commonwealth of massachusetts -...
TRANSCRIPT
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
ESSEX, ss. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENTCIVIL ACTION NO.
MARY ELLEN DEVINE, TRUSTEE of the )DEVINE FAMILY REALTY TRUST; EDWARD F. )JOHNSON, TRUSTEE of the )SANDPIPER/JOHNSON FAMILY TRUST; )RICHARD D. TURNER; CHARLES F. and JOAN )HARTNETT; DON and PATRICIA L. FRANCIS, )TRUSTEES; ANNE H. SHEEHAN; MARY E. and )THOMAS DUGAN, TRUSTEES; KATHLEEN )HEAD, TRUSTEE OF LONG BEACH TRUST; STACY )E. HO and CARLENE H. TSAI; CHRISTINE )CARTER; PHILLIP E. and MARY A. POLLARD; )PETER and CHARLENE ONANIAN; RITA M. )ROBERTO, TRUSTEE of the ANTHONY ROBERTO ) TRUST; JANIS P. REED; GAVIN SYMES, TRUSTEE )of the ARICIA SYMES ELMER TRUST; TIMOTHY )and SUSAN DOWD; JANE L. FLYNN; ROBERT E. )and JOAN M. BUTMAN; BARBARA B. TUFTS; )JOHN J. and ANNE M. CARTY; JOANNE and )DOLORES CORDEIRO; MIGUEL A. and KRISTINA )MARTINEZ; RICHARD and GLADYS SULLIVAN; )PAUL M. and ELEANOR K. BUTMAN; )WILLIAM L. and GERALDINE R. BUTMAN; )MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN; NAOMI E. SULLIVAN; )ANNE M. ACKERMAN; KEVIN M. GILLIGAN; )NORMAN STAVIS; ROBERT A. and BARBARA E. )MANZELLI; ANDREW N. and MARTHA J. TUCKER; )GORDON ROBERT and ANDREA J. BERRY; )KARA DONOHOE, TRUSTEE of the MARY )DONOHOE TRUST; CAROL A. SULESKI, TRUSTEE; )DAWN M. MCCARTHY; PETER J. LIMONE; )RICHARD C. PRATT; DENNIS and PATRICIA )HUNT; FRED HOCHBERGER III, TRUSTEE of the )HOCHBERGER TRUST; SUSAN GREELY, TRUSTEE )of the KIERAN REALTY TRUST; CHERYL M. )HUNT and FREDERICK J. HANNIFAN, TRUSTEES; )WILLIAM P. SELDON, AND JANE E. MERRILL, )AND K. L. SWEENEY, TRUSTEES; G. FRANCIS and )DEANNA RIZZO; DIRAN K. DOHANIAN, )PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE of the ESTATE of )HAGOP M. DOHANIAN; LANDERS and JENNIFER )
1
SYMES, TRUSTEES; WILLIAM J. MCMILLAN; )LEE A. and DOREEN H. GRIFFITHS; JOHN M. )and KELLEY A. MCCARTHY; CECILY J. GRAY; )CHARLES F. HARTNETT; MADELYN M. SULLIVAN, )TRUSTEE of the SULLIVAN LONG BEACH )REALTY TRUST; BRENDA C. GILLIS, )TRUSTEE of the BASTOS FAMILY )IRREVOCABLE TRUST; PAMELA H. and )GENE F. GNERRE; ELEANOR L. THOMPSON; )ANGELO J. and MARLENE TEDESCO, TRUSTEES )of the TEDESCO LIVING TRUST; )SHARON M. HITCHCOCK, )
Plaintiffs ))
v. ))
TOWN OF ROCKPORT ) Defendant )
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
Introduction
1. This Action is brought against Defendant Town of Rockport, Massachusetts (“Town” or
“Defendant”) by 57 Plaintiffs who are present or former owners of cottages (owning as
individuals, spouses, siblings, family members, trustees, partners, or otherwise), and who
are or were lessees under substantially and substantively identical leases (but for the
amount of rent due) with the Town relating to land located on or near Long Beach in
Rockport. The Plaintiffs each assert claims for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment, for violation of M.G.L. c. 186, for a declaration that certain provisions of the
leases between the parties are void as a matter of law, and for injunctive relief. The terms
“Lease” and “Leases” refer to the leases executed in or about February, 2014 by each of
the Plaintiffs and the Town. The term “Leased Land” means the land leased by the Town
to the owners of dwelling units located on 154 lots owned by the Town. Each Plaintiff(s)
2
is(are) identified in the particular Counts applicable to each said Plaintiff(s) which follow
the fact sections hereof.
Parties
2. The Defendant is a town organized under the laws of the Commonwealth, and has a
principal place of business located at Town Office Building, 34 Broadway, Rockport,
Massachusetts.
3. As stated above, each Plaintiff(s) is(are) identified in the particular Counts applicable to
each said Plaintiff(s) which follow the fact sections hereof.
General Facts
4. The Town owns the Leased Land, which is adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean at Long Beach.
The Leased Land is bounded as follows: on the east by the beach known as Long Beach
and the ocean; on the west by tidal marshland, the road known as Long Beach, Old
County Road, and Glenmere Road; on the north by the inlet to said marshland; and on the
south by the border between Rockport and Gloucester.
5. In or about 1900, the Town divided the Leased Land into lots, which now number 154,
and began leasing those lots. The Leases identify the lots with reference to lots located
on Assessors’ Maps 21 and 25.
6. The Town presently leases various lots to the Plaintiffs, pursuant to the Leases as
described in Paragraph 1.
7. Each of the Plaintiffs or their predecessors have constructed and maintained dwellings
and other structures on the various lots, all with the agreement and consent of the Town
and as expressly stated in the Leases and predecessor leases. Most, but not all, of the
3
dwelling units are single-family cottages; the other dwelling units are contained in either
two-family dwellings or are owned in condominium form.
8. Nearly all of the lots are rectangular in shape and contain, on average, approximately
3,200 square feet.
9. The lots are laid out in three rows.
10. The first row (“Row 1”) is adjacent to the seawall along Long Beach.
11. The second row (“Row 2”) is adjacent to Row 1.
12. The third row (“Row 3”) is immediately to the northwest of Rows 1 and 2.
13. The Leases are all substantially and substantively the same, but for the amount of rent
charged thereunder.
14. The annual rent for 2014 set by the Town for Row 1 lots began at or about $3,923, more
or less; the annual rent increases by $1,389 each year of the ten-year term. For Row 1
lots, the annual rent more than quadruples during the term of the Leases, culminating in a
rent of $16,419 in 2023.
15. The annual rent for 2014 set by the Town for Row 2 lots began at or about $2,314, more
or less; the annual rent increases by $746 each year of the ten-year term. For Row 2 lots,
the annual rent nearly quadruples during the term of the Leases, culminating in a rent of
$9,032 in 2023.
16. The annual rent for 2014 set by the Town for Row 3 lots began at or around $2,101, more
or less; the annual rent increases by $533 each year of the ten-year term. For Row 3 lots,
the annual rent more than triples during the term of the Leases, culminating in a rent of
$6,897 in 2023.
4
17. The Plaintiffs use the Leased Land for residential purposes only, all as required by the
Leases.
Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of
M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
18. M.G.L. c. 186, § 14, in pertinent part, states the following:
… any lessor or landlord who directly or indirectly interferes with
the quiet enjoyment of any residential premises by the occupant, or who attempts to regain possession of such premises by force without benefit of judicial process, shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than three hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than six months. Any
person who commits any act in violation of this section shall also
be liable for actual and consequential damages or three month’s
rent, whichever is greater, and the costs of the action, including a
reasonable attorney’s fee, all of which may be applied in setoff to or in recoupment against any claim for rent owed or owing. The superior and district courts shall have jurisdiction in equity to restrain violations of this section. The provisions of section eighteen of chapter one hundred and eighty-six and section two A of chapter two hundred and thirty-nine shall apply to any act taken as a reprisal against any person for reporting or proceeding against violations of this section. Any waiver of this provision in any lease
or other rental agreement, except with respect to any restriction on the provision of a service specified in this section imposed by the United States or any agency thereof or the commonwealth or any agency or political subdivision thereof and not resulting from the acts or omissions of the landlord or lessor, and except for interruptions of any specified service during the time required to perform necessary repairs to apparatus necessary for the delivery of said service or interruptions resulting from natural causes beyond the control of the lessor or landlord, shall be void and
unenforceable.
M.G.L. c. 186 § 14 (emphasis added).
19. M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B, in pertinent part, states the following:
(1) (a) No lease relating to residential real property shall contain a
provision that a lessor may, except to inspect the premises, to make
repairs thereto or to show the same to a prospective tenant,
purchaser, mortgagee or its agents, enter the premises before the
5
termination date of such lease. A lessor may, however, enter such premises:
(i) in accordance with a court order;
(ii) if the premises appear to have been abandoned by the lessee; or
(iii) to inspect, within the last thirty days of the tenancy or after either party has given notice to the other of intention to terminate the tenancy, the premises for the purpose of determining the amount of damage, if any, to the premises which would be cause for deduction from any security deposit held by the lessor pursuant to this section.
…
(8) Any provision of a lease which conflicts with any provision of
this section and any waiver by a tenant or prospective tenant of
any provision of this section shall be deemed to be against public
policy and therefore void and unenforceable.
…
M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B (emphasis added).
20. Section 12.4 of the Leases states: “The Town hereby warrants and covenants that, so long
as Tenant is not in default of this Lease beyond any applicable cure period, Tenant shall
have peaceful and quiet use and possession of the Premises without hindrance or
interruption on the part of the Town.”
21. However, the Leases then defeat and breach the covenant of quiet enjoyment with the
following language contained in the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6:
Lot Lines/Use By Others. … Tenant further acknowledges that abutters, other residents of Long Beach and/or members of the public may use portions of the Land1 for pedestrian access to their respective lots and/or to other parts of Long Beach, and agrees not to disturb, hinder, or otherwise interfere with such access rights. By signing this Lease, Tenant acknowledges and agrees that such
1 Under the Leases, the term “Land” refers to, and is defined as, that portion of the Leased Land leased by each particular Plaintiff.
6
encroachment, access and/or use by others shall not constitute a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment or the Town’s other obligations under this Lease.
22. The Town inserted, and insisted upon, said Section 2.6 language for the first time in the
Leases, while at the same time unilaterally increasing the rents, which rents will escalate
by 2023, by more than triple, nearly quadruple, and more than quadruple, depending on
which Row a lot is located in.
23. By inserting, and insisting upon, said language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, the Town
violated M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14 and 15B.
24. Said language is against public policy, void, and unenforceable.
25. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of said language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, each Plaintiff has sustained
actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on his or her lot,
as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
26. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Leases, as a result of
which interference and breach each Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
27. M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 states the following:
Any provision of a lease or other rental agreement relating to real property whereby a lessee or tenant enters into a covenant, agreement or contract, by the use of any words whatsoever, the effect of which is to indemnify the lessor or landlord or hold the
7
lessor or landlord harmless, or preclude or exonerate the lessor or landlord from any or all liability to the lessee or tenant, or to any other person, for any injury, loss, damage or liability arising from any omission, fault, negligence or other misconduct of the lessor or landlord on or about the leased or rented premises or on or about any elevators, stairways, hallways or other appurtenance used in connection therewith, shall be deemed to be against public policy and void.
M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
28. Section 6.3 of the Leases states the following:
Landlord Repairs. Tenant agrees that the Town shall have no responsibility or liability for, and Tenant shall assume the risk of, any loss or damage or injury to the Premises, including the Improvements, or to the Personal property of Tenant or any of the other Tenant Parties, from any cause whatsoever, including, without limitation, vandalism, theft or otherwise, provided however, that nothing herein limits in any manner any remedies Tenant may have against the Town due to the negligence of the Town or its agents, employees, or contractors.
29. Section 9.1 of the Leases states the following:
Indemnification. Tenant shall assume and maintain exclusive control of the Premises (except as otherwise provided for in this Lease) and, to the maximum extent this provision may be made effective according to law, shall defend, indemnify and hold
harmless the Town from and against all claims, expenses or
liability of whatever nature arising from: … (b) the use or
occupancy of the Property by the Tenant or any of the other Tenant
Parties, or arising, directly or indirectly, from any accident, injury
or damage whatsoever, however caused, to any person or to the
property of any person, occurring during the Term of this Lease
and thereafter, so long as Tenant or any occupant claiming under Tenant uses or occupies any part of the Property, in or about the Property, or arising from any accident occurring outside the Property but within the general area of the Property, where such accident, injury or damage results or is claimed to have resulted from any act, omission or negligence on the part of any of the Tenant Parties. The foregoing agreement shall include indemnity against all costs, expenses and liabilities incurred in or in connection with any such claim or proceeding brought thereon, including attorneys’ fees, and the defense thereof with counsel
8
acceptable to the Town or counsel selected by an insurance company which has accepted liability for any such claim.
30. Section 9.2 of the Leases, in pertinent part, states: “Release. …To the maximum extent
this provision may be made effective according to law, Tenant agrees that the Town shall
have no responsibility or liability, and hereby waives any and all rights of recovery and
releases any claim it may have against the Town or its agents, employees, or contractors,
for any injury, loss or damage to any of the Tenant Parties, the Improvements, or to the
property of any of the Tenant Parties, provided, however, that nothing herein limits in any
manner any remedies Tenant may have against the Town due to the Town’s negligence.”
31. Section 9.3 of the Leases states:
Non-Lease Property. Tenant acknowledges and agrees that the Town’s obligations with respect to other Town-owned property, improvements and/or facilities, including, without limitation, the seawall, sidewalks, and beach areas that are not part of the Property (the “Non-Lease Property”) are subject to any and all applicable laws, including, without limitation, any obligations and/or liability that the Town may have under the applicable laws of negligence, but are independent of this Lease. Tenant shall have all rights and remedies as are available to all under such laws for the Town’s failure to maintain the Non-Lease Property, but such
negligence shall not constitute a default of the Town under this
Lease or entitle Tenant to exercise any remedies it may have under
this Lease. For avoidance of doubt, nothing herein shall impair Tenant’s rights and remedies against the Town under applicable laws with respect to the Non-Lease Property independently of the Lease.
32. Section 12.12 of the Leases states: “Personal Liability. No official, employee or
consultant of the Town of Rockport shall be personally liable to Tenant, the other Tenant
Parties or any partner thereof, or any successor in interest or person claiming through or
under Tenant, the other Tenant Parties, or any such partner, in the event of any default or
breach, or for or on account of any amount which may be or become due, or on any
9
claim, cause or obligation whatsoever under the terms of this Lease or any amendment or
extension entered into pursuant hereto. In no event shall the Town be liable for indirect,
special, consequential and/or punitive damages.”
33. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Defendants violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
34. Said language is against public policy and void.
COUNT 1: Mary Ellen Devine, Trustee of the Devine Family Realty Trust v. Town -
Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§
14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
35. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
36. Plaintiff Mary Ellen Devine resides at 11 Mayflower Road, Woburn, Massachusetts and
owns a cottage known and identified as 6 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff is Trustee of the
Devine Family Realty Trust.
37. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
38. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
10
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 2: Mary Ellen Devine, Trustee of the Devine Family Realty Trust v. Town -
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of
Leases
39. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
11
40. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
41. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 3: Edward F. Johnson, Trustee of the Sandpiper/Johnson Family Trust v. Town
- Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§
14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
42. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
43. Plaintiff Edward F. Johnson resides at 72 Middle Street, Woburn, Massachusetts and
owns a cottage known and identified as 8 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff is Trustee of the
Sandpiper/Johnson Family Trust.
44. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
45. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
12
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
13
Count 4: Edward F. Johnson, Trustee of the Sandpiper/Johnson Family Trust v. Town
- Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of
Leases
46. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
47. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
48. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 5: Richard D. Turner v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
49. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
50. Plaintiff Richard D. Turner resides at 1 Wayside Lane, Ashland, Massachusetts and owns
a cottage known and identified as 10 Long Beach.
51. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
14
52. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
15
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 6: Richard D. Turner v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
53. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
54. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
55. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 7: Charles F. and Joan Hartnett v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
56. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
57. Plaintiffs Charles F. Hartnett and Joan Hartnett reside at 851 Spruce Street, Winnetka,
Illinois and own a cottage known and identified as 18 Long Beach.
16
58. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
59. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
17
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 8: Charles F. and Joan Hartnett v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By
Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
60. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
61. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
62. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 9: Don and Patricia L. Francis, Trustees v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
63. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
18
64. Plaintiffs Don Francis and Patricia Francis reside at 3 Ryan Road, Gloucester,
Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 20 Long Beach. Said Plaintiffs
hold title to said cottage in trust.
65. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
66. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
19
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 10: Don and Patricia L. Francis, Trustees v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §
15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
67. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
68. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
69. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 11: Anne H. Sheehan v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
20
70. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
71. Plaintiff Anne H. Sheehan resides at 64 Main Street, # 55B, Stoneham, Massachusetts
and owns a cottage known and identified as 21 Long Beach.
72. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
73. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
21
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 12: Anne H. Sheehan v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
74. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
75. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
76. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
22
COUNT 13: Mary E. and Thomas Dugan, Trustees v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
77. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
78. Plaintiffs Mary E. Dugan and Thomas Dugan reside at 18 Barton Road, Medford,
Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 23 Long Beach. Said Plaintiffs
hold title to said cottage in trust.
79. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
80. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
23
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 14: Mary E. and Thomas Dugan, Trustees v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §
15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
81. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
82. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
83. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
24
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 15: Kathleen Head, Trustee of Long Beach Trust v. Town - Breach of Covenant of
Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of
Section 2.6 of the Leases
84. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
85. Plaintiff Kathleen Head resides at 40 Fair Oaks Drive, Lexington, Massachusetts and
owns a cottage known and identified as 25 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff is Trustee of Long
Beach Trust.
86. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
87. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
25
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 16: Kathleen Head, Trustee of Long Beach Trust v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c.
186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
88. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
89. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
90. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
26
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 17: Stacy E. Ho and Carlene H. Tsai v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
91. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
92. Plaintiffs Stacy E. Ho and Carlene H. Tsai reside at 35 Granger Avenue, Reading,
Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 26 Long Beach.
93. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
94. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
27
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 18: Stacy E. Ho and Carlene H. Tsai v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By
Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
95. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
96. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
28
97. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 19: Christine Carter v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
98. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
99. Plaintiff Christine Carter resides at 15 Pondview Lane, Reading, Massachusetts and owns
a cottage known and identified as 32 Long Beach.
100. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
101. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
29
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 20: Christine Carter v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
102. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
103. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
30
104. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 21: Philip E. and Mary A. Pollard v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
105. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
106. Plaintiffs Philip E. Pollard and Mary A. Pollard reside at 40 Arlington Road, Woburn,
Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 34 Long Beach.
107. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
108. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
31
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 22: Phillip E. and Mary A. Pollard v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By
Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
109. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
32
110. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
111. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 23: Charlene Onanian v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
112. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
113. Plaintiff Charlene Onanian resides at 61 Ridgeway Road, Weston, Massachusetts and
owns a cottage known and identified as 36 Long Beach.
114. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
115. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
33
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 24: Charlene Onanian v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
34
116. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
117. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
118. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 25: Rita M. Roberto, Trustee of the Anthony Roberto Trust v. Town - Breach of
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By
Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
119. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
120. Plaintiff Rita Roberto resides at 282 Bennington Street, East Boston, Massachusetts and
own a cottage known and identified as 42 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff is Trustee of the
Anthony Roberto Trust.
121. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
35
122. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
36
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 26: Rita M. Roberto, Trustee of the Anthony Roberto Trust v. Town - Violation of
M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
123. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
124. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
125. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 27: Janis P. Reed v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
126. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
127. Plaintiff Janis P. Reed resides at 17 Wilson Avenue, Wakefield, Massachusetts and owns a
cottage known and identified as 43 Long Beach.
37
128. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
129. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
38
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 28: Janis P. Reed v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
130. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
131. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
132. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 29: Gavin Symes, Trustee of the Aricia Symes Elmer Trust v. Town - Breach of
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By
Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
133. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
39
134. Plaintiff Gavin Symes resides at 50 Dodge Street, Beverly, Massachusetts and owns a
cottage known and identified as 48 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff is Trustee of the Aricia
Symes Elmer Trust.
135. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
136. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
40
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 30: Gavin Symes, Trustee of the Aricia Symes Elmer Trust v. Town - Violation of
M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
137. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
138. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
139. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 31: Timothy and Susan Dowd v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the
Leases
41
140. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
141. Plaintiffs Timothy Dowd and Susan Dowd reside at 12 High Ridge Road, Topsfield,
Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 58 Long Beach.
142. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
143. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
42
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 32: Timothy and Susan Dowd v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way
of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
144. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
145. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
146. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
43
COUNT 33: Jane L. Flynn v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
147. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
148. Plaintiff Jane L. Flynn resides at 28 Fairview Avenue, Reading, Massachusetts and owns
a cottage known and identified as 59 Long Beach.
149. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
150. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
44
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 34: Jane L. Flynn v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
151. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
152. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
153. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
45
COUNT 35: Robert E. and Joan M. Butman v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
154. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
155. Plaintiffs Robert E. Butman and Joan M. Butman reside at 227 Lambert Road, New
Canaan, Connecticut and own a cottage known and identified as 65 Long Beach.
156. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
157. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
46
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 36: Robert E. and Joan M. Butman v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By
Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
158. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
159. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
160. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
47
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 37: Barbara B. Tufts, Trustee v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the
Leases
161. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
162. Plaintiff Barbara Tufts resides at 1405 Essex Village, Lynnfield, Massachusetts and owns
a cottage known and identified as 71 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff holds title to said
cottage in trust.
163. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
164. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
48
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 38: Barbara B. Tufts, Trustee v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way
of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
165. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
166. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
167. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
49
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 39: John J. and Anne M. Carty v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
168. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
169. Plaintiffs John J. Carty and Anne M. Carty reside at 11 Tanager Road, Attleboro,
Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 72 Long Beach.
170. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
171. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
50
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 40: John J. and Anne M. Carty v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way
of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
172. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
173. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
51
174. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 41: Joanne and Dolores Cordeiro v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
175. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
176. Plaintiffs Joanne and Dolores Cordeiro reside at 171 Swarton Street, Unit 48, Winchester,
Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 75 Long Beach.
177. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
178. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
52
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 42: Joanne and Dolores Cordeiro v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By
Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
179. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
53
180. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
181. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 43: Miguel A. and Kristina Martinez v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
182. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
183. Plaintiffs Miguel A. Martinez and Kristina Martinez reside at 142 Grapevine Road,
Wenham, Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 78 Long Beach.
184. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
185. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
54
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 44: Miguel A. and Kristina Martinez v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
55
186. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
187. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
188. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 45: Richard and Gladys Sullivan v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
189. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
190. Plaintiffs Richard Sullivan and Gladys Sullivan reside at 3 Hickory Hill, Manchester-by-
the-Sea, Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 79 Long Beach.
191. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
192. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
56
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
57
Count 46: Richard and Gladys Sullivan v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By
Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
193. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
194. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
195. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 47: Paul M. and Eleanor K. Butman v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
196. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
197. Plaintiffs Paul M. Butman and Eleanor K. Butman reside at 227 Lambert Road, New
Canaan, Connecticut and own a cottage known and identified as 80 Long Beach.
198. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
58
199. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
59
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 48: Paul M. and Eleanor K. Butman v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By
Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
200. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
201. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
202. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 49: William L. and Geraldine R. Butman v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
203. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
204. Plaintiffs William L. Butman and Geraldine R. Butman reside at 237 Concord Street,
Gloucester, Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 82 Long Beach.
60
205. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
206. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
61
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 50: William L. and Geraldine R. Butman v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §
15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
207. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
208. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
209. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 51: Michael G. Sullivan v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
210. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
62
211. Plaintiff Michael G. Sullivan resides at 38 Scotland Road, Reading, Massachusetts and
owns a cottage known and identified as 88 Long Beach.
212. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
213. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
63
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 52: Michael G. Sullivan v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
214. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
215. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
216. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 53: Naomi E. Sullivan v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
64
217. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
218. Plaintiff Naomi E. Sullivan resides at 30 Mansur Street, Lowell, Massachusetts and owns
a cottage known and identified as 92 Long Beach.
219. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
220. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
65
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 54: Naomi E. Sullivan v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
221. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
222. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
223. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
66
COUNT 55: Anne M. Ackerman v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
224. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
225. Plaintiff Anne M. Ackerman resides at 2909 Eaton Square, Ellicott City, Maryland and
owns a cottage known and identified as 93 Long Beach.
226. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
227. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
67
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 56: Anne M. Ackerman v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
228. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
229. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
230. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
68
COUNT 57: Kevin M. Gilligan v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
231. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
232. Plaintiff Kevin M. Gilligan resides at 25 Stewart Road, Reading, Massachusetts and owns
a cottage known and identified as 95 Long Beach.
233. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
234. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
69
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 58: Kevin M. Gilligan v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
235. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
236. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
237. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
70
COUNT 59: Norman Stavis v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
238. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
239. Plaintiff Norman Stavis resides at 235 Main Street, Boxford, Massachusetts and owns a
cottage known and identified as 96 Long Beach.
240. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
241. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
71
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 60: Norman Stavis v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
242. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
243. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
244. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
72
COUNT 61: Robert A. and Barbara E. Manzelli v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
245. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
246. Plaintiffs Robert A. Manzelli and Barbara E. Manzelli reside at 24 Evans Street,
Watertown, Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 100 Long Beach.
247. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
248. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
73
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 62: Robert A. and Barbara E. Manzelli v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
249. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
250. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
251. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
74
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 63: Andrew N. and Martha J. Tucker v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
252. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
253. Plaintiffs Andrew N. Tucker and Martha J. Tucker resides at 26 Shasta Drive, North
Reading, Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 102 Long Beach.
254. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
255. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
75
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 64: Andrew N. and Martha J. Tucker v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
256. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
257. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
258. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
76
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 65: Gordon Robert and Andrea J. Berry v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
259. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
260. Plaintiffs Gordon Robert Berry and Andrea J. Berry reside at 8 Green Meadow Drive,
Reading, Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 103 Long Beach.
261. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
262. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
77
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 66: Gordon Robert and Andrea J. Berry v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §
15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
263. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
264. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
78
265. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 67: Kara Donohoe, Trustee of the Mary Donohoe Trust v. Town - Breach of
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By
Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
266. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
267. Plaintiff Kara Donahoe, Trustee of the Mary Donohoe Trust resides at 67 Hancock Drive,
North Kingstown, Rhode Island and owns a cottage known and identified as 104 Long
Beach.
268. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
269. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
79
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 68: Kara Donohoe, Trustee of the Mary Donohoe Trust v. Town - Violation of
M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
80
270. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
271. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
272. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 69: Carol A. Suleski, Trustee v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the
Leases
273. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
274. Plaintiff Carol Suleski resides at 17 Little Pond Road, Merrimac, Massachusetts and
owns a cottage known and identified as 106 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff holds title to said
cottage in trust.
275. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
81
276. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
82
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 70: Carol A. Suleski, Trustee v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
277. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
278. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
279. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 71: Dawn M. McCarthy v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
280. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
281. Plaintiff Dawn M. McCarthy resides at 2640 S. Veitch Street, #409, Arlington, Virginia
and owns a cottage known and identified as 108 Long Beach.
83
282. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
283. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
84
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 72: Dawn M. McCarthy v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
284. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
285. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
286. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 73: Peter J. Limone v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
287. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
85
288. Plaintiff Peter J. Limone resides at 56 Tappan Street, Melrose, Massachusetts and owns a
cottage known and identified as 109 Long Beach.
289. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
290. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
86
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 74: Peter J. Limone v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
291. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
292. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
293. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 75: Richard C. Pratt v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
87
294. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
295. Plaintiff Richard C. Pratt resides at 100 Ledgewood Drive, # 319, Stoneham,
Massachusetts and owns a cottage known and identified as 110 Long Beach.
296. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
297. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
88
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 76: Richard C. Pratt v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
298. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
299. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
300. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
89
COUNT 77: Dennis and Patricia Hunt v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the
Leases
301. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
302. Plaintiffs Dennis Hunt and Patricia Hunt reside at 15 Arundel Avenue, Andover,
Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 111 Long Beach.
303. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
304. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
90
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 78: Dennis and Patricia Hunt v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way
of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
305. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
306. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
307. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
91
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 79: Fred Hochberger III, Trustee of the Hochberger Trust v. Town - Breach of
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By
Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
308. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
309. Plaintiff Fred Hochberger III resides at 680 Boston Post Road, Weston, Massachusetts
and owns a cottage known and identified as 112 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff is Trustee of
the Hochberger Trust.
310. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
311. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
92
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 80: Fred Hochberger III, Trustee of the Hochberger Trust v. Town - Violation of
M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
312. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
313. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
314. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
93
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 81: Susan Greely, Trustee of the Kieran Realty Trust v. Town - Breach of
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By
Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
315. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
316. Plaintiff Susan Greely resides at 192 Stonecleave Road, North Andover, Massachusetts
and owns a cottage known and identified as 114 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff is Trustee of
the Kieran Realty Trust.
317. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
318. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
94
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 82: Susan Greely, Trustee of the Kieran Realty Trust v. Town - Violation of
M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
319. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
320. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
95
321. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 83: Cheryl M. Hunt and Frederick J. Hannifan, Trustees v. Town - Breach of
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By
Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
322. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
323. Plaintiffs Cheryl M. Hunt and Frederick J. Hannifan reside at 490 Main Street, # 104,
Northborough, Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 115 Long
Beach. Said Plaintiffs hold title to said cottage in trust.
324. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
325. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
96
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 84: Cheryl M. Hunt and Frederick J. Hannifan, Trustees v. Town - Violation of
M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
97
326. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
327. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
328. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 85: William P. Seldon, and Jane E. Merrill, and K. L. Sweeney, Trustees v. Town
- Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§
14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
329. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
330. Plaintiffs William P. Seldon, and Jane E. Merrill, and K. L. Sweeney reside at 10 Drews
Crossing, Westford, Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 116 Long
Beach. Said Plaintiffs hold title to said cottage in trust.
331. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
98
332. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
99
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 86: William P. Seldon, and Jane E. Merrill, and K. L. Sweeney, Trustees v. Town
- Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of
Leases
333. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
334. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
335. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 87: G. Francis and Deanna Rizzo v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
336. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
337. Plaintiffs G. Francis Rizzo and Deanna Rizzo reside at 11 Cortland Avenue, Lynnfield,
Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 118 Long Beach.
100
338. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
339. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
101
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 88: G. Francis and Deanna Rizzo v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By
Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
340. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
341. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
342. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 89: Diran K. Dohanian, Personal Representative of the Estate of Hagop M.
Dohanian v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of
M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
343. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
102
344. Plaintiff Diran K. Dohanian, Personal Representative of the Estate of Hagop M.
Dohanian, resides at 269 Payson Road, Belmont, Massachusetts and owns a cottage
known and identified as 126 Long Beach.
345. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
346. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
103
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 90: Diran K. Dohanian, Personal Representative of the Estate of Hagop M.
Dohanian v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3,
9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
347. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
348. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
349. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
104
COUNT 91: Landers and Jennifer Symes, Trustees v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
350. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
351. Plaintiffs Landers and Jennifer Symes reside at 4 Lee Way, Rockport, Massachusetts and
own a cottage known and identified as 128 Long Beach. Said Plaintiffs hold title to said
cottage in trust.
352. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
353. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
105
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 92: Landers and Jennifer Symes, Trustees v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §
15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
354. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
355. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
356. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
106
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 93: William J. McMillan v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
357. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
358. Plaintiff William J. McMillan resides in Winchester, Massachusetts (P.O. Box 1070) and
owns a cottage known and identified as 130 Long Beach.
359. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
360. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
107
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 94: William J. McMillan v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
361. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
362. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
363. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
108
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 95: Lee A. and Doreen H. Griffiths v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
364. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
365. Plaintiffs Lee A. Griffiths and Doreen H. Griffiths reside at 21 Wormwood Street, Unit
603, Boston, Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 132 Long Beach.
366. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
367. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
109
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 96: Lee A. and Doreen H. Griffiths v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By
Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
368. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
369. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
110
370. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 97: John M. and Kelley A. McCarthy v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
371. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
372. Plaintiffs John M. McCarthy and Kelley A. McCarthy reside at 4 Bailey Terrace,
Peabody, Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 136 Long Beach.
373. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
374. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
111
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 98: John M. and Kelley A. McCarthy v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
375. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
112
376. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
377. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 99: Cecily J. Gray v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
378. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
379. Plaintiff Cecily J. Gray resides at 18 Highet Avenue, Woburn, Massachusetts and owns a
cottage known and identified as 02R Old County Road.
380. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
381. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
113
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 100: Cecily J. Gray v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
114
382. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
383. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
384. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 101: Charles F. Hartnett v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
385. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
386. Plaintiff Charles F. Hartnett resides at 851 Spruce Street, Winnetka, Illinois and owns a
cottage known and identified as 28 Old County Road.
387. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
388. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
115
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 102: Charles F. Hartnett v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
116
389. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
390. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
391. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 103: Madelyn M. Sullivan, Trustee of the Sullivan Long Beach Realty Trust v.
Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c.
186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
392. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
393. Plaintiff Madelyn M. Sullivan resides at 191 Bolas Road, Duxbury, Massachusetts and
owns a cottage known and identified as 97 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff is Trustee of the
Sullivan Long Beach Realty Trust.
394. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
117
395. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
118
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 104: Madelyn M. Sullivan, Trustee of the Sullivan Long Beach Realty Trust v.
Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3,
12.12 of Leases
396. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
397. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
398. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 105: Brenda C. Gillis, Trustee of the Bastos Family Irrevocable Trust v. Town -
Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§
14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
399. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
119
400. Plaintiff Brenda C. Gillis resides at 27 Wyman Street, Burlington, Massachusetts and own
a cottage known and identified as 134 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff is Trustee of the Bastos
Family Irrevocable Trust.
401. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
402. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
120
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 106: Brenda C. Gillis, Trustee of the Bastos Family Irrevocable Trust v. Town -
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of
Leases
403. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
404. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
405. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
121
COUNT 107: Pamela H. and Gene F. Gnerre v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6
of the Leases
406. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
407. Plaintiffs Pamela H. Gnerre and Gene F. Gnerre reside at 101 Brooksby Village Drive,
#208, Peabody, Massachusetts and own a cottage known and identified as 19 Long
Beach.
408. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
409. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
122
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 108: Pamela H. and Gene F. Gnerre v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By
Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
410. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
411. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
412. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
123
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 109: Eleanor L. Thompson v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
413. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
414. Plaintiff Eleanor L. Thompson resides at 116 Columbia Road, Arlington, Massachusetts
and own a cottage known and identified as 53 Long Beach.
415. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
416. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
124
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 110: Eleanor L. Thompson v. Town - Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of
Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of Leases
417. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
418. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
419. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
125
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 111: Angelo J. and Marlene Tedesco, Trustees of the Tedesco Living Trust v. Town
- Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§
14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
420. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
421. Plaintiffs Angelo J. Tedesco and Marlene Tedesco reside at 1427 Wando View Street,
Daniel Island, South Carolina and own a cottage known and identified as 146 Long
Beach. Said Plaintiffs are Trustees of the Tedesco Living Trust.
422. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff has
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
423. The insertion of that language constituted, and continues to constitute, a direct or indirect
interference with the quiet enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of
which interference and breach said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential
damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
126
(a) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L., c. 186, § 14 and are void and unenforceable;
(b) A declaration that the third and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 of the
Lease violate M.G.L. c. 186, § 15B and are void, unenforceable, and
against public policy;
(c) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove the third
and fourth sentences of Section 2.6 from the Lease;
(d) A permanent injunction enjoining the Town, its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, members of the public, and all persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
injunction from (1) any further intrusion, encroachment, access, and/or use
of the Leased Land other than the Town’s access permitted by M.G.L. c.
186, §15B; and (2) any further breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
in any manner;
(e) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(f) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
Count 112: Angelo J. and Marlene Tedesco, Trustees of the Tedesco Living Trust v. Town
- Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, § 15 By Way of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of
Leases
424. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
127
425. By inserting, and insisting upon, the language of Sections 6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 of the
Leases, the Town violated M.G.L. c. 186, § 15.
426. Said language is against public policy and void.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) A declaration that Section 6.3 of the Leases violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 15
and is against public policy and void
(b) A permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Town to remove Sections
6.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 12.12 from the Lease; and
(c) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
COUNT 113: Sharon M. Hitchcock v. Town - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and
Violation of M.G.L. c. 186, §§ 14, 15B By Way of Section 2.6 of the Leases
427. The Plaintiff(s) identified in this Count re-state, and incorporate(s) by reference, the
allegations made in paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive.
428. Plaintiff Sharon M. Hitchcock resides at 32 Souther Road, Gloucester, Massachusetts and
owned a cottage known and identified as 62 Long Beach. Said Plaintiff sold said cottage
in 2015.
429. As a direct and proximate result of the Town’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the insertion of the abovesaid language of Section 2.6 of the Leases, said Plaintiff
sustained actual damage in the form of a diminution in the value of the structures on the
lot, and a concomitant lesser sale price, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
430. The insertion of that language constituted a direct or indirect interference with the quiet
enjoyment of the residential premises and a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
and a breach of Section 12.4 of the Lease, as a result of which interference and breach
128
said Plaintiff is entitled to actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee.
WHEREFORE, said Plaintiff(s) pray(s) for the following relief:
(a) An award of actual and consequential damages, or three months’ rent,
whichever is greater, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable
attorney’s fee, as mandated by M.G.L. c. 186, § 14; and
(b) Such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.
JURY DEMAND
Each of the Plaintiffs demands a jury trial on all issues so triable.
Respectfully submitted,By Plaintiffs’ attorneys,
William H. Sheehan III, BBO #457060Thomas J. Flannagan, BBO #564328MacLean Holloway Doherty & Sheehan, P.C.8 Essex Center DrivePeabody, MA 01960(978) [email protected]@mhdpc.com
January 27, 2017
129