compartmentation and fire risk survey

Compartmentation and Fire Risk Survey

1 - Ashmount Rd / 6 1 Earlsmead Road

South Tottenham

London

N15 4D

Issue Date: 25 th November 2019

Project Number 4001/01 Ridge Consultants / Homes for Haringey – Ashmount and Earlsmead

Tag Fire Safety Ltd Fire Compartmentation Survey V1. Rev 02 of 25

Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 2

1. Executive Summary .........................................................................................................................

5

2. Fire Safety Recommendations ........................................................................................................

7

2.1 High Risk Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 7

2.2 Medium Risk Recommendations .................................................................................................... 8

3. Introduction and Fire Overview ....................................................................................................

10

4. Building Details .............................................................................................................................

12

5. Fire Safety Audit ............................................................................................................................

13

6. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................

1617

Appendix 1 - Photographs .................................................................................................................

1818

Contents



Earlsmead



Date Revision

No.

Comment

25.11.19 01 Initial issue date

11.02.19 02 Revision

This report is a copyright of Tag Fire Safety Ltd. It applies only to the named project and must not be used in support of any other project. It may be distributed to third parties only with the permission of Tag Fire Safety and must be distributed in full and without amendment to content or presentation.

Additional fire safety measures may be necessary for insurance and other purposes. The detailed aspects of the design and construction are, unless explicitly stated otherwise in this report, to be in accordance with the recommendations of Approved Document B and the appropriate British Standards.

The validity of this report is dependent upon the recommendations being implemented in full and as described.

This report relates to a project that is subject to third party approval. It should be ensured that the contents of the report are agreed with all the relevant approval bodies prior to implementation.

Document Prepared by Signed Dated

D Morris BSc (Hons)

MIFSM MIFireE

25.11.19

Document Reviewed by Signed Dated

Peter Orton MSc, MIFireE,

MIFPO, MIFSM

10.12.19

Project Number 4001/01

Ridge Consultants / Homes for Haringey – Ashmount and Earlsmead


1.1 The site comprises 2 detached structures, with separate internal blocks provided within Ashmount and a single block within Earlsmead around a central stairwell. These were believed to be constructed in the

mid 1970’s. The blocks are located each on a separate road (Ashmount and Earlsmead) with a shared

communal garden at the rear separating them.

1.2 Ashmount has 3 adjoining blocks of 3 floors, with the front entrance on Ashmount Road. These all have

separate entrances off the main street level leading directly to the communal corridors / stairwells. Two of the blocks have 6 flats (identified as 1 to 2b and 3 to 4b), with the third having 5 flats (5 to 6a)

with the missing flat taken up by a secured walkway from the front of the block to the rear communal

garden. No access could be provided within block 5 to 6a as keys were not provided, there was not an

option to open with a drop key and none of the tenants answered the intercom.

1.3 Earlsmead is a single block of 9 flats over 3 floors with an internal shared corridor and stairwell leading

from the main entrance.

1.4 The buildings are believed to have been built of traditional type ii masonry construction, with brick and

blockwork walls and a concrete floor slab / stairwell. Externally the ground and first floor are brickwork with a tiled mansard which also covers the second floor. As the building is of mansard construction

and of limited size, there is minimal loft space provided, although there was no access available to this

space at the time of the site visits or after liaising with the residents.

1.6 The survey was undertaken in accordance with general fire safety auditing principles in order to identify

hazards that could contribute to injury of persons resorting to the building, against the requirements

of Building Regulations and applied enforcement criteria under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.

1.7 The means of escape provision in terms of size, distance and time of travel is suitable for the identified risk

profiles, as they provide for persons resorting to the blocks to escape to a place of ‘relative’ or ‘ultimate’ safety.

1.8 As far as reasonable possible it was identified that the means for protecting the means of escape in terms

of fire separation and compartmentation is considered unsuitable and will not prevent the products

of combustion impacting on the means of escape or the safety of residents. This is recommended to

be ascertained with further intrusive inspections (locations identified later in the report).

1.9 The means for raising the alarm of fire is considered unacceptable in design and conformity to British

Standard 5839. In consideration of the provided compartmentation between flats and between

communal areas, the limited fire alarm provision within flats and communal area is inadequate to inform persons of a fire in the early stages of combustion to facilitate an evacuation to be carried out.

1.10 An additional fire alarm system is provided within the communal area comprising of wireless detection

heads, with a controller located by the main entrance door of each block. It is unknown when this

system was installed and it is believed to have been provided as a temporary measure in order to

provide an additional fire safety system until either the compartment deficiencies are rectified, or a full compliant fire alarm system is put in place along with a simultaneous evacuation policy. The system

has been identified as an Ei650i – Optical Battery Smoke Alarm, by EI Electronics. This system is

inadequate for use within this type of premises on a permanent basis as it does not conform to British Standard 5839-1.

1. Executive Summary




1.11 The employed fire plan is identified differently throughout the blocks via the associated FANs (Fire Action

Notices). Block 1 to 2b and Earlsmead has a ‘Stay Put policy’ in place, with Block 3 to 4b having a ‘simultaneous evacuation’ policy. It was not possible to identify the policy within block 5 to 6a due to

lack of access. This provides an element of confusion amongst the residents, with all of the adjoining

blocks requiring the same policy. It is recommended that the blocks have a ‘simultaneous evacuation’

policy put in place, with FANs changed to show this and all residents made aware of the procedures.

This in consideration of the compartmentation provision will be suitable, however does require the

additional provision of AFD fitted within the communal areas of the blocks.

1.12 Following the survey it is determined, that the fire safety provisions and means of escape strategies are

not fully compliant with applied enforcement criteria, but if the recommendations detailed in this

report are carried out, all blocks will be considered to be meeting a compliant and safe condition.

1.13 The internal flat front entrance doors along with lobby protection doors within Ashmount and Earlsmead,

were noted to have been replaced with matching Gerda fire rated doorsets throughout (with the

exception of one identified later in the report). These are well known throughout the industry due to

their quality and the fact that they are one of the few manufacturers to have their doorsets fire test in

multiple wall construction types, meaning they are fully accredited and certified. They were noted to be in good condition and as far as practicable to tell, had been fitted correctly to the manufacturers

test detail.

1.14 No access could be provided to the electrical intake cupboards under the stairs on the ground floor of

each block, which were noted to not be of a fire rated construction. An intrusive inspection is

recommended within this area, along with the riser on the stairwells, any sections of the loft space

that can be accessed and behind the mansard to identify the construction, particularly in areas where the boiler flues penetrate it.




2.0.1 This section sets out the fire safety recommendations necessary to meet the appropriate fire safety standards for the building use, occupancy and risk profiles. The measures are those considered by the

Consultant to be necessary to meet a ‘reasonable standard’ of general fire precautions in the premises

in accordance with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and applied enforcement criteria

for the type and use of building.

5.

2.0.2 This Fire Safety Survey is not a Fire Risk Assessment therefore timescale for completion of the recommendations is not given.

6.

2.0.3 Each Recommendation is given a ‘Priority Rating” based on the impact on the safety of persons

resorting to the building in the event of a fire.

7.

2.0.4 The Responsible Person should consider the Recommendations of this report and determine suitable

timescales for completion of the necessary upgrades.

2.0.5 The Recommendations below are rated ‘high, medium and low’ based on the risk to persons who will

occupy the building. High risk relates to the risk of serious injury or death, Medium risk relates to an

identified risk of injury and Low risk relates to a relevant standard for regulatory compliance.

2.0.6 If the provided Recommendations are carried out it is the considered opinion of the Consultant that the

building will provide adequate fire safety provisions for the identified risk profiles.

2.1.1 The compartmentation between individual dwellings or to the communal escape routes does not provide 60 minutes fire separation to facilitate a ‘stay-put’ fire policy be employed. To this end, an automatic

fire detection and alarm system should be provided in the communal areas to ensure all occupiers of

the building are alerted to the fire to allow a total evacuation of the building and a ‘simultaneous

evacuation’ policy being put in place.

Presently a wireless detection system is provided within the communal area (type mentioned previously in the report). This is inadequate for the premises and is believed to have been installed as a temporary

measure only. The system should comply with British Standard 5839 Part 1 comprising of smoke

detection in the communal escape routes interlinked with a heat detector sited in each flat hallway. The system should be zoned to take into account compartmentation and party walls between blocks.

2.1.2 It was identified during the survey that the stairwell was being used to store residents belongings and

waste materials. This increases the fire loading within an area that should be deemed sterile as it is the only means of the escape from the premises. It is recommended that the residents be informed not to

use this area for storage of any kind.

2.1.3 The employed fire plan is identified differently throughout the blocks via the associated FANs (Fire Action Notices). Block 1 to 2b and Earlsmead has a ‘Stay Put policy’ in place, with Block 3 to 4b having a

‘simultaneous evacuation’ policy. It was not possible to identify the policy within block 5 to 6a due to

lack of access. This provides an element of confusion amongst the residents, with all of the adjoining


policy put in place, with FANs changed to show this and all residents made aware of the procedures.

2. Fire Safety Recommendations

2. 1 High Risk Recommendations





additional provision of AFD fitted within the communal areas of the blocks.

2.2.1 It was not possible to identify whether waste pipes in bathrooms run in an open vertical riser or run

between all floors without fire separation between storeys. The shaft should be sealed at each storey

level. Pipework passing through the storey levels should be appropriately fire stopped and fitted with a fire collar. Alternatively the shaft should be sealed at the bottom and top and smoke detection

provided in the shaft which is interfaced to the block fire alarm system. Further intrusive inspections are recommended to identify whether these measures are in place.

2.2.2 Throughout the survey a number of small perforations were identified between flats to include pipe work

and cable routes notably in storage cupboards where the old boiler was located, which had been fire stopped but not to the required standard. If a British Standrad 5839 fire alarm is not to be provided as

detailed above, all perforations should be in-filled with a fire resisting material which provides a

minimum of 60 minutes fire resistance. Each in-fill should be suitably certified as meeting the requirements of British Standard 476.

2.2.3 An extractor fan located in the kichen of flat 3b (Ashmount) was noted to traverse into a riser without being able to identify if there are fire dampers or shaft protection. The shaft should be sealed at each

storey level. Pipework or ducting passing through the storey levels should be appropriately fire

stopped (plastic pipes should be fitted with a fire collar). Alternatively the shaft should be sealed at

the bottom and top, each extract fan increased to a fire resisting standard and smoke detection

provided in the shaft which is interfaced to the block fire alarm system. Further intrusive inspections

are recommended to identify whether these measures are in place.

2.2.4 Flat entrance doors should be fire resisting and should be capable of restricting the spread of the products

of combustion from the flat into the escape routes. Most flat doors were noted to have recently been

changed to a ‘Gerda’ FD30s, however an individual dwelling door (Ashmount 1a) was noted to be of a

different type and was timber in construction with an unknown fire rating (access couldn’t be provided

to this flat to identify if it had a fire rating or not). Certification should be obtained which confirms all

flat doors are of a FD30 standard, if this door is not fire rated it should be replaced. Any doors that

open onto the corridor (means of escape) should be fire doors fitted with a serviceable self-closing

device and an intumescent strip / cold smoke seal with a 30 minute fire rating. These should either be

locked shut or have a serviceable self-closing device and an intumescent strip / cold smoke seal with a

30 minute fire rating installed into either the door edge or doorframe, conforming to BS 476 part 20:22 and BS476 part 31:1. BS 476 - Fire doors and doorframe, BS EN 1154 – Self-closers, BS EN 1154 – Hinges,

BS EN 1906 and BS EN 12209 – Door handles and locks. The fire doors must be repaired / installed and

maintained in accordance with BS 8214:1990.

2.2.5 Within the communal stairwell, the electrical intake seems to pass through a riser which appears to run

the height of the building. The void should be sealed at each storey level, with pipework or ducting

passing through the storey levels being appropriately fire stopped (plastic pipes should be fitted with a fire collar). Alternatively the void should be sealed at the bottom and top and smoke detection

provided in the riser which is interfaced to the block fire alarm. The electrical cabling should be suitably

fire stopped where it enters the riser.

2.2.6 It was identified in all blocks that the door to the service electrical cupboard under the stairs was of an

unknown fire rating. The doors that open onto the corridor (means of escape) should be fire doors fitted with a serviceable self-closing device and an intumescent strip / cold smoke seal with a 30 minute

2. 2 Medium Risk Recommendations




fire rating. These should either be locked shut or have a serviceable self-closing device and an

intumescent strip / cold smoke seal with a 30 minute fire rating installed into either the door edge or doorframe, conforming to BS 476 part 20:22 and BS476 part 31:1. BS 476 - Fire doors and doorframe,

BS EN 1154 – Self-closers, BS EN 1154 – Hinges, BS EN 1906 and BS EN 12209 – Door handles and locks.

The fire doors must be repaired / installed and maintained in accordance with BS 8214:1990.

2.2.7 The electrical intake cupboards located on the ground floor of each block under the stairwells, were

noted to be of insufficient fire resistance. There were multiple unsealed penetrations leading into

them, including within block 1 to 2b, a large surface mounted electrical cable that is run cross the hallway. Please note; access could only be provided to these sections where they were left open. Any

that were locked were inaccessible at the time of the assessment.

2.2.8 Fire detection in the individual flats is believed to be suitable for the applied risks (based on a sample

survey of the flats – Flat 3b was inspected within Ashmount and 1a within Earlsmead). These flats are

provided with a British Standard 5839 Part 6: Type LD2 system, comprising an interlinked smoke

detector in the flat entrance hallway and a heat detector in the kitchen. Each flat regardless of

residency should be provided with a minimum of a British standard 5839 Part 6: Type LD2 system. No

other flats were inspected at the time of the assessment and so compliance throughout is only assumed. It is recommended that all flats are inspected to identify the level of detection coverage.

2.2.9 It is unknown if emergency lighting is provided within the escape routes and communal areas to assist escape in the event of a fire. If it is provided, it could not be confirmed if the level of illumination from the system provides the minimum of 1 lux at floor level as an illumination test was not carried out, but it would appear from the location of the lighting that if they could be confirmed as Emergency Lighting, that sufficient illumination is provided to assist escape.




3.1 This fire safety audit was commissioned by Ridge and Partners LLP to assess the existing fire safety

provisions in terms of compartmentation against applied enforcement criteria and to source a

strategic fire safety solution for the blocks to deliver conformity with the Regulatory Reform (Fire

Safety) Order 2005 and Building Regulations.

3.2 For the purpose of the audit, the Consultant assessed the fire safety provisions against the functional

requirements of Building Regulations Approved Document ‘B’ with particular emphasis on the

following elements:

Means of warning and escape

Internal fire spread (linings)

Internal fire spread (structure)

3.3 In assessing the suitability of the Building Regulations functional requirements, the following fire safety

provisions were audited:

The means of escape

The means for protecting the means of escape (compartmentation)

The means for raising the alarm of fire

Fire evacuation strategies

Statutory Legislation and Codes of Practice used for the purpose of fire safety audit

3.4 With effect from 1 October 2006 the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 became the Fire Safety

Legislation with the repeal of the previous main and subsidiary Acts relating to the communal areas

of flats built in a block. Single private dwellings do not fall under the requirements of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.

• Building Regulations 2000 Approved Document “B”

• British Standard 5839: Part 1: 2002 (2013) Fire Detection & Alarm Systems

• British Standard 5266: Part 1 and 6: 2005 (2011) Emergency Lighting

• British Standard ISO 3864: Part 1: 2011 Fire Safety Signs

• British Standard 9991: Code of practice for fire safety in the design, management and use of buildings

• British Standard 9991: Code of practice for fire safety in the design, management and use of residential

buildings

• British Standard ISO 23932:2009 Fire Safety Engineering: general principles

• British Standard 476-10:2009 – Fire tests on building materials and structures. Guide to the principles, selection, role and application of fire testing and their outputs

• British Standard 6266:2011 Code of practice for fire protection for electronic equipment installations

• British Standard 7671:2008+A1: 2011 Requirements for electrical installations.

3.5 The audit was undertaken in accordance with general fire safety auditing principles in order

to identify hazards that could contribute to ignition, fire growth and propagation.

3. Introduction and Fire Overview




3.6 Under the Building Regulations the ‘responsible person’ is required to provide an adequate

level of life safety to the building by providing suitable means of escape, means of warning occupants of a fire and limiting internal fire spread. This can be achieved by the adoption of

standard guidance as documented within British Standard 9999 and 9991 respectively.

However, British Standard 9999 and 9991 recognise that alternative solutions may provide a

more appropriate design.

3.7 It is acknowledged that the blocks were not constructed to meet the requirements of current

Building Regulations. It is recognised however that it is not always possible or practical without major reconstruction works being undertaken to meet the exact requirements of

current Building Regulations, therefore the general principle is that in order to evidence

compliance, standards of fire safety must be relevant for the identified risks and persons

resorting to the respective building.

3.8 The information, limitations and assumptions used in the preparation of this report are noted

below:

3.8.1 The Consultant was not provided with any building or fire safety equipment drawings or past planning

applications or submissions, therefore the information contained within this report was obtained during the site survey and from information obtained from residents.

3.9 This audit did not include areas below normal floor level or above false ceilings unless these

areas were readily accessible and no ‘intrusive’ or ‘destructive’ inspections of equipment or

services were carried out.

3.10 This report considers, as a guide, the requirements of British Standard 9999 Code of practice for fire safety in the design, management and use of buildings and British Standard 9991

Code of practice for fire safety in the design, management and use of residential buildings to

assess the means of escape and compartmentation provision as the ‘Standard’ works on the

principles of the buildings applied fire risks (risk profiling).

3.11 In assessing the means of escape and compartmentation provision to meet the requirements

of this audit, the following factors have been considered:

The anticipated probability of a fire occurring.

The anticipated fire severity.

The ability of the structure to resist the spread of fire and smoke.

The consequential danger to persons in and around the building.

3.12 Fires do not normally start in two different places in a building at the same time. Initially, a fire will create

a hazard only in the part in which it starts and is unlikely, at this stage to involve a large area. The fire may subsequently spread to other parts of the building, usually along the circulation routes. The

items that are first to be ignited are often furnishings and other items not controlled or regulated by British Standard 9999. It is less likely that the fire will originate in the structure of the building itself

and the risk of it originating accidentally in circulation areas is limited, provided that the combustible

content of such areas is restricted.

4. Building Details




4.1 In establishing the fire safety audit principles, the Fire Safety Consultant took into account the

nature and design of the building, the occupants, including potential vulnerable occupants, the fire protection afforded and observed at the time of the audit.

4.2 The site comprises 2 detached structures, with separate internal blocks provided within

Ashmount and a single block within Earlsmead. These were believed to be constructed in the mid 1970’s. The blocks are located each on a separate road (Ashmount and Earlsmead) with a

shared communal garden at the rear separating them.

4.3 It could not be confirmed that the blocks are of timber framed construction. The buildings are believed to have been built of traditional type ii masonry construction, with brick and

blockwork walls and a concrete floor slab / stairwell. Externally the ground and first floor are

brickwork with a tiled mansard which also covers the second floor. As the building is of

mansard construction and of limited size, there is minimal loft space provided, with no access

available during the site visits or after liaising with the residents.

4.4 Ashmount has 3 adjoining blocks of 3 floors, with the front entrance on Ashmount Road. These

all have separate entrances off the main street level leading directly to the communal corridors

/ stairwells. Two of the blocks have 6 flats (identified as 1 to 2b and 3 to 4b), with the third

having 5 flats (5 to 6a) with the missing flat taken up by a secured walkway from the front of

the premises to the rear communal garden. No access could be provided within block 5 to 6a as keys were not provided, there was not an option to open with a drop key and none of the

tenants answered the intercom. Earlsmead is a single block of 9 flats over 3 floors with an

internal shared corridor and stairwell leading from the main entrance.

4.5 Individual flats are provided with brick, blockwork and stud partition walls as noted within the

two flats that could be inspected.

4.6 In general it is determined that the construction of all the blocks is sound and does not present

a significant fire risk through their design or use.

5.1 In order to assess the suitability of the fire compartmentation all accessible areas and potential

fire risks in the communal spaces of each block were assessed against applied enforcement criteria and risk profiles.

5.2 A ‘sample’ number of flats were also assessed to determine if the fire compartmentation

between the flats and between the flats and the communal areas (escape routes) is sufficient to facilitate the fire emergency plan employed, which currently shows two different policies

(stay put and simultaneous evacuation). The following flats were assessed during the survey:

Flat 3b (Ashmount)

Flat 1a (Earlsmead) – noted to be under refurbishment

It is recommended that further flat access is provided throughout the premises in order to gain a more

complete understanding.

5. Fire Safety Audit




5.3 It was identified that the fire compartmentation appears to conform to the requirements of

Building Regulations at the time of construction but over the years a number of refurbishments have been made to communal systems and power supplies which have

perforated compartment walls which have not been appropriately fire stopped. Within the

flat’s perforations or fittings in the internal walls have no impact on fire spread throughout

the building, the key features in preventing fire spread are the walls, ceilings, floors and fittings

between flats and the walls and fittings between flats and the communal areas.

5.4 All building work and refurbishments should have been ‘signed off’ and approved by either a Local Authority Building Control Officer or an Approved Building Inspector; therefore

compartmentation should be to an appropriate standard. This could not be confirmed, as

approvals were not available for audit at the time of the survey.

5.5 As part of the survey, building services risers in communal areas should be assessed for

compartment suitability. All of the risers in all of the sub-divided blocks should have services

running between levels and into flats which are appropriately fire stopped. Further intrusive

investigation required to ascertain this.

5.6 Providing the recommendations of this report are followed, the compartmentation and means of escape provisions will be acceptable and as detailed in British Standard 9999 and 9991 and

therefore considered suitable for the identified risk profiles.

Means of Escape Provision

5.7 As part of the survey process the building occupancy levels, were assessed against the suitability of the

provided means of escape.

5.8 In determining the suitability of the means of escape, the Consultant assessed the staircase provision, exit

routes and exit doors to ensure that the building occupants can safely evacuate the building in the

event of a fire.

5.9 It is the considered opinion of the Consultant that the staircase provision and exit widths are suitable in

number and design to facilitate the evacuation policy to be implemented and are fully compliant with

the accepted guidance of British Standards.

Emergency Exit Routes and Exits

5.10 All of the emergency exit routes and final exit doors were assessed for suitability in regard to numbers,

widths and location. It was identified that the emergency exit routes and exits in the main were

suitable for the identified risk profiles to facilitate the applied evacuation procedure.

Travel Distances

5.11 It was identified that the travel distances to a place of ‘ultimate’ or ‘relative safety’ from within the

individual flats is within the guideline for the identified risk profiles.

Staircases

5.12 During the audit the staircase provision was surveyed to determine the suitability as an element of the

means of escape provision. Building Regulations recommend that a single staircase in a residential building over 3 storeys should have a staircase constructed of materials of ‘limited combustibility’.

Based on the survey it was identified that the staircase provision appears to be designed and




constructed in accordance with Building Regulations Approved Document ‘K’ and is therefore suitable

as an element of the escape strategy, even though not over 3 storeys in height.

Evacuation Procedures

5.13 The employed fire plan is identified differently throughout the blocks via the associated FANs (Fire Action

Notices). Block 1 to 2b and Earlsmead has a ‘Stay Put policy’ in place, with Block 3 to 4b having a ‘simultaneous evacuation’ policy. It wasn’t possible to identify the policy within block 5 to 6a due to

lack of access. This provides an element of confusion amongst the tenants, with all of the adjoining


policy put in place, with FANs changed to show this and all tenants made aware of the procedures.


additional provision of AFD fitted within the communal areas of the premises.

Compartmentation

5.14 It was identified that the fire compartmentation appears to conform to the requirements of Building

Regulations at the time of construction although no destructive or intrusive surveys were carried out of wall voids, under fixed flooring or in ceiling voids.

5.15 All building work and refurbishments should have been ‘signed off’ and approved by either a Local Authority Building Control Officer or an Approved Building Inspector; therefore compartmentation

should be to an appropriate standard. This could not be confirmed, as approvals were not available for

audit at the time of the survey.

5.16 In assessing the compartmentation the Consultant surveyed for holes, cracks, and perforations of visible

walls, ceilings and floors within the escape routes, service risers and all available areas. A survey of a

’sample’ number of flats was also carried out.

5.17 During this survey no intrusive or destructive surveys were carried out.

5.18 In assessment of the visible and accessible fire stopping it is believed that it does not meet the

requirements and guidance of British Standard 476 (integrity, stability and insulation). Refer to Recommendations.

5.19 In partition walls between flats, where socket outlets are provided these should be adequately fire stopped in the wall cavity to prevent spread of the products of combustion into the cavity or from flat

to flat.

5.20 It was also identified during the flat surveys that an extraction fan is provided in the kitchens. It could not

be confirmed if the fan is ‘open’ to the cavity or provided with a fire damper (refer to

Recommendations).

5.21 The electrical intake cupboards located on the ground floor of each block under the stairwells, were noted

to be of insufficient fire resistance. There were multiple unsealed penetrations leading into them, with

the access doors in differing states of repair and useability, and not believed to be of a fire resitant nature. Please note; access could only be provided to these sections where they were left open. Any

that were locked were inaccessible at the time of the assessment




Fire Doors

5.22 Individual flats are provided with a fire resisting door, which appears to be of a FD30 design, except flat

1a (Ashmount) which is timber and of an unknown a fire resisting design (access could not be provided,

please refer to Recommendations).

5.23 Fire doors within lobby sections were all noted to have been recently replaced with the individual flat doors. These were of a FD30s design and in good condition at the time of the assessment, with no

noticeable faults.

Service Risers

5.24 Within the communal stairwell, the electrical intake seems to pass through a riser which appears to run

the height of the building. The void should be sealed at each storey level, with pipework or ducting

passing through the storey levels being appropriately fire stopped (plastic pipes should be fitted with a fire collar). Alternatively the void should be sealed at the bottom and top and smoke detection

provided in the riser which is interfaced to the block fire alarm. The electrical should be suitably fire

stopped where it enters the riser.

Surface Linings

5.25 The surface linings within escape routes and communal areas were believed to be a Class ‘0’ rating, which

is considered suitable for the designated use and risk profiles.

Fire Loading

5.26 The applied fire loading and potential growth and propagation of fire were assessed to ensure an ignited

fire could not spread uncontrollably with serious impacts on the means of escape. It was identified

that the fire loading in escape routes and communal areas is low and well managed, however within

block 3 to 4b fire loading was noted at the top of the communal stairwell from tenants storing items

here.

Emergency Lighting

5.27 It is unknown if emergency lighting is provided within the escape routes and communal areas to assist

escape in the event of a fire. If it is provided, it could not be confirmed if the level of illumination from the system provides the minimum of 1 lux at floor level as an illumination test was not carried out, but

it would appear from the location of the lighting that if they could be confirmed as Emergency Lighting,

that sufficient illumination is provided to assist escape.

Fire Alarm System

5.28 There is a temporary fire alarm provision in the escape routes via wireless detection heads, with a

controller located by the main entrance doors. It is unknown when this system was installed but is

believed to be only of a temporary nature. The system has been identified as an Ei650i – Optical Battery

Smoke Alarm, by EI Electronics. This system is inadequate for use within this type of premises on a

permanent basis as it doesn’t conform to British Standard 5839-1. Individual flats that were able to be

inspected are provided with a British Standard 5839 Part 6 LD2 system provided and managed by the

Landlord. The means for raising the alarm of fire is not considered suitable for the identified risks

(refer to Recommendations).




6. Conclusion

6.1 In overall assessment of the blocks it is identified that the blocks were built in accordance with the

functional requirements of Building Regulations in force at the time of construction.

6.2 Over the years a number of refurbishments have been carried out on services and equipment which has

resulted in compartment walls, floor and ceiling slabs being perforated.

6.3 It is recognised that it is not always possible or practical without major reconstruction works being undertaken to meet the exact requirements of current Building Regulations, therefore the general

principle is that in order to evidence compliance, standards of fire safety must be relevant for the

identified risks and persons resorting to the respective building.

6.4 With this in mind, it is recommended that the compartmentation breeches and other fire safety issues

identified and detailed in the recommendations be rectified and an interlinked British Standard 5839 Part 1 fire alarm system be provided in the communal areas and a Part 6 fire alarm system be provided

in all flats which will compensate for the minor compartmentation breaches in the flats, by giving an

early warning of fire within the building.

6.5 It is the considered opinion of the Consultant that following the completion of the issues detailed in the

‘Recommendations’ that all blocks will meet the functional requirements of Building Regulations,

British Standard 9999 and 9991 and be compliant to a minimum from the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.




inaccessible at the time of the

assessment

Pic. 5 – Example of riser on Pic. 6 – Example of lobby protection Pic. 7 – Flat 1a with a different front Pic. 8 – Example of riser outside flat communal

stairwell with Gerda fire door on first floor entrance door to the rest of the entrance doors flats

Appendix 1 - Photogr aphs

Ashmount – Block 1 to 2b

Pic. 1 – Front profile of the block Pic. 2 – Standard front entrance

door to flats Pic. 3 – Example of under stairs electrical intake cupboard that was

Pic. 4 – Electrical cable surface mounted across hallways




Ashmount – Block 3 to 4b

Pic. 9 – Front profile of the block Pic. 10 – Standard front entrance

door to flats

Pic. 11 – Example of riser on

communal stairwell

Pic. 12 – Items being left on

communal stairwell which forms

the only means of escape outside

flat 3b

3b

Pic. 13 – Example of BM Trada certificate and door tagging to flat

Pic. 14 – Example of pipework being surface mounted within flat 3b

Pic. 15 – Example of extract within kitchen of flat 3b



Ashmount – Block 5 to 6a

Pic. 16 – Front profile of the block Pic. 17 – Entrance door to internal

walkway that leads to the rear garden



Earlsmead

Pic. 18 – Front profile of the block Pic. 19 – Gas flue leading through Pic. 20 – Example of lobby Pic. 21 – Standard front entrance roof

space (further investigation protection with Gerda fire door door to flats



required)

Pic. 22 – Example of riser on communal stairwell

Pic. 23 – Inaccess ible loft hatch Pic. 24 – Side profile of the block

Tag Fire Safety Ltd Fire Compartmentation Survey V1. Rev 02 Page 22 of 22

compartmentation and fire risk survey

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