compiled consti 1 digests

42
1 COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V CAMPOS RUEDA FERNANDO; October 29, 1971 FACTS - Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio CamposRueda, as administrator of the estate of the late EstrellaS o r i a n o Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P161,974.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxesfor the transfer of intangible personal properties in thePhilippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to thetime of her death in 1955.- Rueda’s request for exemption was denied on theground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal toSection 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.- Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decisiond e n y i n g the claim for tax exemption. However,respondent denied this request on the grounds thatthere was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which wasmoreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.- Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreigncountry,' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of theNational Internal Revenue Code, refers to a governmento f that foreign power which, although not ani nternational person in the sense of international law,does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangiblepersonal properties of our citizens not residing therein,o r whose law allows a similar exemption from suchtaxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier shouldhave been recognized by our Government in order toentitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of thelast proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code. ISSUE Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least somuch thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a"foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section122 of the National Internal Revenue Code HELD- Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeal’sRuling. - If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it isrequired in line with Pound's formulation that it be apolitically organized sovereign community independentof outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legallysupreme within its territory, acting through a govern ment functioning under a regime of law.- it is thus a sovereign person with the people composingit viewed as an organized corporate society under agovernment with the legal competence to e x a c t obedience to its commands.- The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupyinga definite territory, politically organized, exercising bymeans of its government its sovereign will over theindividuals within it and maintaining its s e p a r a t e internationa

Upload: nina-cylen-briguera-celestial

Post on 02-Jan-2016

94 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

DESCRIPTION

Preliminary Part

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

1COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V CAMPOS RUEDAFERNANDO; October 29, 1971FACTS- Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio CamposRueda, as administrator of the estate of the late EstrellaS o r i a n o   V d a .   d e   C e r d e i r a , l i a b l e   f o r t h e   s t u n   o f   P 161,974.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxesfor the transfer of intangible personal properties in thePhilippines, the deceased, a Spanish national havingbeen a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to thetime of her death in 1955.-   R u e d a ’ s   r e q u e s t   f o r e x e m p t i o n   w a s   d e n i e d o n   t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e   l a w o f   T a n g i e r   i s   n o t r e c i p r o c a l   t o Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.- Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decisiond e n y i n g t h e c l a i m f o r t a x e x e m p t i o n .   H o w e v e r , respondent denied this request on the grounds thatt h e r e   w a s   n o   r e c i p r o c i t y   [ w i t h   T a n g i e r ,   w h i c h   w a s moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.- Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreigncountry,' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of theNational Internal Revenue Code, refers to a governmento f   t h a t   f o r e i g n   p o w e r   w h i c h ,   a l t h o u g h   n o t   a n international person in the sense of international law,does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangiblepersonal properties of our citizens not residing therein,o r   w h o s e   l a w a l l o w s   a   s i m i l a r   e x e m p t i o n   f r o m   s u c h taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier shouldhave been recognized by our Government in order toentitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of thelast proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code.ISSUEWhether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least somuch thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a"foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section122 of the National Internal Revenue CodeHELD- Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeal’sRuling.- If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it isrequired in line with Pound's formulation that it be apolitically organized sovereign community independentof outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legallys u p r e m e   w i t h i n   i t s   t e r r i t o r y ,   a c t i n g   t h r o u g h   a government functioning under a regime of law.- it is thus a sovereign person with the people composingit viewed as an organized corporate society under ag o v e r n m e n t   w i t h   t h e   l e g a l   c o m p e t e n c e   t o   e x a c t obedience to its commands.- The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupyinga definite territory, politically organized, exercising bymeans of its  government its sovereign will over thei n d i v i d u a l s   w i t h i n   i t   a n d   m a i n t a i n i n g   i t s   s e p a r a t e international personality.- State is a territorial society divided into governmenta n d   s u b j e c t s ,   c l a i m i n g   w i t h i n   i t s   a l l o t t e d   a r e a   a s u p r e m a c y o v e r a l l   o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s .   M o r e o v e r , s i m i l a r l y w o u l d p o i n t   t o   t h e   p o w e r   e n t r u s t e d   t o   i t s g o v e r n m e n t   t o   m a i n t a i n   w i t h i n   i t s  t e r r i t o r y   t h e conditions of a legal order and to enter into internationalr e l a t i o n s .   W i t h   t h e   l a t t e r   r e q u i s i t e   s a t i s f i e d , international law does not exact independence as acondition of statehood.- Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can beno doubt that California as a state in the American Unionwas lacking in the alleged requisite of internationalpersonality. Nonetheless, it  was held to be a foreignc o u n t r y   w i t h i n   t h e m e a n i n g   o f   S e c t i o n   1 2 2 o f   t h e National Internal Revenue Code.- This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even at i n y   p r i n c i p a l i t y ,   t h a t   o f   L i e c h t e n s t e i n ,   h a r d l y   a n international personality in the traditional sense, did fallunder this exempt category.

2UNITED STATES V DORRLADD; May 19, 1903FACTS The defendants, Fred Dorr et al., have been convictedupon a  complaint charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libelagainst the

Page 2: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

Government of the United States or theI n s u l a r   G o v e r n m e n t   o f   t h e   P h i l i p p i n e   I s l a n d s .   T h e complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of theCommission7.T h e a l l e g e d   l i b e l   w a s p u b l i s h e d   a s   a n editorial in the issue of “Manila Freedom” of April 6,1902. Virulent attacks on the Civil Commission and itsmembers, for instance the appointment of one Tecson as justice of the peace and the branding of Trinidad H.P a r d o   d e   T a v e r a   a s   a   c o w a r d   a n d   a   r a s c a l ,   w e r e explicitly raised among others. Hence, this appeal.ISSUES1.W h a t i s m e a n t i n s e c t i o n 8 o f A c t N o . 2 9 2 b y t h e expression “the InsularGovernment of the Philippines”?82. Whether the article constitutes an offense undersection 8 of Act No. 292?HELD1. Ratio The term “government” as employed in ActNo. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission isu s e d   i n   t h e   a b s t r a c t   s e n s e   o f   t h e   e x i s t i n g   p o l i t i c a l system as distinguished from the concrete organism of t h e G o v e r n m e n t   –   t h e H o u s e s   o f   C o n g r e s s   a n d t h e Executive.Reasoning There are two admissible meanings of thet e r m   “ g o v e r n m e n t ”   p r o v i d e d :   a .   i n   a   g e n e r a l   a n d abstract sense, the existing laws and institutions of theIslands, or b. the aggregate of the individuals by whomthe Government of the Islands is, for the time being,administered.  The first admissible definition is derivedfrom the act of (the U.S.) Congress on July 14, 1798,commonly known as the Sedition Act)92.Ratio The publication of an article can not bep u n i s h e d   u n d e r   A c t   N o .   2 9 2   o f   t h e   U n i t e d   S t a t e s Philippine Commission as having seditious tendenciesunless it has a tendency to produce disaffection or a feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal tothe Government and obedient to its laws.- The publication of an article abusive of  the UnitedStates Philippine Commission and its members is not alibel upon the Government and does not fall within saidAct No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission.Reasoning The article in question contains no attackupon the government system of the U.S., and thoughgrossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains noa t t a c k   u p o n   t h e   g o v e r n m e n t a l   s y s t e m   b y   w h i c h a u t h o r i t y o f   t h e   U . S .   i s   e n f o r c e d   i n   t h e s e   I s l a n d s . Furthermore, it is the character of the men who areintrusted with the administration of the government thatt h e   w r i t e r   i s   s e e k i n g   t o   b r i n g   i n t o   d i s r e p u t e   b y i m p u g n i n g   t h e   p u r i t y   o f  t h e i r   m o t i v e s ,   t h e i r   p u b l i c integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the article therefore, nos e d i t i o u s   t e n d e n c y   b e i n g   a p p a r e n t ,   c o n s t i t u t e s   n o offense under section 8 of Act No. 292)

Dispositive The judgment of conviction is reversed andthe defendants are acquitted.

Page 3: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

375 phil. 113, September 27, 1945CO KIM CHAM vs. ESEBEUIO VALDEZ TAN KEH

FACTS:

Co Kim Cham had a pending case that was filed during the period of Japanese occupation. He filed a petition of Mandamus, in which he is requesting for the judge of the lower court to continue the proceedings in the Court of First Instance in Manila. But Judge Arsenio P. Dizon refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings of the said case since the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas MacArthur invalidating and nullifying the judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines, in the absence of an enabling law, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts while the government is under the occupation of the Japanese.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid.

2. Whether or not the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur in which he declared “that all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines are null and void” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts.

RULLING:

1. YES. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The government, during the Japanese occupation being de facto government, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, are remain valid after reoccupation of a territory.

2. NO. The proclamation does not invalidate the judgement and judicial proceedings. And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,1898, said in part: "Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the supervision of the American Commander in Chief."

4Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. PunoFacts:Petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) on June 201980 taking his oath on November 29 1982. On January 17 1983, the CA wasreorganized into the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to BP 129 “An Actreorganizing the Judiciary…” which appointed petitioner as an appellate justice in theIAC, to which he accepted ceasing him to be a member of the Judiciary. After the EDSArevolution in February 1986 brought the

Page 4: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

reorganization of the entire governmentincluding the IAC, which was issued through EO No. 33 by President Aquino exercisinghis legislative powers. The Screening Committee then recommended the return of  petitioner as associate justice of the new CA assigning him to be ranked number eleven(11), however when the appointments were signed his ranked changed to number twenty-six (26). Petitioner now seeks the correction claiming that his transfer from AssociateJustice to a ministry of justice and now his recent reappointment did not adversely affecthis ranking in the CA. The Courten bancgranted the correction of his seniority, whichwas challenged via motion for reconsideration by Associate Justices Campos andJavellana contending that the present CA is a new court, neither can petitioner claim thathe was returning to a former court for the courts where he had previously been appointedhas already ceased to exist. They also further allege that petitioner submitted the requestto the wrong party as it was supposed to be addressed to the President, and since hisrequest was not approved, the Supreme Court should respect the President’s decision.Issue:W/N the CA is a new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniorityenjoyed by petitioner?W/N the CA is merely a continuation of the CA and IAC?Held:The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC existing prior to EO No. 33 for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government. At the time of the issuance of EO No. 33, PresidentAquino was still exercising the powers of a revolutionary government, encompassing both executive and legislative powers, such that she could, if she desired, amend, modifyor repeal any part of BP 129 or her own EO No. 33.5

6THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant.G.R. No. L-36409, October 26, 1973

Facts: The defendant-appelant bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Soon after, she demolished the house and built another one in its place without even securing a building permit. For the reason that one of the assistants in the City’s Mayor Office as well as her neighbors in the area told her that such permit was not necessary for the construction of the house. Conversely, she was then indicted by the City Engineer’s Office for the violation of the Municipal Ordinance No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was later on found guilty in the violation thereof by the lower court. However, she appealed and argued that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country.Issue: Is the Municipal Ordinance No. 14 Series of 1964 enforceable within the US Naval Base?Held: Yes. The Philippine Government has not renounced its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or deprived itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. Thus, as stated in the Military Bases Agreement, the Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. It should be noted that within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be validly exercised. Therefore, any residual authority and therein conferred, whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien country.

7LEE HONG HOK V DAVID

Page 5: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

FERNANDO; December 27, 1972FACTS- Pedro, Simeon, Rosita and Leoncio LEE HONG HOK,petitioners- Aniano DAVID, the Hon. Secretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources, the Director of Lands and Court of  Appeals- APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of  Appeals.- Petitioners wanted to declare null and void David’s Torrens Title (OCT No. 510) because they alleged to ownthe disputedlot(226 m22Lot 2892, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre) throughaccretion.- Jun 18, 1958 – Director of Lands issued David a sales patent of the lot- Aug 26, 1959 – Undersecretary of Agricultural andNatural Resources issued David a Miscellaneous SalesPatent No. V-1209- O c t 2 1 , 1 9 5 9 – N a g a C i t y R e g i s t e r o f D e e d s i s s u e d David OCT No. 510 ISSUES1. WON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamationb u t b yaccretion,   t h e r e f o r e a   p r i v a t e   –   n o t p u b l i c - domain (this court says it does not warrant any furtherconsideration)2. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a partyother than the government to dispute the validity of agrant (this court says it does)3. WON the indefeasible character of a public landpatent after one year should not  be recognized (thiscourt says it should be).HELD1.Imperiumis the government authority possessed bythe state which is appropriately embraced in the conceptof sovereignty, anddominiumis the state’s capacity toown or acquire property. Dominium enables the state toprovide for the exploitation and use of lands and othernatural resources, including their disposition, except aslimited by the Constitution. The present Constitutionadopts the modified concept of  jure regalia, in which alllands – in Spain and its earlier decrees – were held by the Crown, and the present Constitution holds that it isthe state which possesses ownership (Cariño v InsularGovernment).  In Valenton v Murciano (1904), all   landsheld without proper and true deeds of grant be restoredto us (the Spanish state) according as they belong to us,in order that after reserving before all what to us or too u r   v i c e r o y s ,   a u d i e n c i a s ,   a n d   g o v e r n o r s   m a y   s e e m n e c e s s a r y   f o r   p u b l i c  s q u a r e s ,   w a y s ,   p a s t u r e s   a n d commons in those places which are peopled, taking intoconsideration not only their present condition, but alsot h e i r   f u t u r e   a n d   t h e i r   p r o b a b l e   i n c r e a s e ,   a n d   a f t e r distributing to the natives what may be necessary fortillage and pasturage, confirming in them in what theynow have and giving them more if necessary, all the restof said lands may remain free and unencumbered for usto dispose of as we may wish.In Montano v Insular Government, unappropriatedpublic lands constituting the public domain the solepower is vested in Congress. The land in question is not private property; the Directorof Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources have always sustained the public characterthereof by virtue of reclamation (and not by accretion which the petitioners claim).Therefore, the only remedy for the appellants is ana c t i o n   f o r   r e c o n v e y a n c e   o n   t h e   g r o u n d   o f   f r a u d committed by respondents.There was no fraud; everything was done in the open –notices were published, sale and awarding of land toDavid were public official acts of a Government officer.T h e   d i s p u t e d   l o t   i s   a   r e s u l t   o f   r e c l a m a t i o n , therefore a public land.

Page 6: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

2. Only the government, represented by the Director of L a n d s ,   o r   t h e   S e c r e t a r y   o f   A g r i c u l t u r e   a n d   N a t u r a l R e s o u r c e s ,   c a n   b r i n g   a n  a c t i o n   t o   c a n c e l   a   v o i d certificate of tit le issued pursuant to a void patent.P l a i n t i f f s   a r e   p r i v a t e   p a r t i e s   a n d   n o t   g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s ,   a n d  t h e r e f o r e   c a n n o t   i n s t i t u t e   f o r   t h e nullification of David’s Torrens Title, since they are notthe registered owners of the land and they had not beendeclared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of NagaCadastre after claiming it as their private property.Maninang v Consolacion states that “[t]he fact that theg r a n t   w a s m a d e   b y   t h e   g o v e r n m e n t   i s   u n d i s p u t e d . Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or notis a question which the government may raise, but until i t i s   r a i s e d b y   t h e g o v e r n m e n t   a n d s e t   a s i d e , t h e d e f e n d a n t   ( i n   t h i s   c a s e ,   t h e   r e s p o n d e n t s )   c a n n o t q u e s t i o n   i t . T h e   l e g a l i t y   o f t h e   g r a n t   i s a   q u e s t i o n between the grantee and the government.”Only the government can question the validity of the title which it gave.3. Since the filing of the sales application of David andd u r i n g   a l l   t h e   p r o c e e d i n g s   i n   c o n n e c t i o n   w i t h   s a i d application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patenti n   h i s f a v o r ,t h e a p p e l l a n t s d i d   n o t p u t   u p   a n y opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal tothem because after the registration and issuance of thecertificate and duplicate certificate of tit le based on ap u b l i c   l a n d   p a t e n t ,   t h e   l a n d   c o v e r e d   t h e r e b y automatically comes under the operation of RA 496subject to all the safeguards provided therein. After registration and issuance of the certificate and d u p l i c a t e   c e r t i f i c a t e   o f   t i t l e   b a s e d   o n   a   p u b l i c   l a n d    patent, the land is automatically covered by RA 496 ---R A 4 9 6 § 4 8says that any question concerning thevalidity of the certificate of tit le based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuanceof the patent. Thereafter the certificate of tit le based thereon becomes indefeasible.I n A q u i n o v   D i r e c t o r o f   L a n d s   ( 1 9 1 9 ) ,   “ [ t ] h e proceedings under the Land Registration Law and underthe provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law arethe same in that both are against the whole world, bothtake the nature of judicial proceedings, and for boththedecree of registration issued is conclusive andfinal.In Cabacug v Lao, “a holder of a land acquired under afree patent is more favorably situated than that of anowner of registered property. Not only does a free patenthave a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in additionthe person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favorthe right to repurchase within a period of five years.”David’s application was a renewal of his deceased wife’sapplication, wherein his deceased wife occupied Lot2892 since 1938.The decision of Court of Appeals of January 31,1961 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 areaffirmed

8

WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ET. AL vs.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNALREVENUEFACTS:Petitioner Reagan, a civilian employeeof an American corporation providing technicala s s i s t a n c e   t o   t h e   U S   A i r   F o r c e   i n   t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ,  q u e s t i o n e d   t h e   p a y m e n t   o f   t h e income tax assessed on him by respondent CIRon an amount realized by him on a sale of hisa u t o m o b i l e   t o   a   m e m b e r   o f   t h e   U S   M a r i n e Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is hiscontention, that in legal contemplation the salew a s   m a d e   o u t s i d e   P h i l i p p i n e   t e r r i t o r y   a n d therefore beyond our jurisdictional power totax. He seeks that an amount of P2,979.00 asthe income tax paid by him be refunded.I S S U E :   W O N   t h e   C l a r k   F i e l d   A i r   B a s e   i s   a foreign property therefore excluded from thepower of Philippine taxation.HELD: NO.By the [Military Bases] Agreement, itshould be noted, the Philippine Governmentm e r e l y   c o n s e n t s   t h a t   t h e   U n i t e d  

Page 7: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

S t a t e s e x e r c i s e   j u r i s d i c t i o n   i n   c e r t a i n   c a s e s .   T h e c o n s e n t   w a s   g i v e n  p u r e l y   a s   a   m a t t e r   o f   comity, courtesy, or expediency over the basesas part of the Philippine territory or divesteditself  completely of jurisdiction over offensescommitted therein. This provision is not andcan not on principle or authority be construedas a limitation upon the rights of the PhilippineGovernment.T h e   S t a t e   i s   n o t   p r e c l u d e d   f r o m allowing another power to participate in thee x e r c i s e   o f   j u r i s d i c t i o n a l   r i g h t   o v e r   c e r t a i n portions of its territory. If it does so, it by nom e a n s   f o l l o w s   t h a t   s u c h   a r e a s   b e c o m e impressed with an alien character. They retaintheir status as native soil. They are still subjectt o   i t s   a u t h o r i t y .   I t s   j u r i s d i c t i o n   m a y   b e diminished, but it does not disappear. So it isw i t h   t h e b a s e s u n d e r   l e a s e   t o   t h e A m e r i c a n armed forces by virtue of the military basesagreement of 1947. They are not and cannotbe foreign territory.9

Republic vs. Nolasco

FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman.  He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England.  After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months.  It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique.  They got married in January 1982.  Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province.  In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left.  Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s whereabouts.  He did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to London.  He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned.  Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?

HELD: 

The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract.  More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.

10

G.R. No. L-41299 February 21, 1983 (120 SCRA 707)

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, DAVID B. CRUZ, SOCORRO CONCIO CRUZ, and LORNA C. CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Page 8: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

Sometime in March, 1963 the spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz, applied and granted a real estate loan by the SSS with residential lot located at Pateros, Rizal as collateral. The spouses Cruz complied with their monthly payments. When delayed were incurred in their monthly payments SSS filed a petition for foreclosure of their real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the ground that the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment, Pursuant for these application for foreclosure notices were published on the second notice the counsel for spouses Cruz sent a letter to SSS informing the latter that his clients are up to date in their payment of the monthly amortization and the SSS should discontinued the publication of the notices of foreclosure. This request remain unheard, these spouses Cruz filed an action for damages against SSS before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its immunity from suit being an agency of the government performing government function. The trial court and court of appeals nevertheless awarded damages in favor of spouses Cruz which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SSS can invoke immunity from suit

HELD:

No. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued for damages. The SSS does not enjoy immunity from suit by express statutory consent.

It has corporate power separate and distinct from the government. SSS own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in court. These words “sue and be sued” embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental function, by virtue of the explicit provision of the afore cited enabling law, the government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability that statutory law has given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the court; subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

Moreover, as found by both the Trial and Appellate Courts, there was clear negligence on the part of SSS when they mistook the loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that of private respondent Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was called to the error, but it adamantly refused to acknowledge its mistake. The SSS can be held liable for nominal damages. This type of damages is not for the purpose of indemnifying private respondents for any loss suffered by them but to vindicate or recognize their rights which have been violated or invaded by petitioner SSS.

11

EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar (Consti1)

Second Division

Buena, March 16, 2001

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Justice and Equity

Facts:

Page 9: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development Corporation, intiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway in Pasig

The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units

By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG, Ciper, Septa, Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction, World Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders, and De Leon Araneta Construction for the construction of the housing units

Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each housing unit"

Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the completion of the housing units despite the fact that there was only a verbal promise, and not a written contract, by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds will be available and forthcoming

Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5,918,315.63

Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst. Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on quantum meruit (what one has earned) and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA)

In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December 20, 1994, the amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of the petitioners' money claims under Advise of Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303

In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims to the DPWH

In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money claims

Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and attorney's fees.

Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997

Issue:

Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners and then Undersecretary Canlas should be upheld

Whether or not the State is immune from suit

Holding:

Yes.

No.

Ratio:

While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are void, in view of violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and lack of legal requirements, it still finds merit in the instant petition

Page 10: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express declaration or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality

"in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated is upheld, applying the principle of quantum meruit

Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their compensation; even the DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment of the money claims

2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions.

The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice

Petition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside.

12Republic vs. Sandoval220 SCRA 124, March 19, 1993

FactsThe Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) headed by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems

and demands to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) concerning genuine agrarian reform. Meetings were held between the two parties, however, MAR advised KMP to wait for the ratification of the 1987 constitution and allow the government to implement the comprehensive land reform program. KMP decided to march to Malacañang to air their demands. Tadeo talked to the press that there will be bloodshed if they were not allowed to pass through Mendiola. In anticipation of the disturbance, Oplan Yellow was put into effect wherein the anti-riot forces were assembled. The clash, then, occurred between the two parties which resulted in the death of 12 marchers, 39 were wounded with gunshots, and 12 sustained minor injuries. Three of the police and military personnel sustained gunshot wound and 20 suffered minor physical injuries. President Aquino created the Citizen’s Mendiola Commission tasked to investigate the disorders, deaths and casualties that took place. From the result of the investigation, there were several recommendations and suggestions from the commission. One of the recommendations is that the deceased and the wounded victims of the Mendiola incident be compensated by the government. Thus, the petitioners (KMP’s heir of the deceased together with the injured members) filed a case for the compensation from the government. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines together with the military officers implead as defendants of the court and filed petition for certiorari.

IssueWhether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit

RulingThis is not a suit against the State with its consent. The recommendation made by the

Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit. This Court has also pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority.

The general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent; it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The state cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court.

The instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

Page 11: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

13

Shauf v. Court of Appeals(191 SCRA 713), November 27, 1990

Facts:

Petitioner Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is qualified. She had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the said Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four (4) years at the time that she applied for the same position in 1976. Her application was forwarded to Anthony Persi, an Education Director, who by then had some reservations regarding Shauf’s work experience. Persi requested the Civilian Personnel Office to initiate immediate inquiry to the Central Overseas Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Persi was informed by CORRO that an Edward Isakson was selected for the position. By the reason of her non-selection to the position, Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity complain against the respondents for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex and nationality. RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. The defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies and the case should be dismissed. CA reversed the RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit. Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity and this is not a suit against the US government which would require consent and the respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal and unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines and is not part of international law.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces.

Ruling: No, they are not immune. As expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the State may not be sued without its consent. This is a generally accepted principle of international law under Art. II, Sec. 2. The case may be taken as a suit against the US since the damages to Shauf will be taken from funds of the US. However, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the course of their duties. The unauthorized acts of the government officials are not acts of the State. The respondents are being sued in their private and personal capacity.

14

JUSMAG vs. NLRC (Art. XVI Sec. 3) G.R. No. 108813 December 15, 1994

Facts:

Private respondent (Florencio Sacramento)) was one of the 74 security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at the petitioner (Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Philippines (JUSMAG- Philippines)). He had been with petitioner from 1969-1992. When dismissed, private respondent held the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG Phils. - Filipino Civilian Employees Association (JPFCEA), a labor organization duly registered with DOLE. Respondent’s services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position and filed complaint w/ DOLE on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by petitioner.

Page 12: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

Respondent asked for reinstatement. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the suit invoking “immunity from suit”. Labor arbiter Cueto in an Order dismissed the complaint "for want of jurisdiction". Respondent appealed to NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and the latter reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter and held that petitioner had lost its right not to be sued because (1) the principle of estoppels -that petitioner failed to refute the existence of employer- employee relationship (2) petitioner has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired the services of private respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not, petitioner has immunity from suit.

Held:

YES. When petitioner took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement between the Philippines and America. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against petitioner cannot prosper. Take note that according to Article XVI Sec 3 of the Phil. Constitution, “a suit against the State by a citizen is a suit against the rest of the people represented by their common government”. Moreover, immunity of State from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of international law that the Philippines recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. Immunity is commonly understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state and anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habeat imperium (an equal has no power over an equal). Lastly, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities and does not extend to commercial, private and proprietary acts.

Hence, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.

15

G.R. No. 142396. February 11,2003KHOSROW MINUCHERvs.HON.COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHURSCALZOFACTS:Sometime in May 1986, an Information forviolation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425,otherwise also known as the “Dangerous DrugsA c t   o f   1 9 7 2 , ”   w a s   f i l e d   a g a i n s t   p e t i t i o n e r Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian.T h e   c r i m i n a l   c h a r g e   f o l l o w e d   a   “ b u y - b u s t operation” conducted by the Philippine policenarcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, ap r o h i b i t e d   d r u g ,   w a s   s a i d   t o   h a v e   b e e n seized. The narcotic agents were accompaniedb y   p r i v a t e   r e s p o n d e n t   A r t h u r   S c a l z o   w h o w o u l d ,   i n   d u e  t i m e ,   b e c o m e   o n e   o f   t h e principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrinor e n d e r e d   a   d e c i s i o n   a c q u i t t i n g   t h e   t w o accused.I S S U E :   W O N  r e s p o n d e n t   S c a l z o   c a n   i n v o k e immunity from suit.HELD: YES.The doctrine of immunity from suit will notapply and may not be invoked where the publicofficial is being sued in his private and personalcapacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment theya r e   s u e d   i n   t h e i r   i n d i v i d u a l   c a p a c i t y . T h i s situation usually arises where the public officiala c t s   w i t h o u t   a u t h o r i t y   o r   i n   e x c e s s   o f   t h e powers vested in himA   f o r e i g n   a g e n t ,   o p e r a t i n g   w i t h i n   a territory, can be cloaked with immunity fromsuit but only as long as it can be established t h a t h e i s a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e d i r e c t i v e s o f t h e sending state. The consent of the host state isan indispensable requirement of basic

Page 13: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

courtesybetween the two sovereigns.The job description of Scalzo has taskedhim to conduct surveillance on suspected drugs u p p l i e r s   a n d ,   a f t e r   h a v i n g   a s c e r t a i n e d   t h e target, to inform local law enforcers who wouldt h e n   b e   e x p e c t e d   t o   m a k e   t h e   a r r e s t . I n conducting surveillance activities on Minucher,l a t e r   a c t i n g   a s   t h e   p o s e u r - b u y e r   d u r i n g   t h e b u y -b u s t   o p e r a t i o n ,   a n d   t h e n   b e c o m i n g   a principal witness in the criminal case againstMinucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official functionor duties.All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of theU n i t e d   S t a t e s   D r u g   E n f o r c e m e n t   A g e n c y a l l o w e d   b y   t h e   P h i l i p p i n e  g o v e r n m e n t   t o conduct activities in the country to help containthe problem on the drug traffic, isentitled tothe defense of state immunity from suit.16

G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HISEXCELLENCY AMBASSADORSOERATMIN, and MINISTERCOUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIMvs.  JAMES VINZON, doing businessunder the name and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICESFACTS:P e t i t i o n e r ,   R e p u b l i c   o f   I n d o n e s i a , represented by its Counsellor entered into aM a i n t e n a n c e   A g r e e m e n t   w i t h   r e s p o n d e n t J a m e s   V i n z o n ,   o w n e r   o f  V i n z o n   T r a d e   a n d Services. The Maintenance Agreement statedt h a t   r e s p o n d e n t   s h a l l ,   f o r   a   c o n s i d e r a t i o n , maintain specified equipment at the EmbassyMain Building, Embassy Annex Building and theWisma Duta, the official residence of petitionerA m b a s s a d o r   S o e r a t m i n .   T h e   e q u i p m e n t covered by the Maintenance Agreement are airconditioning units, generator sets, electricalf a c i l i t i e s ,   w a t e r   h e a t e r s ,   a n d   w a t e r m o t o r pumps. It is l ikewise stated therein that thea g r e e m e n t   s h a l l   b e   e f f e c t i v e   f o r   a   p e r i o d o f   four years and will renew itself automaticallyunless cancelled by either party by giving thirtyd a y s   p r i o r   w r i t t e n   n o t i c e   f r o m   t h e   d a t e   o f   expiry.Petitioners claim that sometime prior tothe date of expiration of the said agreement,o r   b e f o r e   A u g u s t   1 9 9 9 ,   t h e y   i n f o r m e d respondent that the renewal of the agreementshall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief o f   A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .   W h e n   t h e   C h i e f   o f   A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a s s u m e d   h i s   p o s i t i o n ,   h e allegedly found respondent’s work and servicesunsatisfactory and not in compliance with thes t a n d a r d s   i n   t h e   A g r e e m e n t .   H e n c e ,   t h e I n d o n e s i a n   E m b a s s y  t e r m i n a t e d   t h e a g r e e m e n t .   P e t i t i o n e r s   c l a i m ,   t h a t   t h e y   h a d earlier verbally informed respondent of theirdecision to terminate the agreement.On the other hand, respondent claims thatt h e   a f o r e s a i d   t e r m i n a t i o n   w a s   a r b i t r a r y   a n d unlawful. Hence, he fi led a complaint againstt h e   p e t i t i o n e r s   w h i c h   o p p o s e d   b y   i n v o k i n g immunity from suit.I S S U E :   W O N   t h e   R e p u b l i c   o f   I n d o n e s i a   c a n successfully invoke state immunity from suit.HELD: YES.T h e r e   i s   n o   d i s p u t e   t h a t   t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t   o f   a  d i p l o m a t i c   m i s s i o n   i s   a n act  jure imperii .   A   s o v e r e i g n   S t a t e   d o e s   n o t m e r e l y   e s t a b l i s h   a   d i p l o m a t i c   m i s s i o n   a n d l e a v e   i t  a t   t h a t ;   t h e   e s t a b l i s h m e n t   o f   a d i p l o m a t i c   m i s s i o n   e n c o m p as s e s   i t s m a i n t e n a n c e   a n d   u p k e e p .   H e n c e ,   t h e   S t a t e may enter into contracts with private entitiest o   m a i n t a i n   t h e   p r e m i s e s ,   f u r n i s h i n g s   a n d e q u i p m e n t   o f   t h e  e m b a s s y   a n d   t h e   l i v i n g q u a r t e r s   o f   i t s   a g e n t s   a n d   o f f i c i a l s . I t   i s t h e r e f o r e   c l e a r   t h a t   p e t i t i o n e r   R e p u b l i c   o f   Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereigna c t i v i t y w h e n i t e n t e r e d i n t o a c o n t r a c t w i t h respondent for the upkeep or maintenance.The Solicitor General, in his Comment,s u b m i t s   t h e   v i e w   t h a t ,   “ t h e   M a i n t e n a n c e Agreement was entered into by

Page 14: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmentalfunctions. In such a case, it cannot be deemedto have waived its immunity from suit.”

17

18

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUDGE VICENTE A. HIDALGO,Presiding Judge of the RegionalTrial Court of Manila, Branch 37FACTS:Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an actionfor the annulment or declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/orr e c o v e r y   o f   o w n e r s h i p   a n d   p o s s e s s i o n   a p r o p e r t y   a g a i n s t  t h e   R e p u b l i c   o f   t h e Philippinesin the RTC of Manila.I t   i s   a l s o   k n o w n   a s   t h e Arlegui Residencew h i c h   h o u s e d   t w o   P h i l i p p i n e presidents and which now holds the Office of the Press Secretary and the News InformationBureau.The case was initially dismissed by thepresiding Judge of the Manila RTC (Branch 35)on the ground of state immunity. The case wasre-raffled to the Manila RTC (Branch 37), withr e s p o n d e n t   V i c e n t e   A .   H i d a l g o   a s   p r e s i d i n g Judge. In an Order, Judge Hidalgo declared theR e p u b l i c   i n   d e f a u l t   f o r   f a i l u r e   o f   S o l i c i t o r G a b r i e l   F r a n c i s c o  R a m i r e z ,   t h e   h a n d l i n g solicitor, to file the required Answer within theperiod prayed for in his motion for extension.I t   i s   c o n t e n d e d t h a t   t h e   r e s p o n d e n t J u d g e   v i o l a t e d   t h e   C o n s t i t u t i o n   a n d   t h e fundamental rule that government funds areexempt from execution or garnishment whenhe caused the issuance of the writ of executionagainst the Republic.ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke immunityfrom suit.HELD:It is settled that when the State givesi t s c o n s e n t t o   b e s u e d , i t   d o e s   n o t t h e r e b y n e c e s s a r i l y   c o n s e n t   t o   a n   u n r e s t r a i n e d execution against it. Tersely put, when theState waives its immunity, all it does, in effect,i s t o g i v e t h e o t h e r p a r t y a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o prove, if it can, that the state has a liability.T h e   f u n c t i o n s   a n d   p u b l i c   s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d   b y   t h e S t a t e   c a n n o t   b e   a l l o w e d   t o p a r a l y z e d   o r   d i s r u p t e d   b y   t h e   d i v e r s i o n   o f   public funds from their legitimate and specificobjects, as appropriated by law

19

CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA,petitioners,v.HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, ALBERTO A.CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, and DELFINA HERNANDEZSANTIAGO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB),respondents. G.R. No. 107271; September 10, 2003 CORONA,J.: FACTS: I

Page 15: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

n 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed thelegality of the abolition. The CFIin 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all thedismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Governmentappealed the decision but such was dismissed.In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partialpayment of her back-wages. The others were paid in full.In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago.The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000.The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle;properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directedthe sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago asback-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check butthe City Treasurer can¶t do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocancorresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the CityTreasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liablefor any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city.ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago¶s claim. HELD: Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subjectto his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third personor garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited inthe PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not besubject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Eventhough the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is atliberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgmentsrecovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final andmake provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-definedexception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law.In such a case, themonetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocanalready approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14for Santiago¶s back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgmentof the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.

20

PHILIPPINE AGILA SATTELITE INC. (PASI) VS. LICHAUCO

Page 16: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

G.R. NO. 142362, MAY 3, 2006

CONSTI LAW (SECTION 13, ARTICLE 7 - IMMUNITY AGAINST SUIT)

FACTS

Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly organized corporation, whose President and Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. The Philippine government, through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to secure from the International Telecommunication Union the required orbital slots and frequency assignments for the Philippine satellite.

The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International Telecommunication Union two orbital slots, designated as 161º East Longitude and 153º East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites. Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter confirming “the Philippine Government’s assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its satellites.”

PASI averred that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly “embarked on a crusade to malign the name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.”

Aggrieved by Lichauco’s actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted a civil complaint against Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC. The complaint, alleging three causes of action, was for injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages.

The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged “crusade” to malign the name of plaintiff De Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.

ISSUE

Is the suit one against the state?

RULING

The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen that would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although the latter has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his duties.

As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction against her performing any act in relation to orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one for declaration of nullity of award, seeking to nullify the alleged award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude; and one for damages against Lichauco herself.

Page 17: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of the government will result in a charge against or financial liability to the government that the complaint must be regarded as a suit against the State itself. However, the distinction must also be raised between where the government official concerned performs an act in his/her official and jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party- defendant or respondent.

As to the first two causes of action, the Court ruled that the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case.

The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals states: “While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.”

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.: “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

21

GR No. 169304 March 13, 2007

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT,USEC. MA. MARGARITA GALON and USEC. ANTONIO M. LOPEZ, petitionersvsPHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC., respondent

Facts:

Page 18: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the Philippines. The Secretary of Health issued an Administrative Order (A.O) No. 27 outlining the guidelines in the accreditation of gov't suppliers for pharmaceutical products. It was amended by A.O No. 10 providing for additional guidelines for accreditation ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner. Respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million unit vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent’s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. Only two companies participated, with respondent submitting the lower bid. In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondent’s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to the other company. Respondent filed a complaint injunction, mandamus and damages against DOH.

Issue:

Whether or not DOH can invoke immunity from suit.

Ruling:

No. The doctrine of state immunity is not applicable considering that individual petitioners are being sued both in their official and personal capacities, hence, they, not the state, would be liable for damages. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. The defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State

22

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY represented by its SCHOOL’S DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT vs. CELSO OÑATEG.R. No. 161758; June 8, 2007

Facts: The petitioner seeks to reverse the CA’s decision affirming the Legazpi City RTC decision which declares as null and void the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner and directing the latter to return to respondent Celso Oñate the possession of the portion of land occupied by the school site of the Daraga North Central Elementary School.

Issue:WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner may be sued in violation of the state’s immunity from suit.

 Held: 

No, the Court ruled that petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its being privy to the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the disputed property. When it voluntarily gave its consent to the donation, any dispute that may arise from it would necessarily bring petitioner DECS down to the level of an ordinary citizen of the State vulnerable to a suit by an interested or affected party.  It has shed off its mantle of immunity and relinquished and forfeited its armor of non-suability of the State.

Page 19: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

23

PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC., Petitioner, vs. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 155504 June 26, 2009

Facts:

PROVI is an entity engaged in the sale of high technology equipment, information technology products and broadcast devices, including the supply of plastic card printing and security facilities. TESDA is an instrumentality of the government established under (R.A.) No. 7796 and attached to DOLE. To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-printed certification and/or identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards to trainees who have passed the certification process. TESDA’s Pre-Qualification Bids Award Committee (PBAC) conducted two (2) public for the printing and encoding of PVC cards. A failure of bidding resulted in both instances since only two bidders, PROVI and Sirex Phils. Corp. submitted proposals. Due to the failed bidding, the PBAC recommended that TESDA enter into a negotiated contract with PROVI. TESDA and PROVI signed and executed their "Contract Agreement Project: PVC ID Card Issuance" (the Contract Agreement) for the provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of PVC cards. TESDA would pay PROVI the amount of P39, 475,000 within 15 days after TESDA’s acceptance of the contracted goods and services. On August 24, 2000, TESDA and PROVI executed an "Addendum to the Contract Agreement Project: PVC ID Card Issuance". TESDA in turn undertook to pay PROVI thirty percent (30%) of the total cost of the supplies within thirty (30) days after receipt and acceptance of the contracted supplies, with the balance payable within thirty (30) days after the initial payment. PROVI further alleged that out of TESDA’s liability of P39,475,000.00, TESDA paid PROVI only P3,739,500.00, leaving an outstanding balance of P35,735,500.00, as evidenced by PROVI’s Statement of Account. PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages against TESDA. PROVI additionally prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment/garnishment against TESDA. TESDA responded by filing a Motion to Discharge/Quash the Writ of Attachment, The RTC denied TESDA’s motion; TESDA filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA to question the RTC orders, The CA set aside the RTC’s orders and subsequently denied PROVI’s motion for reconsideration; hence, the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds, to cover PROVI’s claim against TESDA, is valid

Held/Ruling:

No, because PROVI’s petition lacks merit and therefore, Invalid. TESDA is an instrumentality of the government undertaking governmental functions. R.A. No. 7796 created the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority or TESDA under the declared "policy of the State to provide relevant, accessible, high quality and efficient technical education and skills development in support of the development of high quality Filipino middle-level manpower responsive to and in accordance with Philippine development goals and priorities." Under these terms, both constitutional and statutory, we do not believe that the role and status of TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the government, directly attached to the DOLE through the participation of the Secretary of Labor as its Chairman, for the performance of governmental. It is equipped with both express and implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.

24

G.R. No. 152318 April 16,2009DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜRTECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT,ET. AL. vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.

Page 20: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

FACTS:T h e   g o v e r n m e n t s   o f   t h e   F e d e r a l Republic of Germany and the Republic of thePhilippines ratified an Agreement called SocialH e a l t h   I n s u r a n c e —N e t w o r k i n g   a n d Empowerment (SHINE which was designed to" e n a b l e   P h i l i p p i n e   f a m i l i e s – e s p e c i a l l y   p o o r o n e s – t o   m a i n t a i n   t h e i r   h e a l t h  a n d   s e c u r e h e a l t h   c a r e   o f   s u s t a i n a b l e   q u a l i t y . "   P r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s   w e r e   en g a g e d   a s   c o n t r a c t employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE.Nicolay, a Belgian national, assumedt h e   p o s t   o f   S H I N E   P r o j e c t  M a n a g e r . D i s a g r e e m e n t s   e v e n t u a l l y   a r o s e   b e t w e e n N i c o l a y   a n d   p r i v a t e  r e s p o n d e n t s   i n   m a t t e r s such as proposed salary adjustments, and thec o u r s e   N i c o l a y   w a s   t a k i n g   i n  t h e implementation of SHINE different from herpredecessors.The dispute culminated in a signed bythe private respondents, addressed to Nicolay,a n d   c o p i e s   f u r n i s h e d   o f f i c i a l s   o f   t h e   D O H , Philheath, and the director of the Manila officeof GTZ. The letter raised several  issues whichprivate respondents claim had been brought upseveral times in the past, but have not been given appropriate response.In response, Nicolay wrote each of thep r i v a t e   r e s p o n d e n t s   a   l e t t e r ,   a l l   s i m i l a r l y worded except for their respective addressees.She informed private respondents that  theycould no longer find any reason to stay witht h e   p r o j e c t   u n l e s s   A L L   o f   t h e s e   i s s u e s   b e addressed immediately and appropriately.Under the foregoing premises andcircumstances, it is now imperative that I amto accept your resignation, which I expect toreceive as soon as possible.Negotiations ensued between privaterespondents and Nicolay, but for naught. Eachof the private respondents received a letterf r o m   N i c o l a y ,   i n f o r m i n g   t h e m   o f   t h e   p r e - termination of their contracts of employmento n   t h e   g r o u n d s   o f   " s e r i o u s   a n d  g r o s s i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n ,   a m o n g   o t h e r s ,   r e s u l t i n g   t o loss of confidence and trust."HELD: NO.This self-description of GTZ in its ownofficial website gives further cause for pause ina d o p t i n g   p e t i t i o n e r s ’   a r g u m e n t   t h a t   G T Z   i s entitled to immunity from suit because it is "ani m p l e m e n t i n g   a g e n c y . "   T h e   a b o v e - q u o t e d s t a t e m e n t   d o e s  n o t   d i s p u t e   t h e characterization of GTZ as an "implementingagency of the Federal Republic of Germany,"y e t i t b o l s t e r s t h e n o t i o n t h a t a s a c o m p a n y o r g a n i z e d   u n d e r   p r i v a t e   l a w ,   i t   h a s a   l e g a l personality independent of that of the FederalRepublic of Germany.T h e C o u r t i s t h u s h o l d s a n d s o r u l e s t h a t   G T Z   c o n s i s t e n t l y   h a s   b e e n   u n a b l e   t o e s t a b l i s h   w i t h   s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t   i t   e n j o y s   t h e immunity from suit generally enjoyed by itsp a r e n t   c o u n t r y ,   t h e   F e d e r a l   R e p u b l i c   o f   Germany.

25

G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner, upon receipt from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of a U.S. request for the extradition of the respondent Jimenez, formed a panel of attorneys to evaluate the matter. The same respondent asked the petitioner that he be furnished a copy of the original request and other supporting documents, and be given ample time to comment on them, but was denied. Respondent Jimenez brought it to the RTC where the respondent Lantion ruled in favor of Jimenez. Petitioner has now brought up an instant petition arguing that the RTC’s ruling was in violation of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the U.S.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the evaluation process can be considered a criminal investigation; and if yes,

Page 21: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

2. Whether or not the private respondent’s due process rights to notice and hearing (as provided by Section 14 of the Bill of Rights) during the evaluation proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty?

Ruling: The Court ruled that respondent Jimenez be provided with a copy of the original request and its supporting documents, and be given sufficient time to file his comment with sufficient evidence.

1. Yes. Aside from the fact that it is the DFA’s job to evaluate extradition requests and not the DOJ’s, the evaluation is akin to a criminal investigation because there is impending threat to the prospective extraditee’s liberty.

2. No. The Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the U.S., as well as the latter’s own extradition procedure, are silent regarding the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. And even if there was conflict between them, the doctrine of incorporation states that provisions of international law are only enforceable in a jurisdiction so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the municipal law. It is only natural that the due process rights of notice and hearing govern.

2627IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarilyexercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke suchproclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, theframers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without anyqualification. 

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards

Page 22: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

by Congress and review by the Court. 

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be noappointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

28

Tondo Medical Center Employees Association Vs CA

GR NO 167324

Facts:

DOH launched Health Sector Reform Agenda to reform the local health system. It was formed in order to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals, secure funding for priority public programs, promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance, strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies and expand the National Health Insurance program. However, the petitioners alleged that the implementation of the HSRA had resulted in making free medicine and medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. They alleged that the HSRA is void for being in violation of several constitutional provisions (e.g. Art III Sec 1, Art II Sec 5, Art II Sec, 9, etc.)

EO 102 was the order to redirect the functions and operations of the Department of health which provided for the changes in the roles functions and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed order, DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of being the devolution of basic services to local government units. Petitioners alleged that this EO is in excess of the Presidential Authority.

Issue:

Whether or Not the HSRA and EO no. 102 are unconstitutional

Ruling:

No, HSRA and EO 102 are not unconstitutional. The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners’ allegations that it violates the general principles. The argument that the EO 102 is in excess of the presidential authority due is without basis. Records are devoid of any explanation of how HSRA violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in the Sec 1 Art III of Consti. Petitioners failed to substantiate how the constitutional guarantees were breached and petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition.

With the EO 102, the constitution clearly states that the president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Furthermore, DOH is among the cabinet level departments

Page 23: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

enumerated under the Book IV of the Administrative code mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the president.

29

OPOSA Vs. FACTORAN JR.G.R. No. 101083

FACTS:

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66, National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs herein are all minors, represented by their respective parents. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers’ class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs “are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the national resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical rainforests.” The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource. The minors further asservate that they “represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn.” Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

a. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;b. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber

license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have the cause of action?

RULING:

After a careful examination of the petitioners’ complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for, it bears stressing, however, that in so far as the cancellations of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as the party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

30

SECTION 16: Right to a balanced and healthful ecology

Nota Bene: THIS IS JUST A SUMMARY. Major portions were lifted directly from the case.

Page 24: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

G.R. # 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) , petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,respondents.

FACTS:

Daily garbage dumping operations of the City of Caloocan in Brgy. Camarin, Tala Este, Caloocan City

Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Brgy. Camarin filed a letter of complaint with LLDA seeking to stop the operation of the said open garbage dumpsite due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents as well as the possibility of pollution of water content of the surrounding area

On-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of leachate1 that seeps from said dumpsite reveals that quality of water is indeed affected due to the presence of bacteria, coliform, etc. Because of the results, LLDA issued a cease & desist order to the City Government of Caloocan, MMDA, contractors and other entities to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter in the said dumpsite.

City Gov’t of Caloocan complied, although, after sometime, dumping operations resumed since authorities (City Gov’t of Caloocan, representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA) failed to settle the problem

LLDA issued another order reiterating the Alias cease & desist order. With the assistance of PNP, LLDA enforced the Alias Cease & Desist Order by prohibiting entry of all garbage dump trucks

City Gov’t of Caloocan filed with RTC of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease & desist order with prayer for issuance of writ of injunction. In the complaint, City Gov’t of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health & safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. Judge issued a temporary restraining order enjoining LLDA from enforcing its cease & desist order.

LLDA filed motion to dismiss. Judge Serapio denied LLDA’s motion to dismiss and granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order.

CA dismissed preliminary injunction issued. CA also lifted the cease & desist order to City Gov’t of Caloocan, provided that future dumping of garbage in the said area shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works.

1 “Leachate” – liquid percolated through soil or other medium (Webster’s…)

Page 25: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining order with Supreme Court seeking to nullify the aforesaid order of (RTC’s Serapio) denying its motion to dismiss.

Court issued a temporary restraining order, until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by LLDA; and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Gov’t of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Camarin dumpsite.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exercise of authority of LLDA in the garbage dumping operation in Brgy. Camarin, Caloocan City is constitutional

RULING:

Yes, LLDA has the proper exercise of authority under its charter and amendatory laws. With reference to R.A. 4850 (as amended by P.D. No. 813 and E.O 927 series of 1983) authorizes the LLDA to “make, alter or modify order requiring discontinuance or pollution”. Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction”.

While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressely granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a “cease and desist order” is, perforce, implied.

“The immediate response to the demands of the “necessities of protecting vital public interests” gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 provides that “the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature”, which is a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person. The Philippines is also part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental right.

Temporary restraining order was made PERMANENT enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Gov’t of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Camarin dumpsite.

31

TANO v. SOCRATESFacts:The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of:(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled:" AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"(2) Office Order No. 23,  requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business,trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit isrequired to be had, to obtain first a Mayor’s and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessaryinspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa and,( 3 )   R e s o l u t i o n   N o .   3 3 ,   O r d i n a n c e   N o .   2   e n t i t l e d :   " A   R E S O L U T I O N  

Page 26: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

P R O H I B I T I N G   T H E CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS”T h e p e t i t i o n e r s c o n t e n d   t h a t   t h e   s a i d   O r d i n a n c e s   d e p r i v e d   t h e m   o f   d u e p r o c e s s   o f   l a w ,   t h e i r   livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XIIand Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute authorityto determine whether or not to issue the permit.They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar asthe Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocationand entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their businessendeavors to a successful conclusionPublic respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the ProvincialGovernment's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that there was noviolation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.Issue:Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutionalHeld: NORatio:In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and thepowers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), andunder Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve theexercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.***Sec. 16.General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for itsefficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, amongother things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology , encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliantscientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve thecomfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (emphasis supplied).It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) toestablish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of fiveyears; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.

 It imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniangpanlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penaltiesf o r   a c t s   w h i c h   e n d a n g e r   t h e   e n v i r o n m e n t   s u c h   a s   d y n a m i t e   f i s h i n g   a n d  o t h e r   f o r m s   o f   d e s t r u c t i v e fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers andlakes or of ecological imbalance." The petition is dismissed

32

CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. CaragueG.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

Page 27: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

33

Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)

191 SCRA 288

November 1990

FACTS:

Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products “naphta cracker” and “naphta” to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPC’s application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.

ISSUE:

Page 28: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the investors without considering the national interest

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained.

The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: “.. he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”.

Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.

34

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent

COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

Page 29: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

RULING :No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege

subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some validlimitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidate”.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual.

The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

35

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

Page 30: Compiled Consti 1 DIGESTS

Issue:w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitutionw/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.