compartmented security for browsers

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RuhR-Universität Bochum Compartmented Security for Browsers - Or How to Thwart a Phisher with Trusted Computing Sebastian Gajek, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Christian Stüble, Marcel Winandy Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany ARES 2007 2 nd International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security Vienna, 10-13 April 2007

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Presentation of a paper at ARES 2007 conference. Security architecture to prevent phishing attacks.

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Page 1: Compartmented Security for Browsers

RuhR-Universität Bochum

Compartmented Security for Browsers-

Or How to Thwart a Phisher with Trusted Computing

Sebastian Gajek, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Christian Stüble, Marcel Winandy

Horst Görtz Institute for IT SecurityRuhr-University Bochum, Germany

ARES 20072nd International Conference on Availability, Reliability and SecurityVienna, 10-13 April 2007

Page 2: Compartmented Security for Browsers

2007-04-10Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2

RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

"Classical" Phishing

…….

Costumers(e.g., bank)

Adversary A

credentials

credentials (e.g., username,password)

Collection Server

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Malware Phishing

Adversary A

credentials

…….

Costumers(e.g., bank)

Tailored to specific services, such as domestic banks

Collection Server

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Reasons for Success

● Strong assumptions on ordinary users● Legacy flaws of Internet technology (e.g. DNS)● Vulnerabilities of underlying computing platform

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Existing approaches

● Browser-based● Server-based● Operating System based

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Marcel Winandy

Browser-based approaches

● White lists / black lists● Heuristic checks● Blinking browser boundaries● Logo-type certificates● Wallets

Browser F extra functionality

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Browser-based approaches

● White lists / black lists● Heuristic checks● Blinking browser boundaries● Logo-type certificates● Wallets

Browser FMalware Phishing !?

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Server-Based Approaches

● User-friendly authentication protocols● Password-augmented SSL protocol● Trusted device augmented SSL protocol

ClientClient Server

F extra functionality

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Server-Based Approaches

● User-friendly authentication protocols● Password-augmented SSL protocol● Trusted device augmented SSL protocol

ClientClient Server

F

Malware Phishing !?

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

OS-Based Approaches

● Isolation● Integrity Verification● Secure GUI● Virtualization

Example: Tahoma BOSBrowser Browser Browser

VMM

VM VMVM

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Marcel Winandy

OS-Based Approaches

● Isolation● Integrity Verification● Secure GUI● Virtualization

Example: Tahoma BOSBrowser Browser Browser

VMM

VM VMVMClassical Phishing !?

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13Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10

Idea:Combination

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Our Approach

● Trusted wallet: Let the system...– authenticate legitimate service sites

– control and perform the user authentication

● Compartmentalization: Isolate browser / wallet● Trusted execution environment:

– Security kernel

– Trusted Computing

– Virtualization

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Basic Architecture

Wallet­Proxy

authentication data

serviceusage

virtualnetwork Service

P

System S

Browser

Legacy OS

Security Kernel

Hardware(Trusted Computing Support)

U

realnetwork

compartment

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Marcel Winandy

Wallet-Proxy

BrowserB

U

authenticateUW

use_serviceU↔B use_serviceB↔W

update_proxyWB

Wallet­ProxyW

PauthenticateWP

use_serviceP↔W

SSL secured channel

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Wallet-Proxy

BrowserB

U

authenticateUW

use_serviceU↔B use_serviceB↔W

update_proxyWB

Wallet­ProxyW

PauthenticateWP

use_serviceP↔W

SSL secured channel

Setup login data

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Wallet-Proxy

BrowserB

U

authenticateUW

use_serviceU↔B use_serviceB↔W

update_proxyWB

Wallet­ProxyW

PauthenticateWP

use_serviceP↔W

SSL secured channel

Setup login data

Call service

site

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Wallet-Proxy

BrowserB

U

authenticateUW

use_serviceU↔B use_serviceB↔W

update_proxyWB

Wallet­ProxyW

PauthenticateWP

use_serviceP↔W

SSL secured channel

Insert login data

Setup login data

Call service

site

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Wallet-Proxy

BrowserB

U

authenticateUW

use_serviceU↔B use_serviceB↔W

update_proxyWB

Wallet­ProxyW

PauthenticateWP

use_serviceP↔W

SSL secured channel

Insert login data

Setup login data

Call service

siteAuthenticate site and user

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Marcel Winandy

Setup Procedure

● "Two-factor authentication"– User receives credentials out-of-band

● username, password (uid, pwdid), URLid of website, and ack.code

– Wallet blocks login forms in Browser– User has to enter credentials in Wallet– Wallet performs login procedure– User enters acknowledgement code in Browser

● "One-factor authentication"– User has to register online at website– Wallet blocks login forms in Browser– User has to enter credentials in Wallet– Wallet links password to website

● pwdid := hash(pwdiduser || r), r is random value

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Trusted Components

CompartmentManager

Secure GUIStorageManager

Wallet­ProxyW

Net

start start

start

U

PTPM

sealing / unsealing

measurement

user interfaceinput / output

network connection

load / store data

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Trusted Components

CompartmentManager

Secure GUIStorageManager

Wallet­ProxyW

Net

start start

start

U

PTPM

sealing / unsealing

measurement

user interfaceinput / output

network connection

load / store data

Trusted path

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RuhR-Universität Bochum

Marcel Winandy

Trusted Components

CompartmentManager

Secure GUIStorageManager

Wallet­ProxyW

Net

start start

start

U

PTPM

sealing / unsealing

measurement

user interfaceinput / output

network connection

load / store data

System integrity

Trusted path

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Marcel Winandy

Secure Booting

CRTMBIOS

OS LoaderOS

TPM

PCRs

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Marcel Winandy

Secure Booting

CRTMBIOS

OS LoaderOS

TPM

PCRs

CompartmentManager

Secure GUIStorageManager

Proxy WalletW

start start

start

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Marcel Winandy

Secure Booting

CRTMBIOS

OS LoaderOS

TPM

PCRs

CompartmentManager

Secure GUIStorageManager

Proxy WalletW

start start

start

Seal Wallet data toplatform configuration

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Marcel Winandy

Implementation

Hardware TPM

Hypervisor Layer 

Hardware Layer

Application Layer

Security Kernel

Compartment

Email Browser

{untrusted}

Compartment

WalletProxy

{trusted}

 

Isolation

Trusted Software Layer

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Marcel Winandy

Implementation

Hardware TPM

Hypervisor Layer 

Hardware Layer

Application Layer

Security Kernel

Compartment

Email Browser

{untrusted}

Compartment

WalletProxy

{trusted}

 

Isolation

Trusted Software LayerCompartment MgrSecure GUI Storage Mgr

VideoInput TDDNet DiskL4 Microkernel

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Marcel Winandy

Ongoing and Future Work

● Web form scanner– Currently improving and enhancing implementation

● System updates (property-based attestation)– Currently working on PbA implementation

● What about additional user attributes?– e.g. address, age, credit card number, etc.

● Usability– Secure GUI ("mGUI")

– Proxy-Wallet

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Marcel Winandy

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Marcel Winandy

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Questions ?

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backup

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