comparing mass and elite

8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite

1/28

American Association for Public Opinion Research

Comparing Mass and Elite Subjective Orientations in Urban ChinaAuthor(s): Jie ChenSource: The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Summer, 1999), pp. 193-219Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public

Opinion ResearchStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2991254

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2/28

COMPARING MASS AND

ELITE

SUBJECTIVE ORIENTATIONS

IN URBAN CHINA

JIECHEN

Abstract Comparisonsof mass and elite sociopolitical prefer-

ences and evels of theirattitudinalonsistencyarecritical or under-

standingmass-elite

interactionand hence

politicaldevelopment

n

such a rapidlychangingsociety as China.

Yet

such

studies

are very

scarce or urbanChina.Basedontheresponses o

identicalquestions

asked of both mass and elite interviewees

n

Beijing,

this

article

submitsfour important indings.First,while the masses and elites

shared imilarviews ongovernment olicy performance

nd

the role

of

the individual

n

politics, they

held

quite

different

positions

on

issues of regime legitimacy, reform assessment,

and

democratic

principles.Second, these

two

sets

of

political

actors

organized

heir

subjectiveorientations o some issues similarlybutto othersdiffer-

ently. Third,

n

general,

the elites

in

this

study

had low attitudinal

consistency

relative

o

their

counterparts

n

many

otherstudies.

And,

finally, such relatively ow attitudinal onsistencyamongthe elites

seemed to be caused at least

in

part by the ongoing

decay

of the

Chinese

Communist

Party's(CCP) grassrootsorganizations.

These

findingshave strong mplications or the weaknessand

strength

of

the

CCP's

rule

and hence

China's

sociopoliticalstability.

Do ordinary itizensandpoliticalelitesin China haresimilarpositionson

majorsociopolitical

ssues?

Do

the two

groups

construct heir

respective

positions (or subjectiveorientations) imilarly?

These

questionshave

a

lot

to

do with

explaining

he nature

and characteristics f

the

relationship

between

the

two sets of

political actors,

and hence with

predicting

ocio-

political development

n

that

rapidlychangingsociety.

Among

studies of democraticand transitional

ocieties,

there are at

JIE CHEN

is associateprofessorof political science and directorof the Instituteof

Asian Studies at Old

Dominion

University.

The research

reported

here was

supported

by

Old Dominion

University,

he Social Science Research nstitute

of

the

University

of

Tennessee-Knoxville, University

of Wisconsin-River

Falls,

and the Public

Opinion

Research Instituteof

People's University

of China

in

Beijing.

The author wishes to

thank Christine

Drake,

Robert

Holden,

Xiushi

Yang,

and the

anonymous

referees for

their careful

readings

and

insightful

comments

on

earlierversions

of

this article.

Public

OpinionQuarterly

Volume 63:193-219

?

1999

by

the AmericanAssociation or Public

Opinion

Research

All

rights

reserved.

0033-362X/99/6302-0001$02.50


3/28

194

Jie Chen

least three major

concerns hathavemotivated nquiries

nto congruence

(or similarity)between

mass

and

elite

attitudesand constraintor consis-

tency) of theirrespectivebelief systems(e.g., Achen 1978;Converseand

Pierce 1986; Dalton

1985; Hermann1986; Huberand Powell

1994; Jen-

nings 1992; Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger,

1995, 1997;

Reisinger et al.

1996).

In

relation

o congruence, firstconcernhas been about

he quality

of representation

y the politicalelites. Accordingto these

studies, the

degree of congruence

between mass

and elite subjectiveorientations o

majorpolitical

ssues serves

as

a

good

indicatormeasuring ow well polit-

ical leaders

represent

he

views

of

ordinary eople

n a

society.

As Manion

(1996, p. 736)

has noted,

a

high quality

of representations usually re-

flectedin significantagreementbetween citizens and elected leadersor

governingparties

on

specific

issues or a

general deological

dimension.

Again,

in

the same context

of attitude

congruence,

a second concern

s

about the

sociopolitical

consequence

of

the

gap

between

mass and elite

attitudinal

preferences.

Some

analysts

argue

that the

high

level

of dis-

agreement

etweenmass and

elite

attitudes

an

have

serious

political

con-

sequences, especially

in

societies

experiencingprofound

economic

and

political

reforms: If the leaders

. . .

are

significantly

out of

step

with

popularpreferences,mplementingdifficultor controversial olicies will

be that much

harder; imilarly,

f

ordinary

itizens havepreferences

hat

differ from those

of the elite .

.

.

they

could

come

to

view the

political

and economic

reforms

as either

meaningless

or

lacking egitimacy.

Under

these circumstances

he

citizenry

may

not

only

fail

to

comply

with

the

reformsbut

they may act to undermine hem (Miller,

Hesli, and Rei-

singer 1995, p.

30).

In

relation

to

attitudeconstraint,

a third concerninspiringstudies on

this

subject

s about the communication etween

the

masses and

elites.

As many analystsof constraint aveargued,a significantdiscrepancy e-

tween

the

levels

of

belief consistencyof

these two

groupscan

cause a

seriouscommunication arrier etween them

in their

dialogues

on

major

policy

issues.

As

Jennings

has

explained,

or

example,

if elites view the

world

n

a

decidedly

more constrained nd stable

fashion,

then it

presum-

ably

becomes more difficult for them to

fashion

agendas

and

priorities

thatcan

appeal

o

large

swatchesof a more

variegated,

nconstrained

ank

and

file. Fromthe other

side,

if

ordinary

itizens do not

put

their

political

thoughts ogether

n

a consistentand stable

fashion,

or

if

they put

them

together n a quitedifferent ashionthando elites, it is not difficult o see

why they might

be befuddledor

discouraged y

the behavior

of

what

they

see as doctrinaire f

'ideological'

elites

(Jennings1992, p. 421).

In

essence,

these

three

major

concernsaddressed

by

previousstudies

are

all

about

the

nature,characteristics,

nd

consequences

of the interac-

tions

between

the elites and the masses.

I

believe that

although

most of

these studies deal with elite-mass

nterplay

n

democratic ystems,their


4/28

Mass and Elite Orientations in China

195

insights into and approaches o congruence

and constraint an also be

very useful for analyzing elite-mass interactions

n

post-Deng China.

Chinatodayis by no means a democratic ociety by Westernstandards.

Nonetheless,as Chinese society undergoes

ignificantand rapidshifts in

its political and economic structures,he relationsbetween the govern-

ment and its

people

have

changeddramatically Pei 1998, p. 77). One

of the most important ndicationsof such

a dramatic hange is that the

local political elites have become-willingly

or unwillingly-more re-

sponsive to popularviews as more channelsand opportunities ave be-

come available or

ordinary

itizens'

participation

n public affairs,espe-

cially

at local

levels,

since the

early 1980s

(see, e.g., Bernstein, 1993;

Jennings1997;Manion1996;O'Brien 1994; Pei 1994; Shi 1997; Shue

1988).1

n

Beijing,

for

example,

a

growing

numberof municipalpolicies

and

regulations-on

such issues as

housing, pollution, unemployment

benefits,

and

the

appointment

f

district-government

fficials-have been

adjusted

or

corrected

by municipal

eaders

(of course,

not without

their

nitial

reluctance)due,

at least

in

part,

o

public complaints hrough

various channels

n recent

years (see

Shi

1997, chap. 2). Although

the

current lite-mass

relationship

an

hardly

be characterized

s one between

therepresentativesnd therepresented,hisrelationship asno doubtbe-

come

more

interactive,

or

reciprocal,

han it was

in

the

prereform

ra.

Under these

circumstances,

he

study

of mass-elite attitude

congruence

and constraint

s two

key aspects

of the

interplay

betweenthese

two sets

of

political

actors seems to

be

more

important

han ever before.

In this

connection,

a

systematic

analysis

of

attitude

congruence

and

constraint

an

help

shed some

light

on

at least two urgentpolitical

ssues

in

the context of the elite-massrelationship

n

contemporaryChina.One

is sociopolitical tability.Measuredby the

conceptof congruence,a high

degreeof similaritybetweenmass and elite subjectiveorientations o the

country's

most salient

sociopolitical

ssues will more

likely

be

a

factor

fosteringpoliticalharmony

between

the two

groups,

andhence social sta-

bility. Conversely,

as Miller and

his

associates

(1995, p. 30)

have

sug-

gested,

a

high degree

of differencebetweenelite and

mass

subjective

ori-

entations

will

more

likely

be a

catalyst

for serious conflictsbetween

the

two

groups,

and

hence

potential

social

instability (especially

because

China's

political representation ystem

is

still

very

limited

and

fragile,

and hence

inadequate

or

resolving

the conflicts

effectively).

Related o attitude onstraint mong he elites andthemasses,theother

political question

s whether

(given

the

use

of coercion

as a last

resort)

the current ulingelites

can resolve their conflicts with the masses over

some

major

controversialssues-such as

major

economic

restructuring,

1.

For

example,

citizens now have

opportunities

o

participate

n

competitive

lections of

local administrators

n

ruralareasand

delegates

o localpeople's congresses

n

both

rural

and urbanareas.


5/28

196

jie Chen

democratization, nd

the currentregime

legitimacy-in a consensual,

peaceful

manner

without

expandingthe current, imited

representation

system.The currenteadershave time andagainrejected heideaof estab-

lishing a Westernstyle democracy n

China.

Nonetheless, given the

lessons they have

learned rom the 1989

Tiananmenncident,2hey have

become more willing to play kinder and

gentler politics (Pei 1998,

pp.

69-73) through he

party-led dialogue between the

masses and

the

cadresto resolveconflictsand

controversies e.g., Jiang

1998). Any

meaningful dialogue

involves

two-way

communication hat is

signifi-

cantly

affected

by

the

degree

of

similarityor

difference

between he levels

of attitude onstraint

mongthe two

groups

nvolved in

thedialogue(see

Jennings1992, p. 421). Thehigh degreeof similaritybetween the levels

of attitudeconstraint

mong

the

elites and

masses,

as mentioned

above,

could enhance he

feasibility

and

effectivenessof thedialogueand there-

fore increase

he

chancesof consensualresolutionof

controversies.Con-

versely,a large gapbetweenthe levels of

attitude

onsistencyamong

the

two

groups

could foreshadow

difficultcommunication etween

them,

and

hence a dim futurefor

consensual,peaceful

resolution

of controversies.

In

today's China,

his issue of effective and

meaningful

dialogue

between

thepoliticalelites andmasseshas become ncreasingly mportant s more

and more

frustrated

mployees

of state-owned

enterprises lip

into the

army

of the

unemployed

due to

nation-wideeconomic

restructuring.3

While a

study

of

attitude

congruence

between local

leaders

and

their

constituentsand selectors

in

ruralChina

has

just emerged

(see

Manion

1996),

so

far there has been no

empirical

study comparing

he levels of

attitudeconstraint

mong

the elites and the masses in

China,

nor on the

issues of either

attitude

ongruence

r

constraintn an

urban ettingwithin

that

country.

Therefore,

s

part

of the

concertedeffort

among

studentsof

Chinesepoliticsandcomparative oliticsto graspnew dynamicsbehind

the

elite-mass

nteraction,

his

study

s

intended o

providesuch a needed

analysis

of

both

congruence

and

constraint

n

an

urbanenvironment

n

China.

Specifically,

begin my analysis

with a brief

discussionabout he

data and

clusters

of

attitudinaltems for

comparison;

then examine the

similarities nddifferencesbetween

subjective

orientations f local

politi-

cal elites and the

masses, analyze

the difference

between

the

levels

of

attitude

onstraint

mong

the two

groups, nvestigatemajor

actors nflu-

encing

the level of elite attitude

onstraint,

nd

finallyconcludewith some

2. Although

the current op CCP leadership

has so far refused to reverse

in public

the

originalofficial verdictof the

1989Tiananmenncident, t has done some

soul searching

in private

regarding he domestic and

internationalonsequencesof

large-scalecoercion

(e.g., see Jiang

1997).

3. According

o Hu Angang(1997), a leading

Chinesescholarof labor

markets, he actual

unemployment ate

n

urbanareas

was as

high

as about8

percent; his rate wasexpected

to climb to

10-15 percentas soon as the

governmentbeganto restructure

tate-owned

enterprises.


6/28

Mass and Elite Orientations

in China

197

implicationsof my findings

or futurepolitical and economicchanges n

post-Deng

China.

Data and Clusters of

Subjective Orientations

The data

analyzed

n

this studycome froma representative-sample

urvey

conducted

n

an urban ocale, Beijing, in late 1997

(see Appendix A).

Two important nd unique

features

of

the survey data

allow us to carry

out this

analysis.

One

is

that

this

cross-sectional urvey ncludedrespon-

dentswho were eitherordinary itizens (626)

or

typical

ocal, urbanpoliti-

cal elites (68). Inthisstudy,we defined ocal politicalelites according

to

two

important

riteria:administrative osition andmembership

n the

Chinese

Communist

Party (CCP).

In

today's China,

the administrative

apparatus

f local

governments

till

prevails

over

the

legislativeapparatus

(e.g.,

see

Lieberthal 995). Therefore,

hose who hold

administrative

osi-

tions aretypicallyconsideredpolitical elites,4

since

they

have

real

power

to influence he

socioeconomic ife of

ordinary

itizens.Moreover,

most

of the

important

dministrative

osts

at local

levels

(at

east

in

urban

areas)

arestill occupiedby CCPmembers, ortheregimestill insistsuponexer-

cising

the

party

eadership

at all levels of

government.

A

typical

ad-

ministrative

anking ystem

in urbanareasstratifies adres

nto

threema-

jor categories:

bureau-level

juji) leaders,

who

are

considered

high-level

cadres

gaoji

ganbu);

department-levelchuji)

eaders,who are

mid-level

cadres

zhongjiganbu);

and section-level

keji)

leaders,

who

are

ordinary

cadres

(yiban ganbu) (see

Shi

1997, p. 56).

Politicalelite

respondents

n

our

sample

covered all

three

categories(about

24

percent

bureau-level,

36

percentdepartment-level,

nd 40

percentsection-level).5And,

as dis-

cussedin the nextsection,all these cadresdid havepowerto set local

policies

in their domains.

The

other

mportant

eatureof the data is that the

same questionnaire

4. Whencomparing lite and

mass

belief systems,Miller,Hesli, and

Reisinger 1995) and

Reisingeret al. (1996) also includedadministratorsn the categoryof the

elite.

5. Under he CCP's guidelinesand supervision,uji and chujicadresof boththe municipal

governmentand districtgovernments under he municipalgovernment)

reselected by

the municipalpeople's congress (elected by the districtpeople's congresses)or district

people's congresses (elected directly by

the

people);

most

keji

cadres are

appointedby

theirhigherauthorities.

But

all

of them

may be removed

from

office by the municipal

people's congressordistrictpeople's congresses seeCentralCommittee1995).Forexam-

ple, in July 1996, the directorof the financialbureauof the BeijingMunicipality juji, or

high-level cadre)

was removedfrom office

by

a motion

passed

in

the Beijing Municipal

People's Congressbecause of his misallocationof public funds (Wu 1998).

In addition,

all

these cadres

have

been increasingly crutinized y the massesthrough

ariouschannels,

such as the news media andcomplaintbureaus.Thus,at least

in

theory, he cadres

n our

sample

are

expected

o

be accountable o their

constituents, iven

that the

formershould

not work to undermine he CCP's one-party ule. For a more detaileddiscussionon the

cadre

system

and mass

scrutiny

of the cadres

n

contemporary hina,

also see Shi (1997).


7/28

198 Jie Chen

items regarding ttitudes oward

majorsociopolitical ssues were applied

to both elite and mass interviewees.These two features, herefore, acili-

tate the following analysis of congruenceand constraint,which is based

on

comparison

f

positions

of

the

entireset

of

elites and the entireset

of

ordinary itizens-sampled from the same sociogeographic ocation6-

on the same set of sociopolitical

ssues.

Within our

questionnaire,

3 questions

were asked

regarding espon-

dents' subjectiveorientations.Rather han including all these questions

in our analysisof congruenceand constraint,7 e decided to select

and

categorize he questionsaccording

o their naturally ccurring lusters

(Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1995,p. 8). Following the steps of Miller,

Hesli, andReisinger 1995), we conductedan exploratory actoranalysis

with all 33 questions,usingthe sample

of

bothmass andelite respondents.

As table

1

shows, five major actors,composed

of 24

questions see

Ap-

pendixB), emerged

romthe factor

analysis.

These five factors

dealtwith

subjective

orientations o five substantive

reas:

nstrumental

upport

or

evaluationof governmentpolicies),

affective support(or

evaluationof

regime legitimacy),politicalefficacy,

assessment

of

reform,

and

demo-

cratic

values. These five factors ogether xplain

about

half(48.6 percent)

of theitem varianceamongall 33 items. The instrumentalupport luster

(the

most

important actor)explained

19.2

percent

of the item

variance,

while the other

four

major

actorsof affectivesupport,politicalefficacy,

reformassessment,

and democratic alues

explained9.8, 7.1, 6.8,

and

5.7

percent

of the

variance,respectively.

These five clusters constitute

the

focus for

this

analysis

of attitude

congruence

and constraint.

The

remaining

nine

items,

outside of the five

major actors,

oaded on

five additional actors

that

together

accounted

or

only

about

10

percent

of

the item variance from

a

low

of 1.1

percent

o

a high

of

2.5 percent).

Due to their ow percentage f variance xplanation, hesenine itemswere

excluded

n this

analysis.

The five clustersof

questions,

we believe, capture he subjective

orien-

tations o some

of

the

most

salient

aspects

of

sociopoliticalreality

n

con-

temporary

China.

The instrumental

upport

cluster includes

eight

items

6. Rather hanmatching ach

member f

political

elites with

his

or her

constituents,Miller,

Hesli, and Reisinger 1995, 1997) and Reisinger

et al. (1996) also made a comparison f

the entire set of elites and

the

entire set

of

ordinary itizens of the same geographical

locationof theirresidence when they studied

belief congruence r/andconstraintn post-

Soviet societies.However, t shouldbe noted hat,unlike he elites in mostprevious tudies

(e.g., ConverseandPierce 1986;Jennings1992;Miller,Hesli, andReisinger1995, 1997),

who tend to have higherpositions

and

come

from largergeographical

bases

(national

or

regional),

the CCP cadres

n

our

study

are local political elites who do not have direct

influenceon public affairs

at

national

evel

and

yet have morefrequent ontactswith their

constituents.

7. Converse(1964) and Jennings 1992) once appliedsuch an approach o the study of

attitude/belief onstraint.

They

divided

all

possible

questions nto subsets

on

the basis

of

face validity (Converse1964, p. 229; Jennings

1992, p. 425).


8/28

Mass and Elite

Orientations in China

199

Table

1.

Factor

Analysis of

All

Attitudinal temsin the

1997

Beijing

Survey

InstrumentalAffective

Political Reform Democratic

Support Support

Efficacy Assessment Value

Item

(1) (2)

(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(9) (10)

Q12.C .77

Q12.I .74

Q12.H .66

Q12.K .65 .27

.26

Q12.B .63 .30 .33

Q12.D .62

Q12.F

.58

.38

Q12.E .56

-.36

.33

Q20.G .76

Q20.H

.74

Q20.E

.74

.29

Q20.F .72 -.27

Q20.I .28 .67

Q20.M .58

Q21.N .77

Q21.S .69

Q21.0

.65

Q21.P .53 .42

Q20.A

.69

Q20.B

.28 .66

Q20.D

.59

Q20.L

-.25

.68

Q20.K

.66

Q20.J .29

.34

.52

Q14.

.81

Q13. .73

Q12.A

.28

.72

Q12.J .35

.29 .39 -.26

Q20.Q -.74

Q20.R

.67

.29

Ql l.

.70

Q9.

.69

Q10.

.77

SOURCE.-The

1997

Beijing Survey.

NOTE.-Figures in this table are factor loadings of .25 or larger from the varimax ro-

tated

matrix for

all factors with

eighenvalues greater

than

1.0.


9/28

200

jie Chen

linked to public policy areas:

minimizing he gap betweenrich

and poor,

combatingpollution,providingwelfareservicesto the needy,

fightingof-

ficial corruption,providing ob security, mprovinghousing conditions,

providingadequatemedical carefor all, and maintaining rder.

Ourpre-

survey interviews indicate widespread nterest

in

each

of

these policy

areas.

n

other

words,

all these items

collectively

measure he overalleval-

uations

of and

support

or

government

policies.

The affective supportcluster

contains

six

questions referring

o the

diffused or generalizedattachments Macridisand Burg 1991,

p. 8)

the

respondents

have for the political regime: its values and

norms and

its politicalinstitutions.Because these attachments r evaluations

are all

vital to thevery survivalof any type of regime,they are togetherconsid-

ered an indicator

of

regime

legitimacy (e.g., Easton 1975;Miller 1993).

This cluster of

questions,

herefore,distinguishes

hose

who

approve

of

the current

political system

from those who

do

not.

The political efficacy

cluster

encompasses

our

questions

referring

o

the feeling that

individual

political

action does

have,

or can have, an

impact upon the political process

(Campbell,Gurin,and

Miller

1954,

p. 187).

It has been

argued

hatsuch

feeling

motivates

people

to pay atten-

tionto andparticipaten politicsandpublicaffairs(e.g., NathanandShi

1993, Jennings1997).

Conversely,

he absence of

such a

feeling

of effi-

cacy

evokes

political apathy

and withdrawal

Chen 1997).

The reformassessmentcluster

(composed

of three

questions)

reflects

respondents' atisfaction

r dissatisfactionwith the overalleffects

of

post-

Mao reformson theirmaterial ife and

politicalstatus,

andtheir

prediction

of the futureof the reforms.

These

questions clearly

differentiate hose

who have

perceived

hemselvesas beneficiaries f

the reforms

romthose

who have

not

and,therefore,

hose who are

ikely

to

support

eforms rom

those who are not.

Finally, the questions n the democraticvalue cluster capture

respon-

dents' attitudes oward hreedemocratic

principles: ompetitive

elections

of

government

fficials

by

the

population, qualprotection

and

rights

for

all

people regardless

f

their

politicalviews,

andthe

existenceof the inde-

pendent

news mediawith the freedom o

expose

and

criticize

government

wrongdoing.

These

principles,amongothers,

arecritical o the

emergence

as well as the survival

of a

democratic

ystem

in

any society (e.g.,

Chen

and

Zhong 1998;

Gibson

and Duch

1993). Therefore,

hose

favoring

de-

mocratization remore ikelyto supportheseprinciples,while thosesup-

porting

an

authoritarianule

are less inclined to endorsethese values.

In

sum,

these five clustersof 24

questions ogether apture

espondents'

subjective

orientations owardsome

of the most salient

aspects

of socio-

political

ife

in

contemporary

hina.These

questions

hus

provide

a broad

empirical

basis for our

comparison

of mass and elite

subjective

value

systems.


10/28

Mass and

Elite Orientations in China

201

Congruence between

Mass

and Elite

Subjective

Orientations

How similarordifferent houldwe expect

elite andmass subjective

orien-

tations o be

in

today's China?Thereare, as

mentionedabove, almost

no

survey-based

mpiricalstudies dealing with value congruence

between

ordinarypeople

and

political elites.8As a result,the expectations

about

mass-elitebeliefcongruence

n

this study

arebasedmainlyon sometheo-

retical analysesrelevant o this subject.

First,we

expect that ocal political

elites, or CCPcadres,are moresup-

portiveof majorgovernment oliciesthanthemasspublic.The important

reason for this expectationcomes from

the unique policy making

and

implementation

ystem

that

s

still

characterizeds a top-down process

in China.In this

process,while the central

or national)Partyelites make

majorpolicies,

the local cadres can make

necessaryadjustments

as

local policies) when

implementing

he

majorpolicies (Shi 1997, p.

106).

Therefore, he

local cadresare better

situated o makethe currentpolicies

fit

their

needs or

policy interpretations

e.g., Brugger

and

Reglar

1994;

Jennings1997;

Pei

1994, chap. 3)

and

hence tend

to

have more

positive

evaluationsof thepolicies (i.e., higherscores on the instrumentalupport

items)

than do

ordinary

itizens.

Second,we

anticipate

hat ocal elites

in

our

sample

aremore

supportive

of the current

political system.

It is

quite

obvious

that,

because of the

CCP's

unchallengeable ulingposition

n

the current

politicalregime,

ts

cadres

still

have

many

kinds of

privileges

that

ordinary

itizens

do

not

enjoy,

such as unusual

access to informationand influential ndivid-

uals and more

opportunities

or

working

he

system (Jennings

1997,

p. 267).

In

other

words,

the CCP

cadresare

definitely

he

greatest

bene-

ficiaries of the currentpolitical system.Thus, they should score higher

on the

affective

support

tems

than the masses.

Third,

our

expectation

about

congruencebetweenmass and elitepoliti-

cal

efficacy

s ambivalent: lite

political

efficacy

could be

higher

or lower

thanmass

efficacy.

Thereare

at least two

important ontending

iews that

can

be

drawn rom

previous

studies and field

evidence.

One is

that CCP

local cadresare less

efficacious,since

they still operatewithin

a

Leninist

framework hat

emphasizes

nternal

discipline

and

hierarchy,

nstead of

a

sense of individual nfluence

(e.g., Zang 1993).

This

view seems to

be supported y the numerous peechesmadeby the CCPtopleadership

stressingpartydiscipline

and

harmony

e.g., Jiang 1998).

The otherview

is that

the local cadres

may

have a

stronger ense of individual nfluence

because

they

can make local

policies

and influencethe

implementation

8. An exception o this is Manion's 1996) studyof mass-eliteattitude ongruence

n rural

China.


11/28

202 jie Chen

of centralpolicies due to the increasingautonomy hat ocal governments

andproduction nitshave gainedsince reform e.g., Goldstein1994, 274;

Lieberthal nd Oksenberg1988).

Fourth,we expect that political elites tend to give a more positive as-

sessmentof the reformsas a whole thanmost ordinary eople do. In post-

Mao China,all majorreformprograms ave been carriedout through he

party-state ierarchy

n

a

top-downmanner.Although he local cadres

do

not have much sayin initiatingmajorreformpolicies, they do have privi-

leges, which ordinary itizens do not enjoy, such as being better nformed

of the intentsand

prospects

of reforms

e.g.,

via centraldocuments or

zhongyangweijian)

and

using

their discretion

(though imited)

to ad-

just and mplement pecificreformpolicies.As a result, ocal cadresare

better ituated obenefitmost from heseparty-led eforms e.g., Jennings,

1997; Pei 1994).

Finally, we expect thatpolitical

elites

may be

less democratic

han,

or

just as

democratic

s, ordinary eoplemay

be. On

the

one

hand,according

to some China analysts, ocal cadres could be less democraticbecause

they operate,

as mentioned

above,

in

a nondemocratic

artysystem (i.e.,

a Leninist

ystem)

andhave been

constantly

bombardedwith authoritarian

propaganda rom the centralparty organ. On the other hand, according

to another

group

of

analysts,

cadres' attitudes owarddemocratic

values

could

be

quite similar

o

ordinary

itizens'

attitudes,given that currently

most

cadresare

younger,

better

educated,

and more technocratic han

old-generation adres,

andhence much ess averse o the idea of democra-

tization (e.g., Cheng

and White

1990; Goldstein 1994, pp. 716-17;

Lee

1991;

Pei

1994, chaps. 2-3).

To test these expectationsagainstthe empiricalevidencecollected

in

our

survey,we compare he means

of

mass and elite attitude ndices that

arecomputed rom themeasures n eachof the five substantive lusters.9

Figure 1 presents he results of the comparison.10

Elites were

only slightly

more

supportive

f

current,majorgovernment

policies

thanwere

ordinary eople,

and

the differencebetween heirevalu-

ationswas not

significant at

the

.05

level). Contrary

o ourearlier

xpecta-

tion,

this

resultimplies that there

was

quitea high degree

of

elite-mass

congruence

on the issue of instrumental

upport.

A

possible

reason for

9. We formed wo additive ndices

(one

for

mass,

the otherfor

elite)

for each of the five

major actorsby adding he values of all items in each cluster ogether.Then we

rescaled

all the indicesso thatthe rangeof valuesfor each indexwas 1-4. Thesamemethodwas

also used

in

an

analysisby Miller, Hesli,

and

Reisinger 1995, p. 14).

10. In the meantime, ollowing the same procedureas used for the comparisonof

elite

and mass attitudes

see

note

9),

we also

compared

he

means

of

attitude ndices

of two

subgroupswithinthe elites (juji and chujicadres n one groupand keji cadres

n

another)

in all five attitudinal ategories.The results (not presented n this article) ndicated

hat

the

attitude ndex means

of

these two groupsare not significantlydifferent n any one

of

the five categories at the .05 level), and that the means of

keji

cadreswere much

closer

to

those

of

juji/chuji cadresthan to the means of the total masses.


12/28

i r

X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r

cUU

Y

'-0~~~~~-

0-4

0-

E) >

0-

D

C

OC/)

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c

-C

.

.

4-'J;-44

4-. ;H

co

0~

0

E-

C

0

cOle)

ci

xapuI

Jo)

Lrw~~U\

-

xJpUIJ0UP3N

_ =~


13/28

204 Jie Chen

such anunexpected esultcouldbe thaturban adreshadmuch ess discre-

tion than

expected

to

manipulatemajor policies

in

favor

of

their own

interestsas centralgovernment egulations/legislations ecame increas-

ingly extensive and pervasive(e.g., see Tanner1994). Therefore, adres

no longer felt the impacts

of

majorpolicies significantlydifferently rom

ordinarypeople.

In terms of the affective supportcluster, as we expected, elites were

significantly at the .001 level)

more

supportiveof the current egime's

norms

and institutions

hanwere

ordinarypeople. Along with the above-

mentioned inding,this result can be understood o mean that, although

the two

sets

of

political actors

elt

similareffects

of

specific government

policies on theirpersonal ives, cadres still had a higher degreeof emo-

tional and ideological

attachment or the currentCommunist

egime. It

appears hat

he

constant

ampaignsby

the CCP central

eadership

o

pro-

mote its ideologies

had

made

a difference

amongthe local

cadres

(see

Jiang 1998).

As for

the questionsregardingpolitical efficacy,

we found that elites

andmasses were not

significantlydifferent at

the .05

level)

in

their

sense

of

the individual nfluence

on

public affairs,although

he masses scored

slightlyhigher hanthe elites.Thisresultmay provethatthe two compet-

ing views, mentionedabove,

were

both correct:

on

the

one

hand,

urban

cadresfelt

powerless

when

facing

the formidable

partyhierarchy;

n

the

other, they

felt a bit

more

powerful

when

dealing

with

ordinarypeople

under

heirdirectcontrol

(Shi 1997). Yet,

a

mix of

these two mentalities

togetherproduced

certain

evel of

efficacyamong

he local

cadres,

which

converged o

some

extent with the

level

of efficacy amongthe masses.

In

terms

of

the cluster

of

items dealing with reform assessment,we

found

thaturbancadresregistereda significantly at the .001 level) more

positiveevaluationof post-Maoreformsas a whole thandidtheordinary

people.

This result

seems to confirmour earlier

expectation.

And it

may

further

mply

that

given

the currentdirectionand

speed

of

reform,

ocal

cadreswill continue

o be the

stronger upporters

f the reform

programs

initiatedby

the

centralauthority.

Finally,

we found that ocal elites were

significantly at

the .001

level)

less

supportive

of

some

major

democratic

principles

han were

ordinary

people.

This

findingapparently

onfirmsone

of

the

competingarguments

mentioned

above,

that CCP cadres are less

democratically

riented

be-

cause of theauthoritariannfluence romtheparty'sorganizationalystem

and

its

ideological propaganda.

In

sum,

our

findingsportray

a mixed

picture

of

congruence

between

mass

and elite

subjective

orientationsoward ive

major

clustersof socio-

political

issues.

Apparently,

both

groups

shared

very

similar views on

governmentpolicy performance

nd the role of the

individual

n

public

affairsand

politics. Yet,

therewere some

controversies,

r

at

least

uneasi-


14/28

Mass and Elite Orientations in China

205

ness, between he two groupsover the issues

of regime egitimacy,reform

assessment,andpotentialdemocratization. an

the

politicalelites resolve

these controversiesby convincinga majorityof ordinarypeople that the

currentpolitical system is worth as much

supportas the elites believe?

And can the elites persuade he masses thatreform s equally beneficial

to

all,

and that

democratization

hould be at least delayed?These ques-

tions,

as

we discussed above,

can be betteransweredby comparing he

levels

of

attitudinal

onstraint

mong

the elites

and

masses.

Levels of Attitude Constraint among Elites

and Masses

So

far

therehave been

no

empirical

studies

comparing,the

evels of atti-

tude

constraint,

r

consistency,among political

elites

and the

masses

in

contemporaryChina.

But there have been such studies

in

some well-

establisheddemocratic

ystems

and

in

post-Soviet

societies, although,

as

some analysts point

out

(Jennings1992; Miller, Hesli,

and

Reisinger

1995),

the

numberof

these studies is still

very

small. Our

expectations

aboutattitudeconstraintamongthese two sets of political actors,there-

fore,

are

mainly

derived

from those studies in other

systems.

There

seem to be

at

least three

major

areasof consensus

n

these studies.

First, hey have all foundthat

he

level

of attitude onstraint mongelites,

measuredby average nteritem

orrelations,

s distinctlyhigherthan that

among

the

masses as

a whole.

Some analysts

of

these studies

(Converse

and Pierce

1986; Granberg

and

Holmberg 1988; Jennings 1992) argue

that

he

higher

evel

of attitude

onsistencyamong

elites results romtheir

constant

ontemplation

ndarticulation f

publicpolicies

andsocial

goals,

whereas he lower level of constraint mong ordinarypeopleas a whole

is attributableo their ack

of

opportunities

relative o the elites) to engage

in

such activities.

Second,

most

of

these

studies

agree

thatwithin he mass

public,

attitudes ndbeliefs shouldbe

more consistent

among

he citizens

who

are

most

actively

involved

in

politics

and

public

affairs han

among

those who are not. This

is

because

a

higher

frequency

of

involvement

n

politics

or

public

affairs

instead

of formal

party

or

government ositions)

provides

his

segment

of

the

public

with more

opportunities

o be familiar

with

and

articulate

ociopolitical ssues,

which

helps

foster more consis-

tent attitudes.And, finally,theyhavesuggested hatthe levels of attitude

constraint n more

salientand

personally

elevant ssues

(such

as

regime

legitimacy

and

specificpublicpolicies

related

o

people's daily lives)

tend

to be

higher

than those on abstract

and

complex

issues

(such

as

foreign

policy

and democratic

principles) e.g.,

see

Jennings1992; Miller, Hesli,

and

Reisinger 1995).

To test these three

hypotheses,

ollowing

the

steps

of the

previous

stud-


15/28

206

jie

Chen

ies (e.g., Granberg nd

Holmberg1988;Jennings1992; Miller,Hesli, and

Reisinger 1995),

we

computed

he average nteritem orrelation or each

of the fivemajorclusters orthe totalelites,thetotal masses,andthemost

active citizens.11 he results

are presented

n

figure 2.

In

general, he empirical

evidence presented n figure 2 confirmsonly

some of our

expectations,while contradicting thers.First,in terms

of

the differencebetween the levels of

constraintamong the elite and the

masses as a whole, only for theinstrumentalupport ndaffective

support

clusterswas

it

truethatthe

level

of attitude

onsistencyamongelites

was

distinctlyhigherthan that of

the

generalpublic.

For the other

three sub-

stantiveclusters, he levels of attitude

onsistencyamong

the

two groups

were almost he same(only .01 or.02 difference or eachcluster). nother

words,

relative to the

masses,

the

level of elite attitudeconstraint

was

considerably

ower than

expected.

These

findingsbring

both

good

and bad

news

to the

ruling elite.

The

good news

is

that

since

both

groups

share he same

(or verysimilar)

evels

of attitudeconstraint

egarding

he role of the

individual,

reformassess-

ment, and democratic

principles,

the elites should have little

difficulty

in

convincing ordinary

people

that

central-leadership uidance

s more

importanthanindividual nitiatives,that reform s or will be good for

everyone,

and that

democratization-especially by

the

Western stan-

dards-should be

delayedat least for the

present.

But the badnews is

that,

because elites

and

ordinary

people

construct

heir

values about

regime

legitimacy quite differently,

elites will

have

a hardtime

persuading

he

publicthat he current uthoritarian

egime

merits

strongsupport.

n addi-

tion, although

both

elites and

ordinarypeople now equallysupport

major

government olicies (as fig.

1

indicated),

he local elites

may have a

seri-

ous

problem ustifying major

governmentpolicies

if

policy performance

declines (e.g., a higher inflationrate,a higher unemployment ate, or a

climbing

crime

rate).

This is

because there

is a

distinct

gap between

the

way

elites and

ordinarypeople organize

heir evaluationsof

government

policy performance see fig. 2).

Second,

the

empirical

evidence confirms

he

anticipated ap

between

the levels

of

attitude

onstraint

mong

he

most active

citizens

and

among

the rest of the

public

on

all five substantive ssue

areas,although

he

gap

was

quite

narrow or the clustersof

politicalefficacy,

reform

assessment,

and democratic

principles.

On the same

three ssue

clusters,

surprisingly,

11. We also

computed

and

compared

he

average

nteritemcorrelations or each of

the

five

attitude lusters

or

juji

and

chuji

cadres n one

group

and

keji

cadres n another.The

results

(not presented

n

this

article)

did

not show

any

remarkable istinction

between

the two

groups

in the

levels

of attitude

consistency

for

any

one of the five attitudinal

clusters: he minusculedifferencesof the

average

nteritem orrelations etween the

two

groups

for

the five clusters

ranged

rom .0012 to

.0028. Again, these resultsapparently

suggested

hat

keji

cadresdid

belong

to the same

category

of the

elites defined n this

study.


16/28

42,

0

m

co

E

>

(1)

0

C)

0

E m

oo

't

cu

o cn m

Cy)

CY)

0

= z

?

e: D

E

F ~~

~~

Q

XQ

E


23/28

214

Jie Chen

ratization ince the structures

f their attitudes oward these issues are

quitesimilar.The other mplication, owever, s

that he two groupsmight

haveseriousdifficulties n trying o resolvetheirexistingor potential on-

troversiesover government

policy performance nd the CCP's right to

rule because of the significantdifferencebetween

the internalorganiza-

tions

of

their views on

these two issues.

Finally,the above-mentionedindings and

implicationsalso indicate

both the weaknessand

strengthof CCP rule in

post-DengChina.On the

one hand,

the

lack

of consensuswith the

masses

on the issue of regime

legitimacyandthe lack

of ability o reachsuch

a consensus due to differ-

ent

constraintevels)

constitute he weakestpoint

of CCPgovernance.On

the otherhand,the existence of agreementwith the masses on the issue

of the individual's ole

in

politics

and he

absence

of communication arri-

ers (due to

the

similarconstraint evels)

in

this issue arearepresent

he

strength

of CCP

rule. If

sociopolitical

stability

refers to social

harmony

under

he CCP

one-party ule,

as the

top party

eadership

defined

t

(see

Jiang 1998), the most

challenging, f not impossible,task for the

ruling

party

and its

cadres

s to reach a

generalagreement

with the masses on

the

legitimacy

of such

one-party

rule. And the most valuable asset

the

CCP has for buttressingts authoritarianule is the consensusbetween

the elites and

the

masses

that he individual hould

not

play

a

very impor-

tant role in

public

affairs

and should

obey

authority.

n

short,

the most

consensual

part

of the interaction r

dialogue

between the elites and

the masses

in

urban

China is more

likely

to be based on their common

understanding

f

the

importance

f central

authority

nstead

of their

af-

fective

support or,

or emotionalattachment

o,

the current fficial de-

ology

and

politicalsystem.

In

conclusion,

we

emphasize

he need for more extensiveand nclusive

studiescomparing he beliefs and values of the masses and the elites at

various

evels and

in different

settings

in

this rapidlychangingsociety.

As Chinaenters

he next

millennium,

with

its

more modernized

conomy

and

society,

the

political

attitudes

and

the structuresof

such attitudes

among

the two

sets

of

political

actors will almost

certainlyexperience

moredramatic

hanges,

andsuch

changes

will

eventually

affectthe future

of

this

dynamiccountry.

Appendix A

Survey

and

Sample

This

analysis

s basedon

a

publicopinion

1997

in

cooperation

with the Public

Opir


24/28

Mass and Elite Orientations in China 215

ple's Universityof China.Our sample site

has two salient features.First, as the

capitalof the country,Beijingis viewed as the

political center

n

contemporary

China.Significant oliticalevents-such as theCulturalRevolutionandthe 1989

DemocracyMovement-started in Beijing.

Second,Beijing is the cultural enter

of China and

has

the most

developed educational

ystem

in

the

country.

As a

result, Beijing residentstend to be better

informedabout political events and

issues than do people elsewhere,especially those in remote and

ruralareas.

The data for this study were obtainedfrom a representative ampleof 720

adults

(including

both

ordinarypeople

and

local political elites)

in

the Beijing

region.This probability amplewas derived

rom a multistage amplingprocess.

Eight urbandistricts qu), includingsix regular-sizedistrictsand two large-size

districts,wererandomly hosenat the first

stage

of

sampling.

Fromeach of the six

regular-sizedistricts, our residentialneighborhoods juweihui) were randomly

chosen;

from each of the two

large-size

districts,

six residential

neighborhoods

were randomly hosen at

the

second stage of

sampling.

This

process yielded

36

residential eighborhoods. hen 20 householdswererandomly hosen fromeach

of

the 36 residential

neighborhoods

t

the third

stage, producing

a total of

720

households.

At

the final

stage,

one

individualwas chosen

randomly

rom

each

of

the 720 households

as the

interviewee.Of

the

720

questionnaires

elivered

(by

our

field

interviewers),

00

were

brought

back. Of these returned

question-

naires,

we excluded ix fromourdataset because

hey

did not contain nformation

aboutrespondents' ociopolitical tatus e.g., cadrevs. noncadre nd/orpartyvs.

nonpartymember).Thus,

the

adjusted esponse

rateof the

survey

was 96

percent

(694),

whichwas

veryhighby

Western

tandards,

ut

quite

similar

o the

response

rates

from other

surveys

conducted n

China see Chen and Zhong 1998; Nathan

andShi

1993).Among

our

respondents,

8 were ocal CCPcadres

ganbu),repre-

sentingall

three

majoradministrativeanksat

the

local level-16 at the bureau

level,

24 at the

departmentevel, and 28 at

the

section evel.

They

were from the

municipal

or district

governmental

gencies/organizations. 4

The

underlyingdemographic

haracteristics f the

sampleapproximated

hose

of the 1996

government

ensus andan

earlier

urvey

conducted

n

Beijing.

About

equalnumbersof men(51.4 percent)and women(48.6 percent)appearedn the

sample.Similarly,

he

1996

government

ensus showedthatmales accounted or

50.7

percent

of the

population

n

Beijing(see

BeijingMunicipal

StatisticalBureau

1997).

The

respondents

n our

sample represented ll age groups,ranging rom

18 to

76 years

of

age (with

an

averageage of

42): 18-25,

11.3

percent;26-35,

22.1

percent;36-45,

24.7

percent;46-55,

16.3

percent;56-65,

18.4

percent;

and

65

and

over,

7.2

percent.

The statistics

of

the 1996 census showed the

age

distributions f the

Beijing population

as follows:

18-25,

14.1

percent;26-35,

25.6

percent;36-45,

21.9

percent; 6-55,

13.2

percent; 6-65,

15.7

percent;

nd

65 and over 9.5 percent (see Beijing MunicipalStatisticalBureau1997). The

average

differencebetween our

sample

and the census

in

all

age groups

was 2.9

percent.

The education

evels of the

respondents

anged

rom

elementary

duca-

tion

(13 percent),

middle school education

24 percent),high

school

education

(48 percent),

o

college degree(15 percent).Although

herewere no

comparable

14. For

the

election,appointment, nd removalof these

cadres,see

note 5.


25/28

216

Jie

Chen

statisticsavailable

n

the 1996 census (or any government ensuses

in the

past

several years),15he education evels

in

this sample approximatedhose

in

an

earlier epresentativeurveyconductedn Beijing n 1995 (elementary ducation,

12 percent;middle and high school education,76 percent;and college degree,

12 percent) see Chen and Zhong 1998). Overall, his sampleyielded a sampling

errorof less than

4

percent.

Care was

taken to minimize

linguistic misinterpretations

nd

respondent

f-

fects. Theoriginalwordingof ourquestionnairewhichwas firstdesigned

n

the

United

States)

was reviewed

by

the PORI to fit

the Chinese social and cultural

contextand to

provide

or seamlesstranslationrom

English

o

Chinese.College

studentsof journalismandsociologywereemployedas field interviewers; hey

were

trained y project

members n field

nterviewing echniques

efore he

actual

surveywas carried ut.Respondentswere offeredconfidentialityndencouraged

toprovideanswers hatbestcapturedheir rue eelings.Ingeneral, ircumstantial

evidence

suggests

hat

Chinese

respondents

eel

muchfreer o

express

heirviews

in such a public opinion survey as ours than

is

typicallyassumed

n

the West.

This

is

in

partbecause,

since the

reform,

he

Chinesegovernment

has not effec-

tively

censored

or

regulatedpublic opinion

researchdue to weakened

party

con-

trol at the grassroots evel

and the lack of

any

consistentofficial rules

governing

survey

research.16

Appendix B

The

Five Clusters

of the

24

Items Revealed

by

the Factor

Analysis

INSTRUMENTAL SUPPORT CLUSTER

Q12: Please rate government olicy performance

n

the following areas,using a

scale of 1-5 (1 = very poor;2 = poor;3 = good;4 = very good;5 = excellent).

Q12.C. Narrowing

he

gap

between rich and

poor;

Q12.I. Combatingpollution;

Q12.H. Providingadequate

welfare

to

the

needy;

Q12.K. Eliminating orruption;

Q12.B. Providing ob security;

Q12.D. Improvinghousing conditions;

Q12.F. Providingadequate

medical care for

all;

Q12.E. Maintaining

ocial

order.

15. The statistics close but not comparable o our measuresof education evel) we could

find from all the recentgovernment ensuseswere only the figuresof graduates y level

and type of school and studentenrollment n institutions f highereducation n each

year (see, e.g., Beijing MunicipalStatisticalBureau 1997, 1998; State StatisticalBureau

1995).

16. For example,even some journalists rom Taiwanwere surprised y the fact that

when

interviewed y the media,averageChinesepeople could expressopinions hatcontradicted

official

propaganda. ee Many

Don't

Want

to See a

Fight betweenMainlandand Tai-

wan

(1996, p. A3).


26/28

Mass and Elite Orientations

in China 217

AFFECTIVE

SUPPORT

CLUSTER

Do you agreewith the following statements? 1 = stronglydisagree;2 = dis-

agree;3

=

agree;4

=

strongly

agree).

Q20.G.I respectourgovernmental

rgans.

Q20.H.

In our

country

citizens' basic

rights

ate well

protected.

Q20.E. I am proud o live in socialist China.

Q20.F. Supporting ur politicalsystem is my obligation.

Q20.I. The judicial system is

basically

fair

in

our

country.

Q20.M.

What I value is the same as what our

government

has

promoted.

POLITICAL EFFICACY CLUSTER

Do you agree with the following statements? 1 =strongly agree;2

=

agree;

3

=

disagree;

4

=

stronglydisagree).

Q21.N.

The

well-being

of

the

country

s

mainly dependentupon

state lead-

ers,

not the individuals.

Q21.S.

In

general

I

don't

thinkI

shouldargue

with the authorities ven

though

I believe

my

idea

is

correct.

Q21.0. Suggestions

and

complaints

made

by

the individuals o

the

govern-

ment are often ignored.

Q21.P. CurrentlyChina

doesn't need

political changes.

REFORM

ASSESSMENT CLUSTER

Do you agreewith the following statements?

1

=

stronglydisagree;

2

=

dis-

agree;

3

=

agree;

4

=

stronglyagree).

Q26.A.Since

the

reforms

n

1978, my living conditionshavenoticeably

m-

proved.

Q26.B. Since the reforms

n

1978, my

social statushas

noticeably

m-

proved.

Q26.D.

It is

unlikely

that

Chinawill

experiencesociopolitical

urmoil

n

the

next

10

years.

DEMOCRATIC

VALUE CLUSTER

Do

you agree with

the

following statements?1

=

stronglydisagree;2

=

dis-

agree;3 = agree;4 = stronglyagree).

Q20.L.

Electionsto

governmental

ositions

should

be

conducted

n

such a

way

that

there is more

than

one

candidate or each

post.

Q20.K.

The media shouldbe free

to

expose governmentwrongdoings

uch

as

corruption.

Q20.J. Regardless

of one's

political

belief,

he

or

she is entitledto the same

rights

and

protections

as

anyone

else.


27/28

218

Jie

Chen

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