compiled cases- strikes and lockout

8/10/2019 Compiled Cases- Strikes and Lockout

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BIFLEX PHILS. INC. LABOR UNION (NAFLU) VS. FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL ANDMANUFACTURING CORPORATION and BIFLEX (PHILS.), INC.,December 19, 2006

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners were officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union. And Filflex Industrial andManufacturing Labor Union.

The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with National Federation of Labor Unions(NAFLU), are the respective collective bargaining agents of the employees of corporations.

Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation(respondents) are sister companies engaged in the garment business. Situated in one bigcompound along with another sister company, General Garments Corporation (GGC), theyhave a common entrance.

On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest theaccelerating prices of oil. On even date, petitioner-unions, led by their officers, hereinpetitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting respondentsto file on October 31, 1990 a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure tocomply with procedural requirements.

PETITIONERs CONTENTION:On November 13, 1990, respondents resumed their operations.[5] Petitioners, claimingthat they were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact that thewelga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that violence woulderupt between those participating in the welga and the authorities, respon dents workerswere prevented from reporting for work.

Petitioners further assert that respondents were slighted by the workers no -show, and asa punishment, the workers as well as petitioners were barred from entering the companypremises.

On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondentspremises, petitioners, who claim that they filed a notice of strike on October 31, 1990,

explain that those were for the convenience of union members who reported everymorning to check if the management would allow them to report for work.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since thefollowing requirements for the staging of a valid strike were not complied with: (1) filing ofnotice of strike; (2) securing a s trike vote, and (3) submission of a report of the strike voteto the Department of Labor and Employment.[7]

LABOR ARBITER:The Labor Arbiter, by Decision of December 15, 1992, find ing for respondents, held thatthe strike was illegal.[8] The decretal text of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the respondents guilty of anillegal strike. Consequently, their following officers are declared to have lost theiremployment status:

LIST:1. BIFLEX LABOR UNION (NAFLU) 12 officers2. FIFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING LABOR UNION (NAFLU) -13 off

SO ORDERED.[9]

Respondents thereupon terminated the employment of petitioners.

NLRC:On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the ruling ofthe Labor Arbiter, it holding that there was no strike to speak of as no labor orindustrial dispute existed between the parties.[ 10 ] It accordingly ordered respondentsto reinstate petitioners to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights, and with fullbackwages from the date of their termination. [11]

CA:On respondents petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of May 28, 2002,reversed that of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter.

In finding for respondents, the appellate court discredited petitioners claim of havingbeen illegally locked out, given their failure to even file a letter of protest or complaint withthe management,[12] and their failure to comply with the legal requirements of a validstrike.[13]

The appellate court further noted that while petitioners claimed that they filed a notice ofstrike on October 31, 1990, no copy thereof was ever produced before the Labor Arbiter.[14]

Hence, the instant petition which faults the appellate court to have:

ISSUES:1. WON petitioners were guilty of illegal strike2. WON respondents committed illegal lock out3. WON the union officers were illegally dismissed from employment

HELD: The petition fails.

1. There was illegal strike.

That petitioners staged a work stoppage on October 24, 1990 in conjunction with the welgang bayan organized by the labor sector to protest the accelerating prices of oil, it is notdisputed.

Stoppage of work due to welga ng baya n is in the nature of a general strike, anextended sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers including those who do not havea dispute with their employees regarding their terms and conditions of employment.[15]

Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they arescheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegalwork stoppage.[16]

Even if petitioners joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as anexercise of their freedom of expression, freedom of ass embly or freedom to petition thegovernment for redress of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not absolute. Therebeing no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that they were


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NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW), petitioner,vs.ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA, CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA (CAC), COL.ROGELIO DEINLA, as Provincial Commander, 3311st P.C. Command, NegrosOccidental, respondents.PLANA, J:FACTS

1. NFSW has been the bargaining agent of CAC rank and file employees (about1200 of more than 2000 personnel) and has concluded with CAC a c ollective bargainingagreement effective February 16, 1981 February 15, 1984. Under Art. VII, Sec. 5 of thesaid CBA

Bonuses The parties also agree to maintain the present practice on the grant ofChristmas bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration bonus to the extent as the latte r isrequired by law.

The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1- months' salary.

2. On November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas, milling and ameliorationbonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers.

3. To settle the strike, a compromise agreement was concluded between CAC andNFSW on November 30,1981. Under paragraph 4 thereof

The parties agree to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any caseinvolving the 13th Month Pay Law if it is clearly held that the employer is liable topay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given.

4. After the Marcopper decision had become final, NFSW renewed its demand thatCAC give the 13th month pay. CAC refused.

5. On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment(MOLE) Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck.

6. One day after the commencement of the strike , or on January 29, 1982, areport of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW with MOLE.

7. On February 8, 1982, CAC filed a petition with the Regional ArbitrationBranch at Bacolod City to declare the strike illegal , principally for being violative ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 130 , that is, the strike was declared before the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for unfair labor practice (ULP) s trikes, and the strike was stagedbefore the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote.

LABOR ARBITER:LA Ovejera declared the NFSW strike illegal . The dispositive part of his decision

1. Declaring the strike commenced by NFSW on January 28, 1982, illegal,

2. Directing the Central to resume operations immediately upon receipt hereof;

3. Directing the Central to accept back to work all employees appearing in itspayroll as of January 28, 1982 except those covered by the February 1, 1982memorandum on preventive suspension but without prejudice to the s aid employees'instituting appropriate actions before this Ministry relative to whatever causes of actionthey may have obtained proceeding from said memorandum;

4. Directing the Central to pay effective from the date of resumption of operationsthe salaries of those to be placed on preventive suspension as per February 1, 1982memorandum during their period of preventive suspension; and

5. Directing, in view of the finding that the subject strike is illegal, NFSW, its officers,members, as well as sympathizers to immediately desist from committing acts that mayimpair or impede the milling operations of the Central

-----------------------------------------------------------On February 26, 1982, the NFSW by passing the NLRC filed the instant

Petition for prohibition alleging that Labor Arbiter Ovejera, CAC and the PC ProvincialCommander of Negros Occidental were threatening to immediately enforce the February20, 1982 decision which would violate fundamental rights of the petitioner, and prayin g forpreliminary injunction:

1. Restraining implementation or enforcement of the Decision of February 20,1982;

2. Enjoining respondents to refrain from the threatened acts violative of the rights of

strikers and peaceful picketers; 3. Requiring maintenance of the status quo as of February 20, 1982, until furtherorders of the Court;

and on the Main Petition, judgment be rendered after hearing. 1. Declaring the Decision of February 2O, l982 null and void;2. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;3. Awarding such other relief as may be just in the premises.

Hearing was held, after which the parties s ubmitted their memoranda. No restraining orderwas issued.

II ISSUES

1. Whether the strike declared by NFSW is illegal, the resolution of which mainlydepends on the mandatory or directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-daystrike ban after report to MOLE of the result of a strike-vote, as prescribed in the LaborCode.2. Whether under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged togive its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and ameliorationbonuses, the aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far the disputed 13th month pay.(See petitioner's memorandum of April 12, 1982, p. 2; CAC memorandum of April 2, 1 982,pp. 3-4.) Resolution of this issue requires an examination of the thrusts and application ofPD 851.

HELD:

(e) NFSW strike is illegal. The NFSW declared the strike six (6) days after filinga strike notice, i.e., before the lapse of the mandatory cooling-off period. It also failed tofile with the MOLE before launching the strike a report on the strike-vote, when itshould have filed such report "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike."


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Under the circumstances, we are perforce constrain ed to conclude that the strike stagedby petitioner is not in conformity with law. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us todetermine whether the pendency of an arbitration case against CAC on the same issue ofpayment of 13th month pay [R.A.B No. 512-81, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-A,NLRC, Bacolod City, in which the National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of thePhilippines (NACUSIP) and a number of CAC workers are the c omplainants, with NFSWas Intervenor seeking the dismissal of the arbitration case as regards unnamed CAC rankand file employees] has rendered illegal the above strike under Art. 265 of the Labor Codewhich provides:

It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a s trike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction bythe President or the Minister, or after certification or submission of the dispute tocompulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the samegrounds for the strike or lockout. (Emphasis supplied.)

Articles 264 and 265 of the Labor Code, insofar as pertinent, read:264(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the certified or duly recognized bargainingrepresentative may file a notice of strike with the Ministry (of Labor and Employment) atleast thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practices,the period of notice shall be shortened to fifteen (15) days; ...

(d) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the voluntary settlement.Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the r equisite number of days from

the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declarea lockout.

(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) ofthe total union membership in the bargaining unit concerened by secret ballots inmeetings or referenda. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute basedon substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken .The Ministry, may at its own intitiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervisethe conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union of the employer shallfurnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before theintended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.(Emphasis supplied).

ART. 265. Prohibited activities. It shall be unlawful for any labor organization oremployer to declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively inaccordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required inthe preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first havingbeen obtained and reported to the Ministry.

(a) Language of the law. The foregoing provisions hardly leave any room fordoubt that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and the 7 -day strike ban after the strike- votereport prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should be deemed, mandatory.

When the law says " the labor union may strike " should the dispute "remain unsettleduntil the lapse of the requisite number of days ( cooling-off period) from the filing of thenotice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapseof the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban afterthe report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that " in every case," the unionshall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days beforethe intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period." It must be

stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7- day strike ban must both becomplied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same withinthe statutory cooling-off period.

It would indeed be self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on astrike notice and strike-vote report without at the same time making the prescribedwaiting periods mandatory.

(b) Purposes of strike notice and strike-vote report. In requiring a strike notice anda cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity formediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE "to e xert all efforts at mediation andconciliation to effect a voluntary settlement" during the cooling-off period .

So, too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by theSolicitor General

Many disastrous strikes have been staged in the past based merely on the insistence ofminority groups within the union. The submission of the report gives assurance that astrike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majorityof the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late. (Answer of publicrespondents, pp. 17-18.)

So it has been held that, when a statute is founded on public policy [such as thepolicy to encourage voluntary settlement of disputes without resorting to strikes],

those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions. (82 C.J.S.873-874. Emphasis supplied.)

(c)Waiting period after strike notice and strike-vote report, valid regulation of right to strike.

The cooling-off period and the 7-day s trike ban after the filing of a strike- vote report, asprescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition isessential to attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that theyconstitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.

(2) The Second Issue.

This view is justified by the law itself which makes no distinction in the grant of exemption:"Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are notcovered by this Decree." ( P.D. 851.)

The term "its equivalent" ... shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-sharingpayments and other cash bonuses amounting to not les s than 1/12th of the basic salarybut shall not include cash and stock dividends, cost of living allowances and all otherallowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as well as non-monetary benefits. Wherean employer pays less than 1/12th of the employee's basic salary, the employer shall paythe difference." (Italics supplied.)

The Marcopper decision is therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eightvotes to be doctrinal. This being so, it cannot be said that the Marcopper decision "c learlyheld" that "the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from thebonuses already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC compromise agreement. Atany rate, in view of the rulings made herein, NFSW cannot insist on its claim that itsmembers are entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC.WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.


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NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIEDINDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN) THE PENINSULA MANILA CHAPTER (Interim UnionJunta), MELVIN COWAN, SERAFIN TRIA, JR., PORPERIO YAPE, LINDA GALVEZ,BENJAMIN ESTEVES, LUTHER ADIGUE and RAYMUNDO VANCE,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PENINSULAMANILA,respondents. , REGALADO,J. : G.R. No. 125561 March 6, 1998

The principal parties involved in this labor dispute are petitioner National Union of Workersin Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) The Peninsula ManilaChapter (the Junta, for brevity); the NUWHRAIN The Peninsula Manila Rank and FileChapter (the Union, for short); and private respondent, The Peninsula Manila (hereafter,the Hotel).

The rank and file employees union, representing approximately 800 employees of theHotel, was the herein Union which entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)with the Hotel on December 15, 1991. 4 Petitioners claim that the signing of that CBA bythe Union officers, headed by one Rudolpho Genato, and representatives of the Hotel wastainted with irregularities, prompting the Union to file a notice of strike on the ground of aCBA deadlock. It was further asserted that instead of proceeding with s aid strike, theUnion officers and the officers of its national office thereafter mysteriously signed the CBAwithout consulting the general membership of the local chapter. 5 These anomalies createdanxiety in the Union which continued to prevail in the following years.

On February, 1993, some of the union members submitted a letter-petition for theresignation of the incumbent union officers on the ground that they were a busive andneglectful of their duties. 6 Because the demands went unheeded, a faction of the Unionconducted what was ostensibly an impeachment proceeding, causing the removal fromoffice of the incumbent officers headed by Genato. 7 The faction proclaimed itself as the

Interim Union Junta , now the petitioners in this case.

Subsequent to the supposed impeachment of Genato and his group, the Junta requestedfrom the Hotel the conduct of a special election of officers. The Hotel referred the requestto the NUWHRAIN-LMC-IUF, the Union's national office. The latter disallowed the holdingof the election on the ground that it did not recognize the Junta because it was allegedlyconstituted illegally. 8

The Junta nonetheless conducted the election resulting in the choice of a set of officers ledby petitioner Melvin Cowan, but which the supposedly impeached employees, the Union'snational office, and the Hotel refused to recognize. 9

On August 10, 1993, a notice of strike was filed by the Junta before the National

Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) based on alleged acts of the Hotel consisting

unfair labor practice (ULP), particularly, discrimination, undue interference in the exerciseof the right to self-organization, and bias in favor of the impeached officers . 10

The NCMB dismissed said notice on the ground that the imputed ULP acts weremere conflicts between two sets of union officers or intra-union disputes, and, beingcategorized under the nomenclature of "non-strikeable acts," fall under the jurisdictionof the appropriate office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The NCMBlikewise ordered that the notice of strike be reduced to a preventive mediation case to besubjected to conciliation and mediation proceedings. 11

Meanwhile, the Union, headed by Genato, filed a petition for injunction in the DOLEto enjoin the Junta from usurping the functions of the rightful officers . On the otherhand, the Hotel filed a petition for interpleader and declaratory relief so that it may be

properly guided on which of the two sets of officers, the Genato group or the Cowan group,

it should recognize and deal with in matters pertaining to the CBA. 12

Despite the dismissal of the first notice of strike and the pendency of the aforestatedconciliation proceedings and cases, the Junta filed a second notice of strike on September9, 1993. 13 Additional grounds were set forth therein, including the suspension of analleged Junta officer, one Sammie Coronel, which the Junta claimed constituted anunfair labor practice. This notice of strike was likewise dismissed by the NCMB as the

grounds were found to be mere amplifications of those alleged in the preceding

notice, 14 hence, likewise non-strikeable.

Coronel was eventually dismissed from employment and allegedly because the Juntabelieved that said dismissal was a ULP act, 15 it staged a wildcat strike on October 13 and14, 1993, notwithstanding the prohibition to strike issued by the NCMB, thereby disruptingthe operations of the Hotel. 16 The officers of the Junta and 153 of its members wereinvolved in the strike.

The DOLE Secretary certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsoryarbitration. 17 In the meantime, an order was issued by the med-arbiter in the interpleaderand injunction cases declaring illegal the formation of the Junta, the impeachment of the

union officers led by Genato, and the subsequent election of officers led by Cowan. Itacknowledged the incumbency of the Genato group as officers and ordered the Hotel torecognize them as representatives of the rank and file employees. 18 Said order of themed-arbiter was appealed by the Junta to the DOLE Secretary who, as earlier noted,affirmed the same in a resolution dated December 22, 1994.

On December 29, 1993, the Hotel filed in the NLRC a petition to declare the wildcat strike

illegal and to dismiss the employees who went on strike. 19 On January 13, 1994, the 15

officers of the Junta involved in the s trike were dismissed for alleged acts of union

disloyalty. Said employees and the Junta then filed a case for illegal dismissal before the

NLRC. 20

NLRC:

The NLRC consolidated the foregoing cases and, in decision dated February 7, 1996, itsSecond Division Declared the strike held on October 13 and 14, 1993 illegal as it was notbased on valid grounds pursuant to the ruling of the NCMB when the latter dismissed thetwo notices of strike filed by the J unta. The NLRC held that the issue involving the

suspension and termination from employment of Coronel did not per se constitute ULP

which justified a strike, as the matter involved purely an exercise of management

prerogative which petitioners should have questioned by filing the proper complaint andnot by staging a strike. 21

Consequently, the dismissal of the 15 officers of the Junta was declared to be valid. Withrespect to the 153 members whose illegal acts in the strike were in issue and whosedismissal was likewise sought by Hotel, the NLRC ordered the remand of the case to thelabor arbiter for further proceedings. 22


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In a dissent from the decision of the majority, the opinion was advanced that the strike waslegal because it was premised on a valid ground, particularly, the belief of the workers ingood faith that there existed ULP acts constituting a cause to strike. 23

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Junta but it was denied, 24 thus the instant

petition to set aside the abovementioned NLRC decision and denial resolution.

The petitioners contend that public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretionin declaring the October 13 and 14, 1993 strike illegal and in remanding to the labor arbiter

the matter of the allege illegal acts of the 153 Junta member s for further proceedings. 25

SC:

This Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and finds the petition atbar to be unmeritorious.

Generally, a strike based on a "non- strikeable" ground is an illegal strike; corollarily, a

strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no such acts actually exist. As an exception, even if no

ULP acts are committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULPacts exist so as to c onstitute a valid ground to strike, then the strike held pursuant to suchbelief may be legal. 26 As a general rule, therefore, where the union believed that theemployer committed ULP and the circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the

resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently, such allegations of unfairlabor practices were found to be groundless. 27

An established caveat, however, is that a mere claim of good faith would not justify the

holding of a strike under the aforesaid exception as, in addition thereto, the circumstances

must have warranted such belief . It is, therefore, not enough that the union believed thatthe employer committed acts of ULP when the circumstances clearly negate even a primafacie showing to sustain such belief. 28

The Court finds that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that thesubject strike was illegal, and accordingly holds that the c ircumstances prevailing in thiscase did not warrant, as it could not have reasonably created, a belief in good faith that theHotel committed acts ULP as to justify the strike.

The dismissal of Coronel which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike 29 was not a sufficientground to justify that radical recourse on the part of the Junta members. As the NLRC laterfound, the dismissal was legal and was not a case of ULP but a mere exercise ofmanagement prerogative on discipline, the validity of which could have been questionedthrough the filing of an appropriate complaint and not through the filing of a notice of strikeor the holding of a strike. 30 Evidently, to repeat, appropriate remedies under the LaborCode were available to the striking employees and they had the option to either directly file

a case for illegal dismissal in the office of the labor arbiter 31 or, by agreement of the

parties, to submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that it may be

subjected to voluntary arbitration proceedings. 32

Petitioners should have availed themselves of these alternative remedies instead ofresorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, holding a wildcat strike at theexpense of the Hotel whose operations were c onsequently disrupted for two days. Notevery claim of good faith is justifiable, and herein petitioner's claim of good faith shall not

be counternanced by this Court since their decision to go on strike was clearlyunwarranted.

With respect to the claim of petitioners that additional acts of discrimination by the Hotelgenerated their belief in good faith that ULP acts existed as to justify a strike, the Courtdeems it unnecessary to again scr utinize and expound on the same. The NLRC hasalready held that the alleged acts of discrimination are not "strikeable" grounds asfound and explained by the NCMB when it dismissed the two notices of strike filedby the Junta . 33

The findings of fact of the NLRC, except where there is grave abuse of dis cretioncommitted by it, are conclusive on this Court and it is only where said findings are bereft ofany substantial support from the records that the Court will step in and proceed to make itsindependent evaluation of the facts. 34 The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb theaforestated findings of the NLRC in the present case.

Besides, petitioners should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by theNCMB when the latter dismissed the notices of strike after finding that the alleged acts ofdiscrimination of the hotel were not ULP, hence not "strikeable." The refusal of petitionersto heed said proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith. In light of the foregoingcircumstances, their claim of good faith must fall and we agree with the NLRC that there

was no justification for the illegal strike.

We accordingly uphold the dismissal from employment of the 15 officers of the Junta who

knowingly participated in the strike. An employer may lawfully disc harge employees for

participating in an unjustifiable wildcat strike and especially so in this case, because s aidwildcat strike was an attempt to undermine the Union's position as the exclusive bargainingrepresentative and was, therefore, an unprotected activity. 35 The cessation fromemployment of the 15 Junta officers as a result of their participation in the illegal strike is aconsequence of their defiant and capricious decision to participate herein.

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED for lack of any grave abuse ofdiscretion imputable to public respondent. The assailed decision and r esolution ofrespondent National Labor Relations Commission are consequently AFFIRMED. The caseis remanded to the labor arbiter a quo for further proceedings on the matter of the 153members of the Junta who participated in the strike.


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SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DEALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C.PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents., G.R. No. 85279July 28,1989CORTES, J:

1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damageswith a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded theentrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting forwork and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS ; that the strike wasreported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers toreturn to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffereddamages as a result of the s trike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminaryinjunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return towork; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that thestrike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on s tr ike af ter the SSS fai led to act on the un ion 'sdemands , which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA

collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accruedovertime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; etc.

The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pendingresolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction In the meantime,petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction overthe subject matter To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer forthe issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222].

RTC QUEZON CITY:On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismissand converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, afterfinding that the strike was illegal .

As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was alsodenied on August 14, 1988 petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition withpreliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. Ina resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, res olved torefer the case to the Court of Appeals.

Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restrainingorder enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice ofstrike they filed with the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and tomaintain the status quo .

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hearthe case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminaryinjunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the NationalLabor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.

SSS CONTENTION:SSS advances the contrary view, on the grou nd that the employees of the SSS arecovered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code,therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has

jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees fromstriking.

COURT OF APPEALS:Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are governmentemployees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional TrialCourt , which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing withtheir strike.

ISSUES:

1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by theSSS and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with the s trike and to order them to return towork?

RULING:While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of governmentemployees to organize , it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes theright to strike.

A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees toorganize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions orassociations only, without including the right to strike.

BASED ON DELIBERATIONS: the right to form an organization does not carry with it theright to strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].

At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees tostrike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, theyare prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity ofMemorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].

But are employees of the SSS covered by the pro hibition against strikes?

The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, andagencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations withoriginal charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where theemployees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that theSSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having beencreated under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v.NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil


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Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strikestaged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the publicemployer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily regard theright to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to publicemployees and civil service employees . It has been stated that the Government, incontrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people in the public service,and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations

could not exist in the relations between government and those whom they employ.

If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public SectorLabor - Management Council for appropriate action . But employees in the civil servicemay not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers inthe private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As nowprovided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of theRight of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instantdispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including anypolitical subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and controlledcorporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall notstrike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

2. The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner unionbeing prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.

It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue awrit of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself providesthat terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed bythe Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180vests the Public Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolvedlabor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no

jurisdiction over the dispute.

This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of itsgeneral jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdictionover the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed fortherein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not beengranted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labordispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjointhe strike is appropriate.

Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact ithad proceeded with caution. Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining thecontinuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the respondent

judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the unresolved controversiesemanating from their employer- employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor -Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, theinstant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated

March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Applicationfor Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA), ED CUBELOet. al Petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, (NLRC-2ND DIVISION), HON.COMMISSIONERS: VICTORINO CALAYCAY, ANGELITA GACUTAN, and RAULAQUINO, TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, TAKESHI FUKUDA, andDAVID GO, Respondents,x -xG.R. Nos. 158798-99

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner,vs.TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA),Respondent.

The Facts

The Union is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department ofLabor and Employment (DOLE) and is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of allToyota rank and file employees . [5]

Toyota, on the other hand, is a domestic corporation engaged in the assemblyand sale of vehicles and parts. It is one of the largest motor vehicle manufacturers in thecountry employing around 1,400 workers for its plants in Bicutan and Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

On February 14, 1999, the Union filed a petition for certification election amongthe Toyota rank and file employees with the NCMB, Med-Arbiter Ma. Zosima C. Lameyradenied the petition, but, on appeal, the DOLE Secretary granted theUnions pr ayer, and,through the June 25, 1999 Order, directed the immediate holding of the certificationelection .[7]

After Toyotas plea for reconsiderati on was denied, the certification election wasconducted. Med-Arbiter Lameyras May 12, 2000 Order certified the Union as the soleand exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and fileemployees. Toyota challenged said Order via an appeal to the DOLE Secretary .[8]

In the meantime, the Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)proposals to Toyota, but the latter refused to n egotiate in view of its pending appeal.Consequently, the Union filed a notice of strike on January 16, 2001 with the NCMB,based on Toyotas refusal to bargain. On February 5, 2001, the NCMB-NCR convertedthe notice of strike into a preventive mediation case on the ground that the issue ofwhether or not the Union is the exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and fileemployees was still unresolved by the DOLE Secretary.

On February 21, 2001, 135 Union officers and members failed to render therequired overtime work, and instead marched to and staged a picket in front of theBLR office in Intramuros, Manila .[9] The Union, in a letter of the s ame date, alsorequested that its members be allowed to be absent on February 22, 2001 to attend thehearing and instead work on their next scheduled rest day. This request however wasdenied by Toyota.

Despite denial of the Unions request, more than 200 employees staged massactions on February 22 and 23, 2001 in front of the BLR and the DOLE offices, to protestthe partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota. Due to the deliberate absence of aconsiderable number of employees on February 22 to 23, 2001, Toyota experienced acute

lack of manpower in its manufacturing and production lines, and was unable to meet itsproduction goals resulting in huge losses of PhP 53,849,991.

Soon thereafter, on February 27, 2001, Toyota s ent individu al le t ters to some 360employees r equ ir ing them to exp la in w i th in 24 hour s why they shou ld no t bed i smis sed for their obstinate defiance of the companys directive to render overtime workon February 21, 2001, for their failure to report for work on February 22 and 23, 2001, andfor their participation in the concerted actions which severely disrupted and paralyzed theplants operations .[10]

Meanwhile, a February 27, 2001 Manifesto was circulated by the Union which urgedits members to participate in a strike/picket and to abandon their posts, On the next day,the Union filed with the NCMB another notice of strike for union busting amounting tounfair labor practice.

On March 1, 2001, the Union nonetheless submitted an explanation incompliance with the February 27, 2001 notices sent by Toyota to the erring employees.The Union members explained that their refusal to work on their scheduled work time fortwo consecutive days was simply an exercise of their constitutional right to peaceablyassemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. It further argued thatthe demonstrations staged by the employees on February 22 and 23, 2001 could not beclassified as an illegal strike or picket, and that Toyota had already condoned the allegedacts when it accepted back the subject employees . [13]

Consequently, on March 2 and 5, 2001, Toyota issued two (2) memoranda to theconcerned employees to clarify whether or not they are adopting the March 1, 2001Unions explanation as their own. The employees were also required to attend aninvestigative interview ,[14] but they refused to do so.

On March 16, 2001, Toyota terminated the employment of 227 employee s [15] forparticipation in concerted actions in violation of its Code of Conduct and formisconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code.

The foregoing is also a violation of TMPs Code of Conduct (SectionD, Paragraph 6) to wit:

Inciting or participating in riots, disorders, illegalstrikes or concerted actions detrimental toTMPs interest.

In react ion to the dismissal of i ts union members and off icers ,the Union went on s tr ike on March 17, 2001 . Subsequently, from March 28,2001 to April 12, 2001, theUnion intensified its strike by barricading the gates of ToyotasBicutan and Sta. Rosa plants. The strikers prevented workers who reported for workfrom entering the plants.

On March 29, 2001, Toyota filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for theissuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) with the NLRC , It sought free ingressto and egress from its Bicutan and Sta. Rosa manufacturing plants.

NLRC:

Acting on said petition, the NLRC, on April 5, 2001, issued a TRO against the Union,ordering its leaders and members as well as its sympathizers to remove their barricadesand all forms of obstruction to ensure free ingress to and egress from the companys
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The Courts Ruling

The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and atthe Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes

When is a strike illegal?

Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegalstrike, viz:

(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific proh ib i t i on o f l aw ,such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or

(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law [,such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a validstrike]; or

(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose , suchas inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice againstnon-union employees; or

(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit ofits objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for

example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an

existing i n junc t ion [, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued bythe DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code];or

(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement , suchas a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause . [33]

Petitioner Union contends that the protests or rallies conducted on February 21and 23, 2001 are not within the ambit of s trikes as defined in the Labor Code,

Shrouded as demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages ofwork perpetrated through the concerted action of the employees who deliberatelyfailed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at theBLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros, Manila, on February 21 to 23, 2001. Whatcomes to the fore is that the decision not to work for two days was designed andcalculated to cripple the manufacturing arm of Toyota. It becomes obvious that the realand ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as thesole bargaining agent of the company. This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right ofassembly and to demand redress of grievance.

It is obvious that the February 21 to 23, 2001 concerted actions wereundertaken without satisfying the prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 ofthe Labor Code . The Union failed to comply with the following requirements: (1) a noticeof strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in caseof unfair labor practice ;[39] (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total unionmembership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting calledfor that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at leastseven days before the intended strike.

It is clear that once the DOLE Secretary assumes jurisdiction over the labordispute and certifies the case for compulsory arbitration with the NLRC, the partieshave to revert to the s t a tu s quo an t e (the state of things as it was before). Theintended normalcy of operations is apparent from the fal lo of the April 10, 2001 Orderof then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, which reads:

X x x x Further, the parties are hereby ordered to cease and

desist from committing any act that might lead to the worsening ofan already deteriorated situation .[42] (Emphasis supplied.)

It is explicit from this directive that the Union and its members shall refrain fromengaging in any activity that might exacerbate the tense labor situation in Toyota, whichcertainly includes concerted actions.

Union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike

Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code provides:

ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES(a) x x x

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as aconsequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatementwith full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participatesin an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowinglyparticipates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike maybe declared to have lost his employment status : Provided , Thatmere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitutesufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if areplacement had been hired by the employer during s uch lawful strike.

The rule on vicarious liability of a union member was abandoned and it is onlywhen a striking worker knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during astrike that he will be penalized with dismissal.

Now, what are considered illegal acts under Art. 264(a)?

No precise meaning was given to the phrase illegal acts. It may encompass anumber of acts that violate existing labor or c riminal laws, such as the following:

(1) Violation of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that [n]o personengaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstructthe free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes, or obstructpublic thoroughfares;

(2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out thestrike ;[54] and

(3) Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLESecretary or NLRC in connection with the assumption of jurisdiction/certification Orderunder Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code.
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As earlier explained, this enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover otherbreaches of existing laws.

In the cases at bench, the individual respondents participated in severalmass actions,

After a scrutiny of the records, we find that the 227 employees indeed joined theFebruary 21, 22, and 23, 2001 rallies and refused to render overtime work or report forwork. These rallies, as we earlier ruled, are in reality illegal strikes, as the proceduralrequirements for strikes under Art. 263 were not complied with. W orse, said strikes were

in violation of the company rule prohibiting acts in citing or participating in riots, disorders,alleged strikes or concerted action detrimental to Toyotas interest.

ON SEPARATION PAY:

One exception where separation pay is given even though an employee is validlydismissed is when the court finds justification in applying the principle of social justice wellentrenched in the 1987 Constitution. In Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT ) v.NLRC , the Court elucidated why social justice can validate the grant of separation pay,thus:

In the same case, the Court laid down the rule that severance compensationshall be allowed only when the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconductor that which reflects adversely on the employees moral character . The Court

succinctly discussed the propriety of the grant of separation pay in this wise:In disposing of the Unions plea for reconsideration of its February 27,

2003 Decision, the CA however performed a volte-face by reinstating the award ofseparation pay.

The CAs grant of separation pay is an erroneous departure from our rulingin Phil . Long Distance Telepho ne Co. v. NLRC that serious misconduct foreclosesthe award of separation pay. Secondly, the advertence to the alleged honest belief onthe part of the 227 employees that Toyota committed a breach of the duty to bargaincollectively and an abuse of valid exercise of management prerogative has not beensubstantiated by the evidence extant on record . There can be no good faith inintentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion from work on February 22and 23, 2001 just to attend the DOLE hearings. Lastly, they blatantly violated theassumption/certification Order of the DOLE Secretary, exhibiting their lack of obeisance tothe rule of law. These acts indeed constituted serious misconduct.

One last point to consider it is high time that employer and employee cease toview each other as adversaries and instead recognize that theirs is a symbioticrelationship, wherein they must rely on each other to ensure the success of thebusiness. Even though strikes and lockouts have been recognized as effective bargainingtools, it is an antiquated notion that they are truly beneficial, as they only provide short-term solutions by forcing concessions from one party; but staging such strikes woulddamage the working relationship between employers and employees, thus endangeringthe business that they both want to succeed. The more progressive and truly effectivemeans of dispute resolution lies in mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, which donot increase tension but instead provide relief from them. In the end, an atmosphereof trust and understanding has much more to offer a business relationship than thetraditional enmity that has long divided the employer and the employee.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 158786 and 158789 are DENIED whilethose in G.R. Nos. 158798-99 are GRANTED.

The June 20, 2003 CA Resolution in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 67100 and 67561restoring the grant of severance compensation is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The February 27, 2003 CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 67100 and 67561,which affirmed the August 9, 2001 Decision of the NLRC but deleted the grant ofseverance compensation, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.


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1. Declaring the strike illegal.: nad2. Declaring all the respondent union officers to have lost their employment status.3. Declaring the union guilty of unfair labor practice; and4. Dismissing the Union complaint for unfair labor practice."

2. In RAB-

Filipro (Nestle) and the Cagayan de Oro Filipro W orkers Union-WATU, renewed a 3-yearcontract, the union officers, together with other members of the union sent a letter toWorkers Alliance Trade Unions (WATU), advising them "that henceforth we shal l

administer the CBA by ourselves and with the help of the Union of Filipro Employees(UFE) to where we have allied ourselves." WATU disregarded the unions's advice,claiming to be the contracting party of the CBA. UFE filed a petition for administrationof the existing CBAs at Cebu, Davao and Cagayan de Oro bargaining units againstTUPAS and WATU.

From January 22, 1986 to March 14, 1986, the rank and file employees of the c ompanystaged a strike at the instigation of the UFE officers, who had represented themselves asofficers.

Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. The strikers countered that theirstrike was legal because the same was staged pursuant to the notice of strike filed by UFEon November 14, 1985 of which they c laim to be members, having disaffiliated themselvesfrom CDO-FWU-WATU.

Executive Labor Arbiter Zosimo Vasallo issued his decision, disposing as follows:

1. Declaring the strike illegal;2. Declaring respondent union guilty of unfair labor practice; and

"3. Declaring the following individual respondent Union officers namely: Roy Y. BaconguisET AL, to have lost their employment status." (p. 388, Rollo)

3. In NCR-00-09-03285-87.

On various dates, UFE, its officers and members staged a walkout from their jobs,and participated in the Welga ng Bayan, sympathy strikes, illegal walkout and sit-down strike which resulted to economic losses.

(d) On December 4, 1986, UFE filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of LaborRelations (to protest the unfair labor practices of Nestle, such as hiring of contractualworkers to perform regular jobs and wage discrimination

(e) On December 23, 1986, then Minister Augusto S. Sanchez certified the labordispute to the Commission for compulsory arbitration, strictly enjoining anyintended or actual strike or lockout (p. 392, Rollo);

HON. FRANKLIN DRILONS ORDER:

(l) On September 8, 1987, Hon. F. Drilon issued the following order:

"All the workers are hereby directed to return to work immediately, refrain from resorting toany further slowdown, sitdown strike, walkout and any other k ind of activities that may tend

to disrupt the normal operations of the company. The company is directed to accept allemployees and to resume normal operations.: nad

Parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any and all actsthat would aggravate the situation ." (p. 394, Rollo)

(m) Despite the order, UFE staged a strike on September 11, 1987, w ithout notice ofstrike, strike vote and in blatant defiance of then Labor Minist er Sanchez'scertification order dated November 23, 1986 and Secretary Drilon's return-to-work order dated September 8, 1987." (p. 409, Rollo);

(n) Nestle sent individual letter of termination dated September 14, 1987 dismissingthem from the service effective immediately for knowingly instigating and participating in anillegal strike, defying the order of the Secretary of Labor, dated September 8, 1987, andother illegal acts (pp. 394-395, Rollo).

On September 22, 1987, UFE filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal, ULP anddamages (NLRC NCR-00-03285-87).Labor Arbiter Evangeline Lubaton ruled on bothissues of dismissal and strike legality, upon the premise that the issue on validity of thedismissal of the individual complainants from employment "depends on the resolution ofthe issue on whether or not the strike declared by complainants was illegal."

UFE appealed, the three appeals were ordered consolidated and elevated to the NLRC enbanc (p, 95, Rollo)

The NLRC affirmed the unanimous decisions of the three labor arbiters whichdeclared the strikes illegal, premised on the view that "the core of the controversyrests upon the legality of the s trikes."

In the petition before Us , UFE assigns several errors (pp. 63-321, Rollo), which We havesummarized as follows:

1. that Articles 263 and 264 are no longer good laws, s ince compulsory arbitration hasbeen curtailed under the present Constitution.

2. that the question on the legality of the s trike was rendered moot and academic whenNestle management accepted the striking workers in compliance with the r eturn-to-workorder of then Minister of Labor Augusto Sanchez

3. that the union did not violate the no-s trike/no lock-out clause, considering that theprohibition applies to economic strikes, UFE, it is claimed, premised their strike on aviolation of the labor standard laws or non-payment of holiday pay, which is, in effect, aviolation of the CBA.

4. on the commission of illegal and prohibited acts which automatically rendered the strikeillegal, UFE claimed that there were no findings of specific acts and identifies of thoseparticipating as to render them liable

SUPREME COURT:

We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition failed to show that the NLRCcommitted grave abuse of discretion in its affirmance of the decisions of the LaborArbiters a quo.


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At the outset, UFE questions the power of the Secretary of Labor under Art. 263(g) of theLabor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute tainted with national interests, or tocertify the same for compulsory arbitration. UFE contends that Arts. 263 and 264 arebased on the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 9 of Art. II thereof, the pertinent portion ofwhich reads:

"Sec. 9. . . . The State may provide for compulsory arbitration." (p. 801, Rollo)

UFE argues that since the aforecited provision of Sec. 9 is no longer found in the 1987Constitution, Arts. 263(g) and 264 of the Labor Code are now "unconstitutional and must

be ignored."

We are not persuaded. We agree with the Solicitor General that on the contrary, bothprovisions are still applicable.

"Article 7 of the New Civil Code declares that:

'Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary .

x x x'

"In the case at bar, no law has ever been passed by Congress expressly repealingArticles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code . Neither may the 1987 Constitution beconsidered to have impliedly repealed the said Articles considering that there is noshowing that said articles are inconsistent with the said Constitution. Moreover, no courthas ever declared that the said artic les are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.

"On the contrary, the continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264 of the LaborCode has been recognized by no less than the Congress of the Philippines when the latterenacted into law R.A. 6715, otherwise known as Herrera Law, Section 27 of whichamended paragraphs (g) and (i) of Article 263 of the Labor Code.

"At any rate, it must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code havebeen enacted pursuant to the police power of the State, which has been defined asthe power inherent in a Government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, topromote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society (People vs. VeraReyes, 67 Phil. 190). The police power, together with the power of eminent domain andthe power of taxation, is an inherent power of government and does not need to beexpressly conferred by the Constitution. Thus, it is submitted that the argument ofpetitioners that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code do not have any constitutionalfoundation is legally inconsequential." (pp. 801-803, Rollo)

On the issue of the legality of the strike committed , UFE seeks to absolve itself bypointing out qualifying factors such as motives, good faith, absence of findings on specificparticipation and/or liability, and limiting the no-strike provision to economic strikes.

Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the strikingworkers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or underminethis authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certificationorder is issued .

"One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is iss uedpending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to saythat it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike

is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while thedetermination is being made . Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike islegal can refuse to return to work to their work and cause a standstill on the companyoperations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the managementto fill. Worse, they will also claim payment for work not done, on the ground that they arestill legally employed although actually engaged in the activities inimical to their employer'sinterest. (Emphasis supplied)

"This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the expense of themanagement. Such an unfair situation surely was not contemplated by our labor laws and

cannot be justified under the social justice policy, which is a policy of fairness to both laborand management. Neither can this unseemly arrangement be sustained under the dueprocess clause as the order, if thus interpreted, would be plainly oppressive and arbitrary.

We also wish to point out that an assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary ofLabor automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers, whether or not acorresponding order has been issued by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, the striking workerserred when they continued with their strike alleging absence of a return-to-work order.

Article 264(g) is clear. Once an assumption/certification order is issued, strikes areenjoined, or if one has already taken place, all strikers shall immediately return towork.

The NLRC also gave the following reasons:

1. The strike was staged in violation of the existing CBA provisions on "No Strike/NoLockout Clause " stating that a strike, which is in violation of the terms of the collectivebargaining statement, is illegal, especially when such terms provide for c onclusivearbitration2. Instead of exhausting all the steps provided for in the grievance machinery provided for in the collective bargaining agreement to resolve the dispute amicably andharmoniously within the plant level, UFE went on strike (p. 398, Rollo)

3. The prescribed mandatory cooling-off period and then 7 -day strike and after submissionof the report of strike vote at Nestle's Makati Offices and Muntinlupa and Cabuyao Plantswere not complied with, while no notice of strike was filed by respondents when theystaged the strike at Nestle's Cagayan de Oro Plant

4. In carrying out the strike, coerc ion, force, intimidation, violence with physical injuries,sabotage, and the use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were committedby the respondent officials and members of either UFE or W ATU. It is well-settled that astrike conducted in this manner is illega l (United Seamen's Union vs. DavaoShipowners Association, 20 SCRA 1226). In fact, criminal cases were filed with the MakatiFiscal's Office (p. 402, Rollo).

Thus, the NLRC correctly upheld the illegality of the strikes and the correspondingdismissal of the individual complainants because of their "brazen disregard ofsuccessive lawful orders of then Labor Ministers Blas F. Ople, Augusto Sanchez andLabor Secretary Franklin Drilon dated December 11, 1985, January 30, 1986 andFebruary 4, 1986, respectively, and the cavalier treatment of the provisions of theLabor Code and the return-to-work orders of the Minister (now Secretary) of Laborand Employment, or Articles 264 and 265 (now renumbered Arts. 263 and 264),providing in part as follows:.


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On the alleged lack of jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter Lubaton, NLRC has clarified that thequestion on the legality of strike was properly r esolved by the Labor Arbiter, not onlybecause the question is perfectly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor

Arbiter to adjudicate, but also because the issue was not subsumed by the Order of LaborMinister Sanchez, dated December 23, 1986, certifying the Notice of Strike datedDecember 4, 1986 for compulsory arbitration, further clarifying that the issue of whether ornot the strike staged on September 11, 1987 by UFE and its officials and members wasillegal is a prejudicial question to the issue of whether or not the complainants wereillegally dismissed. We shall not belabor the issue any further.: nad

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED, and the decision of public respondent NLRC,dated November 2, 1988, and its Resolution, dated March 7, 1989, are both AFFIRMED intheir entirety. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

compiled cases- strikes and lockout

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