commentary on epictetus 32-34

7/30/2019 commentary on epictetus 32-34

1/28

Commentary on Epictetus' Enchiridion

(Chapters 32-34)

by Simpliciu s (c. early sixth centu ry)

Chapter. XXXII.

It is possible, you observe some other person more caressed than yourself; invited to

entertainments, w hen you are left out; saluted before are tak en any notice of; thought more

proper to advise with, and his counsel followed rather than yours. But are these respects

paid him good things, or are they evil? If they deserve to be esteemed good, this ought to

be a matter of joy to you, that that person is happy in them: but if they be evil, how

unreasonable it is to be troubled, that they have not fallen to your own share? Besides,

consider, I pray, that i t is not possible, you should have those civilities paid to you in the

same degree that others have; because the profession you have taken upon you, will not

suffer y ou to do the same things to deserve them that others do. And how can it be

should have the same interest, w ith one that constantly pays his morning devotions there?

Or he, that only minds his own business, with another that is eternally cringing, and

commend him; with a parasite, that is ever blowing him up with his own praise, indulging

all h is vices, and admir ing his follies and h is nonsense. At this rate, you are a very unjust,

and a most unreasonable man; for you expect to receive that grat is, which is really s et to

sale, and cannot be obtained w ithout pay ing the price. For instance now, and to use a very

familiar one, you inquire in the market, how lettuce go and are told, they are a half -penny

apiece. Suppose now, another person bids, and pays, and takes them; and you w ill

neither bid, nor pay, and go without them: is there any wrong done? Or hath the buyer a

better bargain than y ou? He parted w ith his money, and hath the salad; y ou have no

salad indeed, but you have kept your money. Just so it is in the case before us. You were

Pay the price, and you may have it; but that pr ice, is commendation and flattery. If

therefore you think the thing for your advantage, it is set to sale, and you know the market

rates. But if you expect it should come wi thout mak ing payments, you are very

unreasonable. And if it be thought too dear, then sure you have no reason to complain; for,

e something as good in the room of


2/28

it; for you have the satisfaction of keeping the price in your own hand still; that is, of not

commending a man against truth and conscience.

Comment.

This discourse seems to be a continuation of the former; proceeding to obviate some

objections sti ll behind, su ch as seem all t o arise from the same habit and disposit ion of

min d. For, when a man hath tu rned all h is thoughts and care upon his own

improvement, and hath disengaged h imself from the world, and it s encumbr ances; when

he hath arrived to that largeness and sufficiency of soul, as to despise riches, and honor,

and popular it y; when he th inks it un becomin g his character, to cour t t he count enance of

great persons, by all the means art s and obsequious att endance of slaves and

sycophants; th ere will, in all lik elih ood, follow th is inconvenience upon it , that he shall

be slighted and disregarded him self, m any of hi s equals and inferiors shall be invited

home to entert ainments, shall be more part icul arly addressed to in pu bli c places, and

receive all outward marks of respect; nay many less capable of advising than he, shall be

admit ted into the secretes of families, and consu lted in all t heir affairs of import ance,

while this person, so much their superior in worth and wisdom, is in dustr iously

neglected.

Now all t he seeming hardshi p, th at appears in such u sage, Epictetus m ight, i f he had

thought fit, have taken off in one word, by remitting us to his usual distinction, of the

th ings that are, and th at are not, with in the compass of our own choice: for, i f those

th ings that condu ce to our r eal happiness be at our own disposal, and the th ings here

mentioned are not so; then ought we not t o suppose our happiness at all to consist i n

them. Bu t t hi s solut ion of the difficult y he takes no notice of here; partl y because it is

general, and applicable to many other cases as well as this, and partly, as presuming it

abundantly enlarged upon, and t hat h is reader was su fficient ly perfect in it before. That

therefore, which he chooses to in sist u pon, is someth ing, th at comes up closer to the

matter in hand; and proves, that the inconveniences here alleged minister an occasion of

much greater advantage, to those, who have the wisdom to make a right use of them.

To th is pur pose, he tells us, th at the instances in wh ich men of inferior quali fications

have the preference and respect, before those, who have made a stri ct ph ilosophical l ife

their choice, must be either good or evil. If you please, to make the division perfect, I will

take the confidence to add, or indi fferent; for i n t ru th , there are a great many t hin gs of

th is middle sort. Bu t t hen it mu st be confessed too, th at th ose which are indifferent , can


3/28

neither be called honorable nor dishonorable. And for th at r eason, the aut hor seems n ot

to have thought th is branch wort h any r oom in his division. Well, we will say then,

according to him, that they are all in one of the extremes, either good or evil: now if they

be good, (says he) this ought by no means be a matter of discontent to you. But quite

cont rary, it should add to your joy and satisfaction, that another person is happy in

them. For this calls for the exercise of a very exalted and philosophical virtue; that of

wishin g well t o all m ank ind, and rejoicing in t he prosperi ty of others.

And h ere we shall do well to observe, what a mighty good he makes this seeming evil to

contain, and how prodigious an honor t his disrespect derives upon u s. For th is indeed is

the very quali ty of the min d, which br ings us to th e tr uest and nearest r esemblance of

God, which is the greatest happiness, any of his creatures can possibly attain to. For

God is himself of absolute and unbounded power, being indeed the only source of all the

lim ited powers commu nicated to any other beings. And as his power is in fini tely great,

so his will is in fini tely good. For hence it comes to pass, that he wou ld h ave all th ings

good, and n ot anything evil, so far as that can be. And because his wil l can i ntend

noth ing bu t what his power is able to accompl ish, t herefore he does really make all

th ings good; and t his he does not n iggardly and grudgingly, bu t comm unicates to every

creature of his own goodness, in as large proportions, as the condition of each creature

is capable of enjoying it .

ot resemble God, in i nfin ite and uncontr ollable

power, for t his is a perfection of the divine natu re, which ou r consti tu tion cannot receive;

and besides, there are many degrees of intermediate beings, which, though much

in feri or to God, are yet much superior t o us in point of power. Bu t sti ll i n t he other par t

of his excellence, he hath condescended to make us like himself, and given us the honor

of a will free and u nboun ded, a wil l capable of extending it s good wishes, and k ind

inclinat ions to all the world, provided we have bu t the grace to make this good use of it .

It is therefore an instance of his wonderful wisdom, and adorable goodness, that he hath

made this to be his image and simi lit ude in our soul s; because th is is th e true and

proper principle of all operation and action. And though the soul cannot punctually

make all things good, as God can, and does; yet it goes as far as it can in making them

so; and for t he rest, i t does it part , by wishing that good, which i t cannot give them. For

th at is perfect and t ru e volit ion, when th e person wil lin g, exert s his whole str ength, and

all t he facult ies assist and concur wit h i t; for we have the absolute disposal of ou r own


4/28

minds, and so the wishing well t o all m ank ind, is what any man m ay do, if he please.

And in deed a tr ul y good man goes farther than all th is; he wishes the prosperi ty of all

men whatsoever; and he stops not there, but extends his kindness to creatures of

different species, to bru tes, to plant s, to even i nanimate th ings; in a word, t o all th at

make those wishes effectual to all, because as I said, the willing is a perfection given us

by natur e, bu t t he power of effecting it i s not. For th is requir es the cooperation of many

other causes, the perm ission of the gods, and th e concurr ence of several agent s, which

we cannot comm and. And hence it is, that all our virt ue consists in our will ; the merit of

all our actions is measured by th at; and th at all t he happiness and misery of ou r l ives is

made to depend upon the good or ill use of it. And thus you have the force of this

argument, proceeding upon a supposition that t hese thin gs are good.

Bu t i f on th e other hand, the respects denied to the phil osopher, and paid to others, be

evil; here can be no ground of dissatisfaction, but a fresh occasion of joy: not upon his

account indeed who hath them, but upon your own, who have them not. At this rate, the

good man can never be melancholy at the want of these thin gs, nor l ook upon it as any

disparagement t o his person, or dim inut ion of his happiness, but is sur e to be pleased,

let the event be what it will; that is, either for the good success of others, if it be good; or

for hi s own escape, if it be evil. And t hu s all angry r esent ments are taken off, in point of

interest and advantage; for though we allow these things to conduce to our happiness,

yet it is a much greater happiness, to aspire after a resemblance of the divine

perfections, which the missing of th em gives men an opportu nit y to do; and if t hey

rath er t end t o make us miserable, then the being wit hout them is not so properl y a

want , as a deliverance.

After th is he proceeds to two other t opics, the possibil it y of obtain ing them, and the

reasonableness of expecting them. From the former of these he argues thus. It is not to

be imagined, that one who never makes his court, should have the same privileges, with

one who is eternally laboring to ingrati ate him self. This labor mu st consist of all t he

ceremonious fopperies, and servile submissions imaginable; the waiting at the great

and al l p laces of publ ic concourse; th e commending all he does, though never so base,

and admiring all he says though never so senseless. And therefore, for a philosopher,

and a man of honor and tr ut h, who cannot subm it to these un worthy methods of


5/28

insinu ating himself, to meet wi th the same count enance, and mark s of ki ndness, which

th ose who prostit u te themselves at th is rate for them; is, as the world goes, absolutely

impossible.

Nay, it i s not only un reasonable upon that accoun t t o expect th em, bu t in point of

just ice too. I t argues a m an greedy and insat iable, when he expects h is meal, and yet wi ll

not consen

yourself, what he hath already bought and paid for: for t hough he left no money under

his plate, yet h e gave that pu rchase, which you would have thought mu ch too dear. And

consequent ly (as he shows by that instance of the lett uce,) you who went without the

dinner, have as good a bargain at least, as he that was admit ted to it : he had t he

varieties indeed, bu t then you have your liberty; you did not enslave yourself so far, as to

nor bear the affected coldness of his welcome, nor the tedious attendance in his anti-

chamber. In short, you were not t he subject of h is haughty n egligence, and st iff

form alit y, nor t he jest of his saucy servants. Now all th is you must have been content

with, t o have dined with his greatness. If you expect i t upon easier terms, you are

mistaken, for it will come no cheaper; and if you expect it , wit hout paying as others do, it

argues you greedy, and an u nfair tr adesman. And t his character is not consistent wi th

th at of a good man; so that you must change your temper, and be more moderate in

your expectances of this k ind .

Chapter. XXXIII.

We cannot be at a loss, what the condi tion of things is by nature, what her law s and

methods, nor how men ought to deport themselves, with regard to them: for these are

things so plain, that al l the w orld, at one time or other, are universally agreed about them.

For instance, if a neig

is a very common accident. Now the application fit to be made from hence is, that, when

one of our own happens to be broken, we should no more think it extraordinary , nor suffer

it to gi

trivial example, should prepare us for bearing casualties of greater consequence, with the

like temper. When any of our acquaintances buries a child , or a w ife, everybody is ready

to mitigate the loss, with the reflection, that all men are mortal , and this is w hat a ll men

have therefore reason to expect. But w hen the misfortune comes home to ourselves, then

we give a loose to our passions, and indu lge our lamentations and bitter complaints. Now


6/28

these things ought quite otherwise to awaken the same considerations; and i t is bu t

reasonable, that what we thought a good argument to moderate the resentments of other

people should be applied with the same efficacy, to restrain the excesses of our own.

Comment.

There are some notions concern ing the natur e of thin gs, in wh ich all mank ind consent ;

and not any one considering person ever pretended to contest or contradict them. Such

are these that follow: th at wh atever is good; is profitable, and wh atever is t ru ly

profitable, is good: that all t hings are carr ied by a natu ral p ropensit y to the desire of

good; th at equal th ings are neither less nor m ore than one another: that twi ce two

makes fou r; and t hese notions are such as right reason hath recommended and ri veted

in to our minds, such as long experience hath confir med, and such as carry an exact

agreement with the tru th and natu re of th ings.

Bu t wh en we descend from t hese general t ru th s, to the part icul ar ideas and doctrines of

single persons, t here we very often find our selves mi staken. And these erroneous

opin ions are of di fferent sorts. Some of them deceive us, by t oo credulous a dependence

upon the report of our senses, as when we pronounce the circumference of the moon, to

be as large as that of the sun, because it appears so to the nak ed eye. Some we are

prepossessed in favor of, by in clining too much t o our sensual in clinat ions; as when we

say, that all pleasure is good. Some are owing to the admitting of arguments before they

are well weighed; as those, which advance th e belief of the worl d being made by two

principles, and that the soul is corporeal. Now these are what men argue differently

upon, and t hey are so far from being always tru e, that many t imes the tru th lies on the

contrary side of the question. And it can never be safe for us to depend upon such

parti cular assumptions, for the kn owledge of th at tr ue state of th ings, which Epictetus

means here, by the condit ion, the laws, and the meth ods of natur e.

Bu t n othing can be a more pregnant proof, how exceedingly fickle and u nfaith ful

parti cular opinions are, and how firm and u nalterable those general and acknowledged

ones, th an t he variety of behavior , in one and th e same case. For let any accident

quit e another person, tr ansport ed wi th the vehemence

of his concern, and all his reason proves too feeble to support it. But when the very same

misfort une happens to another, th ere is none of this disorder; he then looks upon i t as it

really i s, considers it calmly and coolly, without passion or preju dice, and passes the

same judgement u pon i t wit h t he rest of the world who have no part ial affection, or


7/28

parti cular concern to pervert them; but regard only t ru th , and the clear reason of the

thing.

This he illust rates by a very t ri vial instance, th at of breaking a glass: which when done

exceedingly common t his is: th at i t is what happens every day; that, considering how

lit tle a thing th rows a child down, how often they let t hin gs drop out of their hands, and

withal, of how exceedingly brittle the matter of the vessel is made, that the least blow in

the world dashes it to pieces, it is rather t o be wondered, that such th in gs happen no

oftener: thus we say, when our discourse is sober and dispassionate. But when one of

our own is broken, t hen we rage and storm, as if some new thing had happened to us.

And yet in all reason, the same consideration of the accident being so usual, ought to

offer it self t o our minds, then too, and wi th the same success.

Now th is (says he) you may, if you please apply to matters of greater im portance: when

any of our acquain tances buries his wife or h is chil d, who is there, that does not

presently

reflection, from the common principles in their own minds, and the plain constant

course of nature, which they find agreeable to them. For to die, there is a necessity

unavoida

fate, would imply a contr adiction. And yet for all th is, when such a loss happens in a

ext ravagances of passion do immediately follow? Nay, how hard is it to persuade men

th at there is not a justifiable cause for all t his, or t hat any other person l iving ever

suffered such an affliction before? Now, why should not such a one recollect how he felt

himself affected, when he saw his neighbor in such excesses, and how wisely h e cou ld

tell hi m t hen, that he mistook h is own case? That death was inevitable, and nothin g

more frequent; and t hat t here was nothi ng in the accident i tself, whi ch coul d create all

th is disorder, bu t i t was owing ent irely to his own mi staken apprehensions and t he

violent passions of his own m ind, which showed him t he thing in a false light?

Now indeed there are two reasons why we should be thus partial and passionate in our

own case: one is, th e exceedin g fondness, and tender sympath y, between th e rational

soul , and the mortal body; which considerin g that th is part m ust die, is mu ch more

close and moving, than in reason it ought t o be. The other is, th at though we know and

are satisfied, that die we must, yet we do not care to think of it; and so these two dear


8/28

friends live together, as if they we never to part. Now there is nothing that gives man so

mu ch distu rbance and confusion, as the being surpri sed wit h any accident ; for,

whatever we have foreseen, and m ade fami liar t o ou r th oughts by long expectat ion, n ever

gives us those violent disturbances.

This I take to be sufficiently plain, from what we see in our behavior afterwards. For even

th ose th at are most i ntemperate in th eir grief, yet wi th in a lit tle whi le, when they come to

be used to the being without what they lament t he loss of, retur n to th emselves and th eir

reason again, and all is quiet and easy, as if no such misfortune had ever happened.

Then t hey can suggest to their own composed thoughts, what at fi rst they cou ld n ot

endu re to hear, th at t his is no m ore than we see daily come to pass; th at other people

are liable to it , and have born i t as well as they; that th e condi tion of our natu re is

mort al, and most absurd it is to suppose any man can be exempt from t he common fate

of his natu re; that our friends are only gone a lit tle way before, in t he beaten road, which

all our forefathers have tr odden, and in which we ourselves shall short ly follow them.

Now if thi s separation, when a li tt le time and custom hath rendered it fami liar , becomes

so very supportable, after the thin g hath h appened; I would fain kn ow, what reason can

be alleged, why the making such a separation familiar to us beforehand, by frequent

th ought s, and perpetual expectations of it, should n ot enable us to bear it with great

evenness of temper, whenever it shall happen. For surely the true cause of all

immoderate concern upon these occasions, is that we do not represent these things to

our own thoughts, nor accustom ourselves to them so effectually, as we might and ought

to do. And t he reason of th is again seems to be, th at t he generali ty of people have th eir

minds fastened down t o their fortunes; and all t heir imaginations form ed, according to

the model of th eir present condi tion. Hence it is, th at t he prosperous m an is always gay

and big, as depending upon the continuance of his happiness, and never dreaming of

any possible change in h is affair s. And t hu s people also un der un happy cir cumstances,

are as comm only dispir ited and diffident, and can entert ain li tt le thought of a

deliverance, and bett er days. Bu t another cause, which cont ribu tes to th is fault as much

as the former, is the unreasonable fondness of these things, which men lament the loss

of so tenderly: they perfectly dote upon them, while they have them; and cannot

therefore admi t any thought so uneasy as that of part ing wit h them; for n o man alive

cares to dwell l ong upon m editations which are troub lesome and afflicti ng to him . This

fondness is the thing we should guard ourselves against , as least cu t off all the excesses


9/28

of it, by reflecting seriously what we are ourselves, and what that is, which we so

passionately admi re. We should consider, t hat it is what we cannot call our own; and

th at, th ough we cou ld, yet i t is so imperfect a bli ss, as to cloy and weary u s with l ong

enjoyment . Our ki ndness therefore shou ld be reduced, and brought wi th in such

proporti ons as are consistent wit h decency and m oderati on: and in all our conversation,

it will be great prudence to abstain from all expressions and discourse, and especially

from all such actions in our behavior, as tend to endear t hese thin gs the more, and serve

in truth for no other end, than to cherish our own folly, and make our passions more

exorbit ant and u ngovern able.

Chapter. XXXIII.

As no man sets up a mark , w ith a design to shoot beside it: so neither hath the Maker of

the World formed in it any such real being, as evil.

Comment.

The disputes, whi ch are wont t o arise concern ing the natu re and origin of evil, have by

being unskillfully managed, proved occasion of grievous impiety towards God, subverted

the very foun dation of vir tu e and good manners, and perplexed many unwary persons,

with several dangerous scru ples and inextr icable difficul ties.

First , as to that opinion, which makes evil a first pr inciple, and will h ave two common

principles, a good and a bad one, from whence all things whatsoever derive their being, it

is attended with a thousand pr odigious absurdi ties. For, whence should t his power of

being a prin ciple, which is one, and is imparted to both t hese cont rar ies in comm on,

whence I say, should it come? Or how should one and the same cause give it to them

both? And how is it possible, that these two should be cont rar ies un less they be rank ed

under one common genu s. For we mu st dist ingui sh between d iversit y and contrariety;

that which is white, cannot be termed contrary to that which is hot or cold; but

cont rar ies are properly those th ings that are most di stant from one another, yet still

under the same common genus. White then and black, are contraries, because both bear

relation t o the genu s of color; for th ey are both colors alike. And hot and cold are

cont rar ies, for t hey likewise meet under t he genu s of tacti le qualiti es. And this is reason

enough t o show, that cont rar ies cannot possibly be first pri nciples, because there mu st

have been some common genus antecedent to them, or they could not be contraries: and

fart her, because one mu st n eeds have a being, before many; for each of t hose man y


10/28

beings mu st subsist , by virt ue of its essence, comm un icated from that fir st being,

otherwise nothing could ever have been at all.

Again, some single ori ginal bein g there must needs have been, which m ust have been a

foundation for part icular propert ies, and from wh ich t hose propert ies mu st have been

distr ibu ted among the many. For, from th e divine original good, all good things

whatsoever p roceed; and in lik e manner all tr u th , from the same divine fount ain of

tr u th . So that, though there be several pri nciples of several propert ies, yet still these all

are comprehended in , and r esolved in to, one pri nciple at last; and t hat, not some

subordin ate and part icul ar one, as these are in their own kind only; bu t a pri nciple from

whence all t he rest spri ng. One that t ranscends, connects, cont ains th em all, and

comm un icates to each of them it s causal and productive power, wit h such limi tations

and abatements, as their respective natures require. So exceedingly irrational and

absurd it is, to th ink of advancing two principles of all things, or to suppose it possible

th at th ere should be more than one.

Besides, they that wil l h ave this u niverse to proceed from two prin ciples, are driven by

their own tenets into a thousand wild inconsistencies. They tell us, one of th ese

principles is good, and the other evil; they call the good one God, but yet at the same

time, they do not allow him to be the un iversal cause: they cannot worship h im as

almighty, for indeed they have clipped the wings of his omnipotence, and are so far from

ascribing all power to him, t hat they divide it i nt o halves, or to speak more properly th ey

call him the source of goodness, and spring of light, and yet deny, that all things receive

light and goodness from him.

Now what horri d blasphemies, what opprobrious reflections does th is doctrine cast u pon

th e majesty of God? They represent hi m as a feeble and a fear fu l being, uneasy with

cont inual apprehensions, th at evil will invade his terr itories. And, to ease himself of

these fears, and buy off hi s enemy, cont rary to all j ustice, and honor, and in terest,

casting some souls away, (which are so many parts and parcels of himself, and never

merited by any offence of theirs to be thus delivered up,) that so, by parting with these,

he may compound for the rest of the good ones with him. Like some general in distress,

who, when t he enemy attacks him, sacrifices one part of his arm y, to gain an

opport un ity of bri nging off the other. For t he sense of what th ey say amounts to th us

much, though it be not expressed in the very same words. Now he that delivered up

these sou ls, or commanded th em t o be delivered up i n t hi s barbarous mann er, h ad su re


11/28

forgot, or at least did n ot du ly consider, what m iseries those wretched spiri ts must

endu re, when i n t he hands of that evil p rinciple. For (according to them) they are burnt ,

and fried, and tormented all manner of ways; and t his too, notwit hstand ing they were

never guil ty of any faul t, bu t are sti ll parts of God himself. And at last th ey tell u s, that,

if any such souls happen to apostat ize, and degenerate into sin, t hey never recover

themselves; nor are from thencefort h in any possibili ty of retu rn ing to good, bu t

cont inue inseparably u nit ed to evil forever. (Only here it is fit we take notice what sou ls

these are, and h ow they thu s degenerate; for they do not admi t their crim es to be

adult ery or mu rder, or any of th e grossest and m ost flagit ious enorm it ies of a dissolu te

and wicked conversation, but only the denying of two principles, an evil and a good one.)

In the meanwhi le, this God, it seems is left maimed and imperfect, by the loss of so

many of his parts; he is stupid and senseless too, (in their hypothesis I mean, so far be it

from m e to entert ain so irreverent a thought) for h e un derstands nothing at all, either of

his own i nterest, or t he natu re of evil: if he did; what dread could he be under, or how

should evil enter int o any part of that province which good possesses; since th eir natu res

are so very distant and i rr econcilable, that t hey cannot run in to each other, bu t t heir

bounds are fixed, and immovable barriers set between th em from all eterni ty?

For th is th ey say too. Bu t who, in the name of wonder, set these bounds and barr iers?

Did chance? Then it seems they make chance a common principle too. Did any other

being which had aut hori ty over both these, and prescri bed to th em as it self th ought fit ?

Then i t seems that had a subsistence, before they made the world. Bu t how coul d t hat

be done before the creation? For t he division they make is li ke th is upon Earth; t hey

assign the eastern, western, and northern regions to good, and reserve only the south for

evil.

Afterwards they go on, and fancy, th at evil hath five apart ments, li ke so many dens or

cavern s; and here they tell u s of woods, and all mann er of animals, such as frequent

both sea and land; t hat t hese are at eternal war wit h one another; and t hough they are

said to be imm ortal, as being originally good, yet they pretend at the same time, th at

they are devoured by their five-formed monster.

Now then, since these dist inct r egions have been set out , as you see, from th e beginn in g

of the world at least; and each assigned and accommodated to its pecul iar inhabit ant; I

would fain be satisfied, whi ch way evil should m ake an incursion in to the dominions of

good. Or, if we should suppose this possible, yet could it be done however, and still these


12/28

two remain cont rary to one another? May we not as well say, that wh ite may be black ,

and yet retain its whiteness still; and that light can admit darkness, and still be light, as

that perfect evil can make approaches to perfect good, and still continue perfect evil?

And, if th is im possibili ty be evident and u navoidable, what occasion is there to descri be

God as they do, comm it ting an act of so much u nnecessary fear, and folly, and in ju stice,

as is the casting away souls to evil for his own security, and ever since, laboring to no

pu rpose (for so th ey wil l n eeds have it too) to redeem th ese sou ls fr om misery? A design

never to be effected, because, as I observed before, some of them have lapsed, and so

must abide under the dominion of evil to all eternity: and all this they will not allow the

good to have had any knowledge or foresight of, though with the same breath they

pretend, t hat t he evil pri nciple knew perfectly well what n umber of souls would fall int o

his hands, and l aid his stratagems accordingly.

Their scheme certainly had been much better contrived, had they represented the good

principle, as always employed and t aken u p wit h the contemplation of itself, and n ot

engaged it in perpetual war, with an enemy never to be vanquished or destroyed. For

they make evil t o be no less eternal and immortal, than good. And th is in deed is a

considerable objection, and a just reproach to their whole system, that eternal existence,

and in corr uptible duration, no beginning, and n o end, are allowed to evil, as well as to

good. And wh en these glorious attr ibu tes are given to that which we cannot bu t detest,

what difference is th ere left, or wh at can we say more in honor of that, which we cannot

bu t l ove and admir e?

Let u s now proceed, if you please, to t ake a shor t view of th e account th ey give,

concern ing the creation of th e world. Pill ars then there are, th ey tell u s, not l ike those of

th e poet,

Which t his vast globe of Eart h and Heaven sustain ,

(for they scorn , th at any poetical fictions, or th e least fabulous cir cumstance, should be

allowed a place in their philosophy;) but (as one of their greatest masters hath informed

us) of solid unhewn stone, and twelve windows, one of which is constantly opened every

hour.

Bu t t heir marvelous wisdom is not more emin ent ly seen in any one instance, than the

accoun t they pretend t o give of eclipses. They tell u s, that when in framing of the world

the evils th at were in conjuncti on together gave great distu rbance, by t heir jostling and

disorderl y motions, the lum inaries drew certain veils before them, t o shelter them from


13/28

the ill in fluences of that di sorder; and, t hat eclipses are noth ing else, bu t the sun and

moon hi ding themselves stil l behind those veils, u pon some extr aordi nary and

th reatening emergencies.

Then again, how odd and unaccount able is it , th at, of so many heavenly bodies which

give light to t he world, th ey should hold only the two great ones in veneration, and

condemn all the rest; assigning the Sun and Moon t o the good pr inciple, bu t pu tt ing all

the stars into the possession of the evil, and deriving them from a bad cause?

The light of the moon t hey do not agree to be borrowed from t he Sun , bu t t hink it a

collection or constellati on of souls, wh ich she draws up, li ke so many vapors from the

Earth , between change and fu ll; and t hen t ranslates them by degrees in to the sun, from

the ful l t o the next New Moon.

In short, they have a world of extravagant fancies, which do not so much as deserve to

be reckoned among fables. And yet th ey are by no means content to have them looked

upon as fabulous, nor do they use them as figures or hieroglyphics, so as to signify

someth ing else of more substan ti al goodness, bu t w il l needs have th em believed to be

str ictl y and li terally t ru e. Thus t he image they give us of evil, is a monster, compounded

of five several creatures; a lion, a fish, an eagle, and some oth er two th ings, I do not well

remember what; but all these, together, are supposed to make a very ravenous and

form idable composition.

Such abominable impiety against God are th ese notions and pr inciples chargeable with ;

and yet (which is still more amazing) the persons, who advance them, profess to take

sanctu ary in these opinions, out of a more than common r espect, and a profounder

reverence to the divine perfections, than the rest of the world (as they think) express.

They cou ld n ot bear th e impu ting any evil t o God; and, t o avoid th is in convenience, th ey

have foun d out a part icular pr inciple and cause of all evil; a principle equal in honor and

power to th e good, or rather indeed superior and more potent than He. For in all t he

attempts m ade hi thert o, to corru pt t he world, and render it miserable, evil seems plain ly

to have got the better. For they represent evil upon all occasions taking advantage

against good, and contr iving all mann er of ways not t o let it go. This i s constant ly the

bold and daring aggressor; while good, in the meanwhile, gives way to, and mingles itself

with evil, would fain compound the matter, and, for anything that yet appears, hath

discovered nothing in it s whole management, bu t fear, and folly, and i nju stice. Thus,

whi le they abhor to call God th e cause of evil, th ey make him noth ing bu t evil i n t he


14/28

most exquisite degree; and (according to that vulgar proverb) leap out of the frying pan

into the fire.

But, besides these vile profanations of the majesty of God, this system of philosophy

does, as mu ch as in it lies, tears u p th e very roots of all virt ue and moral instr uction, by

destroying and ut terly tak ing away all that liberty of choice, which God and natu re hath

given us. For, besides those att ri but es of eterni ty and imm ortalit y, it does also ascribe to

th is pr inciple of evil a compu lsive power over our will s; and that, so very absolute and

strong, that it is not only out of ou r own di sposal, whether we will commi t wi ckedness or

not, bu t such as even God h imself i s not able to cont rol or overpower. In the meanwhil e

it mu st be confessed, th at this is a very i dle and extr avagant imagination: for, i f our

soul s are violently th ru st and born down in to mu rder or adultery, or any other th at are

reputed the most grievous crim es, and commit these, merely by th e impu lse of some

stronger power, wi thout any consent or volunt ary concurr ence of their own, t hen are

they clear of all guil t. And th is is a mat ter so evident and acknowledged, th at all laws

both divine and human, acquit persons in cases of violence, and such a force as they

cou ld not resist, and wh ere it i s plain t hey acted against t heir wi ll . And indeed th ere is

not, nor can be any sin at all in such actions, where the min ds of men are supposed to

have no concern , bu t to proceed u pon necessit y and constr aint , and su ch as cou ld n ot

be resisted by them.

Now if th ese wise phi losophers, whi le they were at a loss, where to fix th e tru e cause of

these things, considered as evils, bethought themselves of this remedy, and set up such

a principle of evil, as you have heard, to resolve the difficulty; they have done their own

business effectually, and, by a very pleasant blunder, overturned their whole scheme at

once. For, i f it follows likewise, (upon the supposal of such a constr aint put upon the

will s of men by t hat principle) that nothin g they do is any longer evil, then observe, how

pleasant a conclu sion they have brought their matt ers to: for t he consequence lies

plain ly th us, if th eir be such a th ing as a principle of evil, th en t here is no such th ing as

evil in the world; and if t here be no such th ing as evil, then th ere cannot possibly be any

such th ing as a pri nciple of evil; and so upon the whole matter, they have left themselves

neither a pr inciple of evil, nor any evil at all.

Since therefore this is discovered to be but a rotten foundation; if any, conscious of its

weakness, shall presume to affirm, that God is the author of evil as well as good, the

falsehood and im piety of th is assert ion wil l ask bu t l it tle tim e and pains to evince it . For


15/28

how in deed can we suppose it possible, th at that opinion shou ld be true, which casts

such unworthy aspersions upon him , who is the author and giver of all tr ut h?

And fi rst , wh ich way can one conceive, that God, whose very essence is perfect and

immutable goodness, should produce evil out of himself? For, since evil and good are

contrary to each other, as our adversaries themselves grant, how can we imagine one

cont rary to be the product ion of another?

Besides, he that produces anything out of himself, does it, by being the cause of its

existing, by having the cause within h imself, and by having some lik eness to it in his

own natu re; and so, if you respect h im as the cause, th e producing, and the produced,

are in some degree the same. So th at t he promoters of thi s opinion seem not to have

attended to the mani fest dishonor t hey pu t u pon God, by making him not only the cause

and author of evil, bu t t o be the first and original evil in his own natu re.

Since therefore there is no such thing as a common principle of evil, and since God is

not t he au thor and cause of it, what account shall we give of its coming int o the world?

For it is im possible anything should h ave a beginning, without a cause. And the best

course we can take for th is wil l be, first to explain what we mean by evil, and t hen to

inquire into its origin; for the causes of things will very hardly be found, till their natures

are first k nown.

Now as to that evil, which they suppose, who profess to believe a common principle of

evil, and m any of those who dispu te thi s question u nderstand, we may be bold to

pronounce, that there is no such thing in nature. For they pretend, that this evil hath a

positive subsistence of its own, as good hath; that it hath a power equal to good, and

cont rary to it ; that it s essence is incompat ible with th at of good, and wil l no more endu re

any mixtu re with it, t han whit e will wit h black, or h ot with cold. But if there were any

such r eal and substantial evil, li ke the substance of a man, or a horse, or any other

species, which really and actually subsists; it must needs have some sort of perfection in

proporti on t o its natur e; and a part icular form, whi ch makes it what it is, and

distinguishes it from all other beings. Now every form, considered as such, is good and

not evil, because it is endu ed wi th the perfections peculi ar t o its n atur e. And i ndeed t hey

are so sensible of thi s, as to make th at evil of their s desire good, and embrace and cour t

it, and receive advantage by it, and love to partake of it, and use all possible diligence

not to part from i t. And how very r idiculous an attempt is it, t o impose upon u s a thing

which does all t his, for a being simp ly and absolu tely evil?


16/28

Bu t t hen, if we consider in the next p lace, that evil, by the commission whereof men are

dominated wicked, and are pun ished by God and man for contr acting the gui lt of it ; thi s

is pu rely accident al, and hath no real essence of it s own: for we find that i t both is, and

ceases to be, wit hout the destru ction of the subject, which is th e very d istinguishing

character of an accident ; and l ikewise, it never subsists, bu t by inheritance in some

subject: for, wh at evil of th is ki nd was there ever i n t he abstract, wi thout being the evil,

th at is, the crime, of some person who commi tt ed it ? And so in lik e manner, moral good,

which is the true opposite of evil, in this sense is merely an accident too.

Only herein t hey differ, t hat good is that qualit y of it s subject, by whi ch it is rendered

agreeable to natur e, and at tains it s proper perfection. Bu t evil i s the depravation or

indisposit ion of its subject, by wh ich i t swerves and depart s from natu re, and loses or

falls short of its natu ral perfection, t hat i s, of good. For, i f evil were the right di sposition,

and natu ral perfection of the form t o which it belongs, then would i t by this means

change its name and its nature, and commence good. So that from hence we may

conclu de against any pr imary natu re and posit ive subsistence of evil; for i t i s not in

natu re as good is, bu t i s only an additi onal th ing superindu ced upon good, the pri vation

of, and fall from it .

Ju st t hu s we may conceive sickness, wit h regard t o health ; and t he vices of the mind,

with r espect to virt ue. And as the walki ng strong and u pright is the designed and

primary acti on of an ani mal, and t he end wh ich i t pr oposes to itself when i t m oves; but

stumbl ing or h altin g is an accident beside the purpose, and happens thr ough some

agreeable to her operations; directly so we may affirm of evil, when compared to its

opposite good. And, though these be contraries, as white and black are, yet no man can

main tain , th at they do equally subsist, or are equipollent t o one another, as whi te and

black are in a physical consideration. For t hese do both subsist alik e, and neither of

them can pretend to a greater perfection in natu re, than th e other; and consequent ly,

one is not the mere privation of th e other. For, a pr ivation i s properly a defect or k ind of

false step in natu re, whereby the original form is not fu lly come up to, as limping is in a

h i ts form entir e, and as mu ch of what

nature intended should belong to it, as its contrary. Whereas, in the case before us, one

of the extr emes is agreeable to natu re, and the other cont rary to it ; and t hat which is

cont rary to natu re, is an accident al additi on to that part which is agreeable to it ; for


17/28

good was first, and then evil; not evil first, and afterwards good. As no man can say, that

missing the mark was antecedent to the hi tt ing of it; nor sickness before health ; but

quit e otherwise. For it was

purpose th at he might do so. Thu s also it was the original int ent of natu re, to give us

sound health , and a good constitut ion; for, th e preservation and cont inuance of the

creature, was the very end she proposed to herself in forming it. And, in general terms,

whatever any action i s directed to, that is the proper end of it. Bu t n ow the missing the

mark happens afterwards by accident, when the operation does not succeed as it ought,

nor att ain t he end at first proposed, but hi ts upon something else, some disappointm ent

instead of it . Now th en t his disappoint ment, wh ich comes in afterwards and by the by,

may very t ru ly be said to be additional, and accident al to the original pu rpose of hitt ing

the mark ; bu t that pu rpose can w ith n o good propriety of speech be called so, with

If th en all th ings natu rall y desire good, and every t hing of any k ind , acts wi th a prospect

of, or in order to, some real, or some seeming good; it is manifest, that the obtaining

some good is the pri mary end of all operations whatsoever. Sometim es indeed i t

happens, that evil steps in between; when the desire is fixed upon some object not really

and truly good, but such in outward appearance only, and which hath an allay and

mixtu re of evil wit h i t. Thu s when a man in pur suit of pleasur es, or greedy of wealth ,

tu rn s a robber, or a pir ate; his desire, in th is case, is principally fixed upon t he seeming

good; and t hat is th e spri ng, upon wh ich all these actions move; but , as matters stand,

he is forced t o take th e good and t he bad togeth er. For no man alive was yet so

unnatu rall y profligate, as to be gui lt y of lewdness for lewdness sake; or to rob any m an

merely for the sake of stealing; or indeed, disposed to any manner of evil, purely for the

satisfaction of doing evil. Because it is past all doubt, that evil, considered and

were the

principal and ori ginal cause of those th ings which p roceed from i t, t hen would i t be the

end of all such things: as an end it would be desirable to them, as good. For good and

desirable are term s reciprocal and convert ible; and consequent ly, at th is rate, it wou ld

become good, and cease to be evil.

advantage; not all, t heir tr ue and real advantage indeed; bu t all their seeming benefit,

and such as they at t hat t ime take for the true, and best. For no man is wil lin gly


18/28

deceived; no man chooses a falsehood before tr u th , nor shadows before substances, who

knows and is sensible of the difference between them, when he does it. But this

misfort une happens generally, from a bli nd admir ation of some apparent good, wh ich so

dazzles our eyes, that either we do not at all discover the evil it is attended with, or if we

do discern that, yet we see the thing through false optics, such as magnify the good, and

lessen the evil to the eye. Now it is a frequent and a reasonable choice, when we are

content to take a greater good with the encumbrance of a less evil: as for instance, when

we su ffer an in cision, or a cuppin g, and account the evil of these pains much too litt le, to

counterbalance the good there is, in that health which they restore to us.

Once more yet. That all t hin gs desire good, is fart her plain fr om hence; th at, supposing

evil to have a real being, and a power of acting, whatever it did, would be for its own

advantage, th at is, in other words, for it s own good. And thus m uch they who ascri be a

being and operati on to i t confess; for they pretend, that it pu rsues after good, would fain

detain it, and uses all possible endeavors not to let it go. And if evil be the object of no

desire, then it is not any pr imary and designed natu re. But, sin ce the condi tion of it is,

in all part iculars, according to the descript ion here given of it; it is most tr ul y said, to be

an accident al and additi onal th ing, superindu ced to something th at did su bsist before,

bu t to have no subsistence of its own.

Well (says the objector) I allow what you say. We wil l su ppose, th at evil is only an

accident , a defect, a pr ivation of good, and an addit ional disappointm ent of the first and

original intent of natu re. And what of all th is? How are we advanced in the question

before us? For let this be what, or after what mann er you please, stil l i t mu st have some

cause: otherwise, how, in the name of wonder, di d it ever find the way into the world?

How then will you get out of this maze? You allow God to be the cause of all things; you

mu st grant that evil hath some cause; and yet you tell me, that god is infin itely good,

and so cannot be that cause.

This objection hath been already considered, and spoken to, both at the beginning of the

power; and also in the comment upon the XII chapter, upon occasion of th ose words,

trouble not yourself with wishing, that things may be just as you would have them, &c.

But however I will speak to it once more here too, and that briefly, as follows.

God, who is the source and original cause of all goodness, did not only produce the

highest and most excellent things, such as are good in themselves; nor only those that


19/28

are of a rank somethin g inferior to these, and of a middle natur e; but the extr emes too,

such as are capable of falling, and apt to be perverted from that which is agreeable to

natu re, to that which we call evil. Thus; as, after those incorr uptible bodies, which are

always regul ar in their motions, and immu tably good, others were created subject t o

change and decay; so likewise it was with sou ls. The same order was observed wi th th ese

too; for after them which were unalt erably fixed in good, others were produced l iable to

be seduced from it . And this was done, both for th e greater ill ustrati on of the wise and

producing good things of all sorts, as many as were capable of subsisting; and also, that

the un iverse might be full and perfect, when beings of all k inds, and all proportions,

were cont ained in i t. (For th is is a perfection, to want noth ing of any k ind.) And li kewise,

to vindicate the highest and the middle sort , whi ch never decline or deviate from t heir

goodness, from t hat contempt , whi ch always falls u pon th e lowest of any sort; and such

these had been, i f the corr uptible and mort al th ings had not been created, and

supported the othe

And corr up tib le they mu st be. For i t could never be, that wh ile the fir st, and the middle

sort of bodies cont inu ed as they are; some imm utable, both as to their n atu re and their

operation; others immutable indeed, as to their substance, but mutable in their motion;

it could not be, I say, that th e lowest and sub lunary bodies should ever h old ou t, wh ile

the violent revolutions of the heavenly ones were perpetually changing their substance,

and putt ing them in to unnatur al disorders.

For these reasons cert ainly, and perhaps for a great m any others more important th an

these, which are secrets too dark and deep for us, these sublunary bodies were made,

and t his region of mortali ty, wh ere the pervert ible good hath it s residence. For t here was

a necessity, that the lowest sort of good should have a being too; and such is that, which

is liable to change and depravation. Hence also, there is no such thing as evil in the

regions above us; for the natu re of evil, being nothing else but a corr upti on of the

meanest and most feeble good, can only subsist, where that mean and mutable good

resides. For this reason the soul, which, considered by herself, is a generous and

immu table being, is tain ted with no evil, whi le alone in a state of separation. Bu t being

so cont ri ved by natu re, as to dwell i n this lower world, and being in timately uni ted to

mortal bodies, (for so the good providence of our great father and creator hath ordered it,

making these souls a link to tie the spiritual and material world together, joining the


20/28

extremes by the common brands of life,) it seems to bear a part in all those distempers

and decays, which evil subjects our bodies to, by distu rbi ng their natu ral habit and

frame. Though indeed I cannot t hink th is to be evil, str ictl y speakin g, bu t r ather good;

since the effect of it is so: for thus, the simple elements, of which these bodies are

compounded, come to be set free from a great confinement , and severed from other part s

of matter of a different constit u tion, with wh ich t hey were interwoven and entangled

before; and so, getting loose from the perpetual combat between contrary qualities, are

restored to their proper places, and th eir primi ti ve mass again, in order to acqui re new

life and vigor.

And if this proceeding be the occasion of perpetual change, yet neither is that evil;

because everything is resolved at last, into what it was at the beginning. For water,

th ough evaporated int o air , yet i s by degrees congealed i nt o water again; and so, even

parti cular beings lose noth ing by those vicissitudes.

Bu t t hat, wh ich ought t o be a consideration of greater m oment , is, that the dissolu tion of

compoun d bodies, and th e mutu al change of simple ones in to each other, cont ribu tes to

the advantage of the un iverse in general, by m akin g the corr uption of one thi ng to

become the rise and birth of another. By this perpetual round it is, that matter and

motion have been sustained all th is wh ile. Now it is obvious to any observing man, that

both nature and art, (as was urged heretofore,) do frequently neglect a singe part, when

the detr iment of that in part icul ar, may conduce to the good of the whole. The form er

does it, as often as our rh eums, and u lcerous hu mors, are thr own off from the vit als,

and tu rn ed in to sores or swelli ngs in any of the extreme part s; and art im it ates thi s

method of nature, as often as a limb is seared, or lopped off, for the preservation of the

body: so that upon the whole matter, these shocks and corruptions of bodies deserve

rather to be esteemed good th an evil; and t he cause of them, the cause of good and not

evil event s. For th ose sub lunary bodies, which are simples, suffer no in ju ry, because

they are subject to no decay or destr uct ion: and for the evil wh ich t he parts seem to

undergo, this hath been shown to have more good than evil in it , both in simples and

compoun ds, even when considered in it self; bu t, i f taken with respect t o the benefit

which other creatur es reap by it , then i t i s mani festly good. So that the distempers and

decays of bodies, take them which way you will, are not evil, but produce great good.

But if any one shall be scrupulous upon this occasion, and quarrel with our calling that

good, which is confessed to be no better than a perverting of the course of nature; let not


21/28

th is ni ce caviler take upon h im however to call i t evil, in th e gross sense, and common

acceptati on of the word; by wh ich we understand someth ing, ut terly repugnant and

ir reconcilable to good. But let him call rath er i t a necessit y or hardship ; as not desirable

for i ts own sake, but having some tendency, and contr ibu ting, to that wh ich is so: for,

were it simply and absolu tely evil, i t coul d never be an instru ment of good t o us. Now

th at whi ch I mean by necessary, though it have not charms enough of its own to

recommend it, yet does it deserve to be accounted good, for leading us to that which is

good; and that which can become a proper object of our choice, under any circumstance,

is so far forth good. Thus we choose incisions, and bu rn ings, and amputati ons; nay, we

are content to pay dear for them, and acknowledge ourselves obliged, both by the

prescript ion, and t he pain ful operati on; all whi ch were most r idiculous t o be done, if we

th ought these th ings evil. And yet I own, t his is bu t a qualified and in feri or good, not

str ictly and pr operly so, bu t only in a second and subord inate sense: yet so, th at th e

creator of th ese th ings is by n o means t he cause of evil, but a necessary and m eaner

good, though a good still; for such we ought to esteem it, since it is derived from the

same universal fountain of goodness, though embased with some allays and abatements.

And thus much, I hope, may be thought sufficient, in vindication of the nature and

cause of that evil, which bodies are concerned in.

Nothing indeed can so tr u ly be called evil, as the lapses and vices of the sou l of man.

And of these too, much hath been said before; but however we will resume the discourse

on th is occasion, and in quir e afresh, both i nto the natu re and cause of them.

And here we shall do well t o take notice, th at the soul s of a more excellent natu re, which

dwell in the regions above us, are immutably fixed in goodness, and wholly

unacquainted with any evil. There are also the souls of brutes, of a baser alloy than

ours, and standing in the middle as it were, between the vegetative souls of plants, and

our rational ones. These, so far forth as they are corporeal, are liable to that evil, to

which bodies are subject; bu t so far as concern s their appeti tes and i nclin ations, they

bear some resemblance to the human. And the evil, they are in this respect obnoxious

to, is in proportion the same; so that one of these will be su fficient ly explained, by giving

an account of the other.

Now the human soul is in a middle station, between the souls above, and those below. It

partak es of the qualit ies of both ; of those more excellent ones, in the sublim ity of its

natu re, and the excellence of its understandin g: of the bru tal and in ferior ones, by its


22/28

str ict affini ty to the body and animal life. Of both these it is the common band, by it s

vital u nion with the body; and by it s habitu al freedom, it assimil ates itself sometimes to

th e one sor t, and sometimes to the other of th ese natures. So long as it dwells above,

and entertains it self wi th noble and divine speculati ons, it preserves it s inn ocence, and

is fixed in goodness; bu t when it begins to flag and dr oop, when it sink s down from t hat

blissful l ife, and grovels in t he filt h of the world, which by natu re it is equally apt t o do,

then it falls int o all m anner of evil. So that it s own volun tary depression of itself in to th is

region of corru ption and mortalit y, is the tr ue beginning, and p roper cause, of all it s

misery and mischief. For, t hough the soul be of an amph ibious disposition, yet it is not

forced either upwards or downwards; but acts purely by an in ternal pr inciple of it s own,

and is in perfect l iberty. Nor ought th is to seem incredible, in an agent which natu re

hath made free; since even those bru tes that are amph ibious, dwell sometimes in the

water and sometimes upon dry groun d, without being determined to eith er, any

otherwise than by t heir own inclination.

Now when t he soul debases herself t o the world, and enters int o a near in timacy with the

corr uptible body, and esteems th is to be the other consti tu ent of hu man natu re; then it

leads the life of brutes, and exerts itself in such operations only, as they are capable of.

Its intellectual part degenerates into sense and imagination, and its affections into anger

and concupiscence. By t hese the wretched mortal attains t o kn owledge, ju st of t he same

pit ch with t hat of other animals; such as puts him upon seeking fresh suppl ies for a

body contin ually wastin g, and upon contin uing the world by posterit y, to fill th e place of

one who mu st short ly leave it ; and u pon mak ing the best pr ovision he can, for h is own

preservation and defense in the meanwhile. For these cares are what no mortal would

have, were he not endued wit h sensual facu lti es and passions. For what m an, who i s

anyth ing ni ce and considering, wou ld endur e to spend so many days and years u pon th e

support of this body, (when th e burden of the whole matter comes to no more, than

always fill ing, and always empt ying) if sensual in clinat ions did n ot whet h is appeti te? Or

who could undergo the tedious fatigue by which succession is kept up, if vehement

desires did not perpetuall y k ind le new flames, and the prospect of posterit y makes us

more easy to warm ed by th em? These argument s have been in some measure insist ed on

before, and I t ake them to be abundantly clear in th is point; t hat, though our passions

and appeti tes be the cause of moral evil , yet t hey are ext remely beneficial to the

creatu res, in which natu re hath implanted them; as being necessary to their


23/28

constitution, and giving a relish to some of the most indispensable actions of life. Upon

all wh ich accoun ts, even these cannot wi th any ju stice be called evil; n or God who

infused them, the cause of evil.

But the tru th of the matter is thi s: the soul is by natur e superior t o this body, and t his

animal life, and hath a comm anding power over t hem pu t int o her hands. This digni ty

and power so long as she preserves, keeping her subjects under, and at their due

distance; whil e she uses the body as her instr ument, and convert s all it s functions to

her own use and benefit, so long all is well, and there is no danger of evil. But when once

she forgets, that the divine image is stamped upon her; when she lays by the ensigns of

government, and gives away the reins out of her own hands; when she sinks down in to

the dregs of flesh and sense, (by preferring the impetuous temptations of pleasure,

before the mi ld and gent le persuasions of reason,) and enters int o a str ict un ion wi th the

bru ti sh part ; then reason acts against its own pr inciples, divest it self of it s despotic

power, and basely submi ts t o be govern ed by i ts slave. And t his confu sion in the soul i s

the root of all evil; an evil, n ot owing to the more excellent and rational part , whi le it

maintains its own station; nor to the inferior or sensual, while that keeps within it s due

bounds; bu t t o the invert ing of these, the violent usu rpati on of the one, and t he tame

submission of the other; that is, the perverse choice of degenerating into body and

matt er, r ather t han formin g oneself after the sim ili tu de of the excellent spir it s above us.

But still all th is, as I said, is choice, and not constraint ; it is still liberty, t hough libert y

abused.

to give, why choice and volition must needs be

motion of ou rs, and n ot the effect of any compu lsion from without . I have already u rged

the clearness of th is tr u th at large, and th at the soul only i s concerned, and acts purely

upon the principles of her own native freedom, in the choice of the worse, no less than of

the bett er part . Thus mu ch I apprehend to have been plainl y proved, from th e example of

Almighty God hi mself; the determinations of all wise laws, and well consti tu ted

governments, and the judgement of sober and k nowing men; who all agree in th is, th at

the merits of men are to be measured not by the fact itself, or the events of things, but

by the will and in tention of the person. And accordingly their r ewards and punishments,

their censures and their commendations, are all pr oport ioned to the intent ion; because


24/28

be accountable for. From hence it comes to pass, that whatever is done by constraint

and irresistible force, though the crime be never so grievous, is yet pardoned or

acquitt ed, and t he guil t impu ted, not to the part y that did it , but to the person t hat

forced him t o the doing of it . For he who used th at force, did it volu ntaril y; but he who

was born down by it , had no will of his own concern ed in the fact, bu t became the mere

instrument of effecting it, against the inclination of his own mind.

voluntary act, owing to no manner of compulsion, but its own internal motion, what can

we charge evil upon, so justly as upon the soul? But yet, though the soul be the cause of

evil, i t is not the cause of it , considered as evil; for nothing ever is, or can be chosen,

under that notion. Bu t evil di sgui ses it self, and deludes us with an appearance of good;

and when we choose th at seeming good, we take at th e same time th e real evil concealed

under it . And thu s mu ch in effect was said before too.

And now, having thu s discovered the tru e origin of evil, it is fit we proclaim to all the

world, that God is not chargeable with any sin ; because it is not he, but the soul which

produces evil, and t hat freely and wi llingly too: for, were the soul u nder any constrain t t o

do amiss, then, I allow, there would be a colorable pretence to lay the blame on God,

who had suffered her to lie under so fatal a necessity and had not left her free to rescue

and save herself: (Though, in truth, upon this presumption, nothing that the soul was

forced to do, could be strictly evil.) But now, since the soul is left to herself, and acts

purely by her own free choice, she must be content to bear all the blame.

If it shall be fart her objected, th at all t his does not yet acquit Almighty God; for t hat it is

stil l h is act, to allow men this liberty, and leave th em to themselves; and th at he ought

not to permit them in the choice of evil. Then we are to consider, that one of these two

things must have been the consequence of such a proceeding: either first, that, after he

had given man a rat ional soul, capable of choosing sometimes good, and sometimes evil,

he must have chained up h is will , and made it im possible for hi m t o choose anyth ing but

good; or else, that the soul ought never to have had this indifference at all, but to have

been so framed at first, that the choice of evil should have been naturally impossible.

One of th ese two t hin gs the objector m ust say, or he says nothing at all t o the pu rpose.

Now th e former of these is manifestly absur d; for to what pu rpose was the will left free

and u ndeterm ined either way, if t he determining itself one way, was afterwards to be

debarred it? This would have been utterly to take away the power of choosing; for choice


25/28

and necessit y are things inconsistent ; and where the mind i s so tied up, t hat i t can

choose but one thing, there (properly speaking) it can choose nothing.

As to the latt er, it mu st be remembered in the fir st place, th at no evil i s ever chosen,

when th e mind apprehends i t t o be evil: bu t t he objector seems to think , it were very

convenient to have this freedom of the will, wh ich i s so absolu te in the determining of

itself sometimes to real good, and sometimes to that which deceives it with a false

appearance of being so, quit e taken away: imagin ing it t o be no good, to be sure, and

perhaps some great evil: but alas! he does not consider, how many things there are in

th e worl d, account ed exceedin gly good, wh ich yet are not r eally i n any degree

comparable to th is freedom of the wil l. For in t ru th , there is no thing, no privilege, in t his

lower world, so desirable. And t here is nobody so stu pid and lost, as to wish, th at he

were a bru te, or a plant, rath er th an a man. And th erefore, since God displayed the

abundance of his goodness and power, in giving perfections inferior to this; how

inconsistent woul d it have been wi th that boun ty of his, not to have bestowed this most

excellent pri vilege upon mank ind?

Besides, (as hath been in timated formerly,) take away t his un determined propension of

the soul , by which it inclines itself to good or evil, and you u ndermine the very

foundation of all virt ue, and in effect destr oy the natu re of man. For i f you suppose it

impossible to be perverted to vice, you have no longer any such thing as justice, or

temperance, or any other vir tu e, left in the observin g moral du ties. This state of pu ri ty

may be the excellence of an angel, or a God; bu t impeccable and indefectible goodness

can never be the virtue of a man. From whence it is plain, that there was a necessity of

leaving the soul in a capacity, of being corru pted, and of commi tt ing all t hat evil

consequent to such depravation, because otherwise a gap would have been left in the

creation. There cou ld h ave been n o medium between t he blessed spir it s above, and

bru tes below; no such thing as human n ature, or h um an virtu e in t he world.

So then we allow, th at t his self-determ in ing power, by which m en are depraved, is a

th is is to t he order and beauty of the un iverse, and how many good effects it hath . In

other respects, we can by no means admit, that God should be traduced as the cause

and aut hor of evil u pon th is account . When a su rgeon lays on a drawing plaster to ripen

a swelling, or cu ts or sears any part of ou r bodies, or lops off a limb, n o man thin ks he

takes these methods to make his patient worse, but better; because reason tells us, that


26/28

men, in such cir cumstances, are never to be cured by less painfu l applications. Thu s the

divine ju stice, in hi s deserved vengeance, suffers t he passions of the soul to rage and

swell so high, because he knows the condit ion of ou r distemper; and th at the smarti ng

sometimes un der the wild suggestions of our own fu rious appetit es, is th e only way to

br ing us to a bett er sense of our ext ravagance, and to recover us of ou r frenzy.

playing with fi re. And for the same reasons, many wise educators of you th , do not th ink

themselves obliged t o be always thwart ing t he inclinati ons of those under their charge;

bu t sometimes connive at th eir follies, and give them a loose: th ere being no way so

effectual for the purging of these passions, as to let them sometimes be indulged, that so

th e persons may be cloyed, and nau seate, and grow sick of them. And in th ese cases, it

cannot be said, t hat eith er those parents and govern ors, or the justice of God, is the

cause of evil, bu t rath er of good, because all t his is done with a virt uous in tent. For

whatever t ends to the reformation of mann ers, or confir min g the habits of virt ue, may be

as reasonably called virtuous, as those thing that are done, in order to the recovery and

cont inuance of health , may be called wholesome. For actions do principally take their

denomin ation and quality, from the end t o which t hey are directed. So that, although

God were in some measure the cause of thi s necessity we are in, of deviatin g from

goodness; yet moral evil cannot be justly laid at h is door. Bu t h ow far he is really t he

cause of ou r r eflection from our du ty, I shall n ow think , it becomes me to inqu ire.

God does not by any power, or immediate act of his own, cause that aversion from good,

which th e soul is gui lt y of, when it sins; but he only gave her such a power, t hat she

might turn herself to evil; that so such a species of free agents might fill a void space in

the universe, and m any good effects mi ght follow, wh ich, wi thout such an aversion,

cou ld never have been b rought abou t. God indeed is t ru ly and properly the cau se of thi s

liberty of our will s; but then t his is a happiness and a pr ivilege, infin itely to be preferr ed

above whatever else the world thinks most valuable; and the operation of it consists in

receiving impressions, and determinin g it self thereupon, not fr om any constr aint , but by

its own mere pleasure.

Now, that a nature thus qualified is good, I cannot suppose there needs any proof; we

have the confession of our adversar ies themselves to str engthen u s in th e belief of it . For

even they, who set up a principle of evil, declare they do it, because they cannot think

God the author of evil; and these very men do not only acknowledge the soul to be of his


27/28

form ing, bu t they talk big, and pretend th at it is a part of his very essence; and yet,

notwit hstand ing all t his, they own i t capable of being vit iated, but so as to be vitiated by

it self only. For th is is t he mani fest consequence of their other tenets; t hat it depends

upon our own choice, whether we will overcome evil, or be overcome by it; that the

vanqu ished in t his combat are very justly pu nished, and th e victors largely and

deservedly rewarded. Now the trut h i s, when t hey talk at this rate, they do not well

consider, how dir ectly t hese notions contradict t hat ir resistible necessity to sin, which

they elsewhere make the soul to lie under. But however, whether the soul be depraved

by it s own foolish choice, or wheth er by some fatal violence upon it from wi thout , still

the being naturally capable of such depravation, is agreed on all hands; for both sides

confess it t o be actually depraved, which it could never be, without a natu ral capacit y of

being so. Therefore they tell us, the first original good is never tainted with evil, because

his natu re is above it , and i nconsistent with any such defect; as are also the other

goodnesses, in the next degree of perfection to him, such as in their cant are called the

Moth er of Life, the Creator, and t he Aeones. So then t hese men acknowledge the

depravable condition of the soul; they profess God to be the maker of it, and to have set

it in this condition: and yet it is plain they think the nature of the soul depravable, as it

is good, and not evil; because at the same time that they ascribe this freedom of the will

to God, they are yet supersti tiously fearful of ascribin g any evil to him . And th is I th ink

may very well suffice, for the natu re and origin of evil.

Let us now apply ou rselves to consider the passage before us, and observe, how

arti ficially Epictetus hath compr ised in a very few words, th e substance of those

arguments, wh ich we have here drawn out to so great a length. For in regard t he choice

of good, and the refusing of evil, are the object and groun d of all m oral in structions

whatsoever, i t was proper for him to show, that the natu re of evil was something very

odd, and ou t of course. In some sense it h as a being, and in some sense it i s denied to

have any; it has no existence of its own, and yet it is a sort of supernumerary, and a very

untoward addition to nature. In the meanwhile, this shows, that we ought not to make it

our choice, because natu re never made it h ers; and whenever it got in to th e world, it was

never brought in by design, but came in by chance. No man ever proposed it, as the end

of any action; no artificer ever drew his model for it: the mason proposes the house he is

bu ilding, and t he carpenter t he door he is plainin g, for h is end; bu t n either th e one, nor

the other, ever work s, only that he may work ill .


28/28

mark : for what n atu re hath given a real and a designed existence to is the mark ; and th e

compassing of that, is the hi tt ing of the mark . Now, if what natur e really m ade and

designed, be not t he missing of the mark , (as it is not, bu t t he hit ting it i ndeed) and if

evil be the missing of the mark, then i t is plain th at evil can be none of those th ings,

which have a real and a designed existence.

Now, th at evil is pr operl y the missing of the mark , is plain , from wh at hath been spoken

to th is point already. For, su ppose a man makes pleasure his mark, h e aims at i t as a

good and desirable th ing; he lets fly accordingly, hi s imaginations I mean, which indeed

fly swifter t han any arrow ou t of a bow. But if he does not att ain t he good he desires, bu t

shoots wide, or

again, t hat somethin g, to wh ich natu re designed and gave a being, is constantl y the

mark every man aims at, and the obtaining those things, the hitting of his mark, is no

less evident from th e instances I gave, of the mason and the carpent er.

Now, when the aut hor says there is no such real being as evil in the world; you are to

understand, th at natur e never formed or designed any such th ing: and th en, i f you

please, you may take his minor proposition singly by it self, wh ich consists of those

words, As no man sets up a mark wit h a design to shoot beside it. (for th is in timates that

pri ncipal design, and real work of natu re, is never t he missing, bu t t he hit ting of the

mark ; and so add the conclu sion, wh ich i s th is, therefore evil is none of the prin cipal

designs, or real works of natu re.

It m ay likewise be put all t ogether i nt o one single hypothetical proposit ion thu s: If no

man sets u p a mark on pu rpose to shoot beside it , th en there is no such r eal being as

evil in the world. For if there were such a th ing, then i t wou ld be proposed, as the end or

product of action. Bu t evil i s never proposed as a th ing to be produced or obtained, bu t

as a thing to be declined; for evil is always the object of our refusal and aversion. So that

at th is rate, it would follow, that there is a mark set u p, only t hat it may not be hit ;

which is contrary to comm on sense, and the practice of all mank ind. And therefore there

can be no such thing in nature as evil, because evil is not capable of being the end of

any action i n n ature.

commentary on epictetus 32-34

Documents