compiled cases iv 1987 consti

8/11/2019 Compiled Cases IV 1987 Consti

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: CASE DIGESTS

AVILA-CARAG-FERNANDEZ-REYES-SORIANO-TAPIA-TARUCAN

IV. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

CHREA vs. CHRG.R. NO.: 155366

FACTSIn the General Appropriations Act of 1998 (RA 8522), Congress authorized the Constitutional

Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomyto formulate and implement organizational structures, and to fixand determine the salaries of their personnel. Based on said RA No. 8522, the Commission on HumanRights (CHR) proposed through a resolution the creation of ten new plantilla positions, the upgrading orraising of salary of some positions and the reclassification of certain positions. The CHR submitted itsproposal to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for approval. DBM Secretary, BenjaminDiokno however disapproved the proposal. Diokno reasoned that the reclassification scheme elevatedfield units to regional offices without actual changes in functions. On the strength of DBMS disapproval,the Civil Service Commission (CSC)Regional Office rejected CHRs proposed upgrading andreclassification scheme. However, the CSCCentral Office reversed the decision of its Regional Office, and

approved the CHRs proposal. It reasoned that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy just like other ConstitutionalCommissions, and as such its upgrading or reclassification scheme need not first be approved by theDBM.

CHRs Employees Association (CHREA) filed a petition against the said decision. CHREA is agroup that consists of rank and file employees who stand to be prejudiced by the upgrading scheme.They claimed that the scheme benefited only a few employees in the upper level positions and ifapproved would eat a big share in CHRs Budget that should otherwise belong to them. Their mainargument for the schemes disapproval is that under the Salary Standardization Law, only the DBM hasthe authority to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification, upgrading and creation of positions.

In 2004, the SC rendered a decision declaring that the CHR does not enjoy fiscal autonomy andthus, any upgrading or reclassification of its positions needs prior approval by the DBM.

The CHR filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the said SC decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) enjoy fiscal autonomy.2. Whether or not CHRs upgrading and reclassification scheme subject to review by the DBM.

HELD1. NO. The SC ruled that the CHR, unlike the three Constitutional Commissions, does not enjoy

fiscal autonomy. The SC said that only the following departments or offices enjoy fiscal autonomyas mandated by the Constitution: the Constitutional Commissions, the Office of the Ombudsman,and the Judiciary. The bases are in the Constitutional provisions themselves. In all of the saiddepartments and commissions, there is a provision declaring: The Commission/Judiciary/Officeof the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall beautomatically and regularly released.*

As to the CHR, there is no express provision stating that it shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Instead,Art. XIII, Sec. 7 merely states that The approved annual appropriation of the Commission (onHuman Rights) shall be automatically and regularly released. The SC said that the omission ofthe statement vesting fiscal autonomy to the CHR is an express proof that the CHR does notenjoy fiscal autonomy. So, although the CHR was created by the Constitution in Art. XIII, it doesnot enjoy fiscal autonomy unlike the three Constitutional Commissions (the Comelec, CSC andCOA) created in Art. IX, and specifically given fiscal autonomy in Sec. 5. The SC ruled that the


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CHR has limited fiscal autonomy in the sense that its autonomy is limited to automatic andregular release of its approved annual appropriations.

2. YES. Under the Salary Standardization Law, all upgrading and reclassification of governmentoffices need prior approval of the DBM. Even the reorganization of the Judiciary required theprior approval of the DBM despite the fact that it enjoyed fiscal autonomy. More so the CHR,

since as previously stated, it does not enjoy fiscal autonomy.

As to the privilege granted to the other Constitutional Commissions by RA 8522 to reorganizewithout prior DBM approval, the CHR cannot invoke the said privilege. The reason is only thethree Constitutional Commissions created in Art. IX has fiscal autonomy.

* Art. IX, Sec. 5; Art. VIII, Sec. 3 and Art. XI, Sec. 14

GALICTO vs. AQUINO IIIG.R. NO.: 193978; 28 FEBRUARY 2012

FACTSPresident Benigno Simeon Aquino III exposed anomalies in the financial management of the

Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System, the National Power Corporation and the National FoodAuthority. Because of this, the Senate prompted to conduct legislative inquiries on the matter of activitiesof GOCC and issued Resolution No. 17 s. 2010, urging the President to order the immediate suspensionof the unusually large and excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of thegoverning boards of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs). President Aquino issued E.O 7strengthening the supervision of compensation levels of GOCCs and GFIs by controlling the grant ofexcessive salaries, allowances and other benefits. However, petitioner Jelbert Galicto allegedly questionsthe constitutionality of E.O 7 in his capacity as a lawyer and as an employee of PhilHealth Regional Office.As he allegedly stands to be prejudiced by E.O 7 because it suspends or imposes a moratorium on thegrant of salary increase and other benefits granted to the GOCC and GFI officials. Moreover, he claimsinterest in making sure that laws and orders by government officials are legally issued and implemented.

ISSUE Whether or not petitioner Galicto has a locus standi in bringing the petition before the Court.

HELDNO. The SC said that petitioner cannot claim legal stance because petitioner is simply concerned

about his entitlement to future salary increases. A public officer has a vested right only to salaries alreadyearned or accrued. Salary increases are a mere expectancy volatile and dependent on various variables innature. His assertion of legal impediment under Section 9 of E.O 7 of any future increase in petitionerscompensation will only depend on usual factors considered by proper authorities was misleading andincorrect due to the concept of injury as an element of Locus standi. He only points out the denial of areasonable expectation which is not a subject of harm to go against the law. His membership ofPhilippine Bar and a PhilHealth official does not suffice to clothe his legal standing. Thus, Petitioner failedto satisfy irreducible minimum condition to trigger the exercise of judicial power.

*Just a reminderLocus Standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the

law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. The party is directly subject to an adverseeffect by the statute or action in question, and the harm suffered will continue unless the court grants relief in theform of damages or a finding that the law either does not apply to the party or that the law is void or can benullified. This is called the "something to lose" doctrine, in which the party has standing because they directly will beharmed by the conditions for which they are asking the court for relief.A person cannot bring a suit challengingthe constitutionality of a law unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that he/she/it is or will "imminently" be harmed bythe law. Otherwise, the court will rule that the plaintiff "lacks standing" to bring the suit, and will dismiss the case


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without considering the merits of the claim of unconstitutionality. To have a court declare a law unconstitutional,there must be a valid reason for the lawsuit. The party suing must have something to lose in order to sue unless ithas automatic standing by action of law.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS

267 SCRA 408

FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the

Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid

was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was

logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches

RBs bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987

Constitution**, but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the

perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing

among others that:

1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is merely

a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);

2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony.

ISSUE

Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the

legit buyer of shares.

HELD

NO. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the

Filipino First Policy. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing. The Constitution is

the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and

contract. Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning

pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural

resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,

but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and

letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but

also the mental ability or faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel

has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is

impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,

independence and nationhood.

Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinoswhich not only pertains to individuals but

to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simplymeans that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the

common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the

pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or

inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the

common good. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be

made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the

former.


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**Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the

national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least

sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may

prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the

formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the

State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction

and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONAG.R. 113375 5 MAY 1994

FACTSPursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42)

which grants it the authority to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similaractivities, the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing itsrevenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that thePCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinationalcompany and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, became interested to offer itsservices and resources to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individualnominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as thePhilippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium throughwhich the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered toPCSO. Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the LeaseContract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to the

PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given the respondentPGMC the go-signal to operate the countrys on-line lottery system and that the correspondingimplementing contract would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 for final clearance andapproval by the Chief Executive.On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to PresidentFidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of seriousmoral and ethical considerations. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest andthe statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that only a court injunction can stopMalacaang, and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN,with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition. Petitioner claims that it is a non-stockdomestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The restof the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada and Representative Joker P.Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as

taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Taada and Representative Arroyo are suing intheir capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines. Thepublic respondents, meanwhile allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit,citing the Courts resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.

ISSUE(S)1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.2. Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P.

Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration,


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association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic orforeign. is legal andvalid.

HELDWe find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications of

such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the

remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisionedon-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standingthen of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court herebybrushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. The language ofSection 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by wayof collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise.Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independentcontractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intentof the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis estanima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.

Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that anyarrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, andmanagement aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO would, primarily, provide the franchise.

The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are provisionswhich negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture for aperiod of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system.

It was thus declared that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for inparagraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for beingcontrary to law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by thepetitioners.

COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIESPURCASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF JUSTICE/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT

A.M. NO.: 11-7-10-SC; 31 JULY 2012

FACTSThe legal services sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA),

rendered an opinion on 8 June 2010. It found an underpayment amounting to P221, 021.50 as a resultwhen the 5 retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court personal propertiesassigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. COA averred that the underpayment was causedby using the wrong formula in computing the appraised value of the purchased vehicles as applied by theProperty Division of the Supreme Court.

In a Memorandum dated 10 August 2010, Atty. Candaleria recommended the SC to advise theCOA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG Formula. The Constitution itself grants theJudiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. The Court has the recognizedauthority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by the law in the course ofthe discharge of its functions.

ISSUEWhether or not the in-house computation should be respected by COA in light of the fiscal

autonomy of the Judiciary.

HELDYES. The Court has the power to administer the Judiciarys internal affairs, and this includes the

authority to handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as providedby law and by its own grants. Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its


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independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where,when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and courtpersonnel within the parameters of the Courts granted power; they determine the terms, conditions andrestrictions of the grant as grantor. The use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is apart of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirementprivileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and

benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of theJudiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and theSupreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs.

73 SCRA 33; 12 OCTOBER 1976SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

FACTS

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for

the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the

interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length

of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after, the President issued

another related decree, PD 1031, amending the previous PD 991, by declaring the provisions of PD 229providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national

referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD. 991.

On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the

people in the referendum-plebiscite on Oct 16, 1976. The PD recites in its whereas clauses that the

peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim NA evinces their desire to have such body

abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,

which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16. On Sep 27, 1976,

Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and

conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on Oct 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and

1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD 1031, insofar as it directs

the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on Oct 16,1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent

President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a

consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Sol-Gen

contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. The Sol-

Gen principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature,

beyond judicial cognizance of the SC; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President

has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards

normalization.

ISSUE

Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD

The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a justiciable one. This is

especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals

of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Political questions

are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the

controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or

non-political. What is confronting the SC is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in


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proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to

assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President

that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be

found, the actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how

it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the

procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution

and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.

G.R. NO.: 127325; 19 MARCH 1997DEFENSOR-SANTAGO vs. COMELEC

FACTS

On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the

Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its

approval, a.)set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.)caused the

necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.)instructed local election

registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MDSantiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.

Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to amendments to the

Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power

(particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples initiative.

ISSUE

Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the constitution or does it

constitute a revision.

HELD

The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitutionbecause, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a change from a political philosophy

that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear

to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the

State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political

dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII

of the Constitution, is limited to amendments. The prohibition against reelection of the President and the

limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of

governance, to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the

demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a

few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the

common good; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987

Constitution.

Salonga vs. Cruz-PanoGR 59524, 18 February 1985

Facts:

A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and Octoberof 1980. On 6 September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los


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Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of theexplosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possessionby police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May 1980 at the birthday partyof former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R.Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together withother guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by

military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was place in thecustody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, headof the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his twobrothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, anddamage to property.

On 12 September 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in thedeath of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which causedinjuries to a number of persons. On 20 September 1980, the President's anniversary television radio pressconference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during theconference. The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect thatSalonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile, on 25 September 1980,Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella

where he was held incommunicado for sometime. On the night of 4 October 1980, more bombs werereported to have exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people.

A meeting of the General Military Council was called for 6 October 1980. On 19 October 1980, minutesafter the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of theAmerican Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small bombexploded. Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued againstpersons, including Salonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings inMetro Manila. On 21 October 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at theManila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchialasthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the ASSO form whichhowever did not specify the charge or charges against him. For some time, Salonga's lawyers were notpermitted to visit him in his hospital room until the Supreme Court in the case of Ordoez v. Gen. FabianVer, et al., (GR 55345, 28 October 1980) issued an order directing that Salonga's right to be visited bycounsel be respected. On 2 November 1980, Salonga was transferred against his objections from hishospital arrest to an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati.Salonga stated that he was not informed why he was transferred and detained, nor was he everinvestigated or questioned by any military or civil authority. Subsequently, on 27 November 1980,Salonga was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed "under house arrest inthe custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or charges.

On 10 December 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent Salonga a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation"in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included Salonga as a co-accused). Up to the time martiallaw was lifted on 17 January 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, Salonga has not received anycopies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence. On 9 February

1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office to the Ministry ofJustice. On 24 February 1981, the City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing Salonga, among others of havingviolated RA 1700, as amended by PD 885 and BP 31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code.The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for 17 March 1981. On 6 March 1981, Salonga wasallowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conferences and undergo comprehensivemedical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eyeto save his right eye. The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed byGen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with theviolation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736.


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On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga forfailure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge ErnaniCruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied themotion. On 4 January 1982, he issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of theRevised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the

said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition forcertiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by theprosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his furtherprosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in thePhilippines today.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts have dropped the caseagainst petitioner Salonga

Held:

The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved bythe Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powersof Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has theduty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has thesymbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutionalguarantees. In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bailbond as excessive and, therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petitionwas pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision.In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validlybe created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charterpursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Still, the Court discussed theconstitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national identity. Inthe habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner wasfacing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition wasmoot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgatingone of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.

Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either asa co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of anysubversive organization. The respondents have taken the initiative of dropping the charges againstSalonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will not validate the filing of aninformation based on the kind of evidence against Salonga found in the records.

Tanada vs Angara

272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts:

This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities asSenators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of


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tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities forthe service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country.These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators,a free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair

Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitutionwas taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue:

Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction onthe part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally acceptedprinciples of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is

bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part ofour own laws. Pacta sunt servandainternational agreements must be performed in good faith. A treatyis not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because itis a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the UnitedNations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty asautolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exerciseis wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the saidagreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be thepolitical desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTOremains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the developmentof international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus,the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary ReyesGR 159085, 3 February 2004

Facts:

They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some threehundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into theOakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of 27 July 2003. Bewailing the corruption

in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary ofDefense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). In the wake of the Oakwood occupation,the President issued later in the day Proclamation 427 and General Order 4, both declaring a state ofrebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. By the evening of 27 July 2003, theOakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks.The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on1 August 2003, through Proclamation 435. In the interim, several petitions were filed before the SupremeCourt challenging the validity of Proclamation 427 and General Order 4.


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Issue:

Whether the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.

Held:

NO. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation 435, declaring that thestate of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicatemoot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of actual controversies. Nevertheless,courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Thepresent case is one such case. Once before, the President on 1 May 2001 declared a state of rebellionand called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation 38 and GeneralOrder 1. On that occasion, an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons,clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulted and attempted to break into Malacaang. Petitionswere filed before the Supreme Court assailing the validity of the Presidents declaration. Five days aftersuch declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v.Perez and accompanying cases precluded the Court from addressing the constitutionality of thedeclaration. To prevent similar questions from reemerging, the Supreme Court seized the opportunity tofinally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the Presidents

calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding.

David vs. GMAG.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

"Take Care" Power of the President Powers of the Chief Executive The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature

Facts:

These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national emergency)and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases are pending,President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist,thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017.

Issue:1. Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact laws

and decrees. If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional

Held:

Take-Care Power

This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17,

Art. VII: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shallensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is toenforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that alllaws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he isrequired to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, amongothers, execute its laws. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ thepowers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including


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the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government.

The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: to enforce obedience to all the lawsand to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees?

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President Arroyosordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot issuedecrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are lawswhich are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the Presidentin the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo theauthority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of thePhilippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither MartialLaw nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislativepower by issuing decrees.

But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?

As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that thesedecrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the militaryto enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and propertyrelations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017,to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

FORTUN VS. MACAPAGAL ARROYO

FACTS:

On November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergencyin Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violencein Central Mindanao as a response to the massacre of 57 individuals in Maguindanao. Believing that sheneeded greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of persons thathave taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 PresidentArroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of thewrit of habeas corpusin that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. In her report,President Arroyo said that she acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms inMaguindanao and risen against the government. On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session,convened pursuant to but two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the Presidentissued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpusin Maguindanao. Petitioners brought the present actions to challenge the constitutionality ofPresident Arroyos Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.

RULING:No. The petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. Under the 1987Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law


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or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially,but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only theCongress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a powerthat the President does not have. Although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power toreview the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicitthat the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than

initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such reviewshould the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidentsproclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpusis first a political question in thehands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Here, President Arroyowithdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could acton the same.

BAYAN VS. ERMITA

FACTS:Petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 as well as the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response"(CPR). They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR

policy recently announced. Petitioners allege their rights as organizations and individuals were violatedwhen the rally they participated in was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa(B.P.) No. 880. Petitioners contend that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the rightto peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the validexercise of that right.

Respondents argue that petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence thatthey had been "injured, arrested or detained because of the CPR," and that "those arrested stand to becharged with violating Batas Pambansa No. 880 and other offenses.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to sue.

RULING:Yes. Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peacefulassembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P.No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nations streets and parks.They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press theirclaim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. The rightto peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, ofexpression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. Forthese rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rightswould be meaningless and unprotected.

ROQUE VS. COMELEC

FACTS:Petitioners suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelecs award of the2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project) to the joint venture of Total InformationManagement Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic) and topermanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing thecorresponding contract-award.


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ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to sue.

RULING:Yes, because of the compelling significance and the transcending public importance of the one issueunderpinning this petition: the successand the far-reaching grim implications of the failureof the

nationwide automation project that will be implemented via the challenged automation contract. It istrue, as postulated, that to have standing, one must, as a rule, establish having suffered some actual orthreatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal government conduct; that the injury is fairly traceableto the challenged action; and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Theprescription on standing, however, is a matter of procedure. Hence, it may be relaxed, as the Court hasoften relaxed the rule for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens and taxpayers, when the publicinterest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significanceto society, or of paramount public interest. Where issues of public importance are presented, there is nonecessity to show that the suitor has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personalinjury as the requisite injury is assumed.

GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FACTS:These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the same factual milieu butbecause they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to removefrom office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.

The first case, is a Petition for Certiorari which assails on jurisdictional grounds the Decision rendered bythe Office of the President dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for theMilitary and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the administrativecharges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. Thepetition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770,otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss aDeputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The second case, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to annul, reverse and set aside theundated Order requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect toalleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement(PLEBARA) entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and the April 7, 2011 Notice of PreliminaryInvestigation, both issued by the Office of the President, the administrative case initiated againstpetitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declareas unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a SpecialProsecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:Whether or not the the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary

power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-createdOffice of the Ombudsman.

RULING:While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which isby impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provisionsimilarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for thatmatter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without runningafoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under


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Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the DeputyOmbudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.

Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove.48As ageneral rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him.49Theexception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is

expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power.

The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a DeputyOmbudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of theOmbudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with wasintended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector ofthe people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, politicalindependence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments anddiscipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians." Thecloak of independence is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to

effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog53and protector ofthe people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its

officials to escape administrative discipline.

Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from politicalinfluences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on thePresident's exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removalof the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsmanand (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laiddown in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 statesthat the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsmanmay be removed through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said thatgiving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter,would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is,precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies and SpecialProsecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds provided bylaw.
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