comparison of the czech republic and slovakia in european identity formation through symbolic power...

7/31/2019 Comparison of the Czech republic and Slovakia in European identity formation through symbolic power of the euro

1/26

Comparison of the Czech republicand Slovakia in European identityformation through symbolic power

of the euro


2/26

Comparison of the Czech republic andSlovakia in European identity formationthrough symbolic power of the euro..............1

1.Introduction...........................................................................2Theoretical part........................................................................6

Defining the identity and symbols.........................................................6Identity according to the Declaration on European Identity ..................7Views of some authors at the EU identity and symbols..........................7EU as an imagined community..............................................................8Banal nationalism and the EU................................................................9

3. Methodology......................................................................11Practical part..........................................................................13

European identity in the 2009th .........................................................13European identity in the 2010th .........................................................14Note about European identity in Slovakia and the Czech republic........15

Opinions about the euro 2009.............................................................15Opinions about the euro 2010.............................................................16Opinions about the euro 2011.............................................................17Election into the European Parliament 2009........................................18Public opinion on the Lisbon treaty......................................................18Helping to the collapsing state of euro zone- case of Greece...............20

Conclusion..............................................................................21Bibliography...........................................................................24

1. Introduction

Nowadays there is bigger and bigger discussion about being more a

European instead of own countrys nationalist. Moreover sometimes

there can be a pressure whether from the EU apparatus or national

governments or parliament or media. But is possible to import

Europeanism by help of symbols, informing, convincing and so on?

On the other hand Europeanism or common European identity seems

to be necessary if we look at the EU as a nearly federal system, which

is in many aspect similar to the US federal system. Comparing themtogether there are really huge differences in their inhabitants senses

of identity. We can say, the US have been existing for a much longer

time and the EU is still in the process of integration. But its been

quite a while since the cooperation of european states started in 1951

as a European Coal Steel Community1. Moreover there was made a

Declaration on European Identity at the Copenhagen Summit in 1973.

1 According Dinan (2003) reasons and slow development of cooperationstarted after the Second World War.

2


3/26

The identity was defined on the basis of tree pillars. This is a sight of

a long history of the European identity and its importance for the

leaders.

The question of identity is especially important for the new member

states, which join the EU few years ago and havent been going

through the whole process of EU formulation and integration. Special

tolls are especially necessary to build and support the building of the

identity. Symbols (as a flag, anthem, common currency and so on)

can fulfill this role.

McNamara (2010) using Andersons concept of imaged communities

and Billigs concept of banal nationalism writes about the power of

symbols (as anthem, Euro currency, European flag, european

,,language and so on). ,,The authority the EU exercises is

underpinned by symbols and practices that have much in common

with the political technologies deployed by nation-states, but that

have distinct limitations in their claims on European citizens loyalty.

(ibid: 131) She calls the Euro as an emblematic of the careful

balancing of national and European symbols. Moreover Billigs

concept of banal nationalism claims, that also if the symbols arent

noted by inhabitants and would have been noted if disappear, they

fulfill role of identity (according to Anderson awareness of common

imagined community) holder. This concept is the key one for us

because, we are going to find out, if adoption and usage of the euro

currency (which is considered as a banal nationalism) helps to

strengthen European identity perception of inhabitants.

What is the impact of symbols, concretely the Euro on the case of the

Czech republic and Slovakia? Did it help a greater acceptance of the

EU authority? The Czech Republic hasnt adopted the most important

symbol- Euro currency. Slovakia has been using the Euro since the 1st

of January 2009. The Czech Republic and Slovakia used to be one

3


4/26

nation till 1993. So they had a long common history, including

experience with communist regime, which had influenced all parts of

every day life. After Velvet revolution they were dealing together with

all problems and challenges connected with democratizationprocesses and also with EU singing up effort. They also entered the

EU in the same wave. However there is one big difference- usage of

the symbol- Euro. So we have two quite similar states with one

difference, which helps us to study the influence of the introduction of

Euro symbol, if it helped agrater identity awareness in Slovakia.

Looking thought the literature about our topics, we hadnt found any

similar work. Most of the academic papers deal only with the question

of the EU identity. There are many concepts of viewing on the EU

identity. For example Gerad Delany (2002) in his article Models of

European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism

separate three models of the European identity: Moral universalism,

European postnacionalist universalism, European cultural

partikularism and European pragmatims. Florian Pichler (2009: 37-56)

in a chapter European Identities from below: Meanings of

Identification with Europe differs three conceptual attitudes to

European identity: Cultural, Political and Cosmopolitan. Matthias

Kaelberer (2004: 161-178) focuses on relationship between many,

collective identity and European integration in his article The Euro

and European Identity: Symbols, Power and the Politics of European

Monetary Union. Moreover he deals not only with the role of the Euro

as a mean of facilitating the creation of the identity, but also with a

necessity of some kind of european identity, which is necessary for its

successful usage. We have found one article, which wasnt only about

theory, but deals also with countries, it is Risse, Engelmann-Marin,

Knofp, Roschers article: To Euro or Not to Euro?: The EMU and

Identity Politics in the European Union focus on supporters and

opponents of the Euro acceptance in: Germany, the UK and France).

They claim too, that Euro is connected by the identity policy and

4


5/26

political vision of European order. The supporters stand for an idea of

a common European integration as a mean of dealing with the

cultural differences. The opponents stand for national currencies,

which are symbols of national states. (ibid: 175) Moreover there existEurobarometer Surveys, which deals with this topic. They ask people

several questions about their feeling, thoughts and so on. This survey

is quantitative. Nowadays Laura Cram with James Mitchell and Stratos

Patrikios are working on a series of online survey experiments with

visual cues, which will expose participants in England, Scotland and

Wales, within the UK, and in Ireland to implicit symbolic and

functional triggers related to the European Union. Unfortunately, the

surveys and their methodology havent been published yet.

As you could see, there is no relevant article on this topic. So come

back to the McNamara symbolic policy and Billigs banal nationalism.

Can a symbol as is the Euro help to create common EU identity? Here

we can see one problem of the thesis the Czech republic hasnt

accepted euro yet. It has being in the EU since 2004 and still without

euro. So one question has come on our mind. Does the euro have

any influence on perception of EUs authority and loyalty of Slovaks?

The cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia help us to find out if the

euro helped and brought more loyalty of Slovak to the EU authority

and common European identity. To solving this problem in the case of

the Czech republic and Slovakia we use this research question:

What changes in identity connected with the EU has been

occurred in the minds of inhabitants after starting using euro

in Slovakia comparing with the Czech Republic?

We are going to operacionalize the identity not only with the help

inhabitants attitudes and their claim of their feelings about the

identity, but also through their behavior and opinions on the euro,

5


6/26

important events happening in the EU. If their behavior or opinions or

attitudes are similar as the EU proclaims and therefore they agree

with it and dont go against it, than we would say, that they obey and

are aware by the European identity. If not, than we would say, thatthey dont obey by the European identity.

To examine, the identity perception of the inhabitants we are gong to

focus on EU election turnout, acceptance of using euro in Slovakia

and willing to accept euro in the Czech Republic, surveys connected

with euro using and expected positive or negative changes in country

after euro acceptance.

If we find some differences in identity perception between Slovakia

and the Czech republic, well say that the Euro symbol has influence

on the loyalty of the Slovak. And than well assume our findings. If we

dont find any difference, well say that the Euro symbol doesnt have

any influence on the EU identity.

Theoretical part

Defining the identity and symbols

There is many works on the term of identity, but it doesnt to help for

creating only one explanation of it. Sociology, psychology,

anthropology, history, political science and so on deal with this term.

Andersons concept of Imagined communities is described later, also

connected on the EU.

Identity is a variable knowledge about others and us. So the identity

represents that, what the human is and also that he isnt. (Szal

2003: 17)

The symbols are considered as tools for identity creation. Symbols

are pluralistic (rituals, objects and so on) and every symbol itself is a

system of symbolic meanings, which are a part of another symbolic

6


7/26

systems (Zajac 2002: 4). The symbols importance for states and also

the EU is that they help to increase identification of people with

political or other entity.

Identity according to the Declaration on EuropeanIdentity

The European elites arranged about the necessity of defining and

creation of common European identity in Copenhagen 1973. They

defined three pillars. The first was a common heritage, interests and

duties inside the community. The second was a dynamic nature of

europen unification and the third one scope, which the 9 countries

had been reached in their common cooperation in the rest of theworld. (Declaration on European Identity 1973)

All three pillars were based on internal unity, common features,

heritage and internal consistency with regard to the rest of the world.

European identity should have been a tool for consolidation of

international order.

Views of some authors at the EU identity and symbols

First of all we would like to describe some concepts, which are

against common european identity with a focus on reasons why, to

we can better understand the broad context. Than we focus on the

symbols.

There is only one more author who also thinks about the Europeanidentity in the rest of our literature: Weiler- The Transformation of

Europe. He speaks about the development of the EU after 1992 and

explains two possible vision. He called ironic rejecting the nationalism

of the member states and creation of a new European nation and

European nationalism. (Weiler 1991: 2482) So we can assume that

he is against common European identity.

7


8/26

Another author who is against of possibility of creation of European

identity is Fiala, who claims that the usage of symbols for creating

identity isnt enough without creating a common language- cultural

framework. Without it, it is impossible to create a common publicspace for discussion, confrontation of interests and presentation of

political themes. The main problem is that without these

circumstances is impossible to create transparent political decision

making and democratic control of decision making. (Fiala 2006)

These concerns can be marked as worries about the democratic

deficit of the EU.

Next we are going to focus on the above mentioned Matthias

Kaelberer (2004), who deals with the using currency as a mean of

identity. He criticizes usage of the many or currency as a mean of

collective identity because the relationship between identity and

currency is more abstract than real (ibid 167). However he considers

the Euro as one of the most important symbols of European

integration and identity among countries.

EU as an imagined community

Benedict Anderson (in Hroch: 2003: 243-244) considers the nation as

an "imaginary political community that exists in the imagination as a

community by its very nature and externally bounded sovereign. It is

imaginary, because members of the nation do not know each other,

they never meet each other, they never hear about each other.

However the imaginary about the community lives in the minds ofmost of them. "The psychological dimension of the nation by Krejci

(1996: 669) lies in the subjective consciousness of individuals in their

jurisdiction to that nation, this criterion is critical. Moreover Benedict

Anderson (2008:19) argues, that national identity value is generally

the most legitimate political life value of our time.

Likewise the nation, the EU according to Andersons concept shouldbe considered as an imaginary community too. Thus it isnt nation, it

8


9/26

functions nearly like a federation of states, which tries to build their

own identity. Moreover using imaged community concept McNamara

(2007: 13) claims, that the EU can only be symbolized, because even

as various aspects of the EU come to have concrete form, in itsentirety as a political actor, it doesnt have material presence but

exists only in our imagination. The Euro is the most dramatic example

of the process of entitativity, as the single currency makes concrete

the imagined community it constructs (McNamara 2007: 14). No only

Euro, but also passports with EU symbols, no passport controls on

EUs borders and so on help to create the EU imagined community

consciousness and therefore the EU identity. Moreover McNamara

(2010: 136) considers very important moments, when Europeanness

is reframed symbolically and experienced materially, for example

when you dont have to change money if you travel to an other EU

state (except these which dont use Euro). Symbols become fact

through social processes and also through their physical expressions,

which become objects that actors interact with the practice. However

in a way of political authority, the EU has to coexist alongside its

national members with their own well-developed political

communities and symbolic apparatus (McNamara 2010: 136).

However he EU cannot draw upon that exclusive narrative of political

identity, but rather must coexist alongside its national members, with

their own well developed political communities and symbolic

apparatus. The EU must somehow navigate these pre-existing and

robust identities to succeed. (McNamara 2007: 17)

Banal nationalism and the EU

A great part of the general public, as well as political representation,

and especially many sociological scholars, nationalism is understood

only in its hot and confrontational form as unique and often violent,

and therefore bad and for society undesirable phenomenon, which is

situated outside the already established nation-states. The definitionis limited, or rather reduced to a struggle for independence, unity and

9


10/26

independence, machines without offering an alternative term or even

the concept of the ideological complex, which maintains and

reproduces the established national Western nations (Billig 1995: 43).

Hot variant is seen as a force that creates new nations, or converselythreatening the existing nations. However, Billig (1995) considers

banal nationalism as an implicit power, which is maintained and

continually reproduced by nations and functioning nation-states.

Furthermore, he understands the banal nationalism as an answer to

the question of how it is possible (if nationalism and nation-state is a

recessive phenomenon, as many

scholars such as Fukuyama claim) that it comes to uprising of

national sentiments and emotional reactions of the nations on

patriotic callings of their political leaders during time of crises in

Western countries (t tka 2007: 81).

Banal nationalism works on the daily social practices, it goes for the

routine daily reproduction of social symbols and institutions" (t tka 2007: 80, 91).

A key insight of this approach is the insight that nationalism does not only arise in crisis

and conflict, but that nations are reproduced on a daily basis, through banal and

mundane ways, and it is those habits of mind and practice that underpin national

identity (awareness of imagined community). Billig argues that even those activities

and representations that seem the most clichd (flags and anthems, for example)

matter, for they reproduce national identity in ways that prime populations for

supporting their states in more emotional or difficult times, such as

war. He argues that established nations continually flag or remind their populationsof nationhood in a myriad of seemingly innocuous ways. Billig (1995: 40)

mentions unwaved flags or unsaluted flags. They do not require direct

and dedicated attention. These are flags, which we pass every day

and we are not aware of their presence, however we would have

noticed if they would have disappeared out of our lives. Not only flags

but also currency, passports with national symbols and so on fulfill

function of realizing imagined community or identity. They are doing

it subconsciously.

10


11/26

According to McNamara (2011: 17, 18) banal nationalisms well

captures the under the radar, taken for granted rhetoric and

practices that create Europe as a legitimate actor and an authoritystructure that reverberates back on individual identity. EUs cultural

impact is real in the very particular type of banal imagined

community. Participation in this community involves both active

dynamics (imagine this!) and passive participation (unthinking

repetition that reproduces, habits without rethinking).

According to Cram (2009: 101) a European Union identity has more

functional or banal aspects than are suggested by many of the

traditional measures, in terms of sliding scales of stated affiliations.

The mechanisms through which any identification with the EU might

emerge are complex and involve a combination of rational cost

benefit calculations and complex socio-psychological factors.

3. MethodologyWe are going to answer following research question in our paper:

What changes in identity connected with the EU has been

occurred in the minds of inhabitants after starting using euro

in Slovakia comparing with the Czech Republic?

This question is a reaction to the McNamara s power of symbols and

Billigs concept of banal nationalism.

The cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia help us to find out if the

euro helped and increase European identity in minds of Slovakias

inhabitants.

To examine, the identity perception of the inhabitants we are gong to

focus on EU election turnout, acceptance of using euro in Slovakiaand willing to accept euro in the Czech Republic, surveys connected

11


12/26

with euro using and expected changes in country.

If we find some differences in identity perception between Slovakia

and the Czech republic, well say that the Euro symbol has influenceon the European identity of the Slovak. And than well assume our

findings. If we dont find any difference, well say that the Euro

symbol doesnt have any influence on the EU identity.

So we can assume that we are going to use standard positivist

approach because well use deduction, existing theory and variables.

How we are going to come to an answer to our question. We are

going to use comparism of the Czech republic and Slovakia. Why we

can compare the two states to find if loyalty increases in one of

them? We will use a kind of experiment called subsequent

observation, which compares together two groups, from which one

was under the influence of experimental variable and the second one

wasnt. Slovakia has the Euro, the Czech republic doesnt. There are

some problems like the countries arent similar size and arent totally

similar. However its the best group of countries, which we can

compare because of their common history and so on.

By each related situation or factorrs (like European parliament

election turnout) will be compared results from each country and

according to then summed if the European identity of Slovaks was

higher or lower than the Czechs. We are going to compare them from

the start of using Euro in Slovakia, which means the 1st of January

2009.

We are going to use the secondary analyses of documents (as

newspapers articles; articles of experts, polls, surveys and so on),

which are connected with the European identity of the inhabitants;

we use also information gathered from the European parliament

12


13/26

election. These data will mostly have a qualitative character.

Firstly, we are going to explore Andersens concept of imagined

communities with relation to the EU. The reason is, that the EU as anearly federal system is trying to gain awareness of common identity

of its inhabitants. Andersonss concept is ideal, because it speaks

about relationships among inhabitants without knowing each other.

Moreover McNamara (2011: 13) claims, that the EU can only be

symbolized, because even as various aspects of the EU come to have

concrete form, in its entirety as a political actor, it doesnt have

material presence but exists only in our imagination. This description

helps us to understand the role of symbols in the identity creation of

the EU.

Than, we are going to deal with Billigs concept of banal nationalism.

The reason is that Billigs claims, that also if the symbols arent noted

by inhabitants and would have been noted if disappear, they fulfill

role of identity (according to Anderson awareness of common

imagined community) holder. This concept is the key one for us

because, we are going to find out, if adoption and usage of the euro

currency (which is considered as a banal nationalism) helps to

strengthen European identity perception of inhabitants.

Practical part

European identity in the 2009th

Slovaks have the strongest relationship to their country and their

region. The vast majority of people feel a high degree of Slovaks

(81%) and another 17% to some degree. Slovaks have very strong

relationship to the region where they live (70% to a large exent, 28%

somewhat). Slovaks are among the five European nationalities, which

feel mostly Europeans. 44% of Slovaks feel as (nationals) and also

Europeans. (data from eurobarometer 2009: 22-30)

13


14/26

Moreover 22% of Slovaks feel more as European after euro

acceptation, 76% Slovaks claim that nothing has changed.

Czechs have too the strongest relationship to their country and region

in which they live. In the Czech Republic, the vast majority of people

feel a high degree of Czechs (84%) and another 15% to some degree.

Czech have also very strong relationship to the region where they live

(74% to a large extent, 25% somewhat). More interesting in the

context of this work is the extent to which Czech feel Europeans. In

the Czech Republic, approximately a third (31%) of people feel very

much like Europeans and others almost half (47%) to a certain

extent. A fifth of inhabitants feel European almost or do not feel

European at all (22%). (data from eurobarometr 2009: 47-51)

Comparing together these results, we can see, that Slovaks feel much

more as Europeans than Czechs. This means, that more inhabitants

considerer themselves as Europeans, so they have European identity.

European identity in the 2010th

The number of Slovaks, who consider themselves as (nationals) and

Europeans has increased to 45%, what is one percentage more.

(Eurobarometer 2010)

Czechs are at the opposite part of the spectrum. 59% of them definedthemselves only by their nationality. (Eurobarometer 2010) However

72% of Czechs are proud on European identity, 87% on national

identity. 90% of Czechs feel a sense of belonging to the state and

74% to the Europe. (Osoba Petr 2010)

Comparing together these results, we can see, that Slovaks feel much

more as Europeans than Czechs. If we look at the trend, we can see,that the amount of Slovaks who feel as nationals and Europeans has

14


15/26

been slowly increasing. This means, that awareness of Slovaks about

European imagined community has been getting stronger. Despite of

the fact, that Czechs feel more as nationals than as Europeans, they

are strongly proud on their European identity and their belonging tothe Europe. So we can see there some awareness of Czechs about

European identity.

Note about European identity in Slovakia and the Czechrepublic

Going through many Czech and Slovak web pages, archives of

internet newspapers (SME, Pravda) AnoPress archive (connectingarchive of all newspapers and magazines in the Czech republic),

academics papers I havent found any term of European identity or

Europeanism, expect national and Commission results of

Eurobarometer.

Opinions about the euro 2009

Less than a year after the introduction of the euro Slovak citizens aremuch more positive to the common European currency, than in the

EU average. 71% of Slovaks believe that the euro acceptance was

good, only 22% refuse the common currency.

Up to 68% of Slovaks agrees that the euro has generally mitigated

the negative impact the current financial and economic crisis.

(Eurobarometer 2009: 41) The number has increasing tendencies, ithad rise from 66% in spring to 68% in autumn. The positive view of

Slovaks on the euro increased in time of crisis. This can be seen as a

power of this symbol in Slovakia, because as said Billig the

importance of national symbols and so on rises in the time of crisis.

Moreover 77% of Slovaks think that euro helped Slovakia to be more

interesting to foreign investors and 76% that euro strengthen

Slovakias position. (European commission 2009)

15


16/26

IVO analyst Olga Gyrfov sees a positive perception of the euro in

particular, sincere convince of people that the euro is a good step for

the economy and personal wallet. "The crisis has also contributed toeuro-euphoria. Regardless of whether this is so or not, people take

the interpretation that the acceptation of the currency, which applies

in many other countries, will help them to bear the impact of

economic crisis easily, people think, that the country would be

stronger by the euro," says Gyrfov. Other reasons include

according to Gyrfov a sense of pride that "we did it" even earlier

than those who were in the process of integration far ahead. (SME

2009)

Most of the Czechs 56% think that euro doesnt have positive impact

on the mitigating of the negative impact of the current financial and

economic crisis. 37% of Czech think that euro has positive impact.

(Eurobarometr 2009: 47)

Moreover 53% of Czech support euro acceptation and 40% is against.

Summing it up, Slovaks are much more optimistic to impact of euro

than Czech. They consider it useful for the country and also for

solving the crisis. In this point we can see much bigger or stronger

believe in euro and positive opinions and therefore also stronger

European identity of Slovaks.


The view that the euro alleviate the negative impact of economic

crisis strongly agree or agreed 68% of Slovak citizens, contrary to

such opinion disagree or

strongly disagree only 27% of Slovaks. (Eurobarometer 2010: 10)

Only 38% of Czechs agree with euro acceptation, 55% of them areagainst it (CVVM 2010: 5). We can see increasing number of euro

16


17/26

denying and skepticism. Moreover according to lidovky survey (2010)

most of the readers (3174 people from 5020 people who answered) of

the internet server think, that euro would harm the country.

Looking at the whole process, the number of Slovaks believing in euro

help in crisis didnt increased or decreased. However we didnt find

results of this variable in the Czech republic. So we can compare only

their support for euro acceptance and it decrease, the skepticism

increased. Summing it up, Slovaks believe in euro much more than

Czechs, who are getting more and more pessimistic, what means,

that Czechs didnt want to accept one of the EU symbols.


The number of Slovaks, who think that euro acceptance was a good

thing has decreased in last year to 63%. Moreover the number of

people who think that euro was a wrong thing has increased to 34%.

(Focus 2011)

75% of Czechs dont want the euro acceptance and only 21% want

euro to be accepted (CVVM: 2011). The increasing trend of refusing

euro as a home currency has been in the Czech republic since the

year 2001, however it has been strongly increasing for last two years.

Jan Mat jka, director of Media Research agency, thinks, that the

economic crisis, particularly the financial problems of some eurozonecountries, has increased interest in economic issues among the

people. Moreover these problems caused new thoughts about the

advantages of a common European currency, stability in the euro

zone, and even about the risk of the zone crash and return to national

currencies. Czechs agree more with the opinion of President Vaclav

Klaus, who belongs to the flame critics common European currency.

(Tden.cz 2011)

17


18/26

Summing it together the number of people who think that acceptance

of euro was or would be a right decision has been decreased also in

Slovakia not only in the Czech republic. However, the number of

people thinking about euro in a positive way is still quite high inSlovakia. It is much worser in the Czech republic, where is strong

trend of refusing euro.

Election into the European Parliament 2009

There came only 19,64% of electing inhabitants of Slovakia to vote

for European parliament members election 2009. More people came

to vote in the Czech republic, 28,22%.

Moreover most of the Slovaks 61% arent interested in the election.

The number is even higher in the Czech republic, up to 70%. (Focus

2009)

This numbers are speaking by themselves. If we compare Slovakia,

the euro user and the Czech republic, the euro non-user, we can seethat there was much lower voter turnout in Slovakia. Moreover the

acceptance of euro didnt force the people to be more interested in

the election. So we can sum it up, that acceptance and usage of euro

so far havent influence the loyalty to the EU and European identity

concerning to the elections.

Public opinion on the Lisbon treaty

We are going to focus on public opinion on Lisbon treaty, because it

was the most important step for the EU in the years by which we are

dealing with. Moreover we think, that supporting of this treaty can be

a great sight of the European identity and awareness of common

European imagined community. We can consider the treaty as a

force, which rally the member states more together and made the EU

more powerful.

18


19/26

There was hold no regular public survey on the Lisbon treaty in

Slovakia. Therefore we are forced to use survey, which was held on

web pages of the most visited Slovak newspaper- SME.

2

Most of theSlovaks readers dont go through the Lisbon treaty text- 82% (2138

readers answered the question). (SME 2009) An other question of the

newspaper was: it was held a referendum about the Lisbon treaty,

how would you vote? 3179 readers answered. The answers show, that

there is no particular opinion on the treaty. 47% of readers would

agree with the treaty, so far 45% against.

There is not really high interest of the Czechs about the Lisbon treaty,

only 27%. 71% of Czechs declare their non-interest about the Treaty.

However what is more interesting more people (45%) think, that the

Parliament should agree with the Treaty. Only 25% of Czechs think,

that it shouldnt agree with the Treaty and 37% doesnt know. (CVVM

2009)

Summing it together more Czechs agree than disagree with the

Lisbon treaty, however most of them arent interested in the Treaty.

This is quite confusing for any judgment. The non-interest can be sign

of lack of loyalty to the EU and identity. On the other hand, many

people agree with it, which can be sign of the loyalty. Comparing it to

Slovaks, the results are similar, most of them dont read it, what can

be a sign of non-interest in the events in the EU and therefore lack of

the EU identity. We claim this, because we expect, that the people

awared of their EU identity should be interested in the situation in

there.

2

Here is necessary to mention, that this kind of survey has no validity andcant be generalized on the whole society. It has only informationalcharacter and is better than nothing.

19


20/26

Helping to the collapsing state of euro zone- case ofGreece

We choose this topic because of our conviction, that it is the most

important event in the euro zone in the last years, which cussed huge

discussion about the future existence of the zone.

60.5 percent of Slovak citizens refuse a loan to Greece. According to

a survey of the Agency for Public Opinion Research, conducted on 10

to 19 May on sample of 1118 respondents. For the financial help of

Slovaks to Greece is only 25.4 percent of respondents and 14.1

percent of respondents can not answer, or are not interested in the

problem. (podnkam.sk 2010)

Greece Financial assistance amounting to 110 billion euros, which

was agreed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank

and the International Monetary Fund, dont support 59.9 percent of

respondents. Moreover according to 54.2 percent of respondents loan

provided to Greece will not prevent its bankruptcy. 80,1% of Czechs

is against the financial help for Greece Republic, on The contrary,only 13.6 percent of respondents agree with the financial assistance

to Greece. (Madiafax.cz 2010) Moreover Czechs are frightened by the

possibility of impact of the Greece crisis on them. Therefore, more

than two-thirds - 73.8 percent - believe in the fact that it is not

necessary to pursue the adoption of the euro as soon as possible.

There is clearly visible straight attitude of Czechs and Slovaks on thehelp for Greece. They dont agree with it, by what they go against the

decision of the EU. Therefore we can claim, that they are not loyal to

the EU institution and their behavior is against the common decision.

So we cant see any obeying by the European identity. Moreover the

crisis of Greece caused, that Czechs want to postpone the acceptance

of euro.

20


21/26

Conclusion

We focused on the power of symbols in the European identity

creation in the Czech republic and Slovakia in our work.

We tried to answer our research question. The question was: What

changes in identity connected with the EU has been occurred

in the minds of inhabitants after starting using euro in

Slovakia comparing with the Czech Republic?

To answering this question we used following concepts as a

theoretical background: Andersons concept of Imagined

Communities, McNamaras claim3

and Billigs concept of Banalnationalism. We consider the EU as an imaginary community,

because the EU can only be symbolized, because even as various

aspects of the EU come to have concrete form, in its entirety as a

political actor, it doesnt have material presence but exists only in our

imagination. The Euro is the most dramatic example of the process of

entitativity, as the single currency makes concrete the imagined

community it constructs. Moreover Billigs concept of banalnationalism claims, that also if the symbols arent noted by

inhabitants and would have been noted if disappear, they fulfill role of

identity (according to Anderson awareness of common imagined

community) holder. According to Cram (2009: 101) a European Union

identity has more functional or banal aspects than are suggested by

many of the traditional measures, in terms of sliding scales of stated

affiliations. The mechanisms through which any identification with theEU might emerge are complex and involve a combination of rational

costbenefit calculations and complex socio-psychological factors.

Due to the difficult examination of whole identity of both nations, we

3 The authority the EU exercises is underpinned by symbols and practicesthat have much in common with the political technologies deployed by

nation-states, but that have distinct limitations in their claims on Europeancitizens loyalty. While the euro is emblematic of the careful balancing ofnational and European symbols. McNamara (2010: 131)

21


22/26

operacionalized the identity in a more broadly way. We used not only

inhabitants attitudes and their claim of their feelings about the

identity, but also through their behavior and opinions on the euro,

important events happening in the EU. If their behavior or opinions orattitudes are similar as the EU proclaims and therefore they agree

with it and dont go against it, than we would say, that they obey and

are aware by the European identity. If not, than we would say, that

they dont obey by the European identity.

Comparing together identity conclusion in Slovakia and the Czech

republic, we can see, that Slovaks feel much more as Europeans than

Czechs. If we look at the trend, we can see, that the amount of

Slovaks who feel as nationals and Europeans has been slowly

increasing. This means, that awareness of Slovaks about European

imagined community has been getting stronger. Despite of the fact,

that Czechs feel more as nationals than as Europeans, they are

strongly proud on their European identity and their belonging to the

Europe. So we can see there some awareness of Czechs about

European identity.

Summing it up, Slovaks are much more optimistic to impact of euro

than Czech. They consider it useful for the country and also for

solving the crisis. However the number of people thinking about the

euro in positive way has decreased in this year. Despite this fact we

can see much bigger or stronger believe in euro and positive opinions

in Slovakia than in the Czech republic, where is strong trend of

refusing euro. Because of all the mentioned about the euro we claim,

that Slovak has much stronger European identity in this point than

Czechs.

If we compare Slovakia, the euro user and the Czech republic, the

euro non-user, we can see that there was much lower voter turnout in

Slovakia. Moreover the acceptance of euro didnt force the people to

22


23/26

be more interested in the election. So we can sum it up, that

acceptance and usage of euro so far havent influence the loyalty to

the EU and European identity concerning to the elections.

Lisbon treaty was an other point of our interest. We found, that many

Czechs and Slovaks arent interested in the Treaty or they didnt read

it. What isnt sign of behavior, which comes from strong identity

perception. However they are for acceptance of the Treaty, so their

behavior is in accordance with the EU interests. If we complete it,

there is no difference among these two nations in this point.

The last point of our interest was the financial help for Greece. Here

was again no difference in the attitudes, however they went against

the EU decision to help the country. So we cant see here any positive

behavior or attitudes of the inhabitants and therefore we cant state

any loyalty to the EU.

When we sum all our findings up, we find, that Slovaks as euro users

have stronger EU identity than Czechs. They feel Europeans, trust the

euro and its power and are euro optimists. There was no difference

among opinions of Czechs and Slovaks in the case of Greece

(disagreement with the EU opinion and therefore lack of loyalty in this

point) and the Lisbon treaty (agreement with the EU). Slovaks were

worser than Czechs in the EU election. Its 2:2:1. There were just two

positive changes and one negative in EU identity of Slovaks

comparing to Czechs. So its difficult to say it the symbolic power of

euro and also banal power of the euro as one of tools important for

identity creation worked in case of these two countries.

23


24/26

Bibliography

Hroch, M. 2003. vodem k tance text o nacionalismu. s. 9-23. In:

Hroch, M. (ed.): Pohledy na nrod a nacionalismus: tanka text.Praha: SLON.

Krej, J. 1996. Nrod. s. 668-669 in Velky sociologicky slovnk. 1. A- O. Praha: Karolinum.

Anderson, B. 2008. P edstavy spoleenstv: vahy o p vodu a en nacionalismu.Praha: Karolinum.

t tka, V. Vyvoj a prom ny nrodn -integran funkce masovych

mdi v kontextuglobalizace. Doktorsk disertan prce. Brno: Fakulta socilnchstudi MU 2005, 178 s.

Desmond Dinan (2003): How Did We Get Here? In: The EuropeanUnion: How Does it Work?, ed. Elizabeth Bromberg and AlexanderStubb. Oxford University Press, pp.19-39.

McNamara, Kathleen. (2010): Constructing Europe: Insights fromHistorical Sociology Comparative European Politics 8(1): 127-42.

McNamara, Kathleen (2011): The EU as an Imagined Community?Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association Meetings,Boston

McNamara, Kathleen (2007): Constructing Authority in the EuropeanUnion. For presentation at Who are the Global Governors?,conference held at George Washington Universit

Billig, M. (1995): Banal Nationalism. London Thousand Oaks NewDelhi: SAGE

Publications.

Delanty, Gerard (2002): Models of European Identity: ReconcilingUniversalism and Particularism,' Perspectives on European PoliticsandSociety, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 345359.

Pichler, Florian (2009): European Identities: Evidence From theEurobarometer Survey, working paper, WP6: Organisation of theSpread ofExcellence Programme, on-line text(http://cinefogo.cuni.cz/index.php?&id_result=80113&l=0&w=15&id_out=10

24


25/26

15).

Kaelberer, Matthias (2004): The euro and European identity: symbols,power and the politics of European monetary union, Review ofInternational

Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp.161178.

Risse, Thomas Engelmann-Martin, Daniela Knopf, Hans-Joachim Roscher, Klaus (1999): To Euro or Not to Euro?: The EMU and IdentityPolitics in the European Union, European Journal of InternationalRelations, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 147187.

Szal (2003): Termn identita. Sociologick asopis, Vol. 7., No. 9, pp.17.

Zajac (2002): o s symboly. Sociologick zbornk, UniversitasComensiana, Bratislava.

Declaration on European Identity 1973

Weiler, J. (1991) The Transformation of Europe Yale Law Journal 8:2403-83. 80 pages.

Fiala (2006): Evropsk identita. Politologick web.

CVVM (2010): Oban o lenstv esk republiky v Evropsk unii.

Online: http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/101034s_pm100429.pdf

Lidovky (2010): Pruzkum, ei zmenili nazor, proti zaveden je vetinalidi. Online: http://byznys.lidovky.cz/pruzkum-cesi-zmenili-nazor-proti-zavedeni-eura-je-vetsina-lidi-pv4-/moje-penize.asp?c=A100429_164658_moje-penize_tai

SME (2009): Pre krzu udia zaali ma radi euro. Online: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/5170007/pre-krizu-ludia-zacali-mat-radi-euro.html

Tden.cz (2011): ei odepisuj euro. Chce ho jen 15 procent lid.Online: http://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/byznys/cesko/cesi-odepisuji-euro-chce-ho-jen-15-procent-lidi_195384.html

Focus (2011): pozirvne nzory na zavedenie eura poklesli. Online:http://www.focus-research.sk/files/130_Nazory%20na%20zavedenie%20EURO%20na%20Slovensku%20februar2011.pdf

Focus (2009): Volby do EP maj 2009. Online: http://www.focus-research.sk/files/105_Volby%20do%20EP_maj09.pdf

Osoba, Petr (2010): Evropsk identita: vybran problmy. Diskusn

25


26/26

p sp vek. Online: http://prf.osu.cz/ksg/dokumenty/osoba.pdf

CVVM(2009): Nzroy obyvatel R na Lisabonskou smlouvu. Online:http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100891s_pm90407.pdf

SME (2009): Anketa: tali ste text Lisabonskej zmluvy? Online:http://www.sme.sk/anketa_archiv.asp?pol=sme_hs&st=40#ixzz1QKFnkVlq

podnikam.sk (2010): Prieskum: Piku Grcku odmieta 60,5%Slovkov. Online:http://www.podnikam.webnoviny.sk/ekonomika/avvm-pozicku-grecku-odmieta-60-5-slovakov/14604

mediafax.cz (2010): ei finann pomoc ecku nepodporuj, ukzal pr zkum. Online: http://zpravy.kurzy.cz/225552-cesi-financni-pomoc-recku-nepodporuji-ukazal-pruzkum/

eurobarometr (2009): Nrodn zprva esk republika.Eurobarometer (2009): Nrodn sprva Slovensko.Eurobarometer (2010): Report, vol 2.
http://www.sme.sk/anketa_archiv.asp?pol=sme_hs&st=40#ixzz1QKFnkVlqhttp://www.sme.sk/anketa_archiv.asp?pol=sme_hs&st=40#ixzz1QKFnkVlqhttp://www.sme.sk/anketa_archiv.asp?pol=sme_hs&st=40#ixzz1QKFnkVlqhttp://www.sme.sk/anketa_archiv.asp?pol=sme_hs&st=40#ixzz1QKFnkVlq

comparison of the czech republic and slovakia in european identity formation through symbolic power...

Documents