comparing paths to war

8/12/2019 Comparing Paths to War

1/29

Distinguishing Rivals That Go to War from Those That Do Not: A Quantitative ComparativeCase Study of the Two Paths to WarAuthor(s): John A. VasquezSource: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 531-558Published by: Wileyon behalf of The International Studies Association

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600890.Accessed: 17/02/2014 13:12

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Wileyand The International Studies Associationare collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend

access toInternational Studies Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 131.111.184.106 on Mon, 17 Feb 2014 13:12:17 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=blackhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=isahttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2600890?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2600890?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=isahttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black


2/29

Internationaltudies uarterly1996) 40,531-558

DistinguishingRivals That Go to War fromThose That Do Not:A QuantitativeComparativeCase Studyof the Two Paths to WarJOHN A. VASQUEZ

Vanderbiltniversity

Many interstate nduringrivalries xperiencewars,some do not. Thisanalysis resents nd tests n explanationofwhether, hy, nd howrivalsgo towar. t isarguedthatrivalries etween qual states hatdo notgo towarare thosein whichterritorialssues are notat stake.Rivalries n theabsence of territorialssuestendtogo towaronlybybeingembroiled nan ongoingwarby third arty.Aseriesoftestswith mphasison rivalriesbetweenmajorstates ccurring uring1816-1986 supports heterritorialexplanation.Two distinct aths to war are empiricallydentified-oneleading toa dyadicwar nvolving territorialispute(s) nd a secondpathbywhichrivalswithout territorialispute oin an ongoingwar becauseofcontagionfactors.

Enduring rivalries is a topic that has received increased attention in the last fewyears (see Wayman, 1983, 1996; Huth and Russett, 1991; Geller, 1993; Goertz andDiehl, 1993; Thompson, 1995; Bennett, 1996; Hensel, 1996). Most rivalries resultin war, but a fewdo not. Is it possible to distinguish the fewthat do not go to warfromthemany thatdo? This article presents a theoretical answer to this query basedon the territorial xplanation ofwar and teststhis explanation on rivalries betweenmajor states from 1816 to 1986. The theoretical analysis suggests that rivalries differmarkedly in how they go to war, so much so that it is possible to distinguish twodifferentpaths to war. The identificationof these paths provides a more completeunderstanding ofwhyand how rivalriesbetween equal states lead to war.This article begins with a discussion of some of the conceptual issues involved indefining rivalry. t then develops a theoretical explanation ofwhyand how rivalriesgo to war, presenting two propositions that can be tested empirically. The nextsection outlines the research design, and the fourthpresents the findings.

Autthor'sote:Mythanks o ScottBennett, aul F. Diehl,DouglasM. Gibler,Marie T. Henehan,A. BikashRoy,TomWalker, nd the reviewersnd editorsof SQ forvaluablecomments. he finalresponsibilityor he articleremainsmine alone, however.C 1996 Inteirnational tudies Association.PuLblished y Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF,UK

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/29

532 DistinguishingivalsThe Concept ofRivalry

Commentators n international istory, hetherpolitical scientists r historians,have often elt he need to use the term ivalryocharacterize special,competitiverelationship hat mergesbetween woparties hatdistinguishest from he typicalrelationship hatgoverns olitical ctors.Thus, we havethe Franco-German ivalryof the ate nineteenth nd early wentiethenturies,herivalryetweenPrussia ndAustriaover Germany, nd the recentSoviet-American ivalry.No one questionsthat heserelationships eservethe abel rivalry, utwhatmakesthem onceptu-allydistinct rom ther conflictive r competitive elationships ne mightfind nhistory hat re notusually onsideredrivalries?Operationaldefinitions frivalry mphasizerepeated disputes i.e., the use orthreat fforce) s themajorcharacteristicfrivalry. oertz nd Diehl (1993) reviewthe variousoperationaldefinitionsurrentlynuse and the effect ifferentisputethresholds ave on the number fwars nd rivalries ncluded na definition.Whiletheseoperationaldefinitions ave been useful or nalyzing ata, they o notreallyprovide conceptualization f the dynamics frivalryhatgiverise to therecurrentdisputes nthe first lace.What s needed isa better, onceptualdefinition hatwillbe able to predict he onset ofdisputes see also Thompson, 1995:195-7).Rivalrys defined here as: a relationshipharacterizedy xtremeompetition,ndusually sychologialhostility,n whichhessue ositionsf ontendersregovernedrimarilyby heirttitudeowardach other atherhanby he takest hand.Competition s theengine that drivestherivalry nd, in political nteractionsas opposed to purelycommercial ransactions), roduces hostilityt some level. As conflict ecurs, on-tenders ecomemoreconcernedwithhurtingrdenying heir ompetitorhanwiththeirownimmediatevalue satisfaction,nd withthis,hostility eepens and goesbeyondthat ssociatedwithnormalconflict.Whilecompetitionnd thehostilityften ssociatedwith tare the mostobviouscharacteristicsf rivalry,hefoundation n whichrivalry ests ies with he ssue(s)undercontentioncf.Bennett, 996). Technically,when ssues re approachedanddefined in termsofwhat theymean for the otheractor,this is called an actordimension;s opposed to a stakedimension,hich defines ssues in terms of theintrinsic alue the stake has to oneself see Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981:60). Thehallmark of a rivalry s the adoption of an actordimension,which s drivenbynegative ffect i.e., hostility),ather han a stakedimension,which s drivenbyacost-benefitnalysisof the stake under contention.Normal conflict s guidedultimately y a selfishconcern,whereas rivalry, ecause of the persistenceofhostility,an getout ofhand and make fordisagreementndnegative ctsthat roma strict ost-benefitnalysis re notnecessary.Whenan actordimension sadopted,there s also a tendency or ll issues and thespecific takes hat ompose them)tobecome linked ntoone grand ssue-us versus hem.Thus, as I havenoted elsewhere Vasquez, 1993:82):

Arivalrysa competitiveelationship mong equalsthat inks takes nto ssues n thebasis of an actordimension. he actordimension esults i-om persistent isagree-mentand the use of negativeacts whichbuild up negative ffectpsychologicalhostility). ostilityeinforceshe actordimensionwhichgradually educes ll issuesI The level of hostilityan be expected to var-y epending on how manyrivalries political ctor s involved nandhow it ranksrivalsby the threats heypose. When there re multiplerivalries,heremay be, as Deutsch and Singer(1964) argue, cross-cutting f certain ssues which will moderate affect.Whereas when there is only one rivali-ycross-cuttings ess ikely, specially f ll the ssues re reduced to one of us vs. them r good vs. evil see Mansbachand Vasquez, 1981 ch. 7 for laboration).Hence, political ctors nvolvednonly ne rivalry,uch as the U.S. and USSRfrom1947 to 1964,will have a higher evel of hostilitynd willbe more guidedby theirmutualhostilityhan politicalactors nvolved n multiple ivalries, or xample, the U.K.-Italy ivali-yriorto WorldWar I.



4/29

JOHN A. VASQUEZ 533to a singleoverarching ssue. Simultaneously,oncrete takes re transformedntosymbolic nd transcendent nes, and proposalsfor he disposition f takes nd theresolution f an issue distribute osts nd benefits n an unequal basis. This makesfor more disagreement,greateruse of negative acts, and an intensificationfhostility, hich n turn einforces he actordimension.An escalating onflict piralresults,which reates n atmosphere nwhich rises re likely o be born.Rivalry ecomes a way f ife.The relationships difficulto change because eachside is involved n a vicious circle nwhichhostilitymakes actors define ssues nways hat re ntractable nd threatening,nd actors ecome hostile,npart, ecauseof theway heyhavedefinedthe ssues thatdividethem.

Issues become intractablenot simplybecause they re intrinsicallyifficultoresolve, ut also because one side cannot ust seize the stakes t hand through heerforce. Relativecapabilityplaces the actors n a situation romwhichneither anmake a decision withoutthe agreementof the other.The result,typically,sstalemate,whichfuelsbothhostilitynd recurring isputes.The advantageofsucha conceptualizations that tgetsat thedynamics nderlyinghe enduringdispu-tation Wayman, 983:18, note 6) of rivals nd hence is able to predictwhentwopolitical ctors an be expectedtoengage inrecurring isputes.The inability f either side to impose its issue position leads me to assume,contrary oWayman ndJones 1991) and Goertz and Diehl (1993), thatrelativeequality is a prerequisiteof rivalry.Withoutequality there cannot be a realcompetition, because one side would be capable of dominating the other.Anotherway of puttingthis s that nteractions etween equals are bound to bedifferent rom nteractionsbetweenunequals, because the logic of equality ofpoweror status s fundamentally ifferent rom helogic of nequality.This canbe seen by ooking at some of themajor-minor yads Wayman nd Jones 1991)and Goertz and Diehl (1995) identify s rivals, such as Russia-Turkey pre1816-1918) and U.S.-Mexico (1896-1921) (Waymanand Jones, 1991) or U.S.-Haiti and India-Nepal (Goertz, 1994:221-2; Goertz and Diehl, 1995). Therelationships and behavior of these dyads, I would submit, re fundamentallydifferent rom the Anglo-German rivalry, he Soviet-American ivalry, r therivalry etweenFrance and Germany,Prussia and Austria,or Russia and Aus-tria-Hungary cf. Thompson, 1995:197-200). Relations between unequals isbetterdiscussed based on an imperialist or asymmetric erspective than theperspectiveofrivalry.From psychological erspective,herelationship etween elative qualsshouldbe differentrom hatbetweenunequals. In an unequal relationship, nly heweaktendto take an actordimension nd are guided byextremehostilityand a hostilitybased primarilyn seething esentment ather han on the other spectsofhostil-ity).Likewise, he stronghave no need to fear theirweaker opponent, and henceare more motivated y predation hansecurity.he absence ofmutual ear, nsecu-rity, nd hostility uggests hat the fundamental sychological nderpinnings funequal relationshipsre differentrom hoseofequal relationships. evertheless,whether ivalries re better onceptualizedby controlling or quality s a questionthat should be decided ultimatelyn the basis ofempiricalresearchrather hansolely conceptual analysis.By examining onlyrivalsbetweenequals, thisanalysisprovides basisfor subsequent omparisonwith hebehavior fprotractedonflictbetweenunequals.Thisdefinition frivalry,hen, mphasizes hree haracteristics:irst,he ssue(s)which s thefoundation f herivalry. econd,the ontention ver his ssue(s),whichbetween equals gives rise to persistentdisagreement n the formof an actordimension.Third, psychologicalhostility, hich arisesnaturally rompersistentdisagreementnd is typical f themostenduring ivalries.



5/29

534 DistinguishingivalsWithin he empirical iterature, ivalrieshave attractednterest ecause dyadsthathave recurrent isputeshave a much higherprobabilityf goingto war thanother dyads see Diehl, 1985; Goertzand Diehl, 1992a; Wayman,1996),with hepossible exceptionofcontiguous yads Bremer,1992). No one has asked,however,whatfactors istinguishhe manyrivalries hatgo to war from he few hatdo not.This is an important uestionfor both theoretical nd methodologicalreasons.Theoretically, eing able to explain the difference ould add to our knowledgeabout the onset ofwar.Methodologically,he question providesa challengeandhencea test or ppraising heexplanatory ower nd empirical ccuracy fvariousexplanationsofwar.Clearly,distinguishingnterstate ivalries hatgo to warfrom hose thatdo notis a task made immensely asier ifone has an explanationof warin general. t ismaintainedhere that the most important hingsabout understandingwhetherrivalriesresult in war are: (1) the issues under contention-some issues, like

territorialssues,are muchmore prone to war thanothers,forexample, purelyideological issues; and (2) the patternof interaction-that s, how the issues arehandled.From thisperspective,hemain difference etweenrivalries hathave a war andthose thatdo not s theability o avoid crises nvolving erritorialssues.Rivalstatesthatdo nothave territorial isputeswith ach other tendnot to fight major warwitheach other unless theyare brought n by third parties.The next sectionelaboratesthe meaning of these propositions nd provides justificationor hemfrom hegeneral theoretical xplanationfromwhich hey re derived.Explaining theOnset and Expansion of War

War s a very omplexsubject,npartbecause war does notresult rom single etofcauses.There aremanypathsto war. n another nalysis Vasquez,1993), I havedelineatedthetypical ath bywhichrelatively qual stateshave become embroiledin warswithone another n themodern statesystem. had initially oped thatsingleexplanationofwar overall ofhistoryould be constructed.nstead, havecome to theconclusion hatthere re differentypes fwarand that ach type anbe preceded bydifferentausal sequences.To explainwar requires dentifyinghevariouspathsthat ead to war.In tryingoidentifyhe causal sequencesthatprecedewars, havedistinguishedbetween underlying nd proximatecauses. Underlying auses are fundamentalcausesthat et off train f events the proximate auses)that nd inwar. Of all thevarious ssues over whichwars can arise, argue that territorial isputesbetweenneighbors re the main sourceof conflict hat an giverise to a sequenceof actionsthatends inwar (see also Kocs, 1995). Since all neighborsusuallymust, t somepoint ntheirhistory,ontendwith his ssue, nd because this ssue san issueoverwhich mostneighbors re apt to fight, see territorial isputesas an underlyingcause ofwar.Whether r not theywillgiverise towar,however,willdepend onhowthe ssue s treated the proximate auses). Sincehowstates reat ach othervariesaccordingto a numberofcharacteristics,heproximatecauses ofwar are muchmorevaried than theunderlyingauses.I identify roximate ausesby ooking t theforeign olicypractices hat ead towar. I argue that, n themodernglobal system,war is likely mong equals ifthepracticesof power politicsare used to try o resolveterritorial isputes.Powerpolitics ehavior, ather hanpreventing ar, ctuallyncreases heprobabilityhatitwill break out. This is because the main practicesof powerpolitics-alliances,military uildups, nd theuseofrealpolitikactics-increase nsecurityndhostility,motivatingach side to take a harder ine. Coercion fails oproducecomplianceorcompromise ecausethe natureof the ssue at stake s suchthatgivingn especially



6/29

JOHN A. VASQUEZ 535to an equal) is unthinkable.Under such conditions,the use of power politicsproduces a setof interactionsnd domesticpoliticalenvironmentshatmake warincreasingly ikely.Between equals, war is brought bout by each side's takingseries of stepsthat ncrease hostilitynd make the ssue at hand more intractable.This involvesthe disputants n a series of crises,one of whichescalates to war.Evidenceon which teps ncreasethe probabilityfwar and which haracteristicsfcrisesmake themprone to escalationcan be found n existing mpiricalresearch(see Vasquez, 1993:ch. 5).The use of the foreign policypractices of power politics to handle certainterritorial isputes, t spredicted,will ncreasethe probability fwar,but whetherpower politicswillbe used depends, in part, on the natureoftheglobal politicalsystem n operation.The global institutionalontext, n particular,whether tprovidesnorms nd rulesof thegame for esolvingssues,has a major mpactonwhether tateswill resort to power politics. Preventingwar and creatingpeaceinvolves earninghow to build structures hatprovide mechanismsfor resolvingissues through iplomacy ather han armed force.To summarize: n the modern state system,ne of the mainfactors hatbringaboutwarbetweenequals is the rise of territorial isputes,particularly etweenneighbors, hat,n the absenceor failure fa global nstitutional etworko resolvethe ssuepolitically,makeactors esort otheunilateral olutions rovidedbypowerpolitics.From theabove it follows hatrivalries hat nvolve erritorialisputes re muchmore apt to result n war than rivalries hat do not involve territorial isputes.Attempts o demark nd define erritory,specially orders, s an important ourceofrivalry.n fact, his erritorialspect s reflectedn thevery tymologyfthe termrival,which s derived fromthe Latin rivalis,which means one using the samestream rivus) s another American eritage ictionary,nd college ed.). Thus, inthe first se ofthe term, ivalswere thosewhoboth soughtto use a life-sustainingpiece of territoryhatoftenhad to be shared.In themodernglobal system,manyneighbors nded up contending n territorialstakes, nd one suspectsthatmanyrivalries riginated n attempts o controlthespace betweenthem.Hence, it should come as no surprise hatmost rivalries rebetweenneighborsand appear related to territorial isputes.Less frequent rerivalries etweennoncontiguoustates.Using theWayman ndJones 1991) sample,which dentifieswenty-eightnterstate ivalries etween1816 and 1986, t has beenfound hat wenty-fourfthemwerebetweenneighbors,whereasonlyfourwerenot(Vasquez, 1993:134-5).One oftheproblemswith estingheproposition hat ivalsnvolved n territorialdisputes re moreapttogo towar sthat incewar smulticausal,herewillbe rivalsthatgo to war withouthavinga territorial ispute.A valid testofthepropositionwill therefore ave to incorporate his added complexity, ut to do so requiresidentifyingt least someofthe additionalconditions nder whichrivalsgo to war.One ofthemajorways tateswithout erritorialisputesgo to war s that hey redrawn ntoa dyadicwar that preadsto become multilateral;hat s,a complex ar(see Vasquez, 1993:71-4). Put anotherway, herivals rebroughtnto warbythirdparties.Models ofcontagion nd diffusion,hen,become relevant ordeterminingwho will be atwarand when. fhaving rivalry ocusedon territorialuestions sone pathtowar, secondpathto war s forrivalswithout territorialisputetobedrawn into a war. Furthermore, ne would expect, on the basis of the abovetheoretical nalysis, hatthiscomplexwar would beginwitha territorial isputebetween he nitialbelligerents.Existing mpiricalfindings ffer ome clues as to thepath bywhich nterstatewars xpand (see Buenode Mesquita, 1978; Organski ndKugler,1980;Yamamotoand Bremer,1980; Wayman, 984; Sabrosky, 985; Siverson nd Starr, 991).Once



7/29

536 Distinguishingivalsa war breaks out, other states re brought n because of alliance commitmentsrdiffusion rocesses nvolving erritorialontiguitysee Siverson nd Starr,1991),ongoing rivalries, he breakdown of political order, economic dependence, orsimply he dynamicof the ongoingwar itself see Vasquez, 1993:ch. 7 for a fulldiscussion).Taken in conjunctionwith hefirst ath towar, hefollowing ouldbe predicted:

1.The mainfactor hatdistinguishesivals hatgo to war, t some point n theirhistory, rom hose that do not is thepresence of an ongoing territorial ispute.Territorial isputesmakewar more ikely. ecause there re otherpathstowar, hispath would be expected to hold primarily ordyadicwars nd initial elligerentsna multilateral ar.2. The main pathbywhichrivals hatdo not have territorialisputesgo towar

is to be brought nto an ongoing warby one of the nitialbelligerents. hismeansthat ivalswithout erritorialisputes re more ikely o be involvedncomplexwarsrather handyadicwarswith ach other. n addition, twouldbe expected that herebe some tendency or rivals drawn ntoa war to oin thatwar after ome decentinterval ollowingnitialhostilities. he longer the interval, he easier it wouldbeto ustifyhe nference hat t was theongoing war and processesof diffusion hatdrew nthe rivals r provided an incentive or hese rivals o fight.Nevertheless, he immediate ntry f a rival nto an ongoing war should not betakenas evidence against the second path to war. Alliances or commitments odefend third arty ould bring na statefairly oon, as in WorldWar and World

War I,when major tate(s) omes to the id of minor tate hat sbeing pressuredbyone's rival.Russia did thiswith erbia in 1914,and Britain nd Francedid thisforPoland in 1939.This theoretical nalysis larifies ome of the dynamics nd complexities fwhyrivalsgo to war. Since there re twodistinct aths to war, t s difficultor ivals hatare equal to avoid war.Nevertheless,he presence of distinct aths helps explainwhywar is more probable in some rivalries han others. Thus, the analysiscanexplain whywarwasmoreprobablebetweenGermany nd France-Russian 1914thanbetweenGermanynd Britain.Also,unlikeotherhypotheses,t learly pecifiestheprocessbywhichrivalswillcome to war and thetype fwar twillbe (dyadicvs.complex).Finally, heexplanation uggestswhy ome rivalries o not resultnwar andwhatthe characteristicsfthese rivalries hould be. From thisperspective, heU.S. andUSSR did not fight direct dyadic)war witheach otherbecause there was noterritorial isputebetween hem.A complexwarwas avoided byeach side'stakingcare tomanagetheir ivalryo as to avoid theescalation nd spreadofwars nwhichtheywere a party.2Theoretically,heanalysis eemsplausibleand has a certain mountofexplana-tory ower.What needs to be seen iswhether tcan pass systematicesting.

2 One ofthe r-easonsheU.S. and USSR were o concerned bout managing heii- ivalh-ynd especiallynter entioninto ongoing warswas the danger of escalation to nuclearwar see Kahn, 1968). The absence of a territorial isputebetween heU.S. and the USSR meant hat he ssuesdividing hetwo,whichwereprimarilydeological,werenotworthr-iskingll-outwar.The implication fthis nalysis s thatnucleardeterrence y tself id notpreventwar,whichmeansthat n rivalries hathave a salient erritor-ialispute,deterrencewould have a muchhigherprobability f failingseeVasquez, 1991; see also Thompson, 1995:209).



8/29

JOHNA.VASQUEZ 537Research Design

Because the analysis delineates two distinctpaths to war, it is important hathypotheses erived to test heexplanationbe properly pecified.We can begin byasking,on thebasis ofthe theoretical nalysis,what distinguishes ivals hatgo towar from hosethatdo not.First, twould be expected that ivalries hathaveneverbeen at warwould be thosethatdo not have territorial isputes.Second, it wouldbe expected hat lthough ome rivals hat o nothave territorialisputeswouldgo towar, heywould 1) be more pt tobe involvedn complexmultilateralars ather handyadic wars,and theywould (2) have more of a tendency han rivals nvolvingterritorialisputes o oin an ongoingwarrather hanbe involved t thebeginningofthewar. Based on this nalysis,hefollowingwogeneralpropositionsre derived:

Proposition: Rivals that ave territorialisputesre more pt togo to wardirectlyith ach othert some ointntheir istoryhan hosewithouterritorialdisputes. ence,rivals hatdo notgo to war shouldbe thosewithouterritorialdisputes.Proposition: Rivals hat o towar n the bsencef erritorialisputeshouldbe nvolvednmoremultilateralars handyadicwars.Likewise,ivals hat otowar n the bsence fterritorialisputeshould e more ikely o get nvolvednongoing ars han t the eginningfwars.

Since the explanationfromwhich hesepropositions re derivedpositsdifferentpaths to war depending on whether tates re relativelyqual or unequal, dyadsconsisting funequal states i.e., major-minor yads)will not be examined. Eventhoughwarsof quality rethoughtobegoverned y imilar aths owar, speciallyinthepresenceofrivalry,here ssome evidenceto suggest hatminor tates ehavedifferentlyrommajorstates-sometimesmore cautiouslynd at other imesmoreaggressivelysee Vasquez,1993:127, 168, 191,230-1, 316, 318,339, note 17). Forthisreason, thisanalysiswill be confined nly to rivalries etweenmajor states. uch aprocedure snot unusual npeace research see Singer,Bremer, nd Stuckey, 972;Wayman, 996).Thisalsohas the dvantage ffocusing n cases aboutwhich hereswidespread istorical nowledge.he standard orrelates fWar ist ormajorpowerswillbe taken s an operational efinitionordistinguishing ajorfromminor tates.3Anynew theoretical pproach requiresthatnew data be collected, nd thiscanslowdown considerably hetesting rocess.As a field,we are onlybeginning ogetdata on rivalries,nd the efforts o date have produceddisagreements n exactlywhat onstitutes rivalryonceptually nd how tshould be operationalized. t is nosurprise hatdifferencesndefinition hould producedifferentists frivalriesseeGoertzand Diehl, 1993). The differencesnthe ists re not as severe s one mightsuspect,however, ince theycenterprimarily n howmany disputesto use as athreshold ordetermining hat s or isnota true rivalry. n obvioussolution othisdefinitionalroblem s to treat he mountof enduring isputation Wayman,1983:18,note6) (i.e.,thevariationnthe number fmilitarized isputes n a dyad)as an underlying imension to measurethe degree ofrivalry.Goertzand Diehl(1995) move in this directionbyestablishing hresholds orsporadicor isolatedconflict, roto-rivalries,ndenduring ivalriesbut eealsoGoertz nd Diehl, 1994).

To date mostquantitativenalyseshave employedthe numberof militarizedinterstate isputes MIDs) as the basic indicator fan interstate ivalrysee Goertz3 Major powers re identified ySmall and Singer 1982:45) as:Austria-Hungar-y1816-1918), Prussia 1816-1870)and its successorGermany 1871-1918, 1925-1945), Russia/USSR 1816-1917, 1922-present),France (1816-1940,1945-present), ngland/U.K. 1816-present), taly 1860-1943), Japan (1895-1945), U.S. (1898-present), nd China

(1 950-pr-esent).



9/29

538 Distinguishingivalsand Diehl, 1993). This analysiswill do the same; all threemajor listsof rivalriesbased on Correlates of War militarized nterstate ispute (MID) data will beemployed. These lists can be ordered by the degree to which their operationalcriteria educe the potential et of nterstate ivalries. his is accomplishedby twosets frules, ne defining henumber fdisputes equired ndthe econd the engthoftimeexamined. The most restrictedist s thatof Wayman ndJones 1991:5),who operationally efine an enduring rivalry s having at least fivereciprocatedmilitarized isputesduring twenty-five-yeareriod, each ofwhichmust ast forminimum f thirty ays. Rivalries nd if there s no furthereciprocateddisputeover a twenty-five-yearpan. These criteriaproduce onlyseven dyadic rivalriesbetweenmajor statesfrom1816 to 1984. The main reason forthis s that,unlikeother operational definitions,Wayman and Jones's 1991) criteria equire thatadisputebe reciprocated n order to count s an indicator, hereasothers ook at thetotalnumber f disputesregardless fwhether hey rereciprocated.Wayman ndJones 1991) adoptthis ule npartbecauseJones 1988) shows hat bout40 percentof the militarized isputes never receive a response from he target nd becausesometimesmilitarized isputes nvolvingminor tates luster,making dyad ppearas an enduringrivalry hen nfact tmaynot be.The second mostrestrictiveist s thatof Goertz nd Diehl's enduring ivalrieswhichuses six militarized isputeswithin wenty ears s a threshold.On the basisof an extensive nalysisofdisputes between variety fstates,Goertzand Diehl(1993:167) find clear drop in the numberof nterstate ivalriesfmore than sixdisputes are used as a threshold.This operational definition esults n elevenrivalries etweenmajor statesfrom1816 to 1976.The least restrictiveist s thatofWayman 1983, 1996) who identifies rivalryexistingbetween two major states f theyhave at leasttwo militarized nterstatedisputes witheach other over the course of a decade. A rivalrys said to end tenyearsafter helastmilitarizeddispute.One of theadvantagesofhisapproach isthat t dentifiesmore specific ime periods when a dyad isa rivalry. his permitsan examination of each period to see which path to war it follows. Such aspecification elpsalleviate henumber-of-casesroblem,which an be quite severewhen identifyingnly rivals and not periods f rivalry.Wayman's 1996) criteriaproduce twenty-threeivalsbetweenmajor states nd forty-foureriods of rivalry.It is assumed that as the number ofmilitarized isputes ncreases, he kind ofrelationship epicted n the theoretical ortionof the article s likely o exist; thatis, t sassumedthat herepetition f militarized onfrontationssgoingto ndicatea highly ompetitive elationship haracterizedby negativeaffecthostility)ndgovernedbyan actor dimension.Of course,therepetition fdisputesdoes notdirectlyap hostilityr theactordimension, nd no claim s made here that t does. Rather, herepeatedMIDs areseen as an indirect ndicator f hesefactors, hich s not n implausible ssumption,especially or herivalries haracterized y largenumber fdisputes.Whether heassumptionsaccurate s an empirical uestionthatwillneed furtheresearch hatisbeyondthescope ofthis rticle.4 uffice tto say here thatthe mainpurpose ofthis rticle snot to establish heempirical uperiorityftheparticular onceptionofrivalryfferednthe firstection, ut thesuperiorityftheexplanationofpeaceand war inwhich thatconceptionofrivalry appens to be embedded. For such atest, t sbetter o use standard ists frivalry,f t s assumedthat hesebear some

4 It s certainly he ase that ivals haracterized y hekind fhostilitytipulated n thedefinition frivalrymployedherewillhave repeated MIDs. Hostilityfthis ort s posited s a sufficientondition or epeatedconfrontations. hatis not clear is whether here xistdyads withrepeated confrontationshat ack hostilitynd are not governedbyanactordimension.The presenceof the atterwould make the use oftheMID indicatormorecomplicated.



10/29

JOHN A. VASQUEZ 539reasonablecorrelation o themorecomplicated nmeasured spectsoftheconcept.The variousrivalries hatwillbe used in the data analysis re reported n Table 1along with therrelevantmeasures.The real problemoccurs n trying o finddata on territorial isputes.Very ittlesystematic orkhas been done on thisquestion, lthoughthere re some data onterritorial hanges (Goertz and Diehl, 1992b) and lists of border conflictsDay,1987). One ofthebest nalyses ftherelationship etween erritorialssues ndwaris Holsti 1991), but his analysis s notbased on precise operationalizedmeasures.Eventually, ata on territorialssuesand disputeswill need to be collected to testthepropositions.n thepresent ircumstances,erritorialontiguity illbe takenas an indirectmeasure. t is argued inVasquez (1993) thatat some point n theirhistory, eighbors that are relatively qual will tend to establish their bordersthrough he use offorce. fthis s the case, it can be expected that tates hat recontiguous nd arerivals re infact ikely o be disputing verterritorialssues.Ofcourse,thiswill need to be checked historicallyn each case and documentedextensivelynd/or oded ina scientificallyeliablemanner, ut such projectwouldrequire separate analysis.For now, ach case can be examinedon the basisofa cursory istorical eview osee whether ivals re fighting ver territorialssues.In thisreview, ivalswillbeconsidered s having territorial ispute f: 1) theymakedirect laims to a pieceofterritoryeld oroccupied byone oftherivals, r (2) theyhavecompeting laimsregarding erritory eld by a thirdparty. he small numberof cases permits achto be checked to see whether tfits he ogicof thehypothesis. he isting f he yadsinthe ontingencyabless thus n integralartof he ata analysis nd canbe een s a setof uantitativeomparativease tudies.ucha procedures an efficientay fdetermin-ingwhethermore igorous, ut ime-consumingnd costly, atacollectionswarranted.Lastly, ontiguityan serve s an indirect ndicator, ecause from he theoreticalperspective eing presentedhere, twould be expected that f ontiguous ivalsdidnot xperiencewar nthemannerpredicted, heexplanationwouldbe falsified. heuse ofcontiguityhereforeatisfieshe condition ffalsifiability.5Employinghe boveoperationalndicators,hefollowing ypotheses ill e tested:

1. Rivaldyads hatre contiguousre more pttogo towar tsome ointintheir istoryhan ivaldyads hat re not ontiguous.2. Rivalriesnvolvingontiguoustates re more ptto nd ndyadic arthan ivalriesnvolvingoncontiguoustatestobetestedy emovingcases fmultilateralar).3. Noncontiguousivals hat otowar re muchmorepttobe nvolvedin multilateralars han ontiguousivals hat o towar.4. Noncontiguousivals hat o to war are muchmore ptto oin anongoing arthan ontiguousyadshat otowar.5. In comparisono contiguousivals,noncontiguousivalswilleitherhaveno warorbe nvolvednlynmultilateralarswith ivals.

Conversely,t is a limited ndicatorbecause it may not be acceptable to those who hold thatcontiguitymay beassociated withwar not because territorialssues are more prone to violence,but because contiguity rovidesanopportunity orwar due to proximity r frequentnteractions. heoreticalrefutationsf these positionlsre presentedin Vasquez (1993:ch. 4). In order to resolve the debate overwhy neighborsfight-whether ecause of proximity,interactions,rterritoriality-bothides ofthedebate must ome upwith setofcrucial ests see Vasquez, 1995). Theanalysisnthis rticle s not ntended o provide uch test, ut o assess territorialxplanation fwhy ndhowrivalriesgo to war, omething hatneither heproximityorthe nteractionxplanationi as attempted o do.



11/29

540 DistinguishingivalsTABLE 1. ComparisonofMajorStateRivalry ataa

Wayman Goertz DyadiclDyad Contig.b Wayman andJones andDiehlC WaTd MultiFR-GER Y 1830-18421850-1880 1850-1945 Franco-Prussian M1905-1933 1905-1939 WWI M1936-1945 WWII MFR-IT Y 1860-18761888-19031925-1950 WWII MFR-RUS N 1830-1864 Crimean M1917-19281948-1971FR-AH N 1848-1869 Ital Unification M1914-1918 WWI MFR-JN N 1938-1950 No warsPRUS-AH Y 1865-1876 SevenWeeks MGER-RUS Y 1838-1860 [WWI,WWII]*RUS-AH Y 1912-1918 WWI MRUS/USSR-JN Y 1895-1913 1895-1945 1895-1976 Russo-Japanese D1917-19301933-1955 Changkufeng DNomohan MWWII MRUS/USSR-CH+ Y 1914-1939 1898-1986 1898-1929 Sino-Soviet D

1966-1984UK-FR Y pre-1816-1840 Fr.Rev/Nap M1825-18501888-1908UK-RUS N 1849-1871 Crimean M1877-1914 1877-19231917-19331946-1971UK-GER N 1900-1931 1900-1939 WWI M1938-1945 WWII MUK-JN N 1932-1950 1932-1954 WWII MUK-IT N 1934-1950 1911-1940 WWII MIT-AH Y 1843-1887 1843-1918 1843-1915 Aust-Sardinian MItal Unification MSevenWeeks M1904-1918 WWI MIT-GER N 1934-1945 [WWI]*IT-RUS N 1893-1905 [Crimean]*1917-19281937-1951 WWII MUS-UK N 1837-1861 No wars1902-1913US-GER N 1915-1927 WWI MUS-JN N 1932-1950 WWIIUS-USSR N 1917-1928 No wars1946-1983 1946-1986 1946-1973US-CH N 1900-1915 Boxer Rebellion M1949-1984 1949-1974 1949-1974 Korean M

Numberf ases: 23 dyads 7 dyads 11 dyads



12/29

JOHN A. VASQUEZ 541TABLE 1. Continued

(a)Based on Wayman 1996), Wayman ndJones (1991), and Goertz and Diehl (1995:Table 1).(b) ContiguityY = yes,N = no) is operationally efined s an adjacent and borderor a separationof ess than 150milesofwater.Data derivedfrom almer 1961) and Langer 1972). Under this tandardCorrelates fWar projectoperationaldefinition he US-USSR iscontiguous fter 959 when Alaska sgranted tatehood.However, nthis nalysis ecauseboththe U.S. and theUSSR arecontinental ationsthat re proximate nly nareas distant rom opulationcenters hey re treated s not contiguous orthe entireperiod.(c) Goertz nd Diehl omit12rivaldyadsofWayman:FR-IT, PRUS-AH, RUS-AH, UK-FR,GER-RUS,FR-RUS,FR-JN, T-GER, IT-RUS, FR-AH, US-JN,US-GER. Lastdisputedate isused, not terminationdate.(d) War data includingparticipants nd date ofentry re taken from mall and Singer 1982:Table4.2). The 1917 allied interventions not treated s an interstate arbySmall and Singer 1982:80, 202,227),but isted s an extra ystemicnd international ivilwar. hisisconsistentwith addis' (1987:4-5,223) interpretationhat he U.S. and USSR have neverfought war.(*) Warsfought utside rivalry eriod.(?) Because USSR-Chinahave a rivalry henboth are major states, 966-1984, the earlierrivalry f1914-1939 is retained n thesample even thoughChina was not then a majorstate. Conversely, herivalry fJapanand China, 1914-1947, whichproduces threewars, s not ncludedbecause therewasnever periodof rivalry hen bothwere majorstates.

The finalmeasurement roblem thatneeds tobe discussedbefore esting hesehypothesess howto operationalize war t some point n theirhistory. he variousperiods ofrivalrydentifiedmakethisproblematic ecause sometimeswars occurbefore r after particular eriodofrivalry.he generalrule adopted isto ncludea war as occurringt somepoint ntherivalry's istoryf toccurredduring r aftera periodof rivalry,ut not f toccurredbefore. ince mostwarsoccurredduringrivalry eriod, this is not a major problem; however, ome specific ases wereaffected.Thus, for Goertz and Diehl, who identify he U.K.-Russia rivalry s1877-1923, the earlierCrimeanWar is not ncluded, lthough t s included n theWayman ample,which dentified he 1849-1871 periodas one ofrivalry. imilarly,in the Italy-Germany ivalry,which is identified s a rivalryby Waymanfor1934-1945,WorldWar I where talyand Germanywereon opposite sides is notincluded because it occurredbeforetheperiodofrivalry. astly, heU.K.-Francerivalrys identified orrectly y Waymanand Jones as predating 1816, whereasWaymanhas two pecific eriodsofrivalry1825-1850 and 1888-1908). Since mostobserverswouldregardthe U.K.-Francerivalrys one thatwent owar, he FrenchRevolutionary/Napoleonicars are included n the analysis,withEnglandseenasa joiner.Findings

Beforebeginning reporton the testsof these hypotheses, briefreview f thedifferencesmongthe three ists frivalriess reported nTable 1 s n order.Usinga highthreshold ordeterminingivalry,Wayman ndJones 1991) identifyevenrivals ndGoertz nd Diehl (1995) identifylevenrivals. asically,Goertz nd Diehl,who do notrequirereciprocationo ncludean MID, identifyll therivalsWaymanandJones dentify ith ne exception-U.K.-France (pre 1816-1840). The lattersa legacyof the earliercentury, heretherewouldbe no questionhistoricallyf tsstatus s a major rivalry.n additionto the six rivalriesWayman ndJones 1991)also identify, oertzand Diehl include: U.K.-Russia, U.K.-U.S., U.K.-Germany,U.K.-Italy,and U.K.-Japan. The change in operational criteriabrings in five



13/29

542 Distinguishingivalsrivalries nvolving he U.K. All thesecases are important istorically; heoreticallythey re of interest ecause they nvolvenoncontiguous tates nd a leading (andoften he eading)naval power.These differencesre not as major as those betweenthe two restrictedists(Wayman nd Jones 1991) and Goertz nd Diehl (1995)) on the one hand and thebroader list ofWayman 1983, 1996),which ncludes anytwo states hathave twoMIDs within en years.The former aveconsiderably ewer ases than the atter7and 11vs.23), aswould be expected given heir perational riteria. wo importantquestions re raised bythisdifference:1) Are therivalriesncluded byWayman'sbroader nclusion riteria eally rivalries ?2) Willthesample affecthefindings?Withone exception,Wayman ncludes ll the periods of rivalry hatGoertzandDiehl include-the latter dentify 837-1861 as a period ofrivalry etween heU.K.and theU.S. whereasWaymandentifiesnly1902-1913 as a period ofrivalry. oth,however, ncludethe dyad.

Of moresignificances whatWaymanncludes nd Goertz nd Diehl's definitionleaves out. Goertz nd Diehl's criteriamit welve fWayman's ivaldyads seeTable1, notec). Historically,lmost llofthese welvemitted yads re typicallyhoughtfas rivalries, ndsome are ofmajorhistoricalmportance;or xample, or heWorldWar period,Goertz nd Diehl's criteriamit:RUS-AH (which tartshewholethingoff), R-AH, nd US-GER. For theWorldWar I period, R-IT,FR-JN, nd US-JN reomitted.Alsonot ncluded re the nter-wareriod rivalriesf T-GER and IT-RUS.In thenineteenthentury,hemost ignificantivalry issingsthat fPRUSSIA-AUS-TRIA, as well s FR-RUSand thepreviously entionedU.K.-France.On the positive ide, Goertz nd Diehl's definitionliminates number frivalryperiods hatnevergo to war.Goertz nd Diehl's definitionlsodoes notsee themoresubtleor marginal) ivalries fFR-RUS twentiethentury)nd USSR-CH (intheColdWar) as true rivalries. iven hese utcomes, hich reknown nly fterhefact, hemorerestrictiveriteriappeartobe identifyinghose ivals hat re more ntense ndforwhatever easonarenot able to avoidrepeated onfrontationsndwar.Since t sknown hat epeated onfrontationsreassociatedwith heonsetofwar Wallensteen,1981; Leng, 1983), comparisons f results singthetwodifferentamplesmay llowinferencesbouttheeffectfthenumber frepeated onfrontationsnd presumablythe ntensityf he ivalryand ts nderlying ostility)obemade. f hisast ssumptionisgranted,hemorerestrictedampleofGoertz nd Diehl maybe considered setofrivalries herehostilityshigher, lthough ny nferencesmade on this asis must econsideredonly suggestive ecause there s no direct measure of hostilityeingemployed.The real question,of course, s whether he high and low operationalthresholdsmakeanydifferencenthestatisticalnalysis.HYPOTHESES1 & 2. RivalriespronetowarTable 2 provides preliminaryookat all three ists frivalries o geta sense ofhowthey mightdiffern their mpacton Hypothesis1. Hypothesis1 predictsthatcontiguousstates are more apt to go to war than noncontiguous tates.Thishypothesiss fine s a preliminaryest, ut itmustbe remembered hat t gnoresthe twopaths towar, particularlyhe second which s intendedto describe hownoncontiguous tatescome to war. Keeping this caveat in mind, it is clear thatHypothesis1 issupported nall three ampleswith espective ule's Q's of 67, .50,and .57 (and Phi'sof 65, .46, and .37), althoughthesedo notalways eachthe 05levelof statisticalignificance.6

5The Yule's Q's and Phi's shouldbe seen as heuristic evices to aid interpretation. hat s importants not thespecific alue of thestatistic,uthow t changes from he early ablesto the ater s controls re added. Yule's Q andPhi are appropriatefor2X2 tablesusing nominaldata. Yule's Q is simplygamma calculatedfor 2X2 table.Phi is



14/29

JOHN A. VASQUEZ 543TABLE 2. Rivals andWar

a. WaymanndJones1991) (5 MID threshold)ampleNo War SomeWarUS-USSR US-CHNoncontiguous

1 10 5 UK-FRContiguous FR-GER

IT-AHRUS/USSR-JNRUS/USSR-CHLikelihoodratio, p = .08aCorrectedYule's Q = .67bPhi=.65 p=.O9

b.GoertzndDiehl 1995) (6 MID threshold)ampleNo War Some War

US-USSR US-CHNoncontiguous US-UK UK-ITUK-RUS+ UK-GERUK-JN3 4O 4

FR-GERContiguous IT-AHRUS/USSR-JNRUS/USSR-CH

Likelihoodratio, p = .068aCorrectedYule's Q = .50bPhi=.46 p=.12



15/29

544 DistinguishingivalsTABLE 2. Continued

c. Wayman 996 (2 MID threshold)ampleNo War Some War

US-CHUK-IT FR-RUSNoncontiguous US-RUS UK-GER IT-RUS/USSRUS-UK UK-JN US-JNFR-JN UK-RUS US-GERIT-GER+ FR-AH4 100 9

FR-GER RUS-AHContiguous FR-IT RUS/USSR-JNGER-AH RUS/USSR-CHIT-AH UK-FRGER-RUS...

Likelihood ratio, p = .03aCorrectedYule'sQ = .57bPhi=.37 p=.08(a) Chi-squareprobability.(b) SinceYule's Q alwaysmathematically roducesa perfect elationshipwhen there s a zero in ustone cell, tcan be corrected y placinga 1 in that ell (fordiscussion f theprocedureused to correctYule's Q,see Vasquez and Henehan (1992:411-4)). In all instances hatthiswas done, the 1workedagainstthehypothesis.(*) See notesb and d in Table 1.(+) UK-RUS foughtn the earlier Crimean War withEngland, oining the war on March31, 1854.This war s priorto Goertz nd Diehl's rivalry eriod of 1877-1923 and so is not ncluded according othe operationalrules.Wayman 2 MID), however, as a UK-RUS rivalry eriod 1849-1871 so thewar sincluded npart c ofTable 2.(+ +) IT-GER fought arlier nWorld War I with taly oining the war on April 23, 1915. Since thiswar s priortoWayman's eriodofrivalry f1934-1945, it s not ncluded.(+ + +) Note the GER-RUS dyad is theonlyone in which a war is fought fter herivalry eriod.GER-RUS fight ach other nboth World War I and WorldWar II, butWayman ists rivalry oronly1838-1860.According o theoperationalrules, ll warsfoughtfter rivalry eriodare included n theanalysis.

These positive ssociationsmean that ontiguous ivals re morefrequentlyptto have somewar in theirhistory hanare noncontiguous ivals.Anotherwayofsaying his sthatnoncontiguous ivals remore ikely o avoidwaraltogetherhanare contiguous ivals.What salso evident nthetables,when thePhi scores re thefocusofexamination,s that hemore restrictiveists fWayman ndJones 1991)based on chi-squaredivided by the sample size. It tends to be lowerthan Yule's Q when dealingwith mall samples,hence it is less appropriatehere, except when Q needs to be corrected.Yule's Q has the disadvantage f being vei-ysensitive o zeros and mustbe correctedwhen a zero appears inone cell (see noteb to Table 2). Significanceevels rereportedfor each table as well as for ndividualPhi scores. A discussionof these statistics an be found n Norusis(1993:210, 217).



16/29

JOHNA.VASQUEZ 545and of Goertz and Diehl (1995) (5-6 MID threshold, espectively) o better hanthebroader 2 MID threshold) ampleofWayman 1996). This pattern,whichwillbecome more pronounced and consistent n later tables, mplies that the moredisputatious ivalsbetter it he explanationofwarbeingtested nthis nalysis.An examination of the contiguouscases that go to war (in Table 2, a andb)-France-GER, Italy-AH,RUS\USSR-Japan, nd RUS/USSR-China)-seems tosupport he notion hat ivals hat re contiguousre actually ightingverterritorialissues.Allofthesedyadshave had rather erious erritorialisputes n thewars heyhave fought, s will be discussedbelow. The only exception to this s the UK-FRcase, where no direct erritorial isputebetween hesetwoparties gaveriseto theFrench RevolutionaryWars,whichEngland oined only ater.7In theWayman nd Jones 1991) sample Table 2, a), there re only worivalriesinvolving oncontiguous tates, nd thesesplit, hereby eakening he association,buteachcase does provide upportfor he arger heoreticalnalysis. he U.S.-So-vietcase,ofcourse, svery ntriguingfone does not accept,as I and severalothersdo not, heconventional xplanation hat he Cold Wardidnotbecomehotbecauseof nuclear deterrence see Kugler, 1984; Mueller, 1989; Vasquez, 1991). It isconsistent ithProposition and implies hat ntheabsenceofterritorialisputes,rivalsmaybe able to avoid war.The U.S.-Chinarivalry,lthough n exception, ddssupportto this notion,because the onlywar for the rivalry eriod (1949-1974)Wayman ndJones 1991) identifys the KoreanWar,which s a war neither heU.S. nor China reallywanted.China was drawn nbecause the battlefield ottooclose to itsborder, nd the U.S. miscalculated omewhat nd gotcarried waywithits military uccess dding territorialbjectives t did nothave initiallysee Georgeand Smoke,1974). To thiswasadded the problemthatMacArthurpparently adeven more territorial bjectivesthan Truman. To the extent that China tookMacArthurnd otherAmericanhard-linerseriously,henthe U.S. and China hada perceived territorial ispute,making this rivalrymore dangerous.All in all,however, heU.S., despite MacArthur, id not place anydirect laims on Chineseterritory,o theKorean War sa better llustrationfhowan ongoingwar draws nnoncontiguous rivals.The slightly roader Goertzand Diehl sample (Table 2, b) strengthens hesefindings y dding twomore nstances fnoncontiguoustates hatdo notfight,utthey lso add threenoncontiguous ivalriesnvolving heU.K. thatdo have somewar,thereby lightlyowering he overall trength fassociation.

7An examination f the minor-minorivals n theWayman nd Jones 1991) samplealso supports he conclusionthat ontiguous ivals re much more ikely o have war-s verterritor-yhannoncontiguous tates:No War War-Noncontiguous 0 1Contiguous 4 9

No noncontiguousminor-minor ivals,with heexception f US-Spain (I1850-1898), r-e dentified yWayman ndJones (1991) (and this s not really n exceptionbecause in 1898 it is really major-minor yad). Of the thirteenminor-minor ontiguousrivals,nine have some war and four do not. A perusal of the nine cases thatgo to war(GRK-TUR, IND-PAK, ISR-EGY, ISR-SYR,N.KOR-S.KOR, BOL-CHILE, BOL-PARA,PERU-CHILE, IRAN-IRAQ)suggests hatmost re infactwarsoverterritory,he possibleexceptionbeing r-an-Iraqsee Levy nd Froelich,1985),and eventhathas important erritorialspects see the relevant iscussion n Langer-,972:131 1). Ofequal interestntermsof future esearch are the fourrivalries nvolving ontiguous statesthat do not go to war (CHILE-ARG,ECUD-PERU, AFG-PAK,THAI-CAM). These are not necessarily nomalies sincethe territorialxplanationdoes notclaimthatwar s nevitable ven f err-itol-ys at stake;the key s how the ssues r-e andled. These cases are of nter-estin ter-msf finding ut exactlywhy heydid not go to war.



17/29

546 DistinguishingivalsTable 2, c turns o Wayman's 1996) larger ist of rivalries ased on a ten-yearrather hantwenty-five-yearuration.Here the relationship s statisticallyignifi-cant with a solid Yule's Q of .57, but a weaker Phi of .37. Nevertheless, hecontiguous ivals it erfectly.8 n nspection ftheninecontiguous ases shows hatalmostall have territorial isputes hat ead to war.These territorial isputesare of twodistinct ypes:claimsto territoryeld byeither one of the rivals or claims involving erritory eld bya thirdparty.Therivalry f France-Germany s a notorious example of the first ype. Italy andAustria, of course, are fighting ver Italian irredenta. rance and Italy havecompetingterritorial laims goingback to the Italian Warsbegun in 1495, andsimilar territorial ssues still play a role in the Italian Wars of Unification.Territorialclaims against France are laterresurrectedby Mussolini. Germanyand Russia have a long-standing erritorial ivalryn the area ofPoland and theBaltic states,whichbecomesgreatly ggravatedby Germanambitions beginning

duringWorld War I and greatly xtended in Hitler's Lebensraumlan) to createa Mitteleuropancorporatingmuch of the Ukraine (see Bell, 1986:260, 284-5,288; Kaiser, 1990:370-4, 377-84). It is the latterobjectivethat makes the 1941attackfundamentally erritorialsee Vasquez, 1996a). Russia-Austria/Hungarybecome entangled over controlling erritoryromthe declining OttomanEm-pire. The nature of theirterritorial laims on the Ottoman Empire, however,were such thatthe rivals probablycould have avoided war, f t were notfor thepresence of other Slavic statesthatmade territorial laimsthatAustria-Hungaryfoundthreatening.The rivalry fPrussia-Austria egins as struggleforhegem-ony nGermany, utmovesto warfare verspecificpieces of and and eventuallyends withtheterritorial nification f GermanyunderPrussia withoutAustrianinfluence see Carr, 1991). Finally, Russia and Japan, and Russia and China,skirmish ver borders and territoryn the Far East (see Carr, 1985:56-7, 65).This suggeststhat at theheart of theserivalries nd thereasons they nd up inwar are territorial isputes.The tencases ofnoncontiguous ivalries oing to war n Table 2, c (northeastell)depress the statistical ssociation.A comparisonof the threesamples in Table 2,especiallybetweenthe tworestrictiveamples and the broader Waymansample,suggeststhat reducing the thresholdfor identifyingivalrywill include moredeviant noncontiguousases thathave somewar,butwillnot nclude ny deviantcasesofcontiguous ivalswithout ar.The deviant noncontiguous tateswith omewar,however, o not undercut he territorialxplanationofwar, fthereexistsseparate paththatbrings hese states ntowar.Tables 3-7 attempt o assess thismorecomplicated xplanationby ntroducingvariouscontrols ncrementally.his providesa wayoftesting o whatextentthecases inthe northeast ell are being brought owarbya differentrocess.Sincetherestrictedamples both produce similar esults nTable 2, the remaining nalyses

8UnlikeWayman nd Jones 1991),whichhas the UK-FR as a r-ivalr-yr-edating816 and is used to identifyhisrivalry s having ome war, heWayman 1996) sample has twoper-iods f rivalry,he firstfwhich,1825-1850,can beseen as a legacyfrom heNapoleonicWa-s and thus s legitimatelyncluded n the some-war ell. The second period,1888-1902,however, s more truly n exception and for hatreasonis of theoreticalnterest. his case suggests hatcolonialterritorialisputes re simply ot as war-prone s other erritorial isputes a findingonsistent ithMost ndStarr 1980)). From this nalysis ne mightderive the following ropositions:Rivals disputingwith ach otheroverrespective ore territol-yre more aptto go to war than rivalsdisputing ver peripheral including olonial) territory.Fi-om his t further ollows hat:Rivalsfighting ver core territol-yre apt to fightmore ntensely han r-ivalsightingover- eripheral erritory.



18/29

JOHN A.VASQUEZ 547will ompare only he Goertz nd Diehl (6 MID threshold) amplewith heWayman(2 MID threshold).9Table 3 beginsthis ssessment f thetwo-paths-to-warxplanationby removingthecases ofmultilateral ar. tprovides test f Hypothesis , whichpredicts hatrivalries f contiguous tates re muchmore apt to end in dyadicwar than rivalriesinvolving oncontiguous tates.The results f thistest re quite stark; t turns utthatall the cases of noncontiguous ivalsgoing towar (in Table 2, b and c) aremultilateralwars. For both samples the relationship s perfect.For each of thesamples,the respective ule's Q's both go up to 1.00 as do the Phi's (seeTable 3, aand b). Justhow muchweightcan be placed on this finding s the focus of theremainingthree hypotheses,which are crucial for assessing the accuracy of aterritorialxplanationofwhy nd how rivalsgo towar.Fornow, t sclear that he bivariateests n major-majorivalries roducea solidassociationTable 2), and closer nspection upports heclaim that ontiguous ivalsare fightingver territory.urthermore,he claim that noncontiguous ivals rebroughtowarby separate ath sconfirmed urthery hedramatic esultsnTable3. Both the tests nd examination f specific ases provideevidence onsistent ithProposition ,whichmaintains hatrivalrieshathave territorialisputes re moreprone to directwarsthanrivalries hat re not focused n territorialisagreements.HYPOTHESES 3-5. Thetwo aths owarHypotheses 3-5 assume thatsome states go to war because theyhave seriousgrievanceswith ne another hat hey xpect to be settled nlybywar nd that hereare other states hatgo to war but eitherdo notwant toor are embroiled n a warstarted ecause of someone else's rivalry. notherwayof ooking t these twopathstowar is to distinguish etweengoingto war because ofa directbilateraldisputeand going to war as a resultof supporting thirdparty.The different ausalsequences associatedwith heonset of waron the one hand,and thespreadingofwar on the other,need to be better ncorporated nto howwe conceive of ourhypotheses nd construct urresearchdesigns.There arebasically woways ftestinghe claimthat ertain tates remorepronetobeingbroughtnto war, ather hanbeing na rivalryhere nepartynitiates ar.The first s to see whethernoncontiguoustates re more likely o be involved nmultilateralhan n dyadicwars.Hypothesis tests his laim.The second s to seewhethernoncontiguous ivals re more apt to be war oiners in an ongoingwar.Hypothesis tests his laim.Thishypothesisrovides purer est f the notion hatnoncontiguousivals re lessproneto war and mustbe broughtnto n ongoingwarstarted orotherpurposes.Unlikeparticipationn multilateral ars where severalpartiesmight harethesamegrievances,articipationna warafter decent ntervalsuggestshat tates rebroughto thewarfor easonsdifferentrom hose f he nitialbelligerentsnd most ikely y differentrocess.Boththese estsrepremised n theassumptionhatdifferentinds frivalriesreproneto differentypes fwar.Table 4 presentsa test of Hypothesis3 by predictingthat if the territorialexplanationof war is correct, hen noncontiguousrivalsshould fightprimarilymultilateral ars nd notdyadicwars;whereascontiguous ivals ouldfight ither.Whilethebivariate ormat oes notprovidethe mostprecisetest,t shouldproduce

9The Goertzand Diehl sample is the sourceofmany nalyseson rivalry; herefore,fonlyone restricted ist sselected, his ne shouldbe it. t also has the dvantageofhaving ourmore asesthanWayman ndJones nd droppinga case which, ecause it nvolves ensored data (pre-1816), s pi-one o miscoding n thedependentvariable.As can beseen inTable 2, the Goertz-Diehl ample is not beingpickedbecause it will do better han theWaynmatnnidJonessample.



19/29

548 DistinguishingivalsTABLE 3. Rivals and AnyDyadicWar MultilateralWarsRemoved)

a. GoertzndDieehl1995) (6 MID thlreshlold)ample

No War AnyDyadic WarNoncontiguous US-USSRUS-UK

2 00 2

Contiguous RUS/USSR-JNRUS/USSR-CH

Likelihood ratio, p = .018aYule's Q = 1.00Phi = 1.00 p = .045

b.Wayman1996) (2 MID threshold)ampleNo War AnyDyadicWar

Noncontiguous US-USSRUS-UKFR-JNIT-GER+4 00 2

Contiguous RUS/USSR-JRUS/USSR-CH

Likelihood ratio, p = .006aYule's Q = 1.00Phi= 1.00 p=.Ol

(a) See Table 2.(+ +) See Table 2.

someassociationf hehypothesissaccurate.'0Afairlytringentest s topredict hatanynoncontiguousivalryhat asat east nedyadicwar nthepost-Napoleonic eriod(1816-1980)wouldbe taken s a casefalsifyinghehypothesis.his means thatonlyI()This testunderestimates he strengthftheproposition ecause it coun-tsontiguousdyads havinig yadicwarsinfavor f hehypothesis, utcounts ontiguous yadshaving nlymultilaterl wars s evidence gainst hehypothesis,when nfact he territorialxplanationdoes notdenythe atter ossibility.



20/29

JOHN A.VASQUEZ 549TABLE4. Contiguity nd Large Wars

a. Goertznd Diehl 6 MID threshold)amplle

At Least One OnlyDyadicWar MultilateralWarsNoncontiguous UK-GER UK-JNUK-IT US-CH

0 42 2

RUS/USSR-CH FR-GERRUS/USSR-JN IT-AHContiguous

Likelihood ratio, p = .06aCorrectedYule's Q = -.60Phi=-.58 p=.10

b.Wayman1996) (2 MID threshold)ample

At Least One OnlyDyadic War MultilateralWars

UK-GER FR-RUSUK-IT IT-RUSNoncontiguous UK-RUS US-CHUK-JN US-JNFR-AH US-GER0 102 7

RUS/USSR-CH FR-GER PRUS-AHRUS/USSR-JN IT-FR RUS-AHContiguous IT-AH GER-RUS...UK-FR

Likelihoodratio, p = .07aCorrectedYule's Q = -.48bPhi=-.36 p =.12



21/29

550 Distinguishing ivalsTABLE 4. Continued

(*) The Wayman 2 MID) sample has 23 cases; the 4 not ncluded here have no warsfor he relevantperiods (FR-JPN,US-UK, US-USSR, UK-FR). Three no wars are excluded in the Goertz and Diehlsample.(a)See Table 2.(b) See Table 2.(++ + ) See Table 2.

noncontiguous ivals hat ight xclusivelymultilateral arswillbe taken s evidencein favor f the proposition.The results nTable 4 bear out thisprediction.Not asingle noncontiguousrivalry in eithersample) foughteach otherdirectly ndexclusively y fighting dyadic war. While thecontiguousdyads reflect similartendency,t s ess pronounced.The relationship s not quite statisticallyignificant,butthecorrected ule'sQ's arefairlympressive:.60and a moderate .48 thePhi'sare -.58 and -.36).11 Justhow manyexceptions hecontiguous ivals ruly mbodycan be assessed by determining hether hemultilateral ar was an outcome of arivalry rivenby a territorial isputeor some otherrivalry.Hypothesis providesone wayof getting t thatquestion. t recognizes he factthat n a multilateralwar, those states that are involvedfrom he beginning redifferentrom hosewho oin lateron. This second group comes to thewar becauseofcontagionfactors rbecause thewar diffuses. his is a distinct ath to war thatcan be differentiatedrom hefactors hatbrought bout the initialonset of war.Table 5 triesto get at thispath by comparingthose rivals hat are present t thebeginning f thewarwith hose thatoin in.Hypothesis predicts hatnoncontiguous ivals re muchmoreaptthan ontigu-ous rivals ojoinan ongoingwar.This isa better est fProposition ,because unlikeHypothesis3 it makes a clear distinction etweenthe behavior of noncontiguousand contiguous ivals. o be awarjoiner, n actormust nter hewarbydeclarationor troopcommitmentt least threemonths fter he initialdeclaration.Dates ofentryre given nTable 5.To test hishypothesis, pecific eriodsofrivalrynd wars had to be examined.Wayman's 1995) shorterperiods lend themselves etterto such a test, nd theresultsof this ample are reported n Table 5. One oftheproblemswith horterperiods,however, s that hey ould potentially ias the test fone or tworivalshadmanyshortperiodsofrivalrynd dominatedthedata. This, however, s not thecase as can be seen from he table.The results nTable 5 are consistentwith hehypothesis, howing statisticallysignificant elationship t the 058 levelwith Yule's Q of-.61,but a weakerPhi of-.34. Thus, as contiguity oes up (i.e., fromnoncontiguous o contiguous),thetendency o join an ongoingwar goes down. Only five of eighteen contiguousrivalries o towar by oining an alreadyongoingwar. Conversely, ightof thirteennoncontiguous ivalries o towar by oining an ongoing war.Five cases go to warfrom he beginning, ut these are all multilateralwars.Of the five ases, two areauthentic xamplesofnoncontiguous ivalries hatgo towar,even in the absenceof direct erritorialisputes.The UK-GERrivalryn 1939 and toa lesserextent heFR-AH rivalryn 1859 are of this lk. The other threecases, however,mayreflectmeasurement rrornthat t eastone sidejoinedan ongoingwar, lbeitfairly arly.

I The negative ign nthis nd subsequent ables imply eflects he orderofthevariables nthecontingency ableand is not substantivelyelevant o the hypothesis. he negative ign means that as contiguity oes up (i.e., fromnoncontiguous ocontiguLous),ightingn onlymultilaterl wars goes down.



22/29

JOHN A. VASQUEZ 551TABLE 5. Contiguitynd Diffusion fWarsWayman1996) (2 MID threshold)ample(based nperiodsndwarpairs)

Foughtfrom WarJoiner nBeginning an OngoingWarUK-GER 1914 UK-IT 1940aUK-GER 1939 UK-RUS 1854 bNoncontiguous FR-AH 1859 UK-JN1941 cFR-AH 1914 FR-RUS 1854bUS-CH 1900 IT-RUS/USSR1941cUS-JN1941 cUS-GER 1917US-CH 1950 d

5 813 5

FR-GER 1870FR-GER 1914FR-GER 1939 FR-IT 1940 aPRUS-AH 1866 RUS/USSR-JN 945'CContiguous IT-AH 1849 IT-AH 1915 fIT-AH 1859 GER-RUS/USSR 1941IT-AH 1866 UK-FR 1793 gRUS-AH 1914RUS-JN 1904RUS/USSR-JN 938RUS/USSR-JN 939RUS/USSR-CH 1929GER-RUS 1914Likelihoodratio, p = .058+Yule's Q = -.61Phi=-.34 p=.06

(a) Italydeclared war on FR and UK 6/10/1940;WWII started n 9/1/1939.(b) The Crimean Warstarted n 10/23/1853;R and UK entered3/31/1854.(c) In WWII GER and IT attacked USSR on 6/22/1941; apan attackedUS and UK on 12/7/1941;WWII started /1/1939.(d) Chinaintervened gainst heU.S. intheKorean War on 10/27/1950,bout4 months fter hewarbegan on 6/24/1950. his is the shortest ime pan in this olumn.(e) The USSR declared waronJapanand attackedJapaneseforces nManchuriaon 8/8/1945.(f) taly nteredWWI on 5/23/1915;WWIbegan 7/29/1914.(g) The FrenchRevolutionaryWarsbegan onApril20, 1792 and France declared war on EnglandonFeb. 1, 1793.(+) See notea to Table 2.

Forexample,the FR-AHrivalryreceding1914really nly ame to warbecause ofentanglingalliances. A stronghistorical rgument can also be made that theAnglo-GermanrivalryprecedingWorld War I did not produce the war, thatGermanywantedto avoid war with the U.K., and that the U.K. was dragged inbecauseofBelgium seeVasquez, 1993:95-6). Finally, heUS-CH case reflects .S.



23/29

552 Distinguishingivalsinterventionn the Boxer Rebellion, n intervention hich t s inconceivable hatthe U.S. would haveundertaken n its wn.The rather olidYule'sQ, then, robablyis underestimatingherelationship.The casesinthewarjoiner northeast) ellofTable 5 are allfairlytandard.Theyall involve tates hat re brought ntoan ongoingwaraftertstarted. he SecondWorldWar nthePacific s treated s an extension f theEuropean war,but even fone objects othis nterpretation,heU.K. andU.S. can still e seen asbeing broughtinto an ongoing Sino-Japanesewar because theirpolicies conflictwithJapaneseobjectives n China and theregion Iriye, 1987:118, 148, 150, 156, 162, 171; seealsoVasquez (1996b) formoredetail).Table 6 testsHypothesis4 in the Goertz and Diehl sample. The longer timeperiods ntheGoertz nd Diehl samplemeanthatmultiplewarsoften ccur nthesametimeperiod.Rather handropthis ample, twasdecided tocode a dyadbasedon thetypical modal) way t enteredwars from hebeginning r ater).Onlythreeoftheeight asesweresubject o this ule IT-AH, RUS-JN, nd US-CH-see Table1 for thewars), and IT-AH and RUS-JNwereeasily classified n thebasis ofthemodal rule.12For cases that acked a modal path,a second rule was followed: hewarwithin r closest to the period of rivalry dentified y Goertzand Diehl wastaken s thebasis of hecoding. OnlytheUS-CH case was determined ythis ule.13On thebasisoftheserules, hedyads nthe Goertz ndDiehl samplewereclassifiedinto the categoriespresented nTable 6. The results re similar o those nTable5,butconsiderably tronger. he corrected ule's Q is -.85and Phiis-.77;as statesbecome morecontiguous, hetendency o oin wars as opposed tofightingromthebeginning)goes downdramatically.This is an interestingncrease n theQ and Phi,given hereductionnthenumberof cases. It is also a serendipitous indingn that twasbrought bout because of adiscrepancynthewaythetwo amples measure duration frivalry. comparisonofthe two amples permits n examination f thetypical atha rivalry raverses nitsway o war without he noise of atypical ases). Table 6 provides trong videncethat hetypical ath towarfornoncontiguous ivals s to enter nongoingwar,whilethe typical path to war for contiguous rivals is to fightfrom the beginning.Identifyinghe typical ath to war a rivalry ollowsmakes therelationship epictedinHypothesis much clearer.The final able combines heeffectsfthe twopathsto war to testProposition .Table 7 testsHypothesis ,whichpredicts hat ithernoncontiguous ivalswillnotgo towaror iftheygo towartheywilldo so by participatingnmultilateral ars.Contiguousrivals re expectedto be much morelikely hannoncontiguous ivalstofight yadicwars.As can be seen inTable 7,theresults re statisticallyignificantin the predicteddirection orboth samples,withrespective corrected)Yule's Q's

12IT-AH fought n thebeginning n 1849, 1859,and 1866, and only nce enteredwar s ajoiner (in 1915). Of thesewars, he former ll relate o the talianWarsof Unification,nd these eem to capturebetter he major reasonsfor heIT-AH rivalry. US-JNfought rom hebeginning n 1904, 1938 (Changkufeng), nd 1939 (Nomohan), and enteredas a joiner dyad in Wor-ldWar II in 1945. Again, the formerwars seem more critical or he purposes of the dyadicrivalry.3I'The U.S. and China, as can be seen in Table 5, fough-twowars n the post-Napoleonic period-the BoxerRebellion and the Korean War. While bothfallwithinWayman'speriods,Goertz and Diehl identify nly 1949-1974as a period ofrivalry,o the Korean War isused as a basisofthe coding. China is seen as inter-veningn an ongoingwar.In case this ulewas not sufficient,third -ule as developed butneverused): a dyadwould be classified s ajoinerif t eemed to have nter-venednan ongoingwar being fought ytwo therparties regardless f the timeofentry) rto havefought rom he beginning,f twasone ofthemainparticipants riingingbout thewar.Under this ule,boththe Boxer Rebellion for he U.S.) and Korea (forChinese inter-vention)ould be classifiednthe oiner cell.



24/29

JOHN A. VASQUEZ 553

TABLE6. Contiguitynd Diffusion fWarsGoertznid iehl 1995) (6 MID threshold)ample

(based on modalpatli towar) +Foughtfrom WarJoiner nBeginning an Ongoing War

UK-GER UK-ITNoncontiguous UK-JNUS-CH1 34 0

FR-GERIT-AHRUS/USSR-JNRUS/USSR-CHContiguous

Likelihoodratio, p =.01aCorrectedYule's Q = -.85Phi=-.77 p =.03

(+) The Goertz and Diehl sample consists f 11 cases; the 3 not ncludedhere have nowarsfor herelevant ivalry eriod (UK-RUS, US-UK, US-USSR).(a) See Table 2.(b) See Table 2.

of-.75 and -.60 (and Phi's of-.62 and -.38).14Rivals that re noncontiguoushavea lower coreon contiguity)re more ikely ither o avoidwar ortofightach otheronly nmultilateral ars.These findingsinTable 7 as well asTable 6) arealso consistent ith hompson's(1995) recent laims hat patialrivalries,nvolvingontentionver erritorialssues,and positionalrivalries,nvolving ontention verglobalpolitico-economicssues,evincedistinct ehavioralpatterns. he latter,which lmost lways nvolvenoncon-tiguousstates, re, according to Thompson (1995:208-9), mostly acific nd lesslikely o fight irectly he farther part they re geographically. onversely, hespatialrivalries, hichoftennvolved ontiguous tates ightingverterritory,ighteach otherfairlyrequently.hompson focuses n theprincipalrivalries rom hefifteenthhroughthe twentieth enturies, o that four of his six centuriesareindependentfrom hedata used here, yet his conclusions re very imilar o thepatterns elineated nthis nalysis.

14The secondPhi, swould beexpectedgiven tsmagnitude, oes notquitemake the 05 significan-ceevel, lthoughit comesclose withp = .06. Note here,however, s inTable 4, that ontiguous yadstend tobecomeinvolved nmoremultilateralwars thandyadic wars. This has th-e ffect f weakening the association even though-he th-eoreticalexplanationdoes not saycontiguous tateswill not fightmultilateral ars. In thisway, he test sunderestimatinghestrength fthehypoth-esis.



25/29

554 DistinguishingivalsTABLE 7. Contiguity and the Two Paths to War

a. Goertznd Diehl 1995) (6 MID threshold)ampleRivalry-Producing No War orWars; At Least One MultilateralDyadic War War

UK-RUSUK-GERUS-USSR UK-ITNoncontiguous US-UK UK-JNUS-CH0 72 2

Contiguous RUS/USSR-JN FR-GERRUS/USSR-JN IT-AH

Likelihood Ratio, p =027aCorrected Yule's Q = .75bPhi=-.62 p =.038

b.Wayman1996) (2 MID threshold)ampleRivalry-Producing No War orWars; At Least One MultilateralDyadic War* War+

Noncontiguous 0 14cContiguous 2 7d

Likelihood Ratio, p = .04aCorrected Yule's Q = .60bPhi=-.38 p =.06

(*) Cases from Table 4, part b.(+) Cases from Tables 3, part b, and 4, part b.(a) See Table 2.(b) See Table 2.(c) Four dyads never fightwars and 10 fightmultilateral wars.(d) Seven fightmultilateral wars.



26/29

JOHN A.VASQUEZ 555Conclusion

The tests n this rticle re very ncouraging. heyshow hat ne ofthemain factorsthatdistinguishivalries hatgo to war from hose thatdo not s whether he rivalsare contiguousor noncontiguous. n addition, there is a strongtendencyfornoncontiguous ivals o go to warprimarily y oining ongoingwars.This processusuallyoccursthrough rival'sbeing brought nto an ongoingwar,but t can alsooccur hroughtates' articipatingn a multilateral arfairlyoon aftert s nitiated.These findings rovide clear empirical vidence that the existenceof two distinctpaths to war s not ust a logicalpossibility, ut a behavioralregularityhatneeds tobe recognized nthe constructionf testdesigns.Other analysesofcontiguity aveneither estednor shown his.The use oftwodifferentperationaldefinitionsf rivalry-one fairly estricted(6 MID threshold) nd the otherfairly road (2 MID threshold)-also producedinterestingnd unexpectedfindings,lthough ll thehypotheses assed tests asedon the twosamples. Still, he morerestricted oertzand Diehl sample generallyproduced stronger indings nd a better it hanthe2 MID sample ofWayman. hismakes cleartwofindings hatwerenot reallyknown efore he analysis. irst, ivalsinthe Goertz nd Diehl samplebetter epict he twopathstowar.The major reasonforthiswas uncovered erendipitouslyn theanalysispresented nTable 6. Whenforced, ormeasurement easons, o code rivals n thebasisof their ypical modal)path to war, twasfound hat ontiguous tatesgenerally ight yadicwarswhereasnoncontiguous tates,when they ight, enerally ightmultilateral ars, nd oftenjoin the atteraterather han nthe beginning.Without ooking tthe modal pathto war rivals ake,thisrelationship,lthough tillpresent, s somewhatmuted.Thereason is that ontiguous tates re also often roughtnto argewars, ven thoughthat s nottheir ypical ath towar. Nevertheless,t s rare formajor stateswhosecoreterritorys noncontiguous o fight arsone on one,eventhough ornaval statesor colonial competitors here re fewbarriers gainstdoingso.Second, giventhe results, t is clear that rivals n the Goertz and Diehl samplebetter fitthe territorialxplanationbeing testedin this analysis.For whateverreason, heserivals, s opposed tothe et dentified y hebroader 2MID threshold,tendto go to war in a mannerslightlymore consistentwith hatpredictedbytheterritorialxplanation.This leads us to askwhatdistinguishes he two amples.By definition,he Goertz nd Diehl rivalshavemore confrontationsnd moreofa persistent attern f disputing. his suggests hat ess intenserivalries re moresubjectto anomalouspatterns, ut notso much as to makethepredictedrelation-ships disappear. Specifically,hereal differences that n the essintenserivalries,contiguous tates re brought ntomultilateral ars morefrequentlyhan are thecontiguous tateswho have intenserivalriescf.Table 4, a and b). The latter ightmoredyadicwars nd warsoverterritory,s ispredictedbythe territorialxplana-tion. Less intense and short-termivalries ppear to go to war with each otherbecause ofthewarsofothers.Anumber ftherivals hat re omitted yGoertz ndDiehl seem tobe of this lk-FR-IT, FR-RUS, IT-RUS, FR-AH, RUS-AH, US-JN,US-GER-although onlyfurther esearch an make this onclusiondefinite.f thisisfound obe thecase, then tmaybe because suchrivalries ack the evel ofhostilitydiscussed n the first ectionofthis rticle.Atanyrate, t s thecase thatthemorerestricted ample,which s presumedto containthemorehostilerivalries, etterfits hepropositions eingtested.Of more mmediate heoreticalmportancesthat hefindingsre consistent iththe territorialxplanationof rivalry nd war,which states thatrivals thathaveterritorialisputes re much moreapt to go towarthanrivals hatdo not.Theseother ivals hatgo towarprobably o sothrough processofwardiffusion.espitethepreliminaryatureofthese tests, hey o showthat his heoretical nalysis an



27/29

556 Distinguishingivalsaccurately xplainhow rivalries esult nwarand that t s able to distinguishivalsthatdo not go towar from hosethatdo.Those who would object to this onclusionwould reply hat he use of contiguityas a measure ndicates nly hat hose thathave more of an opportunityofight illfightmore frequentlyhan those thatdo not.An inspection f thecontiguous ivalsthat go towar,however, howsthatall thesedyads-FR-GER, IT-AH, PRUS-AH,GER-RUS, RUS/USSR-JN, US/USSR-CH-go towarnot imply ecause they avethe opportunity o do so, but because theyall have very serious issues underdispute.'5 Furthermore, hese issues are not of a random nature; all involveterritorial isputes.The tests how thatworkon a territorialxplanationofrivalryis worth nvestigating urther nd shouldnot be dismissed prioriby a proximityexplanation, lthoughtheproximity xplanation s a legitimate lternativenter-pretation or ome of these findings n theabsence of precise measurement f theissue content f rivalries.

The most severe limitation f the tests s the use of contiguitys an indirectmeasure of territorial isputes. Getting data on the latterwould be a way ofdiscriminating etween heterritorialnd theproximity-interactionxplanations.In addition,more n-depth ase studies fwhether oncontiguous ivals rebroughtinto wars because of the territorial isputes of their allies would provide anadditional test of the explanation and further lucidation on whether nd howterritorialssues are behindrivalrynd war see Vasquez, 1996a, 1996b).The findings f this nalysis, articularlyhe uncovering f twopathstowar, realso consistent ithThompson's (1995) analysis hat ome rivalriesand wars)arebasically patialand over territorialssues,while otherrivalriesand major globalwars) are over positional ssues.Although argue thateven global warsoften tartas dyadicwars over specificterritorial uestions,the alternative xplanation isplausible. Future researchwill need to determine he extentto whichpositionalissues rather hancontagionfactors including he inking f ongoingrivalries) rethe primarymotivating actors ringingnoncontiguous tates ntowarwitheachother.The existence fthis lternative xplanationfurther nderlines heneed forhigh-quality ata on the ssues overwhichrivals re contending.Giventhecomplicated nd multicausal rocesses ssociatedwithwar, t s llusoryto think hat nyonetestwill verbe definitive. ather, heway oproceed sthrougha numberof differentests,which ogether an correct or hegaps inanyone test.The testshereindemonstrate newayofdoing that ycontrollingor ossiblepathsto warthrough ampling.Together,they ouldhavefalsified he territorialxpla-nation,buttheydo not. For the tests o become moredefinitive,hepresenceofterritorialssueswillneed to be morepreciselymeasured.The tests resentedhereshow that such an effortwould be justified.An inspectionof the specific asessuggests hat erritorialssues rebehindwhether nd howrivals o towar, mplyingthatmoreprecisemeasurementwill show thatrivalsgo to war notsimply ecausethere s an opportunity,ut because territorialisputes upplyrivalswith willing-ness to fight hatfew f themhave been able toresist.

ReferencesBELL, P. M. H. (1986) The Origins f he econdWorldWar n Europe. ondon: Longman.BENNEiT, D. S. (1996) Security, argaining, nd the End of InterstateRivalry.nternationaltudiesQuarterly0:157-183.

l5Thedyadsthatmight e moremargiial

and fight orterritoi-y,ut mayonlydo so after eing brought nbyotherstates'wars, re FR-IT and RUS-AH.



28/29

JOHN A. VASOUEZ 557BREMER,S. (1992) Dangerous Dyads: ConditionsAffectinghe Likelihoodof nterstateWar, 1816-1965.Journal fConflictesolution6:309-341.BUENO DE MESQUITA,B. (1978) Systemic olarization nd the Occurrence nd DurationofWar.JournalofConflictesolution2:241-267.CARR,W. (1985) PolandtoPearl Harbor. ondon: EdwardArnold.CARR,W. (1991) The Origins f heWars fGerman nifzcation.ondon: Longman.DAY,A.,ED. (1987) Border nd Territorialisputes,nd ed. London: Longman.DEUTSCH,K.,ANDJ.D. SINGER 1964) Multipolar owerSystems nd International tability.World olitics16:390-406.DIEHL, P. (1985) ArmsRaces toWar:Testing omeEmpirical inkages. ociologicaluarterly6(3):331-349.GADDIS,J. L. (1987) TheLongPeace: nqziriesnto heHistoryf heColdWar.New York: OxfordUniversityPress.GAMSON,W.A.,ANDA. MODIGLIANI 1971) UntanglingheCold War.Boston:Little,Brownl.GELLER,D. (1993) PowerDifferentialsnd War nRivalDyads. nternationaltudies uarterly7:173-193.GEORGE, ., ANDR. SMOKE 1974) DeterrencenAmerican oreign olicy.New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress.GOERTZ, . (1994) Contextsf nternationalolitics. ambridge: CambridgeUniversityress.GOERTZ, ., ANDP. F. DIEHL (1992a) The Empirical mportanceofEnduringRivalries. nternationalInteractions8:151-163.GOERTZ, .,AND . F. DIEHL 1 992b) Territorialhangesnd ntermationalonflict.ondon: Routledge.GOERTZ, .,AND . F. DIEHL 1993) EnduringRivalries: heoreticalConstructs nd EmpiricalPatterns.Internationaltudies uarterly7:147-171.GOERTZ, G., ANDP. F. DIEHL (1994) Taking the Enduring Out of Enduring Rivalry. Paper presentedat the AnnualMeetingoftheAmericanPolitical cienceAssociation,New YorkCity.GOERTZ, .,AND . F. DIEHL 1995) The Initiation nd Termination fEnduringRivalries: he Impactof Political hocks.AmericanJournalfPolitical cience 9:30-52.HENSEL, . R. (1996) The Evolution f nterstate ivalry. h.D. dissertation, niversity f llinois.HOLSTI, K. J. (1991) Peace and War:Armed onflictsnd International rder, 648-1989. Cambridge:Cambridge Universityress.HUTH, P., ANDB. RUSSETr1991) General DeterrenceBetweenEnduring Rivals:TestingThree Com-petingModels.Americanolitical cience eview 7:61-73.IRIYE, . (1987) The Origins f he econdWorldWar n the acifzc. ondon: Longman.JONES, . M. (1988) Patterns f Conflict:816-1988 Coursevs. Fine-GrainedAnalysis. aper presentedat the WorldPeace ScienceCongress,College Park,Md., May5.KAHN, . (1968) On Escalation:MetaphorsndScenarios, ev. ed. Baltimore,MD: Penguin.KAISER, . (1990) Politics nd War:EuropeanConflictrom hilip I to Hitler.Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press.Kocs, S. (1995) Territorial isputesand InterstateWar, 1945-1987.Journal fPolitics 7:159-175.KUGLER, . (1984) Terror WithoutDeterrence:Reassessing the Role ofNuclear Weapons. Journal f

Conflictesolution8:470-506.LANGER, . L., ED. 1972) AnEncyclopediafWorld istory. oston: Houghton Mifflin.LENG, R. J. (1983) When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises.Journal ofConflictesolution7:379-419.LEVY, . S., ANDM. FROELICH1985) The Causes ofthe Iran-Iraq War. In TheRegionalizationf War,editedbyJ.Brown nd W. P. Snyder, p. 127-143. NewBrunswick, J:TransactionBooks.MANSBACH,. W.,AND .A. V

comparing paths to war

Documents