chief delegate
for
DR V announced the
of this party,
to compliczte the
with
legitiniate RV
a
C.-mrnunist
anti-war demonstrations a
Hznoi considered
(U) In the remraining mownths of 1969, thr.
Paris, Tulks
demnand unilateral
actions by
the Communists hadl ohown no desire-
to
engage
in
genuine
apon the sove reignty
settlement of the
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge resigned as the chief US delegate
to tile
Ameit ica's attempts
tile table."
Gp-4.
4. Msg, 28710, 280629 Sep 68, COMUSMACV
to CDR
Guidance-
4th
Quarter
Guidance
to CDR 7AF,
69, Subj: Counter-Sapper
Techniques (U), Gp-4.
69, Subjý Statement
Operational Guidance
forcernent, Operation
CTZ, 0ZO7,4Z
numbers of ground troops.
questions
of these paroxysms.
a quadrumvirate
of major
primary
figures,
Duan
the option
of larger
broaden
of the situation.
Mekong Delta.
withdrawal
was lower
of the North
of whether to fight a protracted
"waror to seek
a cease fire
victory they sought through political means
...
of force. The basic campaign plan for RVN, embodied
In COSVN
namize the war.
of North Vietnam posed
talks, develop their
respond
of the founder
of the Vietnamese
political scene was highlighted
for and fruitful were soon dampened as the North Vietnam-
ese
of policy was noted during
the first quarter of 1969;
the North Vietnamese were uncomproiising and that a set-
tlement of the war be based on
their Four Point and the National Front for th-i Liberation
of
South Vietnam's (NFLSVN) Five Point peace proposals. In Hanoi during
the
first
quarter
of
was reaching a climax. The decisions which were reached
became known as the VC/NVA delegates at Paris enunciated
their
positions,
captured,
four to
solution
greatly
resembled the Four and Five Point programs, with the addition of one point. The key issue
of the unconditional
remnained. The Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV) was quick to publicly
recognize the 10 Points
and to acclaim the proposal as the
true and just plan for a settlement of the Vietnamese conflict. 1
(U) The Communists made another
overt
solution to the war when the People's Revolutionary
Government (PRG) was established
the key to peace;
and the "puppet GVN" were viewed as obstacles to peace.
(S) Throughout June, July,
and August, the North Vietnamese did not appear to waver
in
their
determination to achieve their often stated objective of unifying the north and
south
with-
out outside intervention (this included their previous views on troops
reductions, world opinion,
that Hanoi had the impression
that the
to disengage
to inflict maximum
public
w
to Hanoi
in August to accompany released US PWs, reported that DRV Premier
Pham Van Dong took a
much harder line toward the US and
appeared
case two years earlier. Pham
appeared to be very skeptical of US policy,
and
1970
being "the year of fiercQ fighting. " Pham demanded uni-
lateral US/Allied troop withdrawal, followed by a goner 1 election which would be supervised by
333 . •THIS PAG R ED •
Y•"IMD
that suc.i an election would "exclude the Saigon clique". Pre-
mier
Pham
stressed
reunification
of
completely
prior
on 3 Sep. Some
vestigial hopes for a breakthrough at Paris remained
and were fanned by an ambiguous statement by the Chief Hanoi delegate to the talks on 2
Sep.
after North Vietnamese leaders
they
remained
wedded for the rest of the year to the formula which they
had earlier stated.
(C) The basic
remained
govern-
ment which would not include President Thieu or Vice President
Ky. Ho Chi
group. Although
about the degree
been indicated
at
Paris, the substance of
the letter continued to assert that the. keys to peace were
acceptance
of
withdrawal of US troops from RVN.
SECSTATE Rogers said later in the
year that 1f the Hanoi leadership did not
intend the letter to be a rejection the Presideat's
letter and
"overlooked", then "all they have to do
is
us".
period for
collegial leader-
by the
Hanoi leadership
the US Vietnamization policy,
socialism
editorial
the Russian Revolutior.
Arm% and in the development of socialisrm,
In
a
departure
ponent
of
on the battlefields
US to make
If a protracted stalemate
the same t•m•e guarantoe
4 completoly in-
of US troop••.
If the NVA
then
mili-
in May of
1969 to receive
agreement
miglit be signed at the end of 1969, and that
in order to prepmre for tuch ,-n
event.
the 300. 000
other essential rnilitary
in order to. r; it the
upper
hand
in
SI
Tin reflected expectations
would be met. Periodically in 1969, there were
indications that the
though never with relinquishing
New Years
people would fight as long as there were US
troops in
Vietnam. It
pro-
duction and building socialism in NVN. 10 The North Vietnamese leaders seemed to
convinced
He also stated
that the DRV
Paris
at
the
"The
Paris
Conference
was held on 25 Jan.
North
during subsequent
meet-
ings: the US was forced, unconditionally, to cease the bombing of NVN; the US was
responsible
NFLSVN; the
was a puppet
from
settlement
at the first
following are extracts from like otatement:
By the Minister XuAn Thuy, Chief of the Delegation
of
Republic Of Viewtnam.,
Conf•rence on VietINam
critit Republic of Vietnam.
Government of the
Natiotml Front
for lboration.
have
used all
NGUYEN THANHI LE
IIes t nleiotiat or., at
tlhu
)h(,tog raphs , and dIiscu ssion of the North Vietname~se
ncot iating. tecam at Pa ris.
se e footnoto~t
demands of world public
party conference has at last been opened....
The purpose of the Paris four-party
conference
on
th-e
basis
national rights,
namely independence,
sovereignty, unity
Agreements on Vietnam....
sabotaging these
adminis-
into a US neocolony
partition
immediate cause of the
spirit, on April 8. 1965, the Government of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam
Government must
with
South
against
the sovereign-
eva Agrvomenvi
ed:
any
UNCLASSIFIED
11_-6
their respective
people themselves
without foreign
South Vietnam
National Front
solution of the
of
deeds to its words and does not
really want a peaceful set-
tlement of the
President
to
defend
(S) During February,
by Xuan Thuy
at Paris, visibly
istratlon, though
appeared to be leaning
more and more toward secret negotiations by the end of March. On 27
March the US
Although the Vietnamese
with
the
Comnunists
will
ultimately
tiations under some formula acceptable
to the United States
sub-
stantive
Hanoi to offer
US private "understandings"
servable military concessions. They also
enable Hanoi
to back
a six-point proposal
for a peaceful
the DRV:
Admir'.stration,
Stat,.s
six-point program
in Saigon's Six Points,
patriotic for es and the National Front for the
Libera-
the US - rigged-up
puppet regime. The
Viet-
ly talk
as a stalemate;
the DR V
the bombing above the
DMZ, and it had
8
the
munist forces had a degree of tactical initiative. As the stalemate developed and the war con-
tinued, Hanoi
tended to
making
the war, the
Proceeding from a desire to reach a
political
United States
The South
of broad sections
of the world
NFL conforms
between
as overseas
respect
still comes
the war to... perpetuate the partition of Vietnam.
(S) During the summer,
the North Vietnamese continued
However, during the funeral
North Vietnamese Prime Minister
to the war
representatives
and by the VC . The North Vietnamese
response was that the PW issue
could be settled
US/GVN
X, Prisoners of War,
suggested that the US discuss
the issue with
the PRG. This
down by the US . After the Chief US delegate, Amabassador
Henry Cabot Lodge, had resigned,
the Chief North Vietnamese
interview to a newsman
are getting
some benefits
if
which they couldn't
about
go out and talk
to the press about
it? We are per-
and talk
end.
the US ceased the bombing of North
Vietnam; NVN emphasized that this
action
taken by the US was "unconditional". The first sentence of the
DRV's opening statement
talks
is evidence of the importance Hanoi placed on
this "fact". This theme was echoed numerous times at the Paris talks and through the various
news media of NVN. By late April, Hanoi's public line on the tacit understandings which had
led to the total cessation of US bombing had developed clearly
and authoritatively. Hanoi
military activity and argued that
US
actions,
rather
than those of DRV, had violated terms set forth in the bombing halt agreement. Hanoi initially
claimed that the offensive
of the Tet cease-fire; it
then widened its field
particular
of the bombing of North Vietnam. The truth is
that
territory and agreed
conference
to the Vietnam
problem. By continuing
and security, the Americans
particularly
held that it was uncon-
ditlonal; however, Hanoi
had not previously
which claimed that an understanding existed, did lend
credence to those reports. It was surmised that Hanoi
had viewed its concessions under the
bombing halt
may have felt
tions under the bombing
(S) Beyond
activities and the restriction of
the US
actions, the new Hanoi line appeared to be designed to squash the almost
universal public as-
a bombing halt. Hanoi may have wanted
to do this
because the US
had failed to
statements were aimed
the likelihood
NVN's Position on US Troop Reduction
(S) As stated in Point One of the DRV's Four Point
solution to the war. the US was
expect-
basis of cor.tention during
Thuy had implied this demand in
his formal presentation at Pa3ris dluring the first plenary
session: he
had been an inferred North Vietnamese
demand
since March 1965. These two represented the first the formula had
ed in explicit terms
repeat of Hanoi's pre-bombing
Hanoi had
persistently demanded an unconditional halt to US bombing. In the end of course,
the bombing
accepted certain strictures on its military
activity.
The conditions of the bombing halt, however,
were never made public, and this may
be precisely the sort of arrangement that Hanoi sought on the troop withdrawal issue. in such
circumstances, Hanoi saw an opportunity to maintain publicly that the US withdrawal was uncon-
ditional and that the same time claim another
"great victory of the
vision: thus, the
force- would
the event of Com-
munist renunciation or violation of the agreernent. In such a case, the US could postpone with-
drawal, but Hlanoi believed that US public opinion
would not allow this to happen.
(S) The dlemandl for unconditional withdrawal also was in harmony with
the larger Comn-
munist press campaign
against the
case with the propaganda before the bombing halt, the wvithdrawal
line
"obdu racy"
of
the US as the a gg resso r in making a cessation
of its
a ggression contingent upon conditions or conce~ssions extra cted from~ the 'vi ctim of aggres -
(S)
1'ri)m Ft-'brun
ry i nto' late A pril, there ,%ere no mat itir indications of a change in l-lanoi 'S
attitud, toward the trtoo p vithdrawal demland: however, on 46t A pr, MiVnh eotdysa
ed that HIanoi wokuld
by a
satrengthening of ARVN forves. Kio made, remiarks \Ohtch suggested that Hanoi w\AK constide ring
the
withdrawal. lie ztaid that
thre (onmtuniqts would be
take, to withdraw its4 troop~s oncti a formal
AMOnnoupill 0lt %if nitentions to withd
raw,ý them hid been
announced. l1o said that 14tanoli Could not
at proatint ansawo t ques~titins tonve mning withdrawal tif itx t roo'pit (rkn
th o 4sou th , he idl anot
resteito 1Iznu~' s stonla rd a sset'tion
th-it the OR\V had no troo~pg in thv louth, Thirl suggested thitt
the (WA' hadl reakched the point
osf
dirawals.
29
frotm its previouts stwnd oni the qurmitin of US troop
rotdictio ie nlVN. Du~ring the 1811h setion of the Part,% oAlk, the
folIlowine ttmn a
daa
troopo -ind th-Are of othier foreigti c untrivix -4 the
US camip (romi South Vivtn~Awtl¶i' the kv'y problem~
bovauste so long1 4A s thoise rtrolos tramplve the- toil
of Vietnam, the %vltoamtanee periple's fundaizmental
N'ational
~thomskelveg
thoir
*
Sep reception in PariF
legitimate demand of the Viet-
narnese people, but
a considerable number
of troops rapidly,
wvell, we'll study this factor and we'll take it into
account. '"31 This was again reminiscent of
the 1967-68 scenario
would
produce
that talks could
talks were completed.
Thuy's pledg(e to "take into account" an acc-,leration of US withdrawals
was
upon the US to take significant action and yet leaving
Hanoi with an opening for further mov'ement.
depending
on
Viet Dung labeled US
maneuver. The NVN AmbossF-ior
to be withdrawn
as a result
of President Nixon's
soldiers in
not explain
away th,ý fact that the US stubbornly stands for retention of half million
soldiers in
lie asserted
that President
of self -determ-ination was also false since the US stubbornly
oppotsed v'reation of
provisional vualititin government for carrying out of general free and derno-
cratie olections. The
basically in three ways
speaking to thle peotple of
NVIN, they s.harply vritivototl
numbers of
34 when,
spealting to
the popu-
lation o'f NVN.ind to their supportora in fihe Smuth, thejy claimed that the troop withdrawals
wore signift-itnt victory (or the VCMA When tipeaking ýo th it:Adro in campign plans and in
polivy dockmeints, they
And
rodeployment.
(C)
In tho latte r niontho of 1969. the Position o;f theo Hantii leader~hip was that
they would
to VS witlitr~wal if the VS agreed to with-Iraw
comtpletoly within a
dritincrdfllip %pAn. Tlhi ?4was tlhe general jwosition that Xuan TIhuy' had *rnutciated
on 2 Soep.
tDong was retorted as 'echoit.g staternants which had
bieen mado at theo Parls talks or 8 rec that 'diocuession ont datea for withdrawal American forces
andi forces of foreig±n couptriost
belonging to American
, CF'
North Vietnamese
fov
a visit to Hanoi talking of an
18 month time span. However,
a
senior
American
Eaton's idea". 36
all US troops leave. A visitor to.
Hanoi said
saying that zoo, 000
R\;N after-
xxithdrawal.
37 Le Duc 'rho, a senior member of the DR V Politburo had indicated
similar con-
Nov when he said that
the US would withdraw completely
RV N within one year after 2ill sides had
agreed to do
(S) Directly
Chapters
US war policy. Hanoi1
would proceed
On one
hand, if the US chose to withdraw forces in small increments, the Communists
-had to
doubts concerning
the achievement
rapidly the major-
ity or all
of US troops
withdrawal, Hanoi
spocific
for
allowed
any
concessions.4.
could
world
public opinion to the point whore it would become potssible f(,. the US
to enaint~ain, indefinitely,
a significant
US force in RVN. Ono of the NY N representatives at
Paris emphasirwd
fiighting with
a significant
to
timte, however, depending
Allied fis;tbng ..apability,
a poss~ible
the~ RVNAI', espmacially'
support
romainod
in-
definitely.
was at a very low point and there
was no US
ground combat presence
de grace.
substantially
improve,
it
grapple
in Quan Doi
The editorial
stated that
Vietnamization
US Forces
that
The growing
that this could
probably feared
aggressor. While
leadership's
strong
they will
Minh ., Death
died of a heart attack
at 0947
hours on
3 Sep
in Hanoi
at the
mediate
disputes
statutre
worsened in July
and continuing
the successful prosecution
of
its power
own
assistance.
they
to
maintain
what internal
policy towards the
war they would
adopt.
(S) Ho Chi Mmih occupied a unique position in the party and
government hierarchy at the
he was 79 years
balancing
was also
the eyes of
ameng the members
of the Politburo
that had paralyzed
NVN to
in the Communist
to Commumnist countries to stop
feuding and achieve
unity of the North Vietnamese
Communist
it was in
and)South Vietnam.
parties be ended.47
lovols of
Howevor,
pione-
strict
of t1e pos~iblo
tydt are
and wh'rn surh
"loot
VITactice "
though this may be
support
of
both
major
Coammunist
p-wers.
48
in
nificant than ideological disputer. The militants, whose membership
was corrpos d of both
civilians and military,
generally
influx of
Soviet
influenc '.
circles concerned
conflicting beliefs
in military
advocated a quick, decisive
generals
this policy until post-Tet
was clearly
to make
marked by a speech
In
factions in the North.
emphasis on dome
ftic proble ns.
scale units and without
"conventional
attacks. A third group, led by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, favored
victory
considerably
weakened
Minh Chinh
Affair". More
important
political
party, government,
limiting the involvement
parently tried to convin, a Chinh and others
who hela the same views that they were wrong.
The
one would guess
offensive in
presented a position
Party. Apparently
the opposition
people if
Also, Chinh
memrbers.
For instance, in addition to Chinh, the
Chief of the NVN
52 The decision
(S) The Party leaders
mediately under him
Communists
who
--
there were
four prime
I. Le
Duan. The most prominent of the leaders wa s Le Duan, 61 years old, First
Secretary
held the
to have established
as 'small President
Ho"). A national-
speeches and
"revisonism".
faction
which
wa s dedicated
at the time
of Ho Chi
labored
short run,
had held the position of
Secretary-General
excesses
The post had
of the
Standing Committee
of the
National Assembly
power,
friendship
as
Giap
among those men,
(proponents of quick military
-HANl
as the
the party took precedence over the military in an insurgen-
cy and was
his primary focus.
The party had
at-
So many
youths fully devoted to the
Revolution are ready
to
control
them.
56
in general, a political structure
was necessary
a "General uprising". These transitory bodies were
known as Revolutionary Committees (RCs). The halfway structure to the Communist seizure of
political power in Vietnam was called,
until the
satisfied that the
enough to recognize that the RC would
have to appeal to
centers. The revised term, Revolutionary C ommittees, which appeared during
the enemy
offensive, attempted to provide a new approach to enlist the
support of the
on
of
the
RCs.
58
b. Chinh, the dogmatist, was flexible as far as choosing tactics which would aid the
Revolution. Thus he favored
Through the
get
warfare
whole,
not
the army in sabotage and in battle. The people are
the water and our army the fish.
He favored
negotiations if they helped advance his cause. Truong Chinh also advocated
strongly
It is absolutely necessary for the people's demo-
cratic dictatorship
revolutionaries and ev.ploiters who refuse to 'ubmit
to reform. Ther.fore, we must pay continuous atten-
tion to consolidating
the repressive appratus
the
One
of his pronouncements was "for a new-born revolutionary power to be lenient with counter-
revolutionaries is tantamount to committing suicide". 59
THLr
PA "
'1.
third ranking member was Premier Pham Van
Dong, also 61
the gov-
1955 and
Hanoi.
regard-
his long time personal friend. In 1960,
however, his
rank fell from second to fourth in the Politburo, removing him from the position of heir-appar-
ent.
4.
Vo Nguyen
Giap. A fourth figure was General Vo Nguyen Giap, 57 years
old; the
North's primary military strategist. He served as Vice Premier, Minister of National Defense,
Commander-in-Chief, and member of
the
mod-
From 1965
to 1968, he appar-
ently sided with the militant faction which advocated a rapid and forceful response to the US
military
to that at Dien
returned to his
five "comprehensive
the "Heroic People's Army",
Socialist
Republics",
and
factors in the struggle. The
basic component
of Giap's strategy was the
long drawn out war to wear out his opponent on the
battlefield
of his forces
"Revolutionary War which relies on
the heroic spirit to triumph
over modern
weapons". The
casualties
by most observers that
there would be no immediate
benefits for the US resulting from a major shift in NVN
policy.
In announcing
Ho's death,
Hanoi explained that "in these days of grief... (it is time for)... all
party, armed
forces and
strengthen
solid-
arity,
and channel all our will and forces into the great cause of fighting and defeating US
agressors... "6 2 The authoritative army
newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan
strongly reaffirmed
the party's leadership of the armed forces. A pledge to maintain "determination to fight and
win" included an uncommon promise "not
to become disheartened
culties
Minh leadership wore con-
al party monthly). The editorial
stated that:
President Ho
which he
is a collective of his
closest
comrades
tested in the long
that the Politburo would continue to function as it did
when Ho was
alive -- much like a board of directors. After the reading
of Ho's will on 9 Sep, Le
Duan
the "Liberation Struggle. "
Order
resolve
country
(Ho's) desire."
(C) Some strains in Hanoi's collective leadership showed through in the last quarter of
1969. Truong
have
recovered
completely
1
950s
of 1968
which he
As early as
commemorating
implicitely
disagreed
sec-
it, Chinh
... of the
concerns in order "...to con-
solidate
the
out
his domestic
targets in a speech on 6 Nov 68 which was published in the
party daily,
Nhan Dan,
the agricultural sphere and
North Vietnam
had apparent-
ly discovered
and when they are allowed individual initative
than they are when forced
to
work
"we must
produce in
a
at
"The
stand and reflect these
the North". In
was
telling
had changed. There
for the
building up the economic and political
structure of North Viet-Nam.
a protracted
appealed for unity in the war effort, and at one
point said:
are to
to reach unanimity. The
person and
understand the truth, the party must engage in criti-
cism
and
self-criticism.
70
(C)
Giap, in a lon-
the celebration
anniversary of the NVA, to enunciate what seemed to be
the position
some
themes
had mentioned in earlier years. It called fo r protracted
war, fo r coordina-
to defeat a large
prepara-
tions, and fo r the exploitation of Allied political and military weaknesses. It wa s
different
of expanding and safeguarding
the rear areas and bases. He stated, "If we succeed in gaining
mastery over the rural
human and material
for
protracted
by leaps
the enemy's mistakes
or of effective
as a suggestion
A third new
of "rational attacks".
The article also placed emphasis on the need occasionally to
be on the
defense "to insure
out the offense".
of forces; a decision
counter pacification,
to maintain
and strengther,
tracted war, and to build up the quality of
the VC/NVA units with an emphasis on innovative
tactics. However, more ambitious
need for medium
and big offensives.
statements about
a ?Irotracted
Offensive
to have formed the basis of COSVN Reso-
lution 9
Neither
precisely when or where any
new offensive would
"The big question in
know how to transform
The statements
of the
VC/NVA actions and
Introduction
(S) The DRV continued to require extensive aid from the USSR in 1969 and continued to re-
ceive it. Prior to Ho's death
and afterwards,
Hanoi's
leaders
war. 72 Soviet
were
that
threatened
be-
tween
in 1969, the
of time in
and
became characterized
by controlled
minor warfare, and
dissension in the Communist
camp may have influenced
was
Union as a possible
allowed the
agree-
didn't give
Premier
Embassy
focusing
in
place".
US-Soviet
confrontation
of
Chinese
influence
and
power.
and
both
there
resolutely demand
munist Party of the Soviet Union and
German
Com-
"munist
Party
on
January
10
in
Moscow.
1
stating that
the past four years,
while the Communist Chinese
petroleum exports
the 1968
figure, but
ships visited
of
1968-69
seven Soviet ships arrived
in NVN in December,
supported the hypothesis
terrorism and indiscrim-
the USSR and the DRV signed a new aid agreement.
Pham Van Don-*
negotiation
excellent
wvere thought
Soviet official
of
US
trying
., , . a problem of aggressor versus victim to a problem of
South Vietnam versus North
mutual troop withdrawal;
in
South Vietnam and ... when US decides to take certain action, we can
reasonably assume that NLF
had
only
noted
peace cabinet in Saigon; he indicated
that a peace cabinet could possibly be the
'..:
NFLSVN and
other DRy-
the following broadcast
was
founded
in
cratic, and Peace Forces
the NFLSVN
people are more clearly
termined to defend their
are aiding the heroic Vietnamese poeple.
Our po-
and
unchanged....
that the only way
nam, and political settlement
de.
"sires
of
the
Vietnamese
poeple.
89
Action in RVN
(U) Following the same lines of the DRV and the NFLSVN,
the USSR expressed the opinion
that the US was the cause of all fighting
in RVN. An Izvestia
commentary on 13 Jan stressed
that "... threat hangs over peace because of the US continuing to escalate.., the war against the
Vietnamese
was losing patience. and that the CHICOMS were gaining
influence in SEASLA as a result
of the
negotiations.
Feb,
such
US
attitude,
one news release stated that the "... US has no cause
to 'resent' attacks since
in talks ind for
renewal of fighting as
operations". The article concluded that perhaps these blows
,..would
bring "...
and finally end the hope
of a US rnili-
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that Pravda ventured no immediate comments on the new VC/NVA offensive and thereby indicat-
ed a
the war in RVN general
coverage and no major changes in approach
were detected; however,
an article entitled "Aggressor Suffers Louses" and devoted
much
attention to US casualty statis-
tics -- indicating that the US had suffere-.. 104, 000 KIA in
the
viewed as a gesture of Soviet support
for the DRV/NFL-
and successful offensive
was also significant that this
article came on the heels of Le Duc Tho's visit to
Moscow, which was followed
on 8 May, by
for the war. 92
(G) The NFLSVN published its 10-Point solution to the war
on 8 May; in response,
Pravda
published
proposal as a new
initiative that again showed the "profound g