compiled case digest-cabuchan (v2) (1)

Negotiable Instruments Law Case Digests SBCA-SOL 14-15 Agapay.Albarillo.Ambito.Arevalo.Baguilat.Bunag.Cabrera.Claveria.Escalona.Fernando.Ferrer.Flores.Hernando.Hipolito.Lara.Melgar.Mella.Nasam.Nunez.Retardo.Rodriguez.Soriano.Tamayao.Ubaldo

1 |C a b u c h a n . N e g o C a s e D i g e s t s

Negotiability Philippine Education v. Soriano

GR L-22405, 30 June 1971 || Negotiability FACTS: Enrique Montinola sought to purchase from the Manila Post Office 10 money orders (P200 each), offering to pay for them with a private check. Montinola was able to leave the building with his check and the 10 money orders without the knowledge of the teller. Upon discovery, message was sent to all postmasters and banks involving the unpaid money orders. One of the money orders was received by the Philippine Education Co. as part of its sales receipt. It was deposited by the company with the Bank of America, which cleared it with the Bureau of Post. The Postmaster, through the Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post Office informed the bank of the irregular issuance of the money order. The bank debited the account of the company. The company moved for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether postal money orders are negotiable instruments HELD: Philippine postal statutes are patterned from those of the United States, and the weight of authority in said country is that Postal money orders are not negotiable instruments inasmuch as the establishment of a postal money order is an exercise of governmental power for the publics benefit. Furthermore, some of the restrictions imposed upon money order by postal laws and regulations are inconsistent with the character of negotiable instruments. For instance, postal money orders may be withheld under a variety of circumstances, and which are restricted to not more than one indorsement.

Caltex Philippines vs. Court of Appeals 212 SCRA 448 G.R. No. 97753 || Negotiability

FACTS:

280 Certificates of Time Deposit (CTDs) were issued by the Security Bank and Trust Company in favor of Angel Dela Cruz, who deposited a collective amount of Php 1,120,000. Such CTDs were then delivered by Dela Cruz to Caltex Phils. for the purchase of fuel products.

Dela Cruz lost all the CTDs in March 1982 and informed the manager of Security Bank. The manager arranged for the replacement of the lost CTDs upon compliance of Dela Cruz to their bank procedure which entails execution of a notarized Affidavit of Loss.

Upon replacement of the allegedly lost CTDs, Dela Cruz obtained a loan of P875,000 from same bank. He then executed a notarized Deed of Assignment of Time Deposit, surrendering to the bank full control of the time deposit account, allowing the latter to apply the said time deposits to the payment of whatever amounts may be due on the loan upon maturity.

On the other hand, in November 1982, Mr. Aranas, the credit manager of Caltex, presented to Security Bank for verification the CTDs declared lost by Dela Cruz. Aranas claimed that the same were delivered to Caltex as security for purchases made. Accordingly, Security Bank rejected Caltexs demand for the payment of the value of the CTDs.

In April 1983, the loan of Dela Cruz with the Security Bank matured and the latter applied the time deposits in question as payment of the matured loan.

Caltex then filed a complaint demanding payment of the value of the CTDs plus accrued interest and compounded interest.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the case.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether or not the subject Certificates of Time Deposit are negotiable instruments

2. Whether or not Caltex can recover the value of the CTDs HELD:

1. YES. A sample text of the CTD states: This is to Certify that B E A R E R has deposited in this Bank the sum of PESOS: FOUR THOUSAND ONLY, SECURITY BANK SUCAT OFFICE P4,000 & 00 CTS Pesos, Philippine Currency, repayable to said depositor 731 days. After date, upon presentation and surrender of this certificate, with interest at the rate of 16% per cent per annum. Section 1 of the NIL requires among others, that for an instrument to be negotiable, it must be payable to the order or to bearer (par.



D). The accepted rule is that the negotiability or non-negotiability of an instrument is determined from the writing, that is, from the face of the instrument itself. The documents provide that the amounts deposited shall be repayable to the depositor. The court ruled that the depositor indicated is actually the bearer. The documents do not say that the depositor is Angel Dela Cruz and that the amounts deposited are payable only to him. If it was really the intention of the bank to pay the amount to Dela Cruz only, then it could have so expressed in clear and categorical terms instead of having the word bearer stamped on the space provided for the name of the depositor in each CTD. The Security Bank, through its manager, testified that the depositor referred to is Angel Dela Cruz. However, the court ruled that the manager merely declared that Dela Cruz is the depositor, insofar as the bank is concerned, but obviously other parties not privy to the transaction between them would not know that the depositor is not the bearer stated in the CTDs. Hence, the situation would require any party dealing with the CTDs to go behind the plain import of what is written thereon. This need for resort to extrinsic evidence is what is sought to be avoided by the NIL and calls for application of the elementary rule that the interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.

2. NO. Unfortunately for Caltex, although the CTDs are bearer

instruments, a valid negotiation thereof for the purpose and agreement between it and Dela Cruz, requires both delivery and indorsement.

As stated by Mr. Aranas in a letter addressed to the bank, these certificates of deposit were negotiated to us by Mr. Dela Cruz to guarantee his purchases of fuel products. This admission is conclusive upon Caltex. Under the doctrine of Estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied against the person relying thereon. If it were true that the CTDs were delivered as payment and not as security, Aranas could have easily said so, instead of using the words to guarantee.

Under the NIL, an instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof, and a holder may be the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof. In the present case, however, there was no negotiation in the sense of a transfer of a legal title, in which case delivery would have sufficed. Here, the delivery of the CTDs was only as security for the purchases of Dela Cruz. Therefore, Caltex could only have been a holder for value by reason of lien. Accordingly, a negotiation for such purpose cannot be effected by mere delivery of the instrument because the terms thereof and the subsequent disposition of such security, in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation, must be contractually provided for.

Metropolitan Bank vs Court of Appeals

194 SCRA 169 || Negotiability FACTS: Eduardo Gomez opened an account with Golden Savings and deposited 38 treasury warrants over a period of two months. These warrants were all drawn by the Philippine Fish Marketing Authority and purportedly signed by its General Manager and counter-signed by its Auditor. Six of these were directly payable to Gomez while the others appeared to have been indorsed by their respective payees, followed by Gomez as second indorser. All these warrants were subsequently indorsed by Gloria Castillo as Cashier of Golden Savings and deposited to its Savings Account in Metrobank, Calapan branch. The warrants were then sent to the main office of Metrobank and then to the Bureau of Treasury for special clearing. More than two weeks after the deposits, Gloria Castillo went to Metrobank several times to ask whether the warrants had been cleared. Later, however, "exasperated" over Gloria's repeated inquiries and also as an accommodation for a "valued client," the Metrobank allowed Golden Savings to withdraw from the proceeds of the warrants. Three withdrawal were made by Golden Savings with a total amount of P968,000.00 and in turn, Golden Savings allowed Gomez to make withdrawals from his own account, eventually collecting the total amount of P1,167,500.00 from the proceeds of the apparently cleared warrants.



After the withdrawal of Gomez, Metrobank informed Golden Savings that 32 of the warrants had been dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury because of the forgery of the signatures of the drawers and demanded the refund of the amount it had previously withdrawn but the demand was rejected. The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Golden Savings and on appeal, the decision of the lower court was affirmed. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the instruments are negotiable (2) Whether or not Golden Savings should be held liable for its warranty as general indorser HELD: (1) No. Clearly stamped on their face is the word, non-negotiable and that they are payable from a particular fund, Fund 501. According to Section 1 and Section 3 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the indication of Fund 501 as the source of payment to me be made on the treasury warrants makes the order or promise to pay not unconditional and the warrants themselves non-negotiable. (2) No. Metrobank cannot also contend that the act of Golden Savings of indorsing the warrants assumed that they were genuine in all respects what they purport to be since according to Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is only applicable to negotiable treasury warrants. The indorsement was made by Gloria Castillo not for the purpose of guaranteeing the genuineness of the warrants but to deposit them with Metrobank for clearing. It was Metrobank that made the guarantee by stamping in the back of the warrants: All prior indorsement and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed, Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., Calapan Branch Further, Metrobank was negligent of giving the clearance and assurance to Golden Savings that it was already safe for Gomez to withdraw the proceeds of the treasury warrants due to it being exasperated with the continuous inquiry of Gloria Castillo. It is important to note that without such assurance given by Metrobank, Golden Savings would not have allowed such transaction.

Sesbreno vs. CA GR 89252, 24 May 1993

FACTS: On 9 February 1981, Raul Sesbreno made a money market placement in the amount of P300,000 with the Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation (PhilFinance), with a term of 32 days. PhilFinance issued to Sesbreno the Certificate of Confirmation of Sale of a Delta Motor Corporation Promissory Note (2731), the Certificate of Securities Delivery Receipt indicating the sale of the note with notation that said security was in the custody of Pilipinas Bank, and postdated checks drawn against the Insular Bank of Asia and America for P304,533.33 payable on 13 March 1981. The checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

Pilipinas Bank never released the note, nor any instrument related thereto, to Sesbreno; but Sesbreno learned that the security was issued 10 April 1980, maturing on 6 April 1981, has a face value of P2,300,833.33 with PhilFinance as payee and Delta Motors as maker; and was stamped non-negotiable on its face. As Sesbreno was unable to collect his investment and interest thereon, he filed an action for damages against Delta Motors and Pilipinas Bank. ISSUE: Whether non-negotiability of a promissory note prevents its assignment. HELD: Only an instrument qualifying as a negotiable instrument under the relevant statute may be negotiated either by indorsement thereof coupled with delivery, or by delivery alone if it is in bearer form. A negotiable instrument, instead of being negotiated, may also be assigned or transferred. The legal consequences of negotiation and assignment of the instrument are different. A negotiable instrument may not be negotiated but may be assigned or transferred, absent an express prohibition against assignment or transfer written in the face of the instrument. herein, there was no prohibition stipulated.

FIRESTONE TIRE VS CA

GR No. 113236 || Negotiability FACTS: Fojas-Arca purchased tires from petitioner with special withdrawal slips drawn upon Fojas-Arca's special savings account with respondent bank.



Petitioner in turn deposited these withdrawal slips with Citibank. The latter credited the same to petitioner's current account, then presented the slips for payment to respondent bank. This singular circumstance made plaintiff believe and rely on the fact that the succeeding special withdrawal slips drawn upon the defendant would be sufficiently funded.

Thereafter, Fojas-Arca, again, purchased Firestone products on credit using withdrawal slips. On December 14, 1978, Citibank informed petitioner that special withdrawal slips Nos. 42127 and 42129 dated June 15, 1978 and August 15, 1978, respectively, were refused payment by respondent bank due to insufficiency of Fojas-Arca's funds on deposit. That information came about six months from the time Fojas-Arca purchased tires from petitioner using the subject withdrawal slips. Citibank then debited the amount of these withdrawal slips from petitioner's account, causing the alleged pecuniary damage subject of petitioner's cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent bank should be held liable for damages suffered by petitioner, due to its allegedly belated notice of non-payment of the subject withdrawal slips HELD: No, respondent bank should not be held liable. Petitioner admitted that the withdrawal slips in question were non-negotiable. Hence, the rules governing the giving of immediate notice of dishonor of negotiable instruments do not apply in this case. Thus, respondent bank was under no obligation to give immediate notice that it would not make payment on the subject withdrawal slips. The essence of negotiability which characterizes a negotiable paper as a credit instrument lies in its freedom to circulate freely as a substitute for money. The withdrawal slips in question lacked this character. Citibank should have known that withdrawal slips were not negotiable instruments. Citibank was not bound to accept the withdrawal slips as a valid mode of deposit. But having erroneously accepted them as such, Citibank and petitioner as account-holder must bear the risks attendant to the acceptance of these instruments. Petitioner and Citibank could not now shift the risk and hold private respondent liable for their admitted mistake.

Payable to Bearer

ANG TEK LIAN v. CA G.R. No. L-2516 || Payable to Bearer

FACTS: For having issued a rubber check, AngTekLian was convicted of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict. Knowing he had no funds therefor, AngTekLian drew the check upon the China Banking Corporation for the sum of P4,000, payable to the order of "cash". He delivered it to Lee Hua Hong in exchange for money which the latter handed in act. On November 18, 1946, the next business day, the check was presented by Lee Hua Hong to the drawee bank for payment, but it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, the balance of the deposit of AngTekLian on both dates being P335 only. ISSUE: WoN the check in question need endorsement considering that it is made payable to the order of cash HELD: It depends upon the circumstances of each transaction.Under the Negotiable Instruments Law (sec. 9 [d], a check drawn payable to the order of "cash" is a check payable to bearer, and the bank may pay it to the person presenting it for payment without the drawer's indorsement. A check payable to the order of cash is a bearer instrument. Where a check is made payable to the order of "cash", the word cash "does not purport to be the name of any person", and hence the instrument is payable to bearer. The drawee bank need not obtain any indorsement of the check, but may pay it to the person presenting it without any indorsement. Of course, if the bank is not sure of the bearer's identity or financial solvency, it has the right to demand identification and /or assurance against possible complications, for instance, (a) forgery of drawer's signature, (b) loss of the check by the rightful owner, (c) raising of the amount payable, etc. The bank may therefore require, for its protection, that the indorsement of the drawer or of some other person known to it be obtained. But where the Bank is satisfied of the identity and /or the economic standing of the bearer who tenders the check for collection,



it will pay the instrument without further question; and it would incur no liability to the drawer in thus acting. Petition dismissed. CAs decision affirmed.

Complete but Undelivered Development Bank of Rizal vs. Sima Wei

GR 85419 || Complete but undelivered. (Section 16 of Negotiable Instruments Law)

Facts: Sima We executed and delivered to the Development Bank of Rizal(DBR) a promissory note, engaging to pay DBR or order the amount of P1,820,000.00 with interest at 32% per annum. Sima Wei made partial payments on the note, leaving a balance of P1,032,450.02. Sima Wei issued two crossed checks payable to DBR drawn against China Banking Corporation, bearing respectively the serial numbers 384934, for the amount of P550,000.00 and 384935, for the amount of P500,000.00. The said checks were allegedly issued in full settlement of the drawer's account evidenced by the promissory note. These two checks were not delivered to DBR or to any of its authorized representatives. For reasons not shown, these checks came into the possession of Lee Kian Huat, who deposited the checks without DBR's indorsement (forged or otherwise) to the account of the Asian Industrial Plastic Corporation, at the Balintawak branch, Caloocan City, of the Producers Bank. Cheng Uy, Branch Manager of the Balintawak Branch of Producers Bank, relying on the assurance of Samson Tung, President of Plastic Corporation, that the transaction was legal and regular, instructed the cashier of Producers Bank to accept the checks for deposit and to credit them to the account of said Plastic Corporation, inspite of the fact that the checks were crossed and payable to DBR and bore no indorsement of the latter. Issue: Whether DBR, as the intended payee of the instrument, has a cause of action against any or all of the defendants, in the alternative or otherwise Held: No. A negotiable instrument, of which a check is, is not only a written evidence of a contract right but is also a species of property. Just as a deed to a piece of land must be delivered in order to convey title to the grantee, so must a negotiable instrument be delivered to the payee in order to

evidence its existence as a binding contract. Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which governs checks, provides in part that "Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto." Therefore, the payee of a negotiable instrument acquires no interest with respect thereto until its delivery to him. Delivery of an instrument means transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another. Without the initial delivery of the instrument from the drawer to the payee, there can be no liability on the instrument. Moreover, such delivery must be intended to give effect to the instrument. The two (2) China Bank checks were not delivered to the payee, DBR. Without the delivery of said checks to DBR, the former did not acquire any right or interest therein and cannot therefore assert any cause of action, founded on said checks, whether against the drawer Sima Wei or against the Producers Bank or any of the other respondents. Since DBR never received the checks on which it based its action against said respondents, it never owned them (the checks) nor did it acquire any interest therein. Thus, anything which the respondents may have done with respect to said checks could not have prejudiced DBR. It had no right or interest in the checks which could have been violated by said respondents. DBR has therefore no cause of action against said respondents, in the alternative or otherwise. If at all, it is Sima Wei, the drawer, who would have a cause of action against her co-respondents, if the allegations in the complaint are found to be true. *A cause of action is defined as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another. The essential elements are: (1) legal right of the plaintiff; (2) correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. Liability of Persons Signing

Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Aruego GR L-25836-37 || Liability of persons signing as agent. (Section 20)

FACTS; On December 1, 1959, the Philippine Bank of Commerce instituted against Jose M. Aruego Civil Case No. 42066 for the recovery of the total sum of about P35,000.00 with daily interest thereon from November 17, 1959 until fully paid and commission equivalent to 3/8% for every thirty (30) days or fraction thereof plus attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due and costs. The complaint filed by the Philippine Bank of Commerce contains twenty-two (22) causes of action referring to twenty-



two (22) transactions entered into by the said Bank and Aruego on different dates covering the period from August 28, 1950 to March 14, 1951. The sum sought to be recovered represents the cost of the printing of "World Current Events," a periodical published by the defendant. To facilitate the payment of the printing the defendant obtained a credit accommodation from the plaintiff. Thus, for every printing of the "World Current Events," the printer, Encal Press and Photo Engraving, collected the cost of printing by drawing a draft against the plaintiff, said draft being sent later to the defendant for acceptance. As an added security for the payment of the amounts advanced to Encal Press and Photo-Engraving, the plaintiff bank also required defendant Aruego to execute a trust receipt in favor of said bank wherein said defendant undertook to hold in trust for plaintiff the periodicals and to sell the same with the promise to turn over to the plaintiff the proceeds of the sale of said publication to answer for the payment of all obligations arising from the draft. Defendant filed an answer interposing for his defense that he signed the drafts in a representative capacity, that he signed only as accommodation party and that the drafts signed by him were not really bills of exchange but mere pieces of evidence of indebtedness because payments were made before acceptance. ISSUE: 1. WHether the drafts Aruego signed were bills of exchange? 2. Whether Aruego can be held liable by the petitioner although he signed the supposed bills of exchange only as an agent of Philippine Education Foundation Company. RULING: 1. YES. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, a bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writting addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to order or to bearer. As long as a commercial paper conforms with the definition of a bill of exchange, that paper is considered a bill of exchange. The nature of acceptance is important only in the determination of the kind of liabilities of the parties involved, but not in the determination of whether a commercial paper is a bill of exchange or not. 2. Yes. Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that "Where

the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him as an agent or as filing a representative character, without disclosing his principal, does not exempt him from personal liability."An inspection of the drafts accepted by the defendant shows that nowhere has he disclosed that he was signing as a representative of the Philippine Education Foundation Company. He merely signed as follows: JOSE ARUEGO (Acceptor) (SGD) JOSE ARGUEGO For failure to disclose his principal, Aruego is personally liable for the drafts he accepted.

FRANSISCO V. COURT OF APPEALS 319 SCRA 354 || Section 20

FACTS: A. Fransisco Realty and Development and Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation entered into a Land Development and Construction Contract. Fransisco was the president of AFRDC while Ong was the president of HCCC. It was agreed upon that HCCC would undertake the construction of housing units and the development of a large parcel of land. The payment would be on a turnkey basis. To facilitate the payment, AFDRC executed a Deed of Assignment to enable the HCCC to collect payments from the GSIS. Further, they opened an account with a bank from which checks would be issued by Fransisco and the GSIS president. HCCC later on filed a complaint for the unpaid balance in pursuance to its agreement with AFRDC. However, an amicable settlement ensued, which was embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement. It was embodied in said agreement that GSIS recognizes its indebtedness to HCCC and that HCCC would also pay its obligations to AFRDC. A year later, it was found out that Diaz and Fransisco had drawn checks payable to Ong. Ong denied accepting said checks and it was further found out that Diaz entrusted the checks to Fransisco who later forged the signature of Ong, showing that he indorsed the checks to her and then she deposited the checks to her personal savings account. This incident prompted Ong to file a complaint against Fransisco. HELD: Ongs signature was found to be forged by Fransisco. Fransiscos contention that he was authorized to sign Ongs name in her favor



giving her authority to collect all the receivables of HCCC from GSIS. This contention is bereft of any merit. The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that when a person is under obligation to indorse in a representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as to negative personal liability. An agent, when so signing, should indicate that he is merely signing as an agent in behalf of the principal and must disclose the name of his principal. Otherwise, he will be held liable personally. And assuming she was indeed authorized, she didn't comply with the requirements of the law. Instead of signing Ongs name, she should have signed in her own name as agent of HCCC. Thus, her contentions cannot support or validate her acts of forgery. Forgery

Jai-Alai Corp. of the Phil. vs. Bank of the Phil. Islands G.R. No. L-29432 || Forgery

FACTS: Petitioner deposited 10 checks in its current account with BPI. The checks which were acquired by petitioner from Ramirez, a sales agent of the Inter-Island Gas were all payable to Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. or order. After the checks had been submitted to Inter-bank clearing, Inter-Island Gas discovered that all the indorsements made on the checks purportedly by its cashiers were forgeries. BPI thus debited the value of the checks against petitioner's current account and forwarded to the latter the checks containing the forged indorsements which petitioner refused to accept. ISSUE: Whether BPI had the right to debit from petitioner's current account the value of the checks with the forged indorsements RULING: BPI acted within legal bounds when it debited the petitioner's account. Having indorsed the checks to respondent bank, petitioner is deemed to have given the warranty prescribed in Section 66 of the NIL that every single one of those checks "is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be." Respondent which relied upon the petitioner's warranty should not be held liable for the resulting loss. The depositor of a check as indorser warrants that it is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be. Having indorsed the checks to

respondent bank, petitioner is deemed to have given the warranty prescribed in Section 66 of the NIL that every single one of those checks " is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be."

Republic Bank v. Ebrada 65 SCRA 680 || Forgery

MWSS vs. Court of Appeals

143 SCRA 20||Forgery FACTS: Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (hereinafter referred to as MWSS) is a government owned and controlled corporation created under Republic Act No. 6234 as the successor-in- interest of the defunct NWSA. The Philippine National Bank (PNB for short), on the other hand, is the depository bank of MWSS and its predecessor-in-interest NWSA. When it was still called NAWASA, MWSS made a special arrangement with PNB so that it may have personalized checks to be printed Mesina Enterprises. These personalized checks are the ones being used by MWSS in its business transactions. From March to May 1969, MWSS issued 23 checks to various payees in the aggregate amount of P320,636.26. During the same months, another set of 23 checks containing the same check numbers earlier issued were forged. The aggregate amount of the forged checks amounted to P3,457,903.00. This amount was distributed to the bank accounts of three persons: Arturo Sison, Antonio Mendoza, and Raul Dizon. MWSS then demanded PNB to restore the amount of P3,457,903.00. PNB refused. The trial court ruled in favor of MWSS but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision. ISSUE: Whether or not PNB should restore the said amount HELD: No. MWSS is precluded from setting up the defense of forgery. It has been proven that MWSS has been negligent in supervising the printing of its personalized checks. It failed to provide security measures and coordinate the same with PNB. Further, the signatures in the forged checks appear to be genuine as reported by the National Bureau of Investigation so much so that the MWSS itself cannot tell the difference between the forged



signature and the genuine one. The records likewise show that MWSS failed to provide appropriate security measures over its own records thereby laying confidential records open to unauthorized persons. Even if the twenty-three (23) checks in question are considered forgeries, considering the MWSSs gross negligence, it is barred from setting up the defense of forgery under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. We cannot fault the respondent drawee Bank for not having detected the fraudulent encashment of the checks because the printing of the petitioners personalized checks was not done under the supervision and control of the Bank. There is no evidence on record indicating that because of this private printing the petitioner furnished the respondent Bank with samples of checks, pens, and inks or took other precautionary measures with the PNB to safeguard its interests. Under the circumstances, therefore, the petitioner was in a better position to detect and prevent the fraudulent encashment of its checks. The Supreme Court further emphasized that forgery cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. This was not done in the present case.

Banco De Oro vs Equitable Banking Corporation

157 SCRA 189 || Forgery FACTS:

Banco de Oro (BDO), through its Visa Card Department, drew six crossed Managers check with the total amount of P45,982.23 payable to certain member establishments of Visa Card. The checks were deposited with Equitable Bank to the credit of its depositor, Aida Trencio.

After stamping at the back of the checks the usual endorsements, All prior and/or lack of endorsement guarantee, the defendant sent the checks for clearing to Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).

BDO paid the checks and its clearing account was debited for the value of the checks and Equitable Banks clearing account was debited for the same amount.

Thereafter, BDO discovered that the endorsements at the back of the checks and purporting to be that of the payees were forged and/or unauthorized or otherwise, belonging to persons other than the payees.

BDO then presented the checks directly to Equitable Bank for the purpose of claiming reimbursement from the latter. However, Equitable Bank refused to accept such direct presentation and to reimburse BDO for the value of the checks.

In accordance with the rules of the Clearing House, the dispute was presented for Arbitration. The Arbiter rendered decision in favor of plaintiff. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Board of Directors of the PCHC affirmed the decision of the Arbiter. A petition for review was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon city which also affirmed in toto the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Banco De Oro could collect reimbursement from Equitable Bank HELD

Yes. The petitioner is estopped from raising the non-negotiability of the checks in question since it stamped its guarantee on the back of the checks and subsequently presented the checks for clearing. On the basis of these indorsements by the petitioner, the proceeds were credited in its clearing account.

A commercial bank cannot escape the liability of an endorser of a check and which may turn out to be forged documents. Whenever any bank treats the signature at the back of the checks as endorsements and guarantees the same, there can be no doubt said bank has considered the checks as negotiable.

The Court also emphasizes that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements.

Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law says that every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course: a) that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; b) that he has good title to it; c) that all prior parties have capacity to contract; d) that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting.

Thus, the drawer also owes no duty of diligence to the collecting bank, since the law imposes a duty of diligence on the collecting bank to



scrutinize checks deposited with it for the purpose of determining the genuineness and regularity. The collecting bank, being primarily engaged in banking holds itself out to the public as the expert and the law holds it to a high standard of conduct.

Gempesaw vs CA GR. 92244 || Forgery

FACTS: NatividadGempesaw owns and operates four grocery stores in Caloocan City. She maintains a checking account with respondent drawee Phil. Bank of Communications to issue checks to her suppliers. Alicia Galang, her bookkeeper, makes the checks and petitioner signs them, without verifying the accuracy of each, since she trusted Galang. Petitioner never bothered to verify the correctness of the returned checks. In 2 years, a total of 82 checks were issued, most of them in excess of her actual obligations to the various payees, all crossed checks with forged indorsement signatures. Petitioner completed the checks by signing them as drawer and thereafter authorized her employee Alicia Galang to deliver the eighty-two (82) checks to their respective payees. Instead of issuing the checks to the payees as named in the checks, Alicia Galang delivered them to the Ernest Boon, Chief Accountant of PBCOM Buendia branch. Signatures of the first payees as first indorsers were forged. The checks were then indorsed a 2nd time with the names of Alfredo Romero and Benito Lam and donated to their respective accounts. It was only after 2 years that petitioner found out about the fraudulent transactions. Petitioner then demanded respondent drawee Bank to credit her account with the money value of the 82 checks for having been wrongfully charged against her account. Respondent drawee Bank refused to grant petitioner's demand. ISSUE: WON Petitioner can claim the value of the 82 checks debited against her account since there was forgery HELD: No. While forgery is a real or absolute defense by the party whose signature is forged, it is not applicable to the case at bar. A party whose signature to an instrument was forged was never a party and never gave his consent to the contract which gave rise to the instrument. In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the checks were filled up and completed by her trusted employee, Alicia Galang, and were given to her for her

signature. Her signing the checks made the negotiable instrument complete. Prior to signing the checks, there was no valid contract yet. As a rule, a drawee bank who has paid a check on which an indorsement has been forged cannot charge the drawer's account for the amount of said check. An exception to this rule is where the drawer is guilty of such negligence which causes the bank to honor such a check or checks. In the case at bar, the petitioner relied implicitly upon the honesty and loyalty of her bookkeeper, and did not even verify the accuracy of amounts of the checks she signed against the invoices attached thereto. Furthermore, although she regularly received her bank statements, she apparently did not carefully examine the same nor the check stubs and the returned checks, and did not compare them with the same invoices. Petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of her loss. And since it was her negligence which caused the respondent drawee Bank to honor the forged checks or prevented it from recovering the amount it had already paid on the checks, petitioner cannot now complain should the bank refuse to recredit her account with the amount of such checks. Under Section 23 of the NIL, she is now precluded from using the forgery to prevent the bank's debiting of her account. But petitioner can claim for damages under Article 1170 of NCC since the respondent drawee Bank did not discover the irregularity with respect to the acceptance of checks with second indorsement for deposit even without the approval of the branch manager despite periodic inspection conducted by a team of auditors from the main office constitutes negligence on the part of the bank in carrying out its obligations to its depositors.

Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals 252 SCRA 620 || Forgery

FACTS: The Province of Tarlac was disbursing funds to Concepcion Emergency Hospital through checks drawn against its account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). These checks were drawn payable to the order of Concepcion Emergency Hospital. Fausto Pangilinan was the cashier of Concepcion Emergency Hospital in Tarlac until his retirement in 1978. He used to handle checks issued by the provincial government of Tarlac to the said hospital. However, after his retirement, the provincial government still delivered checks to him until its discovery of this irregularity in 1981 by forging the signature of the chief payee of the hospital, Dr. Adena Canlas. Pangilinan was able to deposit 30 checks amounting to P203,000.00 to his account with the Associated Bank.



When the province of Tarlac discovered this irregularity, it demanded PNB to reimburse the said amount. PNB in turn demanded Associated Bank to reimburse said amount. PNB averred that Associated Bank is liable to reimburse because of its indorsement borne on the face of the checks. ISSUE: What are the liabilities of each party? HELD: The checks involved in this case are order instruments. Liability of Associated Bank. Where the instrument is payable to order at the time of the forgery, such as the checks in this case, the signature of its rightful holder, the payee hospital, is essential to transfer title to the same instrument. When the holders indorsement is forged, all parties prior to the forgery may raise the real defense of forgery against all parties subsequent thereto. A collecting bank, Associated Bank, where a check is deposited and which indorses the check upon presentment with the drawee bank, PNB, is such an indorser. So even if the indorsement on the check deposited by the bankss client is forged, Associated Bank is bound by its warranties as an indorser and cannot set up the defense of forgery as against the PNB. Exception: If it can be shown that the drawee bank, PNB, unreasonably delayed in notifying the collecting bank which is the Associated Bank, of the fact of the forgery so much so that the latter can no longer collect reimbursement from the depositor-forger. Liability of PNB. The bank on which a check is drawn, known as the drawee bank (PNB), is under strict liability to pay the check to the order of the payee, Provincial Government of Tarlac. Payment under a forged indorsement is not to the drawers order. When the drawee bank pays a person other than the payee, it does not comply with the terms of the check and violates its duty to charge its customers, the drawer, account only for properly payable items. Since the drawee bank did not pay a holder or other person entitled to receive payment, it has no right to reimbursement from the drawer. The general rule then is that the drawee bank may not debit the drawers account and is not entitled to indemnification from the drawer. The risk of loss must perforce fall on the drawee bank. Exception: If the drawee bank, PNB, can prove a failure by the customer/drawer (Tarlac Province) to exercise ordinary care that

substantially contributed to the making of the forged signature, the drawer is precluded from asserting the forgery. In sum, by reason of Associated Banks indorsement and warranties of prior indorsements as a party after the forgery, it is liable to refund the amount to PNB. The Province of Tarlac can ask reimbursement from PNB because the Province is a party prior to the forgery. Hence, the instrument is inoperative. However, it has been proven that the Provincial Government of Tarlac has been negligent in issuing the checks especially when it continued to deliver the checks to Pangilinan even when he already retired. Due to this contributory negligence, PNB is only ordered to pay 50% of the amount or half of P203, 000.00. But then again, since PNB can pass its loss to Associated Bank by reason of Associated Banks warranties, PNB can ask the 50% reimbursement from Associated Bank. Associated Bank can ask reimbursement from Pangilinan but unfortunately in this case, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over him.

METRO BANK VS FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK 118 scra 537|| FORGERY

FACTS: August 25, 1964: Check dated July 8, 1964 for P50,000.00, payable to CASH, drawn by Joaquin Cunanan & Company on First National City Bank (FNCB) was deposited with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metro Bank) by Salvador Sales. Earlier that day, Sales had opened a current account with Metro Bank depositing P500.00 in cash Metro Bank immediately sent the cash check to the Clearing House of the Central Bank with the following words stamped at the back of the check: Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company Cleared (illegible) office All prior endorsements and/or Lack of endorsements Guaranteed. The check was cleared the same day. Private respondent paid petitioner through clearing the amount of P50,000.00, and Sales was credited with the said amount in his deposit with Metro Bank. August 26, 1964: Sales made his 1st withdrawal of P480.00 from his current account



August 28, 1964: he withdrew P32,100.00 August 31, 1964: he withdrew the balance of P17,920 and closed his account with Metro Bank September 3, 1964: FNCB returned cancelled Check to drawer Joaquin Cunanan & Company, together with the monthly statement of the company's account with FNCB. notified FNCB that the check had been altered actual amount of P50.00 was raised to P50,000.00 name of the payee, Manila Polo Club, was superimposed the word CASH. September 10, 1964: FNCB wrote Metro Bank asking for reimbursement June 29, 1965: FNCB filed for recovery CA affirmed Trial Court: Metro Bank to reimburse FNCB ISSUE: Whether or not Metrobank should reimsburse FNCB for the altered amount as indorser HELD: NO. FNCB liable. Under the procedure prescribed, the drawee bank receiving the check for clearing from the Central Bank Clearing House must return the check to the collecting bank within the 24-hour period if the check is defective for any reason. - FNCB failed to do so indorsement must be read together with the 24-hour regulation on clearing House Operations of the Central Bank Metro Bank can not be held liable for the payment of the altered check. Moreover, FNCB did not deny the allegation of Metro Bank that before it allowed the withdrawal of the balance of P17,920.00 by Salvador Sales, Metro Bank withheld payment and first verified, through its Assistant Cashier Federico Uy, the regularity and genuineness of the check deposit

from Marcelo Mirasol, Department Officer of FNCB, because its (Metro Bank) attention was called by the fast movement of the account.

Republic Bank vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 42725 April 22, 1991 || Forgery

FACTS: On January 25, 1966, drawer San Miguel Corporation (SMC), drew

a dividend Check No. 108854 for Php240 on its account in the respondent First National City Bank (FNCB) in favor of J. Roberto C. Delgado, a stockholder. After the check had been delivered to Delgado, the amount on its face was fraudulently and without authority of SMC, altered by increasing it from P240 to P9,240. On March 14, 1966, the check was indorsed and deposited by Delgado in his account with the petitioner Republic Bank, who accepted the said check without ascertaining its genuineness and regularity. Republic endorsed it to FNCB by stamping on the back of the check "all prior and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed" and presented it to FNCB for. Believing the check was genuine, and relying on the guaranty and endorsement, FNCB paid P9,240 to Republic March 15, 1966. SMC then notified FNCB on on April 19, 1966 of the material alteration in the amount of the check in question. Thereafter, FNCB informed Republic in writing of the alteration and the forgery of the endorsement of Delgado, who by then had already withdrawn his account from Republic.

FNCB demanded that Republic refund the P9,240 on August 15, 1966 on the basis of the latters endorsement and guaranty. Republic refused, claiming there was delay in giving it notice of the alteration and that it was not negligent and SMCs faulted in drawing the check in such a way as to permit the insertion of numerals increasing the amount. ISSUE: Whether or not Republic, as the collecting bank, is protected, by the 24-hour clearing house rule, found in CB Circular No. 9, as amended, from liability to refund the amount paid by FNCB, as drawee of the SMC dividend check HELD: Yes. Under the 24-hour clearing house rule embodied in Section 4(c) of Central Bank Circular No. 9, as amended, such rule is a valid rule applicable to commercial banks. It is true that when an endorsement is forged, the collecting bank or last endorser, as a general rule, bears the loss. But the unqualified endorsement of the collecting bank on the check



should be read together with the 24-hour regulation on clearing house operation. Thus, when the drawee bank fails to return a forged or altered check to the collecting bank within the 24-hour clearing period, the collecting bank is absolved from liability. Every bank that issues checks for the use of its customers should know whether or not the drawers signature thereon is genuine, whether there are sufficient funds in the drawers account to cover checks issued, and it should be able to detect alterations, erasures, superimpositions or intercalations thereon, for these instruments are prepared, printed and issued by itself, it has control of the drawers account, and it is supposed to be familiar with the drawers signature. Unless an alteration is attributable to the fault or negligence of the drawer himself, such as when he leaves spaces on the check which would allow the fraudulent insertion of additional numerals in the amount appearing thereon, the remedy of the drawee bank that negligently clears a forged and/or altered check for payment is against the party responsible for the forgery or alteration, otherwise, it bears the loss.

Philippine Commercial International Bank v. CA G.R. No. 121413 || FORGERY

FACTS: These consolidated petitions involve several fraudulently negotiated checks In October 1977, Ford Philippines drew a Citibank check in the amount of P4,746,114.41 in favor of the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue (CIR). The check represents Fords tax payment for the third quarter of 1977. On the face of the check was written Payees account only which means that the check cannot be encashed and can only be deposited with the CIR's savings account with Metrobank. The said check was however presented to PCIB and PCIB accepted the same. PCIB then indorsed the check for clearing to Citibank. Citibank cleared the check and paid PCIB P4,746,114.41.CIR later informed Ford that it never received the tax payment. It was later discovered that Fords accountant Godofredo Rivera, when the check was deposited with PCIB, recalled the check since there was allegedly an error in the computation of the tax to be paid. PCIB, as instructed by Rivera, replaced the check with two of its managers checks. It was further discovered that Rivera was actually a member of a syndicate and the managers checks were subsequently deposited with the Pacific Banking Corporation by other members of the syndicate. Thereafter, Rivera and the other members became fugitives of justice. In July 1978 and in April 1979, Ford drew two checks in the amounts of

P5,851,706.37 and P6,311,591.73 respectively. Both checks are again for tax payments. Both checks are for Payees account only or for the CIRs bank savings account only with Metrobank. Again, these checks never reached the CIR. In an investigation, it was found that these checks were embezzled by the same syndicate to which Rivera was a member. ISSUE: Whether Ford has the right to recover from the collecting bank (PCI Bank) and/or the drawee bank (Citibank) the value of the checks HELD: Yes, both are liable for the loss of the proceeds of said checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR. The mere fact that forgery was committed by a drawer-payors confidential employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual facilities to perpetrate the fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the bank, does not entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer. The rule applies to checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the confidential employees who hold them in their possession. In GRs 121413 and 121479, PCIBank failed to verify the authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. Furthermore, PCIBanks clearing stamp which guarantees prior or lack of indorsements render PCIB liable as it allowed Citibank without any other option but to pay the checks. PCIB, being a depository / collecting bank of the BIR, had the responsibility to make sure that the crossed checks were deposited in Payees account only as found in the instrument. In GR 128604, on the other hand, the switching operation involving the checks, while in transit for clearing, were the clandestine or hidden actuations performed by the members of the syndicate in their own personal, covert and private capacity; without the knowledge nor official or conscious participation of PCIB in the process of embezzlement. Central Bank Circular 580 (1977), however, provides that any theft affecting items in transit for clearing are for the account of the sending bank (herein PCIBank). Still, Citibank was likewise negligent in the performance of its duties as it failed to establish its payment of Fords checks were made in due course and legally in order. The fact that drawee bank did not discover the irregularity seasonably constitutes negligence in carrying out the banks duty to its depositors.



Ramon Ilusorio vs CA GR no. 139130 II FORGERY

FACTS: Ramon Ilusorio (petitioner) is a prominent businessman who, at

the time material to this case, was the Managing Director of Multinational Investment Bancorporation and the Chairman and/or President of several other corporations. He was a depositor in good standing of respondent bank, the Manila Banking Corporation. As he was then running about 20 corporations, and was going out of the country a number of times, petitioner entrusted to his secretary, Katherine E. Eugenio, his credit cards and his checkbook with blank checks. It was also Eugenio who verified and reconciled the statements of said checking account.

Eugenio was able to encash and deposit to her personal account about seventeen (17) checks drawn against the account of the petitioner at the respondent bank, with an aggregate amount of P119,634.34. Petitioner did not bother to check his statement of account until a business partner apprised him that he saw Eugenio use his credit cards. Petitioner fired Eugenio immediately, and instituted a criminal action against her for estafa thru falsification before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. Private respondent, through an affidavit executed by its employee, Mr. Dante Razon, also lodged a complaint for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents against Eugenio on the basis of petitioners statement that his signatures in the checks were forged. ISSUES: (1) whether or not petitioner has a cause of action against private respondent; and (2) whether or not private respondent, in filing an estafa case against petitioners secretary, is barred from raising the defense that the fact of forgery was not established. HELD:

1. Petitioner has no cause of action against Manila Bank. To be entitled to damages, petitioner has the burden of proving negligence on the part of the bank for failure to detect the discrepancy in the signatures on the checks. It is incumbent upon petitioner to establish the fact of forgery, i.e., by submitting his specimen signatures and comparing them with those on the questioned checks. Curiously though, petitioner failed to submit additional specimen signatures as requested by the National Bureau of Investigation from which to draw a

conclusive finding regarding forgery. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner, by his own inaction, was precluded from setting up forgery. Petitioners failure to examine his bank statements appears as the proximate cause of his own damage. The bank was not shown to be remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to petitioner so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the banks attention at the earliest opportunity. But, petitioner failed to examine these bank statements not because he was prevented by some cause in not doing so, but because he did not pay sufficient attention to the matter. Had he done so, he could have been alerted to any anomaly committed against him. In view of Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, no recovery could be had for damages. Petitioner further contends that under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law a forged check is inoperative, and that Manila Bank had no authority to pay the forged checks. True, it is a rule that when a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, the check is wholly inoperative. No right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefore, or to enforce payment thereof against any party, can be acquired through or under such signature. However, the rule does provide for an exception, namely: "unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority." In the instant case, it is the exception that applies. Petitioner is precluded from setting up the forgery, assuming there is forgery, due to his own negligence in entrusting to his secretary his credit cards and checkbook including the verification of his statements of account.

The fact that Manila Bank had filed a case for estafa against Eugenio would not estop it from asserting the fact that forgery has not been clearly established. Petitioner cannot hold private respondent in estoppel for the latter is not the actual party to the criminal action.



Samsung Construction v. Far East Bank G.R. No. 129015, August 13, 2004ll Forgery

FACTS: Samsung Construction held an account with Far East Bank. One day a check worth (P999,500.00), payable to cash, was presented by one Roberto Gonzaga in the Makati Branch of Far East Bank. The check was certified to be true by Jose Sempio III, the assistant accountant of Samsung, who was also present during the time the check was cashed. Later however it was discovered that no such check was ever approved by the Samsungs head accountant, the president of the company also never signed any such check. ISSUE: Whether or not Far East Bank is liable to reimburse Samsung for cashing out the forged check, which was drawn from the account of Samsung HELD: Far East Bank is liable for reimbursement. Sec. 23 of the Negotiable Instrument Law states that a forged signature makes the instrument wholly inoperative. If payment is made the drawee (Far East) cannot charge it to the drawers account (Samsung). The fact that the forgery is clever is immaterial. The forged signature may so closely resemble the genuine as to defy detection by the depositor himself. And yet, if the bank pays the check, it is paying out with its own money and not of the depositors. This rule of liability can be stated briefly in these words: A bank is bound to know its depositors signature. The accusation of negligence on the part of Samsung was not clearly proven. Absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is that the ordinary course of business was followed.

Material Alteration

Philippine National Bank v. CA 256 SCRA 491 || Sections 124 &125

ENRIQUE P MONTINOLA VS THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

G.R. NO L-2861 || SECTION 124 & 125 FACTS:

On April 30, 1942, M. V.Ramos, as a disbursing officer of an army division of the USAFE, went to the neighboring Province Lanao to procure a cash advance in the amount of P800,000 for the use of the USAFFE in Cagayan de Misamis. Pedro Encarnacion, Provincial Treasurer of Lanao

did not have that amount in cash. So, he gave Ramos P300,000 in emergency notes and a check for P500,000. On May 2, 1942 Ramos went to the office of Provincial Treasurer Laya at Misamis Oriental to encash the check for P500,000 which he had received from the Provincial Treasurer of Lanao. Laya did not have enough cash to cover the check so he gave Ramos P400,000.00 in emergency notes and a check No. 1382 for P100,000.00 drawn on the Philippine National Bank. According to Laya he had previously deposited P500,000.00 emergency notes in the Philippine National Bank branch in Cebu and he expected to have the check issued by him cashed in Cebu against said deposit. Ramos was unable to encash the said check for he was captured by the Japanese. But after his release, he sold P30,000.00 of the check to Enrique P. Montinola for P850,000.00 Japanese Military notes, of which only P45000 was paid by the latter. The writing made by Ramos at the back of the check was to the effect that he was assigning only P30,000.00 of the value of the document with an instruction to the bank to pay P30,000.00 to Montinola and to deposit the balance to Ramos's credit. This writing was, however, mysteriously obliterated and in its place, a supposed endorsement appearing on the back of the check was made for the whole amount of the check. At the time of the transfer of this check to Montinola, the check was long overdue by about 2-1/2 years.

Montinola instituted an action against the PNB and the Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Oriental to collect the sum of P100,000, the amount of the aforesaid check. There now appears on the face of said check the words in parenthesis "Agent, Phil. National Bank" under the signature of Laya purportedly showing that Laya issued the check as agent of the Philippine National Bank. ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject check is a negotiable instrument. HELD:

No. It was not negotiated according to the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) hence it is not a negotiable instrument. There was only a partial indorsement and not a negotiation contemplated under the NIL. Only P30k of the P100k amount of the check was indorsed. This merely makeMontinola a mere assignee and this is the clear intent of Ramos. Ramos was merely assigning P30k to Montinola. Montinola may therefore not be regarded as an indorsee and PNB has all the right to dishonor the



check. As mere assignee, he is subject to all defenses available to the drawer Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Oriental and against Ramos. Anent the issue of alteration, the apparent purpose of which is to make the drawee (PNB) the drawer against which Montinola can recover from directly. Such material alteration which was done by Montinola without the consent of the parties liable thereon discharges the instrument, pursuant to Sec. 124 of the NIL. Montinola cannot be said to be a holder. He is an assignee. And even if he is a holder, he is not in good faith because he did not pay the full amount of the consideration for which the P30k was issued to him he only paid 45k Japanese notes out of the 90k Japanese notes consideration. At any rate, even assuming that there is proper negotiation, Montinola can no longer encash said check because when he sought to have it encashed in January 1945, it is already stale there being two and half years pass since its time of issuance. Accomodation Party

Intestate Estate of Victor Sevilla v. Francisco Sevilla G.R. No. L-17845 April 27, 1967 || Accommodation Party

FACTS: Sevilla, Varona and Sadaya executed, jointly and severally, in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), or its order, a promissory note for P15,000 with interest at 8% per annum, payable on demand. Varona was the only one who received the proceeds of the note. Sevilla and Sadaya signed the note as co-makers to accommodate Varona. Payments were made on account but with an outstanding balance of P4,850. BPI then collected from Sadaya the balance with interest. However, Varona failed to reimburse Sadaya despite repeated demands. Sevilla died which led to naming Francisco Sevilla (Administrator) as administrator. Sadaya then filed a creditor's claim on his estate for the payment made on the note. Administrator resisted the claim on the ground that the deceased Sevilla "did not receive any amount as consideration for the promissory note," but signed it only "as surety for Varona". RTC ruled in favour of Sadaya and directed Administrator to pay the same from the estate of the deceased Sevilla. CA reversed the decision and disallowed Sadayas claim against the intestate estate. ISSUE:

Whether or not Sadaya can claim against estate of Sevilla as co-accommodation party when Verona as principal debtor is not yet insolvent HELD: NO, CA decision affirmed. The SC held that since Varona received full value of the promissory note while Sadaya received nothing therefrom, the former is bound by the obligation to reimburse the latter. A solidary accommodation maker who made payment has the right to contribution, from his co-accommodation maker, in the absence of agreement to the contrary between them, and subject to conditions imposed by law. Consequently, according to Art. 2073, the requisites before one accommodation maker can seek reimbursement from a co-accommodation maker shall not be applicable, unless the payment has been made in virtue of a judicial demand or unless the principal debtor is insolvent. The following are the rules:

(1) A joint and several accommodation maker of a negotiable promissory note may demand from the principal debtor reimbursement for the amount that he paid to the payee; and (2) a joint and several accommodation maker who pays on the said promissory note may directly demand reimbursement from his co-accommodation maker without first directing his action against the principal debtor provided that (a) he made the payment by virtue of a judicial demand, or (b) a principal debtor is insolvent.

In this case, Sadaya's payment to BPI "was made voluntarily and without any judicial demand," and that "there is an absolute absence of evidence showing that Varona is insolvent". Hence, Sadaya cannot claim from Sevillas estate. ErnesitaCrisologo - Jose (petitioner) vs CA and Ricardo Santos, VP for

Salses of Mover Enterprises(respondents) 177 SCRA 594 || Section 29

Ponente: Regalado. J FACTS: Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. was the vice-president of Mover Enterprises, Inc. in-charge of marketing and sales; and the president of the said corporation was Atty. Oscar Z. Benares. Atty. Benares issued Check No.



093553 drawn against Traders Royal Bank, dated June 14, 1980, in the amount of P45,000.00 (Exh. '1') payable to defendant Ernestina Crisologo-Jose. Since the check was under the account of Mover Enterprises, Inc., the same was to be signed by its president, Atty. Oscar Z. Benares, and the treasurer of the said corporation. However, since at that time, the treasurer of Mover Enterprises was not available, Atty. Benares prevailed upon the plaintiff, Ricardo S. Santos, Jr., to sign the aforesaid check as an alternate signatory. Plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. did sign the check. The check was issued to defendant Ernestina Crisologo-Jose in consideration of the waiver or quitclaim by said defendant over a certain property which the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) agreed to sell to the clients(Ong Spouses) of Atty. Oscar Benares, with the understanding that upon approval by the GSIS of the compromise agreement with the spouses Ong, the check will be encashed accordingly. However, since the compromise agreement was not approved within the expected period of time, the aforesaid check for P45,000.00 was replaced by Atty. Benares with another Traders Royal Bank check bearing No. 379299 dated August 10, 1980, in the same amount of P45,000.00 , also payable to the defendant Jose. This replacement check was also signed by Atty. Oscar Z. Benares and by the plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. When defendant deposited this replacement check with her account at Family Savings Bank, Mayon Branch, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. This prompted the petitioner to file a case against Atty. Bernares and Santos for violation of BP22. Meanwhile, during the preliminary investigation, Santos tried to tender a cashiers check for the value of the dishonored check but petitioner refused to accept such. This was consigned by Santos with the clerk of court and he instituted charges against petitioner. RTC Ruling:The Trial Court held that the consignation was not applicable in the case at bar. CA Ruling:Reversed and set aside the RTC's judgment of dismissal ISSUE: Whether or not Mover Enterprises may be held liable on the accommodation instrument, that is, the check issued in favor of herein petitioner. HELD: SC modified the decision of respondent court in CA by setting aside and declaring without force and effect its pronouncements and

findings insofar as the merits of Criminal Case and the liability of the accused therein are concerned. Affirmed the CA decision. Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which holds an accommodation party liable on the instrument to a holder for value, although such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party, does not include nor apply to corporations which are accommodation parties. This is because the issue or indorsement of negotiable paper by a corporation without consideration and for the accommodation of another is ultra vires. Hence, one who has taken the instrument with knowledge of the accommodation nature thereof cannot recover against a corporation where it is only an accommodation party. If the form of the instrument, or the nature of the transaction, is such as to charge the indorsee with knowledge that the issue or indorsement of the instrument by the corporation is for the accommodation of another, he cannot recover against the corporation thereon. By way of exception, an officer or agent of a corporation shall have the power to execute or indorse a negotiable paper in the name of the corporation for the accommodation of a third person only if specifically authorized to do so. Corollarily, corporate officers, such as the president and vice-president, have no power to execute for mere accommodation a negotiable instrument of the corporation for their individual debts or transactions arising from or in relation to matters in which the corporation has no legitimate concern. Since such accommodation paper cannot thus be enforced against the corporation, especially since it is not involved in any aspect of the corporate business or operations, the inescapable conclusion in law and in logic is that the signatories thereof shall be personally liable therefor, as well as the consequences arising from their acts in connection therewith. The fact that for lack of capacity the corporation is not bound by an accommodation paper does not thereby absolve, but should render personally liable, the signatories of said instrument where the facts show that the accommodation involved was for their personal account, undertaking or purpose and the creditor was aware thereof.

Stelco Marketing v. CA 210 SCRA 51 || Accomodation Party

FACTS: Stelco Marketing Corporation is engaged in the distribution and sale to the public of structural steel bars. On seven (7) different occasions it sold to



RYL Construction, Inc. quantities of steel bars of various sizes and rolls of G.I. wire. These bars and wire were delivered at different places at the indication of RYL Construction, Inc. The aggregate price for the purchases was P126,859.61. Although the corresponding invoices issued by STELCO stipulated that RYL would pay "COD" (cash on delivery), the latter made no payments for the construction materials thus ordered and delivered despite insistent demands for payment by the former. On April 4, 1981, RYL gave to Armstrong Industries described by STELCO as its "sister corporation" and "manufacturing arm" a check drawn against Metrobank in the amount of P126,129.86, numbered 765380 and dated April 4, 1981. That check was a company check of another corporation, Steelweld Corporation of the Philippines, signed by its President, Peter Rafael Limson, and its Vice-President, Artemio Torres. The check was issued by Limson at the behest of his friend, Romeo Y. Lim, President of RYL. Romeo Lim had asked Limson for financial assistance, and the latter had agreed to give Lim a check only by way of accommodation, "only as guaranty but not to pay for anything." Why the check was made out in the amount of P126,129.86 is not explained. Anyway, the check was actually issued in said amount of P126,129.86, and as already stated, was given by R.Y. Lim to Armstrong, Industries, in payment of an obligation. When the latter deposited the check at its bank, it was dishonored because "drawn against insufficient funds." When so deposited, the check bore two (2) indorsements, that of "RYL Construction," followed by that of "Armstrong Industries." On account of the dishonor of Metrobank Check No. 765380, and on complaint of Armstrong Industries (through a Mr. Young), Rafael Limson and Artemio Torres were charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila with a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. They were acquitted in a decision "on the ground that the check in question was not issued by the drawer 'to apply on account for value,' it being merely for accommodation purposes."|Thereafter a complaint was filed by petitioner against RYL and Steelweld for the recovery of sum of money in payment of the steel bars ordered. RYL was nowhere to be found that is why the proceedings commenced as against Steelweld only. The trial court decided in favor of petitioner but this was reversed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether Steelweld as an accommodating party can be held liable by Stelco for the dishonored check

RULING: Under the Negotiable Instruments Law an accommodation party is liable. 'SEC. 29.Liability of an accommodation party. An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party.' " It is noteworthy that the Trial Court's pronouncement containing reference to said Section 29 did not specify to whom STEELWELD, as accommodation party, is supposed to be liable; and certain it is that neither said pronouncement nor any other part of the judgment of acquittal declared it liable to STELCO. To be sure, as regards an accommodation party (such as STEELWELD), lack of notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in title of the persons negotiating it, has no application. This is because Section 29 of the law above quoted preserves the right of recourse of a "holder for value" against the accommodation party notwithstanding that "such holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party. As far as Steelweld is concerned, there was no commercial transaction between said appellant and appellee. Moreover, there is no evidence that appellee Stelco Marketing became a holder for value. Nowhere in the check itself does the name of Stelco Marketing appear as payee, indorsee or depositor thereof. Finally, appellee's complaint is for the collection of the unpaid accounts for delivery of steel bars and construction materials. It having been established that appellee had no commercial transaction with appellant Stelco, appellee had no cause of action against said appellant.

Travel-On v. CA

210 SCRA 352 || Accomodation Party FACTS: Travel-On (petitioner) is an agency selling airline tickets on commission basis and Arturo S. Miranda (respondent) procures tickets from Travel-on on behalf of airline passengers also for a commission. On June 1972, Travel-on files a suit against Miranda to collect for 6 checks issued by the latter with a total face amount of P115,000. The said checks were presented by Travel-on and all dishonoured by the drawee bank. Miranda claimed that he had already paid all his dues to Travel-on and that the checks were issued just to accommodate the manager of Travel-on to show its Board of Directors that Travel-ons accounts receivables



were somehow still good. The manager denied this explanation of Miranda. Both the trial and appellate courts had rejected the checks as evidence of indebtedness on the ground that the various statements of account prepared by petitioner did not show that Private respondent had an outstanding balance of P115,000.00 which is the total amount of the checks he issued. ISSUE: WON the respondent is liable for the 6 checks he issued because there is

no accommodation transaction HELD: The Supreme Court held that the private respondent must be held liable on the six checks he issued, as those checks in themselves constituted evidence of indebtedness of private respondent. The appellate court erred in considering only the statements of account in determining whether private respondent was indebted to petitioner under the checks. It failed to give due importance to the most telling piece of evidence of private respondents indebtedness --- the checks. The Court stressed that a check which is regular on its face is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration and every person whose signature appears thereon is deemed to have become a party thereto for value -- Sec. 24 of NIL. And the mere introduction of the instrument sued on in evidence prima facie entitles the plaintiff to recovery. While the Negotiable Instruments Law does refer to accommodation transactions, no such transaction was here shown. Sec. 29. Liability of accommodation party. An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party. Having issued or indorsed the check, the accommodating party has warranted to the holder in due course that he will pay the same according

to its tenor. Travel-On obviously was not an accommodated party; it realized no value on the checks which bounced.

BPI vs. Court of Appeals

326 SCRA 641|| Accommodation Party FACTS:

Henry Chan owned a Continental Bank Managers Check payable to "cash" in the amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00). In 1987, Chan went to the office of Benjamin Napiza and requested him to deposit the check in his dollar account by way of accommodation and for the purpose of clearing the same. Private respondent Napiza acceded, and agreed to deliver to Chan a signed blank withdrawal slip, with the understanding that as soon as the check is cleared, both of them would go to the bank to withdraw the amount of the check upon private respondents presentation to the bank of his passbook. Napiza thus endorsed the check and deposited it in a Foreign Currency Deposit Unit (FCDU) Savings Account he maintained with BPI. Using the blank withdrawal slip given by private respondent to Chan, one Ruben Gayon, Jr. was able to withdraw the amount of $2,541.67 from Napiza's FCDU account. It turned out that said check deposited by private respondent was a counterfeit check. When petitioner BPI demanded the return of $2,500.00, private respondent claimed that he deposited the check "for clearing purposes" only to accommodate Chan. Petitioner claims that private respondent, having affixed his signature at the dorsal side of the check, should be liable for the amount stated therein in accordance with the provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law on the liability of a general indorser (Sec. 66). ISSUE: Whether private respondent is obliged to return the money paid out by BPI on a counterfeit check even if he deposited the check "for clearing purposes" only to accommodate Chan HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that ordinarily, Napiza would have been liable because he is an accommodation indorser. But due to the attendant circumstances, Napiza is discharged from liability. The withdrawal slip indicates as well as the rules promulgated by BPI that withdrawal from the bank should be accompanied by the presentment of the account holders (Napizas) savings bankbook. This was not done so in the case at bar because Gayon was able to withdraw without it. Further,



BPI allowed the withdrawal even before the check cleared. BPI already credited the $2,500.00 to Napizas account even without the drawee bank clearing the check. This is contrary to common banking practices and because of such negligence and lack of diligence, BPI, as the collecting bank, shall suffer the loss.

Agro Conglomerates Inc. v. CA

GR No. 117660 || Accommodation Party

Holders in Due Course De Ocampo v. Gatchalian

3 SCRA 596 || Holders in due course

Mesina v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 70145 (1986) || Holder in Due Course FACTS Respondent Jose Go, on December 29, 1983, purchased from Associated Bank Cashier's Check No. 011302 for P800,000.00. Unfortunately, Jose Go left said check on the top of the desk of the bank manager when he left the bank. The bank manager entrusted the check for safekeeping to a bank official, a certain Albert Uy, who had then a visitor in the person of Alexander Lim, Uy had to answer a phone call on a nearby telephone after which he proceeded to the men's room. When he returned to his desk, his visitor Lim was already gone. When Jose Go inquired for his cashier's check from Albert Uy, the check was not in his folder and nowhere to be found. The latter advised Jose Go to go to the bank to accomplish a "STOP PAYMENT" order, which suggestion Jose Go immediately followed. He also executed an affidavit of loss. Albert Uy went to the police to report the loss of the check, pointing to the person of Alexander Lim as the one who could shed light on it. The records of the police show that Associated Bank received the lost check for clearing on December 31, 1983, coming from Prudential Bank, Escolta Branch. The check was immediately dishonored by Associated Bank by sending it back to Prudential Bank, with the words "Payment Stopped" stamped on it. However, the same was again returned to Associated Bank on January 4, 1984 and for the second time it was dishonored. Several days later, respondent Associated Bank received a letter, dated January 9, 1984, from a certain Atty. Lorenzo Navarro demanding payment on the cashier's check in question, which was being held by his client. He however refused to reveal the name of his client and

threatened to sue, if payment is not made. Respondent bank, in its letter, dated January 20, 1984, replied saying the check belonged to Jose Go who lost it in the bank and is laying claim to it. Respondent Associated Bank on February 2, 1984 filed an action for Interpleader naming as respondent, Jose Go and one John Doe, Atty. Navarro's then unnamed client. On even date, respondent bank received summons and copy of the complaint for damages of a certain Marcelo A. Mesina. Simultaneously, respondent bank, thru representative Albert Uy, informed Cpl. Gimao of the Western Police District that the lost check of Jose Go is in the possession of Marcelo Mesina, herein petitioner. When Cpl. Gimao went to Marcelo Mesina to ask how he came to possess the check, he said it was paid to him by Alexander Lim in a "certain transaction" but refused to elucidate further. ISSUE Whether Mesina is a holder in due course HELD Petitioner's allega

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